

When Populists Win: How Populist Success affects Democratic Attitudes in Germany and the UK

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Abstract

Right-wing populism has experienced significant success throughout Western Europe. Yet relatively little attention is paid to the impact of populism's success on the general public. This article addresses this gap, exploring populism's role in shaping democratic attitudes across the non-populist electorate using two recent right-wing, populist successes: the 2017 election of the far-right, populist Alternative for Germany in Germany, and the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK. Leveraging high quality panel data surrounding each event, we reveal citizens experience a decline in democratic satisfaction after a populist win. Although we find lower parliamentary trust in the wake of Brexit, we fail to find either populist win affected vote intentions. Moreover, this democratic decline is not an artefact of losing an election but rather a direct effect of a right-wing, populist win. Consequently, democratic discontent appears to be both a cause and consequence of a populist win.

Keywords: Populism; Democratic satisfaction; Attitudes; United Kingdom; Germany

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Disclosure

The authors report no potential competing interests.

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Data Availability Statement

The data that support the findings of this study are cited in text and openly available online. The British Election Study (BES) panel data can be found here (<https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>); while the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) is hosted through the GESIS Research Institute and can be found here (<https://www.gesis.org/en/elections-home/gles>).

Right-wing populism¹ is an increasingly potent force in Western Europe. A right-wing populist is currently represented in nearly every Western European national parliament — far exceeding expectations of populism’s eventual reach.² Once in government, these populists can actively undermine the bulwarks of liberal constitutionalism, including an independent judiciary, free press, and minority rights (e.g., Diamond 2021; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Even for those few states who have thus far escaped populist parliamentary representation, right-wing populist movements continue to strain democratic traditions and institutions. Although right-wing populists do not sit in the United Kingdom’s (UK) parliament, for one, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) realised considerable success in European Parliament elections. The resulting Brexit referendum too precipitated the resignation of the sitting prime minister and a populist turn by his party; a dramatic crash in the value of the British pound; and a future in doubt for London’s role as a global economic and banking hub. Thus given populism’s fundamental tension with democracy (Rummens 2017), its prevalence presents an existential threat to Western Europe’s democratic societies (Pappas 2019).

The various motivations and characteristics of right-wing populist supporters have been widely studied (Kehrberg 2015; Ivarsflaten 2008), as has the impact of far right party success on mainstream parties and party systems (Allen and Knight-Finley 2019; Meguid 2005; Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). The downstream impact of populist success, however, remains relatively under-explored.³ Critical to this understanding is whether populist wins alter support for democracy among non-populist voters. When populists win, do citizens disengage with democracy, increasing dissatisfaction and lowering political participation (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Karp and Banducci 2008)? Or, given these wins occur through democratic means and procedures, is the societal impact of a populist success overstated (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013; Kriesi 2020; Spittler 2018), failing to meaningfully affect the non-populist public’s democratic attitudes?

This paper answers these questions, specifically addressing the effect of populist wins on popular support for and engagement with democracy. In particular, we consider the impact of two right-wing populist watershed movements in Western Europe: the arrival of the far-right, populist

¹Populism throughout this piece refers solely to right-wing, nativist populist movements.

²Currently, only the national parliaments of Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom (UK) entirely exclude a right-wing populist party membership.

³See Alarian (2020) and Schwartz et al. (2020) for notable exceptions.

Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany, AfD) into Germany's elected parliamentary body (i.e., the Bundestag) in 2017, and the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK. Of the first, Germany's 2017 Federal election witnessed the first national success of a populist party since the country's reunification. Yet the populist AfD was a relative newcomer to the country's political landscape. Forming in 2013 largely as a party targeting intellectuals and Eurosceptics, the party had an unsuccessful showing in their first election, leaving many to predict the party's legacy would be short lived. Change in party leadership, however, shifted the AfD's populist focus: capitalising on populist, protest movements in the East, and solidifying its identity as a far-right, racist, and anti-immigrant populist party. In light of Germany's historical legacy with populist and xenophobic parties, the AfD's electoral success shocked the country and the globe. Not only did the AfD win seats in the Bundestag from the party list (i.e., Germany's second vote), but also from the direct election of AfD constituency candidates (i.e., Germany's first vote). The AfD's success therefore presents a uniquely surprising case — where German voters in three constituencies directly mandated the AfD's entry to parliament despite the cultural and institutional barriers previously thought to keep right-wing populism at bay (Mudde 2007).

Likewise, the Brexit referendum, championed most vocally by the populist, Eurosceptic, and increasingly right-wing UKIP shocked observers both international and domestic and accelerated the populist trends and working class realignment already present in Western Europe (e.g., Iakhnis et al. 2018; Rydgren 2012). Occurring the same year as Donald Trump's surprising presidential victory in the U.S., the Brexit referendum was widely recognised as a similar expression of the nativist, anti-elitist hallmarks of populist movements (Iakhnis et al. 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019). By examining two different types of populist success—the passage of a populist referendum and the surprising success of a populist party—we can assess whether the relationship between populist wins and democratic attitudes is robust across distinct contexts.

Leveraging evidence from panel data surrounding these two events, we find that populist wins correspondingly depress satisfaction with democracy. Controlling for previous satisfaction in the lead up to the election in Germany, non-populists in AfD winning constituencies express greater democratic dissatisfaction than their counterparts in other districts. Moreover, robustness checks reveal this effect is an not artefact of simply losing an election, but rather losing to a right-wing, populist party. Similarly in the UK, democratic satisfaction meaningfully declined among those

who did not vote Leave post-Brexit referendum. Consequently, our findings suggest that populist success might beget further success – amplifying the causes of populist support and decreasing the likelihood that non-populist voters participate in future elections (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Mény et al. 2002; Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers 2013).

