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REVIEW OF
European & Transatlantic Affairs
Introductory Remarks

1. 1. Letter from the Editors-in-Chief

Christian Neubacher and Diego Rojas Salvador
Editors-in-Chief

It gives us great pleasure to introduce the Spring 2017 issue of the Review of European & Transatlantic Affairs (RETA).

The aim of the journal is to foster and encourage a critical debate about the many challenges facing Europe and the world, and to raise innovative and original solutions to them. Since the publication of our most recent Spring edition in 2016, geopolitical changes from all corners of the world have shaken the foundations of the world order which has persisted over the course of the past 70 years. The United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, and far-right politicians garnered significant vote totals in elections in France, Austria, and the Netherlands. These changes, despite differing in degree and nature, nonetheless paint a similar picture of a broken and tarnished social contract, and societies in need of an economic and political renewal.

Despite these many pressing issues, and other underlying and persisting problems such as the Greek debt crisis and the refugee crisis, it is becoming increasingly clear that a new engagement and energy is emerging across Europe, not least among
As Europe now aims to revitalize its process of integration, European Horizons and other like-minded organizations will continue to play an important role in shaping the policy debate across the continent, ensuring that the future of the European Union is a prosperous one for all its citizens.

The Spring 2017 issue of RETA focuses on the issues mentioned above, and on the future of the European Union, in general. It collects the policy papers developed by the participants of the European Student Conference 2017 (ESC 2017), which took place at Yale University on February 10-11, 2017, and the responses to these papers, authored by illustrious policy makers and academics. In addition, this issue includes a paper presented at the European Security Spring Forum, which took place at the Atlantic Council Headquarters on April 14, 2017, and a paper presented at the Western Regional Conference on Questions of Contemporary Europe 2017, which took place at Brigham Young University on March 29-30, 2017.

Thanks to the diverse group of students, young professionals and scholars, and policy experts from both sides of the Atlantic that contributed content, this issue presents innovative perspectives and ideas that address the challenges faced by the European Union today. Following the themes and the structure of the three Conferences, this issue is divided into three corresponding sections. The ESC 2017 component follows the theme of the conference, “Reforging the Social Contract in Europe”, and it is divided into five subtopics which correspond to the different workshops of the Conference and represent central areas of interest related to European and transatlantic affairs. In the “Foreign and Security Policy” subsection, a paper proposed creating a centralized intelligence database, that will be accessible to all EU members’ intelligence agencies, in order to increase information sharing within the EU, and ensure effective responses to terrorist threats. The “Identity” subsection contains papers that propose top-down and bottom-up strategies to forge a new European narrative, and possible solutions to the new wave of uncertainty that has arisen around the European Project. In the “Legitimacy” subsection, a paper focused on the idea of crafting a European public sphere by improving access to European information, and by improving government accountability. The “Migration” subsection contains papers that look at this topic from the security and labor market angles. The papers propose making progressive changes to the legal and policy framework to preserve people’s freedom of
movement, while effectively combatting terrorism, and developing a pan-European skills assessment process for refugees, as a method to facilitate the labor market integration of refugees and other immigrants. In the “Productivity” subsection, a paper focuses on the relationship between education and productivity and innovation by proposing a decrease in the rigidity of tracking in secondary schools in Europe, and the creation of an internship and apprenticeship program during the last years of high school. The Spring Forum component follows the theme of the conference, “The Leadership Chasm: Intergenerational Strategies to Revitalize Transatlantic Security Cooperation”, and the paper presented proposes that dignity should be the guiding principle and unifying vision behind EU foreign interventions. The Western Regional Conference focused on several questions of contemporary Europe, and the paper included in this issue discussed methods for “Improving the Integration of Refugees in Germany”. The paper proposed that integration is not only achieved by offering language and culture education, but also guaranteeing safety and stability for the refugees.

We hope that the papers and policy proposals contained in the Spring 2017 issue of RETA will contribute to the ongoing discussion on the future of the European Union and the transatlantic bond, and that they will bring to light the perspectives of the young minds that are working towards a brighter, and more prosperous and confident Europe.

Christian Neubacher is a senior at the University of Michigan studying economics and international studies. As a dual Swedish-American citizen, he has experienced both sides of the Atlantic ocean, which has propelled his interest in European politics and transatlantic affairs. Christian serves as the Deputy Head of Journal for European Horizons, and as the treasurer of the University of Michigan chapter of European Horizons.

Diego Rojas Salvador is a senior at the University of Michigan studying computer science and drama. He has an interest in political science, government, and public policy. He serves as the Head of Journal for European Horizons, and as President of the European Horizons chapter at the University of Michigan. Diego believes the European project represents a model of cooperation and integration which other regions of the world should try to emulate.
1. 2. Letter from the Member of the European Parliament

Catherine Stihler
Member of the European Parliament

Every generation faces challenges. Today’s generation is no different. The technological revolution we are living through means that a virtually borderless world exists. Goods and services are traded globally by individuals and companies in ways that were unimaginable a decade ago. Who would have thought that AirBnB would turn the hotel industry on its head? Disruption is the new norm.

The European Union’s digital single market strategy is attempting to make it easier for consumers and businesses alike to harness the potential of this untapped economic goldmine which could yield €400 billion of untapped benefits. Yet, as our borderless world exists for those who can tap on an app and purchase what they want, others do not have the same opportunities. There are many living off the minimum wage, others are not just experiencing a material change in their lives, but a clear deterioration in their quality of living as the service economy dominates and precarious work becomes the norm. It is no wonder that a political backlash to a borderless world faces the EU at a national level.

The rise of nationalism and populism, where the ‘other’ is blamed for the problems individuals face, has led to one of the EU’s most important countries, the U.K., leaving the block to ‘take back control’. By leaving the EU, the U.K. will lose control and influence the rules that impact its businesses trading with the EU. Brexit means borders. It means barriers. It means a disadvantage for ‘global Britain’. The people who will suffer the most from the true consequences of Brexit are the very people who most need the protection of European rules and ideals. Those who put a £350 million lie on a big red bus should be held accountable for the consequences of their actions. We will wait and see.
However, technology will not be held back even with the strong traditional lobby groups who just want analog rules to be applied to a digital reality. How we adapt and learn to cope as individuals in this disruptive and changing world is essential to our individual success. The typical high school student today will have an average of 18 different jobs in their lifetime. We have gone from a ‘job for life’ to a life with various roles and uncertainty in one generation. One of the key skills we need to teach at school is not just coding but resilience. Adapting to constant change requires resilience. Resilience should become our new watchword, both for the EU as it adapts to change and for us as individuals.

I was privileged to participate in The European Student Conference this year. It was a truly unique opportunity to bring the brightest student minds together to think about the most pressing challenges facing the European Union today.

Just as the European Union was founded on the values of cooperation and being ‘united in diversity, these principles are also reflected in the student experience of the conference. By bringing students from different universities together, tackling a unique problem, considering solutions and having feedback from key EU influencers, the underpinning learning experience has the potential to last a lifetime. In the international world today the values of the EU-founding fathers of ‘making war not merely unthinkable but materially impossible’ continue to inspire a new generation of leaders and thinkers. The EU is celebrating its 60th anniversary this year and its significance as the world’s most successful peace process is a legacy which lives on despite the current challenges it faces.

I was inspired by the level of debate, the commitment to European values and the importance of dealing with new challenges head on. If you share the ideas of cooperation, unity, and peace then I would encourage you to participate in the next conference and shape our future world. You are our hope for today and for tomorrow.

Catherine Stihler is a member of the European Parliament for Scotland
2. 1. Brexit as an opportunity - How will Europe consider new defense initiatives

SUBMITTED BY
Dominika Rihova and Elisabeth Weisswange

OBSERVATIONS

“Member States will need to move towards defence cooperation as the norm”

1. The British referendum renders the future of the EU uncertain. Regarding defense, it is unclear how the EU will be affected by the exit of the UK – the EU will lose a main contributor to the defense budget, yet the UK has often blocked decision making, by regularly opposing attempts at deeper integration of EU defense assets and capabilities. As a result, one can see Brexit as an opportunity to make progress in a policy area long eluded.¹

² Angelini, L. (2016). Brexit is an opportunity for EU defence policy. EUobserver retrieved from https://euobserver.com/opinion/134256
2. The EU’s security priorities include securing its external borders, and preventing threats such as terrorist attacks, or threats using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Despite a consensus on this, there is a disagreement on the degree of deeper cooperation in the defense and security area. Yet Brexit provides for a stronger position of the Franco-German tandem. Given the EU’s increased focus on tackling the terrorist threat, compounded by the increasing threat of foreign fighters, the authors expect the countries to take advantage of Brexit and the member states’ (MS) willingness for further integration in the defence and security area to push strongly for closer cooperation.

3. At the same time, Russian expansionism and its destabilizing effect on the Eastern Neighbourhood represent a security threat to the EU and must therefore be faced. The EU Armed Forces should be able to balance and deter Russian military strength without outside help. In 2015 the EU’s spending on defence was €203.143 billion (ca. €150 billion without the UK), while Russia’s was roughly €62 billion. Despite this, few would doubt Russia’s superiority over the EU in its actual fighting strength, thus underlining the need for the EU military capabilities to be rendered fully operational.

4. In light of the increasing populism in Europe, the risk of backlash from European citizens must be taken into account as security and defense comprise core features of state sovereignty, and are among the MS’ most sensitive and closely guarded policy areas.

5. The role of NATO remains uncertain as some MS oppose a duplication of NATO’s traditional collective defence arrangements yet others push for greater self-reliance of the EU in the context of the presidential elections in the US. Another uncertainty is what the
UK’s involvement in the security and defence of Europe will look like in the future.\(^\text{12}\)

6. In the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, published in June 2016, the EU calls for strategic autonomy. The challenge is how to define this term and how to implement it now after Brexit.\(^\text{13}\)

7. These challenges call for a decisive step forward; for an integrated EU military force under one political command and budget\(^\text{14}\), a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy encompassing a flexible intelligence-led approach, prevention of terrorism and organized crime, and lastly protection of citizens and key infrastructure.

**POLICY VISION**

1. The future of the EU’s defense and security ought to be based on the **principle of subsidiarity**, emphasizing its potential to significantly enhance the Members’ ability to stabilize its neighborhood through joint action as well as their counter-terrorist efforts through the promotion of social cohesion and social inclusion which aims at the **prevention of criminal phenomena**, through measures which enhance the cooperation and coordination between the Members, as well as through a **flexible intelligence-led approach**.

2. Following the exit of the UK, it is likely that the European Allies will increasingly speak with one voice in NATO\(^\text{15}\). The EU needs to become more autonomous, also with respect to NATO. A solution would be **stronger and self-reliant defence in tandem with NATO**, as stronger and more capable European defence will lead to a stronger NATO in return.\(^\text{16}\)

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12 Ibid  
13 EEAS (2016b)  
14 ALDE Roadmap Towards EU Integrated Military Forces (2016)  
15 Biscop (2016)  
16 Ibid
3. **Strategic autonomy** means acting without US assets, not without NATO assets. Consequently the EU ought to continue using NATO headquarters besides building **permanent multinational formations with dedicated multinational headquarters**, such as army corps and air wings; each participant would contribute national manoeuvre battalions or military aircraft to these but all the support functions could be ensured by a combinis would be a framework of choice to generate all larger scale European deployments.\(^7\)

4. In terms of the **European Defence Agency**, London will no longer be able to block the remaining MS from using EU institutions and Treaty provisions to the full. The EU should make full use of the EDA’s potential. It could, for example, be the manager of all defence research projects and expand its budget for digital innovation in regards to defence and security. \(^8\)

5. The EU should focus on **strategic enablers** which demand the participation of a large number of MS to make any project economically viable. These strategic enablers could include defence research, technologies, and multinational cooperation. They must be fully funded by the Commission. By doing this, a **European defence industry** could be created. \(^9\)

6. Ultimately, the EU should aim to create a **defence union**, which would bring together national troops under the EU’s battlegroups concept, in place since 2007. Having a unified command for joint European military operations in the form of the above mentioned headquarters would facilitate cooperation of the Members. This would enable the EU to react promptly to unexpected situations and to be present at the negotiation table in cases such as Syria or Ukraine thus increasing its effectiveness and credibility. The critical lever for the defence union is the so-called **Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)** provided under the Lisbon Treaty. It allows the EU member states to cooperate on military matters without needing a unanimous decision from the European Council. \(^10\)

\(^7\) Ibid
\(^8\) Ibid
\(^9\) Ibid
7. Monitoring and disrupting terrorist groups’ usage of the internet and social media for dissemination of propaganda material, recruitment, and fundraising, as well as the prosecution of criminals is essential. IntCen already reflects a high degree of intelligence integration. It engages in open-source intelligence gathering and provides intelligence analysis and strategic assessments for EU decision-makers, especially in the area of counter-terrorism. However, the challenge is that the agency is highly secretive and low profile. Now that it has been given a more central role within the EEAS and receives a lot of EU funding, it is imperative that the agency becomes more open and accountable. Such a move will enhance cooperation among members by strengthening trust and transparency. Brexit also opens the door for an intelligence-led approach in tackling terrorism, as the now EU-27 agree upon the four fundamental freedoms while improving data collection.

8. In the words of J.C. Juncker (2016), ‘Solidarity is the glue that keeps our union together’. The EU should continue in its efforts to enhance solidarity and trust among its citizens through the building of European identity as only a united Europe is a strong Europe capable of facing external threats. Social inclusion and cohesion contributes to terrorist and organized crime prevention as well as to minimization of the effect of a terrorist attack.

ANALYSIS

STRENGTHS:

1. The presented strategy is comprehensive, and makes a proposal founded on the prevention as well as the tackling of both internal and external security threats in both the short and long term.

2. Self-reliance of the EU is at the heart of the proposal as it is a vital asset in the era of a probable Pax Americana’s end.

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3. Increasing the EU’s defence capacity through a unified command is cost effective\(^ {23}\), it renders the EU defense system operational and thus more effective; enhancing the EU’s self-reliance. In addition, this is complementary to the Members’ participation in NATO, thus preventing a backlash of the national governments.

4. An effective and operational military power is strategically necessary in order to regain credibility in the face of Russia and to counter the scepticism of European citizens.\(^ {24}\)

5. The EU’s defense system is not only complementary to NATO, it enhances NATO’s defence capacities. At the same time the EU’s defense union would be more self-reliant and therefore able to act on its own.

6. One can see a certain degree of political will to achieve progress in the area of defence, in particular at institutional and operational levels.\(^ {25}\)

7. The proposal takes into account the shift from traditional defence to IT-based security and defence, therefore acknowledging that development and further innovation in technology is mission-critical for defence and security.\(^ {26}\)

WEAKNESSES:

8. Cyprus-Turkey relations represent a significant obstacle in EU-NATO cooperation, especially in regard to intelligence sharing, which is crucial in preventing and fighting terrorism.\(^ {27}\)

9. Any practical move towards European Armed Forces requires a process of technical and procedural standardization, possibly led by the EDA and the EU military headquarters, which is a challenge requiring the full commitment of the MS.

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\(^ {25}\) Angelini (2016)


10. The remaining EU MS are not keen to deploy troops under the CSDP. The ongoing disagreement between different MS will hinder a smooth and quick process. In addition, MS who were hiding behind the UK’s veto until Brexit might now also come out into the open and object proposals.  

11. The EU cannot count on any future cooperation with the UK and has to make its decision based on this uncertainty.

12. Cooperation will have to be deepened at two levels simultaneously: that of the EU and that of the clusters of MS.

13. The EDA will lose Britain’s budgetary contribution, which is a large amount and might weaken the EDA before it gets stronger.

14. National interests stand in the way – the proposal requires all Members to give up their control over defense and security areas, which are symbolic of national sovereignty. This is a requirement which is especially demanding in the era of growing populism and protectionism.

IMPLEMENTATION

15. Germany and France should use their influence within the EU, to remind the Members of the unstable international environment and of the decreasing involvement of the US in the Middle East, which is likely to soon be followed by its decreased involvement in Europe. The security threat is real and immediate and the Franco-German tandem should make it clear to the other Members that an active engagement of all the Members in the defense area is absolutely necessary.

16. In order to enhance solidarity and trust among European citizens, the Union should continue in its efforts to construct and consolidate a coherent European identity coexistent with the national ones through the maintenance or introduction of projects such as European Solidarity Corps, public digital discussion platforms or a European radio and television channel provided by the European institutions.

28 Angelini (2016)
2. 2. Integrating the EU - Approach to Counterterrorism

SUBMITTED BY
Samuel Blair, Pedro Maddens Toscano,
Paul Love, and Signe Janoska-Bedi

OBSERVATIONS

The Foreign and Security Policy Workshop observes the following:

1. Terrorism, the use of violence for political purposes, is a dimension of foreign policy in Europe. The development of integrated solutions to this threat has been hampered by issues such as the European migration crisis and the emergence of radical ideologies antagonistic to fundamental European values.

2. The European Union’s glaring security gaps concerning refugee routes make them highly susceptible to terrorist exploitation. For example, many perpetrators of the Paris attacks used the refugee routes as means to enter Europe. Many terrorists have also been able to establish multiple identities in several countries.

3. These challenges are aggravated by the lack of information sharing by member state governments, the lack of a centralized EU intelligence database with the power to mandate information sharing, and the turmoil near Europe’s eastern and southern borders.

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POLICY VISION

The Foreign and Security Policy Workshop believes that:

1. **Centralized EU Intelligence Database**
   
   a. A new capacity for intelligence sharing between EU member state governments should be created in order to respond to the terrorist threat facing Europe. This threat should be prioritized as a matter of foreign policy by the EU, because the refugee and migration crisis originates from events outside of Europe, changing the nature of the terrorist threat faced by the EU. This implies that the threat should first be met at the EU’s borders.
   
   b. EURODAC fingerprint data collected from refugees and irregular migrants should be combined with INTCEN, Europol, and state intelligence databases to unify the portfolios of individuals who may pose a threat to the EU.
   
   c. A European Intelligence Agency (EIA) reporting to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will monitor this centralized intelligence database through a human and automated intelligence analysis team that provides an additional layer of security to ensure no threats undetected by member states will harm the EU.

2. **Bolstering Member State Interoperability**
   
   a. This critical intelligence data stored by the EIA can be accessed by all EU member states’ intelligence services and will eliminate the risk posed by insufficient information sharing. This integrated European approach to counterterrorism will strengthen the security of EU member states by significantly enhancing cooperation among their intelligence services. It will greatly improve the ability of EU member states to effectively track terrorists and terror networks across the EU.
   
   b. A tiered-anonymization protocol could be used by EU member states’ intelligence services when coding the method of procurement for intelligence data stored in the centralized intelligence database. This would safeguard the privacy and security of classified intelligence sourc-
es. Additionally, this would help reduce mistrust between member states’ intelligence services which impairs counterterrorism cooperation.

c. This integrated European approach to counterterrorism with supranational oversight is necessary because the intelligence-sharing status quo has left EU governments lacking the crucial information needed to prevent terrorist attacks. The EU can no longer afford its member states’ withholding of vital intelligence analysis from allies due to lack of awareness or mistrust. Europe must confront the foreign policy challenge of extreme ideologies that any individual entering the EU could possess and the border tensions inherent in the migration crisis.

d. The EU should create a basis for multinational intelligence data centralization between Germany, France, and Belgium, all of whom have been hit by terror attacks recently. This would further communication between these member states’ intelligence services, which in turn would allow the EU to be an international player in intelligence sharing with third states. Multinational intelligence data centralization reporting to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy would be overseen by the EU Parliament and accountable to the Commission.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY:

The participants of the Foreign and Security Policy Workshop, in order to realize their vision, intend to:

1. Acknowledge that terrorism has both internal and external repercussions, and recommend that the EU’s response must be cross-dimensional. A European Intelligence Agency (EIA) must be the long term vision. A European Intelligence Agreement between a few key member states, especially those that have been targets of recent terrorist attacks, will allow the appropriate deepening of information sharing.

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3 Ibid
2. Advise that the initial partners in the Agreement be France, Belgium, and Germany. The critical component of the Agreement will fund the EIA, and give the Agency a mandate to collect counterterrorism information from each participating member state, in order to consolidate and standardize intelligence data for universal consumption by such states which are party to the agreement.

3. Establish the eventual goal of this initial agreement to be institutional growth that includes the remaining of EU member states when their political conditions are more conducive to participation in the Agreement. The leadership of the EIA will fall to the High Representative, which, when paired with appropriate oversight by the European Commission and European Parliament, will ensure internal democratic representation. New member states wishing to join the Agreement will report to these institutions, ensuring they meet the membership specifications.

4. Confirm that the specific provisions of this agreement will enable more efficient communication across three critical areas. The mandate will first enable a member state’s own internal agencies to have access to common information, enabling better on-the-ground counterterrorism action, which was a major problem during the 2016 Brussels Terrorist Attacks. Second, it will improve information sharing between member states. This will help track terrorist movement within the EU.

5. Accept that both of these aforementioned efficiencies address internal considerations. A third efficiency with external repercussions will also emerge. Consolidated EU counterterrorism information will enable the EU to interact more effectively with third states and their respective intelligence agencies. Operating much like a unified intelligence agency, the EIA will contribute to international information sharing and the global counterterrorism effort.

6. Acknowledge that isolationist governments and uncertainty over the Schengen Agreement, concerning migrant flows, threaten the feasibility of European security integration.

7. Note that the ‘Splendid Isolation’ policy that fostered the UK vote to leave the EU serves as an example of perceived over-integration.

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by European elites.\textsuperscript{5}

8. Emphasize that in light of these political conditions in Europe, the expansion of information sharing must be incremental to deepening integration between a few states before expanding to include the broader community of EU member states.

9. Reaffirm that the EIA’s separate bureaucracy can serve as an anchor for further development of the EU’s intelligence competencies.

2. 3. The Trump Administration and European Security

SUBMITTED BY
Jelena Vićić and Gabriel Wells

OBSERVATIONS

The Foreign and Security Policy Workshop observes the following:

1. Prior to taking office, the new United States President Donald Trump made a series of statements which signaled a possible shift in US foreign policy, including changes such as improving relations with Russia and the cooling of relations with traditional European allies.

   a. The EU has relied through NATO on the US as a guarantor of its security and stability, and as a protector of liberal world order. Therefore, significant changes in US policy could affect the EU’s interests, its internal stability, and its relations with Eastern European nations and Russia.

   b. President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin have demonstrated mutual goodwill, potentially leading to what Russian media claims will be a “honeymoon phase” in US-Russian relations. Cooperation between Russia and the US could adversely affect the EU. According to the European Council President Donald Tusk, the American Administration poses one of the greatest threats to the stability of the European project.

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c. The EU has many commitments to non-EU countries that the US does not, including the Balkans and countries of the former Soviet Union, and has economic and security reasons to pursue additional commitments, especially in the Balkans.

d. Additionally, Europe’s security is directly compromised by violations of international law and instability on its borders. As demonstrated by the annexation of Crimea, this instability could take many forms, from direct military aggression and changes in borders, to propaganda and intelligence operations.  

2. Changes in US policy bring these issues to the fore, as the EU must decide whether they remain priorities even without US support.

POLICY VISION

The Foreign and Security Policy Workshop believes that the EU should:

1. Increase its resilience and maintain unity in the face of new challenges, including increasing military spending to reach the minimum contribution levels as required by NATO.

   a. Additionally, to promote the effectiveness and independence of the EU outside of NATO, the EU budget as a whole should allow for investments in the interoperability of military technology.

   b. The EU can also serve as a platform for discussion of best practices and connectivity as each individual nation develops its military to meet spending goals.

   c. The EU can build public-private partnerships and propose financial incentives to defense companies to sell more materiel to the internal market, in order to increase interoperability.

2. The EU should “show rather than tell” in its application of hard and soft power, meaning that diplomacy should be open to productive relationships with both the US and Russia, while its actions should demonstrate the resolve to maintain internal stability.

   a. In achieving these goals, the EU can use public diplomatic efforts such as increasing the scope and publicity of EU sponsored exchange programs that extend beyond Europe’s borders.

   b. Additionally, the EU should increase investments with international companies in the capacity of public-private partnerships, especially with the US. This could include anti-propaganda efforts such as fact-checking websites.

