

Efficient pairing computation at the 192-bit and 256-bit security levels

Craig Costello

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

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Contains joint work with.



Colin Boyd



Juanma Gonzalez Nieto



Kenneth Wong



Huseyin Hisil



Tanja Lange



Michael Naehrig



Kristin Lauter



Douglas Stebila

A brief history of pairing speeds. . .

- **1993**

Menezes

⋮
⋮

a few minutes

⋮
⋮

- **2002**

Barreto-Kim-Lynn-Scott (BKLS)

Galbraith-Harrison-Soldera (GHS)

⋮

30-60ms

⋮
⋮

- **2008**

Hankerson-Menezes-Scott


⋮
⋮

14.2ms

⋮
⋮


The 128-bit records. . .

6th April 2010: Naehrig *et al.*: 4,300,000 cycles




The 128-bit records. . .

17th June 2010: Beuchat *et al.*: 2,600,000 cycles



The 128-bit records...

13th October 2010: Aranha *et al.*: 1,600,000 cycles



Why high security?...

How safe are pairings at the 128-bit level? (www.keylength.com)

- **ECRYPT II** - 2011 safe until 2040
- **NIST (USA)** - 2011 safe until at least 2030
- **FNISA (France)** -2010 safe until at least 2020

Why high security?...

How safe are pairings at the 128-bit level? (www.keylength.com)

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SOME REASONS ...

- Some governments, militaries are more paranoid than others
- Let history be our guide: we often underestimate ourselves (cf. Takuya's talk tomorrow)
- Much more fun to be had - interesting things happen beyond 128-bit pairings

- 1 Bilinearity and pairing-friendly curves
- 2 How to compute pairings
- 3 Optimisations
- 4 Pairings at the 256-bit security level (and beyond)
- 5 Pairings at the 192-bit security level
- 6 Work in progress

1. Bilinearity and pairing-friendly curves

Cryptographic pairings and bilinearity

- A cryptographic pairing on an elliptic curve E/\mathbb{F}_q is a **bilinear** map

$$e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$$

$$e : E[r] \times E[r] \rightarrow \mu_r$$

$$e : P \times Q \mapsto e(P, Q)$$

- **Bilinear** means

$$e(P + P', Q) = e(P, Q) \cdot e(P', Q),$$

$$e(P, Q + Q') = e(P, Q) \cdot e(P, Q'),$$

from which it follows that, for scalars $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$, we have

$$e([a]P, [b]Q) = e(P, [b]Q)^a = e([a]P, Q)^b = e(P, Q)^{ab} = e([b]P, [a]Q).$$

We need more torsion!

- $\mathbb{G}_1 \in E[r]$ and $\mathbb{G}_2 \in E[r]$ **must be linearly independent**
- Cases of interest: we want r to be as close to $\#E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ as possible, so think $r \approx q$
- Only one order- r subgroup in $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$
- To find another linearly independent torsion subgroup, we must extend \mathbb{F}_q , but how far do we need to go?

The embedding degree k

- **Balasubramanian and Koblitz** told us exactly how far we need to extend \mathbb{F}_q to find more torsion: namely, to \mathbb{F}_{q^k} where:

The embedding degree k

The embedding degree is the smallest $k \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ such that $r \mid q^k - 1$.

- Once we find one more torsion point in $E(\mathbb{F}_{q^k})$, we find all r^2 points in $E(\overline{\mathbb{F}_q})[r] \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_{q^k})$
- \mathbb{F}_{q^k} is also where we find μ_r
- So \mathbb{F}_{q^k} is where the computations take place

$$e: E[r] \times E[r] \rightarrow \mu_r$$

$$e: E(\mathbb{F}_{q^k}) \times E(\mathbb{F}_{q^k}) \rightarrow \mu_r \in \mathbb{F}_{q^k}$$

- **We need k to be small, i.e. $k < 50$**

Pairing-friendly curves

Definition: E is a pairing-friendly curve if...

