Case Studies of the EU’s CSDP Activity

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Executive Summary

Civilian and military missions and operations represent one of the main activities of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In twenty years of deployment abroad, the European Union (EU) has engaged in 40 deployments in Europe, Africa and Asia. Thus, CSDP is one relevant tool for the external action of the EU.

This paper evaluates CSDP missions and operations in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali. The pool of selected case studies includes missions and operations that represented institutional firsts, such as the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH or the European Union Force Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUFOR), Operation Artemis, and deployments that have lasted for more than a decade. These deployments are characterised by different cooperative frameworks with third countries and international organisations, thus allowing an evaluation of how the EU interacts with partners.

The paper applies the assessment framework presented in ENGAGE Working Paper 9 to evaluate effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability of CSDP activities. The results of the analysis show differences among the deployments, while also identifying common obstacles. These common obstacles suggest the possibility to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of EU external action.

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# Table of Contents

Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 2

1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 4

2 Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 5

3 Refinement of the Assessment Framework ............................................................................ 7

4 Case Studies ........................................................................................................................... 9
   4.1 Kosovo .......................................................................................................................... 10
   4.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina ............................................................................................... 16
   4.3 Democratic Republic of Congo ...................................................................................... 23
   4.4 Mali ............................................................................................................................... 29

5 Conclusions and Initial Recommendations .......................................................................... 37

Reference List ............................................................................................................................. 43

Appendix 1: Assessment Criteria ............................................................................................. 56

Appendix 2: Full Assessment of Case Studies .......................................................................... 68
   Kosovo ............................................................................................................................... 68
   Bosnia and Herzegovina ...................................................................................................... 87
   Democratic Republic of Congo ............................................................................................ 112
   Mali .................................................................................................................................... 140
1 Introduction

The deployment of personnel abroad is part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU). As highlighted in ENGAGE Working Paper 4 (Szép et. al., 2021), Member States are expected to provide to the Union the civilian and military capabilities necessary for the conduct of missions and operations outside of EU territory. Article 43 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) defines the types of external engagement the EU could perform. These range from joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation, to (support to) the fight against terrorism.

Since the inception of CSDP in 2003, the EU has engaged in 40 deployments,1 including 25 civilian and 15 military operations and missions in Europe, Africa and Asia (EEAS, 2023). An understanding of how these operations and missions were conducted and what can be extracted in terms of best practices and main lessons learned is important to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability of EU engagement abroad.

This paper evaluates CSDP missions and operations in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali. Among the missions and operations selected, some represent institutional firsts, such as the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH or the European Union Force Democratic Republic of the Congo, Operation Artemis, from which several lessons learned have been derived. Moreover, the operational deployments analysed occurred at different moments in time, thus representing different snapshots in terms of institutional development of the EU CSDP missions and operations. Finally, these deployments are characterised by varying cooperative frameworks with third countries and international organisations, thus allowing an evaluation of how the EU interacts with partners.

The evaluation is performed by applying a selection of the assessment criteria developed in ENGAGE Working Paper 9 (Sabatino et al., 2022) with relevance for EU deployment.2

After presenting the methodology used, section three includes a refinement of the assessment framework of ENGAGE Working Paper 9 and incorporates modifications to the criteria for operational deployment. The paper then delves into the case studies and concludes with initial recommendations that will be elaborated further in a forthcoming ENGAGE Working Paper. The list of criteria and metrics used are presented in Appendix 1, while Appendix 2 outlines the complete evaluation of each of the missions and operations included in this analysis.

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1 The number refers to current and former missions and operations up to the end of February 2023.
2 The analysis presented in this working paper benefitted from the “ENGAGE WP9 Workshop” organised by KU Leuven on 30 January 2023, which focused on conflict prevention, mediation and resolution.
2 Methodology

This working paper builds on the results of ENGAGE Working Paper 9 (Sabatino et al., 2022), which proposed an assessment framework for defence cooperation among EU Member States and in the EU framework. The effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability of selected civilian and military CSDP missions and operations was assessed by applying the criteria that are directly relevant for operational deployment.

The case studies considered include a range of civilian and military missions and operations conducted by the EU since the inception of CSDP, as well as currently ongoing activities. The selection of CSDP activities included in the analysis forms a representative pool of activities from which to assess the developments and evolution of EU civilian and military crisis management structures.

Table 1: Civilian and Military Missions and Operations Analysed in this Paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the mission/operation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Type (civilian/military)</th>
<th>Main objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPM Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2003 – 2012</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Reform of the police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>2004 – present</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Safe and secure environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>April 2006 – Nov 2006</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Safe and secure environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>2008 – present</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2014 – present</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Military training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration

Each intervention was evaluated against the same set of assessment criteria and metrics. Nonetheless, when the specificity of the deployment required adjustments, some criteria were not considered, such as the inter-mission coherence in cases where there is only one CSDP mission or operation in the respective theatre. In addition, criteria on the provision of equipment to the host country are only applied if the deployment in the country foresaw this activity. Each metric evaluating the criteria is judged against parameters ranging from 0 to 4,
where 0 indicates poor, failed or absent cooperation and 4 represents the best possible outcome. The complete list of criteria and metrics used to perform the assessment can be found in Appendix 1. A refinement of the initial criteria and metrics derived from ENGAGE Working Paper 9 is presented in the following section. This refinement enabled a more rigorous analysis of the case studies, either by adding metrics to the pre-existing assessment framework, or by grouping some of the criteria previously considered relevant to assess effectiveness, but actually better suited to represent preconditions for effectiveness.3

The coherence of CSDP activities vis-à-vis other external action engagements in third countries goes beyond the scope of this working paper and is not considered in the analysis. Some of them are dealt with within other work packages of the ENGAGE project.

The research is based on both primary and secondary sources. The team initially conducted desk research on CSDP activities in the four countries of analysis. The gathered information was used to provide a first evaluation. Subsequently, to validate initial findings, the research team contacted 73 people and was able to conduct 32 interviews. The interviewees were selected based on current or former involvement in the preparation, performance and assessment of the considered missions and operations. Interviewees were therefore national and EU officials, ranging from Head of Missions to personnel deployed in the missions/operations in various capacities, and from EU representatives to directors and personnel of the European External Action Service (EEAS) structures responsible for civilian and military deployments. In terms of the composition of the interviewees, 30% of the total of people contacted were women. A similar percentage (31%) was reflected in the positive response rate of female participants to the interviews. Interviewees were subsequently coded to ensure anonymity of respondents and interview results were used to complement or sustain arguments.

3 For further details, please refer to the following section.
3 Refinement of the Assessment Framework

After a first assessment, the research team refined the criteria, which were then applied to all case studies considered in this paper in a second wave. This section presents the refinements made between the first version in ENGAGE Working Paper 9 (Sabatino et al., 2022) and the version applied here. The refinements allowed for a more rigorous analysis across cases, which will provide rich input for the final paper (forthcoming) in this ENGAGE work package.

The framework proposed in ENGAGE Working Paper 9 included certain metrics to assess effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability that can be better defined as preconditions for effective cooperation. With specific reference to CSDP, these relate to issues in the implementation process, such as the quality of the mandate and its implementation, the operational assessment, Member States’ contributions to the mission, or the transparency and management of funds. Prerequisite conditions for CSDP deployment also refer to the process leading to the inclusion of third states in missions/operations and the exploitation of their support.

A second level of refinement involved the proposal of new preconditions and criteria. A precondition not included in ENGAGE Working Paper 9 refers to the application of lessons learned in the planning process and conduct of missions and operations. The formulation of lessons learned is regulated by common EU procedures, however their application in missions and operations is not always conducted. When confronted with cases in which this application is lacking, the assessment should consider potential case-specific factors that might have prevented the application of lessons learned, as suggested in several interviews. Interviewees 9, 11, 22 and 23, for instance, argued that the local situation might not allow for the application of specific lessons learned from another deployment.

Regarding new criteria, efficiency, understood as efficiency in the management of personnel during deployment, was proposed. The inclusion of this criterion in the evaluation of CSDP missions and operations is useful since the management and provision of personnel often created difficulties in the performance of CSDP missions and operations.

When it comes to the specificities of CSDP deployments, the concept of coherence as defined by Sus et al. (2021) can assume different meanings according to the level of analysis considered. In addition to the proposed criterion addressing the coherence of goals and priorities of the mission/operation in relation to EU policy goals, horizontal coherence in deployments can be understood as coherence between the command structures of the mission/operation and the responsible bodies within the EU. Considerations on the extent to which this type of coherence and coordination works in practice have been presented, when relevant, in the case studies section.

