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Developing Assessment Criteria for Defence Cooperation

**Ester Sabatino, Edouard Simon, Fara Breuer &
Juliette Renaut**

**ENVISIONING A NEW
GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE
FOR A GLOBAL EUROPE**



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Executive Summary

This working paper set out on the ambitious task of creating a tool to enable consistent and high-quality evaluation of defence cooperation in the EU framework and among EU Member States at four different levels (i.e. politico-strategic, operational, capability development and partnership). Indicators were developed to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability of defence cooperation at these four levels. Each metric is judged against parameters ranging from 0 to 4 (with 4 representing the best possible outcome). While this working paper is relevant to users aiming at evaluating cooperation *ex-post*, policymakers can also refer to it to shape their cooperation *ex-ante*. Indeed, the criteria and metrics proposed can ultimately inform future attempts at defence cooperation in terms of best practices and those that should be avoided.

For More Information

EsadeGeo-Center for Global Economy and Geopolitics
ENGAGE
Avenida Pedralbes, 60-62
08034, Barcelona
Email: marie.vandendriessche@esade.edu



Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	2
1 Introduction.....	5
2 Methodology	6
2.1 Methodological Approach.....	6
2.2 Limitations of the Model	7
2.3 Typology of Cooperation Types.....	8
3 Assessing Defence Cooperation: A Literature Review	11
3.1 Identifying a Gap in the Literature	11
3.2 The Politico-Strategic Level of Defence Cooperation	11
3.3 The Operational Level of Cooperation.....	12
3.4 The Capability Development Level of Cooperation	14
3.5 The Partnership Level of Cooperation.....	14
4 Cooperation at Political-Strategic Level.....	17
4.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level.....	17
4.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level	20
4.3 Operationalising the 'Coherence' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level.....	21
4.4 Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level	23
5 Cooperation at Operational Level.....	27
5.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion for Operational Cooperation.....	27
5.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion for Operational Cooperation.....	32
5.3 Operationalising the 'Coherence' Criterion for Operational Cooperation	35
5.4 Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion for Operational Cooperation.....	37
6 Cooperation at Capability Development Level	42
6.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion at Capability Development Level.....	42
6.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion at Capability Development Level	47
6.3 Operationalising the 'Coherence' Criterion at Capability Development Level	49
6.4 Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion at Capability Development Level.....	51
7 Cooperation at Partnership Level.....	54
7.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation	54
7.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation.....	59
7.3 Operationalising the 'Coherence' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation	62



7.4	Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation.....	63
8	Conclusion	67
	Reference List.....	68



1 Introduction

This working paper provides a set of assessment criteria to evaluate defence cooperation in the EU framework and among EU Member States outside the EU framework, building on the results of [ENGAGE Working Paper 4](#) (Szép et al., 2021). It provides a comprehensive tool to allow *ex-post* and *ex-ante* evaluation to be performed by analysts and policymakers. The assessment covers the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability of different cooperative frameworks. The novelty of this approach resides in the broad range of cooperative types and activities included in the analysis and the development of specific criteria and metrics to structure analysis.

The paper is not limited to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) *strictu sensu*, but it covers areas with an impact on the capacity of the EU to deliver results in this policy field: i) defence research and development (R&D) investment, ii) joint procurement, production and exports of defence and defence related materials, iii) pooling & sharing (P&S) of capabilities, iv) multilevel cooperation among the involved EU bodies and agencies, and among EU Member States.

While the sheer number of cooperative frameworks and joint activities in defence highlights a perceived need for collaboration among governments, defence remains a fragmented policy arena at the EU level. It is therefore necessary to ask what the added value of defence cooperation is and whether it generates effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability at the European level, thus contributing to reaching EU strategic objectives.

The first section of the working paper presents a methodological framework drawing on existing literature on defence cooperation. In the second section, the analysis focuses on four distinct types of defence cooperation: politico-strategic, operational, capability development and partnership. We assume that for each type of cooperation, it should be possible to assess effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability. Separate chapters then operationalise this assumption using examples of existing cooperative frameworks to help identify best practices and lessons learned. The assessment criteria developed in this paper will be tested and applied in subsequent publications of the ENGAGE project.

Figure 1: Schematic Presentation of the Analytical Framework

Assessment criteria \ Areas of cooperation	Effectiveness	Efficiency	Coherence	Sustainability
Politico-strategic				
Operational				
Capability development				
Partnership				

Source: own elaboration



2 Methodology

2.1 Methodological Approach

For the purposes of this paper, we draw on [ENGAGE Working Paper 3](#), which put forward definitions of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and sustainability with regards to EU external action (Sus et al., 2021). The authors of that study also developed ideas about the meaning of those terms in the context of specific policy areas of EU external action. Following this approach, in the field of EU defence cooperation, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability can be understood as follows:


- Effectiveness: the capacity to achieve results (output) against set goals and the leadership capability required to do so;
- Efficiency: the way available resources are exploited or the ratio reflecting a comparison of outputs accomplished to the costs incurred therefor;
- Coherence: coordination of different policies originated by EU agencies, bodies or cooperative structures (horizontal coordination) and among the different actors involved at Member State and EU level (vertical coordination);
- Sustainability: the potential for cooperation to be sustained over time and to have a long-term impact (outcome), be it environmental, social, political, or economic.

Given that these assessment criteria will be applied in the context of four distinct types of cooperation, each type will equally need to be delineated, to identify specific assessment criteria appropriate for them. For example, the criterion of effectiveness at the operational level can be assessed in both its internal and external dimensions, as suggested by Peen Rodt (2017). The same distinction applies to the sustainability concept, which can be considered both in terms of sustainable action for the EU, and in terms of external sustainability, for example by evaluating the impact of a mission or operation on the territory of the country where the mission is performed.

To operationalise the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and coherence of cooperation, criteria and a set of metrics are presented in the paper. Criteria are easily identifiable in the operationalising chapters by the symbol ➤ with a yes or no question, while the metrics, formulated as assessment questions, are represented by the following symbol ❖. Each metric is judged against parameters ranging from 0 to 4, where 0 indicates poor, failed or absent cooperation, and 4 represents the best possible outcome. The assignment of an evaluation 'value' allows for a graphical presentation of the results in the form of a chart. This way, it will be easier for users to clearly and quickly identify areas for further improvement as well as successes.



Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the Evaluation



Source: own elaboration

Desk research for the preparation of this working paper involved a literature review of previous assessments performed in the field of CSDP and defence cooperation, as well as academic and think tanks reports and analysis, technical and political documents, and EU internal performance assessments. Building on the results of [ENGAGE Working Paper 4](#) (Szép et al., 2021), existing literature and analysis have also been used to substantiate the identification of relevant factors in the assessment of defence cooperation. In this context, if relevant, cooperation in and with NATO has been used as example and source of information.

The research team subsequently organised thematic working sessions to identify the proposed criteria subsections, according to the level of cooperation involved. The proposed criteria have been tested in an internal workshop which saw the participation of additional experts from both institutions who worked on this working paper. The format of both the working sessions and the internal workshop allowed an open exchange of views and positions on the research topics, making it possible to refine the proposed assessment criteria.

2.2 Limitations of the Model

The proposed model, while comprehensive, has limitations. The paper allows for the possibility that not all assessment criteria matter equally for each type of cooperation. Furthermore, certain characteristics of specific forms of cooperation can positively affect one criterion but have a negative one for another. For example, the ability of national governments to retain control of their national assets in a military P&S arrangement can be a facilitating factor enabling cooperation in the first place and making it potentially more sustainable by acknowledging national sovereignty concerns. Concomitantly, should a participating Member State withdraw national assets, this could undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of the arrangement, or even its existence. Given that the details of cooperation will be context



specific, it is impractical to provide an indication of a suitable – much less optimal – balance of factors having both a potential and negative influence on two or more criteria.

Despite our attempts to be as specific as possible, the parameters used for the scales 0 to 4 contain concepts such as ‘few’, ‘some’, ‘minimum’, ‘loosely’, etc., to make distinctions between the different levels. However, given the limited scope of this paper, developing the practical definition of these terms requires empirical application. This is important to bear in mind as these words carry significant weight because they enable users of this framework to score cooperation efforts based on distinctions between the different points on the 0 to 4 scale. More precision, developed over time, will make forming judgements easier. The main reason for the authors not being able to provide context specific definitions lies in the specificity of each cooperative activity which is likely to differ from case to case.

Finally, the research team recognises that further work is required to understand the interrelationships and dependencies between indicators.

2.3 Typology of Cooperation Types

All four types of cooperation under scrutiny can occur both at the EU level and among Member States. Nonetheless, to establish some boundaries for the assessment of efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, and sustainability of EU cooperation at the partnership level, this working paper focuses exclusively on EU engagement with third countries and international organisations in defence.¹

2.3.1 Politico-Strategic

The politico-strategic type of cooperation is complex to define with precision and its definition can be broad (Biscop, 2005). It is useful to conceptualise it as involving a two-stage process, that begins with the provision of strategic political guidance which then feeds into the strategic military guidance. For example, the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) sets the EU’s current political level of ambition, which can be translated into specific military tasks and types of operations the EU might aim to undertake (Barrie et al., 2018).

For this analysis, we focus on the political-strategic component, which can be defined as the “analysis of the implication of political objectives, the desired EU end state, restraints and constraints as well as an analysis of the capabilities needed, in order to develop potential military options balanced against those capabilities offered or potentially available” (Council of the EU, 2015).

Strategic documents such as the NATO Strategic Concept, the EU Strategic Compass, or national defence white papers and security reviews usually codify relevant defence ambitions. Such documents outline “the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved” and serve as

¹ Cooperation on intelligence sharing is not part of this working paper as it is investigated in [ENGAGE Working Paper 10](#).



a reference framework for day-to-day policymaking (Biscop, 2004). Strategic documents are thus the core of this level of cooperation, which at the EU level are the EU Security Strategies (2003 and 2008), the EUGS (2016), and the Strategic Compass (2022).

The evaluation of the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and sustainability of the process as well as the outcome of the strategic document issued is crucial. Indeed, “it is not sufficient to have a strategy – one must then also do strategy” (Biscop et al., 2009). Nonetheless, focusing on the outcome of the process – the strategic document – is distinct from analysing the implementation of that strategic guidance via specific policies and actions. For the purposes of this paper, the related chapter is focused on the emergence of a common strategic culture, thus on the strategic guidelines by the EU institutions and Member States.

2.3.2 Operational

The operational level of cooperation encompasses a wide range of activities and can be performed both at the EU, regional, and at Member States level. For the purposes of this working paper, the operational level of cooperation has been divided into two main categories: i) efforts to increase the interoperability among partners; and ii) efforts to deploy in operations and missions.

In the first category, the research team included the development of joint operational planning practices, joint training, maintenance of joint formations’ readiness, P&S capabilities, as well as activities to encourage a military role and tasks specialisation and the establishment of bi- or multinational command and control arrangements or formed units for operations.

In the second category, assessment criteria have been created for both civilian and military operations and missions under the CSDP framework, and for multilateral formats contemplating the deployment of personnel. Considering that CSDP and multilateral missions and operations can be deployed in countries where other EU external action activities are ongoing, questions of coordination and sustainability of all activities and actors involved are included in the delineation of the assessment criteria.

2.3.3 Capability Development

For this study, a narrow understanding of capability was adopted, limiting it to military equipment.² This decision is justified by two factors. First, cooperation on capability-development mainly arises with the development of new military equipment. Second, this cooperation triggers specific questions regarding its industrial dimension.

Capability development cooperation takes place up to the acquisition phase and includes the joint research and development (R&D) of military equipment, definition of common standards and requirements, industrial development and procurement, joint procurement of off-the-shelf equipment. Aspects related to the export policy on the jointly produced defence and defence

² For a different definition, please see Haffa Jr. (2018) and NAO (2020).



related materials are also considered as they can have an impact on each of the four meta criteria. One should bear in mind that cooperation does not necessarily include all the activities listed above and that the chapter on capability development does not include cooperation related to capabilities at a later stage of their life cycle (i.e. post-acquisition).

Considering the relatively new aspect of cooperation at the capability development level inside the EU framework, bi-, tri-, or multilateral cooperative examples among Member States have been taken into consideration. Turning towards the EU level, assessment criteria were delineated taking into consideration the ongoing cooperation under PESCO and EDF.

2.3.4 Partnership

The focus of the chapter on the partnership type of cooperation analyses EU activities and cooperative frameworks. For this working paper, cooperation at this level includes the military assistance provided by the EU to third countries, as well as the partnership with third countries and international organisations. The first aspect looks at the EU effort in crisis management and military assistance towards recipient countries. Since its inclusion in the 2003 EU Security Strategy, the security/development nexus allows the EU to include capability development activities in countries when other EU external action activities are ongoing. The convergence of funds in the newly established European Peace Facility (EPF), and the first-ever approvals of transfer of lethal weapons to a third country, are aspects included in the analysis.

The second level of analysis looks at the EU cooperation with third countries. In the deployment of CSDP missions, EU Member States have been assisted by third states – associated, partner, or candidate countries – by means of their participation in civilian and military missions and operations. (Framework) Participation agreements provide the legal framework and assessment criteria were developed to assess aspects related to the involvement of third countries in the planning process of joint operations/missions, the coordination of involved personnel, the consultation with local entities and actors. The engagement of the European Defence Agency (EDA) with associated third countries complements the analysis. Turning to the EU cooperation at capability development level, the research team focused exclusively on the inclusion of third countries and third country entities in PESCO and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects and on third country inclusion in EDA projects.

Against this background, the same range of activities are considered for the cooperation with international organisations. The main difference is on capability development cooperation, as it cannot be evaluated through the same cooperative frameworks as the cooperation with third countries. Finally, for both operational and capability development cooperation at the partnership level, arrangements signed by the EDA with international organisations complement the analysis.



3 Assessing Defence Cooperation: A Literature Review

3.1 Identifying a Gap in the Literature

The literature does not provide criteria and metrics to evaluate defence cooperation ex-post. It rather focuses on factors to increase the success of defence cooperation ('must-haves') and best practices, focusing primarily on what we define in this working paper as the operational type of cooperation (Valasek, 2011; Zandee et al., 2016; Druckman et al., 2022, p. 85). Little to no literature exists on the politico-strategic level or for capability development cooperation. Furthermore, the 'must-have' factors highlighted in the literature do not generate specific insights on the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and sustainability of cooperation.

The contribution this working paper hopes to offer is thus an improved analytical approach capturing in one place, and with much more granularity, the added value of defence cooperation across different forms of cooperation.

The following sections present some of the key findings of the relevant existing work.

3.2 The Politico-Strategic Level of Defence Cooperation

The first phase of politico-strategic defence cooperation lies in the process, meaning the series of actions taken, to create a strategic document. The process adopted is key as it affects the outcome and has different effects on stakeholders' perception of ownership of the process (Andersson et al., 2011). On the national level, Giegerich & Jonas (2012) compared the formulation process of Defence White papers and national security strategies in five European countries and identified the presence of common features. When designing inclusive processes, involving external actors, and the idea that strategy-making is a dynamic process that requires the ability to react to changing circumstances, emerge as important parameters for modern national strategic guidance.

At the EU level, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) process was judged as successful (Biscop, 2012; Andersson et al., 2011), as a clear mandate and political will from EU foreign ministers were issued, asking for a document identifying key threats and security challenges to the EU and recommendations for an overall strategy (Andersson et al., 2011). Secondly, an open debate involving a wide array of stakeholders was conducted, enabling a rich and inclusive debate (Biscop, 2012).