3. The EU must also demonstrate its commitment to current member states and partners.

   a. Changes in the American foreign policy will likely affect the balance of powers in the western Balkans, and possibly cause instability in the Baltics. The EU should continue to encourage and support western Balkan candidate countries on their respective paths to EU membership, since many of these countries are motivated to maintain peace in order to gain greater access to the EU.

   b. Further, the EU should continue to reassure its Baltic member states that their safety is guaranteed through the collective security clause of the NATO Treaty.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY:

1. While it is of utmost importance to maintain friendly relations with the US, changes in the current US foreign policy might have an adverse impact on the EU, its security, interests, and international commitments. The EU must come to the realization that more independent action on its part will be necessary in all aspects of international affairs.
a. The EU cannot and should not solely rely on the US as a provider of peace and security in Europe. Increasing defense spending and connectivity will be a sign of both unity of the EU member states and of deterrence against Russian aggression or any other security threat the EU may face.

b. The present situation gives the EU an opportunity to take charge and assert itself as a credible international power-house. If this opportunity is missed, the EU might become obsolete and lose its historically upheld importance on the world stage.

c. In recent history, the EU has had tremendous foreign policy successes, including playing a crucial role in bringing the Iran deal to a close, bringing peace and stability to the western Balkans, including the signing of the Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as signing the Paris accords. The EU should continue to push for its foreign policy and environmental agenda, while achieving unity and resilience at home.

2. Defense spending is crucial to achieving this goal, even though it is associated with some challenges.

a. The strengthening of the EU’s military capabilities is unlikely to be perceived as the start of an armed race if the EU manages to clearly signal that it will be solely investing in defensive military capabilities.

b. Despite the financial difficulties the EU has been experiencing in the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis, and as a consequence of the migrant and refugee crisis, the EU political leadership needs to use the momentum provided by the change in the American Administration in order to finally increase its military spending. Continuing to save on the military might cause damage to the EU’s global role that will be hard to repair at a time when actors increasingly rely on power politics.

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3. Russia’s current friendliness towards the US could extend to the EU and non-EU states in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it could signal a less aggressive Russian foreign policy. Alternatively, the New American Administration’s warm stance toward Russia could embolden it to act more aggressively. Therefore, the EU should remain committed to its various pre-existing agreements and prepared to defend its borders and interests.

4. It is very difficult to predict how Russia would interpret various demonstrations of strength, such as military spending and commitment to member states. It is easy to make the case that two opposite strategies—pushing forward and pulling back in Eastern Europe—could have the result of either deterring Russia or spurring it to act aggressively; a defensive reaction against the EU compromising its geopolitical and economic interests on its borders. With respect to Russia, the EU should always be cautious of adverse reaction to its enlargement policies.

5. While the focus of the New American Administration is President Trump himself, and ultimately he will determine policy, it is important for the European Union to keep in mind the other members of Trump’s cabinet and the role they may play. Secretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Tillerson may be less enthusiastic than Trump about warming relations with Russia. It is possible that Trump will provide the rhetoric and overarching tone of the relationship, while Mattis and Tillerson could remain more in line with the EU and the Obama administration on issues like NATO and sanctions. This would be a good outcome for the EU, as it would mean that substantively little will change, while nevertheless there may be an opportunity for increasingly effective diplomacy. It is important to note, however, that Tillerson has many business interests in Russia and that Mattis must follow Trump’s directives.

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2. 4. European Global Strategy - How to operationalize in the context of Europe’s neighborhood

SUBMITTED BY
Luka Ignac, Madeleijn Van den Nieuwenhuizen, Mihai Mogildea, and Justin Tomczyk

Over the past decade the European Union has sought the status of a "global power". After launching the European Security Strategy in 2003, it was clear that there is a need for a more comprehensive common foreign policy regarding the near neighborhood. Thirteen years later – in a time of multiple crises – the European Global Strategy has been used to shape the EU’s role in world affairs.

There are many challenges regarding the EU’s relations with major political and economic powers around the world. The goal of this brief is to identify these issues and to elaborate specific policy actions for solving them. As this topic covers a very large research area, we decided to focus our attention on the EU’s strategic partnership within three regions: the Eastern Partnership, North Africa, and North America.

The Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans

OBSERVATIONS

1. The actions of the Russian Federation are a direct threat to the stability of the European Union and the members of the Eastern Partnership. Russia’s illegal seizure of Crimea not only violates the sovereignty of Ukraine but also displays a dangerous return to using interstate conflict to resolve disputes.

2. It’s critical to understand that Russia does not consider itself a
geopolitical partner of the European Union. The Russian Federation has created the Eurasian Economic Union – a regional body composed of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation. This regional body seeks to emulate a similar model of integration seen in the European Union, only with direct alignment with Moscow. In effect, Russia is actively creating an alternative to the European Union. This union contains Belarus and Armenia – two former members of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership Program. The Russian Federation is also a driving force behind possible expansion of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization, a defense pact modeled after NATO’s collective defense structure) into Iran. Russia’s “sphere of influence” is not an abstract concept but rather a collection of regional bodies and political unions that seek to pull influence from the western world. Effectively, the EU and EEU are offering competing forms of governance. Members of the European Union utilize free-market economies and hold political transparency in high regard – members of the Eurasian Economic Union are dependent on state-owned enterprises and are illiberal democracies governed by a collection of oligarchs.

3. Turkey has grown distant under president Erdogan. A slow consolidation of power around the executive has left the Turkish state resembling Putin’s Russia more than a true European democracy. Turkish intervention in the Syrian Civil War has lead to an increase in tensions with the Russian Federation and has resulted in numerous minor crises – such as the downing of a Russian plane in Turkish airspace. Turkey has pursued policies that have placed it on a trajectory away from EU membership. With regard to the Western Balkans, the accession of Croatia and Slovenia has shown that the integration of former Yugoslav republics is possible. However, the persisting ethnic tensions between Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina have complicated future membership opportunities, particularly over the legal status of Kosovo (a status that is even disagreed upon in the EU). Macedonia’s ongoing naming dispute with Greece and Montenegro’s diplomatic row with Serbia over possible NATO membership have also contributed to a rise in tensions in the Balkans.
POLICY VISION

1. This portion of the policy brief will focus on the European Global Strategy in the context of the EU’s eastern neighborhood. This strategy is designed to answer three major questions: (1) How should the EU respond to the actions of the Russian Federation, (2) How should the EU reengage the Eastern Partnership, and (3) How should the EU engage Turkey and the Western Balkans?

2. Russia has shown its willingness to utilize military force as a dispute-resolution mechanism. This contrasts with the European Union’s values of nonaggression and rule of law. As a result, the European Union must sustain all sanctions on the Russian Federation until Crimea is returned to Ukraine. The justification for this invasion is rooted in the cultural identity and history of national minorities in Ukraine. Not only is this situation comparable to the Baltic States and their respective Russian minorities, but also to the many areas of the European Union where state borders do not reflect local identity. Accepting that Russia’s usage of force is justified by the presence of national minorities sets a dangerous precedent for the continent as a whole. This acceptance also implies that Ukraine’s inherit rights as a sovereign state are void and that invasion is a viable means of conflict resolution. It is critical that the European Union takes a staunch stance against Russian aggression in the former Soviet Union.

3. With regard to the Eastern Partnership, The European Union must prioritize its cooperation with GUAM. GUAM is a regional union composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. These states represent around 60 million people and cover a geographic area that stretches from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea. Each of these countries holds some form of association with the European Union with varying levels of integration – examples include Georgia’s visa-free travel agreement with the EU and Ukraine’s Deep and Comprehensive Trade Agreement. The EU should actively seek to reengage these four states in the framework of EU-GUAM cooperation. The goal of this is to streamline any problems that arise from national differences and instead focus on macroeconomic cooperation between both blocs. Examples of this cooperation could be linking eastern EU members like Poland and Romania to the Transcaspian Pipeline and the Transcaspian Trade Route. While these projects are mostly based on theoretical models and already existing infrastructure, they
represent a potential outlet for regional cooperation and may provide EU members with an opportunity to avoid dependence on Russia with regard to energy imports and shipping to China. When looking at individual GUAM members, bilateral cooperation with former communist countries in the European Union may be an effective solution to accelerating modernization and integration efforts. An example of this is LITPOLUKRBRIG – an international military battalion of Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian troops. While the main purpose of this force is peacekeeping operations, LITPOLUKRBRIG has played a major role in training members of the Ukrainian military for counter-terror operations in Donetsk and Luhansk. Another example of cooperation between EU and GUAM members is RO-UA-MD, a framework of border-enforcement cooperation between Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova. Even if these four states do not join the European Union, EU-GUAM cooperation would help foster a productive relationship with a regional body located directly at the edge of the European Union.

4. Finally there is the question of Turkey and the Western Balkans. These countries have been key allies of the European Union and longtime associates but have gradually grown disenchanted with the prospect of membership. Part of this is the ambiguous stance taken by the European Union towards the possibility of membership. Given that EU accession is a timely and tedious process involving several waves of legal reform and years of negotiations, it is easy for a society to become frustrated and fatigued if progress grows stagnant. Therefore it is of the utmost importance that the European Union presents either a clear timeline for future membership or outlines what sort of relationship permanent-associate status entails. Without this, Turkey and the Western Balkans will continue their slide into dissatisfaction with the EU. Permanent-associate status would allow any of these countries to retain the partial benefits of EU membership while pursuing their own policy objectives (similar to Norway or Switzerland).
The Southern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy

OBSERVATIONS

1. The southern region of the European Neighborhood Policy has always targeted problems regarding political, social, and economic instability. Starting with the launch of ENP in 2004 and the establishment of the Union for Mediterranean by the French presidency in 2008, the EU has been committed to engaging in broader cooperation with North Africa through topics such as trade, security, and good governance. However, little progress has been achieved. The Arab Spring (2011) exposed two flaws in the EU’s southern strategy. First, EU strategy towards authoritarian states like Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria was unappropriated and focused mainly on settling diplomatic relations with those governments without contesting their legitimacy and internal policies. Secondly, The Union for Mediterranean working capacity and impact on democratic institution building in this region was weak. This was characterized by the EU’s failure to deliver an individual approach for the south neighbors and a poor implication in the evolving regional conflicts. The European Global Strategy 2016 is aiming to enhance trade and economic exchanges with the south Mediterranean states, to develop programs for human rights protection and justice reform, and to consolidate the security and defense sectors of the target countries. The biggest challenges which the EU must face in the region are related to the phenomenon of failed states, encountering instable state institutions, and high inflationary economies.

2. The southern region of the ENP is facing several political, social, and economic challenges, but for the purpose of this policy paper the focus will be on human trafficking from the region of North Africa into the Southern Europe. Up until 2015, there was the Mare Nostrum policy of Italy – financially supported by the European Commission – that was aimed at deterring illegal immigrants from crossing the Mediterranean from North Africa into Italy, but that also had a search and rescue component which helped save thousands of lives. It was superseded by Frontex’s Operation Triton – also known as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – which has a considerably smaller search and rescue capability and focuses mainly on border protection.
POLICY VISION

1. A returning criticism by NGOs of Frontex’s Operation Triton is that its focus on deterring illegal immigrants from coming to Europe has led to an indiscriminately harsh policy. Many asylum-seekers do not get the opportunity to claim protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The European Council of on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and the British Refugee Council have repeatedly noted that Frontex systematically fails to ensure compliance with international and EC legal obligations of member states. This, in combination with a lack of transparency and an absence of independent monitoring and democratic accountability within Frontex, calls for an updated European policy in its southern neighborhood regarding (illegal) immigration.

2. The southern dimension of the ENP should be restructured to meet the priorities of the EU and the associated states. In terms of political engagement, the EU failed to address the principle of conditionality and did not press the national governments for further reforms. Through delivering a ‘double standards’ policy towards this region before 2011 – which encouraged political compromise with the authoritarian regimes without focusing on the human rights dimension – the European structures have decreased the ENP credibility to deliver substantial reforms in the ten countries covered by the southern dimension. The enlargement of the EU in terms of values, market economy, and the welfare model has not reached its potential through the ENP and there is a clear need to rethink this policy with regard to the southern region.

3. One of the most important strategic measures stated in the European Global Strategy is related to security and counter terrorism efforts. The establishment of the European Union army is critical for protecting the European space and raising the EU’s participation in conflict prevention across the globe. We have seen early attempts at this sort of force organization through the EU Battlegroup initiatives and EU-lead peacekeeping operations around the globe. As an international actor it is of the utmost importance that the European Unionsecures its borders along the Mediterranean coast. The refugee crises have showed the catastrophic consequences of a weak policy towards the Middle East and Levant. Through securing its southern border, the European Union would play a key role in preventing further instability and violence in its southern neighborhood.
4. Migration and refugee policies must be readdressed in a comprehensive manner. The Commission should deliver a comprehensive set of policies targeted at refugee accommodation and integration targeted at the national level. As with all EU policies, the goal of this effort is further integration and cooperation – not fragmentation and division. A policy proposal in this area should address the EU labor market weaknesses from a pragmatic perspective. As the European Commission mentions, ‘by 2060, there will be just 2 workers for every person aged 65 or over – half today’s figure’.1 This social-demographic problem could be solved through the formation of an European Agency for Immigration, Labor and Mobility, responsible for recruiting a qualified workforce from the third states according to the needs of each individual EU region. This agency would develop branches, training programs, and recruitment divisions in each partner state, assuring a high level of transparency and social mobility. Through these policy measures, new social links would be created between EU and ENP countries approaching the threats of labor shortage and demographic decline.

5. A policy solution to the Mediterranean influx of (illegal) immigrants is twofold. First, the EU needs to adapt the current Frontex’s Operation Triton by means of taking the former Operation Mare Nostrum as an example of a better between deterrence and search and rescue components. Second, the managment of migrant flows requires better cooperation of Europe with multiple central and northern African governments, forging migrant deals based on laws for resettlement and the processing of migrants.

Future of Transatlantic Relations within EGS

OBSERVATIONS

1. The surge of populism and radicalism in both Europe and the United States is a cause for concern. This strategy highlights the fact that Europe faces severe challenges in resisting populist tensions. Now more than ever, Europe needs to position itself as the global force. The Union’s importance in taking the initiative and leading NATO has never been as important due to isolationist

sentiment from the United States. At the same time, the EU also needs to strengthen its diplomatic relations with new US administration. Sustainable relations between the EU and the US have never been so crucial and important in order to not only protect and preserve the Union, but also to stabilize global affairs and bring order to the world.

POLICY VISION

1. In order to successfully preserve European unity while strengthening pan-EU identity, the Union must create and invest in Common Defense Force that will be based on cooperation, and reinforcing ties to NATO, and also partner with other international alliances in order to sustain and provide peace.

2. Commission President Jean Claude Juncker highlighted the fact that the ability to protect itself is key to the European Union as a whole. This alliance should represent all member states and operate through a unified European foreign policy based on the principles highlighted in the European Global Strategy. To truly operationalize the European Global Strategy the EU needs to focus itself on “self-confidence building” through creating common force. Within this idea lies the strengthening of the EU by not only positioning Europe as an even more important strategic ally of the United States, but also as a crucial global economic actor with the capability to lead by itself.

3. The diplomatic relations between the US and the EU must be strengthened and focus on preserving economic partnerships that will further contribute to the free market system, and help minimize any harm that may be caused by the “Brexit” referendum. This will be hard to negotiate due to the anti-globalist tendencies relatable to the surging populism, but with persistent and unified diplomatic representation from the EU this must be an imperative for the EU foreign policy.

4. The new diplomacy means that the European Parliament needs to obtain more legislative power in order to be able to coordinate the unified forces and to start negotiations and diplomatic relations with other countries.
5. A reoccurring problem in regional unions is a lack of common identity - and the EU definitely shares this problem. By creating a common force of all European states around a common goal (protection and security) we are laying the groundwork of unity and future cooperation in the Union. This plan has already been advocated by Germany, and seems to be supported by the US due to a lack of military investment from the EU in NATO.

6. The EU has shown itself as not only vulnerable to provocation from the external forces but also uncoordinated in responding to them. Positive examples, such as CETA show that the EU is still a desirable ally and that by cooperating with the Union both sides will be entitled to vast benefits.

7. As the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Mogherini once said referring to the EU, ‘This alliance should represent all member states but also be a showcase of unified European foreign policy’. The Union has a great chance to preserve itself and to help the rest of the world by utilizing the strategies presented in this brief. The implementation of the European Global Strategy will act as a true showcase of EU unity.

3. 1.1. Belonging and Identity within the EU - Forging a New Narrative

SUBMITTED BY
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OBSERVATIONS

The Identity Workshop observes the following:

1. The European Union has been forging ahead with legal and economic integration but its social narrative is based on the principle of promoting peace in Europe. While this narrative is still largely popular within Europe, Eurobarometer statistics show that “peace among member states” has consistently been rated as the most positive result of the EU, falling into second place only in 2015.¹ (Freedom of movement moved into the top spot in 2015.) However, this has not been sufficient to counter the rise of popular nationalism in Europe.

2. Finding a narrative to counter the rise of populist nationalist political movements. The populist nationalist movement in Europe has been gaining increasing electoral success² and has capitalized on anti-EU sentiment. This movement has effectively mobilized a powerful narrative that pro-European entities have struggled to counter. Treating populism as a part of a more traditional left/right political schism has failed. Moreover, there has not been a

successful formation of a cultural and emotionally based European identity that has proved potent enough to meet the emotional and cultural power of nationalism.

3. **Economic narrative.** The economic narrative was and still must be at the core of the EU project. Yet the economic narrative has proven to be no more self-sufficient. The populist movement has been able to effectively combine economic, cultural, and social grievances into a powerful discourse. Growing economic uncertainty and a decline in economic prosperity due to an increasing globalized economy has contributed to this. Attempts to counter this have been largely focused on the economic arguments for the EU but have not been effectively connected to the social and cultural narratives of belonging. For instance, the ‘Remain’ campaign which focused on the economic dangers of Brexit was presented largely through figures but did not cut through to the British public in the same way that the populist ‘Leave’ campaign mobilized both cultural and economic narratives. Pippa Norris and David Inglehart’s data shows that what they refer to as a “cultural backlash” is largely responsible for the rise of populist politics.

4. **Growing intergenerational divide.** The cultural backlash thesis, presented by Inglehart and Norris, raises an issue of generational divide. They argue that the heated cultural backlash fanned by populist political movements has increased the division between the generations and has resulted in disagreement over the EU. A Pew 2016 study demonstrates this with even generally pro-EU countries such as Germany showing stark 14 point gaps in favor ability towards the EU.

5. **Elitism:** Systematic and politician elitism is an important challenge to European unity. This issue is based on tangible and perceived rhetoric that perpetuates a gap between decision makers and the general public. The same 2016 Pew Research study found that only 51% across 10 EU countries have a favorable view of the European Union. This, coupled with Britain’s vote to leave the EU, indicates a troubling disconnect between the EU and its citizens. Combating a sense of perceived or real “elitism” within the EU is key to promoting inclusion and finding a new narrative.

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6. These observations indicate an urgent need to update the European Union’s narrative, building on the popular peace narrative and integrating more economic, social, and cultural components into the existing narrative.

POLICY VISION

Narrative formation is complex and identity cannot be dictated entirely through policy. The knowledge deficit of the EU is exploited politically. A strategy to combat this exploitation would be to attempt to offer a more inclusive narrative via a combination of top-down and grassroots programs and policies. Education should play a primary role to decrease the knowledge deficit exploited by anti-EU politicians.

Top-down strategies

1. Finding a narrative to counter the rise of populist nationalist political movements

   a. In addition, often the political debate leverages the absence or scarcity of information about the EU among citizens. Educational programming is key to meeting this gap. A proposal is the financing of summer schools focused on the formation of basic issues about the EU (history, motives, principles of main policies such as the common market, etc.). For universities, having some money for running summer programs would be attractive. For students, the programs would be even more attractive. Furthermore, it would increase (a little) the academic market for professors of European issues. University students would be the target market (the fact that they attend Erasmus does not imply that they gain more knowledge of the EU).

   b. It is also key to expand this project beyond the student community and into working communities, using existing structures such as outreach through workers’ unions and professional representation bodies.
2. **Forging a new economic narrative**

   a. These policies represent changes to the top-down narrative building that are still based on the traditional economic narrative of the EU but aim to better integrate with European social values.

   b. Nationalist populist movements have been able to effectively use economic uncertainty because given our nation state-based international order, people automatically look to the state for economic protection therefore nationalism becomes a very attractive idea in the face of economic uncertainty. The counter narrative has focused a great deal on macroeconomic information, and concentrated heavily on the economic benefits of the EU as a trading bloc. More focus needs to be placed on the intersection of social and economic benefits of the EU. Therefore European Union informational campaigns addressing economic arguments should also emphasize the protection the trading bloc gives to workers in a globalized world. Moreover, the economic benefits of European integration should be linked with shared ideals around the importance of the social contract.

   c. The European Union should act to ensure that economic grievances do not grow by reinforcing the common social contract through economic policy, both through the European Commission policymaking and the encouraging certain economic policies among member states. For instance, promoting policies that decrease job insecurity and precarious work through European-wide policies on the reduction in the use of zero-hours contracts.

**Bottom-up strategies**

3. **Fostering a common ground between older and younger generations**

   a. Increase visibility of youth participation in EU programming and emphasize the value of youth contributions to society in EU branding efforts. Offer additional avenues for youth participation in narrative development, especially to disadvantaged youths (paid internships, EU workshops for high school and university-aged students, art, writing or other media contests, etc.).
Where possible, these avenues should include opportunities for young people to interact with experienced EU staff and partners.

b. In addition to supporting direct youth participation, empowering youths to promote EU narratives in their communities is an effective way of bridging inter-generational divides. Young people are linked to the older generation through familiar and community ties. This was successfully mobilized in order to deal directly with cultural divides in the Irish referendum on same sex marriage where young people were encouraged to “Ring Gran” and convince her to vote for change in the marriage laws. A similar campaign was attempted by the British ‘Remain’ campaign in the Brexit referendum. These types of campaigns should be institutionalized and strengthened to promote intergenerational dialogue on matters of EU identity.

4. Combating elitism

a. In order for the EU to combat elitism, it should place more emphasis on bottom-up inclusionary methods. One way to do this is to reform or better use already existing platforms. EU institutions are already active in digital media engagement, however, in order to increase the EU’s reach and accessibility it should place more emphasis on social media presence. Traditional media can perpetrate the feeling of elitism in the EU because it is a one-way-street channel of communication. Social media offers the opportunity for engagement and discussion with the ultimate goal of evoking real life action. Social media can and should be used to spark citizen communication and engagement not only with their systems of government, but with other citizens across the EU. This engenders an equal discussion platform and bridges gaps preventing cohesiveness.

b. One issue with elitism in the EU is a lack of transparency. Including the public sphere in information sessions and public forums can give a sense of belonging to citizens at a grassroots level. Students, workers, volunteer organizations, and other communities can meet and discuss how EU policies affect their lives. In this way, a new narrative can become a public discussion rather than an “elite” EU directive.
PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

The group notes that forging a new narrative will require top-down and bottom-up approaches. The participants are committed to contributing to the solution in the following ways:

1. Bridging inter-generational divides in our own communities by using interpersonal relationships to promote dialogue between generations.

2. Ensuring we remain informed about the EU so we can inform others.

3. Holding media to account and working to ensure our local media is accurate and fair in its portrayal of the EU.

4. Actively engaging in EU policies and campaigns.
3.1.2. Response

to 3.1.1 Belonging and Identity within the EU - Forging a New Narrative

Antoine Ripoll
Head of the European Parliament Liaison office with the US Congress

As Europeans are facing, for the first time in the history of their integration process, the prospect of a Member state leaving the European Union, the time has definitely come to rethink the European narrative. The question of a European identity, complementary to national identities, is fully part of this discussion. I would argue in this context that Europeans know what they want, what they are passionate about, and who they are. But they don’t know they know it.

The debate following the election of Donald Trump and the trade agreements with Canada and the United States have vividly highlighted this: 508 million Europeans, instinctively, know what they expect and what kind of society they are building: a cohesive society, respectful of others, transparent, secular, and proud of its human, social, and environmental standards. They have been passionately debating for months about the risks of a sub-par trade negotiation resulting in their markets being flooded with GMOs or chlorinated chicken. They have sworn not to sacrifice their intrinsic benefits on the altar of CETA and TTIP.

Following on the heels of the success of a Europe reconciled with itself, it is a pithy lesson for anyone looking for Europe’s narrative to be a cut above the perceived inhuman, consumerist and selfish globalisation.
Many are asking themselves what the point of Europe is; what goals it aspires to; what its identity is; what makes it indispensable. Older Europeans will argue it is peace. Never before throughout Europe’s modern history have our countries experienced such protracted and visibly durable peaceful times. But peace is a given to millennials, and they find it a stale argument. Others will argue it is the economy. The millions of unemployed looking for lasting jobs, and those who think that tomorrow they will be worse off than yesterday and for whom Europe is a synonym for rampant globalisation, don’t find it convincing.

