



## The Polish Territorial Defence Forces (POL TDF)

*a significant component  
in national resilience and  
resistance*

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*“It is becoming increasingly important in modern conflicts to be capable of defending one’s population, objectives, and communications from the activity of special operations forces, in view of their increasing use. Resolving this problem envisions the organization and introduction of territorial defense.”<sup>1</sup>*

The Russian aggression on Ukraine and the heroic struggle presented by the Ukrainian territorial defence units stimulated the decision-makers in many countries to reconsider the organization of their armed forces. This consideration is inevitably correlated with the expectation of the rapid enhancement of armed forces’ operational capabilities from one side but constrained by the financial limitations from the other side. Polish decision-makers and strategic military leaders faced that challenge in 2016 during the development of the Territorial Defence Forces – a new military structure significantly contributing to the effective national defensive posture. This paper characterizes and explains the role, mindset, training, and “out-of-the-box” approach used by the Polish Special Operations Forces personnel that were selected to establish the Polish Territorial Defence Forces.

### *The strategic environment (1989-2014)*

Political changes started in 1989 and continued through the following years, permanently changed the military landscape of Eastern Europe. Before the “Iron Curtain” collapsed, the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) consisted of more than 450 000 soldiers, both full-time soldiers and compulsory service soldiers. In 1999 Poland joined NATO, and in 2004, Poland became a member of the European Union. These events significantly changed the political and social perception of the military challenges in Poland. At the same time, NATO concentrated on “out-of-area” operations.<sup>2</sup> The deployment of the Polish brigade-size element to Afghanistan and leading the



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Multinational Division Central-South (MND CS) in Iraq became a significant challenge for the PAF. For that reason, the concept of compulsory service became highly unpopular in Polish society, primarily due to the legacy of communist rule. Despite the strategic warnings in the Eastern European security environment (such as Russian aggression against Estonia and Georgia), the obligations to maintain national capabilities to defend Polish territory<sup>3</sup> become less critical than expeditionary capabilities. Ultimately, the Polish government suspended conscription in 2009, fully embracing the All-Voluntary Force (AVF) concept. In just a few years, the sudden suspension of conscription created a significant gap between civilians and “green suiters” (soldiers) and diminished the national capabilities to preserve and effectively train the reservists; two of the most adverse effects of the All-Voluntary Forces (AVF). These factors severely reduced the Polish military capabilities to face the increasingly hostile Russian activities on the NATO Eastern flank culminating in February 2014.

### *The POL TDF concept and the concept execution (2014-2022)*

The annexation of Crimea and occupation of Eastern Ukraine (2014) was a strategic “wake-up call” and led to a profound rethinking of the Polish defense strategy. At that time, many concepts on enhancing the Polish military capabilities were brought into the public debate. However, the immediate restoration of conscription was politically and economically untenable. Based on the whole-of-society approach and existing military expenditures, the “part-time soldiers concept” became a model to look up to enhance the PAF’s operational capabilities. The territorial defense concept<sup>4</sup> was brought in and custom-tailored into that model. Obviously, that idea was not unfamiliar to military historians. In the nineteenth century, Poland struggled to regain the independence lost due to the partitions of the previous century.<sup>5</sup>

After the series of uprisings against the Russians<sup>6</sup>, the concept of comprehensive defense was born. Wojciech Chrzanowski wrote about guerrilla warfare in 1835, Ludwik Mirosławski described the theory of successful uprising in 1862, and Henryk Kamieński defined total war in 1863<sup>7</sup>. The Swiss Army detached a special military representative to Poland during the January Uprising in 1863. His study, known as the “Erlach Report,” shaped the Swiss total defense model for decades<sup>8</sup>.