- k is small (less than 50)
- the prime r dividing $\#E$ has $r \geq \sqrt{q}$
- Hasse-Bound: group order can lie anywhere between $q + 1 - \lfloor 2\sqrt{q} \rfloor$ and $q + 1 + \lfloor 2\sqrt{q} \rfloor$

 $115792089210356248762697446949407573529405578681527665431107311373540212604928$
 $q = 115792089210356248762697446949407573530086143415290314195533631308867097853951$
 $115792089210356248762697446949407573530766708149052962959959951244193983102976$
- ... then think of r and q as independent of each other (from half way down)
- k being small enough is extremely unlikely in general
- **Moral of the story: pairing-friendly curves are very rare!**

Polynomial parameterisations of pairing-friendly curves

- We need to find q, r, t such that there exists E/\mathbb{F}_q with

$$r \mid \#E(\mathbb{F}_q) = q + 1 - t \quad \text{and} \quad r \mid q^k - 1$$

for some small k

- Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano (MNT): $r \mid q^k - 1$ implies $r \mid \Phi_k(q) \dots$
- Barreto-Lynn-Scott (BLS): $r \mid \Phi_k(q)$ and $r \mid q + 1 - t$ together imply $r \mid \Phi_k(t - 1)$, so use this instead

General strategy for finding parameterised families

Fix k small, then search for $t(x)$ and $r(x)$ such that

$$r(x) \mid \Phi_k(t(x) - 1) \quad \text{and} \quad r(x) \mid q(x) + 1 - t(x)$$

- This strategy has been most successful in finding pairing-friendly curves ...

The Barreto-Naehrig (BN) family



- For $k = 12$, $\Phi_{12}(z) = z^4 - z^2 + 1$
- Setting $t(x) = 6x^2 + 1$, gives $\Phi_{12}(t(x) - 1) = r(x)r(-x)$ with
 $r(x) = 36x^4 + 36x^3 + 18x^2 + 6x + 1$
- Set $\#E = r(x)$ and then $q(x) = r(x) - 1 + t(x)$, so
 $q(x) = 36x^4 + 36x^3 + 18x^2 + 6x + 1$
- Search x 's (appropriately sized) for $r(x)$ and $q(x)$ both prime
- Guaranteed curve always of form $E/\mathbb{F}_q : y^2 = x^3 + b$ (no CM needed)
- Guaranteed $k = 12$, so pairing computation takes place over $\mathbb{F}_{q^{12}}$

The ρ -value

- For example, a BN curve is found with $x = 448873741399$, where

$$q(x) = 1461501624496790265145448589920785493717258890819$$


$$r(x) = 1461501624496790265145447380994971188499300027613$$

- The situation here is ideal because $\log_2(q) \approx \log_2(r)$
- We know this happens for large x because $q(x)$ and $r(x)$ have the same degree
- The ρ -value tells us the ratio between the sizes of q and r

$$\rho = \frac{\log(\deg(q(x)))}{\log(\deg(r(x)))}$$

- So $\rho \cdot k$ gives us the ratio between \mathbb{F}_{q^k} (where DLP lies) and r (where ECDLP lies)

Balancing ECDLP and DLP security




- So to target a particular security level, we consider families whose $\rho \cdot k$ values are close to optimal

2. How to compute pairings

The Weil and Tate pairings of $P, Q \in E[r]$



André Weil



John Tate

- Define the divisors $D_P \sim (P) - (\mathcal{O})$ and $D_Q \sim (Q) - (\mathcal{O})$
- Let $f_{r,P}$ be the (unique up to constant) function with divisor

$$(f_{r,P}) = r(P) - r(\mathcal{O})$$

Weil pairing (in crypto): $e(P, Q) = \frac{f_{r,P}(Q)}{f_{r,Q}(P)}$

Tate pairing (in crypto): $e(P, Q) = f_{r,P}(Q)^{(q^k-1)/r}$

The function $f_{r,P}(Q)$ is huuuuuge!

The size of $f_{r,P}(Q)$ for 128-bit security

- The pairing function $f_{r,P}(Q)$ is of degree r , where

$$r = 16798108731015832284940804142231733909759579603404752749028378864165570215949$$

- The coefficients in $f_{r,P}(Q)$ depend on P 's coordinates, so are all of the size


$$P_x = 15283023184232661393336451140837190640382743162584629974443682653991135323854$$