This irritates the élites, who still hope that rational pro-European arguments can convince their citizenry. The backlash favours populists and nationalists, who take advantage of the unscrupulous lies national leaders and the media have been spreading about “Brussels”; a convenient scapegoat for any and all unpopular yet necessary decisions that they are seldom brave enough to own up to.

When all is said and done, as long as the goals of the European project remain muddled, we all suffer the consequences. Our political system has changed with the rise in power of new political parties who postulate being “against”, and who capitalise on the inevitable anger and frustrations. Our economy is shapeless because it is nigh-impossible to adopt the necessary measures to foster education and innovation; the only policies able to sustain jobs and growth, but reviled by devotees of the short-term. Our common plot has become incomprehensible and Europe, traditionally the champion of human rights and humanitarian aid, is becoming a solipsistic fortress.

Is Europe destined to crumble after sixty successful years? Is the European Commission truly its last chance? Will the concomitant crises of terrorism, migration, unemployment, Brexit, the Russian threat, and the Euro mean the end of Europe?

It will depend on what narrative we choose for the European adventure. Unless Europeans have an ingrained feeling of sharing a common destiny, if they believe the drawbacks of shared sovereignty are greater than the benefits of a common identity in a globalised world, then the European edifice will splinter.
But if they understand what makes them unique as Europeans, what differentiates them from other people and motivates them to defend and promote their unique vision of society, then their common history will only just start to take shape.

Is there a glue, in one word, a powerful tie that unites us, like war and peace did in the 50’s, and if so, what is it? I would argue that yes, absolutely, there is one. And that what differentiates Europeans and makes them unique is a conflation of their fondness for collective solidarity, respecting differences and minorities in matters of traditions, expectations of political transparency, avoiding interference between the religious and public spheres of life, and a visceral attachment to their high standards.

More than anybody else, we feel that society must provide a chance to those who are less fortunate because of their health, social position, age, or political circumstances. We have already built a legal and financial arsenal to make this solidarity a reality we can all be proud of. More than anybody else, we have gradually moved forwards together to calmly debate vital issues such as abortion, divorce, same sex marriage. More than anybody else (but still imperfectly), we have given ourselves the means to reduce corruption and increase transparency within our political system.

More than anybody else, we Europeans believe that religion and politics do not belong in the same league; they should live separate lives whilst remaining mutually respectful. More than anybody else, finally, we take ourselves for the world champions of rights and standards. Human rights, the fight against global warming, social rights, transparent consumer protection; nothing is too exacting.

Combine all this and the result will be the European plot. It never really disappeared, but we began taking it for granted because we got so used to it. When are we going to realise that our values and principles are among the best in the world?

If we do this, we will realise that our standards are remarkable but very expensive, and that to defend our high quality social model we must first of all acknowledge its existence and then make it sustainable in a world less concerned than we are with solidarity and high standards.
We Europeans have things to say and a story to tell. It’s time for us to become fully aware of it and give ourselves the means to do so. It is within our reach.
3.2. Pragmatic Steps Towards Fostering Belonging

SUBMITTED BY
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OBSERVATIONS

1. In many EU member states, the level of knowledge of European history and the functioning of EU institutions is limited. After Brexit, Google searches in the U.K. for “What is the EU?” surged.

2. The recent EU-wide rise of Euroscepticism and nationalism shows that many EU citizens do not feel emotionally attached to the Union. Last year’s Brexit referendum has been a painful illustration of the lack of a shared sense of belonging.

3. Under the current Erasmus+ program, young people already have the possibility of spending time in another member state. However, beneficiaries are mostly university students and academics. At the same time, polls have repeatedly shown that people with no academic background tend to have a less positive view of the EU than better educated people. The EU therefore needs to focus more strongly on young non-academics.

4. Many European citizens do not feel that their voice is heard by Brussels for various reasons. Perhaps they do not understand how they are involved or can become involved in the European project. Since policy-making is performed behind closed doors by national leaders, the average citizen feels distant from the EU. Moreover, while the European Commission is one of the driving forces of European integration, it is also often perceived as deficient in democracy.
POLICY VISION

1. Fostering a sense of belonging is essential to furthering the European project and deepening integration. The European Union should promote belonging among all social and age groups, not only young European academics.

2. We propose the establishment of a European Agency for Education that coordinates efforts to harmonize European education systems. We put forward a series of measures that any agency responsible for public education — whether it be a national government, region, or school — has the right to implement. Since each agency can determine the extent of its participation, they are more likely to adopt any one or more of our proposals:

   a. First, we propose an EU-wide high school course on European history, integration, and values which would be taught in all high schools throughout EU member states in a harmonized fashion. The class could be introduced through the publication of common European school books, namely a European history book similar to the already existing French-German history book.

   b. The European Agency should provide funding for school trips to EU institutions to strengthen EU youth’s understanding of Europe. A shared sense of belonging could in this context further be fostered by extending already existing school twinning schemes and exchange programs for high school students and establishing new ones. In addition, we propose that a European school prize similar to the existing “Europäischer Wettbewerb” be introduced to allow high school students and classes to present their own ideas about, as well as wishes for, the future Europe.

   c. We propose an EU-wide baccalaureate that is no longer reserved for predominantly elite communities. Students who take the European baccalaureate should be able to apply to any university in an EU member state on the same terms as a national of that member state with equivalent qualifications.

   d. Member states should be urged to make sure that every young European reaches an advanced level of at least one foreign language. We indeed consider
good communication skills as a core element leading to a shared sense of belonging within the EU.

3. Bringing young Europeans together and allowing them to experience Europe for themselves is fundamental for a common identity to develop. Using Erasmus+ university partnerships as an example, the EU should actively facilitate partnerships between professional bodies such as national Chambers of Crafts.

   a. The idea is to allow more young artisans, for instance, to spend some time in another EU country and give them further training in their field of work through workshops. In addition, they will get to meet other young Europeans and come into contact with their culture, as well as the language and culture of the host country. In doing so, they will get to know what it means to live in an EU that is united in diversity.

   b. In this context, language skills present another very important aspect. Every participant being able to speak the respective national language would be impossible. Therefore workshops need to be available in both English and the national language. Before their stay abroad, participants should be offered an English and/or respective national language class. Here, the Erasmus+ Online Linguistic Support tool could be used. Focus should lie on both general vocabulary and professional jargon.

4. Last, we propose the transformation of the current system of the European Union into a Europe of the Regions. This concept foresees a strengthening at the European level while also giving more competences and influence to the regional level.

   a. We suggest a system in which the European Regions are represented at European level by a Senate of the Regions, which faces as a counterpart a real European government that is elected by all European citizens.

   b. The creation of a Europe of the Regions would be accompanied by the establishment of a Social Union which would include European taxes being distributed within the member states and a European unemployment insurance. Another possibility to foster the European Social Union would be to introduce a common minimum income funded by the EU and distributed by the regions.
PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

1. Although some of our proposals require institutional reform and amending the European treaties, we can also play a direct role in achieving our policy visions. By contacting our former high schools, we can present to students our personal European experiences that have enriched us academically, professionally, and socially. This could inspire students to study abroad in another EU member state, allowing them to improve their foreign language skills, travel around Europe, and actively meet other young Europeans.

2. We can also join initiatives that would take us to schools around Europe to teach and inform students about the European Union. A handful of projects already exist which aim to introduce Europe into schools. Through the “Europe à l’école” initiative in France and “Europe @ school” in the U.K., young Europeans go to high schools and teach students about EU institutions during one hour of the school day. Once a year in Berlin, Stuttgart, and other German cities, high school students can act as Members of Parliament in simulations of the European Parliament. In Madrid, students can participate in the Model European Union.
We observe that people in Europe hold a myriad of identities, some of which can be conflicting and opposed to the idea of a shared European identity. We seek to identify some of these cleavages and evaluate the challenges they pose. Accordingly, we observe:

The appeal of EU exit campaigns

1. EU exit campaigns threaten the notion of a cohesive Europe. Connected to populist and nationalist movements, these campaigns have spread throughout the continent and promote a shared resentment of EU institutions and of the project of European inclusion. The case of Brexit has shown that certain demographic groups are more susceptible to being associated with such “Anti-European” sentiments:

   a. YouGov pre-election surveys revealed the predictable effects of age, income, and education on voters’ decisions; generally, those who supported “Remain” were younger, more educated, and received a higher income.¹

   b. Another crucial difference between “Remain” and “Leave” voters lied in their views on the British welfare system; “Leave” voters considered the British welfare system to be one of the most generous in the EU. This opinion, that British welfare is excessively generous, reflects a wound in national pride, as Britain appears to be a “soft touch.”²

   c. The YouGov polls also contained a relatively large amount of “Don’t Knows,” indicating that many voters had not made up their minds about EU withdrawal.

² Ibid
Characterized by older age, nationalist sentiment, and lower levels of education and income, Anti-Europeanism is also associated with a lack of knowledge about the EU. It is likely that people who are poorly informed about the EU can be easily influenced by populist appeals in favor of EU withdrawal.

Regional, national, European identification

2. Within the European context, individuals might value their regional, national, and European identity to varying degrees, and therefore prioritize them differently:

a. Some regions in Europe express their local identities more vividly than others. In Catalonia, which is fighting for independence from Spain, single ethno-territorial identity is higher than in other parts of Spain, meaning individuals identify primarily as Catalanian. In Belgium, the split between Dutch-speaking Flanders and francophone Wallonia seems to have less of an impact on national identity. In some cases, the drive for regional independence can lead to tensions between nation-states and the EU, as seen in Catalonia’s appeal to the EU to justify and support its autonomy. The influence of sub-state identities on the European vision remains understudied.

b. Another point of tension is that people who identify exclusively on a national basis are more likely to oppose the project of a shared European identity. While nationalist parties tend to be associated with Euroscepticism, we must nonetheless acknowledge that some people hold their national identities in high esteem, but still appreciate their European identity. Nevertheless, there is a lack of research on how nationalist and European identities interact.

Migration and European identity

3. 2016 saw the arrival of 362,376 in the EU.\(^7\) Already in 2017 that number has reached 5,4485 and continues to climb. Given this movement, refugees represent a growing section of EU society and require particular consideration. Refugees, and immigrant populations at large develop different patterns of European identification, whether they are first or second generation.

4. The most pressing issue surrounding first generation immigrants is that of care and integration upon arrival. Of particular note is that while some refugees settle within the EU, others only find temporary shelter in EU countries. Because of this, we have identified the EU’s need to focus not simply on economic integration, but also on cultural integration for those who choose to remain. This involves preserving unique cultural identities while integrating them into the existing European identity. We propose that steps be taken to outline and define integration in official contexts.

   a. For second generation immigrants, identity is as complex an issue. Due to an inherently “mobile past,” a marked lack of identity oftentimes arises. This “identity vacuum” creates a myriad of issues, from alienation to disenfranchisement. Notably, the 2014 Eurostat Report shows that among second-generation immigrants, unemployment has declined.\(^8\) Economic empowerment is key to cultural integration.

5. Religious identity adds a layer of complexity to the European landscape. Although imbued with Christian heritage, Europe presents itself as a model of liberal secularism. Europe seems to have become increasingly secular, as the number of churchgoers has declined. Yet, many still identify with the main Christian denominations.\(^9\) Religious identity is, therefore, being expressed in new ways, and this ambiguity can easily be hijacked by extremist parties. Notably, these parties draw a line between Europe and Islam.

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at large, either by adopting a secular rhetoric to condemn Islamic religious fervor or by adopting a Christian rhetoric to advocate ethno-religious homogeneity. With Muslims representing one of the largest immigrant groups in the EU, religious campaigning poses great threats.

6. We would like to stress the fluid nature of identification, which can result from active choice or from ascribed categories. Because this process is irregular and bears emotional significance, we believe that “European identity” is also constantly redefining itself. Nonetheless, it is centered on core values which should be viewed as accessible to all and compatible with other identities (such as age, nationality, class, or education, among others).

POLICY VISION

We believe that the EU, acting on behalf of the European project, needs to understand its people through additional research. We hope that our research will reveal the fluidity and broadness of the process of identification, thereby suggesting that a shared European identity is indeed possible. By uncovering shared European values, and understanding how people define themselves, we hope that European identity is understood as accessible and inclusive.

1. While survey data has revealed certain demographic trends, the EU still lacks a sophisticated understanding of how these demographics interact. In other words, we know who wants to withdraw from the EU, but we still don’t fully understand how they reach that decision. Therefore, we propose a research project in all European countries (whether full members of the EU or not), in the form of surveys and focus group interviews. This research would use as many segmentations as possible (age, gender, country of birth, citizenship, income, professional sector, religion, and language), and test for interactions between them. The objective is to have a comprehensive view of the identity landscape, in order to avoid making blanket statements on certain identity groups.

2. On top of survey research among European residents, we propose an analytical project focused on political leaders and their campaigns. We want to understand how leaders manipulate voters’
ignorance about the EU and succeed in instilling Euroscepticism. As such, this qualitative research, focused on campaign rhetoric, would complement the statistical analysis suggested previously.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

1. As members of diverse academic institutions, and as 21st-century internet consumers, we strive to be conscientious contributors to debates in the public sphere. This requires both an effort to be informed about issues, and an effort to broaden our perspective and take into account opinions that might be drastically different from ours. As such, we are engaged to carefully listen to diverging opinions, whether on social media, in the newspapers or on the radio.

2. Within our capabilities as students and academics, we strive to promote and help maintain the integrity of journalism. We find that the lack of information, or the spread of false information, is detrimental to the public sphere at large, and harmful for European identity. Therefore, we strive to promote a vital journalistic sector, grounded in reliable sources, which expresses a diversity of opinions and is accessible to all.
3.4. Identity under Uncertainty

SUBMITTED BY
Connor Russell, Madeline McHugh, and Aliénor Sauvage

OBSERVATIONS

1. Europeans are currently experiencing a level of uncertainty unparalleled in recent times across multiple spheres of public life. Economic stagnation, gridlock in political institutions and rising cultural tensions between countries and peoples characterize many recent developments.

2. The development of the European Project has historically been most successful where it has attempted to deliver concrete benefits and certainties to citizens. Programs such as Erasmus have helped to close the “uncertainty gap” between cultural and communication styles for a privileged few European citizens. The Single Market, built on economic and social grounds, has been justified by its impact on the security of European citizens. These are hallmarks of the developing European identity.

3. Europe must tackle this new wave of uncertainty, with the aim of “opening the door” to the further development of a more coherent Europe and European identity. We argue that there exists a triumvirate of uncertainties at the heart of Europe – the economic, the political, and the social.

4. Political:

   a. National identity is built on the common points in people’s daily lives: geography, history, language... It is made up of everything an individual comes across day after day and stage after stage of life.

   b. European identity is unique in the sense that it most closely resembles an attempt at a national identity in the face of a conglomerate of individual nations, the European Union.
c. The EU is unlike anything that currently exists, and a European identity is one that eclipses existing paradigms concerning “national” identity since, by definition, each member state’s identity stands in competition with every other member state.

d. So long as individuals believe that being a citizen of one member state is the true definition of “national identity,” a European identity is a competing ideology whereas the existing narrative is that of the nation.

5. Economic:

a. Economic uncertainty can be damaging to identity, particularly where individuals identify themselves by their economic status or employment. This uncertainty can prevent the development of new identities and views on the world.

b. The development of a European identity requires the economic bonds between European states, within and without the European Union, to be restored. An integrated economic model built on dignity and European values must be reformed to deliver to European citizens.

c. Europe has experienced a prolonged period of economic depression and reduced growth, with the global financial collapse of 2008 fuelling a series of crippling sovereign debt crises. Recovery has been poor. There has been a rising share of employment growth across the EU in temporary work, and self-employment is becoming more prevalent amongst the lower paid.¹

d. Economic uncertainty breeds isolation,² and this has helped to create an atmosphere of competition rather than cooperation.

   i. The poorer regions of Europe increasingly demonstrate a “mindset of scarcity”.³

   ii. Both individuals and policy-makers follow this mindset by approaching the topic of European integration with a logic based on the achievement of rational benefits for individual nations,
rather than an identitarian approach.

iii. This has been seen even amongst the most traditionally Europhilic “founding 6”. The four largest Eurozone countries have exhibited lower levels of trust in the European Union in the years following the financial crisis than in the pre-crisis levels of the United Kingdom, which demonstrates a long-held bastion of Euroscepticism.  

This crisis of identity in the face of economic uncertainty has been felt in divergent and contradictory ways across the EU.

i. Whilst restrictions on fiscal policy have been an inherent part of Eurozone membership since its inception, only in the face of the recent economic uncertainty have these limits had significant impact on national decisions regarding taxation and spending.  

ii. Measures such as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance have had a much stronger effect on Southern European states compared to their Northern neighbours, in part because of their larger pre-existing debt but also due to varying and inconsistent enforcement of rules at European level.  

iii. This has had a damaging impact on the sense of European citizenhood, since it has enabled some to argue that citizens of the union have not been treated fairly. This compounds an often-held sense of being “left behind” by globalization.

6. Cultural:

a. The development of an identity from a quasi-continental context is novel, and the EU is the first governmental organization to undergo this process. There are many obstacles, such as varied perspectives on the foundations of identity, communication failures disabling a group’s connection to the European level of identity, and

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6 Ibid
competing national (and even regional) cultures.

b. An identity uncertainty is prevalent across Europe, stemming from a divide between a values-based identity and a culture-based identity. For example, Western Europeans base their identities on the founding values of their democracies, whereas Eastern Europeans identify with cultural practices anchored in shared tradition.

c. Communication failures and absent institutional responses nurture this cultural uncertainty. These weaknesses hide the variety of ways the EU contributes to cultural activities in member-states.

d. A European cultural identity aims at rebranding centuries’ worth of conflicts: military, social, economic and political, and of peace and prosperity. The EU originates from a conflict and serves as a recurrent reminder of the conflicts that have united Europeans in their common pain, but fails to recognize the other dimensions of culture, such as peace and prosperity.

POLICY VISION

1. Political:
   a. Leaders should appeal to those beyond their home states and Brussels. Appearances, events, and speeches should attempt to encompass more of the spirit of a European identity so each state’s leader may be considered more than just a representative for a member state; they become a representative of Europe as a whole.

2. Economic:
   a. On the economic pillar, we propose two steps to remedy these underlying crises of uncertainty. First, the European Union must tackle the “mindset of scarcity”. By understanding the deeply felt precarity of many citizens, and taking steps to remedy it, the European Union can begin to rebuild an emotional link with its constituents.
i. This could take the form of a fiscal stimulus specifically targeted to reduce both unemployment and underemployment, coupled with funding for skills training organized and distributed at a pan-European level. It could engage states neighboring the EU, to help build a truly pan-European sense of solidarity.

ii. This must lie outside the limits of the current fiscal rules, facilitated by its non-national character. It would help to tackle the damaging nationalistic mindset currently taking hold.

b. Second, there is a need for more systematic and rules-based enforcement of current treaty obligations. This would restore confidence in the equality of all European citizens and nations, and would build credibility for the aforementioned fiscal expansion at a European level.

i. In practical terms, this could be achieved by reducing levels of political discretion in triggering “automatic” stabilizers and an augmented role for reverse QMV decision-making within the Council.

3. Cultural:

a. The development of European identity is multidimensional, which, contrary to popular belief, is a source of wealth rather than of challenge. These dimensions rely on political, economic, and cultural influences to shape them, and a multi-faceted cultural approach can have a strong, positive impact on this development by being low-cost and consuming few resources.

b. First, the EU should shape the foundations of this European identity by appealing to both culture-based identities and values-based identities. There is no requirement for this identity to be simple and forceful, but rather a requirement for it to be inclusive, pluralistic, and to accommodate all European mindsets.

c. Second, the EU should address communication failures to better present European identity to its whole population. In the effort to be inclusive, the EU should strengthen the connection between all levels of European societies by making its mark more visible to all. By doing so,
the EU will enter a positive cycle of better communication leading to a more relatable identity, which will help the expansion of a Euro Identity, and return to the strengthening of communication pathways.

d. Third, the EU must expand its nature beyond a peace-oriented reaction to World War II to include its nature as a promoter of human rights and of economic prosperity. This will give a European identity more flexibility for adapting to new generations of citizens, who face very different issues than their grandparents experienced during World War II.

 PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

1. Political:

   a. The EU, in partnership with connecting organizations, should begin a communications campaign to encourage civilian engagement in elections.

      i. Close the gap between jargon-based elitism and everyday people seeking information on their governing systems.

      ii. More varied outlets for EU-citizen connectivity, i.e. podcasts, broadcasts, radio, appearances, etc.

      iii. European Horizons is an outlet to bridge the gap. We could send members to EU meetings, events, and accessible and related occurrences to provide a connection between European communities and politics.

2. Economic:

   a. Students must lobby both the EU institutions and national governments for a pragmatic response to economic stagnation and imbalanced growth.

      i. Our policy vision balances the need to stimulate the European economy with a more stringent enforcement of existing rules.
ii. We must emphasize that fiscal expansion is not inherently reckless inside the EMU when supported by stringent rules and enforcement. Fairness and transparency are critical.

b. Students can also influence their peers and wider networks to emphasize the material economic benefits of European integration, in order to break down the “mindset of scarcity” forming across the continent.

3. Cultural:

a. Those who have invested in Europe should develop ways of including EU values into tradition, to show its propensity. For example, concerts sponsored by the European Union should sing the European anthem, much like national anthems are sung at important national events. Local and regional cultural administrators should coordinate with the EU to find ways of including it as part of their lifestyle.

b. The EU should develop a label to create a direct representation of its efforts. This label serves two purposes: clearly marking what a European identity consists of, and pointing to the EU as a consistent, reliable entity citizens can relate, and therefore communicate to.

c. The European past is undeniably wrought with warfare but it is also marked by important periods of peace and prosperity. These different phases in European history give legitimacy to the outdated peace narrative that surrounds the Union today, and it becomes possible to renew these foundations by emphasizing their long-standing importance. To do so, we suggest the celebration of a few key dates in European history (such as the Treaty of Westphalia or the Treaty of Rome), to emphasize the values the EU stands for and offer an occasion for citizens across the Union to enjoy a positive, constructive, common heritage. Further, occasions such as the “Journée de l’Europe” should not only be celebrated in Brussels and Strasbourg but collectively experienced within every member state. These celebrations could occur through music festivals, exhibits, or parades, in ways best adapted to the occasion and host country.
4. 1. Crafting a European Public Sphere

SUBMITTED BY
Toma Pavlov, Lara Ryan, and Jasmine Kirby

OBSERVATIONS

The Legitimacy Workshop observes the following:

1. The European Union has made significant progress since its establishment to defend the values of democracy and inclusion. However, in recent years there has been a growing discontent among citizens about the accountability of the EU and the democratic deficit that exists within the institutional structure of the union. While much of the rising anti-elitism, cultural nativism, and economic nationalism can be attributed to political failure at both EU and member state levels, the question remains: is the problem with Europe simply its drive to unite, or the manner in which the union itself has been pursued – a manner which does not allow for adequate civic participation?

2. According to the Autumn 2016 Eurobarometer, six in ten Europeans disagree that their voice counts in the EU, and said they were not well informed on EU matters.¹ This negative trend has persisted over the last years, revealing a communication gap between the EU and its citizens.

3. For this paper, we define public sphere as a space where European citizens can gain and share the knowledge and tools to participate in the creation of policies that will impact their lives.

¹ “European Commission - Autumn 2016 Standard Eurobarometer: Immigration and Terrorism Continue to Be Seen as the Most Important Issues Facing the EU.” 2016. December 22.
Therefore, increasing access to information and helping the public to better evaluate the quality of information available is essential to sustaining a democratic EU.

4. The European public sphere is threatened by various challenges that EU citizens face in obtaining EU information, including disinformation campaigns and fake news. Furthermore, many Europeans do not have the incentive to keep themselves informed on a regular basis about current EU affairs. In a study of Croatian university Students, immediately before Croatia’s 2013 EU accession, Tanackovic, Horvatic, and Badurinas (2015) found that respondents learned about the EU while not specifically looking for EU information through the media and from friends and family. The study also found that respondents believed that official EU websites followed by the media and NGOs were the best places to obtain EU information. Finally, the greatest barriers respondents faced in obtaining EU information were information overload, as well as identifying and evaluating the quality of their sources.

5. The lack of knowledge on the EU became even more evident in the UK hours after the outcome of the Brexit referendum was announced. Google reported sharp upticks in searches not only related to the ballot measure but also about basic questions concerning the implications of the vote, including what the EU is about. This is indicative of a larger trend of growing apathy among EU citizens towards the EU and disinterest in participating in a European public sphere. This trend could be reversed if citizens of the EU were empowered with the ability to effectively use EU institutions to defend their rights such as the entitlement to the right to free movement across borders and the right to provide services on a cross-border basis within the EU, pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty. Member states are required to deliver on these rights. Currently, the established recourse for citizens, in the absence of delivery of such rights, is to appeal to the European Commission (EC).