The idea was then forged in a fire during the Second World War when Polish society developed the Polish Underground State<sup>9</sup> - the most comprehensive form of the national struggle for independence. Unfortunately, the end of the war and the emergence of communism in Poland substantially distorted the territorial defense concept. But the studies continued among the Western military experts. The definition formed by Adam Roberts in 1976 says that “territorial defense is a system of defense-in-depth”<sup>10</sup>. He also added that territorial defense is “a governmentally-organized defense of a state’s own territory, conducted on its own territory”<sup>11</sup>. “Both definitions delivered a solid, theoretical background for further analysis. An almost analogous opinion Horst Menderhausen shared for RAND Corporation in 1980, characterizing territorial defense as “a manifestly defensive system, unsuited to attack across the country’s border.” He also added that territorial defense required “involving a broad spectrum of citizens.”<sup>12</sup> When Poland broke off the military ties to the Warsaw Pact in the late twentieth century, Polish strategic thinking came back to the territorial defense concept. Bolesław Balcerowicz recommended the “strategy of comprehensive defense” to employ all available resources for effective defense of Poland<sup>13</sup>. Józef Marczak and Ryszard Jakubczak continued Balcerowicz’s studies of publishing and promoting the concept of territorial defense in numerous books, reports, and articles<sup>14</sup>. Indeed, the comprehensive defense concept and the employment of part-time

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soldiers to enhance military capabilities are not only the Polish area of expertise. Numerous nations all over the world successfully implemented these ideas into their defensive systems, including National Defense Voluntary Forces (KASP) in Lithuania, National Guard (Zemessardze) in Latvia, Estonia Defense League (EDL) in Estonia, Home Guards in Sweden and Norway, and finally the National Guard in the United States. Their experiences, recommendations, successes, and failures were carefully analyzed during the development of the POL TDF.

As a result of the significant deterioration of the security situation around Poland, the Minister of National Defense established the Territorial Defense Development Office (TDDO) in December 2015.<sup>15</sup> The primary purpose of the TDDO was to create the legal framework to allow for the successful development of the Territorial Defense Forces (POL TDF) as a fifth separate service command within the PAF.<sup>16</sup> The “POL TDF Operational Concept” approved by the Polish Minister of National Defense in April 2016 set up the POL TDF’s milestones, missions, and structures. That comprehensive approach to creating the POL TDF resulted in a solid legal and doctrinal framework. The POL TDF received two fundamental missions: defend the country against aggression (Home Defense) and support the local society (Defense Support to Civilian Authorities).<sup>17</sup> As a motto, the POL TDF accepted the expression “Always Ready, Always Here.” After all, the POL TDF development gained strategic importance. The National Development Strategy,<sup>18</sup> published in February 2017, included the POL TDF program as one of the primary projects to enhance military capabilities. This strategy triggered the expeditious development of the POL TDF doctrinal document<sup>19</sup> authorized by the Chief of the Polish General Staff in April 2018. Finally, the President of Poland recognized the POL TDF missions and roles in the National Security Strategy (May 2020) as a “contributor to the common civic defense”<sup>20</sup>.

The first TDF brigades started growing in the summer of 2016. Based on the threat assessment, the process started on the eastern flank, following central Poland and western voivodships<sup>21</sup> at the latest. The POL TDF internal structure reflects the Polish administrative structure where brigade, battalion, and company commanders’ can directly communicate, cooperate, and coordinate with the regional and local authorities (voivodships, counties, and boroughs)<sup>22</sup>. There are twenty TDF brigades in different development stages, encompassing more than 32,000 soldiers. The POL TDF retains independent training and development capabilities within the two specialized training centers, command battalion, NCO school, cyber detachment, and unconventional warfare detachment. The level of ambition for the POL TDF is to assemble more than 55,000 soldiers, the majority of them being part-time, with only ten percent full-time.<sup>23</sup>

Building the separate service on the strong traditions and heritage of the “Home Army<sup>24</sup>” requires a commitment to encourage patriotic ideas among the recruits. It is also designed to cut a sharp, negative legacy of conscription often associated with the past communist history of Poland. Additionally, in contrast to the active-duty component, the POL TDF part-time soldiers bring their skills and talents from the civilian world into the military. But they remain members of their local communities, with advantageous civilian employment, community engagement, and civic leadership roles in their respective neighborhoods and localities. That concept substantially narrows the gap between society and the military. That is also a sensible execution of NATO’s Article 3 requirements for maintaining and developing the individual capacity to resist armed attack. According to the NATO Warsaw Summit guidance, it also effectively enhances national resilience.<sup>25</sup>

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### *The POL TDF in enhancing the national resilience*

