Waiting to Inhale: Reducing Stigma in the Medical Cannabis Industry

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Abstract
When a new industry category is predicated on a product or activity subject to “core” stigma—meaning its very nature is stigmatized—the actors trying to establish it may struggle to gain the resources they need to survive and grow. To explain the process of reducing an industry category’s stigma, we take an inductive approach to understanding how actors in the U.S. medical cannabis industry collectively attempted to create and disseminate a moral public image based on healing and patients’ rights. We find that reducing category-level core stigma is a phased effort that takes place across different relational spaces. A moral agenda based on broadly acceptable values jumpstarts the process, and the industry then creates a new moral prototype reflecting these values that industry actors can identify with. Category members must publicly disidentify with the current, stigmatized prototypes and infuse the new moral prototype among their stakeholder audiences through their language and practices, creating emotional connections that lead to cognitive acceptance. This process is messy, as individual organizations often need to continue engaging in stigmatized behaviors to survive, even as they publicly disidentify with them. Our process model also identifies ways in which category emergence in core-stigmatized categories differs from the process for non-stigmatized categories.

Keywords: stigma, categories, entrepreneurship, deviance, industry

Imagine starting a business when the federal government has declared your product or service illegal, banks will not let you open a checking account, you cannot deduct your business expenses or pay your taxes through conventional means, you are forced to pay your employees in cash, your friends and neighbors look at you with suspicion, and many of your customers do not want to admit they use your product or service. These are the sorts of things that can happen (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009; Kovaleski, 2014; Voss, 2015) when an...
entire industry category is predicated on a product or activity that is subject to “core” stigma (Hudson, 2008).

Core stigma is “a vilifying label that contaminates a group of similar peers” (Vergne, 2012: 1028), and category-based core stigmas are harmful stereotypes about firms that share similar devalued or discredited attributes that overwhelm perceptions of any positive attributes individual firms may have (Devers et al., 2009). Core stigmas are difficult to remove because they are tied to “core routines, core outputs, and/or core customers” (Hudson, 2008: 252), such as the violence involved in mixed martial arts (Helms and Patterson, 2014), the weapons sold by the arms industry (Vergne, 2012), and the homosexual men served by gay bath houses (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009). Additionally, because core stigma relates to category members’ central attributes and identities (Goffman, 1963), exiting the category is often not an option, as doing so would require firms to abandon their reason for being. Because the stigma is attached to the overall category, firms can take individual actions to cope with the stigma, but they find it difficult to change the generalized perceptions of the entire category by themselves. The question thus becomes, how can a category’s core stigma be reduced?

Category stigma reduction has received limited attention in the organizational stigma literature (Adams, 2012). Instead, scholars have typically focused on how firms in stigmatized industries act independently to manage the effects of the stigma through practices such as shielding, straddling, or co-opting. They shield to protect important stakeholders from the negative effects of the stigma (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009), they straddle multiple categories to divert attention from the stigmatized category (Vergne, 2012; Voss, 2015), and they co-opt negative labels to strategically use their stigma to galvanize support from those with similar values (Helms and Patterson, 2014). But this stream of research has not considered the category-level implications of organizations’ independent actions and whether their efforts to manage stigma at the organization level reduce, perpetuate, or even worsen the overall category’s stigma.

A few studies that have begun to explore how a category’s core stigma can be reduced suggest that it calls for more coordinated efforts than have typically been considered. They found that collective actions such as professionalization, political activism, and certification by reputable or high-status actors can reduce a category’s stigma (Warren, 1980; Adams, 2012; Clair, Daniel, and Lamont, 2016). Warren (1980: 67) also suggested that collectives can engage in a process of “aristocratization” whereby “deviant collectivities frame themselves as a chosen people” by engaging in some form of moral heroism that makes them superior to “normals”—for example by defining themselves as the “non-drinking alcoholic” or “clean dope fiend.”

With a few exceptions (e.g., Adams, 2012) these studies focus on stigmas affecting groups of individuals instead of organizations. As such, they identify useful but isolated tactics for reducing stigma that may not be generalizable to organizational categories. Thus they offer limited insights into the overall process of reducing category-level stigma, the more macro effects of individual organizations’ efforts to obtain resources, and the contestation that shapes the...
process. They also do not focus on the relationships between the category’s and individual firms’ rhetoric and actions (Pfeffer, 1981). Consequently, we have a limited understanding of the process through which an industry category’s core stigma can be reduced. This is important, because stigma can thwart growth, and failure to understand these category-level processes can lead to ineffectual efforts to reduce category stigma.

To understand the core stigma reduction process, we conducted an inductive study of the U.S. medical cannabis industry, whose central practices, products, and providers have been stigmatized. Given our limited understanding of the category-level stigma reduction process and our interest in theory building, we employed a qualitative, grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1994; Charmaz, 2006) and process analysis (Langley, 1999) approach. We used archival, direct observation, and interview data to understand the sources of the industry’s stigma and the process through which a variety of industry members, both collectively and individually, attempted to destigmatize it. We also considered firms’ clandestine attempts to acquire resources while simultaneously striving to change the public’s perceptions of their industry.

We contribute to the stigma literature by developing a process model of category-level core stigma reduction that considers how to remove as opposed to manage a deeply engrained stigma. We explore the coordinated but conflicted nature of this process, how resource considerations can lead firms to continue privately engaging in stigmatized behaviors that are publicly denounced, and the separation required for this to occur. We also examine how category emergence (Durand and Khaire, 2017) may be used to integrate the actions of industry actors and change the associations that audiences make between stigmatized products and broader societal values—and how the category emergence process may differ when the core product is stigmatized.

**THE CATEGORICAL NATURE OF STIGMA**

Core stigma is a categorical phenomenon. Much of what we know about stigma comes from the seminal work of Goffman (1963), who focused on individuals tainted because characteristics such as their physical attributes, race, religion, or national origin deviated from societal perceptions of what is considered “normal.” Goffman conceptualized stigma as a social categorization process, positing that as we encounter strangers we immediately try to categorize them based on our perceptions of their attributes and social identities.

“Culturally given categories are present even at a preconscious level and provide people with a means of making shorthand decisions that free them to attend to other matters” (Link and Phelan, 2001: 369).

As with stigmas based on individuals’ characteristics, firms can be stigmatized simply because of their similarities to other devalued firms (Vergne, 2012). In other words, the categorical nature of stigma “links an organization to a negatively evaluated category of organizations collectively perceived by a specific stakeholder group as having values that are expressly counter to its own” (Devers et al., 2009: 157). Audiences’ negative perceptions of a category will often dominate any positive perceptions (Voss, 2015), and they are motivated to distance themselves from stigmatized industry categories to avoid having the stigma transfer to themselves (Vergne, 2012). Furthermore, audiences often disidentify from (Elsbach and Bhattacharya, 2001) and impose sanctions
on organizations in stigmatized categories (Sutton and Callahan, 1987), making it difficult for them to hire employees, attract customers, secure financing (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Hudson, 2008; Vergne, 2012; Voss, 2015), and gain or maintain legitimacy (Piazza and Perretti, 2015). Ultimately, stigma can stifle markets (Chan, 2009; Anteby, 2010; Livne, 2014), making it important for these firms to confront the stigma. Below, we consider how firms and industry categories have contended with core stigma.

Organizational Responses to Stigma

Prior research on organizational stigma has suggested organizations experience either "core" or "event" stigma (Hudson, 2008), with event stigma resulting from negative social evaluations based on "some anomalous or episodic negative event" (Hudson, 2008: 253) rather than the organization’s core characteristics. Examples of actions that trigger event stigma include bankruptcies (Sutton and Callahan, 1987), tree spikings by environmental activists (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992), homelessness at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), and product recalls (Zavyalova et al., 2012). Because event stigma is related to a specific infraction, organizations can remove it by decoupling the illegitimate actions of specific actors in the organization from its more legitimate core (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Through decoupling, an organization can "credibly claim that the offending part acted without the consent or knowledge of the rest of the organization," allowing the organization to "redraw its boundaries to exclude the offending part(s)" (Devers et al., 2009: 158). In this way, firms can deflect attention away from (Zavyalova et al., 2012), justify (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992), or accept partial responsibility for their actions (Sutton and Callahan, 1987; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Decoupling has its limitations, however, as to be effective units within the organization must be loosely coupled (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992).

Reducing stigma is more difficult for core-stigmatized organizations. Core stigma is identity based and calls into question central characteristics of the organization (Hudson, 2008). Examples include gay bathhouses (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009), arms dealers (Vergne, 2012), brothels (Wolfe and Blithe, 2015), and pornography producers (Voss, 2015). Because the stigmatized attributes are core to the firm’s identity and purpose, they are tightly coupled, making decoupling largely unavailable for reducing stigma. Decoupling would require eliminating its key attributes, and the organization would cease to exist (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009). As such, management research has primarily focused on how core-stigmatized organizations cope with their stigma. For example, Hudson and Okhuysen (2009) illustrated how gay bathhouses employed shielding and concealing strategies—organizational survival efforts centered on safeguarding resource-providing audiences such as customers and suppliers from stigma transfer. Bathhouses picked isolated locations, sourced suppliers from their personal networks, provided customers with discreet membership cards, and hid the true nature of what they did under the guise of "gym" activities. Similarly, Wolfe and Blithe (2015) found that brothels were concealed from disapproving audiences, but they selectively revealed parts of themselves to attract customers.

Organizations have also coped with stigma by straddling stigmatized and non-stigmatized categories (Vergne, 2012) or even by exiting the stigmatized
category altogether when the organization has business interests in multiple categories (Piazza and Perretti, 2015). Category straddling can shift stakeholders’ attention to the organizations’ more legitimate practices. For example, adult entertainment companies *Playboy* and *Hustler* increased their social acceptance by diversifying into more mainstream activities; they opened nightclubs, published magazines on the topics of video games and photography, hired respected writers for their lifestyle magazines, and provided funding for scientific research on sexuality (Voss, 2015).

Co-optation, whereby organizations use the stigma in beneficial ways, seems to be one of the few theorized options for reducing core stigma. Helms and Patterson (2014) showed how mixed-martial-arts (MMA) firms used stigmatizing labels to draw attention and build support among critical audiences. Once they built support, they altered their offensive activities to encourage broader support from additional audiences (Helms and Patterson, 2014).

Similarly, Hampel and Tracey (2016) demonstrated the utility of co-optation in examining the history of the Thomas Cook travel agency, which disrupted the travel industry by offering services to the masses at a time when travel was primarily the province of the upper classes. Societal elites rejected this innovation but were repudiated by the agency. Hampel and Tracey (2016: 25) noted, “Cook’s apparent aim was to portray his critics as selfish elitists who held society back by wanting to prevent others benefitting from the advantages of travel.” As the firm grew, it changed its approach to one of co-optation, enticing its stigmatizers into becoming supporters by offering services (such as international news) that appealed to them.

Thus much of the research on core-stigmatized organizations has considered how they act in isolation to cope with the effects of stigma on their individual firms and has given limited attention to the collective actions necessary for reducing their category’s stigma. Below we examine the scant literature on reducing category stigma.

### Managing Stigma at the Category Level

Organizational categories are conceptual boundaries that allow audiences to cluster organizations by labeling them according to common attributes and to aggregate specific attributes into more-generic classification systems (Fligstein, 2001; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010). These categories can be based on attributes such as the markets in which organizations participate (Granqvist, Grodal, and Woolley, 2013), industry membership (Piazza and Perretti, 2015), or product offerings (Lounsbury and Rao, 2004). Categories allow for judgments about the member organizations’ value and worth (Vergne and Wry, 2014); if the member firms are devalued, the result is a stigmatized category.

