

When Populists Win: How Populist Success affects Democratic Attitudes in Germany and the UK

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The data that support the findings of this study are cited in text and openly available online. The British Election Study (BES) panel data can be found here (<https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-objects/panel-study-data/>); while the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) is hosted through the GESIS Research Institute and can be found here (<https://www.gesis.org/en/elections-home/gles>).

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Abstract

Right-wing populism has experienced significant success throughout Western Europe. Yet relatively little attention is paid to the impact of populism's success on the general public. This article addresses this gap, exploring populism's role in shaping democratic satisfaction across the non-populist electorate using two recent right-wing, populist successes: the 2017 election of the far-right, populist Alternative for Germany in Germany, and the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK. Leveraging high quality panel data surrounding each event, we reveal citizens experience a decline in democratic satisfaction after a populist win. Moreover, this democratic decline is not an artefact of losing an election but rather a direct effect of a right-wing, populist win. Consequently, democratic discontent appears to be not only a cause of but a consequence of populist success.

Keywords: Populism; Democratic satisfaction; Attitudes; United Kingdom; Germany

Word Count: 8355

1 Introduction

Right-wing populism¹ is an increasingly potent force in Western Europe. A right-wing populist is currently represented in nearly every Western European national parliament — far exceeding expectations of populism’s eventual reach.² Once in government, these populists can actively undermine the bulwarks of liberal constitutionalism, including an independent judiciary, free press, and minority rights (e.g., Diamond 2021; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).

Even for those few states who have thus far escaped populist parliamentary representation, right-wing populist movements continue to strain democratic traditions and institutions. Although right-wing populists do not sit in the United Kingdom’s (UK) parliament, for one, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) realised considerable success in European Parliament elections. The resulting Brexit referendum too precipitated the resignation of the sitting prime minister and a populist turn by his party; a dramatic crash in the value of the British pound; and a future in doubt for London’s role as a global economic and banking hub. Thus given populism’s fundamental tension with democracy (Rummens 2017), its prevalence presents an existential threat to Western Europe’s democratic societies (Pappas 2019).

The various motivations and characteristics of right-wing populist supporters have been widely studied (Kehrberg 2015; Ivarsflaten 2008), as has the impact of far right party success on mainstream parties and party systems (Allen and Knight-Finley 2019; Meguid 2005; Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016). The downstream impact of populist success, however, remains relatively under-explored.³ Critical to this understanding is whether populist wins alter support for democracy among non-populist voters. When populists win, do citizens become more dissatisfied with democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Karp and Banducci 2008)? Or, given these wins occur through democratic means and procedures, is the societal impact of a populist success overstated (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013; Kriesi 2020; Spittler 2018), failing to meaningfully affect the non-populist public’s democratic attitudes?

This paper answers these questions, specifically addressing the effect of populist wins on popular support for democracy. In particular, we employ a most-different case design (Gerring 2009)

¹Populism throughout this piece refers solely to right-wing, nativist populist movements.

²Currently, only the national parliaments of Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom (UK) entirely exclude a right-wing populist party membership.

³See Alarian (2020) and Schwartz et al. (2020) for notable exceptions.

to examine the impact of two right-wing populist watershed movements in Western Europe: the arrival of the far-right, populist *Alternative für Deutschland* (Alternative for Germany, AfD) into Germany's elected parliamentary body (i.e., the Bundestag) in 2017, and the 2016 Brexit referendum in the UK.

Germany's 2017 Federal election witnessed the first national success of a populist party since the country's reunification. Yet the populist AfD was a relative newcomer to the country's political landscape. Forming in 2013 largely as a party targeting intellectuals and Eurosceptics, the party had an unsuccessful showing in their first election, leaving many to predict the party's legacy would be short lived. Change in party leadership, however, shifted the AfD's populist focus: capitalising on populist, protest movements in the East, and solidifying its identity as a far-right, racist, and anti-immigrant populist party. In light of Germany's historical legacy with populist and xenophobic parties, the AfD's electoral success shocked the country and the globe. Not only did the AfD win seats in the Bundestag from the party list (i.e., Germany's second vote), but also from the direct election of AfD constituency candidates (i.e., Germany's first vote). The AfD's success therefore presents a uniquely surprising case — where German voters in three constituencies directly mandated the AfD's entry to parliament despite the cultural and institutional barriers previously thought to keep right-wing populism at bay (Mudde 2007).

Likewise, the Brexit referendum, championed most vocally by the populist, Eurosceptic, and increasingly right-wing UKIP shocked observers both international and domestic and accelerated the populist trends and working class realignment already present in Western Europe (e.g., Iakhnis et al. 2018; Rydgren 2012). Occurring the same year as Donald Trump's surprising presidential victory in the U.S., the Brexit referendum was widely recognised as a similar expression of the nativist, anti-elitist hallmarks of populist movements (Iakhnis et al. 2018; Norris and Inglehart 2019).

These two cases (Germany 2017 and the United Kingdom 2016) are therefore well positioned for a most-different case design. Crucially, both the independent variable of interest (a surprising populist victory) and our main dependent variable (democratic satisfaction) covary, while many other factors do not. While Brexit and the AfD are undoubtedly both elements of the rise of a far-right populist wave in Europe, the German experience of 2017 and the British experience of 2016 differ in a number of important ways. Namely, Germany and the UK have significantly different

electoral systems; and Brexit was a one-off referendum while the AfD's entrance into parliament was the function of a regularly scheduled elections. By examining two different types of populist success—the passage of a populist referendum and the surprising success of a populist party—we can assess whether the relationship between populist wins and democratic attitudes is robust across distinct contexts. If we observe the same pattern of decreased democratic satisfaction among non-populist voters in the wake of a populist victory in both Britain and Germany, we will have strong evidence that populist victories themselves are depressing democratic satisfaction.

In fact, this is precisely what we find. Leveraging evidence from panel data surrounding these two events, we show that populist wins correspondingly depress satisfaction with democracy. Controlling for previous satisfaction in the lead up to the election in Germany, non-populists in AfD winning constituencies express greater democratic dissatisfaction than their counterparts in other districts. Moreover, robustness checks reveal this effect is not an artefact of simply losing an election, but rather losing to a right-wing, populist party. Similarly in the UK, democratic satisfaction meaningfully declined among those who did not vote Leave post-Brexit referendum. Consequently, our findings suggest that populist success might beget further success – amplifying the causes of populist support and decreasing the likelihood that non-populist voters participate in future elections (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Mény et al. 2002; Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers 2013).

This paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the theoretical relationships between right-wing populism and support for and satisfaction with democracy, emphasizing the immanent challenges that right-wing populist success poses to democratic governance. Next, we briefly identify and justify our cases, data, and modelling strategy. We present the results for each analysis independently before concluding with a discussion of our results and implications for future research.

2 Democratic Dissatisfaction: A Populist Cause *and* Consequence?

Consolidated democracy implies—and requires—widespread support for the regime type itself (Linz and Stepan 1996). Likewise, democratic theorists argue that democratisation requires mass political demand for functional democratic institutions (Dalton and Sin 2006; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Indeed, democratic backsliding is also accompanied by declined support for democratic governance and increased support for authoritarian and populist leaders, especially in the context of domestic and international social and economic pressure (Diamond 2021; Foa and Mounk 2016;

Lavrič and Bieber 2021). The continued success of Western Europe's democracies therefore requires ensuring the citizenry is satisfied with democratic rule.

It is for this reason that populists pose a unique challenge to liberal democracy. Populists thrive in periods of increased democratic dissatisfaction, as populism seeks to exploit the gap between the promise and practice of liberal democracy (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). Populist rhetoric contends that an homogeneous 'true people' — often implying a racial or ethnic group— have been betrayed by corrupt elites and their co-conspirators, and that the only solution is a more direct form of democracy through the election of the populist or direct referendum (Jacobs, Akkerman and Zaslove 2018; Van Crombrugge 2020). It therefore stands to reason that individuals who are dissatisfied with democracy would be more likely to endorse the radical remedies articulated by populists. Indeed, this is borne out in survey data, with studies revealing robust relationships between democratic dissatisfaction and initial support for populist parties (Arzheimer 2009; Pauwels 2016; Werts, Scheepers and Lubbers 2013). The populists' best interests, as a result, may be to depress democratic satisfaction and promote distrust in political institutions (Schulte-Cloos and Leininger 2021).

This focus on democratic attitudes as a cause of populist support begs the question: can populism also *change* mass democratic attitudes? With respect to populist supporters, democratic satisfaction has already been shown to be affected by populist success. Paradoxically, the same populist supporters who appear drawn to right-wing populists due to their dissatisfaction with democracy also tend to be more supportive of and satisfied with the specific forms of democracy that populism engenders (van Dijk et al. 2020; Zaslove et al. 2021) — especially in the wake of populist wins (Reinl and Schäfer 2020).

Populist supporters, however, are only a small subset of the larger population. Extending this literature to the general public, one may expect a similar relationship between populist wins and downstream democratic satisfaction. For one, this relationship may be akin to the winner-loser gap, whereby individuals who perceive themselves as victorious in a given election are consequently more positive towards national institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2001; Esaiasson 2011). Applying this to the mainstream electorate, non-populists may thus perceive themselves as the 'losers' — in contrast to the populist 'winners' — when populist movements are successful. This loss may accordingly drive down democratic satisfaction and engagement among the general public (Hen-

derson 2008; Norris 1999). Previous work has shown that individuals who score higher in negative partisanship may be more susceptible to democratic dissatisfaction in the wake of electoral losses—if individuals feel more negatively towards populist parties than more “mainstream” parties, we might expect a larger effect (Ridge 2020).

This effect may, however, represent more than a simple winner-loser gap. Elite cues, including those by nationally respected institutions, are powerful in shaping public attitudes and norms (Goodman 2019; Tankard and Paluck 2017). Populist wins by their nature validate their position as elites within national institutions and political discourse. This not only widens their reach within society, but also can communicate new norms of democratic satisfaction and engagement. Elite populist rhetoric, for one, is powerful in decreasing perceptions of democratic norms throughout mainstream society (Clayton et al. 2021). Populists are notable in their relentless critique of politics as usual, as well as their bombastic rhetoric targeting institutions such as the judiciary and the free press (Fahey 2021), thereby presenting a threat to wider support for democratic institutions. Together, this suggests that populist success may similarly pull citizens toward their anti-democratic positions.

Such a hypothesised spill-over of populist attitudes to the general public has already been witnessed for other well-worn populist positions. In Western Europe specifically, the direct election of far-right MPs moved mainstream voters to endorse favoured anti-immigration policy positions in Germany (Alarian 2020). Exposure to populism in the Netherlands too produces a spill-over effect (Rooduijn, Bonikowski and Parlevliet 2021), leading non-populist supporters to endorse immigration attitudes endorsed by their populist counterparts. Provided populists are capable of shifting individuals to adopt positions closer to their own policy positions, the same could theoretically occur for democratic attitudes. We therefore propose our primary testable hypothesis:

Populist success decreases democratic satisfaction.

The effect of populist success on democratic attitudes has been the subject of much debate, and our project is well-positioned to shed light on the effect of populist victories on non populist voters. Although we expect populist success shapes support for democracy in populism’s image, other scholarship suggests populism’s effects may be limited to the direct effect of populists’ actions once in office (Albertazzi and Mueller 2013), and that indirect effects of populism on political

attitudes is relatively rare (Spittler 2018). Further empirically, despite populism’s impact on influencing immigration policy positions, there remains relatively mixed findings with respect to the attitudes of immigrants themselves (Rooduijn, Bonikowski and Parlevliet 2021; Schwartz et al. 2020). Consequently, non-policy attitudes — such as satisfaction with democracy itself — may be immovable by populist wins. Some scholars have argued that the threat that populism poses to democracy in Europe is at the very least overstated (Kriesi 2020), and others have even suggested that populism in the opposition has potentially salubrious effects on democracy (Kaltwasser 2012). Our study is therefore poised to answer the question of whether populist success is capable of moving democratic attitudes, or whether populists’ bark is greater than their attitudinal bite.