The NATO documents define resilience capabilities as “allies’ ability to absorb shocks and ensure access to, and continuity of, critical services and government functions, including supporting military operations in peace, crisis, and conflict<sup>26</sup>. “ So, the NATO members must achieve specific capabilities on civilian and military sides. These challenges to a comprehensive approach to resilience resulted in the Allied Command of Transformation (NATO ACT) series of conferences on resilience. NATO ACT Commander General Philippe Lavigne, in May 2022 in Warsaw, stated that “resilience requires a comprehensive, holistic approach, and strong interdependencies” He added that “to be successfully built, resilience requires successful collaboration between civilian and military stakeholders and must consider these two mutually reinforcing layers<sup>27</sup>. “

In Poland, the POL TDF is a crucial military agent supporting the respective civilian agencies and offices responsible for domestic security during peacetime. Such activities fall within the POL TDF operational doctrine, but it must be clearly stated that the POL TDF is not a first responder. However, the POL TDF brigades maintain the readiness of the specially trained and equipped elements called the Disaster Assessment Response Teams (DART). On request, the POL TDF detaches the Task Forces (battalion or company size) to instantaneously and gradually respond to the security threats, mainly from non-military origin. The robust multi-level interagency cooperation significantly facilitates the POL TDF elements’ employment and builds necessary trust among the members of different services, agencies or authorities. Within the last four years, numerous formal memoranda of understanding were signed with the primary agencies present in the security sphere, such as State Police, National Firefighting Service, Border Guard, Railway Network, Emergency Medical Service, State Forest Service, Prison Service, or even scout’s organizations. But the three primary, national-level operations

shaped the POL TDF methods of employment and revealed their strengths and weaknesses.

Operation RESILIENT SPRING then, later renamed operation LASTING RESILIENCE<sup>28</sup> (March 6, 2020-March, 13, 2022), involved POL TDF elements for almost two years and has continuously supported national, regional, and local authorities, medical entities, and many more institutions, significantly contributing to the slowdown of SARS-COV-2 transmission and building lasting resilience in the society. At the peak of the crisis, more than 6 000 soldiers daily supported the health care system.

Operation STRONG SUPPORT<sup>29</sup> (September 2021 – present) primary objective is to enhance the security of the Polish border<sup>30</sup> with Belarus against the influx of illegal immigrants used by Alexander Lukashenka’s regime to destabilize the security situation. The POL TDF’s essential tasks included supporting local communities in the border region, supporting town and county governments in the border zones, and interagency cooperation with the Polish Border Guard and State Police. The POL TDF currently deploys more than 2 000 soldiers daily to the border zone and takes responsibility for more than 200 kilometers of national border with Belarus. That operation employs Cyber Security Teams and Civil-Military Cooperation elements, K9 Search and Rescue Teams, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and conventional (vehicle, riverine, and horse) patrols.

Operation SOLID ASSISTANCE<sup>31</sup> (February 24, 2022 – current time) addresses the refugee movement toward Poland due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the request for armed forces support in the Polish-Ukrainian border region. The main priority for the POL TDF is to provide support to the fleeing refugees, so the assistance also includes supporting refugees by assisting in relocation, temporary housing, integration with the local community by deploying troops and means to all agency partners who participate in the aid process. The POL TDF deployed the Refugee

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Relocation Support Teams (RRST) to support reception centers and information points. The POL TDF currently deploys more than one thousand soldiers daily to operation SOLID ASSISTANCE.

The dedication of the POL TDF soldiers and their determination resulted in the increasing role of the POL TDF in the national security system. According to the recently published Homeland Defense Act<sup>32</sup>, the POL TDF commander assumed the primary responsibility as a Ministry of Defense Crisis Management Operations Coordinator. At the same time, the POL TDF brigade commanders assumed comparable responsibilities on the regional (voivodship) level, becoming the Regional Crisis Management Advisors. These missions ultimately strengthen the importance of the POL TDF in the national defense system. Furthermore, the POL TDF constitutes an essential interface to coordinate efforts between the military and civilian actors effectively.