Yet these two populist wins vary in their ability to affect another form of democratic engagement: parliamentary trust. In the UK, the Brexit referendum reduced trust in parliamentary representatives. In Germany, however, the AfD failed to affect parliamentary trust. This variation may be due to the nature and electoral structure of these two populist shocks: one a direct election and the other a popular referendum. More simply, while the entrance of the AfD into the Bundestag was certainly shocking, the governing coalition remained. By contrast, Brexit entailed a great deal of uncertainty and poised serious consequences for the UK. Non-leave voters may have had more cause for concern and therefore greater levels of blame to pin on the government who had called for the referendum itself. More positively, neither populist win reduced citizen propensity to vote. Thus together, although right-wing populist wins lead citizens to become less satisfied *with* democracy, they do not push citizens to disengage *from* democracy itself. Given far right populists' adversarial relationship with the political mainstream, and the tensions between populism and liberalism more generally (Canovan 2002), these findings compel political elites to reckon with the widespread democratic disaffection of which populism is both a cause and consequence.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the theoretical relationships between right-wing populism and democratic support. In doing so, we discuss the challenge of right-wing populist success to democracy. Next, we briefly identify and justify our cases, data, and modelling strategy. We present the results for each analysis independently before concluding with a discussion of our results and implications for future research.

Democratic Dissatisfaction: A Populist Cause *and* Consequence?

Consolidated democracy implies—and requires—widespread support for the regime type itself (Linz and Stepan 1996). Likewise, democratic theorists argue that democratisation requires mass political demand for functional democratic institutions (Dalton and Sin 2006; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Indeed, democratic backsliding is also accompanied by declined support for democratic governance and increased support for authoritarian and populist leaders, especially in the context

of domestic and international social and economic pressure (Diamond 2021; Foa and Mounk 2016; Lavrič and Bieber 2021). The continued success of Western Europe's democracies therefore requires ensuring the citizenry is satisfied with democratic rule.

It is for this reason that populists pose a unique challenge to liberal democracy. Populists thrive in periods of increased democratic dissatisfaction, as populism seeks to exploit the gap between the promise and practice of liberal democracy (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). Populist rhetoric contends that an homogeneous 'true people' — often implying a racial or ethnic group— have been betrayed by corrupt elites and their co-conspirators, and that the only solution is a more direct form of democracy through the election of the populist or direct referendum (Jacobs, Akkerman and Zaslove 2018; Van Crombrugge 2020). It therefore stands to reason that individuals who are dissatisfied with democracy would be more likely to endorse the radical remedies articulated by populists. Indeed, this is borne out in survey data, with studies revealing robust relationships between democratic dissatisfaction and initial support for populist parties (Arzheimer 2009; Pauwels 2016; Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers 2013). The populists' best interests, as a result, may be to depress democratic satisfaction and promote distrust in political institutions (Schulte-Cloos and Leininger 2021).

This focus on democratic attitudes as a cause of populist support begs the question: can populism also *change* mass democratic attitudes? With respect to populist supporters, democratic satisfaction has already been shown to be affected by populist success. Paradoxically, the same populist supporters who appear drawn to right-wing populists due to their dissatisfaction with democracy also tend to be more supportive of and satisfied with the specific forms of democracy that populism engenders (van Dijk et al. 2020; Zaslove et al. 2021) — especially in the wake of populist wins (Reinl and Schäfer 2020).

Populist supporters, however, are only a small subset of the larger population. Extending this literature to the general public, one may expect a similar relationship between populist wins and downstream democratic satisfaction. For one, this relationship may be akin to the winner-loser gap, whereby individuals who perceive themselves as victorious in a given election are consequently more positive towards national institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Esaiasson 2011). Applying this to the mainstream electorate, non-populists may thus perceive themselves as the 'losers' — in contrast to the populist 'winners' — when populist movements are successful. This loss may

accordingly drive down democratic satisfaction and engagement among the general public (Henderson 2008; Norris 1999).

This effect may, however, represent more than a simple winner-loser gap. Elite cues, including those by nationally respected institutions, are powerful in shaping public attitudes and norms (Goodman 2019; Tankard and Paluck 2017). Populist wins by their nature validate their position as elites within national institutions and political discourse. This not only widens their reach within society, but also can communicate new norms of democratic satisfaction and engagement. Elite populist rhetoric, for one, is powerful in decreasing perceptions of democratic norms throughout mainstream society (Clayton et al. 2021). Populists are notable in their relentless critique of politics as usual, as well as their bombastic rhetoric targeting institutions such as the judiciary and the free press (Fahey 2021), thereby presenting a threat to wider support for democratic institutions. Together, this suggests that populist success may similarly pull citizens toward their anti-democratic positions.

Such a hypothesised spill-over of populist attitudes to the general public has already been witnessed for other well-worn populist positions. In Western Europe specifically, the direct election of far-right MPs moved mainstream voters to endorse favoured anti-immigration policy positions in Germany (Alarian 2020). Exposure to populism in the Netherlands too produces a spill-over effect (Rooduijn, Bonikowski and Parlevliet 2021), leading non-populist supporters to endorse immigration attitudes endorsed by their populist counterparts. Provided populists are capable of shifting individuals to adopt positions closer to their own policy positions, the same could theoretically occur for democratic attitudes.

Beyond democratic satisfaction, populist wins may also affect wider trust of and engagement with democratic institutions. Of the former, non-populist voters may reasonably blame existing institutions for the rise of the populist challenge. This blame could arise if individuals place responsibility on non-populist politicians for being unable to beat the populists in the electoral arena. Blame may be especially attractive due to the almost universal tendency to underrate the chances of populist parties by both the media and the academic community. In countries across Europe, populism was thought to be anathema due to these states' cultural values; political norms; or formal institutional rules. Yet in both of the UK prior to 2016 and Germany prior to 2017, the prospect of leaving the European Union (EU) or a far-right party entering the Bundestag, if not unthinkable,

was certainly unlikely. Scholars argued that a combination of German cultural values as legislated by the *Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz*, coupled with the five per cent threshold for representation in the Bundestag, meant that the AfD would struggle to breakthrough (Mudde 2007). In the UK, the leaders of the largest parties all vocally opposed leaving the EU, and few believed the UK would actually vote to leave. Thus by downplaying the prospective threat of a populist win, voters may be poised to blame institutions they believed were safe when populists are successful.