Criteria to assess sustainability were refined in three ways. A first modification involved an improved categorisation of the criteria used to assess sustainability. The initial framework of ENGAGE Working Paper 9 proposed a metric to evaluate social sustainability by decisionmakers and local entities involved in the planning and/or conduct of the
mission/operation. This metric falls under what Sus et al. (2021) define as political sustainability in ENGAGE Working Paper 3; the political sustainability dimension considers support among both the general public and policymaking elites. To account for both dimensions of the bi-dimensional aspect of political sustainability, a specific metric to assess the political sustainability among the general public is included in this working paper. This type of sustainability is intended as awareness of the local general public of the mission/operation’s activities and its acceptance. Given that it is difficult to assess local perceptions of a foreign deployment, in providing tentative answers, this paper mainly relied on evaluation reports of international organisations and on media resources, when available.

A second modification for the sustainability criteria was undertaken to more closely align with the meaning assigned to it by Sus et al. (2021). Following their classification, social sustainability covers the impact of the policy – missions and operations in this case – on human rights and living conditions in the place of implementation. Thirdly, economic sustainability has been added to the sustainability criteria. Economic sustainability refers to both the allocation of sufficient economic resources for the implementation of a policy and to the economic consequences of a policy over a sufficiently long period of time.

As a final refinement of the assessment framework, the research team decided to exclude some of the features envisioned in previous working papers. ENGAGE Working Paper 9 proposed a way to display in a chart form the main strengths and weaknesses in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and sustainability. Such a graphical representation, however, would have implied an equal weighing of each criterion, an assumption that does not reflect reality and would have stretched the assessment framework too far.
4 Case Studies

The EU’s CSDP is defined in Title V, Chapter 1, Section 2 of the Treaty of the European Union. According to Article 42(1), the Union shall be able to use civilian and military missions outside the EU territory for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security, by using civilian and military capabilities of Member States (art. 42(3)) and Union instruments (art. 42(4)). Activities under CSDP include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. These can all contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories” (art. 43(1)) and shall use the capabilities at the disposal of EU Member States.

As highlighted in ENGAGE Working Paper 4, CSDP missions and operations are part of the wider foreign policy of the EU and the Union engages abroad by relying on Member States capabilities to conduct them. To ensure coherence and improve effectiveness of the different tools available, a 2018 Council decision created the Integrated approach for Security and Peace (ISP) Directorate inside the EEAS. Through this directorate, the EU is trying to provide a better coordinated EU response and inclusive approach that considers the different options available to face a crisis (EEAS, 2022b). While relevant for CSDP deployments, other ENGAGE project work packages, assess the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU’s External Action Plus and conflict prevention, mediation and resolution in detail.

The amplitude of possible CSDP activities is wide and ranges from the low to the high spectrum of intervention. Nonetheless, the trend of EU intervention abroad has been characterised by the preference towards civilian missions over military ones which is reflected in the number of past and ongoing civilian missions.4 The research team tried to consider a wide range of activities under CSDP through the selection of appropriate case studies. The pool of case studies further allowed to consider the EU deployment abroad since 2003, as shown in Figure 1.

The following subsections analyse CSDP involvement in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. Each case study begins with a short description of the security situation in the country that led to the EU involvement prior to the presentation of the research results.

### 4.1 Kosovo

During the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo acquired the status of an autonomous province, which was revoked by the Serbian authorities in 1989. Following the Republic’s dissolution, the lack of autonomy triggered the Kosovo Liberation Army’s guerrilla activities tactics against central Yugoslav authorities. After negotiations and the cease-fire failed, the Rambouillet Accord (NATO, 1999) was presented as an ultimatum, demanding a high degree of autonomy for Kosovo under international supervision and the presence of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) contingents on the territory. Following the refusal of the then President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, NATO conducted airstrikes on Serbia between March and June 1999, forcing Serbian troops out of Kosovo. On June 10, the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 (1999) activated the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), although the mission remained silent on the status of Kosovo.

In March 1999, the European Council stressed the EU’s ‘moral obligation’ to stabilise the region, and the EU has had active relations with Kosovo ever since (Shepherd, 2009). The relationship was built upon CFSP responsibilities and concentrated on conflict management activities. Against this background, Kosovo was included in the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) with a view towards its potential future EU membership, which consequently increased the EU’s involvement through economic and political instruments. In 2005, negotiations on Kosovo’s future status began between Pristina and Belgrade, with the involvement of Russia, the US and the EU as mediators (Bohnet & Gold, 2011). In 2007, the UN-supported Ahtisaari Plan was presented. It revolved around the creation of an independent state through reforms based on the separation of powers, respect for human rights and accountability of justice. The plan was, however, vetoed in the UNSC by Russia and China and on 17 February, 2008, Kosovo
unilaterally declared its independence. The mandate of the European Union Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) was agreed upon on 4 February 2008 and was initially designed to implement the Ahtisaari Plan. Following the UNSC veto of the plan, the mission took over UNMIK’s responsibilities, including its legal basis of UNSC Resolution 1244 which does not recognise Kosovo’s independence. EULEX became fully operational in April 2009, with a police and justice force of around 3,000 personnel (Cadier, 2011). The mission’s initial mandate was to assist

Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and to further develop and strengthen an independent multi-ethnic justice, police and customs services, in an effort to ensure that these institutions are free from political interference and are adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices (Council of the EU, 2008, p. 93).

EULEX is an ongoing mission and the current mandate is expected to expire in June 2023.

Figure 2: Timeline of EULEX

4.1.1 EULEX Effectiveness

Despite the non-recognition of Kosovo as an independent state by five EU Member States,5 the stability of the country and of the Western Balkans is a priority for the entire EU community. This would support an effective engagement in the country. However, some of the prerequisites for the effectiveness of EULEX, particularly those regarding the mission’s

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5 The Member States not recognising Kosovo are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain.
mandate and its implementation, review, as well as the provision, management and training of personnel are not developed sufficiently.

Since its activation, EULEX mandate was renewed and modified eight times, with the current mandate running until June 2023 (Council of the EU, 2021d) and excluding the operational support of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue according to Council Decision 2023/122 (Council of the EU, 2023b). The tension between the scope and length of the mandate (maximum duration of which is two years) is one of the aspects identified as problematic by practitioners (Interviews 7, 8, 11, 12, 13), who advised longer and more flexible mandates “to respond to local needs when they arise” (Interview 7). The length of the mandate is also connected to the mission’s final exit strategy. If this is identified as the ability of local authorities to take over the mission’s remaining responsibilities, the limited length of the mandate generates uncertainty over the conduct of the mission’s activities.

Between 2008 and 2018 EULEX had executive judicial powers (investigation, prosecution and trial), which have been gradually transferred to the local authorities. This transfer, however, was delayed several times (EULEX, 2016a; Council of the EU, 2018b). It can be argued that the delay was partly dependent on the counterpart’s engagement and capability to take over the mission’s responsibilities, the overall effort in capacity building and the fight against organised crime could have been improved (EU Court of Auditors, 2012). In the end, the mission was not able to deliver in these areas within a specified timeframe, considering, among other things, the lack of political counterparts in the country (Interviews 11, 12, 14, 24) especially in the first years of deployment (Interview 12). Moreover, concerning the internal management of the mission, the level of independence the judiciary personnel of the mission had from the command-and-control structures caused tensions between the institutions in Brussels and the personnel on the ground (Interviews 12, 14, 24) in the execution of the mission’s activities.

The provision of personnel suffers from the deployment of staff not particularly suited for the role. This is due to the general reluctance from Member States to deploy abroad competent police officers, prosecutors and judges (Interviews 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14; EU Court of Auditors, 2012). Pre-deployment training, which is a responsibility of the contributing Member States (General Secretariat of the Council, 2017), has also been at times inadequate (Boštjančič, 2017), with repercussions for both the effectiveness and efficiency of the mission. Furthermore, national procedural differences for deployment (i.e. different timelines and rules for the deployment of personnel abroad) caused delays in the deployment of personnel, making it sometime complex to plan the involvement of countries in the mission (Interviews 7, 9, 13, 15).