3 Data & Results

To investigate our hypothesis, we select two populist events occurring just over a year apart in Western Europe: Britain’s surprising decision to leave the EU via referendum on June 23rd, 2016 (hereafter ‘Brexit’); and the success of the AfD in Germany’s 2017 federal election. These two cases are ideal for studying the phenomenon of populist shocks for a number of reasons. First and foremost, they represent paradigmatic examples of populist parties and movements in Western Europe (Browning 2019; Berbuir, Lewandowsky and Siri 2015; Iakhnis et al. 2018; Lees 2018). Second, both represent distinct phenomena of populism, and therefore allow us to identify whether the relationship between populism and democratic satisfaction is robust across distinct contexts.

Third, the strength of the “populist signal” varies across the two cases. While Brexit was an enormous shock to the entire population and represented an unequivocal populist victory with clear consequences, the effect of the AfD’s relative success may be more muted due to the way the populist signal is filtered through a complex electoral system. We can therefore think of Brexit as an example of a hoop test (Collier 2011)—if we observed no change in democratic satisfaction in the wake of an extremely strong populist signal, we would be reasonably certain that no relationship exists. By contrast, our German case represents a relatively “hard” test of the hypothesis, as the AfD’s success was relatively mild—they did not join parliament, and in fact underperformed compared to polling immediately before the election.

Fourth, the regional variation in the AfD’s performance allows us to test our hypothesis (that populist success in particular drives down democratic dissatisfaction) against the more simple

“winner-loser” effect. To ensure that any observed effect on democratic satisfaction is not just a function of the winner-loser gap, we examine if democratic dissatisfaction decreases in regions of Germany where AfD candidates lose. If null effects are observed, then we have strong evidence that something is happening beyond the simple winner-loser effect. Finally, and most pragmatically, we are driven by the availability of high quality panel data which allows us to measure the precise effect of a populist win on democratic attitudes in both Germany and the UK. If these two populist events affect democratic attitudes similarly, we can be more confident in the relationship between populism and democratic support. Below, we describe the analytical strategy and present the results for each analysis independently. To preview our findings, we find populist wins in both contexts reduce democratic satisfaction of their respective populations.

3.1 The United Kingdom–2016 EU Referendum

We begin our analysis in the UK. The coalition and concerns undergirding Brexit’s passage are thematically and sociodemographically akin to supporters of West European populist parties, and the referendum is treated alongside such parties in the literature (Norris and Inglehart 2019). Sociodemographically, ‘Leave’ voters resemble populist voters on the continent, especially as regards occupation and educational attainment (Allen 2017; Goodwin and Heath 2016). Similarly, immigration and Euroscepticism motivated Brexit just as they motivate right-wing populist voters and parties elsewhere (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2013). The promulgation and passage of the referendum also suggest a populist turn by Conservatives in the United Kingdom, exemplified by the eventual ascension of Boris Johnson to the premiership. Examining the Brexit referendum in tandem with the German case thus demonstrates the analytical utility of comparing populist success broadly, regardless of the particular form the populist impulse takes (party vs. referendum). Still, in contrast to Germany, where the success of the AfD was marginal and varied across constituencies, Brexit was a shock which affected all individuals in the UK at a single point in time. This allows us to more precisely estimate the effect of a populist win in a period immediately following an election. (Due to the heterogenous performance of the AfD across the country, the German case allows us instead to compare individuals in regions where the populist ‘signal’ was strong vs. where it was weaker or nonexistent). Additionally, because the data from which we draw—the British Election Study (BES) (BES 2020)—conducted multiple waves before and after the election, we are able to

determine whether our observed effects endure over time.⁴

Our data consists of the combined British Election Study (BES 2020): containing twenty waves from February 2014 to June of 2020. For our purposes, we identify five waves which surround the Brexit referendum.⁵ In particular, the BES includes survey waves which conclude the day preceding and begin the day after the Brexit referendum. The structure of this data thus allows us to measure the precise effect of Brexit on our key variables of interest, while also controlling for individuals' opinions at multiple previous points in time.

To precisely estimate the effect of populist wins on individuals' attitudes towards democracy, we identify our population of interest as those who did *not* vote to Leave the European Union in the referendum. Leave voters were defined as those who indicated that they *expected* to vote leave in the European Referendum in the wave immediately preceding the vote. As this survey wave concluded the day before the referendum was held, we can be reasonably certain that vote choices were relatively crystallised at this point. Notably, this operationalisation means we include both those UK citizens who voted Remain as well as those who abstained from the referendum altogether.

Our main dependent variable—*Democratic Satisfaction*—refers to satisfaction with the democracy in the UK as a whole.⁶ We opt to include relevant control variables which may account for any observed pattern of results,⁷. Still, our data contains a high number of individuals with small amounts of missing data. We thus use multiple imputation (MI), as it endows our analysis with higher inferential power and provides estimates which are unbiased even when data is not assumed to be missing at random (Eric R Buhi 2008; Lall 2017). Missing data is imputed with multivariate imputation using chained equations.⁸ In total after imputation, our UK data represents a balanced panel of 18,884 individuals measured at five time periods—three preceding the referendum and two in its aftermath.⁹

⁴The authors also recognize that a number of other populist victories—such as *Vox* in Spain, *Fidesz* in Hungary, or even Donald Trump in The United States—could conceivably provide an opportunity to examine the effect of surprising populist victories on democratic satisfaction. Nevertheless, we only examine cases for which there is panel data wherein the exact same questions are asked *immediately before* and *immediately after* the election in question, to maximize our causal leverage. To our knowledge, the BES and GLES are the only two panel data sets which satisfy these criteria.

⁵See Appendix BES A.1.1 for survey wave dates.

⁶See Appendix A.1.2 for survey items.

⁷See Appendix A.1.3.

⁸Monte Carlo simulations include 10 imputations.

⁹Appendix C.2.1 for a comparison of the imputed and non-imputed means. Robustness checks using listwise dele-

3.1.1 Analysis

Do populist wins—beyond those of political parties—also affect democratic satisfaction? Or are populist parties uniquely positioned to affect democratic attitudes? We answer these questions with a series of random-effects general least squares regressions, with robust standard errors clustered by individual estimating the effect of the Brexit referendum on democratic attitudes. Each model includes fixed effects for country (i.e., England, Scotland, Wales) and region (e.g., London, West Midlands). Figure 1 presents the effect of the *Post Election* variable on democratic satisfaction, measured immediately following the Brexit referendum on June 23rd, 2016.¹⁰

For our identified non-populist voters in the UK, we find public satisfaction with democracy as significantly lower in aftermath of the populist, Brexit result. Substantively, average citizen satisfaction with national democracy declines by over 9% in the wave immediately following the Brexit referendum. This relatively large and robust effect therefore provides initial support for our hypothesis that populist victories drive down democratic satisfaction.