Populist success may too shape citizen voting behaviour. If populist success consistently increases democratic satisfaction among populists, while decreasing democratic satisfaction among non populists, a vicious feedback loop might result as individuals who are dissatisfied with democracy often display lower levels of participation (Norris 2002; Karp and Banducci 2008). Further if populist wins similarly reinforce populist attitudes, populism's success may lead to a more politically apathetic and democratically disengaged public (Ardag et al. 2020). Thus across this literature, we identify three testable hypotheses:

1. *Populist success decreases democratic satisfaction.*
2. *Populist wins reduce trust in national legislatures.*
3. *Intentions to vote are reduced in the aftermath of a populist win.*

Finally, although we expect populist success shapes support for democracy in populism's image, other scholarship suggests populism's effects may be limited to the direct effect of populists' actions once in office (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013), and that indirect effects of populism on political attitudes is relatively rare (Spittler 2018). Further empirically, despite populism's impact on influencing immigration policy positions, there remains relatively mixed findings with respect to the attitudes of immigrants themselves (Rooduijn, Bonikowski and Parlevliet 2021; Schwartz et al. 2020). Consequently, non-policy attitudes — such as satisfaction with democracy itself — may be immovable by populist wins. Some scholars have argued that the threat that populism poses to democracy in Europe is at the very least overstated (Kriesi 2020), and others have even suggested that populism in the opposition has potentially salubrious effects on democracy (Kaltwasser 2012). Our study is therefore well positioned to answer the question of whether populist success is capable of moving democratic attitudes, or whether populists' bark is greater than their attitudinal bite.

Data & Results

To investigate our hypotheses, we select two populist events occurring just over a year apart in Western Europe: Britain’s surprising decision to leave the EU via referendum on June 23rd, 2016 (i.e., Brexit); and the success of the AfD in Germany’s 2017 federal election. These two cases are ideal for studying the phenomenon of populist shocks for three primary reasons. First, they represent paradigmatic examples of populist parties and movements in Western Europe (Browning 2019; Berbuir, Lewandowsky and Siri 2015; Iakhnis et al. 2018; Lees 2018). Second, both represent distinct phenomena of populism, and therefore allow us to identify whether the relationship between populism and democratic satisfaction is robust across distinct contexts. Third, the availability of high quality panel data allows us to measure the precise effect of a populist win on democratic attitudes in both Germany and the UK. Of course, these two cases are distinct phenomena of populism: one a referendum and the second a populist party. Nevertheless, while caution is warranted in cross-national comparison, if these two populist events affect democratic attitudes similarly, we can be more confident in the relationship between populism and democratic support.

We describe the analytical strategy and present the results for each analysis independently below. To preview our findings, we find populist wins in both contexts reduce democratic satisfaction of their respective populations.

Germany – The AfD and the 2017 Federal Election

We first examine the attitudinal and behavioural effects of populist success in Germany. In this context of populism’s national success in the 2017 Federal Election, we rely on the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) Short-Term 2017 Election Panel (GLES 2019): a high-quality panel which assesses political attitudes and behaviours from individuals at multiple time points directly before and after the 2017 election. The pre-election survey election ended one day before the 2017 election. Post-election data collection, conversely, began three days and concluded two weeks after the election.⁴ We can therefore be relatively confident that any observed attitudinal change is attributed to the election itself, as opposed to any other post-election event. In sum, the GLES panel data allows us to uncover attitude changes *within* individuals due to the 2017 election

⁴Precise dates of each Wave found in Appendix A.1.1.

results.

Using this data, our population of interest is the general, non-populist German electorate. We consequently exclude populist – and therefore AfD – voters. Our sample notably includes voters of other parties as well as those who did not participate within the 2017 election. This population specifically includes only those who: 1) did not vote for; nor 2) intended to vote for AfD in the 2017 election in either the first or second vote. To meet this criteria, we assessed vote intentions and behaviour beginning one month prior to the federal election.⁵ As this time frame coincides with postal voting becoming available to German voters, we anticipate voters are more informed and their intentions and reported vote choice are likely stable. Further, we recognise respondents may mis-remember or misreport their vote choice once the election results are known (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010). As a result, we do not use post-election vote choice in the creation of our sample. In sum, our inclusion criteria ensures we capture not only the most steadfast, anti-AfD voters but all aspects of the mainstream, German electorate, including both abstainers and non-AfD voters.

Our dependent variables speak independently to each of our hypotheses: satisfaction with democracy, trust in democratic institutions, and willingness to participate in democratic elections.⁶ All components of democratic support are taken at the national level. Satisfaction with and willingness to participate within democracy hence refer to Germany's federal elections. Regarding institutional trust specifically, we consider trust in the Bundestag. All survey items are asked at multiple time points prior to the election beginning nearly a year prior to the election (i.e., October 6, 2016). Post-election attitudes for the first two democratic attitudes were surveyed beginning three days after the election and concluding the following week. Intention to vote, however, was not asked within this survey wave. Thus post-election voting intentions represent responses within the next survey wave, completed six months after the election. Accordingly, the effect of the AfD's win on vote intention is not precisely identified and should be interpreted with caution.

Finally, the focus of this study is a populist win, as opposed to a democratic election itself. We therefore create a variable representing whether the AfD successfully won a respondent's con-

⁵See <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2017/informationen-waehler>

⁶See Appendix A.1.2 for survey item phrasing translated in English, measurement, and coding. Each variable is re-scaled from 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

stituency in the first vote using election returns from the Federal Returning Officer.⁷ In contrast to the second vote, the first vote represents a direct election of a candidate to represent one's constituency in the Bundestag. Thus, whereas all citizens were exposed to the election itself, only those residing within AfD-winning constituencies experienced a direct, populist win. This allows us to estimate the impact of residing in an AfD-winning constituency, after the election on the one's support for democracy.

All models include clustered robust standard errors at the individual level, in addition to controls for a variety of individual level indicators at various time points throughout the survey.⁸ Yet still, our data contains a high number of individuals with small amounts of missing data. We thus use multiple imputation (MI) as it endows our analysis with higher inferential power and provides estimates which are unbiased even when data is not assumed to be missing at random (Eric R Buhi 2008; Lall 2017). Missing data is hence imputed with multivariate imputation using chained equations.⁹ Subsequently, our analysis includes a total of 11,639 non-AfD German citizens surveyed between October 2016 and March 2017 (i.e., 104,751 individual-wave observations).

Analysis

How did democratic attitudes change after the AfD's 2017 success? As a first answer to this question, we compare the average change in democratic attitudes prior to the election with the average change directly after the 2017 election for both AfD winning and losing constituencies.¹⁰ Viewed in Figure 1, democratic satisfaction prior to the election does not meaningfully vary across the eventual AfD-winning and AfD-losing constituencies. Post-election, however, we see democratic satisfaction in AfD-winning constituencies decline - representing an average 1.3% decline. In constituencies where the AfD did not win a seat in the first vote, however, democratic satisfaction received an equivalent post-election bump (i.e., a 1.4% increase). Together, this suggests that the general public's perception of an election matters on who wins: a populist or a mainstream party.