While following similar open processes, the 2008 'ESS Implementation Report' and the 2016 EUGS failed to reach the same level of effectiveness, due to the lack of fundamental clarity (Biscop, 2012) and political will (Biscop, 2009a) of the political mandate, as well as broad and unfocused workshops (Andersson et al., 2011).



Since 1949, NATO has adopted six Strategic Concepts (SC), and their processes have varied greatly (Ringsmose & Rynning, 2011). The 2010 SC process began with a reflection phase, which foresaw thematic seminars to enhance the strategic debate (Andersson et al., 2011). Further, an external 'Group of Experts' was created to advise during the consultation phase, coupled with additional seminars. The Secretary General took close control over the drafting and negotiation process, sidestepping layers of bureaucracy and leading discreet consultation on contentious topics (Wittman, 2011). According to some observers, the 2010 process fuelled public debate and interest in NATO, increased the involvement of the strategic community, provided transparency as well as enticed Member States to clarify their positions. In the run-up to the 2022 SC, some elements of the 2010 process re-emerged, albeit in an adjusted form. Before the political mandate to conduct negotiations on the new SC was given, the NATO Secretary General convened a group of experts to perform a non-official strategic reflection exercise that brought together members of the political, academic, industrial, and public community from NATO Member States and beyond. The final part of the process, again much less public and transparent and complicated by Russia's war against Ukraine, foresees the negotiation of a text based on proposals from the Secretary General and the final endorsement to the document at NATO's 2022 Madrid Summit.

Existing literature thus stresses the importance of a clear political mandate, leadership and political will, an inclusive process to generate ideas informed by clear objectives and without losing control over the drafting, as well as mechanisms to ensure strategic guidance is reviewed in certain intervals. Specifically, regarding EU-level processes Andersson et al. (2011) suggest that most successful strategic document processes included "(a) a high-level, informal steering group including a small selection of well-placed national diplomats, (b) an advisory group of institutional players, and (c) a process group focused on steering the revision process, including representatives of key research institutes".

3.3 The Operational Level of Cooperation

Due to the variety of existing formats in this area, several researchers classified and outlined European operational cooperation (Zandee et al. 2016, p. 1), which according to Drent et al. (2017, pp. 3–9) is composed of 3 layers: force formations consisting of single set of forces of two or more countries; the 'plug-in and out' of force formations in the so-called 'docking-stations' or international structures; frameworks of deployment and namely EU, NATO, or ad-hoc coalitions.

Zandee et al. (2016) list factors considered to contribute to successful operational cooperation, all affecting, to various degrees, the performance of cooperation. The importance of these factors is also recognised by Drent et al. (2017, 7): "NATO has extensive experience in operational standardisation processes, [...] [such] efforts within the EU should be modelled according to those existing NATO standards". The latter point is supported by Frazier and Hutto (2017) arguing that NATO's success in terms of interoperability can be traced back to their ability to contribute to operational exercises in peacetime, which helps socialising its members into common organisational doctrine. Further, the authors determined three criteria



to evaluate the degree of success of an operation: i) training and shared tactics; ii) common/shared equipment; and iii) working in a common language.

Peen Rodt (2017) adds to the literature by looking at how EU missions' effectiveness can be evaluated. She proposes a two-pronged approach for assessing a mission's effectiveness, combining multiple criteria and covering operational missions from their inception to their evaluation. The first, internal dimension, assesses "whether it [the EU] achieved what it set out to do in the way it set out to do so" (internal goals achievement and appropriateness). Indicators include fulfilment of politico-strategic goals, key operational objectives (goal attainment) and timelessness, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness of implementation (internal appropriateness). The second dimension looks at external perspective and assesses "whether and how the target conflict and country benefitted" by looking at external goal attainment and external appropriateness of the mission.

Furthermore, the Royal Danish Defence College (2017) pinpoints the existence of successful communication lines between decisionmakers and the personnel on the ground implementing those decisions and adequate time planning for deployment as key factors for missions' effectiveness. Moreover, it is noted that the effectiveness of deployments can also be measured through operational assessments, to be implemented by local and international experts to better comprehend the situation on the ground (NATO, 2013).

Peters et al. (2021) evaluate effectiveness of CSDP missions by assessing effectiveness as actor and process coherence. Actor coherence includes actors' unity of voice on the expected outputs of the operations; as well as their unity on the evolution of the mandate to reach the expected outcome. Process coherence entails the coherence of policy features, institutional coherence, continuity of core concepts and resonance of EU output with implementation. A lack of said components can impede mission success and effectiveness.

Regarding efficiency in operational cooperation, Sauer (2015) states that the deep level of cooperation between the Dutch and the Belgian navies has been successful in coping with budgetary constraints.

In term of sustainability, O'Donnell (2013) points out, that some cooperative frameworks under multinational command enable the sustainability of the partnership by offering the opportunity for a country to step back from particular missions. De Hoop Scheffer (2007) questions the sustainability and coherence of military alliances outside of its original context, differentiating them from military coalitions, that correspond to alliances "formed on the occasion of a conflict".

The literature on operational cooperation is dense, and crosscuts with other levels of cooperation. Therefore, it can be stated that operational cooperation is addressed as a key factor in interstate defence cooperation. Operational cooperation can be seen as the translation of political doctrine into practical assessments, notably on the ability to act rapidly facing a threat. However, the ability to change and review interests, while adapting to the current security context, is essential to ensure sustainability and coherence within coalitions.



3.4 The Capability Development Level of Cooperation

States collaborate on multinational equipment programmes for several reasons, ranging from sharing the cost of developing and procuring defence capabilities with potential savings, to reaping political and industrial benefits. Gallhöfer (2014) suggests that in addition to the direct economic benefits of cooperation, the way savings deriving from cooperation will be exploited impacts the decision to engage in cooperative frameworks. Moreover, Maulny et al. (2006, pp. 7–8) point to i) increased interoperability, ii) political benefits, such as the perception to be a constructive EU partner, and contributor to EU defence, iii) maintenance of the European defence industrial and technology base, and improved security-of-supply, iv) technology sharing, technology development, common standards, integrated logistics, successful exports, as further potential benefits.

Valasek (2011), although primarily focused on P&S activities, was one of the first authors to provide a list of enabling factors with relevance to defence cooperation for capability development purposes. Authors noted that Member States' desire for autonomy in military affairs challenges cooperation in three ways: by raising 1. fears of entrapment; 2. fears of abandonment; and 3. concerns that poorer and weaker states may try to 'free-ride'. Sovereignty concerns or the fear of being dominated by partners can also jeopardise defence cooperation (Valasek, 2011; Zandee et al., 2016).

Similarly, Maulny et al. (2006) provide lessons learned and recommendations to increase the success rate of cooperative armament programmes. These can be understood as 'must have' factors and are organised into five sections: programme requirements; research and technology (R&T); industrial co-operation; programme budgets; and project management. However, the lack of common analytical tools to assess co-operative programmes might represent an obstacle in the evaluation of cooperation.

In reference to industrial involvement, Lundmark (2017) states that international collaboration between companies has a greater probability of success, if companies consider the collaboration strategic, share the collaboration's strategic objectives; have previously collaborated and if industrial leadership resides with one company.

3.5 The Partnership Level of Cooperation

Literature about EU partnership cooperation mainly revolves around two essential case-studies: the inclusion of the UK into a formal defence and security foreign policy, and the EU as a normative power. Brexit brought about questions regarding the viability of strategic autonomy after losing an important player in EU defence, as well as creating an opportunity to relaunch discussions on EU defence cooperation (Sweeney & Winn, 2020). On the other hand, as a normative power, the EU's external influence is measured through its effectiveness, modelled by its ability to "*shape world affairs in accordance with the objective it adopts in particular issues*" (Plank, 2017). Effectiveness in this framework is identified through two perspectives: goal attainment (internal) and problem-solving (external). While multiple formats



of cooperation can be envisaged, partnership effectiveness is always represented by the convergence of objectives and profiles.

A relevant approach to measure effectiveness of EU engagement in third countries is the Capability-Expectations Gap (CEG) approach (Hill, 1993). It addresses the vacuum between the EU's willingness to commit its resources and political agenda to the demands of third countries. Based on this CEG approach, Dover (2005) points out that effectiveness scores higher when the gap is small and vice versa. Dover also recognises that this approach does not cover all aspects pertaining to the evaluation of effectiveness. When it comes to military assistance, additional capabilities to be included in Hill's analysis are the availability and provision of adequate military means. Bendiek et al. (2020) argue that Hill's model fails to distinguish between internal and external expectations on EU's performance. They state that the gap shows the mismatch between the rhetoric of CFSP policy and third countries' expectations.

Additionally, Antinozzi (2022) underlines the importance of the perception of EU's leadership capacity from strategic partners. Similarly, Zandee (2018) states that the capacity to attract participants is strictly linked to the effectiveness of the cooperation itself. Effectiveness in this regard can also be gauged in terms of the closeness of the dialogue and the depth of the understanding among partners. Here, the effectiveness of cooperation stems from the EU capacity to maintain a firm level of commitment from partners in institutionalised cooperative frameworks (Kelly, 2012).

Another proposed approach is to look at the degree of integration of personnel, command structures and procedures that characterise the partnership with third parties. Karlsrud and Reykers (2020) note that the establishment of a common doctrine and the enhancement of troop interoperability leads to a more effective interaction between partners. Furthermore, the level of armaments standardisation among partners also impacts efficiency and effectiveness of the cooperation (European Parliament, 2018).

Regarding cooperation on the ground, Coning & Friis (2011) introduce the concept of "internal-external power imbalance" in peace and stability operations, which alludes to the lack of understanding of the local context by external actors. A coherent approach between external actors remains key for the sustainability of the operations and the consolidation of the peace process.

Both effectiveness and sustainability of partnerships can be dependent on the framework in which it occurs. Aydın-Düzgit et al. (2021a) evaluate existing partnerships based on the relation of third parties with the EU. Their analysis shows that the impact of the different partnership frameworks regulating cooperation with non-EU countries is relevant to assess the cooperation effectiveness, but factors like political alignment to EU external action (Müftüler-Baç, 2017; European Commission, 2020b; Narli, 2005), or the political class perception of the EU as a weak or strong foreign and security actor, and the resulting (un)willingness to integrate national defence to its defence and security structures (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2021a) might be more important. The latter two aspects show the relevance of the EU leadership capacity as a



determining factor for successful cooperation. Moreover, being part of the European Economic Area (EEA), the presence of administrative agreements or of Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) to participate in CSDP activities (Aydın-Düzgüt et al., 2021a) are considered factors making the partnership profitable.

However, other factors fit within the efficiency criterion, and mostly depend on the model of partnership. For example, operational cooperation is deemed successful if interoperability and proficiency are increased, both essential to bolster operational capacity in partner states and coalitions, while reducing divergences on standards, rules and procedures (Frazier & Hutto, 2017).



4 Cooperation at Political-Strategic Level

4.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level

At political-strategic level, effectiveness is assessed by evaluating the process used for the elaboration of the strategic document, as well as the finalised document of the cooperation and the political support that ensued. Measuring effectiveness as leadership capacity at this level relates to the effect the produced strategic document has on third parties.

4.1.1 Measuring Effectiveness

Understood as goal achievement, effectiveness at political-strategic level relates to the cooperation's ability to generate collective strategic guidance against a set mandate, determined *ex-ante*. The politico-strategic level generally takes the form of a strategic document (at EU level: ESS, EUGS, Strategic Compass; at NATO level: NATO SC). While its release is the ultimate goal and determines the effectiveness of the cooperation, assessing the effectiveness of the process is also crucial as this will not only affect the outcome but will have different effects on stakeholders (Andersson et al., 2011).

- **Criterion 1:** The process for the development of a strategic document generally begins with a mandate. It defines the nature of the document, as well as the objectives it is set to fulfil. The mandate guides the creation process of the strategic document. As an example, the objectives of the mandate for the Strategic Compass called on, among others, the Compass to “narrow the gap between ambition and reality when it comes to the Union’s external action” (Nováky, 2021), and “foster a common European ‘strategic culture’, pushing Member States towards a common understanding of the key threats to Europe and how the EU, as a whole, can be a security provider” (Ungureanu, 2021). It is argued that an inclusive process increases the feeling of ownership, and the legitimacy of the document (Andersson et al., 2011), rendering it more effective and enabling the document to better fulfil its objectives which in turn should contribute to the sustainability of the document. Did the process have a clear mandate and use an inclusive process?
- ❖ **Metric 1:** The clarity of the mandate has implications for the end result the strategic document aims to achieve. Furthermore, based on the assumption that the more political support from Member States the process enjoys, the higher are the chances to release the document, the level of political support should also be an important consideration: How consistent and coherent was the *ex-ante* mandate for the cooperation? Did the mandate enjoy political support?



Clarity of the mandate and political support	No mandate	Ambiguous mandate with no political support	Ambiguous mandate with political support	Clear mandate	Clear mandate with political support
	0	1	2	3	4

- ❖ **Metric 2:** A key question relating to the process lies in the level of inclusivity. Inclusivity, in this context, pertains to the involvement of external actors along Member States and Institutions. Inclusivity also refers to having women involved throughout the process, as the peacebuilding literature underlines. To what extent has the process been inclusive?

Inclusivity of the process	Process restricted to institutions and Member States; no participation of women	Process with very limited external consultations, internal consultations being favoured; women occasionally involved in the process	Process with few external consultations; participation of women throughout certain phases of the process	Open process with balanced external and internal consultations; participation of women throughout the whole process	Open process with external and internal stakeholders, including with partner countries; participation of women throughout the whole process
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 2:** The capacity to produce a document against the mandate is the overarching objective of any cooperation at this level: Has the cooperation resulted in the drafting and release of a document?

- ❖ **Metric:** whether the strategic document has achieved its objectives is best assessed against the mandate and the objectives therein defined: How consistent is the final strategic document with the *ex-ante* mandate for this cooperation?

Consistency with the mandate	No Document produced	Significantly below the expectations of the mandate	Consistent with the main expectations of the mandate	Consistent with the mandate	Exceeds the expectations of the mandate
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 3:** At the EU level, Member States usually give the mandate to draft such a document to the High Representative, or in the case of the NATO Strategic Concept to the Secretary-General. While Member States are generally associated with the drafting of the document (through, for instance, intergovernmental negotiations), it does not necessarily lead to a document that matches their initial expectations and objectives. The political backing of the final document is quite important in this perspective. The lack of endorsement of the EUGS by the European Council, which only ‘welcomed’ the document, led to scepticism on the political backing of the strategy by Member States (Grevi, 2016).



The level of political endorsement of the document is thus presented as an indicator of the cooperation's effectiveness. At the level where the cooperation occurs (e.g., the EU for the Strategic Compass): Has the strategic document been formally adopted by the cooperative framework institutions (or equivalent bodies)?

- ❖ **Metric:** While political support is key during the process, support for the final strategic document is also crucial and the intensity of this support can be expected to vary. The existence of subsequent taskings aiming at further developing or reviewing certain aspects of the strategic document (e.g., the Implementation Plan on Defence and Security, 2016) is also an indication of political support: What has been the intensity of the political support granted to the strategic document resulting from cooperation?