3.1.2 Robustness: Populism’s Endurance

This finding suggests a meaningful relationship between populist victories and democratic satisfaction, and that one of the greatest threats populists pose to support for democracy is in dampening satisfaction with national democracy. Remaining unanswered, however, is the longevity of this effect. In other words, it is possible that the main effect of the Brexit referendum driving down democratic satisfaction among non-populist voters may be fleeting. After the immediate aftermath, democratic satisfaction may regress back towards the mean, eliminating any longstanding decline in democratic satisfaction.

To examine the potentially enduring effect of the Brexit referendum on democratic satisfaction, we explore average satisfaction in the lead up to and up to six months after the referendum. Figure 2 represents a first step in this endeavour, presenting the average democratic satisfaction reported by the general public over time. The results here are striking. After the referendum, democratic satisfaction drops sharply before rebounding slightly, although not to pre-referendum levels.

Next, we complement this simple average plot with a replication our UK analysis, inclusive of

tion are found in Appendix C.2.2 and are substantively identical.

¹⁰Tables found in Appendix B.2.1.




Figure 1: Predicting Democratic Support by Brexit Referendum. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.

the five-month post Brexit survey wave. Results of this analysis indicate that the effect of populist success on democratic satisfaction persists and remains relatively consistent beyond the days following Brexit, and up to nearly half a year later.¹¹

Importantly, there are suggestive reasons to believe that this consistent and persistent decrease in democratic satisfaction is not simply the function of a winner-loser effect. Recent work has shown that the differential effect of winning vs. losing on satisfaction with democracy is highly moderated by the quality of electoral democracy within the given country. In countries with very high levels of institutionalized democracy (such as those seen in Germany and the UK), democratic satisfaction among those who lose elections actually *increases* as compared to abstainers (Nadeau,

¹¹See Appendix C.2.3




Figure 2: Average Democratic Support Over Time, with 95% Confidence Intervals. Dotted line represents Brexit Referendum.

Daoust and Dassonneville 2021).

Furthermore, according to the same study, nearly 80% of the winner-loser gap appears to be driven largely by an *increase* in democratic satisfaction among *winners*, rather than a *decrease* in democratic satisfaction among losers. The fact that we are measuring the effect of democratic satisfaction only on ‘losers’ and still observe a relatively large effect (9%) suggests that populist victories themselves may be capable of driving down satisfaction with democracy beyond the winner-loser effect. To more convincingly examine this possibility, we turn to our second case: that of the AfD in Germany.

3.2 Germany – The AfD and the 2017 Federal Election

We next turn to examine the attitudinal effects of populist success in Germany. For this, we rely on the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) Short-Term 2017 Election Panel (GLES 2019): a high-quality panel which assesses political attitudes and behaviours from individuals at multiple time points directly before and after the 2017 election. Similar to the British BES panel, the pre-election and post-election waves neatly surround the 2017 election. The pre-election wave ended one day before the 2017 election, while post-election data collection began three days and concluded two weeks after the election.¹² We can therefore be relatively confident that any observed attitudinal change is attributed to the election itself, as opposed to any other post-election event. In sum, the GLES panel data allows us to uncover attitude changes *within* individuals due to the 2017 election results.

Using this data, as above, our population of interest is the general, non-populist German electorate. We consequently exclude populist – and therefore AfD – voters. Our sample notably includes voters of other parties, as well as those who did not participate within the 2017 election, consistent with the inclusion of Remain voters in the British case above. This population specifically includes only those who: 1) did not vote for; nor 2) intended to vote for AfD in the 2017 election in either the first or second vote. To meet this criteria, we assessed vote intentions and behaviour beginning one month prior to the federal election.¹³

As this time frame coincides with when postal voting becoming available to German voters, we anticipate voters are more informed and their intentions and reported vote choice are likely stable. Further, we recognise respondents may mis-remember or misreport their vote choice once the election results are known (Ansolabehere and Hersh 2012; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010). As a result, we do not use post-election vote choice in the creation of our sample. In sum, our inclusion criteria ensures we capture not simply the most steadfast, anti-AfD voters, but all aspects of the mainstream, German electorate, including both abstainers and non-AfD voters. Our dependent variable speaks directly to satisfaction with democracy.¹⁴ This survey item is asked at multiple time points prior to the election beginning nearly a year prior to the election (i.e., October 6, 2016).

¹²Precise dates of each Wave found in Appendix A.2.1.

¹³See <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2017/informationen-waehler>

¹⁴See Appendix A.2.2 for survey item phrasing translated in English, measurement, and coding. This variable is re-scaled from 0-1 for ease of interpretation.

Post-election attitudes were surveyed beginning three days after the election and concluding the following week.

The structure and nature of the German data also provides us an opportunity to rule out some alternative explanations for any observed pattern of results, including the simple act of holding/participating in an election or the winner-loser effect. First, the focus of this study is a populist win, as opposed to a democratic election itself. In the post-election period, everyone is subjected to both the *results* of the election (how parties perform) and the *act* of participating in the election itself. Any change in democratic satisfaction in the post-election period could be the result of a number of factors, including the (underwhelming) victory of the CDU/CSU, the extremely poor performance of the SPD, the re-emergence of the Free Democrats; or of course the breakthrough of the AfD. This signal becomes even more complicated by the nature of the two-vote electoral system, where electors first directly vote for the candidate from their constituency (first vote), and then vote for whichever party they most prefer (second vote).

As a result, while the second vote is substantively more important for the allocation of seats to the Bundestag, we elect to focus on the first vote for a number of reasons. In contrast to the second vote, the first vote represents the direct election of a candidate to represent one's constituency in the Bundestag. Thus, whereas all citizens were exposed to the election itself—and therefore, by definition, the *overall* results of the election as determined by the second vote—only those residing within AfD-winning constituencies experienced a direct, populist win. This allows us to estimate the impact of residing in an AfD-winning constituency, after the election on the one's support for democracy. Additionally, while scholars rightly point out that the second vote is substantively more important than the first, this perception does not appear to be shared by the German public, who at best show little evidence of strategic voting (Schoen 1999) and at worst appear to erroneously believe the first vote to be most important.

