

The Dialectics of Dope: Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, the Myth of Marijuana, and Mexico's State Drug Monopoly

Benjamin T. Smith

On 1 January 1938, Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra was made director of Mexico's Campaign against Alcoholism and other Drug Addictions. Over the next two years, he attempted to overhaul popular attitudes to drugs (and drug users) and revolutionize the country's anti-narcotics regulations. During his first year in office, he published a popular scientific paper entitled "The Myth of Marijuana". In it, he confessed that he had smoked the herb and also tested it on a variety of mental patients, unsuspecting bureaucrats, chronic marijuana users, and - in error - at least one young family member. His conclusion, which he repeated in various interviews in the national press, was that marijuana had no ill effects, except a dryness of the mouth, a reddening of the eyes, hunger and tiredness. It was certainly not the cause of the kind of wild hallucinations, violent outbursts and unhinged criminality, which doctors and journalists had ascribed to it.¹

The following year, his ideas inspired new federal regulations on the management of drug addiction. These stipulated a novel solution to the problem of drug peddlers. Rather than imprisoning them, the state would undercut their earnings and put them out of business. They would do this by allowing state-run drug dispensaries and private doctors to hand out small, controlled doses of morphine to opiate addicts in return for a nominal fee.² Inside and outside Mexico, both measures generated considerable scandal. Conservative commentators and rival doctors disputed his findings and questioned his techniques. And U.S. anti-narcotics specialists,

from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Bureau of Customs, employed a variety of public and underhand methods to halt their implementation.

Over the past decade, Salazar's reforms have generated considerable academic and popular interest, at least in Mexico.³ In general, sociologists, historians, and International Relations specialists have concentrated on tracing the ways in which the U.S. authorities slated his insights on marijuana and blocked the new regulations, through a mix of public criticism, press campaigns, covert tactics, and eventually and most tellingly blackmail.⁴ Such approaches have merit. They reflect contemporary U.S. policy initiatives; they chime with a repetitive pattern of U.S. interventions over Mexican drug policy in 1947-1948, 1969, and 1985;⁵ and they resonate with current concerns over the country's failing anti-narcotics efforts. Nearly eighty years after Salazar's regulations were suppressed, Mexico is still engaged in a punitive war on drugs. Since 2006, the policy has caused the deaths of at least 200,000 Mexican citizens and the disappearance of thousands more. Though some punishments for drug use have been reformed, the war is still predicated on the criminalization of drug possession and the imprisonment of drug dealers.⁶ Furthermore, such policies are still encouraged, managed, and paid for by the United States. No doubt, the defeat of Salazar's policies hinted at the tragedies to come.

Though I shall come back to the clampdown on Salazar's ideas in the conclusion, the bulk of this article instead examines another, at least on the surface rather more narrowly historical, question. How did Salazar come up with these novel and radical ideas? And perhaps more importantly, why were they accepted and implemented by the Mexican authorities? As we shall see, during the early twentieth century Mexican attitudes to narcotics were similar to many Western countries. Drug use was linked to certain racial and ethnic groups, held to trigger criminality and violence, and deemed to cause what contemporary commentators called "the

degeneration of the race”. But in the two decades following the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) cultural, legal and medical opinions over drug use gradually started to change. In some ways, Salazar was simply harnessing prevailing trends. But, he also extended these trends in two crucial ways. First, he introduced the idea that drug addiction was not a hereditary failing but actually the product of the social relations between the different classes, and, by extension, the cultural discourses that such relations produced. Second, he introduced an economic (rather than a medical or judicial) solution to these imbalanced social relations. This was a state run drug monopoly.

Mexican Attitudes to Narcotics, 1890-1930

Throughout much of the nineteenth-century, drugs such as opium, cocaine, morphine, and cannabis were used widely as medicines.⁷ But from the 1880s onwards, Mexican attitudes to narcotics changed. Smoking marijuana especially became associated with insanity and criminality. In the capital’s newspapers, stories of *marihuanos* or marijuana smokers committing crimes in states of profound irrationality were relatively commonplace. Gradually the drug became the popular catchall explanation for acts of extreme violence. How did marijuana, used occasionally as an herbal remedy, become “the hardest drug of all,” one that was perceived to trigger “sudden paroxysms of delirious violence”? First, marijuana became associated with *embriaguez* or intoxication in general. In fact, many commentators often failed to differentiate the effects of marijuana, alcohol, and other drugs at all. Second, marijuana became linked to two spaces – the prison and the barracks. These spaces were symbolically important, representing the “injustice, unhygienic conditions, violence, and vice” which were perceived to hold back Mexico’s progress. Finally, the selling of marijuana became associated with *herbolarias* or

female herbalists. Mexican elites held these folk healers to be, at best, superstitious charlatans and at worse, responsible for poisoning credulous sick people. Again marijuana became shorthand for their perceived faults.⁸ In 1903, the popular tabloid, *El Imparcial*, described them as “witches of the twentieth century” who sold “herbs to cure ‘an aire’ [a pain], others against an upset stomach, others to bewitch or to remove the effect of witchcraft, some to give you a fortune and some for criminal uses... that in reality simply induce madness, like marijuana”.⁹

Few other drugs matched marijuana’s levels of popular condemnation. But, by the early twentieth century, opium and particularly opium smoking started to gain an equally unsavory reputation. As in the United States it became strongly associated with Chinese immigrants. In 1908 *El Imparcial* ran an *exposé* on the “Chinese mafia” – the “terrible octopus of crime, that extends its bloody claw over all the world” and had now arrived in Mexico. The paper sent a reporter into Mexico City’s Chinese quarters, where he recounted stereotypical scenes of secretive, sexually predatory, sickly, and opium-smoking immigrants.¹⁰ During the next two decades such stories fused with and reinforced strong nationalist, Sinophobic sentiment, especially in regions with relatively large Chinese populations.¹¹ In 1923, for example *El Siglo de Torreón* ran an investigation into the Chinese community in neighboring San Pedro de las Colonias. The piece warned readers of the immigrants’ “congenital vices, their distinctive dirtiness, their repulsive and contagious illnesses, and their habit of gathering our capital and then taking it back to their own country”. Among the worst of these vices was “their attraction to enjoying the artificial paradises in a haze of smoke of an opium pipe”.¹²

Such prejudices fed into and were buttressed by both medical opinions and legal changes. Early medical appreciations of marijuana all argued that smoking the drug could cause madness and violence. Genaro Pérez’s 1886 thesis claimed soldiers addicted to the drug tended to desert,

act in an insubordinate fashion, or attack their superiors. Prolonged use, he argued, caused “mania”.¹³ A 1920 study of use among revolutionary soldiers came to similar conclusions, arguing that the drug could cause dangerous – even fatal – hallucinations and that long-term smoking could lead to dementia praecox, or schizophrenia.¹⁴ Six years later, another study claimed marijuana intoxication was the “cause of multiple crimes”.¹⁵ Medical investigations into opiate use were similarly negative. Opium smokers and morphine addicts were variously described as “mad”, “unfortunate human beings” and the cause of the violence and social disorder of the Revolution.¹⁶ By the turn of the century, such ideas interwove with degeneration theory and social Darwinism. Medical appreciations of both narcotics were connected to the idea that drug use (and alcoholism, prostitution and other “vices”) not only harmed the individual but also “degenerated the race” and damaged the bloodstock of the nation.¹⁷ When the Mexico City authorities asked whether they should close down a Chinese opium den in 1911, the doctors on the health board [Consejo de Salubridad] replied that marijuana, opium and hashish all “produce organic degenerations”. Opium, in particular, had led to “such accentuated dementia and madness” that it had caused the wholesale “degeneration of Asians”.¹⁸

Finally, such ideas were reflected in punitive laws against the sale and use of narcotics. These started off relatively small-scale. During the late nineteenth century, Mexican army officers prohibited marijuana smoking in the barracks and locked up offenders in the stocks. At the same time the Mexican health board started to regulate who could sell marijuana and opium for medical use.¹⁹ By the turn of the century, the capital’s police were rounding up “dissolute addicts” and *herbolarias* who infringed the rules.²⁰ But after the Revolution, the Mexican authorities - in part influenced by U.S. anti-narcotics drives - transformed these regulations into more punitive, wholesale bans. In 1920, the government introduced a law against “the cultivation

and commerce” of all products “that degenerate the race”; in 1925 the Mexican Congress ratified the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention on Opium; in the same year, the new president, Plutarco Elias Calles, banned all narcotic imports without a license; and in 1926 the Sanitary Code penalized drug infractions with fines and if these were not paid, prison. Finally, in 1929 the new penal code prohibited the “import, export, sowing, cultivation, harvesting, buying, selling, divestment, use and ministering” of all drugs.²¹

New laws and a new, federal sanitary police force generated a rapid rise in narcotic arrests. In 1925 there were over 900 in Mexico City alone.²² Most detentions involved *razzias* or unfocused raids on cabarets, brothels, cantinas, and cafes. Here the police would grab ragtag groups of small-scale narcotics peddlers as well as marijuana and opium smokers. In the northern states of Sinaloa, Sonora, and Baja California, the mass arrest of Chinese gamblers on trumped up charges of drug use was the go-to strategy of increasingly Sinophobic local authorities.²³

Changing Attitudes to Drug Use and Addiction, 1920-1940

By the 1920s, most elite Mexicans had extremely negative views of drugs. The Mexican authorities had imposed relatively punitive laws on narcotic production, sale, and use. And post-revolutionary police forces arrested and imprisoned thousands based on these laws. So, what changed? Why, by 1938 could the director of the country’s Campaign against Alcoholism and other Drug Addictions not only publicly deny the dangerous effects of marijuana, but also engineer the adoption of a state drug monopoly to treat addicts? Here I argue that in the intervening years gradual cultural changes both in attitudes to marijuana and to Mexico’s Chinese population combined with shifts in both medical and legal thinking to provide space for

Salazar to make his bold claims. The way that Salazar made use of this space, however, was novel and radical.