### *POL TDF, National Resistance, and the SOF Connection*

The challenging mission to develop the POL TDF was assigned to the carefully selected personnel. Since the beginning, the key positions in the POL TDF internal structure (such as commander, chief of staff, chief of training, J4 chief, and brigade commanders) were manned by the personnel transferred directly from the Polish Special Operations Forces (POL SOF). Their education, knowledge, and experience left a significant imprint on the POL TDF organization and its missions. But their mission was not to duplicate the POL SOF capabilities but to enhance the critical weaknesses in executing the unconventional warfare (UW). Applying the US-SOF origin taxonomy to UW<sup>33</sup> hampers the proper understanding of the POL TDF personnel's challenges. The UW in the Polish model must be understood as a joint, national struggle to oppose both aggression and occupation, executed on its own territory and not as an expeditionary

operation. So the primary mission was to set up a common language, including the common taxonomy, on the unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures to be well understood by the civilian and military partners. The POL TDF doctrine adopted in April 2018 properly defined the POL TDF missions and tasks and delivered the definitions and descriptions<sup>34</sup>.

Necessary support in constructing the legal and organizational framework for the effective UW developed under the POL TDF umbrella came from the NATO Special Operation Headquarters. Their prolonged studies resulted in publishing the "Comprehensive Defense Handbook (CDH)<sup>35</sup>," which enshrined the defensive resilience and resistance principles of Article 3. That handbook also delivered techniques purely defensive in nature and assisted in developing truly comprehensive deterrence and defensive capabilities.

So, having a properly prepared internal environment, the next step was to establish the organization within the POL TDF structure and did not overlap the POL SOF area of responsibility. In effect, the POL TDF UW detachment was created and subordinated directly to the POL TDF commander. That solution ensured direct access to the critical resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, training). It also limited the organizational risks for that tiny UW component from the "older, bigger brothers" – the POL TDF brigades and training centers.

The crucial moment for the UW Detachment was the decision to expand the team into the unit-size element, led by the best used to be POL SOF operators and commanders. That was also a special moment for all POL SOF and POL TDF soldiers. The unit took the name after the renowned Polish Home Army soldier and post-war anti-communist combatant Brigadier General Janusz Brochwicz-Lewiński (nicknamed Gryf)<sup>36</sup>. The charisma of that prominent military leader allowed to gather

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numerous volunteers from the POL TDF (both full-timers and part-timers) to go through the selection and training. That move commenced the long-term development process to assemble an elite POL TDF UW Unit “Gryf” (borrowing his nickname). The unique relations brought from the SOF environment significantly facilitated multinational cooperation. The cooperation with the US National Guard under the State Partnership Program (SPP)<sup>37</sup> followed numerous joint events in Poland and the USA. The Unconventional Warfare exercise codename RIDGE RUNNER<sup>38</sup> was the most noted, where the US, Polish, and Latvian troops trained together in West Virginia<sup>39</sup> under the generic scenario to improve the UW TTP. Lastly, UK Special Forces elements noted the POL TDF efforts and growing capabilities and deployed the UK 3RANGERS element for the joint training and experience exchange<sup>40</sup>.

These efforts, knowledge, experience, and multinational support allowed the POL TDF UW detachment cadre to launch a unique training event – the UW Qualification Course (UWQC). The UWQC does not mirror the Special Operations Forces requirements but focuses on the modern, comprehensive approach to the unconventional warfare, the roles and missions of key components, cooperation among the prominent actors on a regional and local level, and prepares leaders of local and regional units to oppose aggression and occupation<sup>41</sup>.

The POL TDF is still in the initial phase of UW capabilities development. Still, the primary challenge is avoiding an easy trap in building the structures and answering the wrong security challenges and threats. As Sandor Fabian wrote recently, “we do not look back at a romanticized past of mainly rural resistance but instead, find relevant contemporary sources of lessons and develop bold and innovative concepts that are right for our time.”<sup>42</sup> That is the ultimate goal for the POL TDF UW Unit Gryf.

### *The Way Ahead*

Since its establishment, the POL TDF has been a rapidly developing force. Although based on the ‘Home Army’ tradition, it is agile and open enough to apply new techniques, tactics, and procedures. On top of the traditional arsenal of weapons and tools, the POL TDF reaches for the state-of-the-art technology, as found in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) FLY EYE and JAVELIN Anti-Tank Guided Munitions. Loitering munition (such as WARMATE<sup>43</sup>) is the next developmental step that increases the force’s lethality. With that in mind, the border mission brought back traditional horse patrols, which proved ideal for the austere terrain found in the region. The POL TDF is where “technology meets biology” and produces synergy.