- This huge function is impossible to store with all the computing power in the world. Somehow we need to evaluate it at D_Q , where Q 's x coordinate is

$$Q_x = ((15550921060303536733405227206218421303411153835059642979852113370177068459559 \cdot u + 3600690644796987290442135137031285206249789514588827679002920807555440045456) \cdot v^2 + (5475264847170057761513968927972623766794030526092071182289628553939256498415 \cdot u + 16045231392378269041781500461472571507692250280489500368315808811462293278705) \cdot v + (13578969743206791049626159973437892548805434308942546900125761281664803554809 \cdot u + 8414705805435201691796063348962631501393112240468038251361145485591996962517) \cdot w + (2095760324718272519234982374519336043146898698412090865684809945855004557738 \cdot u + 10991749562144480578133596744105999544930359103290000221828602811069330922292) \cdot v^2 + (563526440913857199739302175501170867491400605855901007410492904987821568516 \cdot u + 12175465566401923735806619064706225201231722038674162959277121785143969709483) \cdot v + 5977392629488041467394421854470109162392545860735885669496575455742917555185 \cdot u + 16414735455238441715243107544357668247548687753217062857281803216595664241398$$

- Even bigger for higher security levels!

A naive (pre-Miller) pairing



$$\begin{aligned}
 \ell_{P,P}/v_{[2]P} &: (P) + (P) - ([2]P) - (\mathcal{O}) \\
 \ell_{[2]P,P}/v_{[3]P} &: (P) + ([2]P) - ([3]P) - (\mathcal{O}) \\
 \ell_{[3]P,P}/v_{[4]P} &: (P) + ([3]P) - ([4]P) - (\mathcal{O}) \\
 &\vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \quad \quad \quad \vdots \\
 \ell_{[r-2]P,P}/v_{[r-1]P} &: (P) + ([r-2]P) - ([r-1]P) - (\mathcal{O}) \\
 \ell_{[r-1]P,P}/v_{[r]P} &: (P) + ([r-1]P) - ([r]P) - (\mathcal{O})
 \end{aligned}$$

$$(\prod \ell/v\text{'s}) = r(P) - r(\mathcal{O})$$

Miller observed . . .

- At any intermediate stage of the “naive” algorithm, we have a function $f_{m,P}$ with divisor

$$(f_{m,P}) = m(P) - ([m]P) - (m-1)(\mathcal{O})$$

- Squaring the function doubles the number of zeros and poles

$$f_{m,P} \xrightarrow{\frac{\ell_{[m]P,P}}{v_{[m+1]P}}} f_{m+1,P} \xrightarrow{\frac{\ell_{[m+1]P,P}}{v_{[m+2]P}}} \dots \xrightarrow{\frac{\ell_{[2m-2]P,P}}{v_{[2m-1]P}}} f_{2m-1,P} \xrightarrow{\frac{\ell_{[2m-1]P,P}}{v_{[2m]P}}} f_{2m,P}$$



$f_{m,P}^2 \cdot \frac{\ell_{[m]P,[m]P}}{v_{[2m]P}}$

- We can get from $f_{m,P}$ to $f_{2m,P}$ in one step

Miller's algorithm for $f_{r,P}(D_Q)$

$r = (r_{l-1}, \dots, r_1, r_0)_2$ and initialize: $R = P, f = 1$
for $i = l-2$ to 0 do

- a.
 - i. Compute ℓ/v in the doubling of R
 - ii. $R \leftarrow [2]R$ //(DBL)
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell/v(D_Q)$
- b. if $r_i = 1$ then
 - i. Compute ℓ'/v' in the addition of $R + P$
 - ii. $R \leftarrow R + P$ //(ADD)
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell'/v'(D_Q)$



3. Optimisations

Miller 2.0: BKLS-GHS algorithm for the Tate pairing

$r = (r_{l-1}, \dots, r_1, r_0)_2$ and initialize: $R = P, f = 1$
for $i = l - 2$ to 0 do

①

//(Miller loop)

- a.
 - i. Compute ℓ/v in the doubling of R
 - ii. $R \leftarrow [2]R$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell/v(Q)$
- b. if $r_i = 1$ then
 - i. Compute ℓ'/v' in the addition of $R + P$
 - ii. $R \leftarrow R + P$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell'/v'(Q)$

②

$f \leftarrow f^{(q^k-1)/r}$

(final exponentiation)



et al. &



et al.: **Never mind D_Q , use Q !**

Miller 2.0: BKLS-GHS algorithm for the Tate pairing

$r = (r_{l-1}, \dots, r_1, r_0)_2$ and initialize: $R = P, f = 1$
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- a.
 - i. Compute ℓ in the doubling of R
 - ii. $R \leftarrow [2]R$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell(Q)$
- b. if $r_i = 1$ then
 - i. Compute ℓ' in the addition of $R + P$
 - ii. $R \leftarrow R + P$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell'(Q)$