The Mexican Revolution changed attitudes to marijuana in two ways. On the most basic level, it generalized the use of the drug. During the conflict, the size of the Mexican army grew almost tenfold from around 27,000 in 1907 to around 250,000 in 1914.²⁴ And, though exact figures are hard to get, these were joined by hundreds of thousands of other men (and women) under arms in the ranks of rebel groups like the Zapatistas, Villistas, and Carrancistas. Though many generals railed against use of the drug, it seems likely that the conflict pushed marijuana smoking out of the barracks and prisons and into a larger proportion of the Mexican population.²⁵ Many were poor, frightened, and illiterate and left little record of their use.²⁶ But, a handful of other, more elite users did. The Mexican philosopher, Alfonso Reyes, recounted the experiences of his four friends, who in the midst of the Revolution's year of starvation – 1915 – decided to “navigate the storm in dreams” like “a drunkard who gets drunk before embarking on a boat as a precaution against sea sickness”. According to Reyes, they holed up in an old church building, smoked a load of marijuana, underwent a “collective nightmare” about a land of morning coats called “chaquetonia”, and played hide-and-seek on the building's ornate paneled flooring by imagining that if they were on the black squares they were invisible and if they were on the white squares they could be seen.²⁷ In fact, by 1920 the amateur ethnologist, Eugenio Gómez Maillefert, claimed that marijuana use in Mexico City was now prevalent among “ex-prisoners, soldiers, thieves, prostitutes, as well as individuals of the middle class and well off young men”. Though selling it was still clandestine, “the ease with which one can obtain it” suggested it was effectively tolerated. Smokers could buy the drug from herbalists, curers, travelling merchants,

and even candle sellers, who often acted as a front for peddling the narcotic; users had even come up with an extensive slang to describe the facets of the smoking process.²⁸

At the same time, the Revolution also encouraged drug use among a particular subset of Mexico's bohemians. Even before the conflict, a handful of writers had taken to smoking marijuana both as inspiration and as a symbol of their rejection of bourgeois conventions. The Spanish poet, Ramón del Valle Inclán, took up the habit when he visited Mexico in 1892, was dubbed "Don Mariguano", and when back home kept up the habit by smoking North Africa kif.²⁹ José Juan Tablada and various other Francophile writers read Baudelaire's hash-inspired poetry, hung out in "vulgar taverns.... which transformed in our eyes into temples for mysterious artistic initiation", started the magazine, *Revista Moderna*, and wrote about experiences with marijuana and opium.³⁰ Nevertheless, during the 1920s such practices extended to a broader section of artists. Tablada and his friends moved from the status of outsiders to the center of a new nationalist, post-revolutionary literature.³¹ They were joined by Porfirio Barba Jacob, the Colombian poet, who wrote approvingly of his experiences with "the lady of burning hairs" [la dama de caballos ardientes], various members of the Estridentista literary movement, and even the Mexican muralists, Diego Rivera and David Siqueiros who tried the drug before deciding that they didn't need it as they were "marijuana users by nature".³² Such experiences made for colorful anecdotes. Though it is difficult to quantify, more generalized use probably also softened many Mexicans' appreciations of the drug, which previously they had only experienced through the alarmist tales of the tabloid press.

From the mid-1930 onwards, public distrust of the group most connected to opium addiction shifted, or at least waned. In the preceding decade, Sinophobic campaigns had had been on the rise. They peaked with the onset of the Great Depression in the northern states of

Sonora, Sinaloa, and Baja California Norte. Here, the authorities helped set up anti-Chinese leagues, implemented health directives that specifically targeted Chinese businesses, blocked mixed marriages, closed Chinese businesses, and deported thousands of Chinese workers.³³ But, with the election of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), such hardnosed racist campaigns (if not some of the underlying assumptions) declined. In many regions, the campaigns had achieved their stated purpose. According to census records, the Chinese population in Mexico fell from around eighteen thousand in 1930 to barely five thousand a decade later.³⁴ At the same time Cárdenas's policies of land distribution and union support undercut some of the economic rationales for anti-Chinese sentiment. In the regions, political organizers also shunned alliances with anti-Chinese groups, which over the past decade had become particularly associated with the out-of-favor former president Calles. Finally, Cárdenas's presidency was, in general, marked by a more open attitude to immigrants. These included Spanish communists and European Jews, but also five hundred Mexican women and their Mexican-Chinese children, who had been forced to settle in Macau with their Chinese husbands.³⁵ Whatever the reasons, it is noticeable that by 1940 the debate over opiate addiction had moved on from the kind of racist stereotypes, which were so prevalent just a decade earlier.³⁶

If broad cultural changes made Salazar's recommendations more acceptable, changes in legal and medical thinking made them possible. In particular, legal thinkers started to distinguish between those that profited from narcotics (deemed criminals) and those that simply used them (deemed sick). During the post-revolutionary era, many Mexican lawyers pushed for the creation of a judicial system, which better reflected the country's progressive credentials. In essence this meant a move from a classical penal code (like that of 1871), which decided on punishments based on the nature of the crime, to more positivist legal codes (like those of 1929 or even 1931),

which took into account the nature of the offender. In practical terms, a crucial element of this shift was the replacement of some repressive punishments with “preventative measures”. These included parole, a special agricultural colony for clinically-diagnosed psychopaths, and what was originally conceived of as a “asylum for the treatment of drunks and drug addicts”.³⁷

In the matter of narcotics, such changes came in gradually. The 1929 code was the first step. It recommended that “anyone that, without medical prescription, was accustomed to being under the influence of any drug” should be “secluded in the asylum for drug addicts” But the code left the definition of addicts wide open and still included punishments for those that “use[d]” narcotics.³⁸ The new penal code of 1931 changed the term “use” to “possess” but now left out the article about the seclusion of addicts.³⁹ It was, however, somewhat clarified by the 1931 Federal Regulations of Drug Addiction [Reglamento Federal de Toxicomania]. This legally defined a drug addict (as someone who used drugs for non-therapeutic purposes), fleshed out the Department of Health’s responsibility to diagnose addicts and ordered their internment in either a public or a private hospital.⁴⁰ Finally, the 1934 Federal Code of Penal Procedures [Codigo Federal de Procedimientos Penales] brought the 1931 code and the 1931 regulations together, arguing that in the case of a person caught buying or possessing drugs, the health authorities should “specify critically if that sale or possession has as its exclusive end the personal use.” If it was deemed for personal use, the accused would be sent for treatment rather than prison.⁴¹

In practice, these legal changes took time to take effect. First, there was the problem of infrastructure. Though the 1931 regulations stipulated that the state would build a Federal Hospital for Drug Addicts [Hospital Federal de Toxicomanos], the project faced repeated delays. As a result, at first addicts were secluded in corridor F of the Mexico City Lecumberri jail; then in 1933 they were moved to a former Department of Health building on Calle Tolsá. Finally in

1935, they were transferred to the newly inaugurated federal hospital on the grounds of capital's La Castañeda mental asylum.⁴² Second, there was the problem of legal interpretation. Even the lawyers that put together the 1931 code acknowledged that there was a grey area between the sick person and the criminal. For example, just after the publication of the code, one of the writers, José Angel Ceniceros, publicly announced that, "the addict is a sick person" but then followed this up by admitting that if subjects were not cured, they might "be considered as criminals".⁴³ Third, there was the practical matter of deciding who was an addict and who possessed the drug with the aim to profit. Department of Health doctors could examine heroin users for track lines and scar tissue, but for marijuana users, evidence of addiction was much more difficult to glean. For example, in 1933 police detained Amado Peña in a cabaret club with "three papers containing marijuana". Initially doctors diagnosed that he was not an addict. But then his lawyer brought in another doctor from the Federal Hospital for Drug Addicts, who confused things further, stating that Peña's lack of a gag reflex could be brought on by sustained cannabis use or other factors such as diphtheria or head injuries. Eventually the judge effectively fudged the matter, incarcerating Peña but giving him the lightest possible sentence.⁴⁴