4.1.2 EULEX Efficiency

Poor management of personnel is also identified as one of the major problems affecting mission results. Seconded personnel tend to have deployment of one to two years (Interviews 8, 11, 24). The short-term character of the deployment, as well as the quality of the seconded personnel, complicate resource allocation and planning to match the requirements of the mission’s mandate (Interviews 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 24). Moreover, the usual length of deployment did not allow for the full exploitation of resources when it came to the mission’s prosecutorial
and judicial roles. In certain cases, the short-term appointments of personnel and the lengthy duration of the proceedings caused a re-start of judicial proceedings by subsequent prosecutors, wasting time and resources (Rashiti, 2019; Interviews 12, 14, 24). Unlike other CSDP missions, EULEX has centralised functions on programming, procurement and personnel (Kastrati, & Uhan, 2021), which allows the mission to conduct tender procedures independently and to relocate or donate equipment to satisfy Kosovar civilian needs.

4.1.3 EULEX Coherence

Turning to the coherence of activities, the lack of policy alignment among EU Member States on Kosovo’s status (Interviews 8, 12, 13, 14) and differing national priorities among contributing states (Interviews 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 24) were identified as major deficiencies, which resulted in the mission’s inability to better satisfy Kosovar requests. Due to the non-unanimous recognition of Kosovo by EU Member States it was not possible to sign a host country agreement with Pristina’s authorities. Therefore, the mandate is defined by EU Member States and the mission needs to establish “a relation that make these contradictions work in practice” (Interview 8). Nonetheless, the mission is coherent with the priorities of the EU and is in line with SAP objectives.6

Coordination with concomitant missions of non-EU actors is formally working. EULEX coexists in Kosovo with NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) with which it shares complementary roles in ensuring local security. According to plans for the coordinated response to security risks, Kosovar police is the first respondent, EULEX the second and KFOR the third. The EU Head of Mission and the KFOR Commander participate in periodical meetings and both appointed full-time liaison officers for their respective missions, allowing information exchange at a senior management level (NATO, 2013; EULEX, 2013). Nonetheless, cooperation evolves around informal practices in field operations, from staff-to-staff cooperation to community practices (Graeger, 2016), and is mostly dependent on the goodwill and personalities of people on the ground (Interviews 7, 8, 12, 13, 15, 24).

Coordination with UNMIK was established by UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). Due to the open-ended character of Resolution 1244 and its silence on the final status of Kosovo, UNMIK is de facto dormant, but remains active in the so-called community issues, such as those related to ethnic minorities, and maintains a rump police presence that overlaps with the EULEX Police (Brosig, 2011). There is little evidence of official coordination between UNMIK and EULEX, apart from a report on the latter’s activities presented as part of the UN Secretary General’s bi-annual report on UNMIK.

EULEX further cooperates with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Kosovo on activities related to the rule of law, policing, elections and gender equality. The continuing lack of transparency within Kosovo’s justice system provided a

6 These are: (1) stabilisation of the region and transition to a market economy, (2) promotion of regional cooperation, and (3) possible membership in the EU.
particularly fruitful ground for cooperation between the two missions, with the Justice Transparency Forum (EULEX, 2016b) being an example of a successful joint initiative between the two organisations (EULEX, 2017). Among the most recent coordinated activities between EULEX and OSCE, some were in areas of gender-based violence (EULEX, 2022c) and youth career development (EULEX, 2022b).

An identified problem in terms of EULEX’s coherence relates to horizontal coherence and dialogue between the mission and CSDP structures. As highlighted by interviewees 11, 12, 24, despite the presence of a structured dialogue, coordination between the mission and EU structures in Brussels is unidirectional. Particularly in the first years of deployment, it was characterised by a general lack of knowledge on judicial reforms and on the functioning of the local system by the EU institutions in Brussels.

4.1.4 EULEX Sustainability

Sustainability of an operational deployment can be understood in different ways, starting from the level of political support. As already identified in the efficiency and coherence sections, the mission suffered from low support in terms of political alignment and personnel provisions.

In terms of environmental sustainability, when EULEX’ mandate was defined, there were no clear CSDP rules pertaining to environmental protection or attempting to limit the environmental footprint of civilian missions. The 2012 European Union Military Concept on Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency for EU-led Military Operations referred only to EU-led military operations and missions (Council of the EU, 2012), with the Initial Guidelines on Climate Protection for Civilian Missions/Operations being first issued in July 2022 (Council of the EU, 2022b). Despite the novelty of the EU approach towards environmental considerations in deployment, EULEX already performs activities to limit its footprint, such as the Carbon Offsetting through Tree Planting Initiative that aims to partially offset the mission’s carbon footprint and contribute to mitigating the harmful effects of air pollution in Kosovo (EULEX, 2022a). EULEX has also shown interest in making environmental protection a rule-of-law matter by taking on cases of environmental crimes (EULEX, 2019b). The analysis and support in the contrast of environmental crimes are also among the features included in the recent operational guidelines for integrating environmental and climate aspects into civilian CSDP missions.

The Inclusion of gender considerations in the planning of CSDP missions and operations is a compulsory feature for all CSDP missions and operations (EEAS, 2022e). EULEX has a “full-time international Gender Advisor, who offers strategic advice on gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the mission’s mandate” (EULEX, Gender Resource Centre, n.d.). The gender advisor also delivers gender training courses and is assisted by the Gender Focal Points, which integrate gender issues in the internal and external work of the mission. In 2008, the mission started with four dedicated gender positions, two held by EULEX international and two by local personnel (Olsson et al., 2014). In 2012, the gender advisor was placed under the Deputy Head of Mission’s Office, allowing the advisor to be present at board meetings and advise on the mission’s implementation plans, reports and strategic planning. Nonetheless, the share of...
female personnel decreased considerably over the years. The downsizing of the mission overall and the almost all-male Formed Police Unit (FPU) of EULEX is among the main reasons for poor female representation (Smit, 2020). FPU is the second security responder in Kosovo after the Kosovar police, constituting the most important deployment of personnel in the mission, which explains the low percentage of women. In 2021, EULEX personnel comprised of 36 women (approximately 15% of personnel), making it the civilian CSDP mission with the lowest representation of women among international staff. Women constituted only 10% of the operational staff (Council of the EU, 2021g), while in 2010 they were 21.68% of the total staff (Kormoss, 2010). The gender imbalance within the mission is dependent on the situation within EU Member States and the ratio of female professionals working in the security, defence and judicial sectors in the participating Member States (Interviews 8, 11, 12, 13, 15). Despite the poor representation of women, Head of MAC, Political Advisor and the Head of Mission at the end of 2022 were all women (Interview 9). EULEX also ran several gender specific campaigns, these ranged from awareness campaigns (EULEX, 2020b), to legal support to victims of violence and monitoring legal processes on gender violence, to training of police frontline officers to identify and deal with cases of domestic violence (EULEX, 2020a). Against the backdrop of Kosovo’s participation in the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) mechanism, the inclusion and implementation of aspects and activities related to gender in all sectors is part of Pristina’s effort in its relations with the EU. It is in this context that a Country Level Implementation Plan as part of the Gender Action Plan III 2021-2025 has been developed for Kosovo with inputs from EULEX. The mission will also support in the implementation of the plan (EU office in Kosovo, 2021).

Turning to political sustainability, cooperation with the local community developed and improved over time. After the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1244, the international community decided to help the Kosovar authorities in defining the constitution and legal basis for the country, which resulted in the coexistence of four different legal codes, which are picked depending on the case in question (EULEX, 2019a; Interview 12). Between August 2008 and April 2011, there were difficulties in holding constructive dialogues with the local community due to the lack of local interlocutors, although the community has since been included in a dialogue to reshape the mission’s mandate and activities (Interview 12). This is evidenced by the exchange of letters on the renewal of the mission’s mandate (President of the Republic of Kosovo, 2021) that was preceded by meetings during the conduct of the mission’s strategic reviews (Interviews 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14). Given the types of activities performed, cooperation between EULEX and the local authorities is paramount for the advancement of the mission and for taking over the mission’s activities (EULEX, 2022d; EULEX, 2018). Despite several examples of good coordination (Interview 9), such coordination occurs mainly at a formal level, as evidenced by the recurrence of the same requests by local authorities in different strategic reviews (Interviews 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14). Nonetheless, the perception of the mission by the local authorities has improved considerably after the termination of the executive tasks in 2018. This was confirmed by interviewees 20 and 21, according to whom “we see now that Kosovo authorities are quite happy with what we are doing, especially the robust monitoring figure”, that refers to the monitoring activities performed by EULEX on selected judicial proceedings (EULEX, 2023).
Improvements could be made also with regard to the level of public trust in EULEX. This is partly due to declarations that did not meet expectations (e.g. the capacity of EULEX to take on major figures in organised crime, “the big fish”) (Interview 12). Referring to the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB), the trust in EULEX has been consistently low, although there seems to be a lack of data since the last published KSB report is from 2018. According to the first 2012 report, only 22% of respondents expressed satisfaction with, and acceptance of, EULEX, which remained fairly constant until 2018, when the last edition of KSB reported 24% satisfaction rate (Rose, 2020). The mission is thus not perceived particularly positively, at least as far as its coercive capabilities are considered, and this deficiency prevents the mission from fulfilling its rule of law mandate (Mahr, 2021). The perception of EULEX did not improve due to a corruption scandal that involved a former prosecutor of the mission (Halili, 2022). EULEX is also perceived as having made little effort to communicate with locals, who reported having very little contact (only 7% in 2015) with the mission (Rose, 2020). Finally, the perception of EULEX is also dependent on the general perception the country and local community have of the EU in general. Despite serving the interests of the EU, the fact that the current High Representative/Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) is a national from a country not recognising the independence of Kosovo, influences local perceptions of the EU (Interview 12). Finally, in December 2022, a EULEX reconnaissance patrol was attacked by a grenade in the northern part of the country, as a consequence of the rising tensions in the region (N1 Belgrade, 2022).