Given that core stigma affects an entire organizational category, we need category-level theory that helps us understand how to address it. Organization-level approaches to stigma management are possible when firms remain sufficiently small that their immediate networks can provide needed resources (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009). The literature’s current focus on coping behaviors does not recognize the tensions between the actions individual firms take to meet their immediate resource needs and the goal to create shared meaning systems and collective identities that will sustain the category’s long-term
viability (DiMaggio, 1988). This oversight exists in part because when stigma research moved from the individual to the organizational level, scholars largely stopped treating core stigma as a category-level construct and focused only on its organization-level effects (Vergne, 2012).

As we will discuss in our findings, part of the process for reducing a category’s stigma can involve establishing a new category. The categories literature provides evidence for how actors can establish new categories by manipulating materials (e.g., physical artifacts, roles, and practices), symbols, and rhetoric to alter categorical boundaries and the cognitive associations that audiences have with particular categorical attributes. Durand and Khaire (2017) identified two ways that new categories are formed: category emergence and category creation. Category emergence is generally initiated by peripheral actors willing to upend the existing order to introduce new artifacts and roles that are not part of the current category system. These material shifts precede a change in the labels and rhetoric that delineate the criteria for category membership, and the legitimacy of these criteria have to be explicated and defended. Some examples include the emergence of the nouvelle cuisine (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005) and minivan categories (Rosa et al., 1999).

In contrast, category creation is primarily cognitive, with central or high-status actors redefining characteristics in an existing category. Rather than the material changes preceding labeling, as in category emergence, the labeling precedes material changes, and the legitimacy of the category comes from the status of the actors making the change. For example, by creating a new category for “light cigarettes” (Hsu and Grodal, 2015: 28), manufacturers aimed to convince users that the product was safer than “full body” cigarettes, even though there were few material differences between the two. Category creators also tend to suppress attributes that are either devalued (Hsu and Grodal, 2015) or contradictory to their overall narratives (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000). If the process is successful, the proponents of the new category create strategic advantages for themselves.

Actors start with a positive reference point in both category creation and category emergence, as the preexisting category they compare the new category with is legitimate. Thus these processes do not account for the ways categories form around stigmatized attributes or how organizations can create a positive category based on negative core attributes. Further, this literature provides limited insights into the process involved in reducing the stigma of contested categories, particularly when the stigmatized category is itself not well established.

Adams (2012) considered organizational tactics for reducing category stigma. He conducted a comparative historical analysis of the plastic surgery and tattoo industries and found that the plastic surgery industry established an industry association to define the boundaries of their field, and that destigmatization occurred when the major medical associations began recognizing their industry association. He also found that the tattoo industry attempted to remove its stigma by redefining the meanings of its practices and attempting to recast its core product as art. Adams (2012: 158) concluded, however, that the tattoo industry’s “level of internal competition and lack of organization hampers the ability of the industry as a whole to effectively reframe the image of tattooing and refocus attention away from the more stigmatized elements of the industry.” This finding hints at the tension between the goals of the collective and
actions of individual organizations, but this tension is unexplored. Thus while Adams’s (2012) study provides a useful starting point for exploring issues related to reducing category stigma, it leaves unanswered the nature of the relationship between category- and organization-level actions as the process unfolds, as well as the actual process through which stigma reduction occurs. Also unexplored is the role of individual firm survival and resource needs in the process (neither industry was ever illegal) and the internal conflict inherent in stigma reduction.

Our goal is to build theory that explains the process of reducing an industry category’s stigma. While “firms have greater capacity for action when standing together than when remaining apart” (Voss, 2015: 128), these actions can also create tensions as firms attend to their individual needs.

METHODS
Research Context

The cannabis plant, also known as marijuana or marihuana, has had a long and controversial history. Reports suggest that cannabis was grown in China at least since 4,000 B.C. and was used for ailments such as constipation, rheumatic pains, malaria, and “female disorders” (Grinspoon, 2005). Cannabis was also used medicinally in the U.S. and was available both with and without a prescription (Snyder, 1970). To understand the stigma reduction process, it is important to first understand how cannabis became stigmatized.

In 1930 President Hoover created the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN)—subsequently renamed the Drug Enforcement Agency—and appointed Harry J. Anslinger to lead the agency. Anslinger committed himself to eradicating narcotics, which for him included cannabis. He reconstructed the meaning of the word marijuana, suggesting that among ancient Aztecs it meant “captured prisoner” or “addict,” contributing to the onset of cannabis’s stigma. He also circulated fabricated stories of immigrants—under the influence of cannabis—engaging in violence, promiscuity, and homosexuality. He used his influence to place newspaper stories that alluded to the users’ demographics and the link between cannabis use and violence. This all led to the emergence of various stigmatizing labels, from “killer weed” to “killer of motivation” (Geluardi, 2010). Table 1 provides a timeline of the labels associated with cannabis; the events crucial in initiating the phases of our model took place between the late 1970s and mid-1990s.

Legislation around cannabis also changed. First, the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act prohibitively taxed cannabis to limit its public availability. Then, despite—or perhaps because of—growing marijuana use in the 1960s, in 1970 the Controlled Substances Act classified cannabis as a Schedule I drug, defined as “substances, or chemicals . . . with no currently accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse” (Drug Enforcement Agency, n.d.). Schedule I drugs are the most dangerous of all the drug schedules with “the potential to create severe psychological and/or physical dependence” (Drug Enforcement Agency, n.d.). These legislative actions contributed to cannabis’s stigma and limited the prospects for using cannabis as medicine, because doctors cannot prescribe Schedule I drugs and scientists have great difficulty accessing them for research studies.
Table 1. A Brief Timeline of Cannabis in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Description/example quote</th>
<th>Labels used for cannabis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1800s to early 1900s</td>
<td>Cannabis used medicinally and supported by the medical community in the U.S.</td>
<td>Medical use of cannabis documented in the 1860 &quot;Report of the Ohio State Medical Committee on Cannabis Indica.&quot; (McMeens, 1860)</td>
<td>“medicine”</td>
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<td>1930</td>
<td>President Hoover creates the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), Harry Anslinger picked to lead the agency.</td>
<td>Federal efforts to devalue and stigmatize cannabis begin.</td>
<td>“killer weed”</td>
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<td>1930s</td>
<td>Mexican and West Indian immigrants who use cannabis enter the U.S. At the same time, the FBN aims to reduce narcotic use. Cannabis gets improperly categorized as a narcotic.</td>
<td>“Although as appalling in its effects on the human mind and body as narcotics, the consumption of marijuana appears to be proceeding, virtually unchecked in Colorado and other Western States with a large Spanish-American population. The poisonous weed which maddens the sense and emaciates the body of the user, is being sold more or less openly in pool halls and beer gardens and, according to some authorities, it is being peddled to school children. . . . Most crimes of violence in this section, especially in the country districts, are laid to users of the drug.” (NYT, Sept. 16, 1934)</td>
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<td>1936</td>
<td><em>Reefer Madness</em></td>
<td>A film about the dangers of cannabis use</td>
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<td>1937</td>
<td><em>Marihuana Tax Act</em></td>
<td>Cannabis taxed essentially to prohibit its use</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950s–1960s</td>
<td>Cannabis use increases among students at prestigious U.S. colleges and universities.</td>
<td>“Many succumb to the drug as a handy means of withdrawing from the inevitable stresses and legitimate demands of society. The evasion of problems and escape from reality seem to be among the desired effects of the use of marijuana.” (Judge J. Tauro, 1967, cited in Himmelstein, 1983)</td>
<td>“gateway drug” &quot;killer of motivation&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td><em>Controlled Substances Act</em></td>
<td>Cannabis classified as a Schedule I drug, defined as having (1) a high potential of abuse, (2) no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the U.S., and (3) a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical supervision. (USDOJ, 2012)</td>
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(continued)
Nevertheless, in the 1990s a new industry emerged in the U.S. around the medical use of cannabis for treating AIDS patients. San Francisco legalized medical cannabis in 1991, and the state of California followed suit in 1996. After these events medical cannabis dispensaries increasingly became a part of the California landscape. In that same decade four other states—Alaska, Oregon, Washington, and Maine—legalized medical cannabis, and many more followed.

Two critical problems for the industry are access to banking and tax regulations. Because cannabis is federally illegal, banks that do business with cannabis-related businesses are subject to federal punishment. “It is illegal to aid and abet the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of marijuana. It is illegal to conspire to manufacture, distribute, or dispense marijuana” (Hill, 2015: 10). Thus providing a checking account or loan to firms growing or selling cannabis, or accepting their deposits—even in states that have legalized cannabis—can result in federal sanctions under the Money Laundering Control Act. This banking climate created a number of difficulties. First, dispensaries’ transactions needed to be predominantly cash-based, burdening them with managing and protecting their cash. Second, traditionally mundane tasks such as paying employees, vendors, and taxes assumed great significance. For example, it is not uncommon for entrepreneurs to pay their taxes in person with stacks of cash and to use “decoys” when transporting large amounts of

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<td>1978</td>
<td>Supreme Court rules that Robert Randall could grow marijuana to treat his glaucoma.</td>
<td>First recorded use of the term “medical marijuana.”</td>
<td>“pot” “weed” “dope” “stash” “ganja”</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>San Francisco becomes the epicenter of the AIDS epidemic and leads U.S. in confronting AIDS.</td>
<td>Initiate moral agenda.</td>
<td>“medical cannabis”</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>San Francisco Cannabis Buyers’ Club opens.</td>
<td>Moral prototyping begins—one of the first legal dispensaries that serves the needs of AIDS patients.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Industry associations and innovations</td>
<td>Morality infusion begins.</td>
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<td>Jan. 2014</td>
<td>Recreational marijuana</td>
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Table 1. (continued)
cash to confuse would-be robbers (Pierson, 2014). Third, without bank lending, many entrepreneurs have had to rely on their personal funds or expensive short-term loans from individuals for working capital (Kovaleski, 2014).

Firms in the industry also experience major challenges in determining their tax liabilities. Under Section 280E of the federal tax code, “No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business if such trade or business consists of trafficking in controlled substances” (Legal Information Institute, 2015). This means that firms in this industry could have an effective tax rate of between 60 and 90 percent if they cannot deduct business expenses (McCoy, 2014).

Overall, cannabis’s history in the U.S. is contentious, as public perceptions have followed the pendulum swing from acceptability to marginalization and slowly back toward acceptability. The medical cannabis industry is an “extreme situation” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537) of a core-stigmatized industry category seeking to reduce its stigma, making it an ideal setting to study the stigma reduction process.

Data Collection
We primarily focused our data collection on Colorado, Oregon, and Washington because these states had operational medical cannabis dispensaries and did not have the high level of variability in rules governing dispensaries that proved problematic in California. These three states led the way in efforts to destigmatize the industry and influenced the legalization processes in states that legalized later. The data for this study came from three main sources: direct observations, interview data, and archival data. Our data sources, summarized in table A1 in the Online Appendix (http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0001839219851501), allowed us to triangulate the insights that we were generating about the industry. We collected data from 2013 to 2015, but the time period we focused on in our analysis ended in 2013 because recreational cannabis became available in Colorado on January 1, 2014. At that point, medical cannabis was legal in 23 states and the District of Columbia but was illegal at the federal level and classified as a Schedule I drug.

