

Faster compact Diffie-Hellman

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Work in progress with Huseyin Hisil and Benjamin Smith

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An elliptic curve and its (quadratic) twist

Suppose $\mathbb{F}_p = \mathbb{F}_{43}$ (-1 is non square)

$$E: y^2 = x^3 - 3x - 1$$

$$E': -y^2 = x^3 - 3x - 1$$

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	$x = 0?$	
	$x^3 - 3x - 1 = -1$ ✗	$(0, 1), (0, -1)$
$(1, 13), (1, 30)$	$x = 1?$	
	$x^3 - 3x - 1 = -3$ ✓	
$(2, 1), (2, 42)$	$x = 2?$	
	$x^3 - 3x - 1 = 1$ ✓	
$(3, 19), (3, 24)$	$x = 3?$	
	$x^3 - 3x - 1 = 17$ ✓	
	$x = 4?$	
	$x^3 - 3x - 1 = 8$ ✗	$(4, 15), (4, 28)$
\vdots	\vdots	\vdots
	$x = 42?$	
$(42, 1), (42, 42)$	$x^3 - 3x - 1 = 1$ ✓	

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


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$$\begin{aligned} \#E &= 43 \\ &= \text{prime} \rightarrow \text{☺} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \#E' &= 45 \\ &= 3^2 5 \rightarrow \text{☹} \end{aligned}$$


Montgomery ladder for elliptic curves ...

- Can compute $P + Q$ from $\{P, Q, P - Q\}$ without y -coords
- **Key:** to compute $[k]P$, have $[n + 1]P$ and $[n]P$ at each stage



same difference \rightarrow same result

vs.



different difference \rightarrow different result

x-only needs twist-security ...

- Consider NISTp224: $p = 2^{224} - 2^{96} + 1$

$$E/\mathbb{F}_p : y^2 = x^3 - 3x + b$$

with $b = 189582\dots 672564$

- $\#E = 2695994666715063\dots 21682722368061$ (224-bit prime)
- What about the order of the quadratic twist of NISTp224?
- $\#E' = 3^2 \cdot 11 \cdot 47 \cdot 3015283 \cdot 40375823 \cdot 267983539294927 \cdot 177594041488131583478651368420021457$ (118-bit prime)
- Not a problem if using both coordinates, just check $(x, y) \in E$
- If only dealing with x 's, honest parties all work on E 😊...
...but attackers could take x 's on E' and solve DLP there 😞
- **Solution:** Use *twist-secure* curves: $\#E$ and $\#E'$ both strong

Combining x -only with endomorphisms???

- Using Montgomery's fast/compact x -only arithmetic with endomorphisms has not been done
- **Reason 1:** GLV curves are special: twist-security (especially over best prime/s) is very unlikely
 - e.g. $y^2 = x^3 + b$ - at most 6 isomorphism classes / group orders over any prime
 - e.g. $y^2 = x^3 + ax$ - at most 4...
- **Reason 2:** GLS curves are much more plentiful, BUT (e.g. over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}) necessarily have insecure E'

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- **Reason 2:** GLS curves are much more plentiful, BUT (e.g. over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}) necessarily have insecure E'
- **NEWSFLASH: Smith'2013/312** gives twist-secure construction with many curves over any particular field
 - \mathbb{Q} -curves: curves over quadratic number field with isogeny to their Galois conjugate
 - $\approx p$ pairs of (E, E') over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}
 - 2-dimensional decomposition possible
 - **more news:** he's coming in August, so details in his talk

2GLV using ϕ ... having (x, y) vs. having x -only

Reason 3:

- To compute $[k]P$ from P

$$k = [1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, \dots, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1] \text{ (256 bits)}$$


- Suppose $\phi(P) = Q$, so $[k]P = [k_0]P + [k_1]Q$

$$k_0 = [0, 1, 0, 0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, 1] \text{ (128 bits)}$$


$$k_1 = [1, 1, 1, 0, \dots, 1, 1, 0, 0] \text{ (128 bits)}$$

- Usual approach fine when we have (x, y) and can perform add P and Q immediately or add whatever/whenever we like
- **BUT:** can't add (in Montgomery land) with x -only
- Can't move anywhere with just P and Q

Can't move anywhere with just P and Q ...



Need $Q - P$ or $Q + P$ to move quickly to $[k]P$



Computing $(\phi - 1)(P)$ and $(\phi + 1)(P)$

- Smith: Hasegawa \mathbb{Q} -curves of degree 2 over \mathbb{F}_{p^2}
- $\phi(x, y) = (x', y')$ on the Weierstrass model, given as

$$(x', y') = \left(\frac{-x^p}{2} - \frac{c^p}{x^{p-4}} \quad , \quad \frac{y^p}{\sqrt{-2}} \left(\frac{-1}{2} + \frac{c^p}{(x^{p-4})^2} \right) \right)$$

for some curve constant c

- Write x -coordinate, x^+ , of $\phi(P) + P$ explicitly

$$\begin{aligned} x^+ &= \lambda^2 - x - x' = \left(\frac{y' - y}{x' - x} \right)^2 - x - x' \\ &= \left(\frac{y^p \cdot f(x) - y}{x' - x} \right)^2 - x - x' \\ &= \left(\frac{(y^2)^p - 2f(x)y^{p+1} + y^2}{(x' - x)^2} \right) - x - x' \end{aligned}$$

- the y^2 terms go away, it's just y^{p+1} that is left ...

Computing $(\phi - 1)(P)$ and $(\phi + 1)(P)$

- How to deal with y^{p+1} : p is odd, so

$$\begin{aligned}y^{p+1} &= (y^2)^{(p+1)/2} \\ &= (x^3 + ax + b)^{(p+1)/2}\end{aligned}$$

- Still a fairly undesirable exponentiation in general, **BUT** ...

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- Let's target 128-bit security, and take E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} with


$$p = 2^{127} - 1$$

- Exponent is now 2^{126} , i.e. requires 126 repeated squarings
- Squarings much cheaper than multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2} = \mathbb{F}_p(i)$
- Translation to Montgomery form is immediate

... maybe not so bad after all ...

Two dimensional differential addition chains. . .

- To compute $[m]P + [n]Q$ 'differentially', Bernstein proposed fast constant-time chain



- 1 DBL + 2 ADD per bit of $\log_2(\max(m, n))$

How fast are we talking?

- Compare to Bernstein's curve25519 (best x -only):

$$255 \text{ montDBL} + 255 \text{ montADD}$$

- \mathbb{Q} -curve over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} with $p = 2^{127} - 1$:

$$\phi \text{ cost} + 127 \text{ montDBL} + 254 \text{ montADD}$$

- ϕ costs a little more than 126 squarings, but we save as many montDBL's (2 mults + 2 squarings each)
- **bonus:** we work over Mersenne quadratic extension, fast modular (lazy) reduction

... timings (and much more) to come ...

Some questions to be answered . . .

- 1 can non-constant time addition chains (with half as many ops per bit - e.g. Peter's PRAC) rival the non-resistant records?
- 2 can we avoid decomposition and simply start with k_0 and k_1 ?
- 3 is it possible to do better in computing $\phi \pm 1$ explicitly?
- 4 how to make things *truly* constant-time?
- 5 what more can we do when we know the point (coordinate) x_P in advance (i.e. fixed base scenario)?
- 6 $\phi \pm 1$ maps on the genus 2 Kummers: not giving up yet 😞...