4.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina

The EU’s involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) began with the European Community’s involvement as a negotiator during the collapse of Yugoslavia. From 1991 the European Community Monitoring Mission was active in BiH to monitor first the conflict and then the peace. This was in addition to a mission deployed to the city of Mostar to help with reintegration in 1994. This involvement served as a test case for the emerging EU crisis response capabilities which developed into the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now CSDP (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013). The BiH case is also unique amongst the CSDP missions insofar as BiH is both a post-conflict society and a candidate country for EU membership (EEAS, 2022f). EU CSDP operational engagement in the country started in 2003 with the EUPM civilian mission which lasted until the end of 2012. A second, military engagement, Operation Althea, was established at the end of 2004 to take over from the NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and is still ongoing. Both deployments operated within a complex international and political environment, taking over from UN and NATO missions, and now operate within the framework of the EU accession process.
4.2.1 Effectiveness of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

The EUPM was the first ESDP/CSDP mission ever deployed and started while procedures were still being written (Interview 11). As such, it represented an opportunity to engage in “learning by doing” (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013). EUPM took over from the outgoing UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH-IPTF) which had been established under the Dayton Agreement to “transform the police from what was believed to be a war-time militia into an international standard police force” (EEAS, 2012). Given the EU’s aspirations for its eventual enlargement to the Western Balkans, EUPM was launched to help BiH complete the necessary reforms to begin negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). As of 2000, the EU had created a “Road Map” of 18 essential reforms before BiH could undertake a feasibility study to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the core agreement of the SAP. As such, it was considered that launching EUPM, in line with strategic policies of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), could help advance the reform process (EEAS, 2012). At the end of 2012, EUPM transferred its competencies to the IPA programme (EEAS, 2012), but its conclusion is considered to have arrived too early (Interview 11).

Like EUPM, operation Althea operates within the Dayton framework. It possesses a UNSC executive mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter through UNSC Resolutions 1551 (2004a) and 1575 (2004b), that assign the operation the specific purpose of implementing the military annexes of the Dayton Accords. Althea is also supporting the EU’s comprehensive strategy for BiH, ensuring safety and security in the country and training and exercising with the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH). Thanks to the improving security situation within BiH, Althea has decreased significantly in size and now consists of 1,100
personnel (the 600 soldiers normally in theatre plus an additional 500 activated in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a precautionary measure). Since November 2021, the EU is further providing assistance to BiH through the European Peace Facility (EPF) mechanism to build local capacity to upgrade the capabilities of the AFBiH through the provision of adequate equipment (Council of the EU, 2021f).

By looking at the preconditions for effective deployment, one can see that the length of the mandates of both engagements were too short and have been renewed several times. On the planning of the mission, prior to the activation of EUPM the EU deployed a Fact-Finding Mission to Sarajevo to explore the possibilities of commencing an EU mission under the ESDP framework, but these initial estimates for required personnel and funding were too low (EEAS, 2012). Furthermore, the process of taking over responsibilities from UNMIBH-IPTF suffered from the lack of data transfer from the UN, which was partly solved by the ad-hoc creation of the double-hatted position of head of the IPTF and head of the EUPM during the planning phase (General Secretariat of the Council, 2002; EEAS, 2012). The unsatisfactory transfer of data between the EU and the UN derived from the lack of coordination and cooperation mechanisms, which have been created and improved in the following decades.7

The different mandates of EUPM were considered to be too ambitious, compared to their length (Interviews 11 and 19) and lacked a strategic political direction (Interview 26). The readjustments of the mandate allowed, however, to accommodate new needs. As BiH advanced in the EU accession process, the fourth mandate explicitly included helping BiH authorities to “identify remaining police development needs which could be addressed through Community assistance” (Council of the EU, 2007a, p. 10; EEAS, 2012, pp. 42–43). After the assessment of EUPM in the 2010 strategic review, the Commission began to plan an exit strategy in cooperation with the mission (EEAS, 2012, pp. 42–43). Towards this end, EUPM’s mandate was focused on providing strategic level advice for law enforcement agencies and ensuring a successful handover between the EUPM and the EU Special Representative (EUSR) Office which would be taking the lead on rule of law matters under the pre-accession framework. However, “despite the progress and results achieved, the law enforcement system remained insufficiently cohesive and subject to political pressure” (EEAS, 2012) which led to the extension of the mission’s activities until the end of 2012.

Coming to Operation EUFOR Althea, it has been reconfigured five times since inception, and the last extension of the mandate was approved by the UNSC Resolution 2658 (2022). The planning of the operation profited from the Berlin plus agreement which allowed the EU to access NATO planning capabilities of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). As they are not part of NATO, Malta and Cyprus cannot participate in Althea and the sharing of information between NATO and EU command structures is not facilitated (Rittimann, 2021). Berlin plus is considered a valuable instrument to enhance practical

7 The last agreement concerning the EU-UN cooperation on security and defense is the EU-UN Framework Agreement on Provision of Mutual Support, signed in 2020: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22020A1119(01)&from=EN
cooperation between the two organisations, but its potential re-use in other operations seems unlikely given the improved EU capacity to plan and conduct operations (Interviews 22, 23). Furthermore, Berlin plus did not prevent NATO interference in the political dimension (Interview 27) which resulted also in the impossibility for Cyprus and Malta to contribute to the mission. A further membership-related problem was caused by Brexit, which triggered a change in personnel command and contribution “that is much felt” (Interview 25). Under the Berlin plus agreement, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander is the operation commander of Berlin plus operations, which, according to SHAPE’s staff organisation (NATO, 2017), is a UK national. Therefore, Brexit required a transfer of operation’s command to a SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff, to avoid having an EU operation commanded by a non-EU state (Rittiman, 2021).

Due to the improving security environment in BiH and the desire to reduce troop numbers by certain EU Member States (Boštjančič, 2017) Althea was progressively downsized and tasks were refocused in mandate revisions. In 2012, Althea was reconfigured to focus on Capacity Building and Training (CB&T) while retaining the original obligations towards preserving a secure environment. From 2018, the official CB&T program concluded, and it now focuses on embedded training alongside AFBiH. Its original mandate set out the exit strategy for the mission as based on progress in building efficient state level structures. While this was acknowledged to be primarily under the control of the BiH authorities, it is also highlighted that EUFOR should contribute to the overall assessment process for the mission.

Both deployments experienced problems related to national procedural differences of participating Member States. In EUPM, different standards for police negatively affected the performance of the operation (Interview 11). In case of Althea, national caveats and different understandings of the attributions of the operation, constituted the main problem in the implementation of activities defined by the mandate or Operational Plan (OPLAN) (Interview 27).