The POL TDF strives to be on the cutting edge in its force class. Lessons learned from prior and ongoing missions serve as a tool for guiding and shaping future developments. Robust international cooperation with European territorial defense outfits, US National Guard, and US and UK SOF ensure continued growth and progress. With almost five years of development and several numerous operational tasks, the POL TDF, with its over 30 000 members, is achieving a role model status among fellow territorial forces. A core cadre with decades of experience ranging from conventional to SOF operations in and out of combat operations zones is magnified by that role.

However, the success of the initial phase of the POL TDF development cannot resolve all security challenges facing Poland. Also, the part-time soldiers will not replace highly trained and skilled full-time soldiers, airmen, sailors, and operators from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Special Operations Forces. Nevertheless, the POL TDF soldiers can effectively engage adversary forces on secondary avenues of approach to delay and canalize movement, destroy C4I and logistics capabilities, and support

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conventional forces on other auxiliary missions and tasks, as is currently happening in Ukraine.

The defense and support of local communities is another crucial mission for the POL TDF during the military crisis or wartime, making them less vulnerable to adversary operations and more resilient to withstand the aggression and repel the invasion. However, any armed forces will not build appropriate links between “green suiters” and civilians without collective social support and its will to oppose aggression. The POL TDF commander, LTG Wiesław Kukula, presents the POL TDF missions in a comprehensive, modern way, shortening it to just one expression, friendly for all Star Wars lovers: Resilience, Resistance & Deterrence, Defense (R2D2).

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### Endnotes

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- 2 NATO Strategy and Out-of-Area Operations, A Monograph by MAJ Scott A. Sendmeyer, United States Army, SAMS, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713508>, page 16
- 3 NATO Treaty, article 3, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm)
- 4 The POL TDF share a lot of similarities with the KASP, ZEMESSARDZE, EDL, and the US Army National Guard.
- 5 More on the partitions of Poland: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Partitions-of-Poland>
- 6 More on the Polish struggle against Russian partition: <https://www.britannica.com/event/November-Insurrection> and <https://www.britannica.com/event/January-Insurrection>
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- 8 The “Erlach Report” was translated to Polish and published in 1919: Franciszek von Erlach, Partyzantka w Polsce, 1863,
- 9 The Polish Underground State, 1939 – 1945, <https://ipn.gov.pl/en/news/4673,The-Polish-Underground-State-1939-1945.html>
- 10 Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1986, 34.
- 11 Ibid., 17.
- 12 Horst Mendershausen, Reflections on Territorial Defense, A RAND Note prepared for the United States Air Force, January 1980, p. 8.
- 13 Bolesław Balcerowicz, Obrona państwa średniego, 1997, page 170
- 14 Ryszard Jakuczbak, Józef Marczak, Obrona terytorialna Polski na progu XXI wieku, page 65.
- 15 A Minister of National Defense decision No. 503/2016, published in December 31, 2016: <https://www.dz.urz.mon.gov.pl/dziennik/pozycja/decyzja-1-decyzja-nr-503mon-z-dnia-30-grudnia-2015-r-w-sprawie-utworzenia-biura-do-spraw-utworzenia-obrony-terytorialnej/>
- 16 The Polish Armed Forces comprises of the five services: Land Forces (Army), Air Force, Navy, Special Operations Forces, and Territorial Defense Forces. See the Act of the Homeland Defense, para 15
- 17 Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civilian Authorities are used to portray the POL TDF mission for the international readers. The US definition taken from the Joint Publication 3-27, The Homeland Defense, April 10, 2018.
- 18 The National Development Strategy (pol. Strategia na rzecz odpowiedzialnego rozwoju): <https://www.gov.pl/documents/33377/436740/SOR.pdf>, page 358-359
- 19 DD-3.40 is the second level doctrine within the doctrinal architecture of the Polish Armed Forces, and encompasses the operational employment of the POL TDF within the national, joint operation.
- 20 The National Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, signed by the President of Poland n May 2020, para 3.13: [https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National\\_Security\\_Strategy\\_of\\_the\\_Republic\\_of\\_Poland\\_2020.pdf](https://www.bbn.gov.pl/ftp/dokumenty/National_Security_Strategy_of_the_Republic_of_Poland_2020.pdf)
- 21 The details of the voivodship roles and missions: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/voivodeship>
- 22 The administrative division of Poland: <https://stat.gov.pl/en/regional-statistics/classification-of-territorial-units/administrative-division-of-poland/>
- 23 The initial POL TDF development plan assumed the 17 TDF Brigades all over Poland. However, the dynamically changing security environment led to adding three additional TDF brigades in Eastern part of Poland. Two of the three brigades are slated for the eastern flank, adding man power on the borders with Belarus and Ukraine. Third brigade will be located in Warsaw (capital city). These changes will better utilize manpower, balance operational