Intensity of political support	No formal affirmation	Adopted by the EU Council	'Welcomed' (or equivalent) by the European Council	'Welcomed' (or equivalent) by the European Council + subsequent taskings	'Endorsed' (or equivalent) by the European Council
	0	1	2	3	4

4.1.2 Measuring Effectiveness as Leadership Capacity

- **Criterion 4:** To assess the leadership capacity of a strategic document, reactions from third countries to this document are good indicators of the relevance of the document and thus the effectiveness of cooperation: Has the strategic document provoked reactions from third countries and their strategic communities?

- ❖ **Metric:** The existence of a debate, as well as official references and reactions to the relevant document across strategic communities of third countries testify to its effectiveness and leadership capacity: How did third countries and their strategic communities react to the strategic document resulting from cooperation?

Intensity of third country reactions	No reaction from any third country or their strategic communities	Sparse and short-term reactions from some third countries (excluding main partners)	Regular debates before and/or after the adoption of the document across the strategic communities	Partial references to the strategic document in official documents of third countries	The document is used widely as a reference document by third countries officials and their strategic communities
	0	1	2	3	4

The EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific provoked limited public reactions from third countries. This can be in part explained by the simultaneously launch of AUKUS, the Australian, British and US defence partnership, that cast a shadow on the EU strategy (Gros-Verheyde, 2021), and on the lack of credibility of the EU's involvement in the region, (Esteban & Armanini, 2021). These limited reactions could be indicative of the strategy's limited leadership capacity.



A more recent example is the Strategic Compass and the reaction to its adoption. Turkey was quick to react negatively to the document, criticising it for voicing concern over 'breach of international law' and the 'instrumentalisation of irregular migration' in the Eastern Mediterranean (MedyaNews, 2022). This reaction from Turkey can be seen as a sign that the EU Strategy had greater impact than previous documents. However, an absence of reaction from countries, such as China and Russia, could be interpreted as them not taking the document and the EU's intentions seriously.

4.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level

4.2.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency

Literature both on EU and NATO cooperation at political-strategic level suggests that the ability to reach set objectives relies on the political, administrative, and organisational resources that have been mobilised for and through the process. Katsioulis & Mölling (2010) suggest a direct relation of political investment and chances for success. The higher the investment in the process, the more chances it has of being effective, yet the less efficient it is almost by definition. This does not imply a wasted or inefficient use of resources, but that efficiency in terms of costs reduction might not be an appropriate metric to apply to cooperation at the political-strategic level.

4.2.2 Measuring Time Efficiency

➤ **Criterion:** Efficiency at the political-strategic level can be assessed by looking at whether deadlines set for the realisation of the strategic document have been met. Looking at time efficiency can also highlight how serious Member States take the process. Generally, significant delays indicate that a process does not enjoy great political backing or is not time sensitive or urgent. Sticking to a schedule signify a process that is considered strategically important to Member States. Has the cooperation been able to deliver the strategic document within the intended timeframe?

❖ **Metric:** How timely was the cooperation?

Time Efficiency	Strategic document never released	No deadlines had been defined	Realistic deadlines had been set, but delays postponed the timely delivery	Realistic deadlines had been set and there were no delays that had an effect on delivery of the strategic document	Delivery of strategic document on schedule, no delays
	0	1	2	3	4



4.3 Operationalising the 'Coherence' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level

Coherence needs to be measured along two dimensions: horizontal (which reflects the consistency across EU policies) and vertical (which refers to the consistency at different levels of decision- and policymaking processes). At this level, horizontal coherence is assessed in relation to other EU external policies and in comparison to other relevant organisations' strategic documents. Participating Member States' adherence to the process of elaboration of the strategic document, as well as their compliance with the final strategic document is used to evaluate vertical coherence.

4.3.1 Measuring Horizontal Coherence

- **Criterion 1:** When assessing the horizontal coherence of a cooperation at political-strategic level, it is necessary to assess the consistency of the strategic document with other policies of the concerned organisation. At a sub-regional level (for instance, Visegrad group or NORDEFECO formats), the analytical importance of the horizontal coherence criterion is weaker, as these formats do not necessarily have other policies against which to assess the coherence of a new document. A new strategic document can also be an attempt to generate higher levels of coherence across various existing initiatives and policies (as was the case with the Strategic Compass, attempting to unite various initiatives e.g., PESCO, CARD, and the EDF). Given that strategic documents are aimed at creating reforms or changes within the institution, their implementation is likely to require changes to pre-existing policies. Thus, horizontal coherence is assessed in relation to other EU external policies: Is the cooperation coherent with other EU policies and/or does it include recommendations for change in these policies?
 - ❖ **Metric:** Interaction with EU policies can go from direct contradiction to the creation of synergies between previously independent policies. Synergy is about creating value from these interactions and thus goes beyond coherence: How is interaction with other EU policies integrated in the strategic document?

Coherence with other EU external policies	The strategic document is in direct contradiction with several key aspects of other EU policies and does not provide guidance for adapting these policies	The strategic document is in contradiction with marginal aspects and does not provide guidance for adapting these policies	The strategic document is in line with other EU policies or provides guidance for adapting these policies	The strategic document brings greater coherence across different policies previously in contradiction through adaptation	The strategic document creates synergies and adaptation between different EU policies
	0	1	2	3	4



➤ **Criterion 2:** Horizontal coherence also pertains to alignment of institutional entities at the same hierarchical level, which can be understood as harmonisation with other allied organisations. Another way to assess if a strategic document is coherent, is to thus evaluate it in comparison to other relevant organisations' strategic documents. For example, the EU and NATO have in recent years focussed on creating close relations on issues of common interest, including crisis management, capability development, and security and defence. Is the strategic document coherent with other international/allied organisations' policies/strategic documents?

❖ **Metric:** Interaction with partners and/or allied organisations can go from direct contradiction to the creation of synergies between existing policies: How is interaction with other relevant organisations integrated in the strategic document?

Coherence with other strategic documents from external organisations	The strategic document is in direct contradiction with several key aspects of other allied organisations' policies, coordination of policies is non-existent	The strategic document is in contradiction with marginal aspects of other allied organisations' policies, coordination of policies is non-existent	The strategic document is in line with other allied organisations' policies or provides guidance for adapting these policies	The strategic document brings greater coherence across different policies with allied organisations' policies previously in contradiction through adaptation or reduces duplication	The strategic document creates synergies and adaptation between different allied organisations' policies
	0	1	2	3	4

4.3.2 Measuring Vertical Coherence

Vertical coherence of politico-strategic cooperation refers to participating Member States' adherence to the process of the strategic document, and to the provisions of the strategic document itself. Vertical coherence can thus refer to the way Member States participate in the process and how the document's conclusions and recommendations are reflected in their own strategic documents.

➤ **Criterion 3:** The adherence of Member States to process and content is thus the most accurate indicator of vertical coherence in a cooperation at the political-strategic level: Have the process and the importance of the strategic document been acknowledged by the participating Member States?

❖ **Metric 1:** Adherence here can be measured in terms of resources made available by participating Member States. Resources can be political, financial, or organisational. The level of contribution determines a Member State's adherence to the process: How significant is a participating Member States' contribution to the elaboration of the strategic document?



States contribution to the elaboration of the strategic document	States do not contribute to the elaboration of the strategic document	States contribute to the process but do not provide (political / financial / etc.) support	States contribute to the process, but provide only the minimum (political / financial / etc.) support required	States contribute to the process and mostly provide the necessary (political / financial / etc.) support required	States contribute to the process and provide the necessary (political / financial / etc.) support required
	0	1	2	3	4

- ❖ **Metric 2:** To measure vertical coherence, it is also pertinent to evaluate the document's importance at national level. Acknowledgement and endorsement at national level indicate an intention of adherence and support for the intensity of Member States' adherence to the document. Acknowledgement can take several forms: Is the strategic document incorporated into national strategies? Do politicians refer to it in speeches? Have measures to adopt the document been taken? Are discussions organised with the public and expert communities on the strategic document following its adoption? Do the relevant national, private industrial companies refer to the strategic document?

Intensity of the acknowledgment of the Document's importance at national level	No acknowledgement from any Member State	Few small Member States (in terms of strategic weight) implement strategic guidance	Some small Member States (in terms of strategic weight) implement strategic guidance	A few significant (in terms of strategic weight) Member States implement strategic guidance	All (or almost all) Member States implement the strategic guidance
	0	1	2	3	4

4.4 Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion at Political-Strategic Level

At the political-strategic level, sustainability may refer to the process of creating the strategic document and to the monitoring of its effects over time. At this level, sustainability also includes environmental sustainability, gender considerations and social impact.

4.4.1 Measuring the Sustainability of the Process

- **Criterion 1:** A proxy for the sustainability of the adoption process is the ability to apply it again on other occasions. Taking the example of NATO strategic concepts, while there is no agreed process (Ringsmose & Rynning, 2011, p. 9), there are several practices that are re-used over time. Has the adoption process of the strategic document been reapplied or can it be used for other similar occasions?



- ❖ **Metric:** The metric used to measure the sustainability of the adoption process refers both to the effective use of the developed methodology, and to the efforts. The existence of guidelines or lessons-learned documents from these experiences are indicators for the reusability of a process: How has the reusability of the adoption process been integrated in the cooperation?

Sustainability of the adoption process	The adoption process has not been reused	Guidelines have been provided to replicate the adoption process	The adoption process has been used one additional time in the same context	The adoption process has been used more than once in the same institutional context	The adoption process has been used more than once and has formed an explicit reference in different contexts
	0	1	2	3	4

Referring to the process and its effects over time, sustainability relates to effectiveness. [ENGAGE Working Paper 3](#) states that “a policy is sustainable if its results are lasting”. At politico-strategic level, the inclusiveness of the process has an impact on the long-term sustainability of the document, as well as its lasting impact. The more open and inclusive a process is, the more legitimate the document is perceived to be, thus enhancing sustainability.

- **Criterion 2:** The inclusivity of the process is a key element to assess the sustainability of a strategic document. The criterion and metric dealing with inclusivity proposed above under ‘Effectiveness’ can be used to evaluate the sustainability of the strategic document’s effects over time.

4.4.2 Measuring the Sustainability of the Strategic Document

Political backing and monitoring of the document’s implementation are key factors indicating the document has lasting effects. However, a monitoring mechanism needs political backing to work. The implementation of the EUGS was monitored on an annual basis, but this never led to substantial changes, due to a lack of political support for its conclusions. Equally, the update of the entirety, or part, of the document, is a valuable indicator. Taking the example of the Strategic Compass, the strategy contains a built-in review system for the underlying threat assessment to be conducted every three years.

- **Criterion 3:** The evolution and the implementation of the document are key factors to assess its sustainability. Provisions for the document’s regular revision further indicate political support: Does the strategic document deal with its future adaptation and/or its implementation?
 - ❖ **Metric:** How have adaptability and monitoring been included in the strategic document resulting from a cooperation?



Adaptability and monitoring of the strategic document	No further adaptation of the document, nor monitoring mechanism has been foreseen	The strategic document provides for regular revision of part of its content, but no monitoring mechanism has been foreseen	The strategic document provides for regular revision of its entire content, but no monitoring mechanism has been foreseen	The strategic document provides for regular revision of part of its content and for a monitoring mechanism	The strategic document provides for regular revision of its entire content, and for a monitoring mechanism
	0	1	2	3	4

4.4.3 Measuring ESG and Ethical Considerations

➤ **Criterion 4:** Sustainability can be assessed through the level of engagement of the document with ESG elements and ethics: Does the strategic document resulting from cooperation deal with ESG and ethical factors?

❖ **Metric:** How have ESG and ethical factors been dealt with within the cooperation?

ESG and ethics	ESG and ethics are not integrated in the strategic document	ESG and ethics are partly (i.e. one or two dimensions are) and marginally integrated in the document.	All dimensions of ESG and ethics are integrated in the strategic document but in its margins.	ESG and ethics are integrated in the strategic document but do not lead to specific guidance	ESG and ethics are integrated at each stage of the strategic document and lead to specific guidance
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 5:** At the EU level, gender equality and women’s empowerment are political objectives and priorities of all internal and external EU policies. The EU approach is based on the belief that “[o]nly if gender and diversity are fully integrated into all EU’s analyses and responses to challenges, crises and conflicts, will the outcome be sustainable” (EEAS, 2021). Gender at politico-strategic level can be understood as the way in which the final document engages with gender considerations. Does the strategic document include gender considerations?

❖ **Metric:** How are gender considerations reflected in the strategic document resulting from cooperation?



Gender considerations in the strategic document	Gender considerations do not feature in the strategic document	Gender considerations are included, but no objectives on achieving gender equality are set	Gender considerations are included; unclear objectives on achieving gender equality are set	Gender considerations are included; clear objectives on achieving gender equality are set	Comprehensive gender considerations are included; clear and ambitious objectives on achieving gender equality are set
	0	1	2	3	4

As an example, under the ‘Act’ section of the document, the Strategic Compass re-affirms its commitment to advance EU Women, Peace and Security objectives, by promoting gender equality at all levels and systematically mainstreaming a gender perspective in all civilian and military CSDP planning and actions.

- **Criterion 6:** Policy sustainability can be measured in terms of social impact on human rights. Are human rights mainstreamed in the document? Does the document consider any potential negative social and societal effects? Are measures defined to increase the positive social impact of the documents?

❖ **Metric:** How are human rights reflected in the strategic document?

Human rights considerations in the strategic document	Human rights considerations do not feature in the strategic document	Mentions of human rights are made; the impact of the strategic document on human rights is not considered	Mentions of human rights are made; unclear considerations on the potential negative social and societal effects of the strategic document	Clear considerations on the potential negative social and societal effects of the strategic document are made; concrete objectives seeking positive social impact are proposed	Significant mentions of human rights are made; clear and ambitious objectives seeking positive social impact are proposed
	0	1	2	3	4

The Strategic Compass refers to human rights on several occasions. More specifically, the EU is committed to comply with Human Rights Law and “systematically mainstream human rights [...] in all civilian and military CSDP actions”, also by strengthen[ing] [its] network of human rights [...] advisers in [its] CSDP missions and operations’ (EEAS, 2022).



5 Cooperation at Operational Level

5.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion for Operational Cooperation

Trust and confidence among states engaging in cooperative formats are two determining factors of efficiency at this level of cooperation. Trust can be measured by looking at the types and continuity of cooperative activities among countries. This is particularly true when it comes to P&S of military capabilities (EATC, 2021). These two factors need to be weighed against the intensity of the cooperation and its impact at the national and EU level. As defined in the methodology section, operational cooperation can be defined as a cooperative framework aiming at increased interoperability of armed forces or as cooperation entailing the deployment of forces abroad.

5.1.1 Measuring Effectiveness

➤ **Criterion 1:** The broad range of activities defining this level of cooperation comes with an equally broad combination of national/EU interests and gains, which vary from country to country and do not always coincide with EU interests. Moreover, the factors influencing the formation of national and EU interests are not necessarily the same for different countries and do not always have the same relevance. When it comes to operative cooperation at the EU level, the (mis-)matching of EU and national interests and goals can be a determining factor for the effectiveness of cooperation: the greater the alignment of national and EU interests and goals, the more effective cooperation is likely to be.

❖ **Metric 1:** Does the cooperation have a low, medium, or high-level impact in fulfilling national goals and in achieving national interests?