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3 Faletar Tanackovic, Faletar Horvatic, and Badurina., 154.
4 Ibid., 155-156.
7 TEU pre-Lisbon, art. 60, 2006 O.J. C 321 E
8 Id. art. 48 and art. 60.
6. The current media landscape is characterized by the growing presence of fake news, post-truth debates, and fragmentation of groups of individuals tending to segregate themselves according to their values and beliefs.Press and media, therefore, have a vital part to play in the development of the European public sphere. European governmental institutions should more aggressively protect this role in light of concern for the deterioration of press freedom in the EU.

7. European citizens currently have no effective outlet to force member states to comply with European treaties and recognize rights established by such treaties. The EC is the only body with the authority to enforce compliance with treaties, creating a democratic deficit which favors European political institutions. Correcting the democratic deficit in Europe is crucial to the development of a European Public Sphere that empowers and engages citizens of the EU. The establishment of a private right of action to appeal to the courts (i.e. ECJ) and other European bodies would grant such citizens the opportunity to retrieve their rights as defined in the Maastricht Treaty and other ratified European agreements.

POLICY VISION

1. Improving Access to European Information:

   a. Sponsor research into how people seek and access European information in order to improve the effectiveness of existing and create new information channels.

   b. Technological advances and social media have added a new dimension to civic space by providing citizens and organizations with new opportunities to make their voices heard, express their grievances, and demand their rights. Online platforms offer citizens the opportunity to engage and mobilize on issues they care about. Currently, both the EC and the EU have official social media accounts. However, out of more than 500,000,000 people

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9 Bee, Cristiano, and Emanuela Bozzini. 2010. Mapping the European Public Sphere: Institutions, Media and Civil Society. Ashgate.

living in the EU, less than 1% are following the activity of the EU institutions via their social media profiles. In order to increase the engagement with its citizens, the EU should use the results from the aforementioned research to develop platforms, which would empower citizens to easily and freely:

i. Be introduced to the EU: What it is about? What does it do? When was it established, etc.?

ii. Be informed about what is on the EU’s agenda in everyday language

iii. Follow the activity of the members of the European Parliament, who attend for their country, and in this way incentivize them to represent the European interests

iv. Make policy suggestions, submit complaints, and petitions

v. Have access to audiovisual materials, live streams, podcasts, and daily news. (Partnerships with media outlets such as Euronews and Euractiv can produce content)

vi. Engage interactively; “Did you know?”, “Today in history”, etc.

c. Public libraries, which are found in most communities throughout Europe, are a great location in which to base many of the services needed to create the informed public necessary for a healthy democracy. Public libraries are built on a tradition of providing access to information from a wide variety of viewpoints, as well as being an adult education site and community building. This facility has moved into the 21st century with the library being a place where people can access media and internet resources along with books. Libraries have also served as a location for the distribution of government services and would be a great place to distribute accurate information about the EU, provide space for debate and discussion of EU policies, as well as allow people to become more aware of their rights as EU citizens and have a place where they can organize maintaining the rights guaranteed to them.

i. One model of a library as a public sphere is “Waiting Room” a library in St. Boltoph in England,
that combines multiple functions desired by the local community: a local history museum, a café and bar, event space, and space for community projects. While this is not what people typically think of as a library, it does provide shared information resources, local history and cultural heritage, and a space for community discussions and events. “Waiting Room” initially received EU funding and became successful enough to operate independently, and provides an example of how developing a public sphere can be done in a cost-effective and self-sustaining way.

ii. Organize workshops and short courses through the public libraries on information literacy. Fake news is often cheaper and easier to access than quality journalism, and the EU could offer subsidies or encourage newspapers to offer cheaper or promotional rates through the public library system. In the current political climate it is important for the EU to be seen as a neutral and valuable provider of information access.

iii. Continue to build on and expand the work of the Public Libraries 2020 Project. Public Libraries 2020 is an EU and the Reading and Writing Foundation initiative to provide advocacy and resources for public libraries throughout Europe to contribute “to European policy objectives in three main areas: social inclusion, digital inclusion, and lifelong learning,” as part of the greater EU 2020 growth strategy. Although the now disbanded grant program was a step in the right direction, the EU needs to contribute more and expand on Public Libraries 2020 and provide public libraries with more funding for European information projects that meet the needs of the local communities. Moreover, by funding more community-based information literacy projects throughout the EU, in return libraries can provide valuable data on what kind of strategies are most effective for getting people engaged with European information.

2. Improving government accountability: An efficient legal channel must be established to provide accountability and European integration. The current process involves bringing a case to the EC and having The Commission compel the member states to correct the action. The recommended alternative to the existing system would grant European citizens with a private right of action through which they may appeal directly to the European courts (i.e. ECJ) in circumstances where they believe that rights established by European treaties are not respected by member states.

a. To prevent any undue strain on European judicial institutions, there should be an interim solution in lieu of massive reforms to the European judiciary. The proposed interim solution is similar to the complaints process that exists for the violation of fundamental human rights (e.g. rights to freedom from discrimination, rights to protection of personal data, and rights of access to due process). This would effectively extend the existing process to allow for petition on the basis of rights guaranteed by EU treaties, rather than simply fundamental rights. In order for this to happen:

i. Citizens must first submit complaints to a national complaints body or court. EU member states are required to have established national bodies specialized in giving information on fundamental rights issues. It is likely that such bodies will assume the additional responsibility of providing information and deciding on matters relating to EU citizenship rights; however, complaints mechanisms may be decided by member states on a local level.

ii. In the event that an individual believes that their citizenship rights from the treaties have been infringed on by a member state or by EU institutions themselves, they may appeal directly to any of the following European bodies:

1. The European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions
2. The European Commission

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3. The European Court of Justice
4. The European Ombudsman

iii. European bodies should determine whether or not to fund cases on an individual basis in order to avoid disincentivizing EU citizens from asserting their rights. Individuals require financial capacity to challenge member states and have their rights recognized; European institutions should be sensitive and responsive to this by providing funding for robust cases.

b. Such an improved process would:
   i. Strengthen the development of a European Public Sphere by allowing citizens to exercise their rights and resolve information asymmetries by creating a more even and transparent non-political venue through which citizens can retrieve such rights.
   ii. Encourage greater European integration and protect the viability of the union by ameliorating the democratic deficit. The reformed legal process provides an outlet whereby EU citizens can engage directly with European institutions and hold member states accountable for the violation of rights protected by EU treaties. The process enhances the democratization of decision making in the EU by moving the concentration of power from political/member state level to an individual level, and by removing disincentives from the system for individuals wishing to assert their rights.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

i. Participants will:
   a. Take action to fight to protect freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
   b. Advocate for public libraries in their home communities.

2. Participants will run workshops through their chapters on information literacy open to the greater campus community, using EU examples and helping participants think critically about where the information they are reading is coming from and to what extent to trust this information.

3. Participants will help members of their campus community learn how to find, evaluate, and use EU information as well as produce easier to understand, well-researched, web content for EU topics.

4. Participants will:
   a. Advocate for the establishment of a private right of action in order to have citizenship rights guaranteed by EU treaties recognized. Specifically, participants will advocate for the establishment of an individual appeals process to national and/or European bodies in order to recognize the right to free movement across borders and the right to provide services on a cross-border basis.
   b. Promote the recognition of rights guaranteed by EU treaties and the dissemination of information regarding the aforementioned rights.
4.2. Europe of Two Speeds?

SUBMITTED BY
Kadi Diallo, Stephanie Metzen, Jan Ertl, and Eric Oringer

OBSERVATIONS

The Legitimacy Workshop observes the following:

1. Besides structural and historical differences in policy participation, stark ideological divisions cause reluctance by some member states to compromise on certain policy questions, resulting in policy standstill (e.g. refugee allocation). These ideological divisions often revert to the age-old question regarding the design of the European Union as either a Europe of States (intergovernmentalism) or a United States of Europe (Federalism).

2. The EU currently does not operate at maximum efficiency in terms of structure since the varying degrees of involvement of member states restricts policy action to overlapping, but not congruent, subgroups of member states and neighboring countries. Obvious examples are the Eurozone and the Schengen Area.

3. Some European projects, like the Eurozone, are both political and economic projects. Thus, there might be some projects that have the same political but different economic benefits for member states.

4. National discourses are increasingly aimed at regaining lost autonomy from Brussels as evidenced by Brexit. A two-speed Europe may be viewed as a mechanism which bridges these grievances whilst remaining legitimate and functional within the EU framework. The differentiated integration mechanism proposes that core member states are keen and able to deepen their integration without hindrance from the skeptical periphery as per the optimum currency area theory in which common currency requires labor and capital mobility, harmonized business cycles, and risk-sharing costs. Thus, economic and monetary union remain focal. This compromise, however, may decrease the project’s
legitimacy from the marginalized periphery and further complicate the Union’s complex institutional structure. Moreover, the proposition implies a simplistic dichotomy between the core and the periphery. Such separations may be dangerous to the Union’s harmony and more importantly, its principle of solidarity.

5. Should a Europe of two- or multi-speed be implemented with a distinct legally binding membership, we observe the following considerations:

a. The process of transforming the current EU into such a system will most likely require a legally binding agreement, such as a treaty, that would need to be signed by each member state. Recent history has shown how controversial treaties can become as well as how arduous and hard-fought the process to arrive at a treaty can be. If the treaty changes the terms of membership which people within a member state favor, that state may reject the treaty and adhere to the status quo.

b. In order to implement a stratification of membership, a membership category determined in accordance with the lowest common denominator in a specific category is necessary. Then, member states desiring minimal integration have the right to remain in a particular category of membership. The implementation of membership categories might cause renegotiation of the four freedoms, ECJ rulings, regulatory directives, and contribution to the EU budget.

c. It must cap the amount of decision making power it gives to its members that have more integration as this would hinder the democratic process and disincentivize countries from basic membership. We recommend two mechanisms; deliberation based on involvement and responsibilities based on particular countries, or deliberations under one body with two speeds.

d. We observe a negative connotation with the discourse of membership class. Moreover, such discourse reinforces the popular disconnect with the, supposedly, distant policy makers in Brussels and the people.

e. The implementation of a two-speed Europe includes the danger of disenfranchising citizens from “periphery” countries and undermining the legitimacy of the
European Union as a unifying regional institution. Periphery countries as a construct of world-systems theory are marked by weak institutions and are subject to exploitation by “core” countries while receiving minimal financial gain. The implication within this division is that core countries are an ideal to which periphery countries should aspire and may subsequently create social and political cleavages that compromise the legitimacy of the EU. Inherent within this membership structure is an uneven balance of power and development.

f. In order to preserve legitimacy, both the upward and the downward transition between membership categories requires a democratic mechanism of consent, either directly through majoritarian popular consent, or through national representative’s approval. The transition between membership categories will be a contentious political issue that, if not clearly codified, might be abused as a bargaining chip to extract favors from the EU. A precedent such as this undercuts the political integrity of the EU and may undermine its legitimacy amongst member states.

POLICY VISION

The Legitimacy Workshop believes that:

1. The extent to which globalization has created interdependencies leads us to believe that cooperation and unity, not separation, will increase legitimacy and functionality.

2. The EU must adopt scales of membership so that countries may opt into various degrees of participation that suit their vision of a Europe, given certain fundamental constraints.

3. Foundational membership will be grounded in economic integration so that periphery countries will be afforded more financial support and thereby incentivized to join for their own economic self-interest.

4. Even at the lowest level of integration, the core values of the
European Union, adherence to basic human rights and the four freedoms (free movement of goods, people, services, and capital) must be respected to preserve functionality. Other basic requirements include respect for ECJ rulings, regulatory directives, and contributing to the EU budget.

5. Eurozone membership is not a requirement of fundamental membership. Though difficult to obtain, we emphasize that any future membership category with Eurozone participation should aim for a mechanism to balance the benefits individual countries have from the common currency. A fiscal union, Eurobonds, and similar proposals could act as this balancing mechanism.

   a. Member states within the Eurozone should retain jurisdiction over their domestic spending, and not be subject to restrictions by other member states. Instead, clear guidelines will be drafted which will detail the policies and practices undertaken by all Eurozone members if they accept a bailout package.

6. States who agree to a specific scope of membership and fail to adhere to the policy will be fined a predetermined sum, voted on by all member states within a category, for each infraction. To ensure justice for all parties involved, there should be a venue for articulating grievances and challenging the policy that disproportionately encumbers a member state. This may take the form of a permanent court in which all member states are welcome to attend and present their cases.

7. Annual summits wherein objectives are discussed bilaterally will enhance the perception of legitimacy as both the core and periphery are on an equal platform for negotiation. A bilateral format would decrease discourses of periphery countries as second-class members.

8. Basic members, including new members, must uphold the current EU Charter of Human Rights in addition to a baseline immigration policy. Failure to abide would result in economic penalties. The EU at multiple speeds should be open to expanding its membership to countries on the geographical periphery, as long as their governments hold themselves to the same human rights standards.

9. Institutional changes ought to recognize the negative effects of institutionalizing the concentration of power as this may have
adverse effects on legitimacy and fuel nationalist rhetoric. Moreover, institutional changes must be done in accordance with a democratic mechanism.

10. A Europe of two or multiple speeds should also not be solely designed to penalize member states that at any given moment would opt for little integration. While rights and benefits should be commensurate with the level of integration and the associated obligations, accession to the EU or to any of its membership categories should not by itself be attached to an ever closer union.

11. The transition between membership categories should be clearly codified. There is a need for a legally binding procedure that details the process of changing a membership category, acceding to a new one, and leaving the EU altogether.

12. The dynamic of EU institutions should be adjusted to reflect the different speeds of its member countries.

   a. On issues that only apply to more integrated members, only premium members should be involved, with the execution of these policies in the EU Commission.

   b. In EU parliament, there should be equal powers between more integrated and elementary membership.

13. Eurostat analysis of core and periphery economic policies.

14. The strength of the European project comes from its unity and solidarity in crises. Thus, disseminating knowledge which reasserts common values of equality and solidarity is important.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

The members of the Legitimacy Workshop, in order to realize their vision, intend to:

1. Explore informal options within the given institutional framework which is important since a new treaty is unlikely in the near future.

   a. Article 50 should be complemented (formally or
informally, whichever is feasible) by a clear and credible formulation of a specific exit procedure.

b. To implement membership categories, it is possible to use an existing organizational structure such as the Eurozone and extend it with the above balancing mechanism.

2. Conduct further research into the debate enabling us to better comprehend the social, political, and economic ramifications of creating degrees of membership. This investigation includes understanding contemporary tensions that exist between national, international, and supranational institutions.

3. Participate in discussions with academics and current EU officials as well as debate advocates of both sides in order to deepen our understanding of the nuances surrounding this discourse. By extension, the more intimately we examine the pros and cons, the more effectively we can articulate our position on the issue and potentially inform policy.

4. Engage stakeholders vis-a-vis member states’ citizens through public forums and conferences in order to create space to air grievances and be heard. It may be argued that contemporary politics reflect a generalized anxiety amongst segments of the population who feel ignored by politicians and policymakers. Creating opportunities for people to be heard by the aforementioned politicians and policymakers will increase the number of stakeholders and by extension; increase the legitimacy of the EU.

5. To increase the stakes, at European Parliamentary elections, each country votes whether to leave or to stay in their membership category with a universally known, legally binding procedure to do so. Since this procedure will involve an exorbitant amount of administrative work, it should be designed to not be implemented until the next election. As each and every country votes, each country has limited bargaining power. If it is clear that only a few select countries face transitions and might receive an undue amount of power over other member states, it should be codified that by anti-discrimination principles, it will not be legally possible to grant special status. This might be deemed structurally inefficient, but generates credibility and prevents moral hazard.
4. 3. Reforming the EU: A Renewed Vision for a More Democratic Europe

SUBMITTED BY
Joseph Bebel, Guillaume Chossière, and Margaret Mary Strauss

OBSERVATIONS

The Legitimacy Workshop observes the following:

1. The legitimacy of the European Union is under fire. With the Brexit vote and the ongoing refugee crisis, the EU must reevaluate its future plans. The democratic legitimacy of the EU is being questioned by growing numbers of eurosceptics and right-wing populist parties across Europe. Unequal application of EU standards leaves some member states dissatisfied with Brussels technocracy. As we currently see the situation, a refounding would not be effective at this juncture. Presently, a refounding would further divide, not unite, the remaining member states. Nevertheless, if the EU is to have a sustainable future, efforts to prepare for a new treaty must begin now. In the future, a new treaty will be essential to avoid passive tense to establish a renewed vision for integration and a more democratic decision-making process. Furthermore, a refounding would signal to europhiles and eurosceptics alike that their voice is being heard. In the short-term, it is our vision that the EU should begin making necessary institutional and policy reforms to lay the foundations for a new treaty in the near future.

a. Institutional and Policy Reforms – The decision-making process should be altered to better include national governments and improve the checking of the power of the European Commission. Moreover, the process should be made more transparent to increase policy salience and keep EU citizens more informed. To prevent future democratic backslides, the EU should standardize the

mechanism of dealing with member states by extending the Copenhagen Criteria to apply post-accession. Public opinion should be accessed more often to ensure that future integration policy aligns more closely with the public vision.

2. Initially, the EU must address the widespread perception of a democratic deficit. To some, it seems that the EU has double standards when dealing with member states who are not maintaining the democratic and economic standards expected at accession. Moreover, Brussels is inconsistent at times – turning a blind eye to bigger member states and punishing the smaller ones. In addition, the absence of a specific, refined mechanism to ensure member states maintain economic and democratic vitality has resulted in the democratic backslide of some member states.² We propose the Copenhagen Criteria be extended to standardize how the EU deals with member states. The European Council, not the Commission, will be responsible for dealing with member states and deciding if funding or voting rights should be revoked. In our eyes, these reforms are needed to re-establish the EU’s democratic legitimacy.

3. Post-Brexit, the EU has the opportunity to reevaluate and adjust its future goals. With the Financial Crisis and the UK vote, it is obvious that the “losers” of globalization are not content with the current EU goals of further economic and political integration. Furthermore, the refugee crisis and recent terrorist attacks point to areas where Europe is not integrated enough. To combat growing euroscepticism throughout Europe, the EU should focus on policy areas where public support for further integration is high. Utilizing data collected by Eurobarometer surveys of public opinion, the EU can then chart a reformed future course in preparing for a necessary new treaty.

4. Efforts in the short term should focus on policies that promote the well-being and economic development of EU citizens, and increase the transparency of its institutions. We believe that the disenchantment of the public towards the EU is due to its abandonment of core values such as solidarity between member states, shared prosperity, and the defense of fundamental human rights. Two recent examples support this assumption. First, the recent Greek debt crisis could have been the opportunity for the EU members to put the principle of solidarity into action.

Yet, several rounds of austerity were demanded of the country without a significant renegotiation of the country’s debt. This has been perceived as retaliation for the country’s past policy decisions rather than true support that would create the conditions for long-term economic recovery. In the case of the Volkswagen scandal, the EU technocracy failed to enforce air quality standards, even though the right to clean air has been upheld several times by the European Court of Justice. Technocratic inefficiency led in this example to increased health risks for millions of Europeans. We believe that the disconnect between what the Union represents in terms of economic development and people’s rights, and recent policy decisions fuel the current discontent toward the Union and its institutions.

5. Other than the European Citizen’s Initiative (ECI), which is meant to foster a more active role of EU citizens in the broader political system, there are few other measures which are widely known that promote accountability for the EU bureaucrats. As an established bureaucracy, it is difficult to subject it to public scrutiny. While one can argue that the EU Parliament and Commission is beholden to its citizens, lawmaking is continuously being pushed out of the public eye. For example, a recent ECI called for the implementation of a more participatory democratic system and the strengthening of the mechanism to serve as an accountability check; this initiative was adopted by the Parliament but blocked by the Commission through its unwillingness to strengthen legislation. We would like to consider reforms in the EU lawmaking process to strengthen checks on the European Commission and increase the competition and transparency of policy-making in the European Parliament. By creating a more participatory system, citizens will be able to engage the EU and foster accountability.

6. The unwillingness to strengthen the ECI implies that reform of the EU accountability system should take place. Refounding is not necessary, but the decision-making processes must be reformed to allow for more citizen participation in the legislative process. The effect of EU legislation on the average person’s life is not well known, with about 84% of the population saying electoral turnout would be higher if more information was provided.

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to this end. The Parliamentary elections, which consistently have low turnouts, were meant to act as the democratic tool citizens employ to hold the EU system accountable to their needs. There is a requirement for a promotional campaign to engage citizens with the EU Parliament in order to reflect their policy wishes and improve accountability. Such a campaign would serve as an educational tool for EU citizens to better understand how the legislative changes directly impact their lives. Reforming the electoral system to reflect a more traditional Parliamentary system may need to take place in order to facilitate the equal and fair electoral participation across the EU, namely through voting on the Commission President and implementing quantitative majority voting.

POLICY VISION

The Legitimacy Workshop believes that:

1. For the first focus of reform, the EU should establish a standard mechanism by which member states can be equally held to expected democratic and economic standards. The Copenhagen Criteria should be used as the basis for this mechanism. The Copenhagen Criteria standardizes the expectations for candidate states acceding to the EU, but once a member state is admitted the criteria is no longer used. In our assessment, extending aspects of the Copenhagen Criteria to apply post-accession would be effective in addressing the perceived double-standard and the democratic backslide of member states. The criteria ensures that candidate states meet certain political, economic, and administrative requirements before accession. These include but are not limited to “stability and guaranteeing of democratic institutions, a functioning market economy, and an ability to take on obligations of membership.” The European Commission is responsible for scrutinizing candidate states and setting out a timeline for them to meet the expected criteria. However, these specific standards are lost once a country becomes an EU member state. Extending the Copenhagen Criteria to be used at the time of accession as well as post-accession would provide a legitimate mechanism by

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which the Commission can deal with backsliding member states. Having this standardized criteria will ensure that the Commission deals with all member states equally.

2. In accordance with this vision, the European Council should be responsible for dealing with member states who violate expected standards. Regarding this point, the Commission has been inefficient and inconsistent in dealing with member states. Therefore, the leaders of EU member states should be responsible for dealing with backsliding members. Because the EU addresses issues on a case-by-case basis, it offers different solutions for the same issue. A points system should be introduced connected to the Copenhagen Criteria. In cases of democratic backslide, the Council can use financial punishment, such as suspension of EU funding to move the member state to comply with the expected democratic principles of the Copenhagen Criteria. If the backslide persists, then the Council can use the “nuclear option” of Article 7 to suspend the voting rights of a violating member state. Any action from the Council must be passed using the qualified majority voting system. As a member state consistently adheres to the outlined criteria, it will receive increased access to EU aid and funds. When a member state begins to backslide in relation to the criteria, the Council can then revoke funding or limit access. Article 7 should also be revised to explicitly state when voting rights will be revoked to eliminate any ambiguity. Triggering of this article will be subject to a vote in the European Parliament using simple majority. Thus, the reformed system will provide a balance of incentives and impediments to the future democratic backslide of member states.

3. The EU should pay close attention to public opinion regarding possible future areas of integration. If the EU were to pursue highly supported areas of integration now, it would give more appetite for the EU to reform more controversial areas of integration in the future. In the most recent Eurobarometer (November 2016), EU citizens highly favored maintaining the free movement of people (81%), an updated common defense and security policy (75%), and a common energy policy (73%).

   a. **In Free Movement** – The EU should focus on maintaining the integrity of the Schengen Agreement by securing its external borders. Steps have been taken in this direction with the implementation of the European Border Plan.
and Coast Guard but now measures should be taken to reform the Dublin Regulation. As 69% of EU citizens support a common migration policy, this direction would not be too controversial.

b. **Common Security and Defense** – To ensure the internal security of those living in the Schengen Area, the EU should reform its Common Security and Defense Policy. Having member states work more closely on counter-terrorism efforts as well as crisis response in the EU and its neighborhood would greatly enhance the level of cooperation between member states. Efforts should also be made to reform CSDP so as not to overlap with NATO but rather be complimentary.

c. **Energy Policy** – As Europe is seen as the leader in the world on environmental issues, it would make sense for the EU to coordinate more on energy policy. Further attention should be given to the European Commission’s Energy Strategy for 2020. Meeting the outlined goals would show the public that Brussels can get things done. The EU should focus on these policy issues as other issues such as the Eurozone (55%), free trade agreement with the US (53%), and future enlargement (50%) are much more controversial. Setting a basis of consulting public opinion when establishing integration efforts, will allow the EU to pursue more ambitious integration plans in the future.

