# An introduction to supersingular isogeny-based cryptography

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> Microsoft<sup>®</sup> Research


Towards quantum-resistant cryptosystems from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies LUCA DE FEO, DAVID JAO, JÉRÔME PLÛT http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/506

> Full version of Crypto'16 paper (joint with P. Longa and M. Naehrig) <u>http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/413</u>

Full version of Eurocrypt'17 paper (joint with D. Jao, P. Longa, M. Naehrig, D. Urbanik, J. Renes) <u>http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/963</u>

> Preprint of recent work on flexible SIDH (joint with H. Hisil) <u>http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/504</u>

SIDH library v2.0 <u>https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/sidh-library/</u>



W. Castryck (GIF): "Elliptic curves are dead: long live elliptic curves" <u>https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/?p=7404</u>

### Part 1: Motivation

#### Part 2: Preliminaries

#### Part 3: SIDH

# Quantum computers ↔ Cryptopocalypse



• Quantum computers break elliptic curves, finite fields, factoring, everything currently used for PKC



• Aug 2015: NSA announces plans to transition to quantum-resistant algorithms

National Institute of Standards and Technology • Feb 2016: NIST calls for quantum-secure submissions. Deadline Nov 30, 2017

## Post-quantum key exchange





Which hard problem(s) to use now???

## This talk: supersingular isogenies



#### Diffie-Hellman(ish) instantiations

	DH	ECDH	<b>R–LWE</b> [BCNS'15, newhope, NTRU]	LWE [Frodo]	SIDH [DJP14, CLN16]
elements	integers <i>g</i> modulo prime	points <i>P</i> in curve group	elements $a$ in ring $R = \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\langle \Phi_n(x) \rangle$	matrices $A$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n  imes n}$	curves <i>E</i> in isogeny class
secrets	exponents <b>x</b>	scalars <b>k</b>	small errors $s, e \in R$	small $s, e \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$	isogenies $\phi$
computations	$g, x \mapsto g^x$	$k, P \mapsto [k]P$	$a, s, e \mapsto as + e$	$A, s, e \mapsto As + e$	$\phi, E \mapsto \phi(E)$
hard problem	given <i>g, g<sup>x</sup></i> find <i>x</i>	given <b>P,[k]P</b> find <b>k</b>	given <i>a, as + e</i> find <i>s</i>	given <b>A, As + e</b> find <b>s</b>	given $E, \phi(E)$ find $\phi$

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## Extension fields

To construct degree n extension field  $\mathbb{F}_{q^n}$  of a finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{q'}$  take  $\mathbb{F}_{q^n} = \mathbb{F}_q(\alpha)$ where  $f(\alpha) = 0$  and f(x) is irreducible of degree n in  $\mathbb{F}_q[x]$ .

Example: for any prime  $p \equiv 3 \mod 4$ , can take  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2} = \mathbb{F}_p(i)$  where  $i^2 + 1 = 0$ 

## Elliptic Curves and *j*-invariants

• Recall that every elliptic curve E over a field K with char(K) > 3 can be defined by

 $E: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ , where  $a, b \in K$ ,  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$ 

- For any extension K'/K, the set of K'-rational points forms a group with identity
- The *j*-invariant  $j(E) = j(a,b) = 1728 \cdot \frac{4a^3}{4a^3 + 27b^2}$  determines isomorphism class over  $\overline{K}$
- E.g.,  $E': y^2 = x^3 + au^2x + bu^3$  is isomorphic to E for all  $u \in K^*$

• Recover a curve from j: e.g., set a = -3c and b = 2c with c = j/(j - 1728)

## Example

Over  $\mathbb{F}_{13}$ , the curves  $E_1: y^2 = x^3 + 9x + 8$ and  $E_2: y^2 = x^3 + 3x + 5$ are isomorphic, since  $j(E_1) = 1728 \cdot \frac{4 \cdot 9^3}{4 \cdot 9^3 + 27 \cdot 8^2} = 3 = 1728 \cdot \frac{4 \cdot 3^3}{4 \cdot 3^3 + 27 \cdot 5^2} = j(E_2)$ 