Cooperation impact on national interests and goals achievement	Cooperation does not enhance the fulfilment of national goals and interests	Cooperation has a low-level impact on the fulfilment of national goals and interests	Cooperation has a medium level impact on the fulfilment of national goals and interests	Cooperation has a high-level impact on the fulfilment of national goals and interests	Cooperation allows the achievement of national goals and interests more effectively than outside the cooperative framework
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 2:** To measure the effectiveness at the EU level, are national goals and interests in line with those of the EU?



Alignment of national goals and interests with the EU ones	National goals and interests are not in line with EU ones	National goals and interests are limitedly in line with EU ones	National goals and interests are partially in line with EU ones	National goals and interests are mostly in line with EU ones	National goals and interests are fully in line with EU ones
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 2:** Cooperation that has a high impact on the achievement of national goals and interests, might be accompanied by losses of states' autonomy or sovereignty, if cooperation is the only way to reach goals and interests. A possible mitigation approach to the loss of autonomy, can be the conditional provision of capabilities and personnel to the cooperative framework. Nonetheless, the possibility to retain control over a decision can be considered both as a positive and a negative factor, as Zandee et al. (2016) point out. It allows participating entities to opt out of cooperation, should the activity not be in line with national priorities, but it might hinder the capacity to deliver result, thus negatively impacting both the effectiveness and sustainability of cooperation. In these cases, effectiveness of cooperation can be assessed by looking at how often the possibility to retain control is activated, and by how many Member States.
 - ❖ **Metric:** In multinational formations foreseeing the possibility to retain authority and decision-making power over the activity of the cooperation, how often do participating Member States activate the clause?

Possibility to retain authority and decision-making power	The clause has been activated by several participating Member States	The clause has been activated by some Member States. The decision was adopted within a timeframe that did not allow other participating Member States to mitigate the reduced availability of resources	The clause has been activated by a small minority of Member States. The decision was adopted within a timeframe that did not allow other participating Member States to mitigate the reduced availability of resources	The clause has been activated by a small minority of Member States. The decision was adopted within a timeframe that allowed other participating Member States to mitigate the reduced availability of resources	The clause has not been activated
	0	1	2	3	4

The EATC can be considered a good example. The conditional Transfer of Authority (ToA) regulates the active involvement of nations and can be revoked by participating Member States at any time. The extremely low rate of activation of the clause is an indicator of the effectiveness of cooperation, and suggests a high degree of trust among participating Member States.

- **Criterion 3:** The effectiveness criterion can also be measured in relation to the internal and external goal attainment.³ Internal effectiveness of an operational cooperation activity can

³ External goal attainment is considered in Chapter 7.



be considered in terms of internal goal attainment and internal appropriateness (FINCENT Publication Series, 2017, p. 80).

- ❖ **Metric:** Are cooperation activities in line with the objective or the mandate of the cooperation?

Adherence of cooperation to its objective and mandate	Cooperation activities contrast with the objective or the mandate	Cooperation is just partially in line with the objective or the mandate	Cooperation is mostly in line with the objective or the mandate	Cooperation is in line with the objective or the mandate	Cooperation perfectly fulfils the objective or the mandate
	0	1	2	3	4

To verify if an operation satisfies internal goal attainment, the tasks performed need to adhere to its objectives and mandate. However, adherence needs to be balanced with politico-strategic goals and operational objectives of both types of operational cooperation considered in this analysis.

- **Criterion 4:** Coming to the internal appropriateness of cooperation, the proper implementation, timeliness, and cost-effectiveness need to be investigated. Timeliness refers to straightforward and timely processes for decision-making, training, force deployment and implementation of the cooperation mandate, whilst cost-effectiveness is essentially a positive cost-benefit assessment where the results justify or even outweigh the material and political costs of cooperation. With reference to missions/operations, all aspects delineated should be present from the perspective of the personnel on the ground and from that of the Headquarters (HQ).

- ❖ **Metric:** Is the cooperation mandate implemented properly?

Proper implementation of the mandate	The mandate is implemented with chronic delay and excessive costs	The mandate is implemented with delay and ineffective costs management	The mandate is timely implemented, but suffer from ineffective cost management	The mandate is almost always timely and cost-effectively implemented	The mandate is timely and cost-effectively implemented
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 5:** With specific reference to a mission/operation, the presence of a strong planning capacity translating into an adequate and scalable, mandate, to be adapted to changed situations and new threats on the ground and at international level is also relevant. The length of the mandate should also allow for the achievement of the mandate's objective. Furthermore, the planning process should involve a tactical assessment mission (TAM) to match the realities on the ground and involve partners as early as possible (Faleg, 2022, pp. 3–50).

- ❖ **Metric 1:** Is the planning of the mission/operation effective? Is it informed by a TAM?



Effectiveness of the mission/operation planning	Mandate is inadequate, planning is ad hoc and not informed by a TAM, partners are not involved	Mandate is sufficiently adequate, but not scalable, planning is ad hoc, a limited TAM had been conducted, partners are involved at a later stage	Mandate is mostly adequate and scalable; no adaptation to the (inter)national situation is possible, planning is mostly thought-out, TAM was conducted, Partners are involved	Mandate is adequate and scalable but its adaptation to the (inter)national situation is complex, planning was well thought-out, TAM was conducted successfully, partners are involved early on	Mandate is adequate, scalable, and can be adapted to the changed (inter)national situation, planning was very well thought-out, TAM was successful and informs planning, partners are involved from the start
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 2:** Are periodic mission reviews and exit strategies defined from the beginning of the operation?

Effectiveness of the mission/operation planning	Periodic review of the achievements is not foreseen; exit strategies are not present	Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen but not performed; exit strategies are not present	Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen but rarely performed; exit strategies are present from the beginning	Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen and performed mostly regularly; exit strategies are present from the beginning	Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen and regularly performed; exit strategies are present from the beginning
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 6:** Once a deployment is in place, its periodic review should be informed by a continuous operational assessment for both military and non-military goals (NATO, 2013, pp. 4–5). Effectiveness can be positively impacted, if the continuous operational assessment is done in conjunction with local authorities and international experts, to gain a broader understanding on the situation on the ground, and to take proper considerations of the potential risks and understanding of the objectives that need to be achieved and assessed (NATO, 2013, pp. 5–18).

❖ **Metric:** Is an operational assessment performed regularly on both military and non-military goals and in conjunction with local authorities and/or international experts?



Effectiveness of the operational assessment	The operational assessment is performed occasionally and is concentrated on either military or non-military goals. Assessment does not consider local authorities and/or international experts views and requirements	The operational assessment is performed occasionally and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals. Assessment does not consider local authorities and/or international experts views and requirements	The operational assessment is performed occasionally and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals. Assessment is informed by local authorities and/or international experts	The operational assessment is performed regularly and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals. Assessment is informed by local authorities and/or international experts	The operational assessment is performed regularly and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals. Assessment is done in conjunction with local authorities and/or international experts
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 7:** As regards personnel for mission/operation, does the planning foresee any pre-deployment and in-mission training, that takes into consideration the reality on the ground (Peters et al., 2021, p. 179)? Effective communication lines between the personnel on the ground and the strategic politico level (Royal Danish Defence College, 2017, p. 11) should ensure proper information on training requirements. Training activities should also consider the eventual presence of joint civil-military deployment and foresee eventual joint training activities. Finally, the time of deployment should be adequate for mission effectiveness and to capitalise on training costs.

❖ **Metric 1:** How effective is the provision and management of the personnel?

Personnel provision and management	Before deployment, personnel are not trained.	Before deployment, personnel are trained. Training is not informed by the reality on the ground and does not include civil-military joint training.	Before deployment, personnel are trained. Training is informed by the reality on the ground but does not include civil-military joint training.	Before deployment, personnel are trained. Training is informed by the reality on the ground and includes civil-military joint training.	Before deployment, personnel are trained. Training is informed by the reality on the ground and includes civil-military joint training.
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 2:** In case of multinational and/or EU missions/operations, does the training provided reflect at least the internationally agreed basic training standards? Is its provision at national level verified by an independent mechanism?



Adherence of training to international standards	Training does not adhere to shared standards, nor there is a verification mechanism	Training adheres to shared standards, but there is no verification mechanism	Training adheres to shared standards, but their application is not verified by an independent mechanism	Training satisfies shared standards, but their application is not verified by an independent mechanism	Training satisfies shared standards, whose application is verified by an independent mechanism
	0	1	2	3	4

5.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion for Operational Cooperation

To define the efficiency criterion for operational cooperation, several factors need to be considered. Depending on whether cooperation aims at increasing interoperability, coherence, and cohesion among partners, or if it foresees a joint deployment, efficiency can have different meanings.

5.2.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency

➤ **Criterion 1:** When looking at operational cooperation among armed forces, efficiency gains can be measured by looking at the reduction of the number of personnel and structures necessary for the participating country, to reach the same operative output if outside of the cooperative framework. Gains can vary according to the specific types of cooperation and lead either to their reduction or total elimination.

❖ **Metric 1:** Does cooperation lead to a reduction or elimination of costs related to personnel and structures?

Reduction or elimination of personnel and structural costs	Cooperation does not reduce costs related to personnel and structures	Cooperation does not reduce costs related to personnel but reduces structural costs	Cooperation reduces costs related to personnel and structural costs	Cooperation optimises costs related to personnel and reduces structural costs	Cooperation optimises costs related to personnel and eliminate structural costs
	0	1	2	3	4

In the case of P&S of capabilities, the EATC example can be considered best practice. The two central goals included in the 2006 Declaration of Intent signed by France and Germany were a more efficient economic management of strategic airlift capabilities and closer planning coordination for operational purposes. Cooperation under the EATC umbrella “has optimised the cost-effective use of air transport, air-to-air refuelling and the aeromedical evacuation capabilities of the participating countries” (Zandee, 2018, p. 36). In the EATC cooperation, Germany managed to eliminate structural costs, through the dissolution of its own air transport command in 2010. This led to a saving of around €3.5 billion (Gallhöfer, 2014, p. 327). The total elimination of structural costs can be considered an exception, but it shows “that permanent integration [...] is perfectly possible” (Zandee, 2018).



❖ **Metric 2:** Does the P&S increase the level of capabilities of participating Member States? Does it focus on strategic enablers?

Increased capacity of participating Member States	Cooperation decreases the operative capacity of Member States. It is not focused on strategic enablers	Cooperation does not affect the operative capacity of Member States. It is not focused on strategic enablers	Cooperation slightly increases the operative capacity of participating Member States, but does not focus on strategic enablers	Cooperation increases the operative capacity of Member States. It focuses on one strategic enabler	Cooperation increases substantially the operative capacity of Member States. It focuses on more than one strategic enabler
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 2:** In case of a common clearance and authorisation system, efficiency can be measured in terms of procedural management of the system leading to a reduction of bureaucratic, maintenance, logistics, and training costs. The efficiency of the procedure is, however, dependant on the actual implementation by the participating states.

❖ **Metric:** Does cooperation lead to a reduction of bureaucratic, maintenance, logistic and training costs?

Reduction of bureaucratic, maintenance, logistic, training costs	Cooperation does not enhance the reduction of bureaucratic, maintenance, logistic and training costs	Cooperation enhances the reduction of few costs indicated in parameter 4	Cooperation enhances the reduction of some of the costs indicated in parameter 4	Cooperation enhances the reduction of several of the costs indicated in parameter 4	Cooperation enhances the reduction of bureaucratic, maintenance, logistic and training costs
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 3:** To reduce these costs role specialisation can be a variable to assess efficiency gains. In the case of the BENESAM cooperation, the gradual integration of training modules, as well as the provision of logistical and maintenance support for each other's equipment, allowed Dutch and Belgian navies to maintain their respective fleet capacities against budgetary cuts (Sauer, 2015, p. 54; Zandee et al., 2016, p. 40). However, role specialisation can lead to dependencies among participating Member States. Depending on the type of cooperation, role specialisation can have a significant, or minimal, impact on the country's national autonomy. The higher the military, expeditionary, ambition of the country, the more probable it is the country will oppose the creation of these dependences.

❖ **Metric:** In case of role specialisation, is it in line with the national ambitions?



Role specialisation alignment to national ambitions	Role specialisation does not satisfy national military ambitions	Role specialisation aligns with few national military ambitions	Role specialisation aligns partially with national military ambitions	Role specialisation aligns with most of the national military ambitions	Role specialisation satisfies the national military ambitions
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 4:** Efficiency gains can derive from the coordination of national defence planning processes. Coordination of defence planning can lead to the development of joint doctrine and high levels of interoperability among the participating Member States.

❖ **Metric:** Does the cooperation lead to a coordination of national defence planning processes and increased interoperability?

Coordination of national defence planning processes	Cooperation does not lead to coordinated defence planning processes, nor to joint doctrines or interoperability	Cooperation leads to initial dialogue towards an alignment of defence planning processes	Cooperation leads to a partial alignment of defence planning processes and some level of interoperability	Cooperation leads to coordinated defence planning processes and high interoperability levels but not to joint doctrines	Cooperation leads to coordinated defence planning processes, joint doctrines, and high interoperability
	0	1	2	3	4

An example is the Capacité Motorisée (CaMo) cooperation between France and Belgium (Biscop, 2020, p. 113).

➤ **Criterion 5:** With specific reference to joint deployment, an aspect that can have an impact on both the efficiency and effectiveness of cooperation is the availability of a well-functioning procurement mechanism for the provision of mission-required equipment. Common warehouses that can mobilise the required resources can generate efficiency gains in the form of economies of scales and reduced timeframes necessary to provide equipment. Moreover, in case of permanent warehouses, the surpluses resulting from one deployment can be re-deployed to other missions/operations. Nonetheless, for the warehouse to be efficient and effective, there needs to be a clear definition of the required equipment and contributions.

❖ **Metric:** In the case of joint deployment is there a warehouse with adequate procedures and resources?



Use of warehouses in joint deployment	There is no warehouse and participating states' contribution to required equipment is not defined	There is a warehouse. A clear definition of states' contributions to required equipment is missing. Relocation of resources to other missions is not performed	There is a permanent, warehouse. A clear definition of states' contributions to required equipment is missing and economies of scales are limited. Relocation of resources to other missions is not performed	There is a permanent, warehouse. There is a clear definition of states' contributions to required equipment creating economies of scales. Relocation of resources to other missions is not performed	There is a permanent, warehouse. The clear definition of states' contributions to required equipment and its actual provision create economies of scales and allow the relocation of resources to other missions
	0	1	2	3	4

The EU Warehouse for civilian CSDP missions and operations can be considered a first attempt to create such a mechanism for civilian CSDP missions and operations, although it provides just general means and there is no similar effort for military CSDP operations (EEAS, 2018, p. 11).

5.3 Operationalising the 'Coherence' Criterion for Operational Cooperation

The criterion of coherence for operational cooperation entails coherence of actions, actors, or processes depending on the aspect under investigation (Peters et al., 2021, p. 174). For the purpose of this chapter, only the coherence of action and actors is considered and categorised as features of horizontal coherence.

5.3.1 Measuring Horizontal Coherence

- **Criterion 1:** Coherence of action can be translated as a match between policy goals and actual contributions towards cooperative outcomes or implementation of cooperation activities. The voluntary character defining cooperation, i.e. the provision of personnel for joint units or the communication of national information to plan and conduct joint activities, can hinder the coherence of cooperation (Karlsrud & Reykers, 2020, p. 1525). With reference to the EU Battlegroups (EU BG), the lack of political support to deploy them contrasts with the EU policy goal of the 2010 Headline Goal, resulting in incoherent action (European Parliament, 2020, pp. 5–6).
- ❖ **Metric:** Do Member States provide the necessary contributions to the cooperative framework, and is this framework used when needed?