Direct observations. We conducted two types of direct observations: we attended industry conferences and were given dispensary tours. Industry conferences provided an opportunity to embed ourselves in the context and observe firsthand how the dispensary owners, entrepreneurs, and other industry leaders talked about and tried to manage the industry’s core stigma. In 2013 the first author, Kisha, attended an industry conference in Seattle organized by Marijuana Business Daily, the leading trade publication for the cannabis industry. At the time, our primary research focus was on what motivated individuals to start businesses in a stigmatized industry. In 2013 the first author, Kisha, attended an industry conference in Seattle organized by Marijuana Business Daily, the leading trade publication for the cannabis industry. At the time, our primary research focus was on what motivated individuals to start businesses in a stigmatized industry. But attending this conference revealed that a more pressing issue the industry saw itself facing was how to remove its core stigma. The conference was a “field-configuring event” (Lampel and Meyer, 2008: 1026) in which industry actors convened to share beliefs and values, engage in collective sensemaking, and orient the field toward a shared vision and direction (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014) in their efforts to change perceptions about medical cannabis. As such, it was an ideal venue for observing real-time efforts to reduce core stigma.
Kisha attended another of these conferences in 2015 to see how the industry’s approaches had evolved. The tone of the presentations was more “corporate,” with many of the presentations focused on how to liaise with mainstream organizations, and with a significant increase in the number of trade show booths by mainstream firms. Another noteworthy difference was that whereas the conference two years prior had been held at a fairly remote horse racing track (because mainstream hotels would not allow the industry to use their facilities), this conference was held in a luxury hotel in Chicago. Both observations were indicators of the industry’s changing level of acceptance. Finally, Kisha was invited to attend a third day-long conference where ancillary businesses, which provide support services but do not directly touch the plant, could pitch their businesses to wealthy individuals, Wall Street investment bankers, and other potential investors in an effort to gain investments.

Kisha also visited five dispensaries in Colorado and Washington. During these visits she had the opportunity to observe the dispensaries’ front-office operations, and in some cases she was also given behind-the-scenes access, such as tours of the cultivation and production areas and of the consultation rooms where patients were served. Kisha observed organizational practices and asked probing questions about the reasons for those practices.

**Interview data.** Prior to the first conference we were unsuccessful in obtaining interviews with industry members; however, the conferences provided the opportunity to build rapport with industry actors. Thus in addition to helping us refine our research question and interview protocol by highlighting participants’ great desire to destigmatize the industry, they enabled us to develop initial contacts that assisted with purposeful sampling. We wanted to get the prominent industry actors’ insights but were aware that given the nature of the context we needed to be introduced by trusted associates. We therefore also employed snowball sampling, asking informants at the end of our interviews if they could refer us to other industry members.

In 2013 and 2014 we interviewed proprietors of dispensaries and other cannabis-related firms, such as growers and firms producing edible products. We also interviewed influential leaders in the cannabis industry, including activists and others invested in changing public perceptions of the industry. The level of influence enjoyed by many of these people is reflected in the repeated coverage they received from top news outlets in the U.S. We asked research participants about past events, as well as those unfolding in real time. The recency and saliency of events greatly reduced the likelihood of recall bias (Huber and Power, 1985). We used a semi-structured interview protocol that provided the flexibility to pursue topics related to our research interests as they emerged in conversation (see the Online Appendix). Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim; however, because of the sensitive nature of some of the issues it was not always practical or appropriate to record the interviews. As such, we took extensive notes for nine interviews. Overall, we conducted 38 interviews that generally lasted from 45 to 90 minutes.

**Archival data.** We collected archival data concurrently with field data. The archival sources gave us a general understanding of cannabis’s history in the U.S., particularly a congressional commission report that was generated to
“separate fact from fiction, reality from myth, and to achieve a balanced judgement on the marihuana issue” (Shafer, 1972: vii). The commission—a multidisciplinary effort of professionals in areas such as law, medicine, criminology, education, sociology, and psychology—examined the history of cannabis use for both medical and recreational purposes, its biological effects, and its social and legal implications. We used more-recent books on the industry to confirm the historical information in the report and provide a more contemporary view.

In addition, we searched ProQuest Congressional for House and Senate reports, bill documents, and hearings related to the major legislation affecting the sale and use of cannabis. The hearings were especially useful for understanding the debates around these issues. We also used Access World News to search the Denver Post, Seattle Times, and The Oregonian for articles related to the cannabis industry. We picked these newspapers because they have the highest readership in Colorado, Washington, and Oregon, respectively. Sometimes a theme emerged in one of these newspapers, and we then searched more-specialized news outlets for further details. This search resulted in about 900 articles that we downloaded and coded. In addition, we had access to two in-depth industry reports that provided extensive analysis of the current state of the industry and projections for its future (Kreit and Geci, 2011; Abernathy, 2013). Finally, we used a number of books and televised documentaries.

Data Analysis

Given the limited knowledge about category-level core stigma removal, we used a qualitative, inductive research approach to both generate theory and supplement existing theory (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). We followed a grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin, 1994) coupled with process analysis (Langley, 1999) in the design and analysis of this study. We began by using the archival data to develop a chronology of key events in the stigmatization of cannabis, as well as key events in the subsequent development of the medical cannabis industry. We paid close attention to critical junctures or “ruptures” that “durablely transform previous structures and practices” (Sewell, 1996: 843) in the evolution of the industry. These chronologies allowed us to tentatively bracket the time period of the study into three overlapping phases (Langley, 1999) that served as a framework for our analysis and ultimately became the phases of our model. Within these three time periods we employed grounded theory, using both archival and interview data to understand how industry actors moved within and across phases and stages.

Early on we observed that industry actors’ efforts could be categorized into collective and individual organizational actions, and we focused on understanding these distinctions within each period. In this context, we define “collective efforts” as actions and rhetoric that were geared toward the group goal of removing the stigma in order to grow the overall industry. Thus we treated actors as representing the collective when they prioritized the industry’s goal to destigmatize and used language and took actions toward that end. Collective actions were primarily taking place on the front stage and often unfolded in interviews and through group interactions in public forums such as conferences. Conversely, individualized organizational actions primarily focused on protecting the competitiveness and survival of the focal firm and could conflict
with the collective’s goals. These were also observable to a more limited extent at conferences, through interviews, and in the archival data.

With the timeline and tentative time periods in place, we used open coding of our interview data to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon from the perspectives of those who were deeply embedded in it (Locke, 2001; Charmaz, 2006). This helped us develop first-order codes and provisional categories from the raw data. We labeled and categorized direct “in-vivo” quotes from informants to “extract or abstract the most relevant themes” (Kreiner, Hollensbe, and Sheep, 2006: 1036), iterating among the raw data, the insights that were emerging from that data, and the theoretical literature to refine our initial codes. These codes and categories also informed subsequent data collection and coding. For example, initial coding highlighted the importance of efforts to change the labels associated with cannabis. With this insight, we paid close attention to the use of labels in subsequent data collection and revisited the archival data to code for labels that were used to stigmatize cannabis over the course of several decades. In addition, we observed that individual organizational actions were sometimes at odds with the goal of destigmatizing the industry. In subsequent interviews we looked for cues to such actions and carefully probed to try to understand their nature and motivations. We gave informants the option to respond to these questions by describing what others were doing or offering hypotheticals, so that depending on the actions they were not incriminating themselves.

We iterated between our emerging codes and theory, and we used axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1994) to try to understand the relationships across the codes and to aggregate them into more theoretical and abstract second-order themes (Pratt, Rockmann, and Kauffman, 2006; Sonenshein, Nault, and Obodaru, 2017). For example, we recognized that industry actors’ language related to patients’ rights and their use of patient testimonials in their marketing were linked under the more abstract theme of connecting to alternative values. Finally, we aggregated related second-order themes into higher-level theoretical dimensions, comparing their relationships with each other as they unfolded within and across the phases and stages that were emerging from the data. These comparisons allowed us to identify the dynamic process that connects the theoretical dimensions. Figure 1 summarizes our data structure, and table 2 presents additional examples of data related to the theoretical categories. A more detailed version of table 2 appears in the Online Appendix as table A2.

Establishing Trustworthiness

We established trustworthiness through several means. First, we triangulated on issues and claims across diverse data sets. We were able to get various perspectives on certain issues by interviewing the actors while also consulting the media data. In addition, we established the findings’ credibility through our “prolonged engagement at the site” (Guba, 1981: 84). Kisha gained significant entry into the industry and built a good rapport with industry insiders, which led them to open up and provide sensitive information (Krefting, 1991). Industry insiders also offered to connect her with their networks and to host her during visits to the field. We also used peer debriefing (Guba, 1981; Lincoln and Guba, 1985), discussing our findings with and obtaining feedback from another researcher who is skilled in qualitative methodologies but was not invested in the project. Finally, after Kisha completed the open coding and we had
developed the emerging categories, we used a professor with expertise in business and entrepreneurship who was not otherwise involved in the project as a secondary coder to confirm the categories (Butterfield, Treviño, and Ball, 1996; Corley and Gioia, 2004). We provided him with 40 samples of the data on index cards, with each sample representing a coded unit of text that could be a sentence or a paragraph. We gave the coder the codes and their definitions, with instructions to match the data to the codes (Butterfield, Treviño, and Ball, 1996). Overall agreement was .83, an acceptable value (Cohen, 1960).

FINDINGS

In presenting our findings we differentiate between category-level (i.e., collective) actions and responses and individual organizations’ actions and responses. At the industry level, we define collective actions as the framing activities and actions that align with the overall missions and goals of the industry (Benford and Snow, 2000). In the medical cannabis industry, this involved the actions of activists, industry group advocates, medical cannabis entrepreneurs (e.g., growers and edibles manufacturers), and/or dispensary owners who are speaking and acting on behalf of the industry in some capacity—such as in newspaper interviews or public presentations—that align with the industry’s goal to destigmatize. We use the terms “collective” and “category” to refer to actions

![Figure 1. Coding structure.](image-url)
Table 2. Examples of Supporting Data for First-order Codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Initiating moral agenda</th>
<th>Moral prototyping</th>
<th>Morality infusion</th>
<th>Side-stage prototype negotiation</th>
<th>Backstage survival violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code—medical marijuana, patient rights</td>
<td>“Peron’s real mission with the San Francisco Cannabis Buyers Club was to get arrested. Once charged, he planned to launch a defense based on marijuana’s medical necessity. He wanted to prove in court that nothing else made AIDS patients more comfortable.” (Pollick, 2014)</td>
<td>“Ultimately what we are doing here is fulfilling the promise of regulated marijuana businesses, of taking marijuana out of the black market, creating jobs, providing people safe access, and expanding healthcare options for folks.” (AI#2_Conference)</td>
<td>“We presented cannabis not as an intoxicant but presented in the context of wellness. So when you look at our advertising, when you look at our promotional and our advertising materials, when you take a look at our website, we’re not talking to people about getting high or getting wasted. We are really genuinely interested in helping people with their wellness issues.” (D#3_Interview)</td>
<td>“I think that from a consumer point of view, consumers would want cannabis testing to be part of any regulatory model. I’ve heard people within the industry who are resisting doing that who don’t think it’s a good idea because they don’t (a) think it’s necessary and (b) don’t want to pay the cost that’s involved. I don’t share that view. There’s another example where you can see a divergence of interest there.” (D#3_Interview)</td>
<td>“We get the older people who are sort of from the reefer madness era and they don’t know anything about it, they are still very hesitant to try it, and it is very taboo. So those people we are a little more cautious with the way we phrase things I guess. We don’t want to make them feel like you know in a drug den or whatever it is. Other people will just come in and say, ‘Oh, what is the best thing that you have?’ Or something like that, which [we] automatically think that they have shopped around and they are just looking for something to get them high.” (D#32_Interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code—patient rights, patient testimonials</td>
<td>“The stories of sick people have propelled the cause of medical marijuana. Proposition 215 was framed by its supporters as a question of patients’ rights, and their most effective television ads told the stories of cancer patients for whom smoking marijuana brought dramatic relief.” (Pollan, 1997)</td>
<td>“There were a lot of growers that, especially back in 2009, 2010 had been growing marijuana, which had been very illegal for so long. They unfortunately just had a lot of black market connections and activities, and they were criminals. They were also good marijuana growers, but they were criminals.” (D#6_Interview)</td>
<td>“We really just feel like if you show people that you can run a responsible cannabis business and help contribute to society and don’t create a lot of problem, it just goes a long way and really just handling all the propaganda and all the fear that the federal government has pushed on us for the last 75 years.” (D#7_Interview)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Code—negative labels for black market</td>
<td>Code—showcasing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Code—sourcing from black market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the context in which the data were provided (e.g., E#2 Conference vs. E#2 Interview). The personal interviews were an opportunity to differentiate between collective actions and organizational actions that contradicted the collective’s goals and were not meant to be publicly visible.