We therefore create our main independent variable of interest, representing whether the AfD successfully won a respondent's constituency in the first vote using election returns from the Federal Returning Officer.¹⁵ Models include clustered robust standard errors at the individual level, in addition to controls for a variety of individual level indicators at various time points throughout

¹⁵<https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/2017.html>

the survey.¹⁶ Due to the inclusion of a number of control variables, coupled with normal survey attrition rate, we are again dealing with a panel where a high number of individuals have a relatively low percentage of missing data. This provides us with another excellent candidate for MI.¹⁷ Subsequently, our analysis includes a total of 11,639 non-AfD German citizens surveyed between October 2016 and March 2017 (i.e., 104,751 individual-wave observations).

3.2.1 Analysis

How did democratic attitudes change after the AfD's 2017 success? As a first answer to this question, we compare the average change in democratic satisfaction prior to the election with the average change directly after the 2017 election for both AfD winning and losing constituencies. Viewed in Figure 3, democratic satisfaction prior to the election does not meaningfully vary across the eventual AfD-winning and AfD-losing constituencies. Post-election, however, we see democratic satisfaction in AfD-winning constituencies decline - representing an average 1.3% decrease. In constituencies where the AfD did not win a seat in the first vote, however, democratic satisfaction received an equivalent post-election bump (i.e., a 1.4% increase). Together, this 2.7% gap suggests that the general public's perception of an election matters on who wins: a populist or a mainstream party.

Given this preliminary support for **H1**, we move to a more sophisticated regression analysis. We estimate two models: one containing all non-AfD individuals residing in a constituency where the AfD won any seats in the Bundestag, and a second model which included only non-AfD individuals who reside within Saxony—the only state with constituencies directly electing populist representatives. Models were estimated using random-effects general least squares regressions and include a fixed effect for regional variation (i.e., state for the German-wide and constituency for Saxon analysis respectively).

Figure 4 demonstrates the effect of our key variable of interest—*AfD Win X Post Election*—for both populations.¹⁸ Here, we report that an AfD win significantly affects democratic satisfaction. In districts in which an AfD candidate was directly elected, we observe a view a 6.8% decline in

¹⁶Appendix A.2.3 lists variable survey measurement (translated) and coding.

¹⁷Monte Carlo simulations include 10 imputations. See Appendix C.1.1 for a comparison of the imputed and non-imputed means. Robustness checks using listwise deletion (i.e., replicating the analysis without multiple imputation) yielded substantively identical results (see Appendix C.1.2).

¹⁸Appendix B.1.1 reports the full output, inclusive of controls, for each model.




Figure 3: Average Change in Democratic Attitudes among German Electorate Before and After 2017 Election

democratic satisfaction after the 2017 election. By contrast, in constituencies where AfD candidate lost, we observe a 3% *increase* democratic satisfaction. We expect that this effect is a conservative estimate of the effect, as those without a populist win in the first vote were still treated by the populist ‘win’ (AfD entering the Bundestag) in the second vote. This effect therefore estimates the marginal increase of a populist win, moving from winning seats in the Bundestag as a whole to also winning seats directly from one’s district. This suggests a fruitful avenue for future research: unpacking the variations among the *types* of populist wins.

Further in isolating the effect from all of Germany to only those voters in Saxony, we reveal a similar, albeit smaller marginal effect, as non-populist German citizens report an approximate 3% decline in democratic satisfaction when residing in AfD winning constituencies compared to

the 3% boost in democratic satisfaction experienced by those within CDU or Die Linke winning constituencies (i.e., AfD losing constituencies). Although small, we find a statistically significant and meaningful decay in democratic support in the aftermath of an electoral populist win, mirroring our findings in the UK.




Figure 4: Predicting Democratic Engagement by Populist Wins among the German public. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.

3.2.2 Robustness: A Loss or a Populist Win?

We thus observe support for our hypothesis that populist victories decrease democratic satisfaction. Still, there are two possible alternative explanations for this pattern of results that bears investigation. First, it may be the case that democratic satisfaction varies in the wake of *any* election, and so any patterns we observe are simply a function of the very occurrence of an election. To examine this

possibility, we calculate the overall change in democratic satisfaction of non right-wing populist voters in the 2013 and 2017 elections. As in the 2017 election, the 2013 election resulted in a top-two performance for the CDU/CSU and SPD. In contrast to 2017, however, in 2013 the AfD was largely marginalized and remained a party in the wilderness, dominated by academics and not yet identifying the core focus on nativism which would drive them to capture seats in the 2017 election (Arzheimer and Berning 2019). Still, to ensure we are examining the same population of interest (non-populist supporters), we utilize the same high quality data set (GLES 2013), and exclude both individuals who indicated that they supported the AfD as well as the neo-Nazi *National Democratic Party*, *NPD*, to ensure we are excluding similar populations of far-right populist voters. The results are shown in 5 below.




Figure 5: Average Change in Democratic Support Post 2013 and 2017 Elections.

These results show a marked difference in democratic satisfaction in the wake of the 2013 and 2017 elections for non-populist voters. After the 2013 election, democratic satisfaction increased by over 5%. In the period following the 2017 election, satisfaction with democracy increased by less than a third that number, at 1.6%. Thus it seems unlikely that our observed patterns of results is simply a function any election occurring, and related instead to the results of the election.

This leads to the second alternative explanation for our observed patterns of results—that a de-

cline in democratic satisfaction is not the result of populists victory *per se*, but simply the result of losing. This alternative explanation would mean individuals feel dissatisfied with democracy as a result of their preferred party losing their constituency vote, rather than this dissatisfaction being driven by populism *per se*. To partially account for this possibility, the prior general population sample was identified not on the basis of their decision to participate in the Federal Election, but in their choice to abstain from voting specifically for the AfD. Nevertheless, the possibility that democratic dissatisfaction is tied to a preferred party's loss remains.

In addressing this concern, we estimate two additional sets of models. First, we categorise each individual by their stated first-vote party preference.¹⁹ We next identified whether an individual's preferred, first-vote party won (i.e., 0) or lost (i.e., 1) their constituency.²⁰ This categorisation thus allows us to use the same population of interest to examine whether the same democratic decline arises with constituency loss regardless if a populist party won.