Despite tentative support for our democratic satisfaction hypothesis, we find less evidence in

⁷<https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017.html>

⁸Appendix A.1.3 lists variable survey measurement (translated) and coding.

⁹Monte Carlo simulations include 10 imputations. See Appendix C.1.1 for a comparison of the imputed and non-imputed means. Robustness checks using listwise deletion (i.e., replicating the analysis without multiple imputation) yielded substantively identical results (see Appendix C.1.2).

¹⁰Unfortunately, items assessing trust in the Bundestag were not asked within enough pre-election survey waves to capture pre-election variation.



Figure 1: Average Change in Democratic Attitudes among German Electorate Before and After 2017 Election

support of other aspects of democratic engagement. Intentions to vote post-election on average decline both for AfD-winning and AfD-losing constituencies. Trust in the Bundestag too appears consistent across constituencies post-federal election. Consequently, although the general public appears less satisfied with democracy itself when populists win, in the case of Germany, it does not appear to affect engagement with its constituent parts.

Given this preliminary support for **H1**, we move to a more sophisticated regression analysis. For each dependent variable, we estimate two models: one containing all non-AfD individuals residing in a constituency where the AfD won any seats in the Bundestag, and a second model which included only non-AfD individuals who reside within Saxony—the only state with constituencies directly electing populist representatives. Models were estimated using random-effects general least squares regressions and include a fixed effect for regional variation (i.e., state for the German-wide and constituency for Saxon analysis respectively).

Figure 2 demonstrates the effect of our key variable of interest—*AfD Win X Post Election*—on our three dependent variables for both populations.¹¹ Here, we report that an AfD win significantly affects democratic satisfaction. Considering only AfD-winning districts, we view a 6.8% decline in democratic satisfaction after the 2017 election. Those in AfD losing constituencies, comparatively, reported an approximate 3% increase in democratic satisfaction. We also anticipate this effect is conservative estimate of the democratic dissatisfaction, as we are ourselves estimating the marginal increase of a populist win — moving from winning seats in the Bundestag as a whole to also winning seats directly from one’s district. Further in isolating the effect from all of Germany to only those voters in Saxony, we reveal a similar, albeit smaller marginal effect: average Germans citizens report an approximate 3% decline in democratic satisfaction when residing in AfD winning constituencies compared to the 3% boost in democratic satisfaction experienced by those within CDU or Die Linke winning constituencies (i.e., AfD losing constituencies). Thus although small, we find a statistically significant and meaningful decay in democratic support in the aftermath of an electoral populist win.

Still, we fail to find similar relationships between other indicators of democratic support. Both in the full and Saxon samples, we estimate the effect of living in a constituency where the AfD won seats in the Bundestag in the post election period is not distinguishable from zero. Put simply, unlike democratic satisfaction, a populist win does not appear able to move trust nor intentions to participate electorally in democratic institutions among the general public.

A Loss or a Populist Win?

Of course, it is possible that these patterns of results are due not to populist success, but simply the result of losing. This alternative explanation would mean individuals feel dissatisfied with democracy as a result of their preferred party losing their constituency vote, rather than this dissatisfaction being driven by populism *per se*. To partially account for this possibility, the prior general population sample was identified not on the basis of their decision to participate in the Federal Election, but in their choice to abstain from voting specifically for the AfD. Nevertheless, the possibility that democratic dissatisfaction is tied to a preferred party’s loss remains.

In addressing this concern, we estimate two additional sets of models. First, we categorise each

¹¹Appendix B.1.1 reports the full output, inclusive of controls, for each model.




Figure 2: Predicting Democratic Engagement by Populist Wins among the German public. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.

individual by their stated first-vote party.¹² We next identified whether an individual's preferred, first-vote party won (i.e., 0) or lost (i.e., 1) their constituency.¹³ This categorisation thus allows us to use the same population of interest to examine whether the same democratic decline arises with constituency loss regardless if a populist party won.

Second, we turn our attention away from the general public to consider populist voters themselves. Whereas the AfD certainly performed well in the 2017 elections, they were unsuccessful in the majority of constituency votes. If this phenomenon were driven only by electoral loss—

¹²We are unable to assess 'other parties' due to data protection clauses. However, this should not affect the substantive interpretation of the data as only four political parties won seats in the first vote: the CDU/CSU; SPD, The Left (*Die Linke*), the AfD, and the Greens (*GRÜNE*).

¹³The use of first-vote choice ensures there are no overlaps between the political party supported and hence whether the individual is a 'winner' or 'loser' of the constituency vote.

and not specifically a populist phenomenon—then we might expect AfD voters in constituencies in which the AfD did not win a seat in the Bundestag to similarly display lower satisfaction with democracy. For this analysis, we identify AfD voters as those who voted for the party in either the first or second vote in the 2017 election. This method grants us greater statistical power while ensuring our two populations of interest — the mainstream public and populist voters — encounter no overlap. We next similarly coding for constituencies as those who directly elected (1) or failed to elect a non-AfD candidate (0). Should the democratic decline effect be due to favoured party loss as opposed to a populist win, we would expect to see similar findings of the interaction term between AfD Loss and Post-election as presented in Figure 2.




Figure 3: Predicting Democratic Engagement by Populist Loss among AfD voters. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.

Is satisfaction with democracy tied to a loss as opposed to a populist win? We replicate our basic

model, looking to each population's first-vote loss after the 2017 election. As evidenced in Figure 3, we see no statistically change in democratic satisfaction nor trust for the general public within losing constituencies. And although vote intention is significant within these constituencies, the effect is positive: indicating voters suffering a first-vote loss after the election are more likely to vote than their winning counterparts. Similarly for AfD voters, we view no statistically significant variation in democratic engagement for residing within an AfD losing constituency after the election. We similarly reduce our sample to Saxon in an effort to more closely match our winning and losing AfD voters to one another. Yet again, we fail to find any variation in respondent satisfaction with, trust in, or engagement with German democracy. Together, these results give us further confidence that populist wins — contrary to a loss itself — have a uniquely negative impact on the population's satisfaction with democracy. In other words, we see little evidence this democratic backlash is due simply to a 'sore loser' effect.