Despite these snags, by the mid 1930s Mexico's penal system had started to distinguish between drug peddlers and addicts. Looking ahead, a crucial element of Salazar's proposals was already in place. Partial, but indicative, figures bear this out. From September 1934 to July 1935 the Sanitary Police had arrested 132 "traffickers" and 214 "dissolute addicts" [*viciosos*]. The same estimates for 1935 to 1936 assert that the police arrested 124 traffickers and 125 addicts.⁴⁵ A review of the individual files of 61 drug cases from Mexico City between March and July 1934 show similar results. Of those arrested 27 were sent to the drug addiction hospital; 17 were freed; and 17 were sent through the penal system.⁴⁶

Changes to the legal system were paralleled and reinforced by changes to the Mexican medical profession. Salazar was not a voice in the wilderness. He was a member, perhaps at the time the leading member, of a powerful clique of Mexican psychiatrists. Like Salazar, they believed that it was their duty to impose their ideas outside the asylum and on other policies that affected Mexican citizens. And like Salazar, they fostered a new methodology, which attacked the old certainties of degeneration theory, tried to strip away popular prejudice from medical diagnoses, and admitted social forces into their understandings of poverty and illness.

During the 1920s, a handful of Mexican medics turned to psychiatry in order to understand ways to improve the general health of the population. They included the heads of the La Castañeda asylum, like Samuel Ramírez Moreno, Alfonso Millán Maldonado and Manuel Guevara Oropeza, as well as some foreign-educated doctors like Salazar and the Berlin-trained Mathilde Rodríguez Cabo. In the following decade, these psychiatrists became a major force within the medical profession and more generally within Mexican society. By 1934, they published their own journal and came to dominate the prestigious (and previously fairly conservative) National Academy of Mexico [Academia Nacional de Medicina]. A few years later, they started their own group, the Mexican Society of Neurology and Psychiatry [Sociedad Mexicana de Neurología y Psiquiatría].⁴⁷

Beyond solidifying their influence over the Mexican medical profession, they also successfully pushed the idea that psychiatrists should lead a national project of “mental hygiene”, designed to make people aware of the symptoms and effects of mental illnesses and help in their alleviation and cure. The then head of the La Castañeda asylum, Samuel Ramírez Moreno, started the project with a series of radio broadcasts on mental health in 1934. Two years later, the

group started a government project designed to detect and treat “problem” children.⁴⁸ And in 1938, the same psychiatrists, together with a host of other fellow travellers from the worlds of medicine, education, law, and government administration, started the Mexican League of Mental Hygiene [Liga Mexicana de la Higiene Mental] to push their activities into other spheres. One of the most important spheres was criminal justice. In the same year, one of Salazar’s closest colleagues, Millán, published an article in the criminology journal, *Criminalia*, which argued that psychiatrists, not judges, should decide whether a person was mentally ill and hence not responsible for a crime.⁴⁹

Salazar’s intervention in public drug policy, then, was no aberration. It was the logical next step in a national project of “mental hygiene”. Furthermore, it also chimed with new methodologies being developed within the wider medical establishment. At the same time as Mexican psychiatrists were attempting to shape national mental health policy, other doctors were also imagining a great social role and during the Cárdenas presidency, they developed the idea of “social medicine”. In part, this involved moving out of the consultancy or hospital and into the towns, villages, and poor urban barrios where the majority of Mexicans got sick and died.⁵⁰ But, it also involved a dramatic methodological innovation. Rather than transferring their beliefs and prejudices from the hospital to the streets, doctors were expected to make use of this interaction with the public and use new disciplines of anthropology and sociology to understand the social and cultural aspects of disease.⁵¹ What this meant in essence was a shift from theory- to evidence-led medical research.

Mexico’s psychiatrists, like Salazar, readily adopted these new ideas. In the Federal Hospital of Drug Addicts, daily interactions with drug addicts were gradually changing some of

the old certainties about narcotics. Some of these certainties centered on marijuana. At the same time as Salazar was handing out marijuana cigarettes to unsuspecting bureaucrats, other doctors at the hospital like Fernando Rosales, Francisco Elizarraras, and Jorge Segura Millán were also doing their own experiments with the drug and reaching similar conclusions about its limited effects. Rosales, for example, was an esteemed doctor with experience in surgery, obstetrics, and general education psychology. He was put in charge of the drug addiction hospital in 1933. On finding limited research on the effects of marijuana, he also started his own studies. Segura Millán was a medical student, who came to the hospital to study the consequences of the narcotic. At first, he believed, like most other doctors, that the drug caused insanity. But by testing the mental and physical effects on nearly a hundred “normal”, “drug addicted” and “psychopathic” users and by placing dogs in “inhalation chambers”, he gradually changed his opinions. Like Rosales, he concluded that the effects were extremely limited, except in the case of a few dogs that became distressed at sitting in a smoke-filled box.⁵² Furthermore, these doctors also started to put these findings into practice by casting a critical eye over those addicts who had been secluded in the hospital for reasons of “marijuana addiction”. In 1936 for example, they released Armando Hernández Heroza because despite being a heavy marijuana user, he showed no sign of addiction or mental health issues. Two years later Guillermo Hidalgo Anaya, was admitted for the third time for “marijuana addiction”. After careful analysis, the doctors concluded that he certainly smoked marijuana but his aberrant behavior was actually caused by acute schizophrenia.⁵³

Other discoveries involved opium addiction. The idea of the drug addiction hospital was to cure Mexico’s drug addicts. Standard treatment for heroin or morphine addiction took five weeks and involved a course of *cylotropina* and calcium as well as physical exercise, classes in

certain crafts, and talks on the dangers of narcotics.⁵⁴ Despite this more holistic approach, the doctors – like Salazar – found that curing patients was almost impossible. Again, observation was key. In one study, the doctors estimated that of 1802 patients interned between 1934 and 1938 there was “not one of them that had been cured definitely”.⁵⁵ In fact most of the city’s opiate addicts returned to the hospital on two or more occasions. In my own study of 100 patients confined between 1933 and 1943, forty-six were addicted to heroin and six to morphine. Only one did not return to the hospital and she had managed to wean herself off the drug through marijuana use.⁵⁶ In addition, doctors were starting to put these discoveries about opiate addiction into practice. As early as early as 1933, doctors at the Calle Tólsa sanatorium were separating those “with hopes... of being cured” and those “that can be considered lost”.⁵⁷ There is also some evidence that as early as 1935, doctors had given up curing some particularly difficult patients and were simply giving them morphine injections for the period of their stay.⁵⁸

Between 1938 and 1940, Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra tried to overhaul Mexican drug policy. Conservative observers portrayed him as a maverick, an outsider, even a madman. But in late 1930s Mexico, his ideas were not that far from the mainstream. His assertions that addicts were sick people rather than criminals, and that opiate addiction was almost incurable were shared by lawyers, doctors, and at least some politicians and members of civil society. Initial reactions to his ideas bear this out. The Mexican health board passed the federal regulations on drug addiction with almost universal approbation.⁵⁹ When the new regulations were announced in late 1939, they were even backed by right-leaning newspapers, like *El Universal* and *La Prensa*.⁶⁰

His ideas on marijuana were more controversial. But many doctors, especially his fellow psychiatrists, supported his proposals. In October 1938, he presented his ideas at the National

Academy of Medicine. Here, all his professional colleagues applauded his findings. (Though one psychiatrist “in a diplomatic manner and extraordinarily timidly” questioned whether Salazar should be giving marijuana cigarettes to kids even by a mistake). In fact they not only “tacitly and enthusiastically accepted” the discoveries, but also demanded that his speech be published and drafted a statement demanding that marijuana no longer be classified as a dangerous drug.⁶¹ In the wake of the “Mito de Marihuana” article, public reactions were more hostile and the government sought to distance itself from his ideas. But, they were not entirely dismissed. After the article’s publication, there is some evidence that judicial authorities moved away from mass arrests of marijuana smokers in Mexico City and elsewhere.⁶² Even the capital’s most conservative magazine, *Jueves de Excelsior*, suggested that readers take Salazar’s ideas “seriously” even if they didn’t agree with the conclusions.⁶³ And as late as 1940, Guadalajara’s conservative *El Informador*, invoked his findings and condemned the harsh penalties brought to bear for minor marijuana infractions.⁶⁴

Medicine, Marx, and Marijuana

In some ways Salazar’s plans simply brought together existing cultural affirmations, legal assertions, and medical ideas. But, in other ways they were extremely pioneering. In particular, Salazar brought together these positions with ideas drawn from historical materialism. His intervention on marijuana, for example, not only added his own research on the effects of the narcotic to those of his fellow addiction doctors, but also suggested why, in the past, observers had linked the drug to violence and criminality. His federal regulations not only admitted to the incurability of opiate addiction but also established addiction as a product of socio-economic inequality to be solved through state intervention in an unbalanced market. Such a combination

pushed his ideas out of the clinic and into public sphere. They also made them palatable for the country's left-leaning authorities.