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$f \leftarrow f^{(q^k - 1)/r}$

(final exponentiation)



et al. &



et al.: **Can do without $v(Q)$!**

Miller 2.0: BKLS-GHS algorithm for the Tate pairing

$r = (r_{l-1}, \dots, r_1, r_0)_2$ and initialize: $R = P, f = 1$
for $i = l - 2$ to 0 do

①

//(Miller loop)

- a.
 - i. Compute ℓ in the (**projective**) doubling of R
 - ii. $R \leftarrow [2]R$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell(Q)$
- b. if $r_i = 1$ then
 - i. Compute ℓ' in the (**projective**) addition of $R + P$
 - ii. $R \leftarrow R + P$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell'(Q)$

②

$f \leftarrow f^{(q^k - 1)/r}$

(final exponentiation)



et al.,




et al.: **Avoid inversions altogether!**

Torsion subgroups, twisted curves, and Type 3 pairings


- Recall that once we extend up to \mathbb{F}_{q^k} , we collect all r^2 points in the r -torsion
- They must form $(r + 1)$ cyclic subgroups of order $r \dots$

Defining \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 in the torsion $E[r] \cong \mathbb{Z}_r \times \mathbb{Z}_r$




- **Galbraith-Paterson-Smart (Shacham):** 4 types of pairings depending on our placement of \mathbb{G}_2


Pairing types




Type 1: supersingular only $k \leq 6$



Type 2: can't keep hashing



Type 3: no $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$



Type 4: \mathbb{G}_2 not cyclic


The twisted curve

- There is an efficiently computable isomorphism from the trace-zero subgroup $\mathbb{G}_2 \in E[r]$ to the “base-field” subgroup of its twist $E'/\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}}$

The twisted curve

- There is an efficiently computable isomorphism from the trace-zero subgroup $\mathbb{G}_2 \in E[r]$ to the “base-field” subgroup of its twist $E'/\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}}$


e.g. $E/\mathbb{F}_{11} : y^2 = x^3 + 4$, $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{11}) = 12$, so $r = 3$ with $k = 2$ and $d = 2$, i.e. $E'/\mathbb{F}_{11} : y^2 = x^3 - 4$



The twisted curve

- A twist of degree d means E' is defined over $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}}$.
- For elliptic curves we can have $d \in \{2, 3, 4, 6\}$

e.g. $E/\mathbb{F}_{103} : y^2 = x^3 + 72$, $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{103}) = 84$, $r = 7$, $k = 6$, $d = 6$



- **Warning:** can work with $Q' = \Psi^{-1}(Q) \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}})$, but must move back at function evaluation time so pairing is in \mathbb{F}_{q^k}

High-degree twists: $d = 3, 4, 6$

- $d = 2$ quadratic twists always available (when $2 \mid k$), but higher twists need special curves
 - $d = 3, 6$ need $y^2 = x^3 + b$ (i.e. $j(E) = 0$ or $D = -3$)
 - $d = 4$ need $y^2 = x^3 + ax$ (i.e. $j(E) = 1728$ or $D = -1$)
- **Fortunately all of the best parameterised families give curves of the shape we want** (e.g. $k = 12$ BN had $y^2 = x^3 + b$)
- We also prefer $k = 2^i \cdot 3^j$ because ...

Towered extension field arithmetic



Koblitz-Menezes '05

- For $k = 2^i 3^j$, build extension field as a sequence of quadratic and cubic subextensions (preferably binomials)
 - Karatsuba-like tricks make arithmetic much faster
 - easier to implement and twisted subfields constructed inherently
- e.g. a $k = 12$ tower

$$\mathbb{F}_q \xrightarrow{\beta^2 - \alpha} \mathbb{F}_{q^2} \xrightarrow{\gamma^3 - \beta} \mathbb{F}_{q^6} \xrightarrow{\delta^2 - \gamma} \mathbb{F}_{q^{12}}.$$

- Instead of $\mathbb{F}_{q^{12}}$ multiplications costing 144 \mathbb{F}_q multiplications, they cost $3 \cdot 3 \cdot 6 = 54$ \mathbb{F}_q multiplications
- **Finding a nice tower is not always possible**