Figure 2 summarizes our findings and presents our process model. A key finding of our study is that the stigma reduction process was a contentious, multiphased effort involving front-stage collective actions that convey the industry’s moral agenda and practices, backstage organizational coping activities by medical cannabis entrepreneurs and dispensary owners that conflicted with the message presented on the front stage, and collective side-stage negotiations. Goffman (1959) characterized social life as a performance that unfolds across various stages. These stages provide access to information and “a given pattern of access to the behavior of other people” (Meyrowitz, 1986: 37).

Goffman (1959) argued that when actors know their actions are visible to others they engage in front-stage behaviors that fulfill moral expectations. Co-occurring with front-stage behaviors are backstage activities that can contradict front-stage performances and are thus meant to be hidden from audiences. According to Meyrowitz (1986: 39), “when we find ourselves in a given setting we often unconsciously ask, ‘Who can see me, who can hear me?’ ‘Who can I see, who can I hear?’” The answers to these questions help us decide how to

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2 We use the signifiers D to identify dispensary owners, E for other kinds of medical cannabis entrepreneurs, and AI for activists and industry group representatives.
behave, relegating unsavory activities to the backstage. Finally, the side stage provides partial views of the backstage as well as the front stage, thus containing elements of both but “lacking their extremes” (Meyrowitz, 1986: 47). That is, the “curtain” unintentionally shifts, and the audience gets glimpses of the messiness involved in producing the show and the clashes among actors over how the front stage should be enacted. Because this stage is partially in public view (such as in the media), actors try to hide whatever they can but also try to justify and reconcile their backstage and front-stage actions (Meyrowitz, 1986).

We use this framework to understand the complexities of a process in which actors must collaborate to achieve collective goals while at the same time individually taking actions to garner critical resources and survive. Figure 2 illustrates that stigma reduction unfolded through three partially overlapping phases: initiating a moral agenda, moral prototyping, and morality infusion. Each phase was triggered by an event or collection of events that started externally and moved internally as the process evolved. The first phase took place primarily on the front stage, whereas the latter phases unfolded across all three stages (front- and backstage activities and side-stage negotiations). For clarity of exposition we describe these phases in a linear fashion, although in actuality they partially overlapped.

**Initiating a Moral Agenda**

The stigma reduction process started with a collective effort to initiate a moral agenda that departed from previous, failed efforts. Beginning in the early 1970s, activists such as the National Organization to Reform Marijuana Laws (NORML) spent about 20 years unsuccessfully pushing for full legalization of all uses of cannabis based on a moral agenda that focused on individual rights and the social harm caused by incarceration for minor drug offenses. The new moral agenda that eventually took hold was more narrowly linked to patients’ rights and was initiated by activists in the gay rights movement who were directly affected by the AIDS epidemic and who began advocating for cannabis to treat terminally ill AIDS patients. To initiate the moral agenda, actors co-opted the “medical marijuana” label and narrative that had been suppressed through most of the twentieth century.

The first piece of the puzzle fell into place in 1978, when the Supreme Court upheld the right of Robert Randall—a 28-year-old Washington, DC teacher—to use cannabis to treat his glaucoma. The court’s decision directed the U.S. government to supply him with federally grown cannabis for medicinal purposes, injecting some legitimacy into the cannabis-as-medicine narrative. This decision was also the first record we could find of the term “medical marijuana”—the label later co-opted by the AIDS activists.

The second event that led to initiating the moral agenda was the AIDS crisis. AIDS activists in the early 1990s, and in particular an individual named Dennis Peron, crusaded for AIDS patients’ rights to use cannabis for medicinal purposes. The activists were in effect linking their efforts to alternative values, and the medical marijuana label and accompanying moral agenda gained credibility as activists linked them to AIDS patients’ suffering. To them this advocacy was urgent; activists like Peron were personally affected by the AIDS epidemic (his partner, Jonathan, was afflicted with the disease), and there were no effective means of treating AIDS sufferers’ symptoms (Werner, 2001). They believed
that cannabis alleviated AIDS symptoms by reducing nausea, increasing appetite, and preventing wasting. Peron recounted his belief in marijuana’s medical benefits: “Jonathan was taking many prescribed drugs, and there were severe side effects, from nausea to loss of appetite. Marijuana was the only drug that eased his pain and restored his appetite and gave him some moments of dignity in that last year” (Gardner, 1996). Peron sold cannabis to AIDS patients and introduced the language that became the foundation of the medical cannabis industry when he pleaded “morally not guilty” after being arrested for selling cannabis. He stated, “The fact is, we did sell marijuana in San Francisco to sick and dying people for 3 1/2 years. We were morally compelled to do this” (DelVecchio, 1996).

Framing cannabis as medicine that alleviated suffering resonated with voters, particularly in San Francisco, which was at the forefront of confronting the AIDS epidemic. The city had allocated millions of dollars for AIDS programs at a time when the federal government’s financial commitment was less than $9,000 for the entire country (Werner, 2001). San Francisco ultimately legalized medical cannabis through passage of Proposition P in 1991; in 1996, California did the same. In response to this success, Peron stated, “I think this is a moral victory. This is about who we are as a people and where we’re going as a nation” (Epstein, 1996).

Gaining any sort of victory for cannabis legalization temporarily united groups with somewhat different agendas, thereby limiting backstage conflicts during this phase. The legislative efforts were successful because many cannabis activists, including NORML, AIDS activists, and patients with a variety of other maladies whose symptoms could be alleviated by cannabis, put aside their differences to collaborate (Gardner, 1996). Patients’ testimonials became a vital part of initiating a moral agenda centered on healing. They were also useful for differentiating between using cannabis for medical and for recreational purposes.

Patients’ testimonials were central to the process of identifying medical cannabis with healing, enhancing its identity as medicine, and reducing its stigma. These testimonials allowed the collective to draw on the language and legitimacy of an existing field and on the broadly accepted value of patients’ rights. Patients and their families appealed to legislators and to those in the general public who were skeptical about cannabis’s efficacy as medicine. During California’s 1996 Proposition 215 campaign to legalize medical cannabis, the medical cannabis collective used television advertisements featuring a 67-year-old nurse who talked about her husband’s experience with cannabis while undergoing chemotherapy:

The nausea from his chemotherapy was so awful it broke my heart. So I broke the law and got him marijuana. It worked. He could eat. He had an extra year of life. Proposition 215 will allow patients like J.J. to use marijuana without becoming criminals. Vote yes on 215. God forbid someone you love may need it. (Goldberg, 1996)

Stories such as this one were designed to challenge stereotypes about who smoked cannabis and to appeal to the societal values of compassion and the belief that individuals should have reasonable access to treatments that reduce their suffering. This new moral agenda set the stage for moral prototyping, in which industry actors collaborated to create morally differentiable category
prototypes but also engaged in more backstage and side-stage activities that conflicted with the actions taking place on the front stage.

Moral Prototyping

Passage of Proposition P in 1991 and Proposition 215 in 1996 initiated the moral prototyping phase of the process because they legalized medical cannabis and created the possibility of developing a new industry category that required a prototype. Prior to establishing the moral agenda, the cannabis trade was seen as one undifferentiated category—the black market. After the moral agenda was initiated and legislation legalizing medical marijuana was passed, this undifferentiated category began to experience category emergence (Durand and Khaire, 2017); the language, symbols, and values associated with healing and the alleviation of suffering supplanted the values long associated with marijuana and its use as an intoxicant. Moral prototyping thus required industry actors to create a medical cannabis category prototype that incorporated positive elements from the healthcare category, while simultaneously disidentifying with the black market and another emerging category, recreational cannabis.

The medical cannabis category provided its proponents with a mechanism for disassociating from stigmatizing labels such as “dope,” “pushers,” “stoners,” and “burn-outs” given to the cannabis plant and its users, and to transfer them—along with the associated stigma—onto other categories. They acknowledged and even agreed with the devaluing labels but contended they were descriptors of other categories—particularly the black market. Through rhetorical work the medical cannabis collective identified alternative, positive labels that they could associate with their category and strived to make their use commonplace. At the same time individual dispensary owners and medical cannabis entrepreneurs—who supported the collective’s efforts—participated in illicit backstage actions to access critical resources. Below, we consider the collective identification and disidentification of front-stage moral prototyping and their co-existence with backstage prototype violations and side-stage negotiations.

Identifying the category with healing. Identification creates a “cognitive and emotional link” between a category and a set of “central, distinctive, and enduring organizational characteristics” (Zavyalova et al., 2016: 257) that helps others relate to the category and see it as reflective of their own values. Key to developing a moral prototype was developing language, symbols, and practices consistent with healing and patients’ rights. Rhetorically, the collective co-opted positively valued labels from the medical field, which was “a professional practice governed by a moral framework” (Miller and Brody, 2001: 582), to replace the old, stigmatizing labels. This dynamic was highly visible at industry conferences, where participants actively negotiated the medical cannabis category’s lexicon and explicitly highlighted preferred labels. A prominent speaker at the first conference told member organizations, “We don’t say medical marijuana anymore, we just say cannabis. It’s a new world” (E#2_Conference). Thus “pot” was now “medicine,” “potheads” were now “patients,” and those using cannabis were not “toking” or “getting high” but “medicating.” Kisha was
frequently asked by others at the conference if she “medicated.” The owner of a marijuana-infused products company succinctly captured these efforts when he stated, “Put out the best medicine to the best dispensary owners. That’s your end goal, making sure that you are servicing the largest patient base because they [the dispensaries] are considered the best in what they do” (E#8_Conference).

Patients’ testimonials continued to be employed in the moral prototyping phase and were instrumental for identifying the category with healing. An edibles manufacturer presenting at a conference rationalized the practice this way: “How can a parent of a child, a loved one who is diagnosed with cancer or AIDS or a mass or fibromyalgia, who uses marijuana successfully, not change a politician’s mind after seeing that?” (AI#2_Conference). He went on to say, “You make it personal, tell your story, your family story. . . . I lost my stepfather to cancer, my step-mama to cancer,’ we all know somebody has that story. But stay real, use real data” (AI#2_Conference). Patients’ testimonials put a human face on the category and introduced an emotional component into the discourse. Emotions are essential to moral judgments, making testimonials an essential tool for moral prototyping (Haidt, 2001).

**Disidentifying with recreational use and the black market.** Disidentification involves identifying in opposition to something by stating “who I am not” rather than “who I am” (Elsbach and Bhattacharya, 2001). As the collective was actively constructing and identifying with the medical cannabis category, they were simultaneously disidentifying with the black market and recreational cannabis categories, which harbored the long-standing stigma associated with using cannabis just to get “high.” Their disidentification with the recreational category, however, was subtler than that from the black market.

The recreational use of cannabis has encountered considerable opposition for almost a century. Thus the stigma around cannabis emerged against a backdrop of general disapproval of recreational intoxication:

> The early campaigns against marijuana use can be viewed as an extension of the temperance and moral reform movements which swept the country during the 1920s. They were generally spearheaded by persons who opposed the use of opiates, alcohol and tobacco on the grounds that all such substances were physically, mentally and morally debilitating. (Shafer, 1972: 424)

Using cannabis as an intoxicant was claimed to induce violent behavior, sap the users’ motivation, and serve as a gateway to using more dangerous drugs. For example, after Colorado passed a bill to allow for medical cannabis in 2009, state senators Chris Romer and Tom Massey wrote a commentary with the opening statement, “Marijuana. Most people see it as a recreational drug and are skeptical of its tangible, medical benefits for patients with chronic pain” (Romer and Massey, 2009). They went on to talk about the importance of keeping cannabis out of recreational users’ hands.