Salazar was born in 1898 in the mining community of Pánuco de Coronado, Durango. Though he was born in an isolated community, he came from a well-to-do family. They soon returned to Mexico City where his father, a mining engineer, rose to become head of the Geological Institute in Mexico City in 1917. At the same time, Salazar received an elite education. He went to school at the National Preparatory School (Escuela Nacional Preparatoria) and then took four years of medicine at the National University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional de México). He completed his studies at the Faculty of Medicine of San Carlos at the University of Madrid before doing a specialization in the relatively new discipline of neuropsychiatry at the Sorbonne in Paris. On returning to Mexico, he mixed employ at the La Castañeda asylum with a private practice and a lectureship at the National University. Education and training lent Salazar considerable prestige. Two years after arriving at the asylum, he represented the institution at the National Medical Congress. By the 1930s, he was a member of the National Academy of Medicine, the founder and president of the Society for the Studies of Neurology and Psychiatry, and a leading member of the Franco-Mexican Medical Association. In fact, his fellow doctors played on his foreign education and his reputation for intellectual rigor and controversy and nicknamed him after the pioneering French doctor, Pasteur.⁶⁵

Had Salazar kept to the routines and practices of most Mexican psychiatrists, it is doubtful that his ideas on narcotics would have escaped the academy. But three other factors also shaped his career and his thinking over narcotics. First he was a defiant eccentric. Described by fellow psychiatrists as “intelligent, unconventional and colorful,” and “always happy, a partygoer.... with a great sense of humor”.⁶⁶ He refused to wear a tie, handed out marijuana

cigarettes to visiting dignitaries, and spent his idle hours injecting marijuana extract into the brains of live chickens. His classes were legendary. He insisted on teaching them on Sundays, graded students based on their pistol marksmanship, and inject heroin addicts in front of his class to ascertain their reactions.⁶⁷ Such rule breaking could anger the more *apretados* [uptight]. His friend, Raul Fournier, admitted that, “*necios* [stupid people] avoided him as [they believed] him not serious”.⁶⁸ It could also get him in trouble. In 1938, the father of one of his patients at the La Castañeda asylum claimed that Salazar forced the inmates “to smoke marijuana in large quantities every day”. The following year police captured one of his patients with a prescription for large daily doses of morphine; it seems Salazar had introduced the regulations to his patients, though legally they were still not in place.⁶⁹

Second, like other psychiatrists of his generation, Salazar believed in engaging with civil society in the public sphere. Furthermore, he was good at it. He not only defended his ideas on narcotics in a series of witty interviews in the press, he also became the national newspapers’ go-to head doctor. Just months before his article on marijuana, he invited pressmen to a public demonstration at the National Academy of Medicine. The demonstration focused on a “child prodigy” from Mexico City, who, the papers claimed, could move objects through telekinesis. After the kid failed to move anything, Salazar explained the journalists that it was most probably a case of mythomania.⁷⁰

Third, and perhaps most importantly, by the mid-1930s Salazar was becoming heavily influenced by historical materialism. Other psychiatrists like Millán and Edmundo Buentello were developing similar methodologies, which linked medicine to the social sciences, and using them to overturn the old arguments about degeneration.⁷¹ But Salazar’s use, particularly of the ideas of Karl Marx, put him at the vanguard of this movement.⁷² Two articles, published in 1937

and 1938, most clearly expressed this shift. The first was a version of a speech, which he gave to the National Academy of Medicine. In it, he tried to weave together contemporary neurology, Freudian psychoanalysis, and Marxist ideas over the contradictions of capitalism to offer a strikingly original take on both psychology and modern society.⁷³ In Salazar's opinion, "money as a symbol of power" or what he called "a disguised version of the economic question" was "at the heart" of most mental illnesses. In fact, capitalism itself was a form of insanity. The rich, in their pursuit of money, suffered a God complex, and became almost psychopathic in their irrational search for more and more wealth. The middle class abetted this collective delusion by establishing the rules of the game, including the central rule, which was the "principle of private property". The poor, meanwhile, were left to suffer the very real effects of this mass psychosis "hungry before a table of food" or "freezing outside a clothes shop". Here, they were offered two options – self-sacrifice or dispossession. The only way out of this, he concluded, was to stop this mass psychosis at its source, eliminate the rules governing private property, and distribute wealth according to people's needs rather than their irrational desires.⁷⁴

The second piece was published in *Criminalia* and concerned robbery. In it he returned to similar themes as his speech at the academy of medicine. Rather than viewing robbery as the product of inherited values and behavior (the old degeneration argument) or a criminal act (subject to the new penal code and to be punished accordingly), he argued that robbery was actually a perfectly rational, "biological" reaction to inequality. In fact, it was the rich who were behaving "irrationally" by accumulating wealth far beyond their needs. As a result, the only solution to robbery was "THE ABOLITION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF LAW". By proposing this, he argued, he was not trying to import foreign communism, but instead suggesting a simple solution to a universal problem.⁷⁵ Salazar's

thoughts on madness, property rights, and the law flipped nineteenth century ideas linking biological inferiority and crime on their head. It was not the criminals who were mad; it was the system. As such, they reflected the radical end of Mexico's "mental hygiene" movement, and the ripping up of the old certainties of degeneration theory.⁷⁶

But they also underlay both of Salazar's interventions on narcotics. Salazar's first public declaration on the theme was the publication of a polished version of his 1938 argument with Dr Oneto at the National Academy of Medicine. Again it was published in *Criminalia* and provocatively entitled "The Myth of Marijuana" ["El Mito de Marihuana"]. The first section comprised a careful critique of previous studies. Salazar pointed out that many of the medical conclusions were based not on observation but on second-hand stories. And he suggested that many of the patients who were allegedly experiencing hallucinations after smoking the drug were actually suffering from other mental illnesses, particularly schizophrenia. In the second section, he wrote up his own experiments with the drug on a cross section of "high functionaries, doctors, lawyers, engineers, distinguished ladies, teachers, journalists, and children" and his interviews with a handful of long-term marijuana smokers. He concluded that, irrespective of class, education or age, marijuana did little except dry the lips, redden the eyes, and produce a feeling of hunger.⁷⁷

Such conclusions were radical enough, especially when presented outside the confines of the drug addiction hospital or the academy of medicine. But it was the third section of the article, which allied such findings to his social thinking, and pushed the article firmly into the realm of policy. Here, Salazar argued that the stories that linked marijuana and violent crime were untrue. Many were idle rumors and they concerned crimes, which were probably caused by alcoholism or other mental illnesses. But others were outright inventions, made up by imaginative if

unscrupulous journalists. This was bad enough; such stories underpinned the unfair prosecution of marijuana smokers in Mexico and elsewhere. But they also had crucial secondary effects. It was these myths - through the power of suggestion - that drove some marijuana smokers to behave in a violent manner. It was the media – not marijuana – that caused murder.⁷⁸ By placing the blame at the foot of lawmakers and journalists, the piece tied in with his other articles. “Marijuana intoxication”, like capitalism itself, was a social and cultural construction. The game was rigged; elites came up with the rules; and the poor suffered the consequences.

A year later, the same blend of medicine and Marxism shaped Salazar’s new federal drug regulations. Like his earlier intervention this depended on existing ideas. Drug addicts were sick people not criminals; curing opiate addicts was almost impossible.⁷⁹ But, the formulation of the problem and the suggested solution were drawn from social theory. According to Salazar and his followers, drug addicts were doubly victimized by capitalism. On the one hand they were already poor, dispossessed, and often suffering physical or psychological pain. Drugs were a release, a form perhaps of what Salazar might have termed “self-sacrifice”.⁸⁰ On the other hand, by taking banned substances they also entered into another, even more exploitative, relationship. Drug prohibition hiked up prices so that drug traffickers could charge them extortionate rates to sate their cravings. And drug prohibition shrouded the act of injecting heroin with an air of attractive mystery. The problem, then, was not so much addiction as an economic and cultural system that – like the myths surrounding marijuana – compounded existing difficulties.⁸¹

By extension, the solution was neither judicial (lock them up) nor medical (treat them) but instead economic. State dispensaries or state-sanctioned doctors would offer morphine to addicts at a nominal price. Here their doses could be controlled and the addicts could be monitored and treated for other diseases. Such a program reduced the amount addicts had to pay

for narcotics, allowed them to hold down regular jobs, and lessened the attraction of crime. At the same time, this new system struck at the illegal economy. Forced to compete with the state's low rates, traffickers and peddlers would be put out of business. Finally, as the business of injecting heroin was forced out of the shadows and into clinic, it would lose its mystique and allure.⁸²