Second, we turn our attention away from the general public to consider populist voters themselves. Whereas the AfD certainly performed well in the 2017 elections, they were unsuccessful in the majority of constituency votes. If this phenomenon were driven only by electoral loss—and not specifically a populist phenomenon—then we might expect AfD voters in constituencies in which the AfD did not win a seat in the Bundestag to similarly display lower satisfaction with democracy. For this analysis, we identify AfD voters as those who voted for the party in either the first or second vote in the 2017 election. This method grants us greater statistical power while ensuring our two populations of interest—the mainstream public and populist voters—encounter no overlap. We next similarly code for constituencies as those who directly elected (1) or failed to elect a non-AfD candidate (0). Should the democratic decline effect be due to favoured party loss as opposed to a populist win, we would expect to see similar findings of the interaction term between AfD Loss and Post-election as presented in Figure 4.

Is satisfaction with democracy tied to a loss as opposed to a populist win? As evidenced in Figure 6, we see no statistically significant change in democratic satisfaction in the general public within losing constituencies. Similarly for AfD voters, we view no statistically significant variation

¹⁹We are unable to assess 'other parties' due to data protection clauses. However, this should not affect the substantive interpretation of the data as only four political parties won seats in the first vote: the CDU/CSU; SPD, The Left (*Die Linke*), the AfD, and the Greens (*GRÜNE*).

²⁰The use of first-vote choice ensures there are no overlaps between the political party supported and hence whether the individual is a 'winner' or 'loser' of the constituency vote.




Figure 6: Predicting Democratic Satisfaction by Populist Loss among AfD voters. Unstandardised beta Coefficients, presented with 90 and 95% Confidence Intervals.

in democratic satisfaction for residing within an AfD losing constituency after the election. We similarly reduce our sample to Saxony in an effort to more closely match our winning and losing AfD voters to one another. Yet again, we fail to find any variation in respondent satisfaction with German democracy. Together, these results give us further confidence that populist wins, contrary to electoral losses in general, have a uniquely negative impact on the population’s satisfaction with democracy. In other words, we see little evidence this democratic backlash is due simply to a ‘sore loser’ effect.

Conclusion

What are the consequences of populist wins on general support for democracy? This project proposed a relationship whereby populist success resulted in decreased democratic satisfaction, thus providing an alternative mechanism by which populism may destabilize democracy. We find support for our main hypothesis, as populist success is associated with a consistent decrease in democratic satisfaction. At first glance, one might expect this to be a simple ‘losing’ penalty, where individuals whose party or referendum position loses express dissatisfaction with the democratic process. Nevertheless, we observe no relationship between loss and democratic satisfaction when considering the effect of first vote *losses* on both mainstream and AfD voters suggesting that this effect is specific to populist wins. And although these effects are modest in size, they are consistent and substantively meaningful. Further, unlike documented winner-loser effects, these effects endure. In the UK, non-populist citizens demonstrate lower levels of democratic satisfaction up to six months post referendum. This finding adds to previous work which finds that it is not simply losing that may cause a decrease in democratic trust or satisfaction (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Blais and Gélinau 2007), but specifically losing to a populist party.

Further, both of these cases are arguably hard tests of our hypotheses. In Germany, while the AfD’s success on the first vote was surprising, public opinion polls suggested that the AfD would undoubtedly be represented in parliament after the 2017 election. Individuals may therefore have already priced in the AfD’s win into their electoral calculations, providing less room for their success to move their relationship with democracy. Likewise, in the UK, Brexit represents a unique populist win of which the full effects have yet to be fully realised. Future work should consider extending these findings, examining more unequivocal populist victories, rather than just populist overperformance. Additionally, examining whether populist *failures* also lead to a decrease in democratic satisfaction is critical for democratic stability. This is especially true considering recent events in the U.S., wherein many supporters of ousted populist president Donald Trump were unwilling to recognise the legitimacy of his electoral defeat, leading to fatal consequences.

Our findings further compel scholars to take seriously the potentially deleterious effect that populist wins have on democracy, beyond the direct threat they pose while in office. While previous work has suggested that populist wins are largely impotent in moving political attitudes (Spittler

2018), we show that populism poses a legitimate threat to democracy by driving down support for the regime itself. If populism is itself a response to any crisis of democracy gripping Western Europe, then the fact that populist wins are able to *further* drive down democratic satisfaction should give defenders of liberal democracy pause. Rather than downplaying the threat that populism poses to mass democratic attitudes, political elites would do well to investigate how to reform democratic institutions such that citizens feel more in control of their own political fates.

Populists often seek to exploit the perceived gap between the idyllic promise and messy reality of representative democracy. If individuals become more dissatisfied with democracy in the wake of populist wins, they themselves may be more likely to turn to radical populist parties or movements in the future. Ensuring that mainstream parties and institutions respond to growing dissatisfaction with electoral democracy will be critical for ensuring the 21st century does not become a century of populism.

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When Populists Win: How Populist Success affects Democratic Attitudes in Germany and the UK

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A Dataset Details

A.1 United Kingdom

A.1.1 BES Survey Wave Dates

Wave	Date
5	31 March - 6 May 2015
6	8 May - 26 May 2015
7	14 April - 4 May 2016
8	6 May - 22 June 2016
<i>Brexit Referendum - 23 June 2016</i>	
9	24 June - 4 July 2016
10	24 November - 12 December 2016

A.1.2 BES Dependent Variable Survey Items

Variable	Survey Item	Response Options	Coding
<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in the UK?	Very dissatisfied	0
		A little dissatisfied	0.33
		Fairly Satisfied	0.66
		Very satisfied	1
<i>Vote Intention</i>	If there were a UK General election tomorrow, how likely is it that you would vote?	Very unlikely	0
		Fairly unlikely	0.25
		Neither likely nor unlikely	0.5
		Fairly likely	0.75
		Very likely	1
<i>Trust MPs</i>	How much trust do you have in Members of Parliament in general?	No Trust	0
			0.14
			0.28
			0.43
			0.57
			0.71
	0.86		
	A great deal of trust	1	