On the front stage, the collective emphasized that they were proponents of providing cannabis to patients in need and, when pressed, would make clear distinctions between the medical and recreational uses of cannabis. But their hesitation to explicitly denounce recreational use was evident throughout our data. Both dispensary owners and entrepreneurs acknowledged that not all of
their clients were using cannabis strictly for medicinal purposes; moreover, recreational users proved to be important to individual firms’ backstage activities.

One of the few examples we could find of medical cannabis dispensaries vehemently opposing recreational use was in Washington State, when regulators proposed fully legalizing cannabis and eliminating the distinction between medical and recreational use. This would have resulted in levying higher taxes on medical cannabis and threatened the image and business models that medical cannabis dispensaries had built over time. Resistance to this plan was not universal, though, as there were many activist and industry groups seeking full legalization. This battle is an example of the side-stage activities that occurred when various coalitions with differing interests came into conflict with one another.³

The medical cannabis category was more publicly opposed to the black market category and positioned medical cannabis as a mechanism for its eradication. The collective argued that medical cannabis dispensaries could recapture revenues previously lost to the black market and redistribute them to their local communities. Building on the patients’ rights narrative they also argued that dispensaries could protect patients by providing them with safe access to quality-controlled medicine so they would no longer have to resort to the black market. In contesting a policy that would make it difficult for dispensaries to operate, a Colorado attorney specializing in medical cannabis wrote in the Denver Post,

We also hear government officials with no formal medical training demonizing and second-guessing private confidential decisions of trained physicians who advise patients. Government should not interfere with private medical decisions. Many of these proposals would drive vulnerable patients away from the well-lit, safe, secure, private, confidential medical marijuana dispensary and put them and their wheelchairs back in the dangerous black market. (Corry, 2009)

Furthermore, the medical cannabis collective worked to transfer many of cannabis’s discrediting labels to the black market category. For example, a prominent dispensary owner stated, “In terms of what I would call the ‘thug influence,’ the influence of the thug dispensary has been potentially the largest single challenge that the cannabis reform movement has faced in recent years” (D#3_ Interview). The dispensary owner used “thug influence” to refer to dispensaries that existed on the fringes of what the industry considered acceptable, particularly with regard to their linkages to the black market.

The cannabis-related stigma of the twentieth century also had a significant racial component, as marijuana use was associated with immigrants from Mexico and the West Indies (Geluardi, 2010) and with jazz musicians, many of whom were African-American. Drawing on racial stereotypes, stigmatizers generated fear by publishing frequent and often false articles about cannabis-intoxicated Mexicans committing atrocious crimes (Geluardi, 2010). The collective drew on some of these same racial inferences to dissociate from the black market, often making references to “Mexican drug cartels” when discussing the black market. A Colorado-licensed cannabis grower stated in an

³ We further define and discuss side-stage actions below.
interview that “I do believe the people of Colorado are better off buying marijuana from the likes of me than they are buying it from the Mexican drug cartels” (Carroll, 2010).

Overall, to distance medical cannabis from stigmatizing labels and stereotypes, on the front stage the collective positioned the medical cannabis category as the antithesis of the black market category and as the solution to the “black market problem.” In short, the medical cannabis category constructed the black market category as the “other.”

**Backstage survival violations.** At the same time the medical cannabis collective was identifying with the medical field and disidentifying with the black market and recreational categories on the front stage, on the backstage individual dispensaries were engaged in some of the very activities being publicly castigated. Relational spaces are “temporally bound settings for interaction and negotiation of social order” (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014: 1176) that can bring together individuals who do not normally interact. The backstage was a relational space where they could access necessary resources that were unavailable through other means, allowing them to survive until the resources became more broadly available. Many dispensaries had difficulty accessing cannabis to sell and capital to finance their growth. To access capital and/or product, some dispensary owners engaged in covert liaising, working with the black market on the backstage. There is evidence that some dispensaries sold excess cannabis to the black market as a source of additional revenue. In Oregon, for example, The Oregonian analyzed law enforcement data and found that about 40 percent of the cannabis trafficked out of the state was linked to the medical marijuana program (Crombie, 2012). They found that the price of cannabis sold out of state could be more than five times higher than in-state legal sales. A dispensary owner discussed this dynamic as follows:

I think certainly a lot of people did start in a black market and now they have found a way to transition into the new legal market, and that is perfectly appropriate to me. You still do see some areas where things aren’t well-regulated, and you might find some people sort of playing both sides of the equation there, and sure I wouldn’t recommend that. I think it’s not worth the risk, but it does happen. They’re growing cannabis but then when push comes to shove, they don’t like the compensation that they get from those patients or from a legal dispensary, [and] they’ll sell that product in the black market or give it to somebody who is a broker who is going to get 200 pounds from various people and ship to the east [coast]. (D\#7\_Interview)

This quote illustrates that some dispensary owners returned to the black market for capital, a transaction facilitated by their prior experience. One grower said, “That’s one thing you have in me, is you have a person that grew up through the whole thing. I have been a participant the whole way. I began cultivating in the late ’70s and that continued. At this point, of course, I am confessing to felonies” (E\#11\_Interview).

Dispensary owners also sometimes needed to go to the black market for product. A dispensary owner “hypothetically” explained how that worked in a market organized as a collective, where patients could grow their own cannabis and contribute it to the collective. He saw this as an opportunity for
dispensaries to source cannabis from the black market, because they used a
don’t-ask-don’t-tell approach when determining the actual source of the
product:

As long as you are a patient with the doctor’s note and you come to my dispensary
and you join the collective. Basically is just to sign the membership form and agree to
be a member of the collective, then cannabis that you have in your duffle bag and
whatever is technically considered legal and you can contribute it to the collective.
(D#7_Interview)

Thus entrepreneurs and dispensary owners engaged in backstage activities
that departed from the moral prototype that was being constructed on the front
stage but allowed them to fortify their resource position, presumably until
crucial resources were more widely available.

Side-stage Negotiations

Situated between the front-stage collective actions and the backstage organiza-
tional actions were side-stage debates that resulted from goal incongruence
and disagreements over how to normalize the industry. These activities were
side-stage because while the messiness of the disagreements was not in full
public view, the public could see evidence that they were occurring. Side-stage
prototype negotiations became apparent even as the medical cannabis industry
attempted to define the category in part by disidentifying from the black market
and recreational categories. A dispensary owner expressed this by stating,
“When you get down to the details of actually regulating how cannabis is going
to be made legal, there can be some real divergent interests. There’s some
divergence there even within the industry in terms of what kind of model
people want to see” (D#3_Interview).

The debate in Washington State over eliminating the distinction between
medical and recreational cannabis is one example of side-stage negotiations.
The infighting among members of the medical cannabis category resulted in
very visible public confrontations. As some factions put their support behind
Initiative 502—a measure to legalize recreational cannabis and punish users for
driving under the influence—others opposed the initiative, while still others
fought over who should be the loudest voice of dissent. An excerpt from the
Seattle Times described one such confrontation:

Philip Dawdy, well known among the state’s marijuana activists, had invited reporters
to the offices of Seattle lawyer Kurt Boehl for the kickoff of the new trade group,
called Safe Access Alliance. The purpose was to discuss opposition among medical-
marijuana patients to Initiative 502, which would legalize and tax up to an ounce of
pot for recreational use in Washington. Two members of another group, the No on
I-502 campaign, crashed the news conference and accused Safe Access Alliance of
co-opting their message — and their donations. (Johnson, 2012)

Dawdy was immediately fired, because his boss did not agree that Safe
Access Alliance should oppose I-502. According to the Seattle Times, “The
spectacle underscored how severely fractured the marijuana-activist commu-
nity has become in Washington state, with various groups running competing
initiatives and taking opposing positions on whether the state should be in the dispensary-licensing business” (Johnson, 2012).

Another example occurred when a bill was introduced in Colorado that would outlaw medical cannabis dispensaries. Many members of the collective vehemently opposed the bill, with over 200 publicly rallying in opposition. According to the *Denver Post*, “Conspicuously absent from the rally, though, were a number of prominent medical-marijuana groups, which on Thursday announced they have formed a new coalition to push for ‘the middle ground in the debate’” (Ingold and Fender, 2010). This new coalition’s executive director was later quoted as stating he found lawmakers surprisingly willing to listen to the cannabis community’s proposals, in contrast to other cannabis lobbying groups that were “still talking with lawmakers about fighting back a proposal that would effectively outlaw retail marijuana dispensaries and instead introducing a bill the cannabis community could support” (Ingold, 2010).

**Morality Infusion**

Moral prototyping established the medical cannabis category and set the stage for solidifying it through morality infusion. The morality infusion phase began around 2010, once a working moral prototype had been established and the new industry had begun to develop trade associations and lobbying groups that could help disseminate the new prototype to others outside the industry. They wanted their prototype to become the dominant way others view the category. While language was still important, and actors continued to build on the rhetoric they had developed during moral prototyping, a critical component of the morality infusion phase was to introduce the material changes that would help project a squeaky-clean image on the front stage that they could actively disseminate. One conference presenter noted, “Business owners need to be squeaky clean in order to survive in a world of increasing scrutiny from regulators, neighbors, and the media” (D#10_Conference). A squeaky-clean image meant that all aspects of their businesses should be beyond reproach. It also meant demonstrating that they were good people concerned with the well-being of their patients and local communities.

We refer to these material and symbolic actions as “showcasing” and “diluting.” Showcasing was meant to demonstrate that they were operating normal businesses, while diluting helped make their cannabis-related activities less threatening to newcomers and outsiders.

**Showcasing a squeaky-clean front-stage image.** Showcasing was an important part of the collective’s efforts to create a squeaky-clean image by altering the category’s material attributes. They used the look and presentation of the dispensaries—from their structural designs and layouts to their hiring practices and self-presentation—to make themselves appear professional and non-threatening and to communicate the values the collective wished to espouse: that they were responsible and caring business owners providing a valuable healthcare service to their community. Figure 3 provides examples of showcasing. Showcasing started with picking the right locations, preferably not in depressed parts of town. The building’s signage should be simple, clean, and non-threatening. Once patients walked through the door, they should enter
an open, professional space analogous to a doctor’s office, and the sales floor should be well-lit and inviting. A dispensary owner emphasized the importance of design:

At [my dispensary] we’ve tried to design everything that we do in order to discredit the stigma associated with cannabis. From the time that people walk into our facility they see a different approach. It’s absolutely sparkling clean. It’s decorated, and we’re very professional but in a very welcoming way so that anybody can walk in and feel comfortable. (D#10_Interview)

Product presentation was also critical, as the firms needed to differentiate their products from the black market’s products and tie them more closely to
medicine. As figure 3 illustrates, that included presenting cannabis buds in clear jars and selling them in child-proof containers that resemble those used for prescription drugs.

Showcasing also extended to the symbols the dispensaries and product developers used in marketing and product packaging. Many employed medical symbols, such as a green cross and the Rx symbol. Figure 4 provides two examples. The consensus seemed to be that dispensaries should avoid "stereotypical" cannabis culture. People in advertisements should not be scantily dressed or look like "stoners," and industry spokespersons should be antithetical to stereotypical cannabis users. A dispensary owner expressed his views on marketing this way:

Start with a logo and [you] have to be very professional and simple. You want to avoid the stereotypical cannabis user stigma. That has been holding us back for the last 75 years. Hopefully one day we will actually be able to be aggressive with the marketing like the alcohol companies. Right now it is just going to bring a lot of trouble. Make sure you are professional, very simple. Don't put any kind of cannabis leaf in there. Try to avoid names like Danny Fat Sax or something like that. (D#7_Conference)

Another element of showcasing is providing detailed information on each cannabis strain’s composition to support claims that certain components of cannabis are beneficial for particular conditions. A traditional problem with black market cannabis is that its potency and chemical composition can vary dramatically, and it can contain pesticides or other potentially hazardous chemicals. Cannabis dispensaries initiated product testing for chemical composition, pesticides, and potency to align their products with science and to signal product safety. Doing so also allowed the dispensaries to provide information and treatment recommendations to customers, supporting their claims that cannabis is medicine. As one dispensary owner stated:

We professionalized the industry in ways nobody had previously—we laboratory tested all of our medicine. So before [my dispensary], patients didn’t really know that the cannabis they were getting was safe. They didn’t know whether it had
contaminants, and they didn’t know really what was in it. And that to me was unac-
tceptable. If I was going to call it medicine, I had to know it was safe. (D#3_Interview)

Overall, with showcasing organizational actors aimed to have squeaky-clean enterprises that would withstand the intense scrutiny that came with being in a stigmatized business, and they infused morality by providing physical manifestations of their rhetorical claims.