4. The EU day-to-day policy-making takes advantage of a strong technocracy that brings effective expertise to the decision making process. However, technocratic processes lack democratic accountability that would make it more legitimate in the eyes of EU citizens. In the case of the Volkswagen scandal, the Commission failed to effectively protect public health against toxic pollutants emitted or produced by diesel cars’ emissions. On top of that, early warnings were disregarded: the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission had warned regulators as early as 2011 about potential cheating behavior from the company after measuring suspiciously high real-world emissions on certain cars. Yet, this report went unnoticed and did not trigger a policy response or a detailed investigation. This lack of reactivity highlights the need for stronger and more transparent oversight processes for technical regulatory bodies. The European Commission should also ensure more rigorous oversight of its own regulatory processes to uphold public trust and accountability. The European

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Parliament has the authority to mandate more frequent and more in-depth reports about regulatory achievements and gaps. Technical committees formed by Parliament members should be incentivized to take part in the regulatory oversight of the Commission. Public information requests addressed by citizens to their European representative could be used to encourage MEPs to take part in regulatory oversight committees.

5. Policy reforms aimed at accountability should include: the enhancement of democratic legitimacy by emphasizing the importance of participatory democracy in the legislative process, reforming the electoral system to reflect quantified majority voting and allow for the direct election of the Commission President, and creating a promotional campaign in local media to demonstrate the impact of EU legislation and increase election turnout. Strengthening the legislation concerning the ECI will better enable citizen participation in setting the legislation agenda and providing accountability to existing political bodies. Reforming the electoral system to a quantified majority voting will more accurately represent the population distribution thus allowing for the majority opinion of people as EU citizens to be represented. The Commission imagines itself to be outside of politicization, but the very appointment of Commission members is political; therefore, the direct election of the Commission President will guide the body to propose legislation that better reflects the desires of EU constituents. Politicizing the Commission is also likely to increase media coverage on European affairs and, as a consequence, voter turnout in European elections.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

1. As ESC participants, we realize that the scope of our vision is wide-ranging. We hope that presenting our vision at ESC will facilitate more open and honest discussion on the future of the European Project. Our hope is that our ideas will provide a springboard for initiating proper reforms to ensure the EU has a sustainable and successful future. We also hope that our discussion of these principles will serve as a foundation for future collaboration of policy recommendation with other think tanks related to European and transatlantic issues.
2. Our proposed reforms represent our long-term vision for a new EU treaty. The new treaty would re-assert the EU’s democratic legitimacy by increasing the transparency and participation of EU citizens. In addition, more balance would be established in the decision-making process, allowing national governments to be more involved in Brussels. Furthermore, the new treaty would help establish a framework by which the EU’s policy-making bodies could better mirror the supported public vision for future integration. Thus, allowing the EU to be a vehicle for initiating a renewed, united vision for the future of the European Project.
4. 4. Improving Subsidiarity: A Proposal for Making the EU More Efficient

SUBMITTED BY
Lucas Feuser, Allison Spivack, and Pierre-Jean Thil

OBSERVATIONS

The Legitimacy Workshop observes the following:

1. The percentage of Europeans that “totally disagree” with the statement their “voice counts in Europe” has remained stagnant over the past three years at approximately 54%. Over the same period, the percentage of people who find that their voice counts has plateaued at around 40%.¹ ²

2. This lack of trust and the perceived inability of European citizens to fully express their concerns (also known as the democratic deficit) have called into question the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. This distrust is the manifestation of a larger force pushing against further expansion of European Union influence.

3. The member states and the European Union divide policy areas into competences, or spheres of influence. The European Union has made significant progress in clarifying the boundaries and definitions of the competences, namely through the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). This treaty marks the first written delineation of the competences. The clarification of boundaries allows for legal and political refinement and serves to limit the influence of informal measures.

² We believe it is important to emphasize the narrow-sighted and deceptive nature of polls. The substantial response that feels their voice is not heard may in fact not be a direct critique concerning the democratic legitimacy and framework of the EU but rather a symptom of a larger emotional response, frustrated by various social and economic factors.
4. TFEU determines the extent to which the Union may exercise its competence to legislate and adopt legally binding acts in named and unnamed policy areas. Article 2 TFEU outlines four formations of power distribution between the Union and member states:

a. Exclusive competence gives the Union singular power to legislate, with member states able to act if permitted by the Union or if intending to implement Union decisions.

b. Shared competence allows both the Union and member states to legislate in the said area. Member states exercise competence to the extent the Union does not.

c. The Union has competence to provide guidelines for member states to coordinate economic and employment policies.

d. The Union is granted competence to support, coordinate, or supplement the actions of member states in certain conditions, granted these actions do not breach the principle of subsidiarity.\(^3\)

5. Policy areas are explicitly divided into Articles 3-6 TFEU.

a. The Union has exclusive competence in many areas related to economics: the customs union, competition rules for the internal market, Eurozone monetary policy, and common commercial policy.

b. Exclusive competence can also be seen for the promotion of conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy. The conclusion of international agreements and the control of Common Security and Defense Policy are exclusive competences with special rules.

c. Shared competence is observed in all areas not specifically mentioned in the Treaty, as per Article 5 TFEU. Areas explicitly address social policy, economic policy, transportation, the environment, and energy.

d. Member states have competence to coordinate economic policies within the Union, while the Union may act to ensure coordination of social and employment policies.

e. The Union may exercise competence to support member states in the areas of human health, industry, culture,
tourism, education, vocational training, youth and sport, civil protection, and administration cooperation.⁴

6. Despite the categorization above, we believe that the treaties fail to comprehensively assign competencies, resulting in significant gray areas within policies. This can lead to negotiations and informal institutions that differ from the original intentions of the treaty.⁵ Furthermore, it can lead to politically driven appeals in the ECJ where bargaining over competencies is done in the ECJ without accountability to the public.⁶

7. We believe negotiations and informal structures lend a sense of ambiguity to the legislative process of the EU that can result in assertions of overstepping boundaries or shirking responsibility. The lack of formal competences leads to negotiations that exclude transparency and therefore harm legitimacy. We believe that further legal demarcation of competences will help to resolve this issue.

8. An example of the phenomenon of disenchantment with integration can be observed through the identity clause of the TEU.⁷ The identity clause has been, since the seventies, the cornerstone of member states’ complaints regarding the respect by the EU for their identity and it reflects the conflictive relationship issues between the member states and the EU.

9. Principles have been developed in order to rationalize relations between the EU and the member states. One of these is the principle of subsidiarity, outlined in article 5.3 TEU and developed in Protocol (2), which states that legislation and action should happen on the lowest appropriate level. In other words, the European Union should only intervene and act when it is more efficient for legislation to be made on the European rather than the national level.

10. The national parliaments (NP) are the guardians of the subsidiarity principle. The treaty provides a mechanism called “Early

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⁴ TFEU Article 3-6
⁵ http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380701238741, page 228.
⁶ DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198705222.003.0010, page 241
⁷ “Constitutional identity is a la mode. The concept has even been said to have replaced sovereignty as the pivot in the debate on the relationship between European and National law and on limits of European Integration”, CLAES Monica, « National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation? », p.109, in National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Law Cosmopolitan Values, Intersentia, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, 2013 p.109
⁸ TEU Article 4.2
Warning System” that gives the NP eight weeks to question the legislative drafts viewed to impinge upon subsidiarity. This process enables the NP to present a yellow card when a certain amount of opposition in national parliaments is reached. When a yellow card is presented to the European Commission, the latter must then give justification for the legislative proposal. On the other hand, at a higher level, the NP can present an orange card to the European Commission with a higher percentage of votes. In this case, it requires the European Commission to present the proposal to the Council and the European Parliament. The legislative power can then vote to reject the legislation if qualified majorities are reached. We view this mechanism as largely ineffective because NP do not focus on European issues (they are more guided by a national vision of problems) and because the members of the NP do not have enough time within the eight-week time frame to properly scrutinize all the legislative acts.

11. Traditional arguments that the answer to the democratic deficit is an expansion in the powers of the European Parliament do not provide a viable solution. The source of the perceived democratic deficit, as the Workshop sees it, is the view that the European Union fails to meet countries’ needs. We believe this question of legitimacy has little to do with political frameworks but rather the perception of European Union action. The lack of meaningful delineation of competences has hindered the EU’s ability to affect meaningful change and has resulted in a deep dissatisfaction and mistrust of the institution.

POLICY VISION

The Legitimacy Workshop believes that:

1. We have identified two directions that policy can take to improve the competence principle: more exclusive competences or more supporting competences.

2. One argument is that funneling more policy areas to a supporting competence could better encapsulate the subsidiarity principle as well as make the policy proposal a more efficient and fair system.
a. Shared competences as they stand are vast and vague. They cover a majority of policy areas without any real distinction as to how and who should push policy forward. For national governments to be able to push legislation that is within the shared competence, the EU has to either “not exercise” its authority or “decide not to exercise” it.

b. This, we feel, runs contrary to the principle of subsidiarity which states that policy should be pushed through the lowest appropriate level for the national governments. Instead of having priority are only capable of pushing legislation if the EU chooses not to.

c. The informality of this system benefits the player with the largest leverage in unofficial negotiations and this player is again the European Union.

d. The way to improve this system would be to put the responsibilities of a lot of these competences under the category of supporting competence, which we feel is most representative of the subsidiarity principle.

3. Conversely, there is an argument for executive competences. The European integration process is clearly blocked by the sovereignty claims of the member states. The increase in executive competences allows the EU to move beyond these claims. Consequently, these competences are needed because:

a. Executive competences allow the EU to take action directly without the barrier of the member states and thus require less lag-time.

b. In the area of the exclusive competences, the law is better implemented as well as harmonized.

c. The movement into a singular sphere of control mitigates the tension between member states and the Union is present in grey areas of other areas of competences.

d. Executive competences provide a sense of legitimization and confidence in the project of the European Union that is seen as important and valuable. A perceived legacy of inaction in the European Union can be challenged with this allocation of competences.

4. The workshop sees energy policy, which is currently a shared competence, as a strong case example of a policy sector where the allocation of competences can be argued either way.
a. A comprehensive energy policy is a popular policy idea within the European Union.\textsuperscript{9} Energy is a salient issue that can be linked to hopes from prosperity and economic improvement. Shifting energy from a shared to an exclusive competence would allow for a coherent policy that will counter questions of inactivity. Exclusive competence would allow the Union to control the factors of energy policy that currently exist under member control and thus create a policy that is not impeded by excessive bargaining.

b. Energy policy, however, has also been an example of the incompetencies and issues that come with trying to coordinate policy on an international level. International agreements, whether they are on the scale of Copenhagen or Paris, or simply within the EU, have shown themselves to be insufficient in the fight against climate change, and the plethora of national interest results in lackluster requirements and hardly any enforcement for those weak requirements. The solution to dealing with the immense variety in national energy policy is not to try to ignore national interest and see it hinder EU progress, but to allow national goals to guide the way. The rise in distributed energy resources and the variety of non-utility energy providers only goes to show that energy is a local issue and should be addressed as such.

5. As seen above, the debate around the allocations of competences leads to the improvement of the allocation of powers between member states and the EU. Nonetheless, it should be observed that the dialogue between the institutions can be also essential to the improvement of the subsidiarity principle. A possible solution is modification of the Early Warning System. From a procedural point of view, we promote a modification of the treaty in order to clarify Protocol n°2 of the Lisbon Treaty. In this area, in order to face the problems we urge for:

a. A reduction of the majorities required to reach yellow cards.

b. The establishment of a specific criteria when the commission has to check the opinions in order to reduce its discrional competence.

c. Clarification related to the timeframe of eight weeks with

specific conditions that the commission will have to fulfill.

6. Moreover, we also advocate for the increase of the cooperation between the different institutions and the NP in two ways:

a. A soft mechanism could be improved, which is the inter-institutional cooperation between the NP of all the member states. For instance, we think this should be done within COSAC. They should conduct more meetings and have more dialogues in order to make public their ideas and their opinions.

b. The creation of an independent European body with non-binding power composed of members of the NP and the commission which would discuss the main important topics that should be enacted at EU level. This body would also be competent to give opinions a priori regarding the fulfillment of the subsidiarity principle before the commission sends the proposal to the NP. Thus, this would help the commission to improve its proposals.

7. Finally, the legitimacy workshop calls for the creation of two binding mechanisms to complement cooperation between parties:

a. A competence to give the ECJ the power to enforce the respect of the subsidiarity principle a priori. This would be a legal action provided to the national parliaments after having reached the majority required for the orange cards and only when the EU legal power does not block the proposal.

b. Allow the NP the right to present a red card that would stop legislative acts after an orange card procedure.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

1. We can aim to hold the Union and Member States accountable and insist on transparency in the process of negotiations on the limits of competencies.
2. We recognize that there may be little a single citizen can do to address the concerns of entire countries, however taking advantage of the European Commission’s citizens’ initiative programs ought to be a priority.

3. We recommend a survey that allows citizens to choose what policies they want to see addressed in a survey in an open format instead of the restrictive categories often present on surveys. This would lead to a better idea of what crises if any, the European Union is actually facing.

4. Finally, we can advocate for increased research and codification of the current delineation of competences in order to provide the academic world and the European citizens with a comprehensive view of Union power.
5.1.1. Engaging Civil Society and the Private Sector in the Labor Market Integration of Refugees

SUBMITTED BY
Gabriel Davis, Giulia Duch Clerici, Anastasia Vishnevskaya, and Lionel Jin

OBSERVATIONS

1. In 2015 the waves of asylum seekers coming to Europe reached over 1 million, compared to just 350,000 a couple of years prior.¹ The rise in refugee flow brings up questions and fears about the fiscal burden and labor market effects of this mass influx of people, and these recently intensified economic doubts lead to refugees often being portrayed as not only a major security threat but also a weighty economic liability.

2. A speedy and effective integration into the labor market is the only sustainable solution to ensure incoming refugees become self-sufficient rather than remaining a burden on the host country’s welfare system and that they start to integrate into society as soon as possible. Especially when given the necessary tools, such as language skills and access to further training opportunities, refugees’ entry into the labor force does not only fill in labor

shortage gaps and help counter Europe’s ageing population, but it boosts the economy by creating new demand and new businesses. In addition, besides being economically astute, ensuring effective labor market integration of newcomers is also the best way to treat them with dignity and respect.

3. However, the higher influx of refugees in the past couple of years has saturated the existing networks and institutions in place in each state to assimilate migrants, and the inability of the system to absorb the influx has led to a political, social, and humanitarian crisis. In the big picture, the major roadblock to refugee integration is that, contrary to voluntary migrants, the forcibly displaced do not migrate as a response to labor demand and therefore face an initial job market mismatch. Even grand-scale initiatives to bring welfare benefits or better housing to refugees are just a temporary solution to the crisis, and their controversial nature due to high costs often brings more resentment and xenophobia. We urge that the priority should be on labor market placement, so the refugees can be the economically rational, independent agents they were before the conflict. In addition, we propose that to de-politicize the crisis, this integration be driven by alternate actors like civil society and the private sector.

4. Because of its limited sovereignty and potential far-right backlash, the EU is struggling to find its role in between all the individual member states’ different employment policies and educational systems. We recommend that the EU focuses on directing civil society’s response into more organized relief and integration programs and on facilitating the private sector’s ability to tap into the refugees’ potential.

a. To capitalize on the existing, positive, welcoming volunteer response, we present a language training program run through the framework of Erasmus + that engages the public sphere, especially youth, who have demonstrated a willingness to welcome and have a more multicultural vision for the future of Europe.

b. To facilitate the engagement of the private sector, that has an interest in this new labor force, we call for a centralized database of refugees’ educational levels, skills and interests in training to be developed through the

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Common European Asylum System and for the establishment of a channel through which the private sector can reach out to the newcomer workforce.

POLICY VISION

Directing volunteer response into an organized language education programs

1. Lack of language skills is a looming barrier to asylum seekers’ economic and social integration. Not speaking English or the local language prevents them from participating in social settings and taking advantage of educational and vocational services. It greatly limits their employment options, halts their education and perpetuates isolation, reclusion, and depression, giving the risk that refugees become long-term, even indefinite, financial liabilities. It is essential that European countries begin to think of language training for newcomers as an institution just as essential as K-12 and higher education because the inability to integrate migrants effectively is a huge loss of human capital and a leading cause of social tensions and political divides.

2. The European Union does not have the sovereignty to adjust member states’ educational systems, so centralizing language instruction systems across the union is unviable. However, given that language acquisition is so important to labor market integration, and that many of the refugees are being processed through a Common European Asylum System, there is room for the EU to take initiative in refugee camps and centers while asylum-seekers wait for family reunification and resettlement. We propose a volunteer-based project, integrated within the existing framework of the Erasmus+ cultural exchange and service program, through which volunteers would be sent to teach English in Greece, Serbia, Italy, Calais, and other areas with high concentrations of refugees waiting for resettlement through the CAES.

3. While asylum-seekers wait in refugee camps, their basic needs are generally attended to by the host government or UNHCR, and supplemented by the integral work of non-governmental

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organizations and volunteers.\textsuperscript{4} Education, however, especially for adult males, remains largely unaddressed. The few self-organized groups that have initiated language lessons, whether it is in camps in Greece\textsuperscript{5} or in migrant centers in Italy,\textsuperscript{6} have been successful not only for language acquisition but also in generating a sense of community. But for these self-organized initiatives, even the strongest ones can only serve a very small percentage of the refugees in need and they often rely on an irreplaceable leader or core team, which makes their work unsustainable over time and not replicable to other places. They often have to deal with red tape from the military and bureaucracy, issues of “voluntourism”, and lack of professional teachers and materials.

4. The EU has the resources to develop a comprehensive model for volunteer-powered, expert-guided language programs similar to the Peace Corps or Teach for America in the United States. The program could be gradually expanded and replicated in different migrant hotspots according to the current needs and eventually develop into a sustainable, long-term institution. Regional governments or municipalities could use a similar model to implement language teaching lessons for migrants and refugees in their communities.

5. The project would require a team of experts to develop the appropriate curriculum and oversee it (an opportunity to acknowledge and reward qualified, veteran language teachers), but it would get the largest percentage of its manpower from temporary volunteers, making it less costly and more flexible, with different cohorts of volunteers starting anew each semester where needed the most. A program like this would be a way for the European Union to capitalize on existing relief efforts, further increase contact between the refugees and their host societies, and foster the narrative of a welcoming, united Europe. Engaging young professionals into this cultural exchange is also a valuable opportunity for capacity-building, as it trains volunteers in language education and humanitarian crisis response, so that regardless of what professional fields they pursue in the future, they will have a background in migration and they will remain carriers of the vision of European social solidarity.

\textsuperscript{5} Miller, Anna Lekas. “In Greece, the Refugee Crisis Worsens While the World’s Attention Turns Elsewhere.” The Nation. September 23, 2016.
5. 1. Engaging Civil Society and the Private Sector in the Labor Market integration of Refugees

Standardized Professional Skills Test

6. In addition to civil society’s involvement in improving the refugees’ access to European labor markets, the private sector must also play a crucial role. The European Union can spur this involvement by expanding upon the existing Common European Asylum System (CEAS) asylum-seeker database to include their qualifications as well as their interest in participating in training programs. Then, the EU can serve as a communication channel for the private sector to access that information and recruit the workers it needs for its vocational training programs and business ventures.

7. As part of the CEAS resettlement interviews, surveys should be administered to asylum-seekers to gauge their existing qualifications, professional backgrounds and willingness to be trained in different industries. Personal information would be kept in a secure, private database, but the data on qualifications, skills and the interests of the refugees would be made available to the private sector. The EU would facilitate outreach and recruitment between the incoming labor force and the employers who are experiencing labor shortages. The creation of such a system would encourage employers to reach out to refugees to fill positions that are currently not being filled while also accelerating the integration of newcomers into the labor market.

8. Companies could be encouraged to train and hire refugees not just out of corporate social responsibility, but to benefit their bottom lines. Many European firms in the service, industrial, and construction sectors are currently experiencing labor shortages,7 and for employers in these industries, the influx of asylum seekers is an opportunity to bring employee numbers back into balance with labor needs. Labor economists predict that as the labor force increases, industries will gradually increase their capital, and eventually increase overall productivity.8 In fact, with “the availability of more workers, firms expand: they increase their productive capacity and build more establishments”,9 so ensuring the private sector is able to effectively utilize the incoming refugees’ productive potential is crucial to the host economy.

9. With this proposal, the EU and its organizations will play a minor, though critical role in ensuring the positive effect of refugees on European economies. CEAS would act as an intermediary between willing asylum seekers and interested employers. Therefore, the creation of the database would not be seen as the EU forcing policy on the private sector, but rather as a tool to advance certain weakened sectors and boost the economy. The database and recruitment services would be available to employers on a voluntary basis and they could each individually decide how to use them. The decision to create training programs would be encouraged by CEAS but would be initiated, developed, and implemented by the corporations themselves. The cost of any training would be covered by the firm, and it should be seen as an investment since they benefit from free labor, through internships, and from future increased productivity.

CONCLUSION

1. Suggested measures – the development of a Europe-wide, volunteer-powered language education program for asylum seekers and the creation of a professional skills and qualifications database for private sector use – should ease refugees’ integration into their host society and access to its labor market. In addition, they de-politicize the response to the mass migration inflow by avoiding policy reforms or welfare programs that cause political backlash and social tensions and engage alternate actors instead. The involvement of civil society and the private sector are also an opportunity for capacity-building and cultural exchange. Finally, letting private citizens take more responsibility for the crisis promotes the idea of social solidarity across the European Union.
5. 1. 2. Response

to 5.1.1 Engaging Civil Society and the Private Sector in the Labor Market Integration of Refugees

Michael Kaczmarek
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For some years now, the European Union, its member states and its societies have been struggling to find a coherent approach to the increased migratory pressures. In 2016, 1.2 million first time asylum seekers applied for international protection in the EU member states, a number slightly down compared with 2015 but almost double that of 2014 (562 700).¹

The increased numbers of people arriving in Europe has put pressure on the existing national and European administrative structures. This applies to the registration, processing and hosting of the migrants alike. It also has implications on national integration efforts as well as on public opinion.

The students’ policy paper deals with a politically sensitive aspect of the migration pressure that Europe is facing, the issue of ‘labour market integration of refugees’. The students discussed in particular two approaches to facilitate this process: engaging the civil society and engaging the private sector.

As a first element, the policy paper proposes to engage the civil society with the help of EU programmes and funds (e.g. through Erasmus+). According to the students’ proposal, the EU should e.g. be responsible for developing and to administering ‘volunteer-powered, expert-guided language programs’, similar to the US nongovernmental initiative ‘Teach for America’ or the volunteer program ‘Peace Corps’, run by the US government. The

¹ Eurostat: news release 46/2017 (16 March 2017)
aim is to encourage and support volunteers and nongovernmental organisations to teach refugees English in different migrant hotspots in the EU and neighbouring countries.

In accordance with the subsidiarity principle, education and training policies as such are not decided on the EU level, but by each member state. The good news, however, is that volunteer-based language or integration courses are already up and running in several places all over Europe.

As the European Commission informs on its website, European funded projects like Erasmus+ facilitate the exchange of good practices on the integration of migrants and fund relevant projects across the different levels of education. For now, these initiatives are limited in number and in their capacity to meet the demands of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection (hereafter: recognized refugees). Therefore, there is definitely a margin for improvement - on the national level as well as on the EU level - to keep track of and to share best practices and to professionalize the approach.

Furthermore, the EU Aid Volunteers initiative (EUAV) provides opportunities for citizens from the EU to engage in humanitarian aid in third countries (countries outside the EU).

As a second element, the policy paper calls for a centralized database of asylum seekers’ educational levels, skills and interests in training. The data should be included in the existing Common European Asylum System (CEAS) asylum seeker database. According to the students’ proposal, the EU, namely CEAS, would then provide the private sector access to the (anonymous) data and act as an intermediary between interested employers and asylum seekers that seek a job.

As with the first proposal, the students underestimate the relevance of the diversity of legislations and national systems and overestimate the EU’s powers and capacities in this area.