A.1.3 BES Control Variable Survey Items

Variable*	Survey Item	Response Options	Coding
<i>Female</i> ^a	Are you...?	Male	0
		Female	1
<i>Employed</i> ^b	Which of the following best describes what you were doing last week?	Unemployed; Less than 8 hours per week	0
		Employed full-time; Part-time; full-time student	1
<i>Religious Identification</i> ^a	Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?	No	0
		Yes	1
<i>White</i> ^a	To which of these groups do you consider you belong?	Non-White British category	0
		White British	1
<i>Income</i> ^a	Gross personal income is an individual's total income received from all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions...what is your gross personal income?	Under £5,000 per year	1
		£5,000 to £9,999 per year	2
		£10,000 to £14,999 per year	3
		£15,000 to £19,999 per year	4
		£20,000 to £24,999 per year	5
		£25,000 to £29,999 per year	6
		£30,000 to £34,999 per year	7
		£35,000 to £39,999 per year	8
		£40,000 to £44,999 per year	9
		£45,000 to £49,999 per year	10
		£50,000 to £59,999 per year	11
		£60,000 to £69,999 per year	12
		£70,000 to £99,999 per year	13
		£100,000 and over	14
<i>Left-Right Scale</i> ^{b c}	Composite scale, derived by YouGov	Left	0
		Right	1

* Table excludes Age, a profile variable calculated by YouGov by last pre-election wave.

^a Item collected at intervals determined by YouGov (i.e., Profile variable).

^b Asked to all respondents in the first wave in which they participated (i.e., top-up question).

^c Composite taken from answers to five left-right ideology questions

A.2 Germany

A.2.1 GLES Survey Wave Dates

Wave	Date
1	6 October - 10 November 2016
2	16 February - 03 March 2017
3	11 May - 23 May 2017
4	06 July - 17 July 2017
5 ^a	20 July - 28 August 2017
6	4 September - 13 September 2017
7	18 September - 23 September 2017
<i>Federal Election - September 24 2017</i>	
8	27 September - 09 October 2017
9	15 March - 26 March 2018

^a Includes refreshment sample (Wave A1 in original documentation).

A.2.2 GLES Short-term Panel Dependent Variable Survey Items

Variable	English Translation	Response Options	Coding
<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in Germany?	Not at all satisfied Not very satisfied Neither satisfied/dissatisfied Fairly Satisfied Very satisfied	0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

A.2.3 GLES Short-term Panel Control Variable Survey Items

Variable*	English Translation	Response Options	Coding
<i>Female</i>	Please state your gender	Male	0
		Female	1
<i>Employed</i>	What categories from this list apply to you?	Not employed full-time or part-time	0
		Employed full-time; Part-time	1
<i>Religiosity</i>	How religious are you?	Not religious at all	0
		Not that religious	0.25
		Moderately	0.5
		Religious	0.75
		Very Religious	1
<i>Left-Right Ideology</i>	In politics people often talk about 'left' and 'right'. Where would you rate yourself?	Left	0
		—	.1
		—	.2
		—	.3
		—	.4
		—	.5
		—	.6
		—	.7
		—	.8
		—	.9
<i>Income</i>	Taken all together, would you please indicate what the monthly net income of your household is? By net income, I mean the amount that you have left after taxes and social security.	Right	1
		Below 500€	1
		500 up to 750€	2
		750 up to 1,000€	3
		1,000 up to 1,250€	4
		1,250 up to 1,500€	5
		1,500 up to 2,000€	6
		2,000 up to 2,500€	7
		2,500 up to 3,000€	8
		3,000 up to 4,000€	9
		4,000 up to 5,000€	10
		5,000 up to 7,500€	11
		7,500 up to 10,000€	12
10,000€ and more	13		

* Age, included as a control variable, is calculated by GLES using birth year.

B Analytical Models

B.1 Germany

B.1.1 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by AfD Win (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>		<i>Trust Bundestag</i>		<i>Vote Intention</i>	
	All	Saxony	All	Saxony	All	Saxony
AfD Win X Post-Election	-0.036*	-0.033+	-0.010	-0.016	0.008	0.020
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
AfD Win	-0.032	0.007	-0.003	0.047	-0.017	0.039
	(0.020)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.055)	(0.023)	(0.061)
Post Election	0.030**	0.027**	0.007**	0.013	-0.017**	-0.029**
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Female	-0.051**	-0.034*	-0.037**	-0.026	-0.031**	-0.033*
	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.016)
Age	0.000**	-0.001	0.001**	0.000	0.002**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employed	-0.005	-0.022	-0.017**	-0.047*	0.007+	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.019)
Religiosity	0.070**	0.084**	0.088**	0.090**	0.040**	0.019
	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.040)
Left-Right Ideology	0.026*	0.071+	0.011	0.014	-0.133**	-0.187**
	(0.011)	(0.042)	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.012)	(0.048)
Income	0.017**	0.021**	0.016**	0.018**	0.016**	0.019**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Constant	0.450**	0.417**	0.406**	0.401**	0.716**	0.710**
	(0.012)	(0.042)	(0.014)	(0.060)	(0.013)	(0.062)
Fixed Effects	State	Const.	State	Const.	State	Const.
Observations	34917	2124	23278	1416	93112	5664

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

B.2 United Kingdom

B.2.1 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Populist Win (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust MPs</i>	<i>Vote Intent</i>
Post Election	-0.091** (0.003)	-0.023** (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)
Age	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Female	0.025** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.004)
Employed	0.027** (0.008)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.010+ (0.006)
Religious Identification	0.067** (0.007)	0.017** (0.006)	0.000 (0.004)
Income	-0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002+ (0.001)
White	0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.024** (0.008)
Left-Right Ideology	0.049** (0.002)	0.034** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Constant	0.285** (0.027)	0.182** (0.025)	0.872** (0.019)
Fixed Effects	Country & Region	Country & Region	Country & Region
Observations	14163	14163	14163

Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C Robustness checks

C.1 Germany

C.1.1 Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

	Means ^a (SD)										
	Full	Imputation									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Dem.	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54
Sat.	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Trust	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
Bund.	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Vote	0.90	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Intent	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Female	0.51	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(0.50)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Age	48.26	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(14.78)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Employ.	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Relig.	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Income	6.72	6.72	6.72	6.73	6.72	6.73	6.72	6.72	6.72	6.72	6.73
	(2.60)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.59)	(2.60)	(2.60)	(2.59)	(2.60)	(2.60)
Left -	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.46
Right	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)

^a Entire sample averages and standard deviations presented - inclusive of both populist (AfD) and non-populist voters. No missing data exists for age and sex, and are therefore are not imputed.