**Diluting the front-stage emphasis on cannabis.** To project a squeaky-clean image, dispensary owners and entrepreneurs also engaged in diluting: deemphasizing cannabis and its potentially negative elements so that it is less threatening to external audiences. One way this was accomplished was by embedding cannabis within their overall health and wellness offerings. Many dispensaries identified themselves not so much as sellers of cannabis but as providers of “medical care” or “wellness services,” of which cannabis was one component. A dispensary owner described his presentation of cannabis this way:

We’ve also done things like we surround cannabis with other holistic healing tech-
niques so any of our patients who come in can utilize our holistic healing clinic, which offers chiropractic, acupuncture, reiki, and about 7 or 8 other holistic therapies com-
pletely free of charge. We have free classes for our patients so they can learn how to
do yoga or learn how to grow their own cannabis. (D#3_Interview)

Deemphasizing cannabis while highlighting wellness services like yoga and reiki rendered dispensaries more approachable, as it is easier for a resistant individual to enter a wellness center that happens to sell cannabis than to enter a dispensary that only sells cannabis. Another dispensary owner stated, “I think it
gives the community a little bit of comfort that, yeah, these businesses are
selling cannabis, but they’re also providing other healing and wellness services
and other remedies to assist in these patients’ treatment plan” (D#10_Interview).

Innovation was also instrumental for dilution. Cannabis is traditionally smoked,
and smoking can have adverse health effects. This is problematic for an industry that wants to associate itself with health and wellness. Cannabis also has a dis-
tinct smell that is often associated with its countercultural use. Accordingly,
product manufacturers introduced concentrates that can be used in vaping
deVICES that conceal the smell, and growers have developed cannabis strains
such as “Mother of Berries” that smells of blueberries. Entrepreneurs and dispensary owners have also been innovating with alternative delivery systems
such as infused edible products, and they use traditional delivery systems such
as capsules, tinctures (liquid applications taken under the tongue), and topical
salves that are non-psychoactive. They have also developed cannabis strains with
different levels of the chemical components believed to affect different kinds of illnesses, and in some cases they have eliminated the intoxicating effects. One
organizational actor tied these innovations to public perceptions this way:

We’re attempting to just cultivate a message of normalcy. This is not a new thing.
This is not a scary thing. This is a plant that humans historically have had in their lives.
We are just simply introducing it in a new way. It also helps that the products that
we make are not psychoactive and they are not going to get you high. That kind of
changes that perception too. (D#5_Interview)
Committing backstage survival violations. Even as they attempted to create a squeaky-clean image on the front stage, dispensary owners violated this image on the backstage when interacting with customers, as not all “patients” were using cannabis strictly for medical reasons. It was not uncommon for individuals to obtain the patient documentation needed to access cannabis for recreational use. Dispensaries were aware of this and were willing to serve these customers. To accommodate these two sets of customers, the entrepreneurs and dispensary owners used the rhetorical strategy of code-switching: “the use of more than one language in the course of a single communicative episode” (Heller, 1988: 1). While individuals generally did not code-switch within the same conversation, they changed their language across conversations with different audiences. For example, as part of our fieldwork, a dispensary owner invited Kisha to tour his dispensary. During the tour, the guide took her to the “accessories” or “glassware” room. She questioned the use of these names, and the guide explained:

Well, I guess it just depends on the audience. I think younger people are more likely to know what a head shop is versus older people. You can’t always know by looking at someone if they have a medical condition or not. But I can sort of gauge when someone walks into the door if they are here to use it as medicine or to just get their weed and be on their way. So, those kinds of people I would usually call it a “head shop,” and for older people I would call it an “accessories shop” usually. (D#32_Interview)

Using different terminologies with different audiences allowed the dispensaries to transition between the front and back stages. Dispensary owners assumed that individuals who appeared to be more in tune with popular culture and whose experiences with cannabis seemed more aligned with recreational use would be more comfortable with the colloquial labels. Code-switching allowed the dispensaries to presumably create a comfortable space for recreational users in order to retain them as valuable customers, because they did not identify with the medically oriented labels that the dispensaries needed to use with customers who approached the industry more tentatively, as well as with governments, the local community, and the medical establishment.

Dispensaries also used the backstage to circumvent the roadblocks created by cannabis’s federal illegality by sometimes engaging in activities that did not align with their front-stage portrayals of professionalism. We referred to this practice as resource supplementing. For example, they had difficulty accessing everyday banking services such as checking accounts, forcing them to pay their taxes by showing up at the tax office with duffel bags of cash (Huddleston, 2014) and to use only cash for transactions with customers and employees. A conference presenter described this challenge:

Cash is still king. This can be extremely problematic from an operations standpoint. Tracking an inventory can be a nightmare. How do you pay your taxes, vendors, and suppliers? Dispensaries face the risk of crime, such as robberies, break-ins, a lot of internal theft. If you have got a bank account, you want to keep your cash separate

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4 The term “code-switching” also describes the way minority groups such as African-Americans alter their communication styles to effectively navigate different cultural settings (Degans, 2013).
from your cannabis, because if your cash smells like weed the banks will not accept it. (E#23_Conference)

To deal with some of these issues, entrepreneurs accessed resources in unconventional ways that they preferred to keep out of the public view. A conference presenter explained:

We know that merchants have been forced to open accounts under their personal name. Others have opened a management account or an accounting firm or found a loophole where they can manage the business processes of the actual cannabis dispensing collective. Other merchants have opened a holding company, of course with no reference to cannabis; they may use an innocent name like Acme Corp or ABC Company, etc. In many cases the owners are forced to misrepresent the nature of the businesses. This is what we have been seeing. We have very few choices at this point. (E#22_Conference)

He went on to discuss the pros and cons of dispensary owners and other entrepreneurs using offshore accounts to access credit and debit cards. Another way dispensary owners contended with their banking challenges was to give patients the option of using regular prepaid gift cards, reloadable cards designed specifically for the industry, or cashless ATMs that are terminal pin-based solutions that allow the merchant to accept all pin-based transactions without any added scrutiny. There is a nominal monthly fee and a small transaction fee for the service. When a patient is ready for the transaction, the debit card is swiped through the cashless ATM terminal, and we enter the transaction amount. They enter the pin, there is a service charge, and within 24 to 48 hours funds are deposited directly into your account. (E#23_Conference)

While some of these approaches were innovative, they were not necessarily approaches that the industry wanted to publicize, since they were roundabout ways of transferring funds into bank accounts that were not supposed to be used for cannabis-related transactions and that could expose them to federal sanctions.

Side-stage negotiations. While the collective attempted to appear beyond reproach on the front stage, they were not always successful, and sometimes their debates would appear in the public sphere. One example was Coloradans for Medical Marijuana Regulation (CMMR), a medical cannabis advocacy group in which a number of dispensary owners were directly involved. Even as the group was having legislative successes it was simultaneously in public disarray as the organizations’ leaders traded accusations. Matt Brown, one of its leaders, “presented a packet of information to DA [district attorney] personnel, spurred by his discovery that thousands of dollars in donations to CMMR never made it into the group’s main bank account. Instead, he learned, the money had been placed in a newly created CMMR account to which he had no access” (Roberts, 2010). At the same time, Brown was accused by another CMMR member of violating the organization’s bylaws by loaning himself money to purchase a new BMW. CMMR leaders tried to keep these dramas away from their supporters, however, because they were concerned about the
potential impact on their legislative efforts (Roberts, 2010). All of these activities were in direct violation of the squeaky-clean image that the industry was working to present, and as they unfolded publicly audiences were getting an opportunity to see what was happening behind the scenes.

Other examples of these collective side-stage disagreements are seen in debates over how states that were new to medical cannabis should structure their programs. For example, the nonprofit model was preferred by some, as it clearly separates the medical cannabis category from the “drug dealer” narrative and prioritizes serving patients over making a profit. But this point was debated. A prominent dispensary owner argued “the nonprofit label is just a smokescreen.” Just as the United Way offers top salaries to its executives, he says, “I can call myself a nonprofit and still pay myself $3 million a year” (Shapiro, 2010).

There were also debates about cannabis dispensaries’ marketing approaches. While the industry chastised the use of sexually suggestive marketing on the front stage, a minority in the industry believed that they should be able to advertise however they saw fit and publicly expressed their right to do so. As one entrepreneur who regularly used semi-nude models in his advertising stated to the press, “How dare these people, who think they represent the cannabis culture, single out the edge of this culture—because we are the cannabis culture” (Hecht, 2011).

In general, the collective resisted engaging in public debates that could undermine their overall goals, and the public only knew about these debates as new groups with divergent platforms formed or as certain factions publicly challenged the emerging norms. These side-stage activities were valuable though, as they were an opportunity for the collective to emphasize important norms.

**Disseminating a squeaky-clean image locally.** A crucial part of morality infusion was disseminating the squeaky-clean image to external audiences who could act to reduce the industry’s stigma. The collective divided their efforts, with dispensary owners and entrepreneurs focusing on local dissemination, while industry and advocacy groups focused on broader dissemination.

To locally disseminate the squeaky-clean image, dispensary owners and entrepreneurs believed they needed to be hyper-local and deeply embed themselves in their communities. Here was the advice at one industry conference:

> You need to participate in the community; you do not want to operate in the shadows. Go to the neighborhood council, the city council, put a face to what a dispensary owner is because they have no idea. This is where all their illusions come from. You want to know all your neighbors. If they have a problem, they can call you. Give them your phone number. It’s much better to have them call you rather than law enforcement. Be proud of what you do. (D#12_Conference)

The dispensary owners showed that they attended church, were members of parent–teacher associations, and had professional backgrounds, and this local embedding built strong interpersonal and interorganizational ties that could serve the industry in a number of ways. One dispensary owner explained, “We are basically prophets, all of us are prophets, and I don’t mean profit. We want to profit but we also want to bring this message of love, goodness, in
everything we do in our personal lives and professional lives. It has to be seamless” (D#31_Conference). This prophesying involved highly visible acts of philanthropy:

Another great company that has actually, from out here in Denver, started a nonprofit group called the [X]. That’s been around since 2009, actually. It’s a group of cannabis entrepreneurs, their patients, employees, or owners that go around and help communities with community-oriented events such as feeding the homeless and picking up trash from marijuana events and cleaning up after the 420 rally. We don’t want to leave a bad image of us. (D#25_Interview)

As important as being involved in community projects was, the dispensary owners needed to have data that demonstrated their involvement. As one dispensary owner advised, “Measure it. [X Dispensary] does a great job of measuring impact. They count everything and make these cool info graphics that we can share. When we say we belong here, we can also say, ‘look what we’ve done’” (D#6_Conference).

Dispensary owners’ attention to local dissemination helped infuse morality into the industry by making dispensaries more familiar to their audiences, ultimately increasing empathy for them and thereby reducing fear of the “other.” Local dissemination also contributed to morality infusion by giving category members a platform to communicate their values to diverse audiences. One dispensary owner stated, “What we really want to do is similar to the gay and lesbian movement. It’s a coming-out party where people learn that cannabis consumers and business people are normal people. They are just like us, like me and you” (D#10_Interview). By dispensary owners showing that they were normal, they hoped that these perceptions of normalcy would also transfer to their businesses and industry.