States contribution to the cooperative framework and actual implementation of the cooperative activities	States do not contribute to the cooperative framework	States contribute to the cooperative framework but do not provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities	States contribute to the cooperative framework, but seldom provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities	States contribute to the cooperative framework and mostly provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities	States contribute to the cooperative framework and provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 2:** At the EU level, coherence of action during deployment can be represented as the coherence of different missions/operations' mandate. Discrepancies between missions/operations' mandates operating on the same territory risk undermining the effectiveness and sustainability of cooperation, as it was in the case of EUFOR Althea and EUPM B&I (EUISS, 2009, p. 164). This level of coherence could also be considered to refer to the coherence of actors, as different bodies and actors are involved. In the case of separate civilian and military missions, is there any coordination mechanism to ensure coherence of policies and efforts? Is this coordination performed through shared procedures? Is there any integrated planning? Are the chains of command of the missions/operations clear and coherent?

❖ **Metric:** In case of two or more missions/operations operating on the same country, is coordination in place?

Missions / operations coordination	There is no coordination among different missions / operations	Coordination of different missions / operations is seldom performed, and it involves just some aspects	Coordination of different missions / operations is regularly performed, but just on some aspects	Coordination of different missions / operations is regularly performed	Coordination of different missions / operations is constantly performed and benefits from shared procedures
	0	1	2	3	4

5.3.2 Measuring Vertical Coherence

➤ **Criterion 3:** The vertical level of coherence, can be understood as the coherence between the mission/operation mandate and the policy goals or priorities of the EU. Does the operation/mission mandate fulfil EU policy goals or priorities?

❖ **Metric:** How does the operation/mission mandate fulfil EU policy goals or priorities?



Coherence of missions / operation with EU policy goals or priorities	Operation / mission mandate does not fulfil EU policy goals or priorities	Operation / mission mandate fulfils few EU policy goals or priorities	Operation / mission mandate just partially fulfils EU policy goals or priorities	Operation / mission mandate mostly fulfils EU policy goals or priorities	Operation / mission mandate fulfils EU policy goals or priorities
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 4:** Different national systems and procedures to agree on new missions, mandate extensions or modifications, definition of the number of personnel to be deployed, and related fiscal effort can lead to delays and coordination problems. The more differences at national level are present, the more probable it is that cooperation will suffer in effectiveness (Kissack, Michaels & Fernández, 2022).

❖ **Metric:** Do national differences affect cooperation?

Procedural similarities for operational deployment	Different national systems and procedures substantially affect cooperation	Different national systems and procedures moderately affect cooperation	Different national systems and procedures rarely affect cooperation	National systems and procedures are similar and residual differences might rarely affect cooperation	National systems and procedures are similar and residual differences do not affect cooperation
	0	1	2	3	4

5.4 Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion for Operational Cooperation

➤ **Criterion 1:** Where cooperation is meant to improve the interoperability, coherence, and cohesion of the respective armed forces, sustainability of cooperation at Member State level can be assessed by looking at whether the country has or does not have the possibility to retain control of capabilities. As a general pre-condition for cooperation, the political and policy interests of participating states need to be satisfied, or at least not undermined, otherwise cooperation becomes internally unsustainable. Particularly in the case of multinational commands, the political sustainability of cooperation can be evaluated by assessing the possibility for a country to refuse to participate in a particular mission, while continuing to be included in the cooperative framework (O'Donnell, 2013, p. 3).

❖ **Metric:** Does the cooperative framework allow to retain control of the shared capabilities, should an activity not be in line with the political and policy interests of the state?



Retention of control of shared capabilities	Cooperation does not allow to retain control of shared capabilities, in case activities are not in line with the political and policy interests of the state	Retaining control of shared capabilities, should cooperation not be in line with the political and policy interests of the state, is possible, but extremely complex	Retaining control of shared capabilities, should cooperation not be in line with the political and policy interests of the state is possible, but complex	Retaining control of shared capabilities, should cooperation not be in line with the political and policy interests of the state, is possible, but limited	Retaining complete control of shared capabilities, should it not be in line with the political and policy interests of the state, is possible
	0	1	2	3	4

The conditional Transfer of Authority (ToA) in the EATC framework regulates the active involvement of nations in the cooperation and can be revoked by participating Member States at any time. Actual use of this possibility might of course hinder the overall sustainability and effectiveness of the EATC.

- **Criterion 2:** From an EU perspective, political sustainability can be measured in terms of adherence of the cooperative activities to the EU policy goals and priorities. Is the cooperation in line with the EU policy goals and priorities?

❖ **Metric:** To which extent does cooperation align with EU policy goals and priorities?

Fulfilment of EU policy goals and priorities	Cooperation is not in line with the EU policy goals and priorities	Cooperation is conceptually in line with EU policy goals and priorities, but the format does not help in fulfilling them	Cooperation is in line with EU policy goals and priorities, but the format allows for their minimal fulfilment	Cooperation is in line with the EU policy goals and priorities, but it just partially helps in fulfilling them	Cooperation is in line with, and helps in fulfilling, the EU policy goals and priorities
	0	1	2	3	4

National and EU policy goals and priorities do not always align and this misalignment can undermine cooperation, even if the prerequisites for good cooperative outcomes are otherwise present.

- **Criterion 3:** A sustainable coverage of costs, and provision of equipment and personnel can be ensured if there is a jointly defined target for which states are accountable. Nonetheless, the voluntary aspect of states contribution to cooperative frameworks or to joint deployments does make verification and any potential sanctioning of underperformance problematic.


❖ **Metric:** Does cooperation foresee a clear definition of burden-sharing and provision of equipment and personnel? Do participating Member States cover costs and provide the necessary equipment, for which they are accountable?



Coverage of costs, provision of equipment and personnel	Cooperation does not define burden-sharing, provision of equipment and personnel.	Cooperation provides information on burden-sharing, provision of equipment and personnel. States do not always satisfy the requirements	Cooperation foresees well-defined burden-sharing, provision of equipment and personnel. States do not always satisfy the requirements	Cooperation foresees well-defined burden-sharing, provision of equipment and personnel. States satisfy the requirements but there is no accountability mechanism	Cooperation foresees well-defined burden-sharing, provision of equipment and personnel. States satisfy the requirements for which they are accountable
	0	1	2	3	4

For civilian CSDP missions/operations, personnel can be seconded or contracted. Despite the presence of target goals for national seconded personnel (Council of the EU, 2019, p. 2), Member States fail to meet this target mostly due to a preference to retain experts in the country. The high percentage of contracted personnel in civilian CSDP missions has a considerable impact on the EEAS budget (see figure 2). Consequently, sustainability of deployment can be hindered, with repercussions on the capacity to perform the mandate. Furthermore, the necessary budget should be provided in a way that is sustainable for the personnel already deployed. The example of the EUCAP Sahel Niger shows some of the difficulties EU missions have encountered: the mission did not receive the necessary funding, thus asking its personnel to accept a financial liability for the period with uncovered budget (ECA, 2018, p. 20).

Figure 3: 2020 CFSP Budget Breakdown by Action Type (EUR)



Source: European Commission (2020a, p. 24)

- **Criterion 4:** The sustainability of joint deployments can be defined in terms of sustainability of the process and of its outcomes. The characteristics affecting the effectiveness of a mission also affect also the sustainability criterion. In this case both criteria are highly intertwined and related metrics can be used to assess both.



5.4.1 Measuring ESG and Ethical Considerations

➤ **Criterion 5:** Does cooperation consider the environmental footprint?

❖ **Metric:** While the inclusion of environmental considerations in the planning and management forms the basis to understand if a cooperative framework can be considered sustainable, it is their full and timely implementation that is a more precise parameter to evaluate this aspect. Does cooperation take into consideration its environmental footprint, and are eventual mitigating activities timely and fully implemented by participating states?

Environmental sustainability	Cooperation does not acknowledge its possible environmental footprint	Cooperation acknowledges its possible environmental footprint but does not foresee mitigating activities.	Cooperation acknowledges its possible environmental footprint and foresees mitigating activities. Participating states partially implement them, and with delay	Cooperation acknowledges its possible environmental footprint and foresees mitigating activities. Participating states fully implement them, but with delay	Cooperation acknowledges its possible environmental footprint and foresees mitigating activities. Participating states timely and fully implement the mitigating activities
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 6:** A more concrete approach, requires evaluating the impact of the generated output on the environment.

❖ **Metric:** Has the cooperation contributed to limiting or reducing the environmental footprint, otherwise created without the cooperative framework?

Environmental impact reduction	Cooperation did not help limiting or reducing the environmental footprint, but generated additional environmental impact	Cooperation did not help limiting or reducing the environmental footprint	Cooperation did not have an impact on the level of environmental footprint, otherwise created without the cooperative framework	Cooperation contributed to limiting the environmental footprint, otherwise created without the cooperative framework	Cooperation contributed to reducing the environmental footprint, otherwise created without the cooperative framework
	0	1	2	3	4

The example of the EATC shows that it is possible to reduce the environmental footprint through cooperation. The flight hour exchange system has the effect of planes flying with greater loads and seldomly empty, there is a reduced use of civil flight companies, and the exchange in flights entails that flights which would otherwise only happen nationally, or not at all, can still be conducted jointly (Gallhöfer, 2014, pp. 328–332).



➤ **Criterion 7:** Gender considerations are relevant for both types of operational cooperation considered in this chapter. Nonetheless, due to space limit, only considerations on gender in deployment will be presented.

❖ **Metric 1:** Does the operation/mission include considerations on gender sustainability? Does the mission satisfy the standards for female inclusion? Does it foresee a dedicated budget?

Gender sustainability in deployment	Gender considerations are not included in the planning of the mission / operation.	Gender considerations are included in the planning of the mission / operation. Standards for female inclusion are not considered.	Gender considerations are included in the planning of the mission / operation. Standards for female inclusion are residually satisfied	Gender considerations are included in the planning, of the mission / operation from the beginning. Standards for female inclusion are partly satisfied	Gender considerations are included in the planning of the mission / operation and satisfy standards for female inclusion.
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 2:** Are the female personnel equally represented for all functions and at all levels? Is there a gender advisor to the mission for which a budget line is included in the planning of the operation?

Gender sustainability in deployment	Gender considerations are not included in the planning of the mission / operation, nor for its management and implementation.	Deployment suffers from unbalanced representation. There is no gender advisor to the mission	Deployment suffers from unbalanced representation. The presence of a gender advisor to the mission is contemplated in the planning, but no dedicated budget line is foreseen.	There is satisfactory balanced representation at all levels and a gender advisor to the mission. Budget line for the latter is not foreseen from the beginning.	There is balanced representation at all levels and a gender advisor to the mission, for which position a dedicated funding line is in place.
	0	1	2	3	4

When it comes to the situation on the ground, should the mission and mission's personnel fail to address and include the female part of the population, analysis show that there is the risk for reduced (or even lack of) support, to the mission from one part of the population and their families (CIMIC-CoE, 2020). Additionally, this can also affect the way civil society manages and includes parts/components of the society. It is therefore important that an assessment of the operation looks at how different components of society are considered in the operation plans and if this is reflected in the composition of the locally contracted personnel.



6 Cooperation at Capability Development Level

6.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion at Capability Development Level

Applied to cooperation at capability development level, effectiveness is assessed by evaluating both military and industrial objectives of the cooperation. Measuring effectiveness as leadership capacity at this level relates to the cooperation's attractiveness for third countries.

6.1.1 Measuring Effectiveness

At capability development level, effectiveness as goal achievement relates to the ability to develop and produce the capabilities pursued by the participating Member States. From an industrial viewpoint, it also relates to the creation of the necessary technological and industrial assets, including a resilient supply chain, especially in terms of strategic autonomy and security of supply (SoS).

An essential question lies in the level at which goals have been defined. At EU level, there are military objectives (Capability Development Plan, OSRA, the 'Invest' section of the Strategic Compass) and industrial ones (Defence industrial policy objectives). At the level of cooperation initiatives, military objectives are expressed as requirements for the capability, while the definition of industrial objectives at the beginning mainly clarifies the acceptable industrial work share among partners. In addition, effectiveness can be interpreted as delivering an increased level of strategic autonomy. A third level of analysis is represented by the Member State level, which, however, is not taken into consideration given the scope and focus of this working paper.

The effectiveness of the development and production of a jointly produced military capability can be assessed by looking at the military performance of the capability: achieving the desired effect in a specific operating environment, having certain specific functionalities, or a certain design for operational purposes.

➤ **Criterion 1:** Has the cooperation delivered a capability that satisfies stated military requirements?

❖ **Metric 1:** To assess the effectiveness of the capability with regard to the set military objectives, it is relevant to analyse how requirements were formulated during the requirement phase of the Defence Capability Systems Life Cycle. Literature (Maulny et al., 2006, p. 10) states that formulating common requirements is one of the challenges for armament cooperation. Inconsistent and incoherent requirements can result in a 'very expensive and complex [system] and would effectively be counter-productive to



the idea behind a cooperative initiative'. Have participating Member States agreed on sufficiently consistent and coherent requirements?

Agreed requirements	No requirements were identified	Failure to agree on requirements	Agreement on the sum of national requirements	Agreement on the distinction between common and national requirements	Agreement on the definition of common European requirements
	0	1	2	3	4

The lack of agreement on requirements caused difficulties in the Tiger Helicopter Programme, launched in the 1980s between France and Germany. The different national requirements caused the production of two different helicopters (Maulny et al., 2006, p. 17). In more extreme cases, when shared requirements fail to be agreed on, the cooperation can fall through, as in the case of the Horizon frigate project. In 1999, the UK left the project, partly because it could not agree on shared requirements with France and Italy.

❖ **Metric 2:** Assuming requirements were agreed upon, has the cooperation met them?

Military performances	Fails to meet the requirements of the armed forces	Significantly below the requirements of the armed forces	Consistent with the main requirements of the armed forces	Consistent with requirements of the armed forces	Exceeds the requirements of the armed forces
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 2:** In the case of capability development cooperation at EU level, goal achievement can be evaluated by looking at EU documents identifying EU capability shortfalls and future need:⁴ Has the cooperation delivered a capability addressing EU military needs and shortfalls?

❖ **Metric 1:** In the case of the A400M military transport aircraft, cooperation aimed at developing an air-to-air refuelling capability, identified as a critical European capability shortfall. According to Airbus, the A400M has already showcased its capability to refuel fighter jets such as Eurofighter, Rafale, Tornado or F/A-18 (Aeromorning, 2019). However, addressing EU shortfalls/needs might not be the only driver for cooperation. Hence, referring to EU documents can help assess the effectiveness of cooperation regarding EU objectives: To what extent has the cooperation succeeded in either filling a capability gap or meeting a capability need identified at EU level?

⁴ At EU level, multiple documents identify capability shortfalls/future needs. These include: Headline Goal Process, High Impact Capability Goals (HICGs), Progress Catalogue High Impact Capability Shortfalls, EDA's CDP, CARD, EDF Work Programme and the Strategic Compass.