The United Kingdom–2016 EU Referendum

Our German results demonstrate that, in the wake of populist success, the general public becomes less satisfied with democracy. We extend our findings through the use of our secondary case of the UK. The coalition and concerns undergirding Brexit's passage are thematically and sociodemographically akin to supporters of West European populist parties, and the referendum is treated alongside such parties in the literature (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Sociodemographically, 'Leave' voters resemble populist voters on the continent, especially as regards occupation and educational attainment (Allen 2017; Goodwin and Heath 2016). Similarly, immigration and Euroscepticism motivated Brexit just as they motivate right-wing populists voters and parties elsewhere (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2013). The promulgation and passage of the referendum also suggest a populist turn by Conservatives in the United Kingdom, exemplified by the eventual ascension of Boris Johnson to the premiership.

Thus the British case further adds to our initial findings empirically. In contrast to the Germany where the success of the AfD was marginal and varied across constituencies, Brexit was a shock which affected all individuals in the UK at a single point in time. This allows us to more precisely estimate the effect of a populist win in a period immediately following an election and whether the decline in democratic satisfaction found in Germany travels across different contexts and modalities

of populist success.

Our data consists of the British Election Study (BES 2020): containing twenty waves from February 2014 to June of 2020. For our purposes, we identify five waves which surround the Brexit referendum.¹⁴ Similar to the German GLES panel, the BES includes survey waves which conclude the day preceding and begin the day after the Brexit referendum. The structure of this data thus allows us to measure the effect of Brexit on our key variables of interest, while also controlling for individuals' opinions at multiple previous points in time.

To precisely estimate the effect of populist wins on individuals' attitudes towards democracy, we identify our population of interest as those who did not vote to Leave the European Union in the referendum. Leave voters were defined as those who indicated that they *expected* to vote leave in the European Referendum in the wave immediately preceding the vote. As this survey wave concluded the day before the referendum was held, we can be reasonably certain that vote choices were relatively crystallised at this point. Notably, we include both those UK citizens who voted Remain as well as those who abstained from the referendum altogether.

Our three dependent variables match our key topics of interest.¹⁵ Satisfaction with the democracy refers to the UK as a whole; whereas satisfaction with democratic institutions refers to the respondents' satisfaction with members of parliament (MPs) generally. Finally, intent to vote is calculated as an individuals' response to the question of whether they would vote in the next UK general election. Again, we opt to include relevant control variables which may account for any observed pattern of results.¹⁶ In total after imputation, our UK data represents a balanced panel of 18,884 individuals measured at five time periods—three preceding the referendum and two in its aftermath.¹⁷

Analysis

Do populist wins—beyond those of political parties—also affect democratic satisfaction? Or are populist parties uniquely positioned to affect democratic attitudes? We answer these questions with a series of random-effects general least squares regressions, with robust standard errors clustered

¹⁴See Appendix BES A.2.1 for survey wave dates.

¹⁵See Appendix A.2.2 for survey items.

¹⁶See Appendix A.2.3.

¹⁷Appendix C.2.1 for a comparison of the imputed and non-imputed means. Robustness checks using listwise deletion are found in Appendix C.2.2.

by individual estimating the effect of the Brexit referendum on democratic attitudes. Each model includes fixed effects for country (i.e., England, Scotland, Wales) and region (e.g., London, West Midlands). Figure 4 presents the results of these analyses for each dependent variable of interest.¹⁸ Specifically, this figure presents the effect of the *Post Election* variable on our three variables of interest, measured immediately following the Brexit referendum on June 23rd, 2016.

For our identified non-populist voters in the UK, we again report public satisfaction with democracy as significantly lower in aftermath of the populist, Brexit result. Substantively, average citizen satisfaction with national democracy declines by over 9% after the Brexit referendum. Combined with our prior results, this leads greater support that our observations in Germany were conservative. This may be because the signal created by the AfD's success in Germany was less 'clear' than the signal sent by the success of Brexit. Whereas non-populist voters in Germany could reasonably look at the results of the election with some hope, as AfD would join parliament but would not join the ruling coalition, leave voters were forced to reckon with a more unequivocal result. Non-populist parties' success in some levels of government may have effectively cancelled out part of the negative effect of the AfD's entrance into parliament (e.g., VanDusky-Allen and Utych 2021). Nevertheless, these results show that populist success understood through both political parties and popular referendum appear to have deleterious effects on general satisfaction with democracy.

Contrasting our German results, however, is the significant and negative relationship between populist success and trust in members of parliament. Although small, Brexit is associated with a two percent point decline in our measure of parliamentary trust. This may indicate that these populist wins are not uniform in their ability to shape evaluations of members of parliament. Alternatively, our estimation of German populism may underestimate the effect due either to statistical power or the fact that even those without a populist win in the first vote were still treated by a populist win in the second vote. This suggests a fruitful avenue for future research: unpacking the variations among the *types* of populist wins. Yet despite this differential effect of trust across our two cases, we again fail to report any significant relationship between populist win and voter intentions in the UK. This again lends provides hope for democracies suffering right-wing populist wins: there is no immediate depressing impact on citizen engagement within the democratic process.

¹⁸Tables found in Appendix B.2.1.




Figure 4: Predicting Democratic Support by Brexit Referendum. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.

Measuring Populism's Endurance

As a whole, these analytical pairs in Germany and the UK reveal the greatest threat of populist success to popular democratic support is in dampening satisfaction with national democracy. Remaining unanswered, however, is the question of longevity of this effect. In other words, it is possible that the main effect of the Brexit referendum driving down democratic satisfaction among non-populist voters may be fleeting. Additionally our German analyses were only able to assess voter intentions six months after the AfD's win—reporting no relationship between populist success and intentions to vote. It may be therefore possible that all measures of democratic engagement similarly fail to last beyond the immediate aftermath of a populist's win.

To measure the potential, enduring effect of the Brexit referendum on democratic attitudes,

we first plot the pattern of our three variables of interest in the lead up to and up to six months after the referendum. Figure 5 represents a first step in this endeavour, presenting the average democratic support reported by the general public over time. The results here are striking. After the referendum, democratic satisfaction drops sharply before rebounding slightly, although not to pre-referendum levels. The other effects are less clear. Voting intention appears flat after the referendum, while trust in members of parliament continues on a downward trend preceding the election in the immediate post-election period, before rebounding five months later.