Local dissemination also had practical implications for the emerging category, particularly for individual firms’ survival. Dispensary owners could get valuable information that helped them cope with a dynamic environment. “I just know the right people, and I play the right politics. Often times I have changed the company direction just basically based off of the rumor, and it happened to be extremely accurate” (D#10_Interview). In addition, local ties could be invaluable in times of crisis:

Connect with your community. Make sure you are going out and talking to those in the community who are established influencers. Because if something goes wrong, and you’ve done a really great job of cleaning up the block your business is on, making sure you are providing strong security, and your block is definitely better for you being there, then they are going to stand with you when the shit hits the fan. (AI#2_Conference)

I can’t be less concerned with it [the federal government]. I don’t see how they can stop this snowball. It’s already rolling too fast. They came out with that memo because they understand they’re losing control. People understand the drug war is a miserably failed endeavor. I don’t think that you can ever stop what we’ve done. With the track record that we have, and the people that we have supporting us, if they came to shut us down there would be riots in the streets. (D#18_Interview)

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5 “That memo” refers to the Cole memo, issued by the Justice Department, which said that banks would not be prosecuted by the current Justice Department for providing banking services to dispensaries and cannabis entrepreneurs.
Disseminating a squeaky-clean image broadly. While the dispensary owners and entrepreneurs focused on local dissemination, the collective also recognized that legislative changes at the federal level would be necessary to achieve destigmatization. Through industry groups, the collective became involved in legislative and regulatory processes at the state level to broadly disseminate a squeaky-clean image and crack down on the thug elements in the industry that threatened their efforts. Industry trade associations and lobbying groups presented many of these showcasing practices to legislators to demonstrate the collective’s willingness to take the necessary steps to make these practices the industry norm and to cooperate in passing or implementing regulations that made these practices mandatory. They believed that once the practices became instantiated in regulations it would weed out (pun intended) those firms that did not conform to industry expectations. The director of one of the industry groups stated,

We do a lot of political and community organizing on behalf of the industry. It’s really amazing to see all the supporting groups like NCIA [National Cannabis Industry Association] here. When the NCIA has the resources to have local- and state-level chapters, and you as business owners can pool your resources and have advocates on your behalf, it will work in the state house to build coalitions in support of your issues and your businesses. That’s the real way to build power and create the change. (E#8_Conference)

Furthermore, the industry established procedures for paying its fair share of state taxes and for paying federal taxes, despite its actions being federally illegal. The collective hoped these actions would foster a more favorable regulatory environment and reassure external audiences that industry actors went further than mere compliance—they exceeded expectations.

Success of the Stigma Reduction Process
Given that the industry’s goal is full destigmatization, how successful have its efforts been? The answer is complex, as it can be difficult to quantify stigma and hence the extent to which it is removed; to determine among what audiences it needs to occur in order to declare the medical cannabis industry has been “destigmatized”; and to know whether it is even a reasonable or meaningful measuring stick. Warren (1980) defined destigmatization as achieving “normalcy,” and Clair and colleagues (2016) and Adams (2012) noted that different degrees of destigmatization can be achieved. Destigmatization can also be achieved along some dimensions but not others (Warren, 1980; Clair, Daniel, and Lamont, 2016), and as with other forms of social evaluations, “not all audiences are equally important, which provides the organization with a strategic choice as to which audiences it should attend to” (Bitektine, 2011: 154). This means that destigmatization can also be achieved with some audiences and not others. This industry is not yet fully destigmatized, so in assessing the amount of stigma reduction in our context, we argue that the relevant audiences for the medical cannabis industry are state and federal governments; the general public, including the media; and the medical community.
State and federal governments. All cannabis sales and usage are still illegal at the federal level, and cannabis is still classified as a Schedule I narcotic, a decision that was reaffirmed by the Drug Enforcement Agency in August 2016 (Saint Louis, 2016). Further, only a handful of small, state-chartered banks are willing to offer financial services (Popper, 2016). At the same time, the federal government has not been enforcing federal marijuana laws in states with legalized cannabis, and it has taken some steps to allay concerns about federal enforcement of the Money Laundering Act against banks providing services to the industry. Arguably, the industry will be fully destigmatized when cannabis is federally legal and the industry can access the same resources as other industries.

However, industry actors have made considerable strides in removing cannabis’s stigma at the state level. One indication that they are succeeding is the trend in state medical cannabis legalizations. The earliest states to legalize medical cannabis did so using ballot measures that required only a majority vote. Bypassing the legislative process was critical for the early successes, because politicians were unlikely to legalize medical cannabis legislatively. The trend in recent years has changed: medical cannabis has been legalized through legislative action in a number of states, meaning legalization received a majority vote in the state house and senate and had the support of, or at least was not actively opposed by, the governor. In Minnesota, for example, the medical cannabis bill had bipartisan support and was signed into law by Governor Mark Dayton in 2014 (Bailey, 2014). In addition, 74 percent of Minnesotans supported medical cannabis (Public Policy Polling, 2014). This suggests that politicians have sufficient confidence in their constituents’ support of medical cannabis to introduce these bills. As of 2018, 33 states and the District of Columbia have legalized medical cannabis, and 10 states plus the District of Columbia have also legalized the recreational use of cannabis (Governing.com, 2018).

General public and the media. The general public’s support for medical cannabis is strong. In 2014, a CBS poll showed that 86 percent of Americans supported medical cannabis (Dutton et al., 2014), up from 73 percent in a 2010 Pew Survey (Pew Research Center, 2010) and 58 percent in a 1997 ABC News poll, far outpacing support for recreational marijuana (Pew Research Center, 2013). In 2017, a Quinnipiac University poll showed that support for medical cannabis was at 94 percent (Quinnipiac, 2017). In addition, the media has been increasingly supportive of medical cannabis. Exemplifying this is CNN’s chief medical correspondent Sanjay Gupta. In 2013, Gupta’s documentary Weed chronicled his change in beliefs about the medical effectiveness of cannabis (Gupta, 2013a). That same year, Gupta (2013b) wrote an article entitled “Why I Changed My Mind on Weed” in which he apologized for previously voicing negative opinions about cannabis without due diligence:

I am here to apologize. I apologize because I didn’t look hard enough, until now. I didn’t look far enough. I didn’t review papers from smaller labs in other countries doing some remarkable research, and I was too dismissive of the loud chorus of legitimate patients whose symptoms improved on cannabis. . . . I now know that when it comes to marijuana . . . it doesn’t have a high potential for abuse, and there are very legitimate medical applications.
In 2014, Gupta wrote another article expressing his belief that cannabis has medical benefits and that failing to consider it as a treatment option is irresponsible. He also went on to produce two additional segments of *Weed*.

Mainstream media outlets have helped normalize cannabis. For example, CNBC produced the documentary *Marijuana Inc., Inside America’s Pot Industry* in 2009 to focus on the inner workings of the industry. Discovery Channel produced the reality television show *Weed Wars* in 2011 that chronicled the challenges of prominent dispensary owner Steve DeAngelo as he tried to manage his dispensary, Harborside Health Center, and in 2013 aired *Weed Country*, featuring patients, growers, and dispensary owners in the medical cannabis industry. National Public Radio profiled high-end restaurants incorporating cannabis into haute cuisine (Ulaby, 2018), noting, “Chefs and entrepreneurs making cannabis-infused foie gras and ‘stoner souffles’ have been featured on not one but two series devoted to gourmet ganja: the Netflix competition program *Cooking On High* and the Viceland show *Bong Appetit.*” *Bong Appetit’s* cookbook is forthcoming.

The most significant mainstream media endorsement may have come from the *New York Times* editorial board, which published the six-part series “High Time: Editorial Series on Marijuana Legalization” that called for an end to marijuana prohibition. Andrew Rosenthal (2014), one of the editors, explained, “The Times editorial board has for years supported the legalization of medical marijuana. And we have opposed federal crackdowns on people who grow or sell marijuana for medical purposes in states where that’s legal.”

In a sure sign of the public’s support of this industry, the first U.S.-headquartered (but Canadian-located) cannabis company, Tilray, went public on the NASDAQ stock exchange in 2018 (Wieczner, 2019). Its IPO was one of the most successful of the year; its stock was up 315 percent at the end of 2018, its market capitalization was $9 billion, and it has entered into agreements with Anheuser-Busch InBev and Sandoz pharmaceuticals to market cannabis-infused products outside the U.S.

**Medical community.** Support for medical cannabis has increased in the medical community as well. In 2014, the Epilepsy Foundation issued a statement calling for “the rights of patients and families living with seizures and epilepsy to access physician directed care, including medical marijuana” (Gattone and Lammert, 2014). A WebMD survey found that 67 percent of physicians believed that cannabis should be a medical option for patients (Rappold, 2014), and NORML listed approximately 60 health organizations that have endorsed patient access to and/or research on medical marijuana (NORML, 2017).

Dr. Peter Grinspoon—who teaches medicine at Harvard Medical School, regularly blogs for Harvard Medical Publishing on the health benefits of cannabis, and sees medical cannabis as a partial solution to the opioid crisis in the U.S.—stated, “It is quite effective for the chronic pain that plagues millions of Americans, especially as they age. Part of its allure is that it is clearly safer than opiates (it is impossible to overdose on and far less addictive)” (Grinspoon, 2018).

Although the medical cannabis industry has not yet been fully destigmatized across all audiences, as more firms gain access to financial markets and partner with major corporations, it is likely that destigmatization is near. The industry
DISCUSSION

In this study we induced a process model that explains how a core-stigmatized industry can reduce its stigma. As with individuals bearing the scars and tribal markings of stigmatized groups (Goffman, 1963), firms in core-stigmatized industries are often shunned, forcing them to exist in the shadows. But stigmatized industries sometimes have growth aspirations they cannot achieve from the shadows, and they thus face a crucial dilemma—the light required to grow also exposes the industry’s morally objectionable traits to greater scrutiny. These industries must figure out how to reduce their core stigmas while their constituent members take the actions necessary to survive the transition. Our study exploring this process makes several contributions to research on organizational stigma and categories research.

The first implication of our findings is that separation is a critical aspect of reducing stigma and takes three forms: separation in phases across time, separation across different relational spaces (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014), and separation across new categorical boundaries (Durand and Khaire, 2017). The second implication is that category emergence in stigmatized industries differs in some respects from category emergence in non-stigmatized industries.

Separation into Phases, Spaces, and New Categories

While stigma is a categorical phenomenon that involves audiences grouping and devaluing organizations with similar attributes (Vergne, 2012), much of the existing literature on core stigma has centered on tactics that individual organizations use to manage stigma. Our findings build on recent research emphasizing that core stigma resides at the category level (Vergne, 2012; Piazza and Perretti, 2015) and suggest that while prior research on managing (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012; Helms and Patterson, 2014) or reducing core stigma (Warren, 1980; Adams, 2012; Clair, Daniel, and Lamont, 2016; Hampel and Tracey, 2016) has identified a number of the tactics employed, it has neglected to consider how the process unfolds in identifiable phases and that it occurs in distinct front-, back-, and side-stage relational spaces (Mair and Hehenberger, 2014). Further, most process models focus primarily on the connections that link different parts of the process in a particular order. While connections and the order of events are important in the model we induced, we found that separation is also important. Separating activities into different relational spaces provides the ability to manage competing interests and accomplish conflicting tasks as firms balance stigma reduction with survival. Separation also involves forming new category boundaries.
Stigma reduction phases. Our findings suggest that categorical stigma reduction unfolds in three distinct but overlapping phases: initiating a moral agenda, moral prototyping, and morality infusion. Whereas prior tactics-focused research has not considered the ordering of activities, our model shows that ordering is important: certain actions must be separated in time and will be unsuccessful until they are connected to other actions that have already taken place. For example, creating a moral prototype and category emergence cannot occur until a clear and acceptable moral agenda has been established, and morality infusion will be unsuccessful if the actions associated with creating a moral prototype have not occurred first.