An isomorphism is given by

 $\begin{array}{ll} \psi : E_1 \to E_2 , & (x,y) \mapsto (10x,5y), \\ \psi^{-1} : E_2 \to E_1, & (x,y) \mapsto (4x,8y), \end{array}$ noting that  $\psi(\infty_1) = \infty_2$ 


# Torsion subgroups

- The multiplication-by-n map:  $n: E \to E, \qquad P \mapsto [n]P$
- The *n*-torsion subgroup is the kernel of [n] $E[n] = \{P \in E(\overline{K}) : [n]P = \infty\}$
- Found as the roots of the  $n^{th}$  division polynomial  $\psi_n$
- If char(K) doesn't divide n, then  $E[n] \simeq \mathbb{Z}_n \times \mathbb{Z}_n$

# Example (n = 3)

- Consider  $E/\mathbb{F}_{11}$ :  $y^2 = x^3 + 4$  with  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{11}) = 12$
- 3-division polynomial  $\psi_3(x) = 3x^4 + 4x$  partially splits as  $\psi_3(x) = x(x+3)(x^2+8x+9)$
- Thus, x = 0 and x = -3 give 3-torsion points. The points (0,2) and (0,9) are in  $E(\mathbb{F}_{11})$ , but the rest lie in  $E(\mathbb{F}_{11^2})$
- Write  $\mathbb{F}_{11^2} = \mathbb{F}_{11}(i)$  with  $i^2 + 1 = 0$ .  $\psi_3(x)$  splits over  $\mathbb{F}_{11^2}$  as  $\psi_3(x) = x(x+3)(x+9i+4)(x+2i+4)$





Subgroup isogenies

• **Isogeny:** morphism (rational map)

$$\phi: E_1 \to E_2$$
  
that preserves identity, i.e.  $\phi(\infty_1) = \infty_2$ 

- Degree of (separable) isogeny is number of elements in kernel, same as its degree as a rational map
- Given finite subgroup  $G \in E_1$ , there is a unique curve  $E_2$  and isogeny  $\phi : E_1 \to E_2$  (up to isomorphism) having kernel G. Write  $E_2 = \phi(E_1) = E_1/\langle G \rangle$ .

## Subgroup isogenies: special cases

- Isomorphisms are a special case of isogenies where the kernel is trivial  $\phi: E_1 \to E_2, \quad \ker(\phi) = \infty_1$
- Endomorphisms are a *special case of isogenies* where the domain and codomain are the same curve

$$\phi: E_1 \to E_1, \quad \ker(\phi) = G, \quad |G| > 1$$

- Perhaps think of isogenies as a generalization of either/both: isogenies allow non-trivial kernel and allow different domain/co-domain
- Isogenies are \*almost\* isomorphisms

## Velu's formulas

Given any finite subgroup of G of E, we may form a quotient isogeny  $\phi: E \to E' = E/G$ with kernel G using Velu's formulas

Example: 
$$E: y^2 = (x^2 + b_1 x + b_0)(x - a)$$
. The point  $(a, 0)$  has order 2; the quotient of  $E$  by  $\langle (a, 0) \rangle$  gives an isogeny  $\phi: E \to E' = E/\langle (a, 0) \rangle$ ,

where

$$E': y^2 = x^3 + (-(4a + 2b_1))x^2 + (b_1^2 - 4b_0)x$$

And where  $\phi$  maps (x, y) to

$$\left(\frac{x^3 - (a - b_1)x^2 - (b_1a - b_0)x - b_0a}{x - a}, \frac{(x^2 - (2a)x - (b_1a + b_0))y}{(x - a)^2}\right)$$


## Velu's formulas


Given curve coefficients a, b for E, and **all** of the x-coordinates  $x_i$  of the subgroup  $G \in E$ , Velu's formulas output a', b' for E', and the map

$$\phi: E \to E',$$
  
$$(x, y) \mapsto \left(\frac{f_1(x, y)}{g_1(x, y)}, \frac{f_2(x, y)}{g_2(x, y)}\right)$$

# Example, cont.

- Recall  $E/\mathbb{F}_{11}$ :  $y^2 = x^3 + 4$  with  $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{11}) = 12$
- Consider  $[3] : E \rightarrow E$ , the multiplication-by-3 endomorphism
- $G = \operatorname{ker}([3])$ , which is not cyclic
- Conversely, given the subgroup G, the unique isogeny  $\phi$  with  $\ker(\phi) = G$  turns out to be the endormorphism  $\phi = [3]$
- But what happens if we instead take *G* as one of the cyclic subgroups of order 3?





