
Field-based studies from a variety of disciplines, together with the experiences of practitioners who have worked in a range of post-conflict countries, consistently support the proposition that sustaining peace after civil war requires careful attention to rebuilding local capacities. This includes the ability of fledgling governments to perform core state functions, such as delivering public services, providing security, and administering justice, and the capacity of local communities to rebuild social cohesion and reconcile formerly warring groups at the grassroots. It is also widely understood that post-conflict peacebuilding activities must be based on local priorities and operate through locally familiar modes of public engagement if the desired effects are to be achieved.

However, the other main precondition for the prevention of conflict-recurrence—the timely provision of international technical, diplomatic, and financial assistance—leads in the opposite direction: the imposition of externally determined priorities and reliance on foreign experts, all at the expense of cultivating local talent and strengthening local institutions.

How to overcome this tension is the puzzle at the heart of Susanna P. Campbell’s engaging and deeply researched book Global Governance and Local Peace. It focuses on the case of Burundi, a conflict-prone country with which the author has had a long involvement as a researcher and a consultant. The study covers the period 1999–2014, during which Burundi slipped, more than once, from war to peace to something in between. Campbell’s first hand knowledge of the political dynamics among diplomats, aid bureaucrats, and multilateral officials in Burundi is evident in the quality and nuance of the analysis.

Through a largely qualitative method, the author identifies several examples of externally funded/directed field managers—from representatives of nongovernmental organizations to senior officials in United Nations peacekeeping missions—who successfully freed themselves, at least in part, from the constraining influence of their international bosses. Top international leadership, whether located at the United Nations headquarters in New York or in the capitals of major donor countries, is far removed from the messy realities of the field. Peacebuilders with a commitment to
empowering local people can sometimes develop bottom-up channels of “informal accountability” that amplify the voices of beneficiary groups. Because fledgling national authorities tend to interpose themselves as the arbiters of the “local,” field managers must deploy considerable political skills to successfully reach beyond the narrow (and often highly compromised) section of society represented by post-conflict governments, which in many instances are “transitional” in nature.

Written in Campbell’s accessible prose, the organizational case studies crystallize the practical dilemmas of on-the-ground peacebuilders. Unfortunately, the analytical framework used to classify each organization—labels include “peacebuilding learner” and “microadapter” (p. 54)—is not particularly helpful. Moreover, the evidence for classificatory decisions is sometimes thin as well, resting at times on generalized assessments that a particular organization, under the leadership of a specific individual for a defined period, was notably inclusive or especially willing to listen to client perspectives.

There is also a lack of clarity as to the reasons why a minority of field-based peacebuilders were able to devise effective methods for binding their organization’s actions to the needs of the people they ostensibly served. Could they evade top-down management dictates from headquarters because of the local accountability mechanisms they constructed? Or could feedback systems be built only because of the effective autonomy local officials already enjoyed?

Despite these shortcomings, Campbell’s timely monograph offers a thoughtful account of the ways in which institutional characteristics and political dynamics combine with personal incentives and leadership techniques to create, on rare but significant occasions, a productive synthesis of the global and the local in the service of peace.

ROB JENKINS
Hunter College & The Graduate Center, City University of New York


Despite having a population twice the size and an economy 40 times as large as North Korea’s, South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) consistently loses to the North when it comes to competition for