Salazar's economic solution to the problem was novel and drastic. Other countries, including the United States, had toyed with the idea of treating addicts. But most paid lip service to some future cure and none sought to undercut peddlers through a state drug monopoly. Nevertheless, it was probably this last factor, which sold Salazar's plan to the Mexican authorities. Under President Cárdenas, the state repeatedly established state-run firms to compete with and undercut exploitative private companies. It was classic revolutionary era economic policy, somewhere between expropriation and capitalism. Some of these companies bought products like sugar and henequen at reasonable prices, and attempted to sideline rapacious merchants. Others sold products from paper to food at a significant reduction from their private competitors.⁸³ By presenting the drug economy as just a subset of capitalist exploitation, Salazar pushed radical medical ideas into the mainstream.⁸⁴

Epilogue and Conclusion

Salazar's tenure in charge of Mexico's Campaign against Alcoholism and other Drug Addictions did not last long. His push to rethink marijuana collapsed under the charges of forcing mental patients to smoke the drug, a mocking press campaign, and an awareness at the federal level at least that the U.S. authorities were not prepared to accept Salazar's intervention.⁸⁵ The following year he was removed from his post for political reasons. His final project, the new

federal regulations on drug addiction, however, was already in motion. In February 1940, the new regulations were published in the *Diario Oficial*. The following month the Mexican health department opened a morphine dispensary in downtown Mexico City. Within a week, around 500 opiate addicts were receiving doses there and the city's dealers were losing thousands of pesos a day. Even the capital's more conservative newspapers were supportive of the measure.⁸⁶ Despite this initial success, by July 1940 the government cancelled the regulations and reinstated the 1931 version. The Mexican authorities claimed that wartime narcotic shortages made the plan unworkable. But, in reality a U.S. ban on exporting narcotics to Mexico and a lack of communication between the relevant Mexican departments combined to scupper the plan.⁸⁷ Over the next decade, Mexican doctors and intellectuals occasionally invoked Salazar's ideas. As the editor of *Criminalia* pointed out in 1944, his findings on marijuana chimed with those of the Le Guardia Committee in New York.⁸⁸ But over the next seventy years, Salazar's ideas were lost to posterity. In fact, his most tangible influence on drug debate was the fact that Mexican dope smokers sometimes termed the herb "Viniegra".⁸⁹

Yet Salazar's brief involvement in the drug debate merits more than an origins story of U.S. intervention or a (potentially rather flaky) *marihuano* memorialization. In historical terms, his works demonstrate the "scientific excellence" of not only drug production, but also drug policy "at the periphery".⁹⁰ Written in a wry and ironic style, based on years of work with drug users and first-hand observation, and sustained by intelligent and critical readings of previous studies, Salazar's articles stand in stark contrast to the pious, often comically alarmist, and intellectually bereft works of contemporaneous drug "experts". In fact, Salazar's intervention suggests that it is here, at the periphery, away from the racially constructed, punitive drug policies of the United States that we should look for alternatives to continuing policies of

prohibition. Even today, it is smaller, “peripheral” nations like Portugal and Uruguay that offer some of the most successful if unorthodox drug policies.⁹¹ At the same time, his arguments remind us of the importance of economic relations in understanding both the cultural and social construction of narcotic policy. Again contemporary policies bear this out. In U.S. states like Colorado, marijuana legalization has followed the market-model. Private companies provide the drug, often at a relatively high price. This, in turn, has led to the creation of an illegal, black market marijuana trade and the continued prosecution of small-scale producers. In Uruguay, by contrast, the state provides smokers with marijuana at a nominal cost. As state dispensaries undercut dealers, the black market in marijuana has all but disappeared.⁹²

Bibliography

Agostini, Claudia. “Las mensajeras de la salud: Enfermeras visitadoras en la ciudad de Mexico durante la decada de los 1920.” *Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporanea de Mexico* 33 (2007): 89-120.

---. “Médicos Rurales y Medicina Social en México Posrevolucionario (1920-1940).” *Historia Mexicana* LXIII, No. 2 (2013): 745-801.

Agostino, Claudia and Andrés Rios Molina. *Las estadísticas de salud en Mexico, Ideas, acotres e instituciones 1810-2010*. Mexico City: UNAM, 2010.

Astorga, Luis. *Drogas sin Fronteras*. Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2003.

Campos, Isaac. "A diplomatic failure: the Mexican role in the demise of the 1940 Reglamento Federal de Toxicomanías." *Third World Quarterly* 39, No. 2 (2018): 232-47.

---. *Home grown: marijuana and the origins of Mexico's war on drugs*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012.

Carr, Barry. *Marxism and communism in Twentieth-century Mexico*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992. 47-79.

Ceniceros, Jose Angel. "La Popular Doña Juanita." *Criminalia*, Feb 1944.

Ceniceros, José Angel. *El Nuevo Código Pena de 13 de Agosto de 1931 en Relación con los de 7 de Diciembre de 1871 y 15 de Diciembre de 1929*. Mexico City, Talleres Graficos de la Nación, 1931.

---. *El problema Social de la Insalubridad*. Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1935.

Chabat, Carlos G. *Diccionario de caló: El lenguaje del hampa en Mexico*. Mexico City: Méndez Oteo, 1964.

Chang, Jason Oliver. *Chino: Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico*. Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017.

Chao Romero, Robert. *The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010.

Codigo Pena para el Distrito y Territorios Federales. Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1929.

Codigo Penal para el Distrito y Territorios Federales en Materia de Fuero Comun. Mexico City, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1931.

Enciso, Froylán. “Los fracasos del chantaje. Régimen de prohibición de drogas y narcotráfico.” In *Seguridad nacional y seguridad interior*, edited by Arturo Alvarado and Mónica Serrano, 61-104. Mexico City: Colegio de México.

Fallow, Ben. *Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.

Flores Guevara, Mariana. “Alternativa Mexicana al Marco Internacional de Prohibición de Drogas Durante el Cardenismo.” Unpublished BA diss., Colegio de México, 2013.

García-Robles, Jorge. *Antología del vicio, Aventuras y desaventuras de la marihuana en México*. Mexico City: Laberinto, 2016.

Gómez Izquierdo, José Jorge. *El movimiento antichino en México (1871-1934), Problemas del racismo y del nacionalismo durante la Revolución Mexicana*. Mexico City: INAH, 1991.

González Rodríguez, Sergio. *Los bajos fondos: [El antro, la bohemia y el café]*. Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1990.

Gonzalez, Fredy. *Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics Among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017.

Gootenberg, Paul. "A Forgotten Case of Scientific Excellence on the Periphery, The Nationalist Cocaine Science of Alfredo Bignon, 1884-1887." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, No. 1 (2007): 202-232.

Gutiérrez Silva, Manuel. "Aesthetic Rivalries in Avant-Garde Mexico: Art Writing and the Field of Cultural Production." In *Pierre Bourdieu in Hispanic Literature and Culture*, edited by Sánchez Prado I, 87-129. Cham: Palgrave MacMillán, 2018.

Guzmán, Ignacio. "Intoxicacion por Marihuana." Unpublished PhD diss., Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1926.

Hari, Johann. *Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of the War on Drugs*. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.

Hernández, Ana Paula. “Drug legislation and the prison system in Mexico.” In *Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America*, 60-70. WOLA Working Paper, 2010.
https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/2011/WOLATNI-Systems_Overload-mexico-def.pdf

Hernández, Lourdes Bautista. “De la penitenciaría al manicomio. El proceso de institucionalización del Hospital Federal de Toxicómanos de la Ciudad de México, 1926-1948.” Unpublished MA diss., Instituto Mora, 2017.

Katz, Friedrich. *The Life and Times of Pancho Villa*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.

Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra. “El sentido de la evolución humana.” *Gaceta Médica de México*, 67 (1937): 396-417.

---. “La función biológico del robo.” *Criminalia* 6 (1938): 332-4.

Lima, Robert, and Valería Luz Valencia. *Valle-Inclán: el teatro de su vida*. Madrid: Nigra, 1995.

Liss, Sheldon B. *Marxist thought in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Ochoa, Enrique. *Feeding Mexico: The Political Uses of Food since 1910*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2000.

Olivera, Jose. "Expendio libre de yerbas medicinales, de veneos y otras drogas peligrosas." *La Farmacia: Periodico de la Sociedad Farmaceutica Mexicana*. December 15 1897.

Olvera Hernández, Nidia Andrea. "Policías, toxicómanos y traficantes: control de drogas en la ciudad de México, 1920-1942." Unpublished MA diss., CIESAS, 2016.

Oneto Barenque, Gregorio. *La Marihuana ante La Academia Nacional de Medicina*. Mexico City, n.p., 1938.