 $E_1, E_2, E_3, E_4$  all 3-isogenous to  $E_1$ , but what's the relation to each other?

## Isomorphisms and isogenies

- Fact 1:  $E_1$  and  $E_2$  isomorphic iff  $j(E_1) = j(E_2)$
- Fact 2:  $E_1$  and  $E_2$  isogenous iff  $#E_1 = #E_2$  (Tate)
- Fact 3:  $q + 1 2\sqrt{q} \le \#E(\mathbb{F}_q) \le q + 1 + 2\sqrt{q}$  (Hasse)

Upshot for fixed q $O(\sqrt{q})$  isogeny classes O(q) isomorphism classes

# Supersingular curves

- $E/\mathbb{F}_q$  with  $q = p^n$  supersingular iff  $E[p] = \{\infty\}$
- Fact: all supersingular curves can be defined over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$
- Let  $S_{p^2}$  be the set of supersingular *j*-invariants

Theorem: 
$$\#S_{p^2} = \left\lfloor \frac{p}{12} \right\rfloor + b$$
,  $b \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ 

# The supersingular isogeny graph

- We are interested in the set of supersingular curves (up to isomorphism) over a specific field
- Thm (Mestre): all supersingular curves over  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  in same isogeny class
- Fact (see previous slides): for every prime  $\ell$  not dividing p, there exists  $\ell + 1$  isogenies of degree  $\ell$  originating from any supersingular curve


#### Upshot: immediately leads to $(\ell + 1)$ directed regular graph $X(S_{p^2}, \ell)$

# E.g. a supersingular isogeny graph


- Let p = 241,  $\mathbb{F}_{p^2} = \mathbb{F}_p[w] = \mathbb{F}_p[x]/(x^2 3x + 7)$
- $#S_{p^2} = 20$
- $S_{p^2} = \{93, 51w + 30, 190w + 183, 240, 216, 45w + 211, 196w + 105, 64, 155w + 3, 74w + 50, 86w + 227, 167w + 31, 175w + 237, 66w + 39, 8, 23w + 193, 218w + 21, 28, 49w + 112, 192w + 18\}$

Credit to Fre Vercauteren for example and pictures...

Supersingular isogeny graph for  $\ell = 2$ :  $X(S_{241^2}, 2)$ 



Supersingular isogeny graph for  $\ell = 3$ :  $X(S_{241^2}, 3)$ 



## Supersingular isogeny graphs are Ramanujan graphs

Rapid mixing property: Let *S* be any subset of the vertices of the graph *G*, and *x* be any vertex in *G*. A "long enough" random walk will land in *S* with probability at least  $\frac{|S|}{2|G|}$ .

See De Feo, Jao, Plut (Prop 2.1) for precise formula describing what's "long enough"

## Part 1: Motivation

#### Part 2: Preliminaries


#### Part 3: SIDH

# SIDH: history

- 1999: Couveignes gives talk "Hard homogenous spaces" (eprint.iacr.org/2006/291)
- 2006 (OIDH): Rostovsev and Stolbunov propose ordinary isogeny DH
- 2010 (OIDH break): Childs-Jao-Soukharev give quantum subexponential alg.
- 2011 (SIDH): Jao and De Feo fix by choosing supersingular curves


**Crucial difference:** supersingular (i.e., non-ordinary) endomorphism ring is not commutative (resists above attack)






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## SIDH: in a nutshell



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Key: Alice sends her isogeny evaluated at Bob's generators, and vice versa  $E_A/\langle R_A + [s_B]S_A \rangle \cong E_0/\langle P_A + [s_A]Q_A, P_B + [s_B]Q_B \rangle \cong E_B/\langle R_B + [s_A]S_B \rangle$ 