EU capability gaps/needs	Failure to fulfil an EU capability gap/need	Cooperation partially fulfils an EU capability gap/need	Cooperation fulfils one EU capability gap/need	Cooperation fulfils both an EU and a NATO capability gap/need	Cooperation fulfils or enable to fulfil several EU capability gaps/needs
	0	1	2	3	4

- ❖ **Metric 2:** In the context of current EU efforts, to boost cooperation and interoperability among Member States, the capability impact on the latter can be considered as an indicator of its effectiveness: Has interoperability among EU Member States increased as a result of this cooperation?

Interoperability	No interoperability resulted from cooperation	Limited interoperability between some EU Member States' armies resulted from cooperation	Partial interoperability between some EU Member States' armies resulted from cooperation	Interoperability between all EU Member States' armies resulted from cooperation	Interoperability between EU, NATO and allied armies resulted from cooperation
	0	1	2	3	4

Cooperation for capability development is heavily dependent on industry. Therefore, effectiveness should be evaluated against the cooperation's industrial objectives. These goals can be assessed by looking at the creation of the technological and industrial assets necessary to produce these capabilities, and by analysing the cooperation's effect on the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

- **Criterion 2:** At cooperation level, assessing the effectiveness of industrial objectives is essentially done by looking at the resilience of the supply chain, especially in terms of strategic autonomy and security of supply (SoS): Has cooperation resulted in a supply chain that brings both strategic autonomy and SoS to involved Member States?

- ❖ **Metric:** What has been the cooperation contribution to the participating Member States' strategic autonomy and SoS?

Contribution to strategic autonomy / SoS	Loss of strategic autonomy and SoS	No gains in strategic autonomy and SoS	Partial gains in strategic autonomy and SoS	Relevant gains in strategic autonomy and SoS	Gained full strategic autonomy and SoS
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 3:** At EU level, the main criterion to assess the effectiveness of industrial objectives is to look at the fragmentation of the EDTIB: Has cooperation resulted in a more integrated EDTIB, reducing duplication of technological and industrial capabilities?

- ❖ **Metric:** What has been the cooperation effect on the EDTIB as a whole?



Defragmentation of the EDTIB	Further fragmentation of the EDTIB has taken place, high levels of duplication	No consolidation among participating defence companies, high levels of duplication	Limited consolidation among participating defence companies. EDTIB increasingly intertwined, expertise of participants partly complementary	Consolidation among participating defence companies, expertise of participants complementary	Transnational integration of participating defence companies
	0	1	2	3	4

The case of the PANAVIA consortium that built the Tornado aircraft is a good example where no consolidation between the activities of the participating defence companies took place (Maulny et al., 2006, p. 21). At that time, consolidation was not envisaged, as these issues were at the heart of state sovereignty. The creation of MBDA instead represents a positive example. Moved by the determination of participating Member States to become less dependent on the US supplier, in 2001 France, Italy and the UK formed MBDA, which Germany and Spain joined later.

6.1.2 Measuring Effectiveness as Leadership Capacity

➤ **Criterion 4:** Effectiveness as leadership capacity relates to the potential effects on third countries. The attractiveness of cooperation can lead to the inclusion of new partners, the acquisition of the produced capability by third countries, or the creation of new norms and standards based on the result of cooperation.

❖ **Metric 1:** Has cooperation attracted new partners?

Attractiveness of cooperation	One (or more) of the participating Member States left cooperation	No additional states expressed willingness to join cooperation	At least one state expressed its willingness to join cooperation	At least one significant state in strategic terms expressed its wish to join cooperation	Cooperation attracted two or more additional participants
	0	1	2	3	4

The A400M aircraft programme is a concrete example of cooperation that does not demonstrate high levels of attractiveness. The initial group of participating countries included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, and the UK. However, Italy subsequently withdrew from cooperation, since Italian armed forces had more urgent priorities than the A400M (Macalister & Willan, 2001). Italy's withdrawal points to the cooperation failure to maintain a high level of attractiveness for participating Member States. It can be argued that such a withdrawal negatively affected the cooperation image and, therefore, disincentivised third countries from wanting to join. Alternatively, the case of Europe's Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which started out as a joint venture between France and Germany in 2017 and was later expanded to Spain in June 2019, highlights the cooperation's ability to



attract new partners. The cooperation was seen as an opportunity for Spain to showcase its defence-industrial base on a multinational stage (War Blog, 2021).

- ❖ **Metric 2:** To further assess effectiveness as leadership capacity, looking at orders from third countries can illustrate the attractiveness of the capability created through cooperation. It can be assumed that a high number of purchases by multiple non-cooperating Member States or other third countries highlights the attractiveness of the capability.

Attractiveness of the developed capability	No state outside the cooperation has purchased the capability	One state has purchased the capability	At least one significant state in strategic terms has purchased the capability	Several states have purchased the capability	Multiple orders are placed by states outside the cooperation
	0	1	2	3	4

While a cooperation can lose in attractiveness, the capability can still be attractive to non-cooperating Member States. In fact, the A400M is currently operated/ordered by 10 nations (IISS, 2022).

- ❖ **Metric 3:** Finally, leadership capacity can be assessed by looking at whether norms and standards created in the cooperative framework were adopted beyond their initial context. If new norms and standards have resulted from cooperation and have been adopted for the creation of other capabilities, this can be interpreted as significant leadership capacity.

Creation and adoption of new norms and standards	No new norms and standards have resulted from cooperation	New norms and standards have resulted from cooperation but have not been adopted across defence industry	New norms and standards have resulted from cooperation but have only been adopted by the Member States in the cooperation	New norms and standards have resulted from cooperation and were adopted across the EDTIB	New norms and standards have resulted from cooperation and were adopted across the EDTIB and the DTIBs of allied countries
	0	1	2	3	4

This point can be illustrated by EDA Manufacturable GaN-SiC-substrates and GaN epitaxial wafers supply chain (MANGA) project. Involving France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK, this led to the establishment of an EU-based supply chain (EDA, 2014). The standards and norms of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have been adopted in other cooperative frameworks for the development of new capabilities, as in the case of the Eurofighter’s new generation Captor-E radar based on AESA technology.



6.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion at Capability Development Level

Efficiency in the context of the capability development level relates to i) cost efficiency and economic reasons for cooperation; ii) time efficiency of cooperation; iii) institutional and industrial set up of cooperation.

6.2.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency

A way to assess the efficiency of capability development cooperation is to look at economies of scale realised by the participating Member States. It is, however, difficult to assess these economic gains precisely, as it requires the use of theoretical counterfactuals should no comparable national armament programmes exist. A solution could be to resort to the "rule of thumb" on the cost of cooperation, according to which the total cost of a cooperative project is equal to its normal costs multiplied by the square root of the number of participants (Mauro et al., 2021, p. 41). For each partner, the cost of the project is lower than the 'normal price'. In addition to economies of scale, cost efficiency can be assessed by looking at the ratio of the budget spent against the planned budget. This metric seeks to assess the nature of the resources used (national, European, or both), if cooperation ran over budget, or if the level of funds were sufficient.

➤ **Criterion 1:** Has cooperation enabled cost savings/economies of scale and respected the set budget?

❖ **Metric 1:** How important were the cost savings enabled by the cooperation?

Cost efficiency	The cost of cooperation is higher for each partner than through a national programme	Cooperation generates extra costs that exceed the "cost-rule-of-thumb"	Cooperation more or less complies with the "cost-rule-of-thumb"	Cooperation exceeds the "cost-rule-of-thumb" expectations	Cooperation' cost is close to the cost of an efficient national programme
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 2:** Was the capability delivered to the set budget?

Management of the budget	Cooperation is cancelled because of lack of funds	Lack of money, under-estimation of total costs or over-estimation of national resources available	Sufficient money, sound estimates of total costs, limited national resources available, slight budget overruns	Sufficient money, national resources available, no budget overruns	Sufficient money, sound estimates of the total cost, common European resources available
	0	1	2	3	4



6.2.2 Measuring Time Efficiency

- **Criterion 2:** Another essential criterion relates to the cooperation ability to meet previously agreed deadlines. Delays could be technical (for instance disruptions in the supply chain) or could stem from disagreement among Member States or industry, as it happened between Airbus and Dassault on how to divide the workshare in the FCAS cooperation (Bauer, 2022). Significant delays will point to difficulties on various levels and may have been subject to poor management, whereas minimal delays can be considered to have benefitted from appropriate management to deal with arising issues and difficulties: Has cooperation been able to deliver the capability within the intended timeframe?

- ❖ **Metric:** How timely was the cooperation?

Time efficiency	Cancelled programme	No realistic deadlines have been defined for the cooperation	Delays that affect the development of the capability	Delays that do not significantly affect the development of the capability	No delays occurred
	0	1	2	3	4

In extreme cases, programmes can acquire significant delays, such as the Trigat MP programme which registered 114 months of delays and was eventually cancelled. In contrast, the Franco-British-Italian Aster family of surface-to-air anti-missile missiles demonstrates the benefits of well managed cooperative programmes. Despite some delays, these programmes have delivered top-of-the-range capabilities (Maulny et al., 2006).

6.2.3 Measuring Industrial Efficiency

In the context of capability development, industrial organisation should be considered as it encompasses the industrial and technological resources, required for the development of such a capability. In addition, the importance of a lean industrial set up has been pointed out in the literature (Maulny et al., 2006).

- **Criterion 3:** The industrial set-up and the question of *juste retour*, are often seen to be “the single biggest obstacle to smoother co-operation on joint European programmes” (Maulny et al., 2006, p. 28) and thus influence efficiency. Positive effects of either limited or non-existent *juste retour* policies include much greater industrial consolidation and technology specialisation across Europe, and focus procurement on choosing the best company, with the best product, for the right price (Maulny et al., 2006): Was the industrial organisation set-up to maximise the effects of the cooperation at European level?

- ❖ **Metric:** Against this background, a good metric lies in the way *juste retour* obligations have been managed, meaning the ratio of work assigned to a national defence industry against the participating Member States’ financial contribution: What was the *juste retour* set-up of the cooperation?



Geo-return set-up	Full juste retour rules on each phase of the programme	Juste retour rules applied from R&D to production and to whole life support	Juste retour rules only applied from R&D to production with the possibility to use the OCCAR 'global balance system'	Juste retour rules limited to R&D activities	Juste retour eliminated: specialisation and open competition for industrial contracts
	0	1	2	3	4

In this context, the “global balance” model of the Organization Conjointe de Cooperation en matière d’Armement (OCCAR) appears as a relevant example to consider. OCCAR’s ‘global balance’ model states that “the defence industry of a member-state must receive work worth at least 66 per cent of its government’s financial contribution to programmes calculated over a number of years” (Maulny & al., 2006, p. 23). In comparison to traditional juste retour, under which a national industry received work equivalent to the full amount of its government’s financial contribution, the ‘global balance’ model is significant progress. This system is, however, criticised for mostly benefiting larger producer countries, as these can participate in more programmes and win significant contracts (Ibid.).

6.3 Operationalising the ‘Coherence’ Criterion at Capability Development Level

Horizontal coherence of this type of cooperation can be assessed in relation to other EU external policies and in relation to other international/national capabilities being in development or already developed. Horizontal coherence in relation to EU external documents presents a challenge as it overlaps significantly with effectiveness. Participating Member States’ adherence to the cooperation, but also the integration of the capability in their militaries, is used to evaluate vertical coherence.

6.3.1 Measuring Horizontal Coherence

- **Criterion 1:** At capability development level, horizontal coherence assesses the consistency of cooperation with EU capability goals and EU industrial policies and strategies: Is cooperation coherent with other EU policies/strategic documents?
 - ❖ **Metric 1:** This criterion also pertains to the effectiveness of cooperation, notably to the metric: ‘Has cooperation succeeded in either filling a capability gap or meeting a capability need identified at EU level?’ By filling a capability gap/need or not, one can both measure the effectiveness of the cooperation but also evaluate its coherence toward EU policies on capability needs and shortfalls.
 - ❖ **Metric 2:** An alternative way would be to compare the articulation of the cooperation with EU industrial policies and strategies, including the EDA’s EDTIB Strategy (2007). The EU industrial defence policies generally relate to the fragmentation and duplication



of industrial capabilities across Europe. This type of horizontal coherence relates to the effectiveness of cooperation, notably to the metric: ‘What has been the effect of the cooperation for the EDTIB as a whole?’ This metric thus evaluates both the effectiveness and the coherence of cooperation and the same scoring applies: Indeed, a cooperation that would trigger additional and redundant industrial capabilities would not be considered as coherent with this policy.

While this goes beyond the scope of this working paper, it can be noted that a criterion and metric could be created to assess the consistency of cooperation with EU internal policies, including the EU Green Deal, for example. Given that the focus is on coherence in relation to external policies, such a criterion is not further investigated.

6.3.2 Measuring Vertical Coherence

Vertical coherence generally relates to the availability of the necessary resources at national level to pursue cooperation.

- **Criterion 2:** Do participating Member States support the cooperation financially and politically? Is the capability integrated in the participating Member States’ militaries? It is important to note that this criterion will have an impact on both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the cooperation, and potentially on its sustainability.
- ❖ **Metric 1:** Looking at the level of financial contribution is useful as it can be argued that the more participating Member States financially contribute to the cooperation, the higher is their level of support: Have participating Member States contributed national resources to the cooperation budget?

Financial participation of Member States	No financial contribution	Promise of financial participation	Financial contribution lower than initially set	Initial financial contribution met	Financial contribution above initial commitment
	0	1	2	3	4

Financial contributions of participating Member States can be determinant in the continuation of cooperation and development of the capability. In the case of FCAS, while the three participating Member States reached a financial agreement in May 2021 on Phase 1B, each accepting to contribute €1.2 billion for this phase, this was not without problems. Indeed, for each new phase of the programme, the German Ministry of Defence has to seek the Bundestag’s budget. This could lead to the amount being renegotiated or payment refused. The succession of contracts and contributions can create tensions among the participating Member States, delay the project, create loss of money or even lead to its cancellation.

- ❖ **Metric 2:** While financial contributions are essential, political support is equally important. Political support can impact the level of financial contributions at the disposal of cooperation or it can help solve issues at industrial level: Have participating Member States politically adhered to the cooperation?



Political commitment of Member States	Participating Member States do not commit politically, nor financially	Participating Member States do not commit politically, only financially	Participating Member States actively support their industry involved in the cooperation	Participating Member States support the project beyond their borders	Cooperation is a strategic priority for participating Member States
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 3:** Have the participating Member States integrated the resulting capability in their militaries?

Integration of the capability in participating Member States' military	The capability is not integrated in participating Member States' military	Commitment of participating Member States to integrate the capability	Only part of participating Member States integrates the capability	Most of participating Member States integrate the capability	All participating Member States integrate the capability
	0	1	2	3	4

6.4 Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion at Capability Development Level

6.4.1 Measuring the Economic and Industrial Sustainability of Cooperation

➤ **Criterion 1:** The sustainability of cooperation can be understood as being related to its economic viability and industrial set-up. Economic viability implies that cooperation has a solid business model, or planned procurement activity. In addition, the ability to export the resulting equipment affects economic sustainability. In this perspective, the degree of alignment of export control policies or the existence of a single set of control rules must be considered: Was the viability of cooperation ensured by sufficient market perspectives?

❖ **Metric:** How has the economic viability of the cooperation been taken into account?

Economic viability	No market perspectives	Some acquisitions planned but uncertainty on their level	Sufficient acquisitions planned and secured	Sufficient acquisitions planned; alignment of export rules	Sufficient acquisitions planned; single set of export rules
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 2:** The potential for further development of the industrial set-up can be an indicator of sustainability. The ability to export the equipment resulting from cooperation,



thus, affects the sustainability of the project and its supply chain to be economically viable: Has cooperation resulted in a sustained cooperation at industrial level?