Pérez Montfort, Ricardo. "El Veneno: Faradisiaco o el olor a tortilla tostada: Fragmento de historia de las "drogas: en Mexico, 1870-1920." In *Hábitos, normas y escándalo, Prensa criminalidad y drogas durante el porfiriato tardío*, edited by Ricardo Pérez Montfort, Alberto Castillo and Pablo Piccato, 145-205. Mexico City: Fondo Enrique Diaz, 1997.

---. *Tolerancia y Prohibición: Aproximaciones a la historia social y cultural de las drogas en México*. Mexico City: Penguin Random House, 2016.

Pérez Ricart, Carlos. "US pressure and Mexican anti-drugs efforts from 1940 to 1980: Importing the war on drugs?" In *Beyond the Drug War in Mexico: Human rights, the public sphere and Justice*, edited by Wil G. Pansters, Benjamin T. Smith and Peter Watt, 33-49. London: Routledge, 2017.

---. *Las agencias antinarcóticas de los Estados Unidos y la construcción transnacional de la guerra contra las drogas en México (1938-1978)*. PhD diss., Freien Universitat Berlin, 2016.

Pérez, Genaro. "La marihuana. Breve estudio sobre esta planta." Unpublished diss., Facultad de Medicina, 1886.

Puig, Juan. *Entre el río Perla y el Nazas. La china decimonónica y sus braceros emigrantes, la colonia china de Torreón y la matanza de 1911*. Mexico City: Conaculta, 1992.

Ramírez Rancaño, Mario. "Una discusión sobre el tamaño del ejército mexicano: 1876-1930." *Estudios de historia moderna y contemporánea de México* 32 (2006): Add page range???

Ramírez Ulloa, Eliseo and Adolfo M. Nieto. "La Intoxicación por la Marihuana." In Eliseo Ramírez Ulloa. *Obras Completas, Tomo III, Ciencia, Humanismo, Sociedad*, 266-77. Mexico City: Colegio Nacional, 1988.

Raúl Fournier. "Salazar Viniegra, la muerte y la libertad. Homenaje a la memoria de Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra." *Gaceta de la Universidad* 4 No. 3 (1957): add pages???

Reyes, Alfonso. *Ancorajes*. Mexico City: Tezontle, 1951.

Ríos Molina, Andrés. *Cómo prevenir la locura. Psiquiatría e higiene mental en México, 1934-1950*. Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2016.

Rodríguez de Romo, Ana Cecilia. “Bosquejo histórico y uso social de la mariguana.” *Revista de la Facultad de Medicina de la UNAM* 55. No. 5 (2012): 48-54.

Rodríguez Romo, Ana Cecilia, Gabriela Castañeda López and Rita Robles Valencia. *Protagonistas de la Medicina Científica Mexicana, 1800-2006*. Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés, 2008.

Rosales Miranda, Carlos. “Intervención penal y administrativa del estado frente a la peligrosidad de los toxicómanos y traficantes de estupefacientes.” *Unpublished PhD(?) diss.*, UNAM, 1939.

Sacristán, Cristina. “La contribución de la Castañeda a la profesionalización de la psiquiatría Mexicana, 1910-1968.” *Salud Mental. Organó oficial del Instituto Nacional de Psiquiatría* 33 No. 6 (2010): 473-480.

Salazar Viniegra, Leopoldo. “Estado Actual de los estudios sobre la marihuana.” *Gaceta Médica de México*, August 31 1940: 383-96.

---. “El sentido de la evolución humana.” *Gaceta Médica de México* 67 (1937): 396-417.

---. “La función biológico del robo.” *Criminalia* 6 (1938): 332-4.

---. “Exposición de motivos para el nuevo Reglamento Federal de Toxicomanías.” *Criminalia* [Add vol???] (May 10 1939): 555–560.

Salvador [sic] Viniegra, Leopoldo. “El Mito de Marihuana (Trabajo de Turno a la Academia de Mexicana).” *Criminalia* [add vol???] (December 1 1938): 206-37.

Schiavone Camacho, Julia Maria. “Crossing Boundaries, Claiming a Homeland: The Mexican Chinese Transpacific Journey to Becoming Mexican, 1930s-1960s.” *Pacific Historical Review* 78 No. 4: 545-77.

Schievenini Stefanoni, José Domingo. “La prohibición de la marihuana en México, 1920–1940.” Unpublished MA diss., Universidad de Queretaro, 2012.

Segura Millán, Jorge. “Marihuana. Estudio medico y social.” Unpublished PhD diss.(?), UNAM, 1939.

Siqueiros, David Alfaro. *Me llaman el coronelazo, memorias*. Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1977.

Smith, Benjamin T. *The Mexican Press and Civil Society: Stories from the Newsroom, Stories from the Street*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2018.

Speckman Guerra, Elisa. "Reforma legal y opinion pública: Los codigos penales de 1871, 1929, y 1931." In *La reforma de la justicia en México*, edited by Alvaro Arturo, 575-613. Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2008.

Tablada, José Juan. *La Feria de la Vida (Memorias)*. Mexico City: Botas, 1937.

---. *La resurrección de los ídolos*. Mexico City: UNAM, 2003.

Tapia, Rogaciano. "Algunas consideraciones sobre los progresos de la morfinomania." Unpublished PhD(?) diss., Universidad Nacional de México, 1920.

Vallejo Rendón, Fernando. *Porfirio Barba Jacob, el mensajero*. Mexico City: Alfaguara, 2012.

Villaseñor Bayardo, Sergio Javier. *Voces de Psiquiatría, Los Precusores*. Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2006.

Walker, William O. *Drug Control in the Americas*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989.

Young, Elliot. *Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the Americas from the Coolie Era Through to World War II*. Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2014.

¹ Leopoldo Salvador [sic] Viniegra, “El Mito de Marihuana (Trabajo de Turno a la Academia de Mexicina),” *Criminalia*, 1 December 1938: 206-37. All translations are by the author.

² Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, “Exposición de motivos para el nuevo Reglamento Federal de Toxicomanías,” *Criminalia*, 10 May 1939: 555–560.

³ Such popular interest has meant some historians have misappropriated Salazar’s claims for political purpose. Thus Froylán Enciso has maintained (at least in public) that Salazar’s regulations effectively legalized all drugs. They did not. Froylán Enciso, *Nuestra Historia Narcótica* (Mexico City: Planeta, 2015).

⁴ William O. Walker, *Drug Control in the Americas* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico press, 1989) 122-3; Luis Astorga, *Drogas sin Fronteras* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 2003), 202-27; Mariana Flores Guevara, “Alternativa Mexicana al Marco Internacional de Prohibición de Drogas Durante el Cardenismo,” Unpublished BA diss., Colegio de México, 2013; Ricardo Pérez Montfort, *Tolerancia y Prohibición: Aproximaciones a la historia social y cultural de las drogas en México* (Mexico City: Penguin Random House, 2016), 282–307; Froylán Enciso, “Los fracasos del chantaje. Régimen de prohibición de drogas y narcotráfico,” in Arturo Alvarado y Mónica Serrano, *Seguridad nacional y seguridad interior* (Mexico City: Colegio de México): 61-104, 71-3; Carlos Pérez Ricart, *Las agencias antinarcóticas de los Estados Unidos y la construcción transnacional de la guerra contra las drogas en México (1938-1978)*, Unpublished Ph.D diss, Freien Universitat Berlin, 2016. For a smart critique of such an approach see Isaac Campos, “A diplomatic failure: the Mexican role in the demise of the 1940 Reglamento Federal de Toxicomanías,” *Third World Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (2018): 232-47.

⁵ Carlos Pérez Ricart, “U.S. pressure and Mexican anti-drugs efforts from 1940 to 1980: Importing the war on drugs?” in Wil G. Pansters et al., *Beyond the Drug War in Mexico: Human rights, the public sphere and justice* (London: Routledge, 2017): 33-49.