C.1.2 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Populist Win (Listwise Deletion)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust Bundestag</i>	<i>Vote Intention</i>
AfD Win X Post-Election	-0.051** (0.017)	-0.018 (0.024)	0.009 (0.018)
AfD Win	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.038 (0.032)	0.003 (0.028)
Post Election	0.023** (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	-0.014** (0.002)
Female	-0.046** (0.004)	-0.034** (0.005)	-0.017** (0.004)
Age	0.000* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Employed	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.005)
Religiosity	0.074** (0.008)	0.100** (0.009)	0.043** (0.008)
Left-Right Ideology	0.067** (0.013)	0.055** (0.014)	-0.107** (0.011)
Income	0.213** (0.011)	0.199** (0.013)	0.164** (0.012)
Constant	0.485** (0.015)	0.428** (0.017)	0.857** (0.015)
Fixed Effects	State	State	State
Observations	19462	13950	49103

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.1.3 Democratic Attitudes by First Vote Loss (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust Bundestag</i>	<i>Vote Intention</i>
Loss X Post-Election	0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.018** (0.004)
First Vote Party Loss	0.000 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.090** (0.004)
Post Election	0.027** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	-0.027** (0.004)
Female	-0.051** (0.003)	-0.037** (0.004)	-0.029** (0.004)
Age	0.000** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)
Employed	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.017** (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)
Religiosity	0.070** (0.006)	0.088** (0.007)	0.047** (0.007)
Left-Right Ideology	0.027* (0.011)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.084** (0.012)
Income	0.017** (0.001)	0.016** (0.001)	0.015** (0.001)
Constant	0.449** (0.012)	0.411** (0.014)	0.650** (0.013)
Fixed Effects	State	State	State
Observations	34917	23278	93112

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.1.4 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by AfD Loss (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>		<i>Trust Bundestag</i>		<i>Vote Intention</i>	
	All	Saxony	All	Saxony	All	Saxony
AfD Loss X Post-Election	-0.005 (0.040)	-0.009 (0.043)	0.009 (0.033)	0.015 (0.037)	0.040 (0.035)	0.057 (0.039)
AfD Loss	0.029 (0.043)	-0.147+ (0.085)	-0.009 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.091)	0.010 (0.034)	-0.056 (0.063)
Post Election	0.051 (0.040)	0.051 (0.041)	-0.015 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.034)	-0.047 (0.035)	-0.047 (0.035)
Female	-0.030** (0.009)	0.008 (0.028)	0.002 (0.010)	0.066* (0.032)	-0.030** (0.007)	-0.025** (0.007)
Age	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)
Employed	0.019+ (0.011)	-0.040 (0.032)	0.013 (0.012)	-0.028 (0.034)	0.017* (0.008)	0.015+ (0.008)
Religiosity	0.092** (0.018)	0.122+ (0.066)	0.100** (0.019)	0.100 (0.072)	0.014 (0.012)	0.014 (0.013)
Left-Right Ideology	-0.058* (0.026)	-0.047 (0.083)	-0.060* (0.027)	-0.042 (0.099)	0.049* (0.019)	0.046* (0.020)
Income	0.008** (0.002)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007** (0.002)	0.007 (0.007)	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)
Constant	0.303** (0.059)	0.440** (0.106)	0.238** (0.063)	0.301* (0.123)	0.721** (0.043)	0.770** (0.035)
Fixed Effects	State	Const.	State	Const.	State	Const.
Observations	5430	564	3620	376	14480	14174

Unstandardised beta coefficients with robust clustered standard errors in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.2 United Kingdom

C.2.1 Comparing Means of Imputed and Non-Imputed Data

	Means ^a										
	(SD)										
	Full	Imputation									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
UK	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.46	0.47	0.47	0.47
Sat.	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Trust	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
MPs	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Vote	0.94	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Intent	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Female	0.49	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(0.50)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Age	55.87	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(14.12)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Employed	0.47	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	(0.50)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Relig.	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54
Ident.	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Income	4.95	4.89	4.91	4.91	4.88	4.89	4.89	4.89	4.91	4.88	4.91
	(3.01)	(2.99)	(3.02)	(2.98)	(3.00)	(3.00)	(3.01)	(3.01)	(3.01)	(2.99)	(3.00)
White	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)
Left -	2.99	3.00	3.01	3.00	3.00	3.01	3.01	3.00	3.01	3.01	3.00
Right	(2.24)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.22)	(2.23)	(2.23)	(2.22)

^a Entire sample averages and standard deviations presented inclusive of both populist (Leave) and nonpopulist voters. No missing data exists for age, sex, or employment status and are therefore are not imputed.

C.2.2 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Brexit: UK (Listwise Deletion)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust MPs</i>	<i>Vote Intention</i>
Post Election	-0.079** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003+ (0.002)
Age	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Female	0.019* (0.008)	-0.015* (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)
Employed	0.041** (0.010)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.018** (0.006)
Religious Identification	0.073** (0.008)	0.017* (0.007)	0.003 (0.005)
Income	-0.003+ (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
White	0.013 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.023* (0.009)
Left-Right Ideology	0.052** (0.002)	0.034** (0.002)	-0.002+ (0.001)
Constant	0.261** (0.033)	0.174** (0.030)	0.897** (0.023)
Fixed Effects	Country & Region	Country & Region	Country & Region
Observations	13282	13607	13608

Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.

C.2.3 Predicting Democratic Attitudes by Populist Win - Including Five Months After Referendum (Imputed)

	<i>Democratic Satisfaction</i>	<i>Trust MPs</i>	<i>Vote Intent</i>
Post Election	-0.078** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Female	0.024** (0.007)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.004)
Employed	0.029** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.009+ (0.005)
Religious Identification	0.068** (0.007)	0.015* (0.006)	-0.000 (0.004)
Income	-0.003* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
White	0.013 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.012)	0.022** (0.008)
Left-Right Ideology	0.050** (0.002)	0.034** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
Constant	0.290** (0.026)	0.188** (0.025)	0.865** (0.019)
Fixed Effects	Country & Region	Country & Region	Country & Region
Observations	18884	18884	18884

Unstandardised beta coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by individual, in parentheses.

+p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.