Another insight from our findings is that key events trigger each phase in the process, and the nature of these triggering events changes across phases. Although the motivation is there from the beginning, initiating the process requires that the environment is also receptive. Exogenous events that serendipitously come together can provide both the means and opportunity to initiate the new moral agenda. Once the moral agenda is established, the collective has the influence necessary to establish a moral prototype, but exogenous events and conditions outside the collective’s control are still required to proceed. As the new category becomes established, however, the events precipitating morality infusion are largely driven by members of the stigmatized category.

In our context, groups such as NORML tried to initiate a social justice–based moral agenda for over 20 years, but it was not until the confluence of the language used in a 1978 Supreme Court decision and the AIDS crisis a decade later that a viable moral agenda was created and there was sufficient energy to press it forward. Similarly, it took the passage of Proposition P in 1991 legalizing medical cannabis in San Francisco, and Proposition 215 in 1996 legalizing medical cannabis at the state level in California, to initiate the moral prototyping phase. These ballot initiatives required the efforts of medical cannabis activists, but they also benefited to a great extent from these communities’ sensitivity to the AIDS epidemic and the patients’ rights–based moral agenda, making the timing right for these initiatives to be proposed and passed; passage, however, was ultimately outside their control. It was another 20 years until morality infusion started to take place, as the language, symbols, values, and practices needed for the new industry category to emerge took hold and as more states legalized medical cannabis. At this point the industry had professionalized—establishing an industry infrastructure and lobbying and trade organizations—and the collective began focusing its efforts on disseminating the industry’s moral image and prototype locally and broadly. While we expect the shifting locus of triggering events from external to internal across the phases is likely to generalize to other contexts, future research should confirm this finding.

Relational spaces and survival. Where and when different competing interests are addressed and managed is also critical. Whereas initiating a moral agenda takes place primarily on the front stage, our findings suggest that moral prototyping and morality infusion unfold across all three stages simultaneously. In our context, establishing and collectively agreeing on what exactly the category prototype would be was a contested process involving messy negotiations that took place partially in public and thus were partially visible on the side stage. Prior research on stigma reduction (e.g., Adams, 2012) has focused only
on front-stage activities and has not considered the conflict that competing interests and agendas can inject into the process or how they are managed.

In their study of how two different institutional logics can come to coexist, Mair and Hehenberger (2014) argued that the front and back stages represent different relational spaces, where different types of meetings occur to allow parties with different perspectives to resolve conflicts. Our findings suggest that these different relational spaces also play an important role in how category stigma is reduced or eliminated. In particular, our model highlights the important role of backstage activities for organizational survival during the stigma reduction process and the separation among the different relational spaces this required.

Not all core activities crucial for organizational survival are consistent with the values and practices being propounded on the front stage, and existing research on managing stigma has primarily focused on hiding these stigmatized attributes from public view (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009; Vergne, 2012). We found that reducing a category’s core stigma required creating a backstage relational space that not only separated survival activities from the prototype they were creating and disseminating on the front stage but also helped actors cognitively manage the value incongruence the two sets of practices engendered (Maire and Hehenberger, 2014). While some may view this as hypocritical because they were using the black market to access resources, the industry members saw it in more pragmatic terms: destigmatizing their industry would do them little good if they were not around to enjoy the fruits of their efforts. Whether and to what extent the backstage continues to be necessary and whether the activities change once the industry has become largely or wholly destigmatized is an interesting avenue for future research.

Forming new categories. Our findings also showed that a third form of connection and separation was accomplished through category formation. Reducing a category’s core stigma does not just involve linking an existing category to another category with a different set of values, or occur through certification by reputable actors. Rather, it can involve more complex processes of category emergence (Durand and Khaire, 2017) in which a new category (medical cannabis) forms out of an existing category (the black market) through bottom-up processes of boundary creation (i.e., by rank-and-file industry participants rather than elites or some governing authority), and the proponents of the new category push the stigmatized values and labels onto the existing category while tying the new category to different, more accepted values, symbols, and labels. They do so through processes of identifying or connecting with a new set of values, language, and symbols and disidentifying or separating from the old category and its associated values, language, and symbols. This perpetuates the stigma, even as the new category separates itself from it. Once the new category prototype begins to coalesce and its values, language, and symbols are shared among its members, it can then be disseminated to external audiences through morality infusion.

Category Emergence in Stigmatized Categories

Our study also contributes to the literature on categories and categorization more generally. There has been an increased interest in the role and influence
of category membership on a variety of organizational outcomes (e.g., Rosa et al., 1999; Zuckerman, 1999; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005; Hsu, 2006; Delmestri and Greenwood, 2016; Paolella and Durand, 2016) and in how values and identity influence responses to new categories (e.g., Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000; Hsu, Koçak, and Kovács, 2018). But less attention has been paid to how categories can morph and change (Durand and Khaire, 2017).

In distinguishing how new categories come about, Durand and Khaire (2017: 97) noted, “In category emergence, the cues and elements solicited to recombine, build, and narrate the story around the novelty belong to alien repertoires and vocabularies; as a result, the emergent category is more likely to be fought against, rejected, demoted, and vilified by incumbent actors that defend and benefit from existing orders and economic models.” This presumes, however, that the artifacts and practices at the center of the existing category are perceived as moral. We find that when new categories emerge from stigmatized categories, the opposite occurs: the existing category is “fought against, rejected, demoted, and vilified” as the newly emerging category works to establish and distinguish itself and to push all of the existing stigma associated with the product at the core of both categories onto the existing category. Thus “removing” stigma does not necessarily mean that the stigma disappears; rather, it can involve scraping the stigma off of one category and concentrating it on another.

We show that a variety of actors worked collectively to create a new moral category prototype they can identify with, while simultaneously creating and disidentifying with a negative category prototype. They did so by infusing generally sanctioned cultural values into their practices, narratives, overall identities, and image (Gioia, Hamilton, and Patvardhan, 2014). Unlike the new values incorporated in the emergence of unstigmatized categories, these values must be strong enough to supplant the prevailing values at the root of the stigma. At the same time, actors must decouple a stigmatized industry’s core artifacts or activities from one set of values and attach them to a new set of values. Our theoretical model highlights the interplay among the language, materials, symbolic actions, and processes of identification and disidentification necessary to make these changes.

Finally, Durand and Khaire (2017) argued that with category emergence in non-stigmatized industries, material changes precede changes in narratives and labeling. In other words, actors introduce innovations that are inadequately captured by the category’s current classification system, and the innovators then devise a new classification system and category that are more representative. We find that the underlying processes for stigmatized category emergence unfold differently. In our context, the narrative that marijuana could be medicine had existed for more than 100 years, although it had been suppressed for most of the twentieth century. Thus the basic narrative itself was not new, even if how it was developed into a powerful moral agenda was.

Further, the product itself had not changed at all, even as the marijuana-as-medicine narrative reemerged and was reconfigured into a new moral agenda. Only in the morality infusion phase, after the moral agenda was established and the new moral prototype was created, were material changes in the product—via selective breeding for particular attributes—and innovations in how the product was consumed (i.e., vaping, tinctures, topicals, and edibles beyond pot brownies) introduced. While Durand and Khaire (2017)
acknowledged that the processes they described were ideal types, our findings suggest that there may be substantive differences in how stigmatized and nonstigmatized categories emerge. When a category is emerging from a stigmatized core, material changes may still be critical, but they can serve their intended purpose only if the category’s initiators first skillfully use language and symbols to establish new categorical boundaries based on morally acceptable premises and begin to change the cognitive associations between the category’s core artifact and the societal values associated with it. Future research on industry categories should continue to explore how firms survive the category’s birth, particularly in stigmatized contexts.

Limitations and Future Research

Ours is a qualitative inductive study; thus there is the possibility that our findings may not generalize to other settings. Our study also focused on three states (Washington, Colorado, and Oregon) that were early movers and were located in the Mountain West and Northwest. It is likely there are regional differences in industry approaches to removing stigma. Comparing early and later legalizing states could yield interesting insights.

Future research should also explore whether the process we identified is observed in other core-stigmatized industries, such as when abortion providers work to be seen as meeting women’s healthcare and reproductive needs; garbage collectors reposition themselves as providing waste management services, including recycling; prostitution is positioned as a feminist issue (Weitzer, 2012); and pornography firms strive to become mainstream (Voss, 2015). While we expect the process we have outlined will be more effective in dealing with morally and socially grounded stigmas than physical stigmas (Ashforth et al., 2007), future research should consider the extent to which the process generalizes across a variety of contexts and types of core category stigma. Future research should also consider whether our findings generalize to groups that are seeking to change audiences’ perceptions around other related social evaluations such as legitimacy, which are “aggregated and objectified at the collective level” (Bitektine and Haack, 2015: 50).

Another potential limitation is that we studied the more prominent leaders of the industry, who were focused on changing and defining it. Further, because of the closed nature of the community, we began collecting data using snowball sampling. Thus we may have been referred into networks of like-minded individuals and failed to capture the differing perspectives of other groups. For example, it is possible that there were other firms on the fringes of the industry that were not as concerned about changing the status quo or had different perceptions about removing stigma. Future research may consider how those firms affected, and were affected by, the overall process. We also did not systematically interview the stakeholder audiences who were being affected, although we had substantial media accounts, voting data, and poll results that were useful in tracking changes in their perceptions.

Finally, while we discuss collective behaviors and perceptions, because our focus was on understanding the overall process of reducing category stigma, we did not conduct an in-depth analysis of the dynamics within the organizations and among the different individual players representing the collective. Our data revealed clear goal consensus with respect to stigma removal and
differentiating medical cannabis from the black market; however, as our discussion of the side stage showed, there was disagreement on other issues. Future research focused on collective actions should explore these interorganizational dynamics in greater detail.

Our study also suggests additional avenues for future research. Because we conducted a contemporaneous rather than a purely historical study, the industry was not yet fully destigmatized in the eyes of all of its different audiences. Future research studying industries that are completely destigmatized with all audiences could offer valuable additional insights, particularly as they relate to the use of the various stages. Another avenue for future research is that cannabis entrepreneurs are likely experiencing changes to their personal identities as their firms and industries undergo their transformations (Powell and Baker, 2014). Future research should examine the nature of these changes and how they affect various outcomes, such as decision making and innovation, for both the individual and firm.

Implications for Strategic Entrepreneurship

Finally, our study has implications for strategic entrepreneurship or the combination of opportunity seeking with advantage seeking (Hitt et al., 2001; Ketchen, Ireland, and Snow, 2007). Scholarship in this area has considered entrepreneurial firms’ strategic actions but has generally not considered the negative social evaluations that entrepreneurial firms may deal with in new industries that carry some stigma (e.g., that require “dirty work,” Ashforth et al., 2007), that rely on bricolage to make do with the substandard resources at hand (Baker and Nelson, 2005), that employ controversial or untested technologies (e.g., stem cell technology, Weitzer, 2012), or that engage in practices challenging existing norms (e.g., Uber, Airbnb, and Napster). Our study highlights how entrepreneurs can use morality to create new meanings for key audiences, particularly when these audiences draw on their values to object to the industry category’s existence. Entrepreneurship involves exploring opportunities in uncharted territories that can be disconcerting to and resisted by some (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Garud, Hardy, and Maguire, 2007). By exploring how new industries deal with antagonistic stakeholders—typical in stigmatized industries—this study informs our understanding of how to overcome audience resistance to new industry categories.

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Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article can be found in the Online Appendix at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0001839219851501.
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