❖ **Metric:** How is cooperation affecting the industrial structure of involved businesses?

Industrial stability	Businesses are now competitors	No effect	Cooperation is strictly limited to the considered capability	Cooperation intensifies in subsequent activities	Industrial integration within a single entity
	0	1	2	3	4

6.4.2 Measuring the Durability of Cooperation

Sustainability can be measured by verifying whether cooperation integrates considerations on future stages of the life-cycle of the capability not covered by the capability development stage.

➤ **Criterion 3:** Without collaboration and cooperation over the evolution of the capability, interoperability of armaments becomes impossible. From an economic point of view, cost of in-service life support can be twice the acquisition cost of a programme (Maulny et al., 2006, p. 17): Was further cooperation at later stages of the capability lifecycle planned in the cooperation?

❖ **Metric:** How did cooperation integrate in-service support considerations?

Integration of in-service support	No agreement on in-service support	National solutions to provide in-service support	Prevailing national solutions with some cooperative aspects	Prevailing cooperation solutions with some national aspects	Shared in-service support
	0	1	2	3	4

Taking the example of the Transall C-160 cooperation programme in the 1960s, France and Germany stopped cooperating once the transport aircraft was put into service. Given the lack of cooperative in-service support, it became impossible to exchange a German Transall with a French one, as spare parts were no longer the same and the operational function of each had evolved in different ways (Maulny et al., 2006, p. 18). The Tiger programme, instead, anticipated such issues through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding to establish a common structure for in-service support.

6.4.3 Measuring ESG and Ethical Considerations

The ability to factor in ESG aspects complements the proposed evaluation method of the sustainability of cooperation aimed at capability development. Its inclusion is particularly relevant as the defence industry is concerned by carbon targets.



- **Criterion 4:** the inclusion of technical requirements related to environmental performances is a good indicator of the sustainability of a cooperation. The existence of an ethics committee is also a good indicator: Has the cooperation engaged with ESG and ethical aspects?

❖ **Metric:** How were ESG and ethical aspects included in cooperation?

ESG / ethics	No integration of these aspects	Only one or two criteria are included (potentially with dedicated criteria)	ESG and ethical requirements are defined	A reporting mechanism is included	An effective monitoring system with corrective mechanism is in place
	0	1	2	3	4



7 Cooperation at Partnership Level

7.1 Operationalising the 'Effectiveness' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation

To define the effectiveness criterion for EU partnership cooperation in defence, one should analyse if the cooperative framework helps the EU reach its strategies and if the objectives of cooperation are clearly defined. Regardless of the partnership level of analysis, this definition can be complex, as several variables often relating to the political sphere play a considerable role. When it comes to defence cooperation, the objective of cooperation can be reaching a target level of development in the country with which cooperation is undertaken, reaching a specific level of security standards, the synchronisation of activities among partners, the joint development of military capabilities, or the definition of shared standards.

7.1.1 Measuring Effectiveness

- **Criterion 1:** A timely and comprehensive revision of the objectives of cooperation, should the international environment and security situation require it, can help assess the effectiveness of cooperation. However, these changes should not affect the coherence between cooperation and the main strategy of the body undertaking it – in this specific case the EU.
- ❖ **Metric:** Are the objectives of a partnership and its activities defined in a way that they support the achievement of overall strategic goals? If needed, are the objectives adjusted in a timely manner without affecting overall coherence of the EU action? Are partner expectations matched?

Definition and adjustment of objectives	0	1	2	3	4
No clear objectives are formulated, overall goals are not considered, coherence is severely impacted, expectations diverge fully		Objectives are defined but do not improve overall goals. Adjustments are not made, expectations do not match	Objectives loosely consider and further overall goals, adjustments are slow and disregard overall coherence of EU action, expectations match slightly	Objectives are defined to further strategic goals, adjustments are made with delay, coherence of EU action is considered, expectations match mostly	Objectives are clearly defined, furthering overall EU strategic goals. Objectives are adjusted quickly, without impacting the coherence of EU action, expectations fully align

- **Criterion 2:** When considering military assistance, the basis on which to evaluate the policy is to check whether there is a clear definition of its objectives. The effectiveness of EU engagement in providing military assistance, can be evaluated through the CEG approach,



according to which the level of effectiveness is higher, the smaller the gap between the demand for capabilities and their supply (Dover, 2005, p. 299).

- ❖ **Metric:** Are adequate military means made available and do the available capabilities and their supply match the demands?

Supply, demand, and adequacy of capabilities	CEG is large, the supply of capabilities is inadequate and does not match demand	CEG is significant, supply of capabilities is unsatisfactory, matches demand only partially	CEG is average, supply of capabilities is adequate, matches demand sufficiently	CEG is acceptable, supply of capabilities is appropriate to demand	CEG is closed, supply and adequacy of capabilities fully match demand
	0	1	2	3	4

In providing military capabilities, the EU struggles to make effective use of its tools, as seen in the case of EU BG deployment, which have never been deployed despite reaching full operational capability in 2007. Their deployment could have increased both the effectiveness of EU operational cooperation and that of the partnership. Indeed, the EU BG concept (Council of the EU, 2016) welcomes non-EU countries to participate, if gains in interoperability and military effectiveness are reached.

- **Criterion 3:** When it comes to cooperation between EU bodies and agencies with third countries and organisations, effectiveness of action can be measured through the performance of activities. To assess whether cooperation is satisfactory, regular and periodic reports should be written, highlighting potential best practices and lessons learned.

- ❖ **Metric:** Are regular, periodic, reports written and do they include best practices and lessons learned?

Performance and quality of periodic reports	No periodic reports of the activities are performed	Periodic reports of the activities are performed; best practices and lessons learned are not indicated	Periodic reports of the activities are performed regularly; best practices and lessons learned are not implemented	Periodic reports of the activities are performed regularly; best practices and lessons learned are not timely implemented	Periodic reports of the activities are performed regularly and include best practices and lessons learned which are timely implemented
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 4:** Another aspect to consider is the presence of shared command structures and clear procedures that define the interaction among parties, for example NATO-EU actions inside the strategic partnership framework between the organisations. The possibility of EU and EDA officials to attend NATO meetings and vice versa increases the possibility to create synergies among partners and ultimately improve the effectiveness of cooperation.



A further example is provided by the EU-NATO cooperation and coordination of operations Sea Guardian and EUNAVFOR MED Sophia. Cooperation allowed the exchange of information for enhanced maritime situational awareness and logistical and medical support.

- ❖ **Metric 1:** Are there clear procedures and doctrines to conduct cooperation? Are shared command structures established and used? Is conduct codified to facilitate the preservation of institutional knowledge and to ensure missions needs are fulfilled?

Level of doctrines and command structures integration	No clear procedures and shared doctrine defining interaction, roles, and responsibilities present; no shared command structures are established conduct codification is not considered	Basic definition of procedures, doctrine, roles, and responsibilities; loose shared command structures conduct is not codified	Adequate definition of procedures, doctrine, roles, and responsibilities; shared command structures are present; conduct codification is attempted	Good and formalised definition of procedures, doctrine, roles, and responsibilities; solid shared command structures are established; conduct is sufficiently codified	Clear and formalised definition of roles and responsibilities; shared doctrine and command structures are established and used; conduct is well codified fully facilitating knowledge preservation and needs fulfillment
	0	1	2	3	4

- ❖ **Metric 2:** When it comes to cooperation on the ground, the level of interoperability of the involved armed forces can have positive repercussions on the effectiveness of joint actions. Prominent levels of personnel and systems interoperability generally correspond to increased levels of effectiveness. Similar considerations can be made regarding the presence or absence of a shared doctrine and clear chain of command, that defines roles and responsibilities, also taking into consideration agreements to ensure third parties' involvement (Karlsrud & Reykers, 2020, p. 1520). Are involved parties and their armed forces adequately integrated? Does integration include systematic collection and dissemination of best practices and lessons-learned?

Level of armed forces integration	Armed forces are not interoperable, integration is neither systemic nor personality-driven	Little to no interoperability of armed forces, integration is only personality-driven	Moderate levels of interoperability of armed forces, integration is moderately systemic	Good levels of interoperability of armed forces, integration is personality-driven and sufficiently systemic	Armed forces are fully interoperable, integration is personality-driven and systemic
	0	1	2	3	4



7.1.2 Measuring Effectiveness as Leadership Capacity

➤ **Criterion 5:** The leadership capacity of the EU can be understood as the capacity to create a cooperative framework compliant with, and contributing to achieving, EU goals. Leadership capacity depends on the perception of credibility of EU actions and engagement from the perspective of third countries or organisations (Antinozzi, 2022). The ability to influence a counterpart during the partnership negotiations can determine the effectiveness of cooperation, but also potentially limit or halt a mission if it is absent.

❖ **Metric 1:** Are the EU actions and engagement perceived as credible in the eyes of the involved third parties? Can the EU create a cooperative framework (CF) and influence partners during the negotiation process?

Legitimacy of EU actions	CF was not set up, there was no agreement between partners, EU actions do not enjoy credibility	CF was set up with delays due to divergent views, EU actions do not enjoy credibility	CF was set up with slight disagreement, EU actions enjoy limited credibility	CF was set up with minimal to no disagreement, EU actions enjoy credibility in almost all realms	CF set up was swift and consensual, EU actions enjoy full credibility in all realms
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 2:** The EU's ability to deliver results regardless of the number of external countries involved in any specific cooperation needs to be considered when defining leadership capacity. As Zandee (2018) points out, the number of participants might affect the effectiveness of cooperation, even if the leadership capacity to attract third countries is pronounced. Does the EU deliver results independent of the number of engaged partners?

Results of cooperation	No success visible during and after cooperation, goals unachieved, and inefficient coordination among partners	Minor success visible, minimal achievement of goals and limited coordination among partners	Medium success visible, considerable achievement of goals and sufficient coordination among partners	Good success visible, overall achievement of goals and satisfactory coordination among partners	Full achievement of cooperative goals and good coordination among partners
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 6:** Effectiveness can be understood as degree of satisfaction of third parties. Are partners satisfied with the cooperation?

❖ **Metric 1:** Measuring perception is not an easy task, but it could be done by looking at increased dialogue and understanding among the parties. In the long-term this can translate into the emergence of institutionalised cooperation or of coalitions with the



third state or organisation (Kelly, 2012, p. 154). Should the cooperation be started with a country or organisation, with which no previous experience of cooperation occurred, the leadership capacity can be related to the effectiveness in maintaining continued levels of commitment, or good levels of achievements. These achievements, however, need to be verified against the cooperation objective (Kelly, 2012, pp. 159–160). Has cooperation lead to increased dialogue, understanding, and commitment resulting in institutionalised cooperation/coalitions between the partners emerged?

Third party satisfaction	No increased dialogue or understanding, no further or institutionalised commitment between parties	Slight increase in dialogue and understanding, no further or institutionalised commitment between parties	Considerable increase in dialogue and understanding, talks regarding further institutionalised commitment	Intensified levels of dialogue and understanding, initial steps towards further institutionalised commitment taken	High levels of dialogue and understanding, parties are involved in further institutionalised cooperative formats
	0	1	2	3	4

- ❖ **Metric 2:** A complementary aspect is the active involvement of a partner in the definition process of cooperation. Here, the leadership ability of the EU translates into the capacity to attract third states' and international organisations' contributions to CSDP, through Framework Participation Agreements (FPA). On FPAs, the European Parliament argued for a further expansion of cooperation "when and where appropriate" (JAPCC, 2011, p. 16; European Parliament, 2021a, p. 17). In that regard, the inclusion of third countries' personnel and equipment might reduce the low level of force generation for CSDP operations and missions, but it can generate effectiveness concerns (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2021b, p. 9). Signing of an agreement does not guarantee effectiveness of cooperation (Aydın-Düzgit et al., 2021b, p. 12), which should rather be measured by looking at the actual participation of third countries in missions/operations. Are third parties attracted and actively involved in cooperation and missions?

Capacity to attract and involve third parties	Third parties are neither interested nor involved in cooperation, no agreement is signed	Third parties are interested in cooperation but not actively involved, signing of an agreement is being considered	Third parties are passively involved, an agreement is signed, no decision on possibility of material and personnel contributions	Third parties are actively involved, and agreement was signed, decisions on material and personnel made but contributions are pending	Third parties are actively involved, agreement was signed, considerable materiel and personnel contributions are made
	0	1	2	3	4



7.2 Operationalising the 'Efficiency' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation

7.2.1 Measuring Cost Efficiency

- **Criterion 1:** The inclusion of third countries and organisations into the cooperative framework can be considered to be efficient if the EU, through cooperation, is able to reach higher or better results than those it would be able to achieve alone. To a certain extent, this efficiency can be considered as cost efficiency, as presumably the EU would have needed additional resources in case it acted alone.

❖ **Metric:** Has the EU been able to achieve higher or better results through cooperation?

Scale of results in cooperation	Cooperation negatively impacts EU results	Cooperation has no effect on EU results	Results match the level the EU would have been able to achieve alone	Cooperation slightly improves EU results	Cooperation significantly improves EU results
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 2:** When measuring efficiency, the modality of the partnership is also relevant. According to the framework used, bargaining costs can vary. Is it an ad hoc, case-by-case partnership, or is it a more structured cooperation framework? The latter is likely to reduce bargaining costs at the expense of reduced flexibility for the participating countries (Karlsrud & Reykers, 2020). One example supporting the case for ad hoc frameworks, is the reduced necessity to negotiate requirements for institutional consensus. Nonetheless, ad hoc agreements do carry the cost of renewed negotiations, as it has been in the case of Switzerland and the continuous definition of the country's contribution to CSDP operations. Unlike FPAs the EU signed with third countries and international organisations, the Swiss contribution to CSDP activities has been regulated by 12 different participation agreements. A state's preference to engage in ad hoc versus structured frameworks is also dependent on the state's national defence policy (e.g. the neutrality of a country or the participation in existing cooperative frameworks limiting the country's ability to engage in other cooperation). This might affect the type of contribution and the regional focus of the action. The more both aspects reflect national priorities, the more likely the country engages in the partnership.

❖ **Metric:** Does the framework used allow to reduce bargaining costs?



Bargaining costs of the negotiation	Bargaining costs are too high to agree on a cooperative framework	Negotiation suffered from considerable political and time costs. Cooperative agreement is limited to one activity	Negotiation suffered from political costs, and required a considerable amount of time. Cooperative agreement foresees multiple actions	Negotiation suffered from limited political and time costs. Cooperative agreement foresees multiple actions	Negotiation did not suffer from political and time bargaining costs. Cooperative agreement foresees multiple actions
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 3:** Regarding EU military and civilian assistance to third countries, the efficiency of cooperation can be evaluated by looking at how straightforward and comprehensive the provision of the necessary equipment is. Taking CSDP training missions as an example, one of the recurrent obstacles identified is the lack of equipment needed to train local officials (Williams & Ali, 2020, p. 10). This reduces the efficiency of the operation, since without said equipment, it is difficult to combine theoretical and practical training. A novelty in this regard is represented by the €5 billion off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF), which combines the previous African Peace Facility (APF) and the Athena mechanism. The change of the EPF envisions the possibility to provide lethal equipment to third countries (Article 1, comma 2a), which can increase the efficiency of the EU military assistance, depending on how well managed and appropriate the contribution is.