4.2.2 Efficiency of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

EUPM did not profit from the use of a common warehouse, which, for civilian CSDP missions has been created in 2018 (EEAS, 2019). Equipment was procured centrally by the EUPM, including vehicles, IT-equipment and pieces of hardware and software (Council of the EU, 2010), nonetheless procedures were lengthy (Interview 26). Due to the double chain of command, with the Commission providing funding, all discussions around equipment had to be cleared with the Commission during the extension of the mission mandates (Council of the EU, 2007a). When the mission downsized, the equipment was sent to a “temporary warehouse”. This included the remaining equipment such as 120 vehicles, down from 231 in 2007 (Council of the EU, 2007a) and the remaining technical equipment (European Council Secretariat and Directorate-General External Relations). Most of the materiel was transferred to the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), some was sent to EULEX (Council of the EU, 2010). The experience of the EUPM led to the development of the CSDP strategic warehouse to ensure a basic level of provisions were prepared for future missions at short notice (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013).
Turning to the personnel management, in EUPM personnel rotation represented a problem, as the appointment period of one-year did not allow a complete performance of the activities of the mandate (Interviews 11, 26). Moreover, the definition of European and international standards “were at best subjective and as no definition was provided, different contributing national police services interpreted these terms differently” (EEAS, 2012). Since EUPM, the EU issued an “EU Policy on Training for CSDP” (General Secretariat of the Council, 2017) and updated the general standards for behaviour during deployment (Council of the EU, 2018a). A further deficiency regarding personnel, was identified in the “deployment gap”, i.e. the difference between the seconded individuals in theatre and the total budgeted by the OPLAN, which reached 35% in 2009 (Council of the EU, 2009b), as well as in the presence of different national caveats.

Inefficient personnel management was present also in operation Althea, where the poorly harmonised pre-deployment training (Boštjančič et al., 2016) is mitigated by a standardised IOT training offered to the personnel of the Multinational Battalion upon arrival (EUFOR Forum, 2022). During the first stages of operation Althea, a deficiency was represented by the lack of a lead nation on force deployment. Consequently, some nations were required to advance resources to others and “lengthy negotiations” were necessary to produce “a high amount of laboriously negotiated agreements” on financial burden sharing (Council of the EU, 2007d, p. 14). These included formal Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) with certain third countries and ad-hoc Participation Agreements (PA) with others, subject to levels of Gross National Income (GNI) relative to that of EU Member States whereby they would not have to contribute to common costs if their GNI per capita did not exceed that of any EU member (Council of the EU, 2004b). This complex formula on third country participation was superseded by the overall structure of the Athena mechanism, and now the EPF.

The efficiency of third-states’ contribution to EUPM was reflected in the use FPAs. These agreements however are concluded in a way that does not injure the EU autonomy in decision making, therefore, third countries are not involved in the definition of goals of the mission. Nonetheless, the very low number of personnel deployed to the mission per third-country, highlights the mainly political value of their contribution to CSDP (Official Journal of the European Union, 2003; Government of Canada, 2018; Interviews 11, 25).

4.2.3 Coherence of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

The coordination between the Head of Mission and the institutions in Brussels in EUPM was considered inappropriate in terms of understanding of the needs of the mission and expertise of the people in the command structures (Interviews 11, 14, 26). In terms of horizontal coherence, the case of operation Althea shows how poor coherence can affect the effectiveness of the mission. For instance, the presence of national caveats and different

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8 The Athena mechanism was created in 2004 and replaced by the EPF. Information on the first years of use of Athena can be found at: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/the-mechanism-for-financing-military-operations-athena.html](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/the-mechanism-for-financing-military-operations-athena.html)
understandings of the duties of the mission can be traced back to insufficient coherence and coordination of policies and activities among the participating Member States.

Moreover, coordination between EUPM and the other missions proved a challenge (Ioannides I., 2018). The presence of two CSDP missions operating in tandem with the EUSR, all with divergent organisational cultures and mission objectives, created pressures often deriving from divergent responses to similar situations (General Secretariat of the Council, 2006, p. 2). These issues led to the adoption in 2005 of seven coordinating principles among the three EU actors in the theatre (the EUPM, EUFOR Althea and the EUSR) to help ensure strategic synergy (Emmerson & Gross, 2007). A further attempt to improve coherence and coordination regarded the timelines of the reviews of EUPM and EUFOR which were aligned, along with that of the EUSR (Council of the EU, 2006c). Coordination between EUPM and Althea was, however, mainly driven by the personalities of the people on the ground (Interviews 26, 27).

4.2.4 Sustainability of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

At the time of EUPM, environmental sustainability was not considered in the planning and conduction of CSDP missions and operations, hence there was no specific, reported action undertaken to limit the environmental footprint. However, at the end of the mission, the equipment remained in the temporary warehouse was liquidated by the Head of Mission who became the Head of Liquidation Team (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013). Different is the case of operation Althea, whose mandate states clearly that “EUFOR and the [troop contributing nations] have a collective responsibility for the protection of the environment” (Council of the EU, 2004c). While it is unclear to what extent Althea’s mandate has been revised to include a greater focus on environment, the repeated extensions of Althea’s mandate have been mentioned in other documents as a key factor to be considered when planning for the environmental impacts of missions (EEAS, 2021). Furthermore, as it operates under the Berlin plus agreement, Althea has to comply with NATO and international standards, such as ISO 14000, NATO MC 469 or STANAG 7141 EP. Finally, there is evidence that the operation performed in-/out-processing surveys and analysis to assess the environmental state of sites (Lucic, 2012).

Turning to gender sustainability, EUPM included a gender perspective in line with the EU’s gender policy for CSDP missions since 2006, and in both later Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and OPLAN, gender balance became a goal of the mission (Council of the EU, 2011). Gender considerations were specifically included in the 2009 OPLAN for the extension of EUPM, according to which the mission had to periodically report on the implementation of gender mainstreaming and issue a specific item on gender in the lessons learned process. With reference to the activities at the benefit of the population, EUPM had to support and assist national institutions in the inclusion of gender, from the training of local police to the evaluation of laws on police officials and sensibilisation on the social acceptance of victims of gender-based violence (Council of the EU, 2009a). Since 2008 the mission had a specific Gender Advisor and a formal Gender Coordination Board to coordinate activities under the UN Development Fund for Women jointly run by EUPM, EUFOR, the UN and a local NGO to raise awareness on matters related to gender and propose ways to better include the gender
dimension in all activities of the mission (EEAS, 2012). However, the Gender Advisor was not a full-time position and was double hatted along with the position of Human Rights & Legal Advisor (Kaski, 2011). Gender representation in deployment constituted an average of 40-45% of all EUPM staff members, out of which 10-15% were international (EEAS, 2012). Alarmingly, misbehaviour of deployed personnel was an issue (Interviews 26, 27, 28). Harassment and misbehaviour were also considered in a 2009 report on Women in Police Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina prepared by the EUPM and the BiH Agency for Gender Equality (EEAS, 2012).

The CONOPS of Althea only contained one mention to gender stating that “[a]n aide-memoire will provide guidance to commanders on the standard of behaviour, gender issues and human trafficking” in the section on the use of force (Council of the EU, 2004c, p. 16). The Headquarters team included one civilian gender adviser and two senior military officers appointed as gender advisors, with the civilian being full-time deployed while the others rotate on a six-month basis (Council of the EU, 2011, p. 29). The limited consideration of gender in the initial stages of the operation was carried forward into the gender distribution of initial forces, with around 95% of personnel being male between 2004 and 2007 (Kronsell, 2016; Valenius, 2007). This did not significantly improve by 2016 when all 19 international civilian consultants were male and only 36 out of 821 military personnel attached to the mission were women (EEAS, 2016). As mentioned in the efficiency section, an identified problem also affecting the sustainability of the mission is related to the personnel “deployment gap”. For instance, the higher the gap, the more the mission’s sustainability is affected.

In terms of political sustainability based on local perceptions and support, EUPM was initially strongly supported by all parties. However, a loss of political support from key constituents in the host country prevented the mission from completing its mandate as initially proposed. The proposed police reform, in particular, faced significant political and constitutional issues which blocked it from being completed as originally foreseen (Padurariu, 2014; Interview 11). Fundamentally, the EUPM’s local political support was high while also tainted by its association with unsuccessful, externally imposed reform plans (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013; Kappler, 2012). Despite some failures of the EUPM in making the local authorities accept proposals for the modification of the national system, projects were defined in coordination with local authorities, particularly from 2008 onward (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013; Interview 11; EEAS, 2012). During the first mandate, instead, local authorities were not involved in the definition of activities (Interview 19). The sustainability of the mission initially suffered from the bad UN’s IPTF reputation from which the mission took over responsibilities and initial personnel (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013). The local community was aware of the activities of the mission, as mission personnel participated in TV and radio shows and were involved in activities with local communities (Flessenkemper & Helly, 2013), despite the perception that the mission should have better engaged in communication activities and public awareness activities (Interview 11).
4.3 Democratic Republic of Congo

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), multiple countries and armed groups had since 1998 been drawn into increasingly complex and violent armed conflict, especially in the Eastern part of the country. The basis for the cessation of some of the violence was the Pretoria Agreement reached in December 2002. The peace accord laid down a transition process, including a transition government. As part of this, the Comité international de l’accompagnement de la transition, that included the EU, was established to monitor and advise in the transition. Following changes in the composition and number of armed groups operating in the Eastern DRC, the security situation deteriorated. This took place despite a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), being deployed in the Eastern DRC since 1999. Due to MONUC’s inability to prevent an escalation of violence, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, requested further assistance from the international community and the EU was the most suitable and willing international actor. The ESDP/CSDP framework had been developing since the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, and there was a need for the EU to demonstrate international unity following the divisive 2003 Iraq War response. Therefore, following the UN solicitation, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) requested a feasibility study for an EU military operation. As a response, then HR/VP, Javier Solana, dispatched a fact-finding mission into the DRC, which together with French pressure and leadership, British and eventually German acceptance, contributed to the UNSC passing Resolution 1484 (2003), providing the UN mandate and authorisation for the European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo, Operation Artemis, deployed between September and November 2003.