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- and community needs and allow for more personnel to serve in regions with highest recruitment.
- 24 More on the Home Army concept: <https://warsawinstitute.org/phenomenon-polish-underground-state/>
  - 25 Warsaw Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm), para 73.
  - 26 HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Office of the Chief of Staff, Layered Resilience Concept Proposal Submission, February 6, 2022, page 2.
  - 27 Poland Hosts NATO Resilience Symposium 2022: <https://www.act.nato.int/articles/nato-resilience-symposium-2022>.
  - 28 The POL TDF media center: Żołnierze WOT cisi bohaterowie trudnego czasu i wielkiej próby społecznej solidarności – podsumowanie operacji „Odporna wiosna” i „Trwała odporność”, <https://media.terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/informacje/734737/zolnierze-wot-cisi-bohaterowie-trudnego-czasu-i-wielkiej-proby-spoecznej-solidarnosci-podsumowanie-operacji-odporna-wiosna-i-trwala-odpornosc>
  - 29 The POL TDF media center: Trzy miesiące operacji SILNE WSPARCIE, <https://media.terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/informacje/712389/3-miesiace-operacji-silnewsparcie>
  - 30 The Polish border with Belarus is also the most Eastern border of NATO Alliance and the European Union (so called Schengen Zone).
  - 31 The POL TDF media center: Niezawodna Pomoc – zawsze gotowi wesprzeć administrację publiczną i pomóc uchodźcom z ogarniętej wojną Ukrainy, <https://media.terytorialsi.wp.mil.pl/informacje/738835/niezawodna-pomoc-zawsze-gotowi-wesprzec-administracje-publiczna-i-pomoc-uchodzcom-z-ogarnietejojna-ukrainy>
  - 32 Ustawa o obronie Ojczyzny,
  - 33 Unconventional Warfare – activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms as of November 2021, page 233.
  - 34 The POL TDF Doctrine (DD-3.40), April 2018, page 20, 48, 50. The POL TDF doctrine based on the POL SOF doctrine on the Unconventional Operations to ensure synergy and common understanding.
  - 35 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, Comprehensive Defence Handbook (CDH), Edition A Version 1, 15 October 2020, chapter 4, page 36. The first efforts to publish the publication on the Resilience and Resistance resulted in 2019 by publishing the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), the profound book scripted by the team lead by COL (Ret.) Otto Fiala (US Special Operations Command Europe).
  - 36 Brigadier General Janusz Brochwicz-Lewiński (Gryf) become a “living legend” among the POL SOF soldiers. He enjoyed the profound respect also from the notable Polish politicians. In 2015 President of Poland, Mr. Andrzej Duda awarded BG Lewiński with the second highest Polish order Order of Polonia Restituta First Class, and in 2017 nominated to the rank of Major General (posthumously): <https://www.1944.pl/archiwum-historii-mowionej/janusz-brochwicz-lewinski,449.html>
  - 37 The State Partnership Program is a program led by the US National Guard to effectively partner and engage operational capabilities. The Illinois National Guard (US IL NG) is the major partner for the POL TDF, but the program for Poland started in 1993: <https://www.nationalguard.mil/leadership/joint-staff/j-5/international-affairs-division/state-partnership-program/>
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  - 43 More on the FLY EYE system: <https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/flyeye-unmanned-aerial-system/> and WARMATE ammunition here: <https://www.wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/warmate-loitering-munitions/>