❖ **Metric:** How straightforward and comprehensive is the provision of necessary equipment in EU military and civilian assistance to third countries?

Provision of equipment to third countries	Equipment is not being provided	Provision of equipment is insufficient, process is complicated	Provision of equipment is limited, the process lacks clarity	Provision of equipment is adequate, process is sufficiently straightforward	Provision of equipment is complete and inclusive, process is uncomplicated
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 4:** A further relevant aspect is the presence of a defined mid- to long-term approach, improving the management efficiency of the measure, as well as the transparency of the funds and the related activities. The latter aspect, however, can be improved if periodic, timely, and data relevant reports are provided, and related lessons learned implemented. Moreover, when it comes to the management of the EPF, a streamlined process should be ensured to avoid the same inefficiency that characterised the APF (European Commission, 2019). Lastly, transparency of cooperation does not increase efficiency per se, yet it can help identify wasted money and misguided practices. Through their amendment/improvement, it is possible to increase efficiency.

❖ **Metric:** Are funds managed efficiently and transparently?



Transparency and management of funds	No goals are set, no formal processes are established, and reporting is non-existent, mismanagement is not prohibited or averted	Basic goals are set, management processes are inefficient, reporting is done arbitrarily and sporadic, mismanagement is identified too late	Loose goals are set, management processes are adequate, reporting is done frequently, lessons-learned and mismanagement are identified but not acted on	Short-term goals are set, management processes have been adapted, reporting is done periodically. Mismanagement and lessons-learned are identified and acted on with moderate success	Clear mid- to long-term goals, management processes are streamlined, reporting is done timely and periodically, lessons-learned and mismanagement are identified and acted on promptly
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 4:** When assessing partnerships on capability development, the effectiveness of third countries and entities inclusion in PESCO and EDF projects can be measured by looking at both the industrial and political processes at the basis of cooperation, and at the outcome in terms of increased capability availability, and improvement and resilience of supply chains. Particularly important for the defence sector is the level of interoperability and standardisation of capabilities. According to the European Parliament (2018, p. 12), standardisation of armaments became a topical issue that can affect both efficiency and effectiveness. Should low levels of standardisation stem from the cooperation, the cooperation itself would lack efficiency, due to complex supply arrangements, different communication, and mission planning systems.

❖ **Metric:** Do capability development partnerships enhance capability availability and interoperability? Are shared services used created and used?

Improved capability availability and interoperability	Partnership interferes with capability availability, standardisation, and interoperability	Partnership does not ameliorate capability availability. Standardisation and interoperability are not advanced	Partnership moderately enhances capability availability, standardisation, and interoperability	Partnerships improves capability availability noticeably. it increases standardisation and interoperability	Partnership significantly improves capability, its availability, standardisation, and interoperability
	0	1	2	3	4

7.2.2 Measuring Time Efficiency

➤ **Criterion 5:** Regardless of the scope of cooperation, efficiency can be measured in terms of the optimised or reduced time otherwise necessary to reach the aims of cooperation at the basis of the cooperation with third countries and organisations.

❖ **Metric:** Does cooperation lead to the optimisation of time required to reach aims?



Time optimisation	Partnership leads to increased time required to achieve results	Partnership increases the time necessary to achieve results required if outside of cooperation	Partnership does not affect the time necessary to achieve results required if outside of cooperation	Through partnership it is possible to optimise time necessary to achieve results required if outside of cooperation	Through partnership it is possible to reduce time necessary to achieve results required if outside of cooperation
	0	1	2	3	4

7.3 Operationalising the 'Coherence' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation

Coherence of partnership cooperation can be measured as policy alignments of the partner state to EU objectives, or in relation to other EU policies or international commitments to which the EU abides. Moreover, coherence can also be considered in terms of adequate input to implement the partnership goals, which, however, can also determine the effectiveness of cooperation. As only the EU level of analysis is considered, it is not possible to differentiate between horizontal and vertical coherence.

7.3.1 Measuring Coherence

- **Criterion 1:** Does the EU have a defined strategy towards the country/region? Is cooperation in line with the wider strategic goals and values of the EU?
 - ❖ **Metric:** Are the third party's policies in line with EU policies, objectives, and goals, and/or with EU international commitments? Are partnership goals addressed with adequate input?

Policy alignment and goal achievement input	Partners and EU policies diverge completely, no input towards goal achievement is made	Partners and EU policies diverge in large part, minimal input towards goal achievement is made	Partners and EU policies converge on some issues, limited input towards goal achievement is made	Partners and EU policies converge in large part, considerable input towards goal achievement is made	Partners and EU policies are fully aligned, goals are addressed with adequate input
	0	1	2	3	4

Military mobility can be taken as an example of coherent action, particularly for political considerations. The partnership with third countries and international organisations is in line with the goal of exploring the potential of synergies for infrastructure development given the existing barriers, hampering training and military exercises. An improved mobility of forces within and beyond the EU will enhance European security by enabling EU Member States to act faster, both in the context of CSDP missions and operations, as well as in the NATO framework.



➤ **Criterion 2:** Coherence among simultaneous missions or operations belonging to the EU or under the aegis of different organisations is also relevant. As an example, the Coordination of CSDP activities on the territory of a third country can profit from coherence and coordination with non-EU actors on the ground. Nonetheless, the coordination of multiple missions/operations, particularly if conducted by different actors, is dependent on information sharing agreements and their implementation. These aspects are investigated in ENGAGE Work Package 5.

❖ **Metric:** Are CSDP missions/operations coherent with missions/activities of third actors?

Coherence between missions and activities	Missions diverge completely, coordination of activities is non-existent	Missions diverge mostly, activities are inconsistent and uncoordinated	Missions partly align, activities are loosely coordinated	Missions are aligned, coordination of activities is significant and noticeable	Missions are fully aligned and coherent, activities are well coordinated
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 3:** Coherence of the process at the EU level requires the capacity of the EU to preserve its decision-making process. Difficulties in evaluating *a priori* if a changed procedural approach can be considered positive need to look at the actual outcomes of the process. On the other hand, constantly modifying the processes employed can lead to inefficiencies, as new processes might need to be tested or might require additional political, bureaucratic, or economic costs to achieve the intended result. An example here is the relationship between the EU and the UK in the field of security and defence. The trade and cooperation agreement of December 2020 did not include aspects related to security and defence cooperation, except for information sharing and cooperation in cybersecurity. Coherence of the EU in this regard will benefit from not ceding to unusual partnership frameworks; but this consideration needs to be weighed against wider political, economic and practical factors. Nonetheless, according to the type of cooperation and of the activities involved, the optimal level of coherence among actors and levels of policies might vary. There is thus no available one-size-fits-all solution (Coning & Friis, 2011).

7.4 Operationalising the 'Sustainability' Criterion in Partnership Cooperation

Regarding sustainability within cooperation with third countries and organisations, assessment criteria need to address both the internal and external dimension of the cooperation, namely the sustainability of the cooperation itself and the sustainability of its results. In defining the sustainability matrix, the ESG criteria can be useful tools.



7.4.1 Measuring Sustainability

- **Criterion 1:** From a political point of view, cooperation with third countries and organisations can be sustainable if there is joint work towards the definition of a common goal, timeline, and necessary effort (EU-NATO, 2021, p. 5). In this, the probable/inevitable presence of free riders can hinder the level of sustainable action, as eventual synergies and spillover effects might be missed or delayed.

❖ **Metric 1:** Are goal, timeline, and required effort defined jointly, is the presence of free-riders circumvented?

Joint definition of common goal and timeline	Goal, timeline, and efforts have been set individually without coordination, free-riding is facilitated and unrestrained	Goal, timeline, and efforts have been set by minority, free-riding is not impeded	Goals, timeline, and efforts have been set with solid support, free-riding is loosely constricted	Goal, timeline, and efforts have been set with majority support, free-riding is severely constricted	Goal, timeline, and efforts have been defined and set jointly, free-riding is prohibited through agreed on measures
	0	1	2	3	4

❖ **Metric 2:** In the case of FPAs, the lack of, or extremely narrow, capacity, of third countries to be involved in operational planning, can affect the political sustainability of the partnership. The declaration of the Norwegian government on the willingness to participate in the planning process of the operation towards the participation to the EU's Military Planning and Conduct Capability (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, p. 7) is an example. Sustainability needs, however, to be present from the perspective of both parties involved. Does the cooperation allow the full exploitation of partner contributions?

Exploitation of partners' contribution	Cooperation limits partners contributions	Cooperation residually allows to exploit partners contributions	Cooperation partly allows to exploit partners contributions	Cooperation mostly allows to exploit partners contributions	Cooperation allows to exploit partners contributions fully
	0	1	2	3	4

- **Criterion 2:** Sustainability can also be interpreted as the degree of the added value of cooperation itself, or of its results. If cooperation generates best practices, or if it reduces duplication among the different frameworks, it can be considered sustainable, as well as effective. However, to assess the sustainability or results analysts should bear in mind the environmental, political, and social costs the actors incur prior to, and after the start of, cooperation. Towards this end, periodic evaluations of cooperation are necessary, which need to be transparent in highlighting actions, processes, and results. By considering the NATO-EU progress reports on the implementation of the strategic partnership, it is not



possible to understand who enables progress or causes eventual delays in the cooperation, thus preventing participating entities to improve (EU-NATO, 2021).

- ❖ **Metric:** Does cooperation create added value, is transparency guaranteed through periodic reporting on political, social, and environmental costs of actors?

Added value and transparency of cooperation	Cooperation duplicates, creates no lessons-learned, actors incur high, unbalanced costs, reporting is inexistent	Cooperation duplicates several efforts, lessons-learned are not identified, costs are unbalanced and unevenly distributed, reporting is done very infrequently	Cooperation duplicates some efforts, lessons-learned are identified, costs are high but more balanced, reporting is done semi-regularly	Cooperation reduces duplication, lessons-learned are identified and considered, costs are balanced and even, reporting is done regularly	Cooperation eliminates duplication, lessons-learned are identified and utilised, costs are evenly distributed, reporting is periodic
	0	1	2	3	4

Military mobility can serve as a positive example. The inclusion of third countries – the US, Canada, and Norway – in the cooperation will help increase its sustainability and exploit potential spillover effects among the participating states. Additionally, military mobility can be taken as a positive example of sustainable cooperation with international organisations. In addition to being a PESCO project, military mobility is listed among the actions of the EU-NATO strategic partnership and is helping improve synergies and requirements among the organisations.

7.4.2 Measuring ESG and Ethical Considerations

- **Criterion 3:** A necessary distinction on the ESG criteria needs to be made if it affects cooperation for joint deployment of forces and cooperation related to the training of forces, and to the capability development aspects. In assessing partnership cooperation for deployment purposes, a criterion to consider is the acceptance of the operation’s mandate and respective actions by the local authorities and population (Peters et al., 2021, p. 19). This can be positively influenced through the participation of local officials in the definition of the mission’s mandate as well as in its implementation. Moreover, acceptability of the mission by the local community could be increased by proper communication strategies, conveying a shared political message. In case of low levels of political external sustainability, is the EU engaging in activities that look at improving the perception of the partnership?
- ❖ **Metric:** Do the objectives of the mission/operation meet local needs? Are local personnel involved in the management and implementation of the deployment? Is the local government able to maintain the results of the joint action once the operation/mission ends (Coning & Friis, 2011, p. 267)?



Social sustainability	Mission mandate is defined without local involvement, related activities enjoy no local support, communication strategies and shared political messages are absent	Mission mandate is defined with little to no local input, related activities enjoy little to no local support, sporadic communication and one-sided political messages are conducted	Mission mandate is defined with minimal local input, related activities enjoy basic local support, essential communication is conducted with limited shared political messaging	Mission mandate is defined with sufficient local input, related activities enjoy significant local support, good communication strategies and considerable shared political messaging are conducted	Local entities are fully involved in mission mandate definition, related activities are fully accepted locally, clear communication strategies and shared political messages are conducted
	0	1	2	3	4

➤ **Criterion 4:** Is cooperation environmentally sustainable?

- ❖ **Metric:** Are environmental impact considerations included in the definition of the sustainability of cooperation and enforced? Is the equipment used up to existing environmental standards? Is personnel deployed acting responsibly with regards to environmental protection?

Consideration of environmental impact	Environmental impact or protection were not considered in definition of mission's sustainability and are not enforced in personnel behaviour or equipment specifications	Environmental impact was considered in definition of mission's sustainability but not included in final document, no enforcement of environmental protection rules	Environmental impact is included in definition of mission's sustainability, equipment and personnel behaviour regarding environmental protection are loosely enforced, have limited repercussions	Environmental impact is included in definition of mission's sustainability, equipment and personnel behaviour are in line with environmental protection, rules are enforced	Environmental impact is included in definition of mission's sustainability, equipment and personnel behaviour are in line with environmental protection, rules are strict and enforced intransigently
	0	1	2	3	4



8 Conclusion

This working paper proposes a tool to comprehensively evaluate defence cooperation in the EU framework and among EU Member States at the politico-strategic, operational, capability development, and partnership level. *Ex-ante* and *ex-post* criteria and metrics presented in this paper allow analysts and policymakers to evaluate the degree of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability of cooperation and can serve to guide future attempts at defence cooperation with regard to best practices and lessons learned.

The performance of the assessment at different times will likely lead to different results, even if the cooperative framework did not change substantially. This is due to exogenous factors unrelated to the qualitative difference in EU cooperation, i.e. the degree of political viability of cooperation which affects the setting up and continuation of cooperation.

While performing the assessment, users will note the predominance of some criteria over others. This imbalance depends on the level of cooperation considered. The investigation of the relations and the impact of the criteria with, and on, one another has only been sketched and these dependencies are a potential area for further research.

This working paper contains the framework to conduct assessments. The set of criteria and metrics can either be used entirely, or selectively, according to the type of assessment to be performed. Indeed, some aspects identified in the single chapters might not be relevant to assess a specific activity in defence cooperation falling inside a specific level of analysis. Should the assessment be comprehensive enough to investigate all proposed criteria, the assignment of an evaluation 'value' allows for a graphical visualisation of the cooperation's status.

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Authors

Ester Sabatino is a research analyst for the Defence and Military Analysis Programme, conducting research on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy, as well as contributing to the programme's wider research projects. Before joining the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Ester was a researcher in the defence programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome. She previously worked in the private sector, in a consultancy firm. Ester is the author and editor of numerous reports, articles and papers on EU defence-industrial cooperation, military capabilities and defence policies.

Edouard Simon is a senior researcher at the French Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS). He is specialised in matters relating to European security and defence issues, as well as industrial policy issues, notably for the arms sector. He notably wrote two studies for the European Parliament on the European Defence internal Market and the European Defence Fund. Prior to that, Edouard was Director of the Brussels office of the European think-tank Confrontations Europe. He holds a PhD in European Union law from Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University and an MBA from ESSEC Business School.

Fara Breuer is a research assistant at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Europe focusing on defence, military and security issues. She graduated with a masters of letters in Strategic Studies from the University of St Andrews and obtained a bachelor's degree in International Studies from Leiden University.

Juliette Renaut is a research fellow at the French Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) and a Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC, specialising in questions on security and defence. Prior to that, Juliette interned at the European Parliament in the Policy Department and at the United Nations Headquarters Operations and Crisis Centre. Juliette is a graduate of King's College London's Department of War Studies and the University of St Andrews's School of International Relations.



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