- Why  $E' = E/\langle P + [s]Q \rangle$ , etc?
- Why not just  $E' = E/\langle [s]Q \rangle$  ?... because here E' is  $\approx$  independent of s
- Need two-dimensional basis to span two-dimensional torsion
- Every different s now gives a different  $\land$  order n subgroup, i.e., kernel, i.e. isogeny
- Composite same thing, just uglier picture

 $E[n] \cong \mathbb{Z}_n \times \mathbb{Z}_n$ 

•*P* 


•Q

 $\bullet[s]Q$ 

(*n* prime depicted below) n + 1 cyclic subgroups order n

× [s]

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
(n prime depicted below)n + 1 cyclic subgroups order n

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n + 1 cyclic subgroups order n

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
## Exploiting smooth degree isogenies

- Computing isogenies of prime degree  $\ell$  at least  $O(\ell)$ , e.g., Velu's formulas need the whole kernel specified
- We (obviously) need exp. set of kernels, meaning exp. sized isogenies, which we can't compute unless they're smooth
- Here (for efficiency/ease) we will only use isogenies of degree  $\ell^e$  for  $\ell \in \{2,3\}$

## Exploiting smooth degree isogenies

- Suppose our secret point  $R_0$  has order  $\ell^5$  with, e.g.,  $\ell \in \{2,3\}$ , we need  $\phi : E \to E/\langle R_0 \rangle$
- Could compute all  $\ell^5$  elements in kernel (but only because exp is 5)
- Better to factor  $\phi = \phi_4 \phi_3 \phi_2 \phi_1 \phi_0$ , where all  $\phi_i$  have degree  $\ell$ , and

$$\begin{split} \phi_{0} &= E_{0} \to E_{0} / \langle [\ell^{4}] R_{0} \rangle , R_{1} = \phi_{0}(R_{0}); \\ \phi_{1} &= E_{1} \to E_{1} / \langle [\ell^{3}] R_{1} \rangle , R_{2} = \phi_{1}(R_{1}); \\ \phi_{2} &= E_{2} \to E_{2} / \langle [\ell^{2}] R_{2} \rangle , R_{3} = \phi_{2}(R_{2}); \\ \phi_{3} &= E_{3} \to E_{3} / \langle [\ell^{1}] R_{3} \rangle , R_{4} = \phi_{3}(R_{3}); \\ \phi_{4} &= E_{4} \to E_{4} / \langle R_{4} \rangle . \end{split}$$



(credit DJP'14 for picture, and for a much better way to traverse the tree)

#### SIDH: security

- Setting: supersingular elliptic curves  $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  where p is a large prime
- Hard problem: Given  $P, Q \in E$  and  $\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in \phi(E)$ , compute  $\phi$  (where  $\phi$  has fixed, smooth, public degree)
- Best (known) attacks: classical  $O(p^{1/4})$  and quantum  $O(p^{1/6})$
- Confidence: above complexities are optimal for (above generic) claw attack

(Our) parameters

#### params public private

 $p = 2^{372} 3^{239} - 1$ 

 $p \approx 2^{768}$  gives  $\approx 192$  bits classical and 128 bits quantum security against best known attacks

$$E_{0} / \mathbb{F}_{p^{2}} : y^{2} = x^{3} + x$$

$$\#E_{0} = (p+1)^{2} = (2^{372}3^{239})^{2} \quad \text{Easy ECDLP}$$

$$P_{A}, P_{B} \in E_{0}(\mathbb{F}_{p}), Q_{A} = \tau(P_{A}), Q_{B} = \tau(P_{B}) \quad 376 \text{ bytes}$$

$$48 \text{ bytes} \quad S_{A}, S_{B} \in \mathbb{Z}$$

$$PK = [x(P), x(Q), x(Q - P)] \in (\mathbb{F}_{p^{2}})^{3} \quad 564 \text{ bytes}$$

$$188 \text{ bytes} \quad j(E_{AB}) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^{2}}$$