Straight to ate (sorry η_T): Miller 3.0



Hess - Smart - Vercauteren

- In \mathbb{G}_2 (the trace-zero subgroup), we have $\pi(Q) = [q]Q$
- Frobenius acts non-trivially and stays within \mathbb{G}_2
- Use this to define a Tate-like pairing, but with a shorter loop

$$a_T(Q, P) = f_{T, Q}(P)^{(q^k-1)/r}$$

- Note Q and P have switched roles, so most of the work in Miller's algorithm is done in the extension field \mathbb{F}_{q^k}
- But we use the twist to pull computation down to $\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}}$
- Trade-off very favourable when $T \ll r$ and $d = 4, 6$

Vercauteren's optimal ate pairing: Miller 3.1

- **Vercauteren:** ate pairing a_T is just a special case of a more general pairing

$$a_{\lambda_i}(Q, P) = f_{\lambda_i, Q}(P)^{(q^k-1)/r}$$

where $\lambda_i = q^i \bmod r$.

- We want smallest λ_i (loop length) possible
- Can do even better: find linear combination $\sum_{i=0}^{l-1} c_i \lambda_i \equiv 0 \bmod r$, where c_i are all short, then

$$(Q, P) \mapsto \prod_{i=0}^{l-1} f_{c_i, Q}(P) \cdot \prod_{i=0}^{l-1} \ell_i$$

defines a bilinear pairing, where the ℓ_i are all simple “one-off” line functions

- Vercauteren proves: $\max\{c_i\} \leq r^{1/\varphi(k)}$
- **Optimal pairing:** loop length at most $\log_2 r/\varphi(k) + \epsilon$
- Parameterised families make it easy to satisfy this bound (one $c_i(x)$)

Miller 3.1: optimal ate pairing

$m = (m_{l-1}, \dots, m_1, m_0)_2$ and initialize: $R' = Q' = \Psi^{-1}(Q)$,
 $f = 1$
for $i = l - 2$ to 0 do

①

//(Miller loop)

- a.
 - i. Compute ℓ in the projective doubling of R'
 - ii. $R' \leftarrow [2]R'$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell(P)$ (untwist Q')
- b. if $m_i = 1$ then
 - i. Compute ℓ'' in the projective addition of $R + P$
 - ii. $R' \leftarrow R' + Q'$
 - iii. $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell''(P)$ (untwist Q')

②

$f \leftarrow f^{(q^k - 1)/r}$

(final exponentiation)

BN $k = 12$ curves have $\varphi(k) = 4$

Instead of looping to $r(x) = 36x^4 + 36x^3 + 18x^2 + 6x + 1$, we loop to $c(x) = 6x + 2$, e.g. our loop changes from

$r = 1461501624496790265145447380994971188499300027613$

to $m = 448873741399$

Fast explicit formulas


- C-Lange-Naehrig PKC2010: presented fastest explicit formulas for doing the group operation and line computation
- All practical scenarios covered

Curve Curve order Twist deg.	Record	DBL ADD mADD	Prev. Record	DBL ADD mADD
$y^2 = x^3 + ax$ - $d = 2, 4$	C-Lange- Naehrig'10 $\mathcal{W}_{(1,2)}$	2m + 8s 12m + 7s 9m + 5s	Ionica-Joux Arene <i>et al.</i> \mathcal{J}	1m + 11s 10m + 6s 7m + 6s
$y^2 = x^3 + c^2$ $3 \mid \#E$ $d = 2, 6$	C-Hisil-Boyd- Gonzalez Nieto-Wong'09 \mathcal{P}	3m + 5s 14m + 2s 10m + 2s	Arene <i>et al.</i> \mathcal{P}	3m + 8s 10m + 6s 7m + 6s
$y^2 = x^3 + b$ $3 \nmid \#E$ $d = 2, 6$	C-Lange- Naehrig'10 \mathcal{P}	2m + 7s 14m + 2s 10m + 2s	Arene <i>et al.</i> \mathcal{J}	3m + 8s 10m + 6s 7m + 6s
$y^2 = x^3 + b$ - $d = 3$	C-Lange- Naehrig'10 \mathcal{P}	6m + 7s 16m + 3s 13m + 3s	El Mrabet <i>et al.</i> \mathcal{P}	8m + 9s ADD/mADD <i>not reported</i>