Figure 5: Average Democratic Support Over Time, with 95% Confidence Intervals. Dotted line represents Brexit Referendum.

Next, we complement this simple average plot with a replication our UK analysis, inclusive of the five-month post Brexit survey wave. Results of this analysis indicate that the effect of populist success on democratic satisfaction persists and remains relatively consistent beyond days following

Brexit.¹⁹ Populism's impact on trust in members of parliament, however, reduces to a mere half percent whereas voting intention remains unaffected. In other words, the negative relationship between Brexit and democratic satisfaction is robust to the inclusion of attitudes five months after the referendum. Trust in parliamentary members, however, may wane in the months following a populist success.

Conclusion

What are the consequences of populist wins on general support for democracy? This project proposed a relationship whereby populist success resulted in decreased democratic support and engagement among the general public. Our results, however, present a mixed relationship between the two. Most importantly, we find that populist success is associated with a consistent decrease in democratic satisfaction. At first glance, one might expect this to be a simple 'losing' penalty, where individuals whose party or referendum position lose express dissatisfaction with the democratic process. Nevertheless, we observe no relationship between loss and democratic satisfaction when considering the effect of first vote *losses* on both mainstream and AfD voters suggesting that this effect is specific to populist wins. And although these effects are modest in size, they are consistent and substantively meaningful. Further, unlike documented winner-loser effects, these effects endure. In the UK, non-populist citizens demonstrate lower levels of democratic satisfaction up to six months post referendum. This finding adds to previous work which finds that it is not simply losing that may cause a decrease in democratic trust or satisfaction (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Blais and Gélinau 2007), but specifically losing to a populist party.

The fact that non-populist citizens are more dissatisfied with democracy at a national level across our two cases is hardly an encouraging sign. Yet, these effects do not seem to cause withdrawal from the political system writ large. In the UK and Germany, regardless of model specification, the consistent effect of populist wins on intent to vote in the next election is null. Put simply, although individuals may feel more negatively towards the democratic process, this disposition does not appear to lead immediately to apathy.

Populism's impact on trust in parliament, however, is more heterogeneous. In Germany, the AfD's success is not associated with decreased trust in the Bundestag; whereas in the UK the suc-

¹⁹See Appendix C.2.3

cessful, populist Brexit referendum depressed trust in members of Parliament. Upon reflection, these results should perhaps not surprise us. In Germany, the AfD had not yet entered the Bundestag at the time trust was measured, and so any negative effect that their entrance may have caused may not have consolidated. In the UK, however, it is impossible for the concept of Brexit itself to grant UKIP access parliament. The relationship between the leave referendum and parliament may simply be too tenuous to maintain much beyond the immediate post-election period.

Further, both of these cases are arguably hard tests of our hypotheses. In Germany, while the AfD's success on the first vote was surprising, public opinion polls suggested that the AfD would undoubtedly be represented in parliament after the 2017 election. Individuals may therefore have already priced in the AfD's win into their electoral calculations, providing less room for their success to move attitudes and behaviour. Likewise, in the UK, Brexit represents a unique populist win of which the full effects have yet to be fully realised. Future work should consider extending these findings, examining more unequivocal populist victories, rather than just populist overperformance. Additionally, examining whether populist *failures* also lead to a decrease in democratic satisfaction is critical for democratic stability. This is especially true considering recent events in the U.S., wherein many supporters of ousted populist president Donald Trump appear unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of his successor, leading to fatal consequences.

Our findings further compel scholars to take seriously the potentially deleterious effect that populist wins have on democracy, beyond the direct threat they pose while in office. While previous work has suggested that populist wins are largely impotent in moving political attitudes (Spittler 2018), we show that populism poses a legitimate threat to democracy by driving down support for the regime itself. If populism is itself a response to any crisis of democracy gripping Western Europe, then the fact that populist wins are able to *further* drive down democratic satisfaction should give defenders of liberal democracy pause. Rather than downplaying the threat that populism poses to mass democratic attitudes, political elites would do well to investigate how to reform democratic institutions such that citizens feel more in control of their own political fates.

Populists often seek to exploit the perceived gap between the idyllic promise and messy reality of representative democracy. If individuals become more dissatisfied with democracy in the wake of populist wins, they themselves may be more likely to turn to radical populist parties or movements in the future. Ensuring that mainstream parties and institutions respond to growing

dissatisfaction with electoral democracy will be critical for ensuring the 21st century does not become a century of populism.

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When Populists Win: How Populist Success affects Democratic Attitudes in Germany and the UK

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A Dataset Details

A.1 Germany

A.1.1 GLES Survey Wave Dates

Wave	Date
1	6 October - 10 November 2016
2	16 February - 03 March 2017
3	11 May - 23 May 2017
4	06 July - 17 July 2017
5 ^a	20 July - 28 August 2017
6	4 September - 13 September 2017
7	18 September - 23 September 2017
<i>Federal Election - September 24 2017</i>	
8	27 September - 09 October 2017
9	15 March - 26 March 2018

^a Includes refreshment sample (Wave A1 in original documentation).

A.1.2 GLES Short-term Panel Dependent Variable Survey Items

Variable	English Translation	Response Options	Coding
<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Germany?	Not at all satisfied	0
		Not very satisfied	0.25
		Neither satisfied/dissatisfied	0.5
		Fairly Satisfied	0.75
		Very satisfied	1
<i>Bundestag Trust</i>	Please state if you trust these institutions or not. How about the Bundestag?	I do not trust at all	0
		I rather do not trust	0.25
		Neither trust/distrust	0.5
		I rather trust	0.75
		I fully trust	1
<i>Vote Intention</i>	If there was a federal election next Sunday, how likely is it that you would go to the polls?	Certain not to vote	0
		Not likely to vote	0.25
		Might vote	0.5
		Likely to vote	0.75
		Certain to vote	1