## Point and isogeny arithmetic in $\mathbb{P}^1$

ECDH: move around different points on a fixed curve. SIDH: move around different points and different curves

$$E_{a,b}: by^{2} = x^{3} + ax^{2} + x$$

$$(x,y) \leftrightarrow (X:Y:Z) \qquad (a,b) \leftrightarrow (A:B:C)$$

$$\overline{E_{(A:B:C)}}: BY^{2}Z = CX^{3} + AX^{2}Z + CXZ^{2}$$

The Montgomery *B* coefficient only fixes the quadratic twist. Can ignore it in SIDH since j(E) = j(E')

 $\mathbb{P}^1$  point arithmetic (Montgomery):  $(X : Z) \mapsto (X':Z')$  $\mathbb{P}^1$  isogeny arithmetic (this work):  $(A : C) \mapsto (A':C')$ 

### Performance

comparison		our work	prior work
public key size (bytes)	uncompressed	564	768
	compressed	330	385
uncompressed speed (cc x 10 <sup>6</sup> )	Alice total	90	267
	Bob total	102	274
compressed speed (cc x 10 <sup>6</sup> )	Alice total	239	6887
	Bob total	263	8514

(see papers for references and benchmarking details)

## SIDH vs. lattice "DH" primitives

Name	Primitive	Full DH (ms)	PK size (bytes)
Frodo	LWE	2.600	11,300
NewHope	R-LWE	0.310	1,792
NTRU	NTRU	2.429	1,024
SIDH	Supersingular Isogeny	900	564

**Table**: ms for full DH round (Alice + Bob) on 2.6GHz Intel Xeon i5 (Sandy Bridge) See "Frodo" for benchmarking details.

All numbers above are for plain C implementations (e.g., SIDH w. assembly optimizations is 56ms)

## **Compressed** SIDH vs. lattice "DH" primitives

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Frodo	LWE	2.600	11,300
NewHope	R-LWE	0.310	1,792
NTRU	NTRU	2.429	1,024
SIDH	Supersingular Isogeny	≈ <b>2390</b>	330

Compressed SIDH roughly 2-3 slower than uncompressed SIDH.

#### Further topics and recent work...

## Validating public keys

- Issues regarding public key validation: Asiacrypt2016 paper by Galbraith-Petit-Shani-Ti
- NSA countermeasure: "Failure is not an option: standardization issues for PQ key agreement"
- Thus, library currently supports ephemeral DH only
- But all PQ key establishment (codes, lattice) suffer from this

## BigMont: a strong SIDH+ECDH hybrid

- No clear frontrunner for PQ key exchange
- Hybrid particularly good idea for (relatively young) SIDH
- Hybrid particularly easy for SIDH

There are exponentially many A such that  $E_A / \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ :  $y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$  is in the supersingular isogeny class. These are all unsuitable for ECDH.

There are also exponentially many A such that  $E_A / \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ :  $y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$  is suitable for ECDH, e.g. A = 624450.

## SIDH vs. SIDH+ECDH hybrid

comparison		SIDH	SIDH+ECDH
bit security (hard problem)	classical	192 (SSDDH)	384 (ECDHP)
	quantum	128 (SSDDH)	128 (SSDDH)
public key size (bytes)		564	658
Speed (cc x 10 <sup>6</sup> )	Alice key gen.	46	52
	Bob key gen.	52	58
	Alice shared sec.	44	50
	Bob shared sec.	50	57

Colossal amount of classical security almost-for-free ( $\approx$  no more code)

# Simple, compact, (relatively) efficient isogenies of arbitrary degree

C-Hisil: For odd order  $\ell = 2d + 1$  point *P* on Montgomery curve *E*, map  $\phi : E \to E', \quad (x, y) \mapsto (\phi_x(x), y \cdot \phi'_x(x))$ 


with

$$\phi_x(x) = x \cdot \prod_{1 \le i \le d} \left( \frac{x \cdot x_{[i]P} - 1}{x - x_{[i]P}} \right)^2$$

is  $\ell$ -isogeny with  $\ker(\phi) = \langle P \rangle$ , and moreover, E' is Montgomery curve.

## Arbitrary degree isogenies

Need not have  $p = 2^i 3^j - 1$ , can easily implement  $p = (\prod q_i^{m_i}) \cdot (\prod r_j^{n_j}) - 1$ with  $gcd(\prod q_i, \prod r_j) = 1$ 



#### Questions?