- Note: improvements/adjustments have since been made in various scenarios - Aranha *et al.* tweaked our formulas in their record-breaking paper

4. Pairings at the 256-bit security level (and beyond)

256-bit security wants $\rho \cdot k = 30$



The BLS family with $k = 24$



Barreto

Lynn

Scott

- e.g. Barreto-Lynn-Scott (among many other contributions) gave curves with $k = 24$:

$$q(x) = (x - 1)^2(x^8 - x^4 + 1)/3 + x;$$

$$n(x) = (x - 1)^2(x^8 - x^4 + 1)/3;$$

$$r(x) = x^8 - x^4 + 1; \quad t(x) = x + 1$$

- when $q = q(x)$, $r = r(x)$ are prime, guaranteed a curve $E/\mathbb{F}_q : y^2 = x^3 + b$ with $r \mid n = \#E$.
- Notice $\rho = 1.25$, so $\rho \cdot k = 30$ (nice!)
- Note that $\deg(t(x)) = \deg(r(x))/\varphi(k)$, so ate pairing is already optimal - loop length is x (nice)

Example: searching for BLS curves

$$q(x) = (x - 1)^2(x^8 - x^4 + 1)/3 + x;$$

$$r(x) = x^8 - x^4 + 1.$$

- Kick-start with $x = 2^{64} = 18446744073709551616$ (targeting 256-bit security): $x \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$, $x \leftarrow x + 3$
- soon enough $x = 18446744073709563373$
 $q =$
15208135392074080989272706652458494633978103633021895928177230523400110387220520735520035558505
43059610293588875674461210160589181740516396182213025676897921852432341904308046467786796909960221
- soon after $x = 18446744073709568134$
 $q =$
152081353920741202406074204344187845907416165206148514542547681060676871445712171751406826067585
8946726622675208621738650395266513452695828995492519266950330867144614888025492087559518474496777
- **moral: thousands/millions/billions... of possible curves to choose from... some of them are much better than others!**


Attractive subfamilies of BLS curves for high-security

C-Lauter-Naehrig'11

Instead of $x \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$

$x \pmod{72}$	$\rho(x) \pmod{72}$	$n(x) \pmod{72}$	efficient tower	curve E	correct twist E'
7	19	12	✓	$y^2 = x^3 + 1$	$y^2 = x^3 \pm 1/v$
16	19	3	✓	$y^2 = x^3 + 4$	$y^2 = x^3 \pm 4v$
31	43	12	✓	$y^2 = x^3 + 1$	$y^2 = x^3 \pm v$
64	19	27	✓	$y^2 = x^3 - 2$	$y^2 = x^3 \pm 2/v$

Can always tower with any of ...



Twist type: M vs. D

- For quartic and sextic twists, there are actually two possibilities for the twist - only one has $r \mid \#E(\mathbb{F}_{q^{k/d}})$ - this is the one we want
- e.g. For $E/\mathbb{F}_q : y^2 = x^3 + b$, sextic twist is one of $y^2 = x^3 + b \cdot i$ (type M) or $y^2 = x^3 + b/i$ (type D)
- Scott'09: either type- M or type- D will have a worse “untwisting” isomorphism than the other, so reject those instances

Remedy: C-Lange-Naehrig'10


If (optimal) ate $a_m(Q, P) = a_m(\Psi(Q'), P)$ is bilinear, then so is $a_m(Q', P')$, i.e. can compute pairing entirely on E or E'

- If twist is Type- M , then $a_m(Q', P')$ (twisting) is best
- If twist is Type- D , then $a_m(Q, P)$ (untwisting) is best