⁶ For a good critique of Mexico’s extremely limited decriminalization laws, see Ana Paula Hernández, “Drug legislation and the prison system in Mexico,” in *Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in Latin America*, (WOLA Working Paper, 2010): 60-70.

https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/2011/WOLATNI-Systems_Overload-mexico-def.pdf

-
- ⁷ Ricardo Pérez Montfort, “El Veneno :Faradisiaco o el olor a tortilla tostada: Fragmento de historia de las “drogas: en Mexico, 1870-1920,” in Ricardo Pérez Montfort et al., *Hábitos, normas y escándalo, Prensa criminalidad y drogas durante el porfiriato tardío* (Mexico City: Fondo Enrique Diaz, 1997): 145-205.
- ⁸ Isaac Campos, *Home grown: marijuana and the origins of Mexico's war on drugs* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2012): 5. 96.
- ⁹ “Espiritismo y Hecherias, Los Brujos del Siglo CC,” *El Imparcial*, 23 Feb. 1903.
- ¹⁰ “La Maffia China es la Terrible Floracion del Juego y del Opio,” *El Imparcial*, 11 Jul. 1908.
- ¹¹ For anti-Chinese campaigns in Mexico see Juan Puig, *Entre el río Perla y el Nazas. La china decimonónica y sus braceros emigrantes, la colonia china de Torreón y la matanza de 1911* (Mexico City: Conaculta, 1992); José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, *El movimiento antichino en México (1871-1934), Problemas del racismo y del nacionalismo durante la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City: INAH, 1991); Robert Chao Romero, *The Chinese in Mexico, 1882-1940* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 145-190; Elliot Young, *Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the Americas from the Coolie Era Through to World War II* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2014), 197-247; Jason Oliver Chang, *Chino: Anti-Chinese Racism in Mexico* (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2017).
- ¹² “Un Barrio Chino en San Pedro,” *El Siglo de Torreón*, 30 Dec. 1923.
- ¹³ Genaro Pérez, “La marihuana. Breve estudio sobre este planta,” Unpubl. diss., Facultad de Medicina, 1886. Also see Dr. Jose Olivera “Expendio libre de yerbas medicinales, de veneos y otras drogas peligrosas,” *La Farmacia: Periodico de la Sociedad Farmaceutica Mexicana*, 15 Dec 1897.
- ¹⁴ Eliseo Ramáirez Ulloa and Adolfo M. Nieto, ““La Intoxicacion por la Marihuana,” in Eliseo Ramírez Ulloa, *Obras Completas, Tomo III, Ciencia, Humanismo, Sociedad* (Mexico City: Colegio Nacional, 1988): 266-77.
- ¹⁵ Ignacio Guzmán, “Intoxicacion por Marihuana,” Unpubl. **PhD?** diss., Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1926.
- ¹⁶ Rogaciano Tapia, “Algunas consideraciones sobre los progresos de la morfinomania,” Unpubl. **Phd?** diss., Universidad Nacional de México, 1920, 8.
- ¹⁷ Campos, *Home grown*, 124-32.
- ¹⁸ Nidia Andrea Olvera Hernández, “Policías, toxicómanos y traficantes: control de drogas en la ciudad de México, 1920-1942,” Unpubl. MA diss., CIESAS, 2016, 59.
- ¹⁹ *El Universal*, 28 May 1895; *El Municipio Libre*, 7 Sept; 1880; 7 Sept 1897 *La Patria*, 7 Sept. 1897.
- ²⁰ *Voz de Mexico*, 1 Jun. 1901; *La Patria*, 3 Jun. 1901

-
- ²¹ José Domingo Schievenini Stefanoni, “La prohibición de la marihuana en México, 1920–1940,” Unpubl. MA diss., Universidad de Queretaro, 2012.
- ²² Olvera Hernández, “Policías,” 202.
- ²³ E.g. Casa de la Cultura Jurídica, Mazatlán, 1927, Exp. 19, Manuel Long and José Kooc; 1925, Exp 19, Chale Wong et al. [Please clarify this note].
- ²⁴ Mario Ramírez Rancaño, “Una discusión sobre el tamaño del ejército mexicano: 1876-1930,” *Estudios de historia moderna y contemporánea de México* 32 (2006): [add page range].
- ²⁵ Friedrich Katz, *The Life and Times of Pancho Villa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 76.
- ²⁶ The few that did left testimonies in their judicial trial files when they confessed to having started smoking marijuana during their times in the army. E.g. Casa de la Cultura Jurídica, Oaxaca, 13752, Juzgado de Distrito, Oaxaca, Causa Criminal o Penal, 25, 1941, Filogonio Siguenza.
- ²⁷ Alfonso Reyes, *Ancorajes* (Mexico City: Tezontle, 1951), 40-6.
- ²⁸ Eugenio Gomez Maillefert, “La Marihuana en Mexico,” *The Journal of American Folklore* 33, no. 127 (Jan-Mar 1920): 28-33.
- ²⁹ Robert Lima and Valería Luz Valencia, *Valle-Inclán: el teatro de su vida* (Madrid: Nigra, 1995): 60-2.
- ³⁰ José Juan Tablada, *La Feria de la Vida (Memorias)* (Mexico City: Botas, 1937): 243-49; Sergio González Rodríguez, *Los bajos fondos: [El antro, la bohemia y el café]* (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1990): 27-48.
- ³¹ Juan José Tablada, *La resurrección de los ídolos* (Mexico City: UNAM, 2003), 127, 185-8. For Tablada shift from the outskirts to the center of the art world see Manuel Gutiérrez Silva, “Aesthetic Rivalries in Avant-Garde Mexico: Art Writing and the Field of Cultural Production,” Sánchez Prado I. (ed.) *Pierre Bourdieu in Hispanic Literature and Culture* (Cham: Palgrave MacMillán, 2018): 87-129.
- ³² Jorge García-Robles, *Antología del vicio, Aventuras y desaventuras de la mariguana en México* (Mexico City: Laberinto, 2016): 123-140; Fernando Vallejo Rendón, *Porfirio Barba Jacob, el mensajero* (Mexico City: Alfaguara, 2012); David Alfaro Siqueiros, *Me llaman el coronelazo, memorias*, (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1977): 204-5. For regional bohemians using the drug see Guillermo Rosas Solaegui, *Un hombre en el tiempo* (Mexico City: Costa-Amic, 1971), 90.
- ³³ Chao Romero, *The Chinese*, 145-90.

³⁴ Fredy Gonzalez, *Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics Among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017), 68. This was probably an over-exaggeration. González points out that Chinese sources indicate that there were still 12600 Chinese in Mexico in 1943.

³⁵ Julia Maria Schiavone Camacho, "Crossing Boundaries, Claiming a Homeland: The Mexican Chinese Transpacific Journey to Becoming Mexican, 1930s-1960s" *Pacific Historical Review* 78. no. 4, [(insert year)]: 545-77.

³⁶ The only article, which invoked the stereotype was one of Mario Gil's pieces in *La Prensa*. But even this was markedly more sympathetic than most 1920s articles. *La Prensa*, 20 Apr. 1940.

³⁷ Elisa Speckman Guerra, "Reforma legal y opinion pública: Los codigos penales de 1871, 1929, y 1931," in ed. Alvaro Arturo, *La reforma de la justicia en México* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 2008): 575-613; José Angel Cenicerros, *El Nuevo Codigo Pena de 13 de Agosto de 1931 en Relación con los de 7 de Diciembre de 1871 y 15 de Diciembre de 1929* (Mexico City, Talleres Graficos de la Nación, 1931), 17-20.

³⁸ *Codigo Pena para el Distrito y Territorios Federales* (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1929), article 525.

³⁹ *Codigo Penal para el Distrito y Territorios Federales en Materia de Fuero Comun* (Mexico City, Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1931), articles 193-198.

⁴⁰ *Diario Oficial*, 27 Nov. 1931.

⁴¹ *Diario Oficial*, 30 Aug. 1934. José Angel Cenicerros, *El problema Social de la Insalubridad* (Mexico City: Ediciones Botas, 1935): 73-5.

⁴² Lourdes Bautista Hernández, "De la penitenciaría al manicomio. El proceso de institucionalización del Hospital Federal de Toxicómanos de la Ciudad de México, 1926-1948," Unpub. MA diss., Instituto Mora, 2017: 51-98.

⁴³ *El Nacional*, 24 Sept. 1931.

⁴⁴ Olvera Hernández, "Policías": 143-4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 202.

⁴⁶ Archivo de la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia (ASSA), Fondo Salubridad Pública, Sección Servicio Jurídico, Caja 39, Exp. 24.

⁴⁷ Cristina Sacristán, "La contribución de la Castañeda a la profesionalización de la psiquiatría Mexicana, 1910-1968", *Salud Mental. Organó oficial del Instituto Nacional de Psiquiatría* 33, no. 6 (2010): 473-480; Andrés Ríos

Molina, *Cómo prevenir la locura. Psiquiatría e higiene mental en México, 1934-1950* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 2016): 26-39; Ana Cecilia Rodríguez Romo et al., *Protagonistas de la Medicina Científica Mexicana, 1800-2006*, (Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés, 2008): 309-11.

⁴⁸ Ríos Molina, *Cómo prevenir la locura*, 86-130

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 40-85, 157-91.

⁵⁰ Claudia Agostini, “Médicos Rurales y Medicina Social en México Posrevolucionario (1920-1940),” *Historia Mexicana* LXIII, no. 2 (2013): 745-801; Claudia Agostini, “Las mensajeras de la salud: Enfermeras visitadoras en la ciudad de Mexico durante la decada dee los 1920,” *Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporanea de Mexico* 33, (2007): 89-120; Claudia Agostino and Andrés Ríos Molina, *Las estadísticas de salud en Mexico, Ideas, acotres e instituciones 1810-2010* (Mexico City: UNAM, 2010): 165-81.

⁵¹ Ríos Molina, *Cómo prevenir la locura*: 139, 140, 153-6.