After Operation Artemis, the DRC continued its transition towards democracy, with significant international assistance. The transition process included the first democratic presidential elections in 40 years and the establishment of a specialised Integrated Police Unit (IPU) within the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) (Hoebeke et al., 2007). The PNC had significant problems and the transitional government asked the EU and other international actors to establish the IPU. Decision 2004/494/CFSP instituted a three-step project to support the establishment of the Unit, through financial and material support. The EU first provided technical assistance and reconstruction of a training centre and the provision of basic operational equipment. Then it trained the Unit and thirdly performed monitoring and mentoring in the implementation of the IPU’s mandate (Hoebeke et al., 2007; Council of the EU, 2004d). In November 2004, the PSC assessed the necessity to launch an ESDP component, establishing EUPOL Kinshasa the following month. The civilian mission was initially planned to remain in the country until three months after the national vote. The initial end-date of EUPOL was 31 December 2005 but after several delays in holding the elections the Council agreed to further extend EUPOL until December 2006 (Council of the EU, 2005, 2006a).

The delay was due to the precarious security situation, despite the presence of the over 10,000 strong MONUC mission. The capitol of Kinshasa, which at the time had a population of approximatively eight million, was divided between various armed groups and militias, despite agreements to contrary (Novaky, 2016; Fritsch, 2008). After the UN Secretary-General’s request
for additional 2,590 troops for MONUC was rejected by the UNSC,\(^9\) in December 2005, the UN asked the EU to examine further “possible means” for an EU contribution to the stability of the country (Novaky, 2018, p. 109). In April 2006, the formal mandate for the European Union Force RD Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) military operation was passed by both the UNSC (Resolution 1671) and the EU Council (Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP) and EUFOR operated along with EUPOL.

**Figure 4: Timeline of CSDP Engagement in DRC\(^{10}\)**

Following the elections in late 2006, the country enjoyed a short period of relative stability. Nonetheless, the IPU formally ended its mandate and state institutions were not stable and mature enough to ensure the stability of the country. Therefore, the EU deemed necessary to further support the country via EUPOL DR Congo, that can be considered an extension of EUPOL Kinshasa, despite a more evident focus on the security sector reform (SSR) (Council of the EU, 2007c).

### 4.3.1 Effectiveness of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

Among the preconditions for effectiveness, Artemis experienced problems, that were mainly related to different systems and procedures among participating Member States. A first example was provided by the different information classification systems among EU Member States and partners, with the result that information sharing was partial (Council of the EU, 2004a). Secondly, despite strong French initiative and leadership with Operation Artemis

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\(^9\) In large parts due the US resistance (Novaky, 2016, p. 109).

\(^{10}\) This working paper considers only Operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo.
planning and operational phases as demonstrated by the EU’s acceptance of initial French entry, the multinational nature of forces was evaluated to be negative (Interviews 1 & 16). This followed the varying national caveats and measures before and during the EU’s planning process, implying that a more comprehensive EU-level coordination could have been time-intensive, as happened during the EUFOR RD Congo (Major, 2009; Novaky, 2018; Peen Rodt, 2014). The use of different logistic supports was necessary given the non-standardised equipment. For example, due to non-standardised equipment, operation’s personnel were forced to use common/civilian cell phones to communicate. Coming to the more operational aspects, “it was difficult to lead an operation with two lead countries, with Germany in the Operational HQ (OHQ) in Potsdam and the French on the ground in the Force HQ (FHQ). The real problem was the lack of trust between both nations” (Interview 16). These challenges have been linked to the complex political process behind EUFOR. Germany, and to a lesser degree France, despite being Framework Nations, did not exercise sufficient leadership. Instead through caveats and domestic political concerns, the planning process slowed down and was overly complicated (Major, 2009; Novaky, 2018; Fritsch, 2008; Engberg, 2013).

At the EU level, the performance of a complete and accurate assessment of the situation on the ground improved over time and it now includes several aspects relating to the EU integrated approach. As a general figure, the complete assessment and proposal of a potential CSDP mission/operation should be followed by a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) (Interview 25). In Artemis, guidelines for the protection of civilians during EU-led Crisis Management Operation, as well as the definition of EU Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) were not developed and identified as lessons learned for future deployments. This, however, was not entirely considered in the performance of EUFOR. During EUFOR a CMC outlining potential activities was missing. Subsequently, EUFOR activities were performed on the basis of an option paper wrote before deployment and problems were mitigated thanks to the experience of the EUSR (Council of the EU, 2007b).

Artemis was effective in the implementation of its mandate. It succeeded in securing the territory of Bunia and in transferring its responsibilities to the MONUC mission (Tomolya, 2015). Nonetheless, the mandate was evaluated to be extremely narrow in space and time, affecting negatively its potential, and not including considerations on the maintenance of security after the termination of the deployment (Turke, 2008; Interview 1). Indeed, MONUC was not able to maintain security after Artemis left the country (Interview 1). Similar considerations can be drawn for EUFOR Congo, for which, however, a degree of discrepancy between the UN Resolution 1671 and the Council Joint action 319/CFSP was present (Fritsch, 2008). The Joint Action did not include redeployment or “draw-down” phase, whereas the UN mandate by using broader language, did. The EU decision not to extend EUFOR mandate (Engberg, 2013) contributed to the discrepancy in the UN and EU mandates, with operational impacts. During the re-deployment phase following the initial end of EUFOR mandate of November 2006 EUFOR personnel did not have a clear rule of engagement, until the PSC issued an emergency one exclusively for self- and force-protection. This meant that EUFOR was not authorised to intervene in case of violence (Fritsch, 2008; Council of the EU, 2007b).
4.3.2 Efficiency of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

Artemis and EUFOR Congo did not use a warehouse for the deployment and each participating country provided what was deemed necessary. In Artemis, participating Member States' contributions were agreed upon in the Paris Force Generation Conference in early June 2003. Local infrastructure was considered to be insufficient and the remoteness of the zone of engagement caused problems in terms of necessary and appropriate military means (Giegerich, 2008; Interviews 1, 28). Among those, strategic airlift capabilities were identified as an EU strategic military priority (Novaky, 2018; Interview 1).

In the case of EUFOR Congo, Germany hosted two force generations conferences followed by two logistic conferences, prior to the deployment of the mission. This process was inefficient and slow as the individual EU Member States could not finalise their internal processes on time, mostly due to the German reluctance to assign the OHQ in Potsdam and mobilise necessary resources (Engberg, 2013; Fritsch, 2008). Furthermore, each participating nation oversaw its own logistics and provision of equipment, but coordinated some of the logistics through multinational logistic organisations, such as the Host Nations Support and Third-Party Logistic Service Support to achieve economies of scale (Council of the EU, 2007b; Engberg, 2013). The provision of C-130 tactical aircraft in EUFOR was problematic as the majority of aircraft could not fly at night, the Greek ones could make one trip per week and the German equipment could only be used in Kinshasa due to national caveats. Moreover, communication systems between EU FHQ and MONUC FHQ had to rely on mobile phones with Congolese SIM cards, due to a lack of standardised equipment (Interview 16).

Coming to the efficient management of funding, Artemis foresaw a financial allocation of seven million euro and requested the Council to establish procedures for post settlement of costs. "Barracks and lodging for the forces as a whole, as well as expenditure related to transportation of the forces as a whole" were not considered eligible as common costs (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP). There was no common funding for Civil-Military cooperation (CIMIC), and the FHQ had to resort to Commission funding. Furthermore, the Council indicated that a more equal distribution of the costs should have been implemented, suggesting an inefficient distribution of operational costs (Council of the EU, 2007b). Again, lessons learned derived from Artemis were not completely addressed by the time EUFOR deployed, as common funding for CIMIC were still missing (Council of the EU, 2007b). Common costs of EUFOR were covered by the Athena mechanism, but detailed knowledge on the mechanism was missing and financed common costs only from the second phase of the mission, meaning that barracks, lodging or initial transport of the forces were not covered by the mechanism (Major, 2009; Engberg, 2013; Council of the EU, 2006b).