A.1.3 GLES Short-term Panel Control Variable Survey Items

Variable*	English Translation	Response Options	Coding
<i>Female</i>	Please state your gender	Male	0
		Female	1
<i>Employed</i>	What categories from this list apply to you?	Not employed full-time or part-time	0
		Employed full-time; Part-time	1
<i>Religiosity</i>	How religious are you?	Not religious at all	0
		Not that religious	0.25
		Moderately	0.5
		Religious	0.75
		Very Religious	1
<i>Left-Right Ideology</i>	In politics people often talk about 'left' and 'right'. Where would you rate yourself?	Left	0
		—	.1
		—	.2
		—	.3
		—	.4
		—	.5
		—	.6
		—	.7
		—	.8
		—	.9
<i>Income</i>	Taken all together, would you please indicate what the monthly net income of your household is? By net income, I mean the amount that you have left after taxes and social security.	Right	1
		Below 500€	1
		500 up to 750€	2
		750 up to 1,000€	3
		1,000 up to 1,250€	4
		1,250 up to 1,500€	5
		1,500 up to 2,000€	6
		2,000 up to 2,500€	7
		2,500 up to 3,000€	8
		3,000 up to 4,000€	9
		4,000 up to 5,000€	10
		5,000 up to 7,500€	11
		7,500 up to 10,000€	12
10,000€ and more	13		

* Age, included as a control variable, is calculated by GLES using birth year.

A.2 United Kingdom

A.2.1 BES Survey Wave Dates

Wave	Date
5	31 March - 6 May 2015
6	8 May - 26 May 2015
7	14 April - 4 May 2016
8	6 May - 22 June 2016
<i>Brexit Referendum - 23 June 2016</i>	
9	24 June - 4 July 2016
10	24 November - 12 December 2016

A.2.2 BES Dependent Variable Survey Items

Variable	Survey Item	Response Options	Coding
<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in the UK?	Very dissatisfied	0
		A little dissatisfied	0.33
		Fairly Satisfied	0.66
		Very satisfied	1
<i>Vote Intention</i>	If there were a UK General election tomorrow, how likely is it that you would vote?	Very unlikely	0
		Fairly unlikely	0.25
		Neither likely nor unlikely	0.5
		Fairly likely	0.75
		Very likely	1
<i>Trust MPs</i>	How much trust do you have in Members of Parliament in general?	No Trust	0
			0.14
			0.28
			0.43
			0.57
			0.71
	0.86		
	A great deal of trust	1	

A.2.3 BES Control Variable Survey Items

Variable*	Survey Item	Response Options	Coding
<i>Female</i> ^a	Are you...?	Male	0
		Female	1
<i>Employed</i> ^b	Which of the following best describes what you were doing last week?	Unemployed; Less than 8 hours per week	0
		Employed full-time; Part-time; full-time student	1
<i>Religious Identification</i> ^a	Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?	No	0
		Yes	1
<i>White</i> ^a	To which of these groups do you consider you belong?	Non-White British category	0
		White British	1
<i>Income</i> ^a	Gross personal income is an individual's total income received from all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions...what is your gross personal income?	Under £5,000 per year	1
		£5,000 to £9,999 per year	2
		£10,000 to £14,999 per year	3
		£15,000 to £19,999 per year	4
		£20,000 to £24,999 per year	5
		£25,000 to £29,999 per year	6
		£30,000 to £34,999 per year	7
		£35,000 to £39,999 per year	8
		£40,000 to £44,999 per year	9
		£45,000 to £49,999 per year	10
		£50,000 to £59,999 per year	11
		£60,000 to £69,999 per year	12
		£70,000 to £99,999 per year	13
		£100,000 and over	14
<i>Left-Right Scale</i> ^{b c}	Composite scale, derived by YouGov	Left	0
		Right	1

* Table excludes Age, a profile variable calculated by YouGov by last pre-election wave.

^a Item collected at intervals determined by YouGov (i.e., Profile variable).

^b Asked to all respondents in the first wave in which they participated (i.e., top-up question).

^c Composite taken from answers to five left-right ideology questions

B Analytical Models

B.1 Germany

B.1.1 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by AfD Win (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>		<i>Trust Bundestag</i>		<i>Vote Intention</i>	
	All	Saxony	All	Saxony	All	Saxony
AfD Win X Post-Election	-0.036*	-0.033+	-0.010	-0.016	0.008	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
AfD Win	-0.032	0.007	-0.003	0.047	-0.017	0.039
	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.061)
Post Election	0.030**	0.027**	0.007**	0.013	-0.017**	-0.029**
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Female	-0.051**	-0.034*	-0.037**	-0.026	-0.031**	-0.033*
	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Age	0.000**	-0.001	0.001**	0.000	0.002**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employed	-0.005	-0.022	-0.017**	-0.047*	0.007+	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.019)
Religiosity	0.070**	0.084**	0.088**	0.090**	0.040**	0.019
	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.040)
Left-Right Ideology	0.026*	0.071+	0.011	0.014	-0.133**	-0.187**
	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.012)	(0.048)
Income	0.017**	0.021**	0.016**	0.018**	0.016**	0.019**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Constant	0.450**	0.417**	0.406**	0.401**	0.716**	0.710**
	(0.012)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.060)	(0.013)	(0.062)
Fixed Effects	State	Const.	State	Const.	State	Const.
Observations	34917	2124	23278	1416	93112	5664

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

B.2 United Kingdom

B.2.1 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Populist Win (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust MPs</i>	<i>Vote Intent</i>
Post Election	-0.091** (0.003)	-0.023** (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)
Age	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Female	0.025** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.004)
Employed	0.027** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.010+ (0.006)
Religious Identification	0.067** (0.007)	0.017** (0.006)	0.000 (0.004)
Income	-0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002+ (0.001)
White	0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.024** (0.008)
Left-Right Ideology	0.049** (0.002)	0.034** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Constant	0.285** (0.027)	0.182** (0.025)	0.872** (0.019)
Fixed Effects	Country & Region	Country & Region	Country & Region
Observations	14163	14163	14163

Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C Robustness checks

C.1 Germany

C.1.1 Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

	Means ^a (SD)										
	Full	Imputation									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Dem.	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54
Sat.	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Trust	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
Bund.	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Vote	0.90	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Intent	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Female	0.51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(0.50)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Age	48.26	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(14.78)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Employ.	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Relig.	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Income	6.72	6.72	6.72	6.73	6.72	6.73	6.72	6.72	6.72	6.72	6.73
	(2.60)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(2.59)	(2.60)	(2.60)
Left -	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.46
Right	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)

^a Entire sample averages and standard deviations presented - inclusive of both populist (AfD) and non-populist voters. No missing data exists for age and sex, and are therefore are not imputed.