⁵² Hernández, “De la penitenciaría,” 130; Jorge Segura Millán, “Marihuana. Estudio medico y social,” Unpubl. PhD diss., UNAM, 1939. *Excélsior*, 2 Nov. 1938.

⁵³ ASSA, Hospital Federal de Toxicómanos, Expedientes Clínicas, Caja 15, Exp. 24; Caja 12, Exp. 6.

⁵⁴ Hernández, “De la penitenciaría,” 101-40.

⁵⁵ Carlos Rosales Miranda, “Intervención penal y administratva del estado frente a la peligrosidad de los toxicómanos y traficantes de estupefacientes”, Unpubl. PhD diss., UNAM, 1939.

⁵⁶ Thanks to my research assistant, Nathaniel Morris, who collected data on a random selection of 10 patients every year for the period. ASSA, Hospital Federal de Toxicómanos, Expedientes Clínicas.

⁵⁷ Hernández, “De la penitenciaría,” 73.

⁵⁸ ASSA, Hospital Federal de Toxicómanos, Expedientes Clínicas, Caja 14, Expediente 5; Caja 17, Exp 21.

⁵⁹ Campos, “A diplomatic failure,” 234.

⁶⁰ E.g. *La Prensa*, 21 Mar. 1940; *La Prensa*, 22 Mar. 1940; *La Prensa*, 10 Apr. 1940; *El Universal*, 23 Mar. 1940.

⁶¹ Gregorio Oneto Barenque, *La Mariguana ante La Academia Nacional de Medicina* (Mexico City, n.p., 1938); Ana Cecilia Rodríguez de Romo, “Bosquejo histórico y uso social de la mariguana,” *Revista de la Facultad de Medicina de la UNAM* 55 no. 5 (2012): 48-54. There is some confusion over the date of this confrontation. Rodríguez de Romo repeatedly refers to it as occurring in 1934. Other texts, including Oneto Abrenque and

Salazar's own refer to it as occurring in 1938. Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, "Estado Actual de los estudios sobre la marihuana," *Gaceta Medica de México*, 31 Aug. 1940: 383-96.

⁶² Based on evidence from the Casas de la Cultura Jurídica of Tijuana, San Luis Potosí, and Mazatlán. Even a year later, head of the department of health, José Siurob, played down the effects of marijuana to conference of law enforcers from the Americas. NARA, RG170, Box 22, Folder 2, "The Struggle against Toxicomanias" by Dr. and General Jose Siurob at Law Enforcers conference.

⁶³ Augusto de Alba, "El debate sobre la mariguana," *Jueves de Excelsior*, 17 Nov. 1938.

⁶⁴ *El Informador*, 7 Nov. 1940. See also *El Informador*, 1 Jun. 1942.

⁶⁵ "Datos biográficos del doctor Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra", *Gaceta Médica de México* 67 (1937), 474. Flores Guevara, "Alternativa Mexicana": 71-3; National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 170, (NARA, RG170), Box 22, Folder 4, H Creighton to Secretary of State, 6 Sept. 1938.

⁶⁶ Raúl Fournier, "Salazar Viniegra, la muerte y la libertad. Homenaje a la memoria de Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra", *Gaceta de la Universidad*, 4.3 (1957).

⁶⁷ ASSA, Fondo Manicomio Federal, Seccion Administrativa, Caja 2, Exp. 3. Lectura "Toxicomanos", 1939. Sergio Javier Villaseñor Bayardo, *Voces de Psiquiatría, Los Precusores* (Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2006), p. 332.

⁶⁸ Fournier, "Salazar Viniegra." For other examples of such behavior, see his personnel file in ASSA, Fondo Manicomio Federal, Seccion Administrativa, Caja 2, Exp. 3.

⁶⁹ NARA, RG170, Box 22, Folder 4, Press Summary, 1 Nov. 1938; H Creighton to Commissioner of Customs, 21 Feb 1939.

⁷⁰ Flores Guevara, "Alternativa Mexicana," 74-5.

⁷¹ Ríos Molina, *Cómo prevenir la locura*, 131-56, especially pp. 139, 140.

⁷² For Marxism in 1930s Mexico see Barry Carr, *Marxism and communism in Twentieth-century Mexico* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 47-79; Sheldon B. Liss, *Marxist thought in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 205-226.

⁷³ As Ríos Molina argues, this generation of Mexican psychiatrists also opened the door to European psychoanalysis in Mexico. Ríos Molina, *Cómo prevenir la locura*, 159.

⁷⁴ Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, "El sentido de la evolución humana", *Gaceta Médica de México* 67 (1937): 396-417.

⁷⁵ Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, “La función biológico del robo,” *Criminalia*, 6 (1938): 332-4.

⁷⁶ Ríos Molina, *Cómo prevenir la locura*, 157-91.

⁷⁷ Salvador [sic] Viniegra, “El Mito de Marihuana”. Other statements of his position backed up this medical evidence. See NARA, RG170, Box 22, Folder 4, Traffic of Opium and Other Noxious Drugs, Resume for the Mexican Delegation at the League of Nations, by Leopoldo Salazar, undated; Salazar Viniegra, “Estado Actual”.

⁷⁸ Salvador [sic] Viniegra, “El Mito de Marihuana,” 230-7. See also Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, “Estado Actual de los estudios sobre la marihuana,” *Gaceta Medica de México*, 31 Aug. 1940.

⁷⁹ For the impossibility of curing opium addicts, see Salazar, “Exposición”; Leopoldo Salazar Viniegra, “El Sueno de Lexington”, *Toxicomanis e Higiene Mental*, Jan-Feb 1939. [Is this a journal? If so add volume/issue]

⁸⁰ See particularly Salazar Viniegra, “Exposición”, 557. The idea was repeated by one of Salazar’s followers, José Quevedo, who ran the first dispensary. *La Prensa*, 21 and 22 Mar 1940.

⁸¹ Salazar Viniegra, “Exposición,” 555-6; *Diario Oficial*, 17 Feb 1940; *La Prensa*, 21 and 22 Mar. 1940; NARA, RG170, Box 22, Folder 4, Traffic of Opium and Other Noxious Drugs, Resume for the Mexican Delegation at the League of Nations, by Leopoldo Salazar, undated.

⁸² Salazar Viniegra, “Exposición”; *Diario Oficial*, 17 Feb 1940.

⁸³ Ben Fallaw, *Cárdenas Compromised: The Failure of reform in Postrevolutionary Yucatán* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001): 125-157; Enrique Ochoa, *Feeding Mexico: The Political Uses of Food since 1910* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2000): 39-70; Benjamin T. Smith, *The Mexican Press and Civil Society: Stories from the Newsroom, Stories from the Street* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2018): 17-20; Carlos Marichal, “Auge y decadencia de las empresas estatales en México, 1930-1980: algunas notas sobre la relación histórica entre empresas estatales y endeudamiento externo,” *Antropología. Boletín Oficial del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia* 72 (2003): 12-22.

⁸⁴ Many of the initial supporters of Salazar’s proposals did not understand, or refused to countenance, the critique of degeneration theory embedded in the new regulations. Instead they stressed the regulations’ economic role. NARA, RG170, Box 22, Folder 2, “The Struggle again Toxicomanias” by Dr. and General Jose Siurob at Law Enforcers conference.

⁸⁵ E.g. *Ultimas Noticias*, 22 Oct. 1938; *El Universal*, 24 Oct. 1938; *El Nacional*, 25 Oct. 1938.

⁸⁶ *La Prensa*, 21 and 22 Mar. 1940; *Excélsior*, 20 Mar. 1940; *El Universal*, 23 Mar. 1940.

⁸⁷ NARA, RG170, Box 22, Folders 3 and 4. Campos, “A diplomatic failure”.

⁸⁸ Jose Angel Cenicerros, “La Popular Doña Juanita,” *Criminalia*, Feb 1944.

⁸⁹ Carlos G Chabat, *Diccionario de caló: El lenguaje del hampa en Mexico* (Mexico City: Méndez Oteo, 1964), 116.

⁹⁰ Paul Gootenberg, “A Forgotten Case of Scientific Excellence on the Periphery, The Nationalist Cocaine Science of Alfredo Bignon, 1884-1887,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49, no. 1 (2007): 202-232.

⁹¹ Johann Hari, *Chasing the Scream: The First and Last Days of the War on Drugs* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015): 233-55; Ernesto Londoño, “Uruguay’s Marijuana Law Turns Pharmacists Into Dealers,” *New York Times*, 19 Jul. 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/19/world/americas/uruguay-legalizes-pot-marijuana.html>

⁹² Uki Goñi, “How Uruguay made legal highs work,” *Guardian*, 10 Dec. 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/10/how-uruguay-made-legal-cannabis-work> ; Tina Griego, “Inside Colorado’s flourishing, segregated black market for pot”, *Washington Post*, 30 Jul. 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/07/30/inside-colorados-flourishing-segregated-black-market-for-pot/?utm_term=.98dd1d4dca01