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3 European Commission: Education and migrants (webpage consulted on 29 March 2017)
4 European Commission: EU Aid Volunteers (webpage consulted on 6 April 2017)
The policy paper does not take into consideration, for example, that member states can considerably restrict asylum-seekers’ right to work. Even recognized refugees do not automatically have the same access to national labour markets as EU citizens. In line with the UN 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugee Status, their access to work is rather granted under the same conditions as to foreign nationals.\(^5\)

Apart from the legal setting, one may also argue that there is no compelling need for the EU to set up and operate an asylum-seekers qualifications and recruitment database, as the policy paper suggests. There are already established recruitment platforms and professional networks. Having said that, refugees do not always possess proof of their qualifications and most of them have obtained their degrees in education systems that are very different from those in their host countries and which employers may have difficulties in evaluating.\(^6\)

To better understand the current situation and the limits of the outlined proposals, a fundamental principle needs to be highlighted: Individual member states, not the EU institutions, have the final say regarding its national integration policies. The main EU role is ensuring the best use of EU resources, agencies and tools to provide member states with guidance and mutual learning opportunities.\(^7\)

While research suggests that early and effective labour market participation is a key aspect of the integration process, national governments have different views on the integration of refugees. Taking into account that integration remains primarily a national competence, the EU level supports the actors working on the integration of recognized refugees and asylum seekers, namely member states’ governments, regional and local authorities, social partners, and civil society.\(^8\)

In conclusion, it is definitely worth it to discuss and to further develop ideas of engaging civil society and the private sector when it comes to the labour market integration of refugees.

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5 EPRS: Work and social welfare for asylum seekers and refugees (December 2015)
6 European Commission and OECD: How are refugees faring on the labour market in Europe? (September 2016)
7 European Parliament: Labour Market Integration of Refugees: Strategies and good practices (March 2016)
8 European Commission: Social and labour market integration of refugees (webpage consulted on 28 March 2017)
However, legal obligations, country-specific considerations and many other practical aspects need to be taken into consideration when working on tailored solutions that work for refugees and the individual receiving countries.
5.2. Migration - Labor Market Angle

SUBMITTED BY
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OBSERVATIONS

The Migration Workshop identifies the following challenges:

1. While European citizens overwhelmingly support the free movement of people, goods, and services within the European Union and 61% feel positively about the immigration of people from other EU Member states, immigration from outside the EU is currently perceived negatively by 56% of the surveyed population.¹

2. Research suggests that the effect of immigration on national labor markets depends largely on the extent to which migrants’ skills complement or substitute those of existing workers, as well as on long-term changes in labor demand.² As long as labor market integration of refugees and other migrants remains slow and strained (in Germany, fewer than half of refugees were employed within 5 years of arrival),³ it is unlikely that public perception will become more favorable.

3. Anti-immigration rhetoric has played a prominent role in Brexit and other nationalist populist movements across the world, and with 69% of Europeans in favor of a “common European policy on migration,”⁴ it is in the interest of the EU that member states apply policies which help foster integration and security.

² The Migration Observatory briefing: The Labor Effects of Migration, accessed here: http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/the-labour-market-effects-of-immigration/
⁴ Standard Eurobarometer 86 (November 2016)
POLICY VISION

1. Public opinion and the short-term concerns of the impact of migrants on the labor market belies the longer-term advantages of such targeted injections of skilled labor into ageing populations, amidst moribund economic growth outlooks across Europe.  

2. We propose a common pan-European skills assessment process for refugees, accommodating country-specific educational and economic requirements. This streamlined qualification-matching program will filter refugees into appropriate job sectors, to be administered under an EU directive. The aim of this is to avoid refugees being forced into low-paying jobs and maximize refugees’ eventual economic contribution. However, part of the challenge emerging from this is ensuring that it an equitable process, with equal availability of opportunity for accredited refugees.

3. Extending this program to all refugees directly at its inception would be unrealistic. Rather, by starting with a pilot program, governments or organizations can focus on refugees with clearly-defined, easily-testable skills. Also, by industry and business leaders driving this initiative, they will have incentives to ensure the success of the program.

4. Given that the largest challenges to execution lie in bureaucratic hurdles, we propose that the program’s implementation process be spearheaded by a new pan-EU council staffed by industry experts and business leaders. This council, as a Track 3 non-governmental EU effort, frees itself from the constraints of formal diplomatic efforts, while possessing the means to employ those refugees who have successfully passed the accreditation process.

5. These assessments must also be coupled with skills-elevation programs and vocational training. The programs will be open to both refugees and current citizens, and ramp up refugees’ work competencies and fill in the unavoidable gaps that remain before they can enter the workforce, such as linguistic barriers.

6. Supporting the first two ideas would be a pan-EU database with coordination between private corporations in different countries.

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as to what skills each would prefer, require, and can be provided by the large refugee population. Given the EU labor market, there is no guarantee that private corporations will actively participate in the database. Also, the potential to exploit refugees as cheap labor may provoke a human rights backlash.

7. By acknowledging the current economic realities, there exists an incentive for private participation through social responsibility and public relations bonuses for these companies, which can be reinforced by government incentives. In addition, the initial support and participation of the aforementioned pan-EU council of business leaders is vital. By allowing individual member states to also determine their respective wage rates for this scheme we circumvent conflicting national labor laws. Additionally, creating sites and opportunities for local-refugee interaction will facilitate communication and build public support. At the micro-level, the refugee integration process hinges on grassroots efforts.

8. By framing our proposal as an EU directive and by spurring private actors, empowered by their national governments, and with all parties contributing in a coherent manner, the proposal creates a targeted and well-communicated approach, enlists incentivized stakeholders, such as EU populations and citizens, business leaders, and EU governments. Also, by employing a rigid, institutionalized approach, we can build on existing programs and institutions and prevent the abuse of the system. The proposal will have an immediate impact in the short-term, and create a flexible outlook in the long-term.

ANALYSIS

Pros

1. The integration of refugees and migrants into the labor market will have a positive influence on the EU labor market. Evidence suggests that refugees contribute to national development and serve as a benefit to and create jobs in host countries.  

7 Spiegel (2015), German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity, accessed here: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html
2. A positive public perception of migrants in the European Union could reduce populism in the long-term. Populist forces within the EU claim that their identity is under attack due to immigration and far-right political parties position themselves as being in defense of cultural identities. By demonstrating migrant’s desire to enter the labor force and to contribute back to local economies, our proposal has the potential to change this negative public perception.

3. Accredited refugees should be granted the right to a low-cost job training scheme, providing these refugees with the skills necessary to make them competitive players in the labor market.

4. Who is responsible?
   a. States have primary responsibility for the human rights of their own citizens. When social contract fails, states and international communities are expected to stand in and provide surrogate protection.
   b. Our long-term goals and solutions for refugees include ensuring the safe return and repatriation of refugees, ensuring reintegration into their local communities, and allowing for resettlement into third countries.

Cons

1. As these aforementioned statements demonstrate, there are many positive aspects to these proposals. However, it is likely that they would generate other problems for the European Union. Recent opinion polls indicate that EU citizens are not interested in an EU with significantly increased powers, which our proposal would constitute. A similar poll indicated that only 35% of EU citizens had a positive view of the EU.  

2. Even Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the EU Commission, has said that “I believe it is a mistake to constantly call for more Europe. It is not about having more Europe but about having a better Europe.” That said, other politicians such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel have stated that they do support transferring more powers to the Commission. With opinions divided over whether the EU’s powers should remain the same or if some

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10 https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/merkel-my-vision-is-political-union/
of these powers should be reverted to national governments, it is clear that there is little appetite for increased EU powers.  

3. Further, a pan-European skills assessment program of migrants and refugees could be subject to significant subjectivity depending on the country or nationality of the person administering the assessment. Also, initiating such a program would require large financial and human resources, which would force EU governments to increase EU funding.

4. Moreover, labor laws vary significantly between European countries, particularly between northern and southern European countries; this proposal may be considered by countries like Denmark and Sweden as too intrusive into their domestic labor laws. For instance, the Swedish government has been unwilling to introduce a significant number of low-paying, low-skilled jobs for migrants and refugees as they view it as undermining the country’s economic model.

5. While these drawbacks provide challenges to our proposal, they could be overcome through a large communication campaign and with concrete results from these programs.

6. More challenging is the lack of general interest within Eastern European countries to accept refugees and migrants from outside the EU at all. This is particularly true of Muslim migrants, as in certain European countries a majority of citizens view Muslim immigrants as unfavorable. For instance, in Poland, 81% of its citizens view Muslim migrants unfavorably, with 69% of Greeks and 65% of Italians holding a similar view. If these countries refuse to accept any or more refugees and migrants from outside of the European Union it is unlikely that the rest of the continent will be able to come up with a solution which incorporates our proposals and increases the positive perception of migrants and refugees within the EU.

11 http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/
12 http://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/ledarkronika/ingvarpersson/article23018242.ab
This paper addresses the question of how to preserve people’s freedom of movement while effectively combatting terrorism. It starts from the premise that European values such as human rights and the rule of law should be respected, as well as the obligations that member states have voluntarily taken on under the Refugee Convention; that the current legal framework (the Schengen Borders Code)\(^1\) is fit for purpose; that the most effective and proportionate way to combat terrorism is not to erect internal borders, but to ensure the integrity of external borders and increase police checks within member states; it is necessary to increase policing and judicial cooperation and information sharing between member states and the EU; and that the speed and accurate processing of asylum claims while providing adequate and humane reception conditions to asylum seekers in countries on the external borders must be improved. The EU has addressed its migration and security challenges over the last few years with a number of steps that have yet to be fully implemented. Thus, this paper does not seek to propose radical changes and generally proposes progressive changes to the existing legal and policy framework. Where this paper seeks to make a unique contribution is to highlight that the EU really needs to do more to communicate with its citizens on the measures that it has taken to combat terrorism and secure its borders, and to foster European values, solidarity, and support for the new European Social Contract. This is addressed by a number of proposed measures, including a bold and imaginative proposal for a 21st century European Public Broadcasting Service that is active in traditional media, digital, and social media.

**OBSERVATIONS**

The Migration and Security Workshop observes:

1. The right to freedom of movement within the EU is one of the fundamental and most cherished freedoms in the Union and is guaranteed by the Schengen Borders Code and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.\(^2\) The Schengen Borders Code allows for

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strictly limited, temporary re-impositions of border controls, which must be well-justified. ³

2. The right to asylum is guaranteed by the Refugee Convention, ⁴ which was drafted in response to the horrors of war, and which member states have voluntarily signed up to. This right is guaranteed within the Common European Asylum System. ⁵ Under the Refugee Convention, it is illegal to penalize asylum seekers and refugees for irregular entry. ⁶

3. The Dublin III⁷ system aims to ensure that every asylum seeker in the Dublin area has swift access to status determination while preventing them from pursuing multiple claims in several member states. An under-recognized premise of the Dublin system is that member states should share the burden of processing asylum claims, provide adequate reception conditions, and host refugees. Unfortunately, there has been little solidarity and burden-sharing towards this end. ⁸ The EU Commission proposed an EU Resettlement Framework in July 2016, but progress has not been forthcoming. ⁹

4. Over the past few years, some member states temporarily closed their internal borders, or reintroduced internal border controls, inhibiting EU citizens’ rights to freedom of movement, and asylum seekers’ rights under the Refugee Convention. Some member states justified this on the basis of security threats arising from a huge increase in irregular migration, but most simply wished to prevent “secondary movement” of asylum seekers from member states at the external borders.

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³ Articles 26-29, Schengen Borders Code. The temporary reintroduction of border controls must be well-justified with serious and compelling reasons, and supporting documentation regarding the genuine existence of a threat to their security.
⁶ Article 31 of the Refugee Convention imposes a duty on Member States not to commence criminal prosecutions or apply other penalties to refugees for their irregular entry onto their territory, including entry as a result of intra-Schengen movement. Article 3 of the Schengen Borders Code states that it applies without prejudice to the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.
⁸ Of the 160,000 asylum seekers the EU Member States agreed in September 2015 to relocate from Greece and Italy in response to groundbreaking proposals from the European Commission (which nevertheless represent a fraction of the asylum seekers in these two countries), only 8,162 had been relocated by 5 December 2016. Of the 22,504 refugees the EU Member States agreed on 20 July 2015 to resettle, only 13,887 had been resettled by 5 December 2016.
5. While it must be recognized that large, unexpected, internal migration fluxes result in pressure on local and national authorities’ ability to fund and plan the development of infrastructure, housing, and education, member states’ temporary closing of their internal borders and refusal to fully participate in relocation and resettlement programs undermines a coherent EU response to the crisis in refugee protection. It also fosters a sense of distrust; undermining counter-terrorism cooperation between member states and the EU institutions.

6. The EU has taken comprehensive steps to address uncontrolled migration flows. On the Eastern Mediterranean route, arrivals in the last four months of 2016 were down 98% year-on-year (thanks to the EU-Turkey Statement). The Malta Declaration of 3 February 2017 addresses the Central Mediterranean route and commits the EU and its member states to take a number of measures to significantly reduce uncontrolled migration from Libya to Italy and break the business model of people smugglers. If successful, and the EU remains vigilant on its other external borders, this will significantly reduce the levels of uncontrolled migration witnessed in the recent past.

7. Criminal networks are facilitating more than 90% of the migrants coming to the EU, with the numbers predicted to increase due to the member states’ newly introduced migratory rules. In 2015, USD 5-6 million was estimated as the annual turnover of migrant smugglers.

8. The increase in terror attacks was in part facilitated by the lack of harmonized internal borders and asylum policies between member states and the lack of well-functioning external borders, but the main problems were a lack of cooperation, coordination, and information sharing between member states’ policing and security forces, and EU institutions such as EUROPOL and EUROJUST. The EU has recognized and taken many steps to address these problems.

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10 Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route
14 E.g. the creation of an EU Border and Coast Guard, the strengthening of the Schengen framework through systematic checks based on risk assessment at external borders, the setting up of EU Internet referral unit for extremist content online and the Passenger Name Records system, the improvement of information sharing between Europol and Eurojust, measures to fight illegal trafficking of firearms and terrorist financing, and the EU-Turkey Statement.
9. The 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy\textsuperscript{15} (CTS) remains unrevised and has not been utilized as a framework for the EU and member states’ counter-terrorism policies (which remain limited to education, social policy, and security and defense).

10. EU citizens have concerns that European values may be jeopardized by the influx of refugees from countries that do not share the same principles in terms of culture. Concerns about immigration and terrorism are the two biggest issues in the EU at present\textsuperscript{16} and are fueling the rise of extreme right-wing political parties, who are exploiting the concerns of EU citizens by framing migrants as security threats. At the same time, the fear of terrorism is leading to Islamophobia and the targeting of minorities in Europe, causing further radicalization and extremist views.

11. Trust in the EU is lower than it was a decade ago. Eurobarometer polls show that trust in the EU is at 36%, which is lower than the 51% who “tend not to trust” the EU.\textsuperscript{17} This demonstrates how the EU continues to struggle to express and communicate its actions, policies, and common ideals to the general European public.

\textbf{POLICY VISION}

\textbf{Internal Borders}

1. Member states should not resort to re-establishing their internal borders, as this is not an effective or proportionate means of combating terrorism.

2. While member states may legally step up police checks in or near border areas (only for the purpose of countering terrorism, but not for the purpose of immigration control), the European Commission should issue guidance to member states on how to implement these police checks in a manner that combats terrorism while protecting the rights to freedom of movement, asylum, and other fundamental rights and European values, such as the principle of non-discrimination.

\textsuperscript{16} Standard Eurobarometer 86, November 2016
\textsuperscript{17} Standard Eurobarometer 86, November 2016
Establishing strong and secure external borders

3. Strong external borders allow the EU to maintain internal freedom of movement and avoid border control at internal borders.

4. While it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of the new European Border and Coast Guard (the strengthened FRONTEX), more can be done to publicize its creation, powers and operations to strengthen the integrity of the external borders.

5. The Commission should conduct more unannounced on-site visits at the external borders in order to check the implementation of member states’ action plans to strengthen external borders, and then publicize its visits and findings, to demonstrate transparency and “toughness” in addressing concerns about external border security.

6. The Commission should further increase the number of hotspots for migrant registration and fingerprint processing upon entrance into the EU in countries that receive the vast majority of migrants and refugees, such as Greece and Italy.

7. The Commission should negotiate agreements to ensure the speedy repatriation of people whose asylum claims are rejected, with countries from which many asylum seekers who have a low likelihood of successful claims come to Europe (e.g. Tunisia).

8. The Commission should continue to allocate further funding from the Refugee Facility Fund to NGOs active in the refugee crisis in Turkey in order to progress the successful implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement on the reallocation of incoming refugees.

9. The European Council should implement and closely monitor the results of the Malta Declaration in preventing uncontrolled migration flows through the Central Mediterranean, including ensuring that there is adequate respect for human rights in enforcement, and there are adequate reception conditions in Libya.
Harmonization of the asylum and immigration policies of member states

10. The EU and its member states should continue to recognize the right to seek asylum, while ensuring that the right is realized in a manner that does not incentivize dangerous or irregular migration flows, yet respects the principle of non-refoulement (e.g. by not sending Kurds back to Turkey, if they face a genuine, well-founded fear of persecution there).

11. Although the Common European Asylum System intends to facilitate a harmonized asylum system, this has not been entirely successful due to member states’ reluctance to cooperate. The member states have to be the ones to commit to a unified, harmonized policy, to show a willingness to share information in order to ensure security.

12. Member states should share the financial burden of providing adequate reception conditions for asylum seekers and speedy and accurate processing of claims, and recognize that this solidarity is the premise for the Dublin III system. Member states should be able to further utilize financial aid from the European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund to relieve the burden of large migration fluxes on national welfare systems.

13. Member states should agree to a harmonized, fair distribution system for refugees that takes the size and financial capabilities of the states into account, and that establishes safe and orderly pathways to Europe for those in need of social protection. As a starting point, member states should agree to the EU Commission’s proposals for an EU Resettlement Framework.

14. Member states [KM10] must provide detailed reasoning when rejecting asylum claims on security grounds. They must share this information in Europol’s dedicated secured communication channel for member states to safely provide reasons for relocation request rejections. They must also exchange fingerprints via police cooperation channels for security verification at national level, particularly in cases where the applicants lack ID or travel documents.
Strengthening counterterrorism cooperation within the EU

15. Member states must deepen policing and judicial cooperation and information sharing between themselves and Europol as well as Eurojust, to prevent terrorists from taking advantage of poor coordination between member states’ forces.

16. The Presidency of the European Council and the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) should suggest a revision of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CTS) and establish it as the basis and framework for all further EU counter-terrorism policy.

17. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) should serve as a coordination hub for prevention, counter-radicalization and de-radicalization initiatives inside and outside the EU, in addition to performing counter-messaging to discourage vulnerable youth from becoming radicalized by extremist propaganda that promotes violence, drawing on the experience of the US Global Engagement Centre.

18. Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre should become a central information hub for law enforcement in the area of cybercrime across the EU.

19. Commend the expansion of the European Organisation of Prison and Correctional Services’ (EUROPRIS) mandate to promote exchange of best practices in training local actors on how to prevent radicalization in prisons by the European Agenda on Security.

20. All member states should ratify the Strategic Framework for European Cooperation on Education and Training (ET 2020).

21. The police and judicial forces of member states investigating terrorism-related offenses should make use of the European Judicial Network (EJN) for the execution of arrests, freezing of assets, and confiscation orders.

22. Europol’s European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC) should closely cooperate with Turkish, Lebanese and Libyan authorities in the dismantling of smuggling networks across the Mediterranean, building on the Malta Declaration, which seeks to support the Libyan coast guard, elevate the standard of reception.
capacities, and improve the socio-economic situation in local Libyan communities.  

23. Member states should further tailor their law enforcement activities in accordance with the EMSC, following the examples of six member states (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, and Romania) that disrupted ongoing smuggling activities on February 1st, 2017. 

Strengthening communication of EU measures, European solidarity, and European values:

24. The creation of a 21st century European Public Broadcasting Service would enable the EU to communicate news and other broadcast programs based on European values to the European public. This broadcasting service will operate in traditional media formats as well as on digital and social media. It should feature content development and creation by all member states, rather than simply translate content to each country’s national language. It should foster understanding of the EU measures taken to address the security and migration crises, as well as promote the development of a common European identity. The EPBS would be responsible for spreading content that does not recognize any partisan political agenda, while also using as sources European reports and publications (such as the Cost of Non-Europe reports) to achieve both the goals of simplifying the information embedded in the reports to the general population while countering the flow of fake information. Also, the EPBS would promote the construction of a public positive narrative that explains the contributions which migration brings to Europe, fostering civic morality, as well as spreading awareness of the measures that Europe has taken to combat terrorism.

25. The EU should also promote new educational measures, such as the creation of civic courses and pro-European programming for educational institutions at all stages of human development, as well as seminars, lectures, and events designed to promote European values.

26. The Commission should do more to explain to EU stakeholders how it is utilizing the Schengen evaluation and monitoring

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18 Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route: http://europa.eu/!kg66Yh
mechanism set out in Regulation 1053/2013 to diagnose and address “serious deficiencies” at the external borders, such as by doing more to fulfill its obligation to inform national parliaments of the content and results of the evaluations and transmit the annual reports, and ensuring that Council recommendations are transmitted to the national parliaments. 20 This will help national parliaments understand what is being done to address external border problems and increase national support for EU measures.

27. Member states should reduce misconceptions about migration by including a separate chapter in their annual economic reports on the contribution of EU migrant workers to domestic welfare systems.

28. Non-Governmental Organizations should take more initiative in promoting online registration opportunities to donate to and volunteer in reception centers for asylum seekers, as well as long-term integration efforts for refugees.

Pursuing effective long-term integration strategies

29. Member states should adopt long-term integration plans for refugees, in order to prevent them becoming second class citizens with lesser educational and employment opportunities, lower standards of living, and poorer life outcomes, hence making them more vulnerable to radicalization.

30. Member states need to prevent the formation of difficult-to-police communities by fostering trust between migrant communities and police forces and other public servants.

31. The EU should also seek to ensure that refugees and asylum seekers are educated in European languages and European values.

32. The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs (LIBE) and the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) should be requested to provide EU-wide policy and academic expertise on the topic of integration, drawing on the best practices in integration from across the EU, especially for member states less used to integrating people.

20 Articles 15(3), 19 and 20 of the Schengen Evaluation Monitoring Mechanism
1. **How can the European Union assist the Western Balkans in dealing with the refugee crisis?** How will the challenges that arise due to a lack of cooperation between the Western Balkans and the European Union impact the situation? There are numerous problems that the Western Balkans have encountered in dealing with the massive inflow of people from the Middle East and North Africa, such as a lack of funds for improvement of border controls and management, as well as a lack of capability for registering the refugees. More often than not, refugees have been exposed to vulnerable situations by being put in reception centers in very poor conditions, exploited financially, and abused physically and emotionally. While most of the Western Balkan countries aim to join the European Union, they have violated many of the European Union standards for the treatment of refugees, such as providing basic commodities, healthcare, education, etc.

2. The refugee and migrant crisis has created much discourse on how this crisis will affect politics and policies at the state level within the Western Balkan countries, and also how the European Union will be able to support this region in improving the border infrastructure, management, prevention of human smuggling, refugee exploitation, and abuse. During 2015, the number of illegal border crossings in the Western Balkans culminated with 2,081,66 detected crossings.\(^1\) However, this number significantly decreased by 84% in 2016 with the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement.\(^2\)

3. Figure 1 – shows the mainland route used by refugees in the Balkans, which refugees begin by entering Greece, transferring to

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1 FRONTEX. Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2016. Warsaw, 2016. p. 8
Macedonia or Italy (in case they seize an opportunity to enter the European Union through Italy), and continuing to Serbia and then to Hungary. However, soon after Hungary decided to implement a policy to close the border in order to prohibit refugees from entering, a significant number of refugees started to enter Croatia and then proceeded to Slovenia.

4. **Cooperation (or the lack thereof) between the Western Balkans and the European Union – security and human rights implications.** The 2015 Paris terror attacks, caused significant anti-refugee sentiments in Central and Southeastern Europe, showed that the cooperation between the European Union and Western Balkans was of high importance. Ahmad Almohammad, who was confirmed by the Serbian authorities to have entered through Serbia, was one of the suicide bombers in the Paris attacks, which killed and injured dozens of citizens. While disputes regarding the documentation of the terrorist attack still exist, and the way he entered remains unclear, this case of uncertainty still makes it necessary for the European Union to more directly engage with the Western Balkans. According to an article published in The Independent, the Macedonian President was concerned that the European Union had rejected the Macedonian authorities’ requests to share intelligent information with them, especially the information related to the alleged extremists. While the European Union reasoning for refusing to share the information is grounded on their legislation, it is still possible to explore alternative options which could improve the way data is shared. After the Paris attacks, the Serbian authorities said that they aim to record more refugees in order to not allow potential extremists pass. The amount of undocumented and unregistered people remains high in Serbia and Macedonia which is seen generally as a threat to security.