Particularly friendly members of family trees

- For BLS $k = 24$, we used $x = 7, 16, 31, 64 \pmod{72}$ instead of $x \equiv 1 \pmod{3} \dots$
- But what happened to the other congruencies?
- “*Particularly friendly members of family trees*”: *eprint 2012/072* - wrote a script that exhausts the subcongruencies in each family until all the best options are found
- For all the most popular families with $k = 8, 12, 16, 18, 24, 27, 32, 36, 48$, constructs a *family tree* . . .
- Tree branches depending on
 - 1 Best tower
 - 2 Curve constant
 - 3 Twist type

e.g. KSS $k = 16$ family tree: $y^2 = x^3 + ax$



Picking fruits in the trees: KSS $k = 16$

rating	equiv. class for x' ($x' = x/5$)	tower	a	twist type	\mathbb{G}_1 gen. $[h](\cdot, \cdot)$	\mathbb{G}'_2 gen. $[h'](\cdot, \cdot)$	%
*****	61, 93 mod 112	T_1	1	M	-	$(v-1, \sqrt{(v-1)^3 + v(v-1)})$	12.2
	5, 37 mod 112	T_1	1	D	-	$(-v, \sqrt{-v^3 - 1})$	12.7
	47, 79 mod 112	T_1	2	D	-	$(2/v, \sqrt{\frac{8}{v^3} + \frac{4}{v^2}})$	12.1
	23, 103 mod 112	T_1	-2	M	$(1, \sqrt{-1})$	-	13.1
****	$\{19, \dots, 1531\}_{16}$ mod 1680	T_2	3	M	$(1, 2)$	$(3/v, \sqrt{\frac{27}{v^3} + \frac{9}{v^2}})$	7.9
***	1153, 1633 mod 1680	T_2	5	D	$(2, 2\sqrt{3})$	-	0.9

Favourite picks from the $k = 16$ KSS tree.

$\mathbb{F}_p \xrightarrow{\mathbb{F}_p[u]/(u^2+u_i)} \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \xrightarrow{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}[v]/(u^8-v_i)} \mathbb{F}_{p^{16}}$			
T_i	T_1	T_2	T_3
(u_i, v_i)	$(2, u)$	$(3, u)$	$(5, u)$


Efficient towerng options in the $k = 16$ KSS tree.

Particularly friendly members of family trees

- Gives a way to streamline your search and pre-order your pairing properties
- More useful at higher security levels where
 - Search space grows
 - Primality testing slows down
- Details how to search, but also provides many low-hamming weight curves that save you having to
- **However, paper needs a re-write**

5. Pairings at the 192-bit security level

192-bit security wants $\rho \cdot k \approx 20$



The best family for 192-bit security

- BN curves with $k = 12$ fall short (i.e. ground field is too big)
- KSS curves with $k = 16$ have $\rho = 1.25$ so $\rho \cdot k = 20$, but only have a quartic twist down to \mathbb{F}_{p^4}
- KSS curves with $k = 18$ have $\rho = 1.33$ so $\rho \cdot k = 24$, but they have a sextic twist down to \mathbb{F}_{p^3}
- Final exponentiations are similar
- **So which family reigns supreme?**

BLS $k = 12$ for 192-bit security

- **Pairing 2012: Aranha, Fuentes-Castañeda, Knapp, Menezes and Rodríguez-Henríquez:** None of the above!!!
- Surprising result: BLS $k = 12$ curves have $\rho = 1.5$, and were overlooked by myself, Mike Scott, and others. . .
- 14,000,000 cycles for 192-bit pairing (compare to 1,600,000 at 128-bit level)
- Another cool result from Aranha *et al.* ($\times 2$): **the Weil pairing is back!**
- At higher levels of security, the final exponentiation swamps the computation, so the (shortened) Weil pairing can outperform optimal ate (in parallelizable environments)
- Simpler polynomials yield nicer final exponentiations (KSS are more complicated)

6. Work in progress

Whoops!

- Very common scenario: in the pairing $e(P, Q)$, one of the arguments is fixed as a long term secret key (or constant public param, etc)
- We can exploit this and perform precomputations
- C-Stebila'10 - merging iterations gives speedups for optimal ate pairings
- Scott'11: “would give a small but useful speedup”
- **But: I majorly stuffed up at LatinCrypt'10:** used affine, but recently realised projective would be much better

	128-bit optimal pairing $k = 12$ BN curve $\mathbb{F}_q = 254$ bits		256-bit optimal pairing $k = 24$ BLS curve $\mathbb{F}_q = 639$ bits	
precomp method	Miller loop cost	\approx storage required (bits)	Miller loop cost	\approx storage required (bits)
none	6469 m_1	-	19069 m_1	-
Scott '05	5017 m_1	70,000	14794 m_1	340,000
quadrupling	4446 m_1	75,000	12898 m_1	368,000
octupling	4053 m_1	100,000	11673 m_1	510,000

Updated projections

Thanks for your attention