Efficiency in personnel management for Artemis and EUFOR resented from national caveats and imbalances in the composition of the forces. In Artemis, a total of around 2,200 personnel, belonging to both EU and non-EU countries was deployed during the operation and a French reserve force of around 1,000 soldiers was stationed in neighbouring countries, to be used in case of need. The majority of personnel in the OHQ was not French, while the prevalence of soldiers on the ground belonged to Paris (Faria, 2004). Changes in commitment from EU
Member States did cause some hurdles. In the case of Germany, despite the parliamentary authorisation of over 300 personnel to be deployed, the actual contribution was limited to around 40 personnel. The then Defence minister explicitly ruled out the possibility of sending combat troops, with reasons being both hesitance to commit combat troops in Africa and the already stretched situation of the Bundeswehr due to the country’s other commitments (Novaky, 2018; Schmidt, 2011).

In EUFOR, some countries, such as Spain and Germany, placed serious national caveats/limitations on where and when their troops could be used. In this instance, German/Dutch troops were only to be used inside Kinshasa (Major, 2009; Fritsch, 2008). “Most German troops were not deployed to Kinshasa, but instead spent most of their time in hotel facilities in Gabon” (Interview 16). Spanish units had multiple conditions on when and where (only in Kinshasa) they could be deployed, with national authorisation required for operations. These limitations caused significant operational challenges to the Force Commander and limited his operational options (Council of the EU, 2007b). If such limitations were to be put in place in future, they should be made clear during planning and force generation process, to plan and complement requirements accordingly (Council of the EU, 2007b).

4.3.3 Coherence of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

Operation Artemis was deployed to assist MONUC and create the security conditions necessary for the UN to operate. Coordination with UN forces on the ground and coordination in preparation of the handing over of responsibility at the end of the EU mandate was performed (Interview 1). However, cooperation could have been more effective (Council of the EU, 2004a) and the experience on the ground triggered the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management (24 September, 2003), through which the organisations established a joint consultative mechanism to increase cooperation on planning, training, communication and best practices. When EUFOR was launched, coherence and cooperation between the EU and UN had slightly improved. In the preparation phase of EUFOR, the EU and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations signed technical agreements on logistics and intelligence (Major, 2009), but there “was [a] lack of understanding between the EU and the UN as to the requirements of the UN for EU support (objectives, tasks and timelines)” (Engberg, 2013). This resulted in different understandings about the role of EUFOR (Interview 10). Eventually, EUFOR RD Congo was given independence and the necessary mandate to act on its own, whilst providing support and coordinating with MONUC. On intelligence sharing, partly due to unsecured communications infrastructures and to the lack of detailed agreements, some of the situation assessments were not shared, with EU intelligence reports being “sanitised” before sharing it with MONUC (Interview 10; Council of the EU, 2007b). The institutional challenges for more effective cooperation were mostly related to a lack of formal cooperation mechanisms.

Coming to the coherence between concomitant EU missions/operations on the ground, at the time of EUFOR RD Congo the EU was running also EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo. The coordination between the EUFOR, EUPOL and EUSEC took place at operational and political level. As per the initial mandate in 423/2006/CFSP, the Force Commander (FCdr) and his
command group oversaw coordination with EUPOL and EUSEC on operational level in Kinshasa (Fritsch, 2008) and coordinated with the EUSR on regular basis. The FCdr also oversaw coordination with local actors, such as Congolese authorities and MONUC. This included sharing intelligence between the EU missions (Council of the EU, 2007b).

Communication between the personnel on the ground and the EU structures was at times difficult in operation Artemis and it was complex to receive intelligence from above, forcing the forces on the ground to work "in a fog at the operational level" (Interview 1). Furthermore, in addition to affecting effectiveness, the acceptance of the French-only first entry in the country as potential solution to diverging know-hows and management of the field, and the presence of different logistical supports are further representations of poor vertical coherence. Criticalities in vertical coherence during EUFOR were also present with regard to aspects on efficiency of cooperation. Changes in commitment from EU Member States, serious national caveats or limitations to deployment, as well as non-standardised equipment mentioned in the previous section, are representative of a lack of coherence and coordination between the national decisions and procedures and the EU ones.

4.3.4 Sustainability of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

Neither Operation Artemis nor EUFOR considered environmental sustainability in their mandates or activities. Nonetheless, Council Joint Decision 2003/319/CFSP on Artemis referenced the EU’s 2003 DRC country strategy, which included considerations on environmental destruction and challenges inherent in the DRC conflicts, both in fuelling the conflict and on how the conflict was impacting the environment of the DRC (Council of the EU, 2003). EUFOR OPLAN annex referred instead to “environmental support”, but it is unclear what this entailed. During EUFOR, however, being under the operational lead of France, French regulations on environmental considerations during deployment applied (Interview 16).

At the time of Operation Artemis, considering also the very narrow mandate of the operation, no reflection on gender sustainability was made and personnel deployed on the ground was mainly male, with a very limited female component (Interviews 1, 16, 18). EUFOR instead was the first EU CSDP operation including a female Gender Advisor in the OHQ in Potsdam, from May 2006 onwards (Gya et al., 2009) and the experience showed the need for such inclusion in all EU operations (Council of the EU, 2007b). While in the beginning there was some resistance towards the inclusion of Gender advisor, it decreased over time. This was for the most part seen as the result of the high effectiveness of the Gender advisor during the operation. "She was the only advisor for 2,400 soldiers" (Interview 16). As the Gender advisor was part of the Operation Commander’s team, the gender dimension was systematically incorporated into the mission also thanks to a regular reporting system on gender. This ensured a tailoring of this dimension for the EUFOR’s operational needs, and the delineation of tailored lessons learned at the end of the mission (Gya et al., 2009). The advisor closely cooperated with the CIMIC branch J9 in both the OHQ and the FHQ. This cooperation was particularly necessary since there was no gender advisor directly placed in Congo but suffered from limited budget that hindered operational effectiveness (Council of the EU, 2007b). As a part of the every-day approach to gender, EUFOR sought to ensure that every patrol included a
female soldier, to enhance a regular outreach and engagement of female soldiers with the population (Gya et al., 2009). Nonetheless, there was a minimal participation of women to the mission, which reflects the composition of the contributing Member States’ armed forces (Interviews 22, 23).

Regarding political sustainability, Artemis performed communication activities with Congolese representatives to ensure the involvement and awareness of local community (Marchl, 2010; Interview 1). The social sustainability of the operation was tangible for the people who lived in Bunia, who were able to return to the city by the end of August 2003. The economic life in the city of Bunia experienced a normalisation of activities, humanitarian support could resume, thus allowing the Interim Ituri Administration and the Ituri Assembly to restart working towards a negotiation between the government and the belligerents (Homan, 2007; Interview 1). Nonetheless, the temporally and geographically limited mandate negatively impacted the sustainability of the mission, particularly the durability of the intended results. Similarly, EUFOR was generally well-received in public at the end of the mission, but it is questionable whether it was able to provide long-term impact, due to limited time-frame and objectives (Major C, 2012).

Related to an efficient management of funding is economic sustainability, or the appropriateness of economic resources for a sufficiently long period of time. Neither operation Artemis nor EUFOR can be considered positive examples for the coverage of CIMIC costs, for which no common funding was available.

4.4 Mali

Following an attack by the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and Islamic armed groups in January 2012, the Malian transitional government called for international help, initially provided by the UNSC. In its 2012 Resolution, the UN requested regional and international organisations, including the EU, “to provide coordinated assistance, expertise, training and development support” to the Malian armed forces to restore state’s authority (UNSC, 2012).