5. Additionally, the refugee crisis has benefited many human smugglers, who due to the vulnerability of the refugees are able to fi-
nancially exploit them. Several reports have noted the extent to which human smuggling is happening, yet it has been difficult for the given countries of the Western Balkans to work efficiently to identify these smugglers. In different accounts it has been alleged that sometimes smugglers even go to the reception camps to find refugees, right under the nose of the police and social workers who guard them.  

6. Last, the reception centers set up in Croatia, but also in other Western Balkan countries, more often than not, do not fulfill the minimum living requirements. In a report released during 2016, people were detained and kept in severe conditions, regardless of their age or health status.  

“The detainees included entire families, children (including a six-month-old baby), unaccompanied minors, disabled people, people in poor health and members of other vulnerable groups. They were detained in the closed parts of the Slavonski Brod camp […] for different periods, […] sometimes with no access to basic sanitary facilities and without adequate, systematic, and continuous legal, medical or psychological support”  

7. As can be seen above, the European Union needs to increase the level of cooperation with the Western Balkans in three aspects. First, there is an immediate need to help the Western Balkans build the physical infrastructure of border controls. Second, there needs to be better management of how data related to the refugees is shared, particularly on refugees coming from suspicious backgrounds. Third, there needs to be an improvement in regional cooperation and planning, on how to best approach this unprecedented crisis. The European Union can influence these countries to create regional mechanisms that will help them share equally the burden of accommodating, transporting, and protecting refugees.

7 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.
8. **A concrete and viable vetting process prior to the arrival of any refugees is vital to ensure the safety and security of the EU.** So far, a universally accepted and comprehensive plan to vet refugees has been difficult to implement due to the open borders of the Schengen Area and the floods of refugees arriving on the shores of Greece and Italy on a daily basis. In addition, it is important to acknowledge that vetting cannot always ensure that attacks will not be carried out on European soil, due to the possibility of radicalization at home, the ability of migrants in some countries to purchase clean police records, and the lack of record keeping in a migrant's country of origin due to war or other reasons. This vetting process needs to take two groups into consideration. First, it must be able to deal with the continuously arriving migrants who have not previously been registered as arrivals in Europe. The second focus must include those EU citizens which have left for extensive stays in the crisis regions such as Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan. As the European Commission has already identified in their Security Agenda compiled in 2015,\(^\text{10}\) there is a very real threat from this second group of EU citizens returning with newly acquired skills and capabilities to conduct or facilitate acts of terror inside the European Union. Keeping this in mind, it would be naturally prudent to set up these vetting centers in buffer zones outside of European borders. As with the U.S. system of consular vetting prior to any applicant arriving inside the U.S., selecting the right personnel to conduct the initial and follow-on interviews, while providing them with access to intelligence and security data bases is of utmost importance.

9. **Impact assessment and funding auditing.** Currently the European Commission impact evaluation process is limited to evaluating the outcomes of interest and results from groups that have benefitted from grants, and other control groups in a similar position but without funding. The Center for Research on Impact Evaluation within the European Commission, offers a comprehensible guide to conducting impact evaluation, however, it remains unclear who is in charge of conducting these assessments, and especially whether the European Commission should hire a third party to do this job, or whether the organizations receiving the grants should do it themselves. Furthermore, the European Commission complex and reporting and auditing procedures, do not necessarily offer a clear view of the impact that funded organizations have on their community. In this regard, it is important to build on the

existing impact assessment and fund auditing that the European Commission has in place, but also to expand further, to evaluate how organizations in the region most affected by the refugee crisis, affect the community. According to a European Commission 2016 briefing, the European Commission has granted 455 million EUR to Turkey, 22.5 million EUR to the Western Balkans, and 83 million EUR to Greece etc. These sums demonstrate the need to establish teams of professionals, who can work on assessing how the funding is being spent, and what effects it is having on the ground. In turn, this will allow the European Commission to gain better insights into which policies or organizations to fund in the future, and what amounts of money are needed in order to pursue certain policies.

10. **Frontex, Europe’s border patrol and coast guard, was never designed to bear the brunt of a crisis such as the one the EU is currently facing.** In order to keep external borders secure and to effectively screen migrants upon arrival, the EU should set aside a larger percent of its budget to Frontex, allowing more manpower to be sent to the shores of Greece and Italy in particular. The EU could fund this expansion and strengthening of Frontex by allocating money from other areas of its budget such as from “Sustainable Growth/Natural Resources,” which currently comprises 41.6% of the budget, to “Security and Citizenship,” which comprises only 1.5 percent. Individual member states could also allocate more funds for security, as security budgets in Germany, Greece, Italy, and France, for example, constitute on average only 1.1% of the total budgets of these countries. In addition to setting aside more funds for Frontex, the EU and/or individual states should consider funding integration programs to provide cultural, vocational, and language training for migrants.

11. **Another topic of debate within the EU concerning the migrant crisis is refugee quotas.** While some countries’ leaders are opposed to accepting migrants, such as Hungary, others are welcoming refugees with open arms, but serious political backlash to these policies is also beginning to take shape, such as can be seen in the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom, France’s National Front, or Germany’s Alternative for Germany, to name a few. The decision to relocate refugees from overburdened countries such as Germany to other member states should not come from Brussels, but

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13 “EU Budget at a Glance.” European Union.
rather should be a decision made by individual countries through referendums in order to gauge the will of the people. Member states could also reform the Common European Asylum System to address the differences in each country’s attitude towards the issue, or they could reach an agreement on relocating refugees within the EU on the basis of a combination of factors such as GDP, population, and geographic size. Another option is for the EU to follow the lead of the United States, Canada, and Australia in participating in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Resettlement program, which stipulates that if a country which a refugee has fled to cannot accommodate him or her, then the UN will relocate them to a third country that can. The program also provides support to governments and NGOs in their efforts to integrate refugees, which is essential for the success of refugees and migrants in their new country.

12. In order to lessen the number of migrants and refugees arriving daily on the shores of Europe, thus lessening the burden on member states and making an agreement on quotas more likely, the EU should give priority to the most vulnerable, particularly women, children, and the elderly. It must, however, remain wary of the ages of migrants and refugees, as a recent study published in Denmark’s Jyllands-Posten found through teeth and bone tests that 74% of young male migrants claiming to be minors are actually adults. Refugees fleeing their countries for legitimate reasons such as war, persecution, and other humanitarian crises must remain at the forefront for prioritization throughout this process.

14 “Resettlement”, UNHCR
6. 1. **Scope for the ECB to Better Manage Aggregate Demand and, By Extension, Productivity Growth**

SUBMITTED BY

Steven Kelly and Karl Hallerstrom

**OBSERVATIONS**

1. Productivity growth is a key determinant of the long-term growth path of an economy. In the aftermath of the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, productivity growth has remained especially tepid — providing additional evidence that productivity growth is cyclical. Given productivity’s cyclical nature, European Central Bank policy has a direct role in the Eurozone’s long-term growth path due to its role in managing aggregate demand.

2. Low inflation readings and a lower nominal growth path since the financial crisis despite significantly more central bank activity demonstrate that the ECB has plenty of room for improvement of its policy toolkit.

3. The ECB has failed at the standard functions of a central bank, most notably in terms of: moderating business cycles, effectively acting as a lender-of-last-resort, and encouraging risky, more-productive investment.

4. The ECB has become politicized in a way that limits its effectiveness in demand management, especially relative to a system of individual national central banks. For instance, the ECB has
assigned many stipulations to its quantitative easing (QE) programs that limit its effectiveness as a “whatever it takes” response measure.

5. The lack of business cycle synchronicity of Eurozone member countries creates additional political pressure on the ECB and limits its ability to respond to demand disruptions in specific member countries.

POLICY VISION

1. The ECB will pursue a higher inflation target, a symmetric version of its current target, or a nominal GDP target, which will prevent it from losing the ability to cut short-term rates and from losing the ability to clear the safe asset market. By retaining the ability to cut short rates and/or credibly commit to additional forward guidance, the ECB will be able to more effectively boost aggregate demand and avoid market segmentation that causes rising risk spreads and underinvestment in risky-but-productivity-enhancing investments.

2. The ECB will diversify its assets purchases as part of its QE program. Given strictures on cutting short rates and forward guidance, diversifying asset purchases would help reduce risk spreads in a world where the safe asset market is not clearing and would not require modifications to the inflation rules. Additionally, to the extent that safe asset purchases are not neutralized, such accommodation could remain in place longer while short rates begin to rise — this could limit financial instability via maturity transformation while still leaving accommodation in place. (To be sure, inclusive monetary aggregates suggest that at present more maturity transformation is desirable to stimulate the economy. This would be a measure to gradually remove accommodation after monetary aggregates have returned to their long-term trends.)

3. The ECB will use its sovereign debt purchases without regard for political risks — just as a national central bank would. This would reduce the political/re denomination risk that could become a self-fulfilling negative equilibrium and help restore the ECB’s independence from political negotiations.
4. The ECB will retain the ability to adopt a yield curve target for all Eurozone nations to avoid the current situation of the lowest interest rates existing in the countries that need the least stimulus and the highest in the ones that need the most. This would be consistent with the idea of a single monetary policy — arguably more consistent than the current perverse yield curve outcomes. This would also help ease political pressure on the ECB. This seems to be within the scope of the ECB legally; the European Court of Justice has in previous cases said the ECB can sustain losses in the name of pursuing its mandate and can support governments that are at present on a fiscally unsustainable path.

PARTICIPANTS’ STRATEGY

1. Pursuant to the vision outlined above, the members of the Productivity–Demand Management workshop will continue to write and speak on our policy prescriptions to inform policymakers and a wider public audience of their importance.

1. We will also continue to engage in such discourse with policymakers directly at future conferences and other transatlantic events.
6. 2.1. Education

SUBMITTED BY
Kelly Davis, Gabriel Goodspeed, Jonas Kavaliauskas and Lukasz Kolodziej

OBSERVATIONS

The Productivity Workshop observes the following:

1. Education, from early childhood to higher education and vocational training, influences the choices people make and the skills and knowledge people they contribute both to their communities and to society. Policies that impact education at all levels can lead to consequences in the labor market, the innovation economy, and in the prosperity of communities. The following policy proposal focuses on two challenges seen in education in Europe today and seeks to provide policies that could bring about positive education reform within these challenges.

2. In 2014, 27% of European employers said they left a vacancy open in the previous year because they could not find anyone with the right attributes\(^1\) and less than 40% of students in academic programs in OECD countries participated in any kind of work-based learning.\(^2\) There must be opportunities provided to youth earlier in their education so as to give them the skills demanded by the labor market earlier.

3. Equipping young people with a wide set of skills and competencies reaching beyond secondary level can make them more flexible and better-prepared employees in an ever-changing labor market and therefore much more desirable. Moreover, putting students in touch with potential future employers will serve to ease their transition into the labor market, and also help businesses. In economic terms, this has a big impact on raising efficiency and decreasing production and talent searching costs, therefore it can

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be argued that there is a big probability that in the long term the benefits for both businesses and students will outweigh the costs.

4. Many EU member states use student tracking systems which provide more than one or two tracking options. Some of these member states begin tracking students as early as age ten. Tracking systems are often rigid and do not allow for mobility between tracks once students are designated to a certain one. They must become less rigid so as to allow students to move between tracks in later years if their interests and skills develop and they wish to make changes in their educational direction. Furthermore, there are certain tracks that should receive more attention than others in order to insure equity in educational attainment amongst all students and less social stratification among tracks.³⁴

POLICY VISION

The Productivity Workshop believes that:

1. The academic policy should implement internship and apprenticeship programs alongside the national higher education curriculum. Additionally, more classes and incentives should be offered for students that are relevant to the skills needed in the European Union economy. These programs and classes should be flexible in dealing with the European Union’s changing economy. The main objective of this policy is to coordinate higher education with the job market in an efficient and equitable manner.

2. We propose to incentivize internship and apprenticeship programs to be offered to students in order to promote the development of applied knowledge within the future workforce of the private and public sectors. Such a program would be more extensive than the internship program offered through ERASMUS to university-aged young people. Furthermore, we believe that EU member countries should provide the option of vocational and service sector training upon completion of compulsory education. This would include, but is not limited to, technical, digital, writing, language, communication, logistical planning, and

other manufacturing and service skills. State actors would also be advised to apply more flexibility in tertiary education in order to permit students on a university program to transfer into vocational training if desired, or vice versa. We believe that an EU subcommittee of economic advisors should be established within the European Parliament Committee of Employment and Social Affairs to monitor changes in supply and demand allowing governments to focus on industries which offer the most promise and employability.

3. The Erasmus program already exists, that provides EU grants and training for about 4 million people and 125,000 institutions. However, most of these students are twenty-two or twenty-three years old. We believe that internships should be provided for students in their last year of secondary education as well as for recent graduates of secondary education in order to start work experience early in their careers. The skills learned in these internships should in the long run lower the structural unemployment problem of the EU. In addition after compulsory education, vocational training will be further implemented throughout the EU. These training centers can provide basic STEM and coding skill training that are essential skills in Europe’s modern economy. The United States can serve as a model for this STEM program.

4. Policy alternatives should seek to increase resources where there is a need and aim to provide flexibility for students to have more control over which tracks they choose to follow. It is also essential that this flexibility will be extended to the later years of education so that students can have full control of their education tracks and careers. Ultimately these policies should contribute to decreasing levels of social stratification in education.

5. We propose two policy alternatives that aim to decrease the rigidity of tracking in secondary schools in Europe. The first policy seems to allow for greater mobility between tracks through offering counseling services at the end of each academic year to assess students’ skills, passions, plans, and test scores, and allow them trial periods to determine if the track they are in is both the track they want and should pursue. The second policy alternative suggests that tracking should occur within school subjects rather than tracks.
than within whole schools in countries where the system allows for this organizational change to occur.

**POLICY ANALYSIS**

1. Internship/Apprenticeship Program for the last year of secondary education: in order to allocate resources in the most efficient way possible, we recommend the Committee of Employment and Social Affairs act strictly as an overseer and researcher of market demands. In this way, the committee contributes information however does not spill over to the other issue of bureaucracy within the European Union. The policy research of this committee will be individualized for different countries that provide different education systems and will provide information for both students and businesses about internship opportunities. The committee can also formulate studies about the supply of skills of recent graduates and the demand for those skills in businesses and provide better information for EU countries’ individual labor markets.

2. Counselors in secondary education will be responsible for reaching out to local businesses and arranging internship opportunities in different fields. Once the internship/apprenticeship is initiated, companies would take over the organizational process and put in place a set of assignments and a schedule, which could be reasonably met by the student and provide him or her with significant professional experience. The internships/apprenticeships would be incorporated into school time for high school seniors and an optional full-time extension would be offered to students in the year after graduation. The government would subsidize the latter program and private businesses would be additionally encouraged to pay their interns, so as to make the option available to financially-challenged students. Part-time positions for high school seniors would generally be unpaid (it would be hard to convince businesses to pay students who are not significantly contributing to the success of the company and are already receiving professional experience from the work they are doing), yet exceptions could be made in cases of particular financial hardship and exceptional performance.

3. Finally, the system could be complemented and strengthened by tapping into the retiring and already retired segments of the population, which still possess relevant working experience.
Professionals close to retirement would be offered an option to substitute a few of their working hours per week to tutor students. This would not cause additional costs for the states. Furthermore, it would not only not overburden retired senior citizens (assuming that this would be a time commitment of no more than 5-10 hours per week), but also help reduce their segregation from society and provide them with a sense of purpose: they would be serving the nation and securing its future by mentoring its young.

4. Switching to a between-subject secondary school tracking system: an increase in flexibility for students to move between tracks accompanied by counseling services, to help them decide what changes are best for them would increase the efficiency in the tracking system to help students start on the educational paths that they desire. The opportunities for moving between tracks and accessing counseling services would be available to all students. This policy would increase the satisfaction that students feel with their educational path after the age of 18 and permit the ability for students in vocational tracks to realize their potential to change the direction of their education to eventually attend university, and vice versa for students in university-bound tracks.

5. The implementation of this policy would require funding to sustain the increase in counselors at secondary schools, as well as to support the creation of after school programs aimed towards helping students catch up in tracks that they transfer to. Funding would be supplied in two manners: the first would be a tax on European citizens that would be allocated specifically to these programs and advocated to European citizens as a tax that will help both young people's obtainment of education and working skills, the second would be through corporations and businesses, which would primarily serve to support the internship and apprenticeship program, therefore some of this funding would funnel towards supporting the counselors helping the process. Corporations and businesses could be exempt from a portion of these taxes if they choose to partake directly in the internship and apprenticeship programs, which would provide an incentive for them to participate.

6. Students would be limited in the number of transfers they make throughout secondary education; those trying another track would be required to fulfill a full semester of it before choosing to stay

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with the track or remain in the track they originally started in. The process of choosing to switch into a different track would require students to talk to counselors, who would advise them based on the student’s academic records, test scores, passions, interests, and career ideas. It is crucial that counselors be well trained to both guide students and allow them agency in decision-making. In addition, counselors must be trained in understanding their responsibility to place students in tracks without bias. This requires counselors to first recognize their biases based on social class and racial backgrounds, and then to check themselves to avoid guiding students based on these biases in order to evade unnecessary social stratification within the tracking system.8

7. A second alternative to improve the tracking system is to create tracks within school subjects in schools in general, rather than separating tracks by school. The purpose of tracking within subjects is to allow students to pursue more advanced tracks in subjects that they are more interested in while following less rigorous tracks in subjects that they are less passionate about. This change in tracking would allow students to refrain from choosing between vocational or academic tracks until later in or after secondary education. For instance, a study on educational reform in Sweden in the late 1940s that included a common curriculum and the abolishment of tracking after the age of 12 concluded that earnings and final education attainment increased for lower income students.9 In 1992, Gamoran analyzed data from students in the United States in the 1980s to demonstrate that tracking systems with more mobility and flexibility led to higher achievement in mathematics amongst students at all levels.10

8. The most difficult component of implementing this change in tracking would be in countries that perform “between-school streaming” where students in different tracks attend different schools, such as in the case of schools in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and other countries.

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The schools would need to be reorganized to incorporate a standard variety of classes. The transition would work most effectively with the addition of counselors as proposed in the first policy alternative in order to provide students with the guidance needed to make decisions on which subjects to pursue at which levels. This policy would require several years for reorganization and the hiring of counselors to ensure a smooth transition for schools and students, but could be very effective in the long run in helping students explore their skills and passions in choosing which educational path to follow after secondary school.
6.2.2. Response

to 5.2.1 Education

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How education will contribute to the future of work is essential, not only for youth employability and the job market but also for the economic model as a whole. Thus, the workshop has chosen an essential topic. The authors come forward with some policies in order to match the changing needs of the demand for employment with the training of future workers. The policy proposal focuses on two aspects of education that could bring a positive reform: internship/apprenticeship programs along with academic curriculum for the last year of secondary education and switching secondary school tracking system to a between-subject based one.

Regarding the first point, the Workshop provides some interesting approaches, like recommending the Committee of Employment and Social Affairs to provide information for both students and businesses about internship opportunities and elaborate studies about the skills the new graduates can contribute with and the demand for those skills in labor market. They also propose that counselors in secondary school will arrange internship programs with local businesses, and after that companies will take care of the organization to provide students (high school seniors and students in the year after graduation) with valuable professional experience. Another appealing proposal is having retiring or retired workers to tutor students. This idea takes advantage of the working experience of professionals close to retirement, giving them a sense of being useful with no additional costs. These programs will help coordinating higher education with the job market in an efficient and equitable manner.

The second point emphasizes the benefits of increasing
the flexibility of tracking systems, giving students more control and allowing them to move between tracks, with special attention to the role of counseling services. Students should be allowed to access trial periods of different tracks. More and well trained counselors will guide students at the end of each academic year to help them choose the academic or vocational track that better fits their skills and interests. Moreover, tracking should occur within school subjects, being more advanced in subjects the students are more interested in and less rigid in subjects that they are less passionate about. This policy would prevent students choosing between academic or vocational tracks until later in secondary education or after secondary education and would improve the satisfaction of students after secondary school.

The Workshop also points out some important insights which, however, have not been analyzed with enough depth. In 2014, 27% of European employers could not find anyone with the right skills to fill a vacancy and less than 40% of students were participating in any kind of work-based learning. Therefore, it is important to provide students with the skills and competencies, beyond secondary education, that will make them better-prepared employees to fulfill the ever-changing demands of the labor market.

The Workshop mainly discusses the advantages of getting students in touch with potential future employers through internship and apprenticeship programs. Transition from education to the job market is indeed essential. However, there are alternative approaches to educate young people to anticipate the future needs of the market and also helping current workers to make a transition to jobs that require new skills that has not been considered as the German dual education system is that students simultaneously receive on-the-job-training in a company and acquire theoretical knowledge in the classroom. According to the World Bank, the dual vocational education system that characterizes countries such as Germany or Austria is one of the core elements to understand their high levels of employment and low youth unemployment rates.

On a separate note but equally important, we should mention the recognition of informal and non-formal education, since a large number of citizens are trained through them. The recognition of these kinds of education involves confirmation by a qualified institution that acquired skills have been evaluated. This official validation would lead to certification. According to the OECD, the recognition of non-formal and informal education results in a number of benefits, both for citizens (economic,
educational, social and psychological) and the employers (recognition makes workers’ skills more visible so that employers can better fit those skills into the internal structure of their company). Besides, non-formal education costs are less than formal education, and it is more flexible, competitive, efficient and productive, since large numbers of workers who have been trained to meet the needs of the market become available.

Recognition of learning outcomes, independent of their source, is essential to improve innovation, increase education levels, and produce new technologies. In the US, there are standardize methods to measure the general knowledge and skills acquired in a four-year-high-school program and to connect learning in the workplace with colleges and universities by helping to obtain academic credit for official courses and exams. Moreover, some industrial organizations have developed their own methods to evaluate the skills and knowledge that workers must have to be competitive in the global market.

Thus, it is crucial to invest in training to ensure that the changing needs of the demand for employment match the training of workers. To make this possible, it is important to know at every moment the needs of the global market, in order to adjust training policies. Another way to accomplish this goal is to offer benefits to companies and workers that invest in training. In this regard, recognition of non-formal education would incentive workers and would help that they are trained in jobs with more demand. In order for the population to acquire the training required to meet the demand for work, a number of measures should be adopted: increasing training directly in the workplace, increasing on-the-job training, and increasing the opportunities for non-formal and informal education to be validated.

Finally, the Workshop misses some important insights regarding education for the future of work. Technological evolution, volatile sociopolitical context, and demographic and environmental changes are reshaping labor market demands, required skills, and labor environment of most countries. As technological innovation will be at the base of very significant economic and social changes, it is important that new technologies are more present in secondary education.

More decisive is the fact that technological advances will affect the supply and demand sides of businesses, both in manufacturing and services sectors. Most jobs will be affected by automation. Some of them, related to administrative or routine tasks, may disappear. Other jobs, liberated from their administrative tasks, will force professionals to focus on the behavioral side of
their business. Technology related skills will be in high demand in a near future, but specialists will also need transversal knowledge to design codes and machines without introducing assumptions that may skew the results, or emphasize pre-existing patterns of social exclusion. In this regard, it is essential to increase female participation in these fields of work to avoid gender imbalance. On the other side, legal and ethical concerns regarding labor contracts, conditions and salaries will raise the need for experts in labor law, social issues, gender, immigration, social security, crime and security. General questions about the types of societies we want to build thanks to technology advances, will call for the contribution of experts such as philosophers and historians. Consequently, demand for soft transversal skills such as creativity, leadership, critical thinking, problem-solving, persuasion, negotiation, communication, people and time management, will remain essential to any organization, and will continue to be in high demand. The future of employment and an evolving work environment will increase the demand for high-skill individuals with multidisciplinary knowledge and soft skills in a vast variety of areas. However, we need to take into account that the extent of changes in the global market will be dramatically affected by nationalistic policies, since these changes require a high degree of international coordination.

The majority of future jobs will require a degree of education beyond secondary school, so higher education and vocational training will play a critical role in the future. The main objectives of higher education include skills transmission. Not just knowledge, but emphasizing soft-skills training, without lacking humanities training, encouraging participation in events and activities outside formal programs and appreciating the value of vocational training. Other objectives are education in values (helping the students to define their personalities and to work for getting multidisciplinary knowledge) and providing an environment for open and safe discussion, which helps to form more flexible and productive workers.