C.1.2 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Populist Win (Listwise Deletion)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust Bundestag</i>	<i>Vote Intention</i>
AfD Win X Post-Election	-0.051** (0.017)	-0.018 (0.024)	0.009 (0.018)
AfD Win	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.038 (0.032)	0.003 (0.028)
Post Election	0.023** (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	-0.014** (0.002)
Female	-0.046** (0.004)	-0.034** (0.005)	-0.017** (0.004)
Age	0.000* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Employed	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.005)
Religiosity	0.074** (0.008)	0.100** (0.009)	0.043** (0.008)
Left-Right Ideology	0.067** (0.013)	0.055** (0.014)	-0.107** (0.011)
Income	0.213** (0.011)	0.199** (0.013)	0.164** (0.012)
Constant	0.485** (0.015)	0.428** (0.017)	0.857** (0.015)
Fixed Effects	State	State	State
Observations	19462	13950	49103

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.1.3 Democratic Attitudes by First Vote Loss (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust Bundestag</i>	<i>Vote Intention</i>
Loss X Post-Election	0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.018** (0.004)
First Vote Party Loss	0.000 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.090** (0.004)
Post Election	0.027** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.027** (0.004)
Female	-0.051** (0.003)	-0.037** (0.004)	-0.029** (0.004)
Age	0.000** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)
Employed	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.017** (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)
Religiosity	0.070** (0.006)	0.088** (0.007)	0.047** (0.007)
Left-Right Ideology	0.027* (0.011)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.084** (0.012)
Income	0.017** (0.001)	0.016** (0.001)	0.015** (0.001)
Constant	0.449** (0.012)	0.411** (0.014)	0.650** (0.013)
Fixed Effects	State	State	State
Observations	34917	23278	93112

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.1.4 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by AfD Loss (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>		<i>Trust Bundestag</i>		<i>Vote Intention</i>	
	All	Saxony	All	Saxony	All	Saxony
AfD Loss X Post-Election	-0.005 (0.040)	-0.009 (0.043)	0.009 (0.033)	0.015 (0.037)	0.040 (0.035)	0.057 (0.039)
AfD Loss	0.029 (0.043)	-0.147+ (0.085)	-0.009 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.091)	0.010 (0.034)	-0.056 (0.063)
Post Election	0.051 (0.040)	0.051 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.034)	-0.047 (0.035)	-0.047 (0.035)
Female	-0.030** (0.009)	0.008 (0.028)	0.002 (0.010)	0.066* (0.032)	-0.030** (0.007)	-0.025** (0.007)
Age	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)
Employed	0.019+ (0.011)	-0.040 (0.032)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.034)	0.017* (0.008)	0.015+ (0.008)
Religiosity	0.092** (0.018)	0.122+ (0.066)	0.100** (0.019)	0.100 (0.072)	0.014 (0.012)	0.014 (0.013)
Left-Right Ideology	-0.058* (0.026)	-0.047 (0.083)	-0.060* (0.027)	-0.042 (0.099)	0.049* (0.019)	0.046* (0.020)
Income	0.008** (0.002)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007** (0.002)	0.007 (0.007)	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)
Constant	0.303** (0.059)	0.440** (0.106)	0.238** (0.063)	0.301* (0.123)	0.721** (0.043)	0.770** (0.035)
Fixed Effects	State	Const.	State	Const.	State	Const.
Observations	5430	564	3620	376	14480	14174

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.2 United Kingdom

C.2.1 Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

	Means ^a										
	(SD)										
	Full	Imputation									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
UK	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47
Sat.	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Trust	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
MPs	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Vote	0.94	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Intent	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Female	0.49	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(0.50)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Age	55.87	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(14.12)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Employed	0.47	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(0.50)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Relig.	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54
Ident.	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Income	4.95	4.89	4.91	4.91	4.88	4.89	4.89	4.89	4.91	4.88	4.91
	(3.01)	(2.99)	(3.02)	(2.98)	(3.00)	(3.00)	(3.01)	(3.01)	(3.01)	(2.99)	(3.00)
White	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Left -	2.99	3.00	3.01	3.00	3.00	3.01	3.01	3.00	3.01	3.01	3.00
Right	(2.24)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.23)	(2.23)	(2.22)

^a Entire sample averages and standard deviations presented inclusive of both populist (Leave) and nonpopulist voters. No missing data exists for age, sex, or employment status and are therefore are not imputed.

C.2.2 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Brexit: UK (Listwise Deletion)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust MPs</i>	<i>Vote Intention</i>
Post Election	-0.079** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003+ (0.002)
Age	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Female	0.019* (0.008)	-0.015* (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)
Employed	0.041** (0.010)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.018** (0.006)
Religious Identification	0.073** (0.008)	0.017* (0.007)	0.003 (0.005)
Income	-0.003+ (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
White	0.013 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.023* (0.009)
Left-Right Ideology	0.052** (0.002)	0.034** (0.002)	-0.002+ (0.001)
Constant	0.261** (0.033)	0.174** (0.030)	0.897** (0.023)
Fixed Effects	Country & Region	Country & Region	Country & Region
Observations	13282	13607	13608

Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.2.3 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Populist Win - Including Five Months After Referendum (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust MPs</i>	<i>Vote Intent</i>
Post Election	-0.078** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Female	0.024** (0.007)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.004)
Employed	0.029** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.009+ (0.005)
Religious Identification	0.068** (0.007)	0.015* (0.006)	-0.000 (0.004)
Income	-0.003* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
White	0.013 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.012)	0.022** (0.008)
Left-Right Ideology	0.050** (0.002)	0.034** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Constant	0.290** (0.026)	0.188** (0.025)	0.865** (0.019)
Fixed Effects	Country & Region	Country & Region	Country & Region
Observations	18884	18884	18884

Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

Figure Captions

- Figure 1: Average Change in Democratic Attitudes among German Electorate Before and After 2017 Election
- Figure 2: Predicting Democratic Engagement by Populist Wins among the German public. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.
- Figure 3: Predicting Democratic Engagement by Populist Loss among AfD voters. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.
- Figure 4: Predicting Democratic Support by Brexit Referendum. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.
- Figure 5: Average Democratic Support Over Time, with 95% Confidence Intervals. Dotted line represents Brexit Referendum.