Finally an idea for future developments. Current data show that the number of skills needed in the global workforce is growing exponentially, namely: from 178 in 2009 to around 1000 nowadays. By the year 2030, some jobs may require as many as 2000 separate skills, some of which have not yet been invented. The current education and vocational training system that most students encounter is not prepared to hande this explosion of skills and knowledge. Thus we have to consider this reality as a cornerstone for any real attempt to face this challenge.
6.3. A Network of Hubs for Technology Development

SUBMITTED BY
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Xilen Vega, and Giorgi Sualdze

OBSERVATIONS

1. In this paper, we will discuss the benefits of establishing a network of hubs in the EU from a perspective of private partnerships, policy support, and sustainable growth. However, it is important to note that there are multiple other areas that need to be addressed and that make this proposal beneficial for the EU. These include but are not limited to: public financing of strategic sectors, territorial inequalities/capabilities, cultural diversity and its influence on technological developments, and relationships with countries outside of the EU with the potential to strengthen the areas while advancing economies. A successful tech hub can be described as a modern utopia where innovators and investors meet to create and disseminate new technological achievements to the masses. With this, the human capital and investment coming from major universities are also important to the success of these diverse companies.

2. Most American technology firms are located on the west coast, with the heaviest concentration in Silicon Valley or San Francisco, in general. Uber, Apple, and Google have headquarters in California, whereas Microsoft calls Washington home. There are a variety of factors impacting the growth of the West Coast as the hub for tech companies. Among these, most prominently, are financial resources, educational institutions, an abundance of international talent and simply the fact that the first few successful tech companies were started in California, which caused exponential growth.
4. However, this paper’s core question is to understand whether the EU would benefit from having a tech hub in a single geography or if it would be better to have a network of technology units across different countries. We will argue that having multiple hubs that are interconnected and communicate regularly is the direction in which the EU should go. This contrasts with the structure in the US since EU countries are more diverse in nature and represent different stages of economic and political development versus different states in the United States and its unified governance/federal structure.

POLICY ANALYSIS

Tech and the European Union

1. Advocating in favor of the development of multiple technology hubs in Europe is sensible because it is a fact that areas of Europe that have a lot to offer in terms of human capital, expertise, network, the radical presence of successful companies, and universities already exist. It is by creating a healthy environment for firms in these areas that the continent will boost its strategic development potential.

   a. These areas have the presence of successful educational institutions, well-established companies, and numerous developers in common. Some of these areas are Stockholm, London, Eindhoven, Berlin, Barcelona, Amsterdam, and Helsinki.

   b. Each mentioned hub is traditionally focused on a few sectors, for example, financial technology in London, hardware design in Eindhoven, and the entertainment industry in Helsinki. Exploiting this already existing expertise would create positive synergies to boost specialized growth.

2. The development of these hubs must, anyway, be well coordinated on the European level. This paper advocates in favor of the creation of a network of hubs that will serve growth in Europe.
6. 3. A Network of Hubs for Technology Development

a. This network must have its roots in constant communication among educational institutions and firms across the hubs. Programs moving towards this direction already exist, such as the European Technology Platform, whose goal is to promote trans-European research and networking in specific sectors, and Projects such as Startup Europe Partnership, that bring together big companies and scale-ups. These networking opportunities must be promoted on a regular basis and the European Union must have a central role in organizing them and providing them with the necessary infrastructures.

b. Ideally, these events should be the occasion for successful technology companies and projects to get to know each other, share knowledge, and become aware of the many investment and business opportunities present in different hubs. With time, this process will give birth to firms that exploit the expertise of the various hubs to build the European value chain.

3. Even though the technological development model supported in this work is led by private initiative, the allocation of public resources is important for the development of the hubs. Investment must be made in the infrastructures necessary for this kind of development, such as in laboratories, high-speed internet access, etc. This kind of investment must be carried out together at a National and European level, with the help of state investment banks and of the EIB. Incentivizing the building of a network between hubs as well requires a significant investment, especially in its initial phase. It is currently beyond the scope of the European Union to heavily invest in already-developed areas, but this constraint should be removed, and resources should be devoted both to building this network and to incentivizing those firms able to create deep interconnections between the identified hubs.

**Analysis**

**Policy perspective**

1. Establishing a network of hubs across Europe makes sense from a standpoint of cultural, political, and economic factors. Countries in the EU are distinct and can specialize in certain parts of startup development. Some may even concentrate on specific industries. They can share knowledge across the network and make the process of development streamlined, innovative, and efficient.
2. Policy can support the development of hubs in the EU in two major ways: (1) by reducing barriers to entry into the market, and (2) by investing in entrepreneurship through investment funds, such as sovereign funds. This way, the EU can create a favorable environment for start-ups to operate in and will provide financial support for the growth of these start-ups. The two incentives would be complementary.

Reducing barriers

1. Policymakers should ease doing business in countries across the EU. According to the World Bank rankings, some of the largest economies in the EU are ranked below the top 20. For example, France is #29 and Spain is #32.¹

2. Not only should policymakers tear down the barriers, but they should also support/incentivize the development of a smaller number of scale-ups. Medium enterprises with clear objectives and revenue models and growth perspectives are the best job creators and more likely to be acquired by other firms. The second thing typical of the Silicon Valley environment that should be reproduced is the frequency with which big established companies acquire smaller ones to integrate them into their business model and take advantage of their innovative push. Projects like Start-up Europe Partnership, that bring together big companies and scale-ups should be promoted more often and maybe supported by smart investment in the region where the synergies are taking place (see the Swedish example).

3. Often, state investment banks act as venture capitalists financing young technology companies in their seed phase. To push for the creation of hubs, among the parameters with which the supported firms are selected it could be useful to include the degree of interconnection they have with the territory of establishment.

4. Furthermore, essential in the American environment is the concept of the mentor. Even if finding mentors is increasingly easy in Europe, thanks to the creation of a lot of incubators as well, we can go one step further in a system with different hubs – the policy maker can promote projects like the commission’s European Technology Platform, whose goal is to promote trans-European research and networking in specific sectors. Furthermore, facilitating the development of the professional figure of the angel

¹ http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings/
Sustainable growth

1. It is essential that innovative companies which have been on the market for a short time have the chance to grow and develop in a favorable environment. This is not created by making public money flow into the various sectors (good firms find a way for markets to finance them), but by facilitating business initiatives. It might be useful to develop a patent protection system that prevents the possibility of cumulating patents in the hands of big firms. This practice can in fact often undermine the development of younger companies.

2. Finally, this point needs to be stressed since we are a transatlantic reality – operating internationally is often hard and one of the biggest issues for newly funded and highly innovative companies is entering different markets and complying with different standards. A solution to this would be to allow younger companies to benefit from a “grace period” for conducting business without losing the opportunities that a narrow time window offers.
7. 1. Dignity and Foreign Intervention in the EU’s CSDP

SUBMITTED BY
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1. Despite their lasting influence in the realms of economics and culture, European states have not assumed enough responsibility to preserve peace and human rights across the globe. In fact, they have often remained apathetic bystanders in the face of genocides, political violence, and humanitarian crises beyond their borders. This lethargy can mainly be traced back to diverging strategic interests and the lack of a common framework for military action. In a world of military behemoths such as the United States, China, and Russia, and in a global context that has become more explosive due to rampant nationalism a disunited European Union loses its relevance because it is ineffective in promoting its values abroad. This incoherence cannot be overcome by a common security strategy based exclusively on interests. Rather, the European Union needs to craft an ideal-oriented doctrine of foreign intervention, with the notion of human dignity at its very center.

2. For our purposes, dignity is the safety in having your existence, or the means for its preservation, taken away by arbitrary violence.

originating from a state, but also from non-state actors in conditions of anarchy. However, a military intervention would be neither practical nor justified in the case of individual or small-scale violations of the aforementioned value. This is because first, such events would not be easily verifiable and second because the potential damage to dignity caused by military action would outweigh the benefits incurred by it. Furthermore, it would also not be prudent to intervene if the violation is an isolated incident that has already occurred, and not part of a larger trend that is likely to continue, since our policy would ideally have a formative, rather than a punitive character. In the context of a civil war, in which atrocities are committed by both sides, we should not be reduced to supporting the lesser of two evils, but at the same time, we should not allow powerless civilians to be sacrificed en masse. In other words, a joint military intervention by the European Union would be called for in the case of an obvious and large-scale violation of dignity that has a high possibility of continuation or even escalation, and in which the victims lack the means to resist.

3. The ethnic cleansing and genocide perpetrated against the Muslim population of Bosnia in the early 1990s serve as a clear example of when decisive intervention would be absolutely justified and necessary. On the contrary, the Iraq War is a clearly unjustified military intervention according to our doctrine, since it was launched on the basis of unconfirmed suspicions, and since its aftermath has been markedly more injurious to the dignity of the Iraqi people than the pre-war status quo. To be clear, the proposed doctrine of foreign intervention does not in any way aim for regime change, but rather to preserve a minimum of dignity in order to empower people beyond the EU’s borders to realize their own vision of progress. In this sense, the doctrine promotes a value that has deep roots in the European intellectual tradition but is neither exclusively European nor incompatible with non-Western cultures.

4. In order for an intervention to be morally justified, not only its rationale but also its method of execution should be grounded in dignity. First, military operations should be limited to where they are absolutely necessary. In essence, this means that military strikes should be principally focused on neutralizing actors that directly engage in the killing or harming of innocent civilians. Second, military interventions abroad, especially in underdeveloped regions, should be accompanied by a strong civilian

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humanitarian effort, which will continue even as the fighting itself has ceased. What underlies this imperative is the recognition that humans have basic needs that go beyond safety and liberty, including adequate means of subsistence, education, access to healthcare, and a hygienic environment. Foreign intervention can only garner the support of the local population, as well as international public opinion, if it is conducted in a dignified manner, i.e. if it provides for these elementary needs. In practical terms, this approach could include the creation of an EU-wide institution equivalent to the United States Peace Corps. Individuals from all EU nations could volunteer in these humanitarian efforts around the globe, giving birth to a shared vision of dignity that would further social integration.

5. We recognize that the ideal we present is rather lofty and vulnerable to the outside pressures of Realpolitik. It is not difficult to imagine the doctrine of dignity collapsing or being misused as a pretext for the pursuit of economic or geopolitical interests. To avert such a betrayal of our original intentions, we propose the creation of two independent regulatory and supervisory bodies. The first of these could be a “Dignity Monitoring Commission”, whose membership would consist of moral leaders in the scholarly, religious, and humanitarian communities, appointed by the EU Commission upon the consent of the EU Parliament. Its purpose would be to continuously study and analyze the state of dignity in the world, identifying potential threats, and offering suggested courses of action, enabling the EU military to intervene at the right time, and not, as in the case of Bosnia and Rwanda, when much preventable harm has already been done. In essence, it would provide a degree of objectivity, serving as a reference point to ensure that EU foreign policy aligns with its stated values. Furthermore, it would serve as an EU-wide standard that would keep the divergent strategic cultures in check, undermining the moral justification of operations conducted by individual states. Although this would not fully prevent member states from engaging in their own foreign endeavors, it would subject them to a considerable restraining criticism. The second body could be an “Intervention Ethics Commission”, composed in a similar manner to the previous organ. Its mission would be to retrospective-ly examine the conduct and consequences of past interventions, investigating unintentional violations of dignity on the EU side, and also analyzing how interventions could have been executed in even closer accordance with our doctrine. Therefore, the EU
would be able to learn from its mistakes and omissions and prevent its values from becoming pretexts for more cynical calculations.

6. Last but not least, this shared vision should ideally be pursued in a manner that reconciles leadership with inclusiveness. To this end, we propose to distribute responsibility within CSDP in a doubly proportional method. First, states with higher levels of absolute defense spending, such as Germany and France, should assume more influential positions within the central structure of command. This criterion is important because it reflects political dynamics and the realities of economic production within the EU. Nevertheless, a second criterion should be added, namely the defense spending of a member state as a percentage of its GDP. Thanks to this provision, smaller states would also be given the opportunity to exercise an influential role in decision-making, if they fiscally demonstrate their commitment to the European security project. This emphasis on inclusiveness that simultaneously recognizes the leadership of traditionally influential member states would cultivate a sense of shared mission and collective commitment.

7. In conclusion, we propose that dignity should be the guiding principle and unifying vision behind EU foreign interventions. The European project has elevated this value to new heights, promoting its citizens’ security, but also recognizing and providing for other human needs such as economic security, a clean and hygienic environment, and privacy. The time has come for Europe to expand the reach of its actions and take the initiative in shaping a world where dignity is enjoyed by every individual regardless of their race, religion, political beliefs or life choices. The wave of rising isolationism that threatens to shatter the foundations of international peaceful synergy, and the lack of progress in resolving international crises like the Syrian civil war, should not scare or discourage us. On the contrary, it should serve as a defense against complacency and as a reminder that the values we have always taken for granted are gained through conscious struggle. Together with the nations of the developing world, we can and we will come a step closer to a world worthy of our noblest dreams and aspirations.
Abstract

Recently, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been lauded for its Willkommenskultur (welcome culture) and relatively liberal policies towards asylum seekers. In the context of the contemporary “refugee crisis,” the FRG has received a greater number of asylum seekers than any other European Union member state. Nonetheless, while the FRG’s efforts have been impactful, an issue of concern in Germany and throughout the EU has been the integration of refugees. Although the FRG has implemented a number of measures to promote integration, including providing cultural orientation and language classes, many speculate about whether these are sufficient. Based on the analysis of current integration policies and fieldwork in Berlin, this paper investigates how integration policies towards asylum seekers and refugees can be improved. Integration is either facilitated or hindered from the moment an asylum seeker arrives in a country of destination, yet the majority of the integration measures in the FRG do not begin until months later after one receives official refugee status. During the time that asylum seekers are waiting, their potential and motivation for integration depreciate. Thus, in order to better integrate refugees, Germany must begin inte-
Grative processes from the moment of arrival rather than waiting. Further, using Ager and Strang’s (2008) conceptual framework on integration, this paper argues that German measures should not only include culture and language classes, but also the means to facilitate safety and stability. Finally, by simply clarifying their approaches toward integration, Germany and the EU as a whole can drastically improve their integration processes.

1. Introduction

In the context of the current so-called “refugee crisis,” the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has received the largest number of asylum seekers of any European Union member state. According to Eurostat (2016), the number of first-time asylum applicants in the FRG “increased from 173 thousand in 2014 to 442 thousand in 2015.” In fact, Germany was the destination country for 45 percent of all of Europe’s asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, while other European states accounted for no more than eight percent individually (Connor, 2017). Nonetheless, while Germany has been lauded for its sizable humanitarian admissions, it has also been criticized for its lack of planning. The FRG has the opportunity to be a positive example among EU member states, but it must ensure that its policies towards incoming asylum seekers and refugees are well thought out and comprehensive. Integration policies are significant for Germany’s reputation in the EU, for the interests of the EU public, and for the interests of asylum seekers and refugees. The EU’s and Germany’s existing approach to integration is insufficient and incomplete, only further complicating the current issues surrounding the influx of asylum seekers in Europe.

Germany specifically, and the EU as a whole, must not only receive asylum seekers but also ensure their integration. While the FRG has some integrative measures in place, these only address a limited scope of integration and only begin once official refugee status has been granted. In order to better integrate refugees, build a positive image, and create a comprehensive process for resettlement, the FRG must create a clear definition of integration, implement integrative measures earlier, and address the safety and stability of asylum seekers. These recommendations are based on policy analysis and fieldwork. In the summer
of 2016, I interviewed 44 asylum seekers, refugees, and people working closely with them in Berlin and I engaged in participant observation. The purpose of this fieldwork was to provide a deeper insight into the integration experiences of asylum seekers and refugees in Germany. Thus, the following policy analysis and recommendations consider both policy research and fieldwork-based research for a more realistic approach, taking into account the lived experiences of the existing policies.

2. CONTEXT

The conflict in Syria has produced over 11 million displaced people, a number that grows continuously (UNHCR, 2015). While neighboring countries have borne the largest part of the displacement burden, vast numbers of asylum seekers have reached European countries, raising both sympathy and suspicion among EU member states. According to Phillip Connor (2017) at the Pew Research Center, “In all, Europe received some 2.5 million first-time asylum applications in 2015 and 2016.” Germany’s situation is unique in terms of their growing number of accepted refugees and asylum seekers. It committed to offering 10,000 places for Syrian refugees in 2013 and 2014, and at the 2014 German Interior Ministers’ Conference, they further “extend[ed] their humanitarian admission programme for Syrian refugees by an additional 10,000 places” (UNHCR, 2014). In August 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel made the pivotal decision to partially suspend the EU’s Dublin Regulations. The Dublin II Regulation stipulates that “only one Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application” and specifies that the responsible member state should be the first that an asylum seeker enters (EUR-Lex, 2011). The suspension of the Dublin Regulations with respect to Syrian asylum seekers was issued on August 21, 2015, and aimed to alleviate some of the burden on the common entry countries of Italy and Greece, making Germany the responsible EU member state for processing Syrian asylum claims (Asylum Information Database, 2015). By the end of 2015, Germany had received nearly one million refugees and asylum seekers in one year alone.

Existing Policy and Asylum Seekers’ and Refugees’ Experiences of the Policy

Nonetheless, while Germany has led the way in terms of
the numbers of asylum seekers received in this current context, the FRG is lacking with regard to its integration measures. Therefore, while other EU member states may look to the FRG as a positive example of humanitarian action, these states may become skeptical about the consequences of the vast numbers of asylum seekers admitted if Germany cannot successfully integrate these newcomers.

First, at the most basic level, the FRG fails to clearly and succinctly define integration. While the German government states that, “integration is regarded as a reciprocal process, which requires effort from both parties” (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2007, 5), a clearer description of what integration entails is lacking. Sociologist Kamuran Sezer (2010) suggests that the government’s lack of clear definition is a substantial part of what makes the debate about integration in Germany so complicated and muddled. Although the majority of asylum seekers and refugees with whom I spoke during the fieldwork felt pressure to integrate, there was no consensus about what this meant. Typically, asylum seekers and refugees defined integration as involving being fluent in German, having somewhat stable employment, and living somewhere other than the refugee camps, whereas Germans who worked closely with them also emphasized the importance of German values – anything from recycling to gender equality – as being part of integration. Nonetheless, some were more skeptical about integration. For instance, an Afro-German slam poet emphatically stated,

I want to start off by saying integration is a really shitty term! Integration means, ‘You should be like us.’ ...I grew up in Bavaria, but I am told I need to integrate because my skin isn’t white. Integration will always have this colonial side effect as long as it does not come to terms with its racism and colonial past.

Further, one camp manager stated, “I consider integration to be bullshit because I think you cannot demand or force people to integrate, and integrate into what? Does a Bavarian integrate in Berlin?” The camp manager noted how other Germans and even many other Europeans were not pressured to integrate and explained that she saw integration as a racist construct targeted at only non-white newcomers. Ultimately, the German government’s lack of clear definition of integration creates ambiguity,
disagreement, skepticism, and even hostility toward the concept itself. Although the German government’s integration measures include language and cultural orientation courses, which are therefore presumably part of how the government views integration, the government itself provides no indication about whether these measures are sufficient to “integrate,” a person or if these measures are only part of integration.

Furthermore, these government-provided courses are insufficient because one must have official refugee status to enroll. The government provides no way for asylum seekers to begin learning German (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Integration Courses,” 2016; “Initial Orientation and Learning,” 2016), and they are pressured to use their own limited resources to begin to learn the language. Eyob, an Eritrean young man who had been in the refugee camp at Bestensee for over a year, confidently showed me a German language book he had been able to save up for and buy. Additionally, Bahemuka, a Ugandan refugee, stated, “I bought my dictionary in three month here because I was very anxious to learn the German language... if you go in the refugee camps, you will find refugees with dictionaries,” noting the commonality of asylum seekers doing what they can to begin learning the language. Without the ability to speak German, asylum seekers face difficulties that range from not understanding labels on food to not being able to find essential services. The influx of asylum seekers has overwhelmed the German system, and it is not unusual for them to wait for several months before hearing from the government about their cases. One Syrian asylum seeker explained,

People are waiting and they are really getting nervous about it. And at the beginning we could manage to hear some people, okay they got their residence, okay now they are moving, but now nothing is changing at all. I know lot of people from nine months, eleven, one year, and they still waiting for their residence. And they are still in the camps.

In the meantime, asylum seekers can do nothing but wait, when they could be working toward integrating. Waiting, and the frustrations that accompany it, was one of the most salient findings from the fieldwork. Many asylum seekers were enthusiastic about learning German and interacting with their new society when they arrived, but after months of waiting in Lagers, or temporary shelters, they became disheartened. This is further significant be-
cause many asylum seekers reported hesitancy to engage with the German population and anger and frustration towards the German bureaucracy after waiting for so long. Tarek, a Syrian asylum seeker, explained that after waiting in limbo for so long, “I’m gonna stay in your eyes a refugee. And this is, you can say, block me from society, that I’m gonna stay out, I’m not gonna come in, you’re not gonna see me as equal.” Thus, current approaches toward integration are insufficient because they are lacking definition and are not applied until months after arrival.

3. Policy Recommendations

In order to facilitate the integrative process, Germany needs to make integrative measures towards asylum seekers clear and immediate. Furthermore, while the FRG’s measures address language and culture, the government must also ensure the safety and stability of asylum seekers to better facilitate the integrative process. First, the German government needs to provide a more concrete definition to “integration.” The differing conceptions about what it means to be integrated causes confusion, and the German government needs to resolve this by specifying a definition, goals, or criteria that would determine what is important for integration.

Second, the FRG must begin integrative measures immediately rather than waiting until asylum seekers obtain official refugee status. Germany cannot maintain a positive humanitarian image while ignoring asylum seekers and only considering refugees. When asylum seekers sit in Lagers for up to a year without being allowed to work or go to school, they lose motivation and begin their next steps as refugees with a negative impression of the German government and society. Working towards or against integration begins upon arrival, and the government currently works against integration for several months until official refugee status is granted.

Third, the German government must facilitate integration by ensuring the safety and stability of asylum seekers and refugees. Strang and Ager (2010) concur that integration is not solely the responsibility of either incoming migrants or the host society; rather, integration is a multidirectional effort (601). Nonetheless, Ager and Strang (2008) draw attention to two distinct domains of
8.1. Improving the Integration of Refugees in Germany

Integration that are the government’s responsibility: 1) language and cultural knowledge and 2) safety and stability. The fieldwork confirmed the importance of these domains in the context of Berlin. While the government addresses the first domain with courses, the second is neglected. The fieldwork demonstrated that asylum seekers overwhelmingly feel unsafe and uncomfortable in the areas surrounding their Lagers. For instance, I witnessed Germans shouting and shaking their fists threateningly at a group of asylum seekers near Bestensee. Furthermore, gymnasiums, tents, and even the abandoned Tempelhof Airport have all been used as emergency housing and are often filled to capacity. Shakir, a Syrian asylum seeker, explained, “I slept in basketball court... I spent maybe three or four months in these places so it was horrible for me... We were 250 people, and 250 we all use one bathroom.” Furthermore, asylum seekers are often transferred to several locations before being granted refugee status, thus creating instability as they do not have time to get used to their surroundings. Clearly, the German government needs to better provide for the safety and stability of asylum seekers and refugees to facilitate integration.

One means to achieving safe and stable conditions for asylum seekers is to educate the receiving community to combat negative attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees, and this must be done across the EU as well. Information and education can fight fear and prejudice, thus fostering safer and more cohesive communities. The German government must be forthright and clear about the rights of asylum seekers and refugees with the German public and with asylum seekers and refugees themselves. Furthermore, the EU as a whole must clearly articulate its policies and approach towards asylum seekers and refugees.

4. Conclusion

Integration is a priority in order to maintain social cohesion, and it is a significant issue for asylum seekers and refugees, the German public, and the broader EU public. The fairly common assumption that refugees will leave Europe should not deter the German government or other EU member states from creating the best and most comprehensive integration measures possible. Although some suggest that refugees will go back to their countries of origin once they are stable and safe again, this is not likely for many as they may become established and spend
years in their European host societies. Furthermore, Germany has lied to itself like this before with regard to Turkish guest workers, which was part of what hindered their integration. Now, Germany has looked at this past integration failure and pondered how to make integration more successful with contemporary refugees. Although integration is a complex issue and requires effort and cooperation from multiple parties, the first steps the German government must take in order to facilitate the integration of contemporary asylum seekers and refugees are to clarify its integration objectives, beginning with integrative processes immediately upon asylum seekers’ arrival, and to provide safety and stability for asylum seekers and refugees. Germany has had good, humanitarian intentions, leading the way among European states in terms of the sheer numbers of asylum seekers received; however, these admissions are not sustainable and cannot be fully successful without improved and comprehensive integrative measures.