In an attempt to improve local governance, resilience of state’s infrastructures and reduce factors of insecurity, the Sahel is the subject of a European intervention that began in 2013. As every other EU deployment, the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali was agreed upon on the basis of a request from the President of the country. Founded by Decision 2013/34/CFSP (Council of the EU, 2013a), the purpose of EUTM Mali is to advise, train and educate Malian soldiers, to rebuild self-sustaining armed forces capable of contributing to the defence of their population and country. Training is provided by the Education and Training Task Force (ETTF) based in Koulikoro, close to Bamako. In parallel, the EUCAP Sahel Mali civilian mission aims to strengthen the police forces of the country, as well as the judicial authorities, to establish the best possible conditions for guaranteeing a constitutional and democratic order. This second mission was established by Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP. Despite these and other international deployments in the country, Mali is suffering from a linear deterioration of security and interference from Russian-affiliated military presence.
Due to the unstable local situation and to the inability to prevent the engagement of EU-trained Malian forces in violent activities (Human Rights Watch, 2022), in April 2022 the EU decided to suspend operational training for the Malian armed forces and the National Guard, thus suspending a relevant part of activities of both EUTM and EUCAP. The only remaining activities performed under EUTM are training on international humanitarian law, high-level training for Malian army officers and high-level advice (strategic advice) to the Malian armed forces.

The security environment in Mali is also being modified by the withdrawal of French-led Operation Barkhane and Task Force Takuba, which were the main providers of security in the north and east of the country. On 17 February, 2022, France announced alongside the EU partners and Canada “the coordinated withdrawal of their respective military resources” (Élysée, 2022).

**Figure 5: Timeline of EU Engagement in Mali**

### 4.4.1 Effectiveness of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

The implementation of both EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali – the training of Malian armed forces and security sector capacity building respectively – was not considered to be effective enough in the 2022 Holistic Strategic Review performed by the EEAS (Council of the EU, 2022a). The reality of the EUTM is complex: the plethora of actors, short rotation of personnel, language barrier and the constant insufficient understanding of the local context and interests are all major limitations to the ambition and objectives of the EU engagement in the country (Baudais & Maïga, 2022).

In terms of political support, the EU involvement in Mali is a representation of the EU integrated strategy in the Sahel (Council of the EU, 2021c). However, both the strategy and the operational deployment in the country do not reflect a shared understanding among EU Member States of
the importance of the country and of the better tools to deploy in the country. In the case of France, the EU direct involvement is a perfect match of interests with those of the French administration, who has been directly involved in trying to improve the security of the country through Operations Serval/Barkahne and Takuba. Particularly after the migration crisis, the interest of Germany in stabilising the Sahel region increased and Berlin became a promoter of several initiatives (e.g. G20 African compact) (Colomba-Petteng, 2021). However, EUTM is not the preferred option for all EU Member States (i.e. Poland) nor the preferred type of intervention (i.e. Finland) (Cadier et al., 2020).

EUTM Mali has had five different mandates that changed over time to include requests from the Malian authorities, e.g. the creation of an Advisory Task Force (Council of the EU, 2014b) and increasing the area and activities of operation (Council of the EU, 2016). EUTM’s mandate, currently running from 2020 to 2024, was the first mandate of an EU mission to be extended for a period of four years. This change was necessary to reflect the results of the 2022 Holistic Strategic Review process. The extended mandate includes an expansion of the area of operations that now covers the whole of Mali and military assistance for other G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso and Niger). It shifts the operational centre of gravity from Bamako to the centre of Mali, including decentralised activities and non-executive accompaniment (Council of the EU, 2020). According to an April 2022 PSC decision, training activities in Mali are temporarily and reversibly suspended, due to the current security situation. The effectiveness of the EU engagement is further limited by the presence of national caveats for deployment. When EUTM Mali was launched, some Member States made the safety of their trainers a priority and as a consequence they only agreed to contribute to the mission on the condition that the training would take place in safe areas, i.e. in Bamako and the south of Mali, excluding the centre and the north, which are exposed to the threat of terrorism. This lack of willingness to take risks, however, did compromise the mission’s effectiveness (Council of the EU, 2022a; Interviews 22, 23).

Since 2014, EUCAP Sahel Mali complements EUTM Mali’s activities. Similarly to EUTM, the mission was refocused several times. The first mandate was broadened to include assistance and advice to Malian internal security forces included in the first mandate (Council of the EU, 2017), the second mandate added a strategic consultancy activity on border management and counterterrorism aimed at developing a management framework, principles and tools (Council of the EU, 2019). Within the framework of the regionalisation of CSDP missions in the Sahel, the mission extensively focused on strengthening capacities to fight terrorism and organised crime, supporting border management and migration management activities, extending the training to other G5 Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad) and delivering training in the totality of the Malian territory. The 2021-2023 mandate (Council of the EU, 2021a) adjusted the mission “to enhance its ability to assist and advise the Malian internal security forces by supporting a gradual redeployment of Mali’s civilian administrative authorities to the centre of Mali” (Council of the EU, 2021b). Finally, the latest mandate of EUCAP Sahel Mali, in force since 1 February, 2023, authorises the deployment of the mission until the end of January 2025. Additional tasks of the mandate are to facilitate the deployment of internal security forces in the south of Mali and to support the strategic communication of
the EU, in line with the recommendations of the 2022 Holistic Strategic Review (Council of the EU, 2023a). The implementation of the mission’s mandate has been affected by the local security situation and only six out of the 20 agreed Secure Development and Governance Poles in the central region of the country were accessible in the first part of 2022. Nonetheless, the training related part of the mandate was evaluated to have produced good results (Council of the EU, 2022a).

Regarding both deployments, the assessment of their effectiveness cannot be separated from the capacity of the local authorities to implement activities. As one interviewee highlighted:

EUCAP and EUTM can be only as effective as local authorities can be, because at the end of the day these are training and advisory missions, they are not executive ones, they do not make decisions for the Malian state. Their effectiveness as such can be extremely effective in terms of outputs, but much less effective in terms of impact if the country that is being supported or its authorities do not basically make full use of the expertise that is being put at their disposition by the EU (Interview 5).

When it comes to the involvement of local community in the planning of the mission, the strategic review recognises the need to better respond to the local requirements, which can be done if higher levels of trust between parties is ensured (Council of the EU, 2022a).

4.4.2 Efficiency of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

With the aim of enhancing a smoother procurement of equipment, the Commission applied flexible procurement procedures (i.e. negotiated procedures without prior publication) given the difficult environment in which EUCAP operates (European Court of Auditors, 2018). Since the creation of the CSDP Warehouse II from 2018 to 2020 Mali was the country to which the warehouse sent the most shipments (EEAS, 2020).

According to a European Court of Auditors’ report, the division of the total mission budget covers mostly personnel costs (53%) and running expenditures (24%), while only the 4% of budget is dedicated to projects in EUCAP Sahel Mali (European Court of Auditors, 2018, p. 16), limiting the potential effectiveness of an efficient allocation of funding. While the EUTM Mali is the smallest mission operating in Mali in terms of budget (Baudais & Maïga, 2022), it represents the largest budget of all military CSDP operations, having mobilised EUR 46.4 million in 2021 and EUR 58.6 million in 2022 (European Parliament, 2022). However, these figures only represent the common costs of the mission, which have increased over time. The budget allocated for the mission is severely criticised by some analysts, for whom the instability prevents real progress on the ground since half the costs would be spent on protecting the trainers (Lebovich, 2020).

With specific reference to the provision of personnel, Member States’ interest in providing the right people is generally high. Nonetheless, the rapid rotation of personnel and lack of specialised personnel also fluent in French are issues affecting the efficiency of CSDP missions in Mali (Interviews 2, 22, 23), while the duration of personnel’s appointment (from four to six months) in EUTM is considered insufficient to perform the tasks of the missions,
particularly for what concerns the advisory role of the mission (Council of the EU, 2022a; Interview 2):

[A]nd in the African context, this is problematic because to establish a relationship with your counterparts, there is a minimum of confidence and of knowing each other that is required. And right now, when things start improving, they leave. Moreover, I would say that at least one in two of commanders do not speak French, which means they cannot really develop a close relationship with their counterparts. [...] This is very interesting and funny because I have seen that other missions [...] are frequently presented with the same issues in management and with the language which is very important. So it is interesting to see that we have similar issues in the EUTM. [...] What is more delicate was [the lack of] those who were in charge of training of the Strategic Council in support of improvement. We did not have enough strategic advisers for example. Here we could have newly retired generals who could come with more authority to give advice. (Interview 2).

The length of the appointment is a problem also in EUCAP Sahel Mali. As the mission’s mandate is of a maximum duration of two years this prevented to plan mid- to long-term activities and to acquire full knowledge of procedures and working conditions for rotating personnel (European Court of Auditors, 2018).

A further major problem affecting both the efficiency and the sustainability of the mission is the lack of a verification and follow-up mechanism of the personnel trained by the mission. This has led to the presence of EU-trained people under the military command of Russian-affiliated forces and to the decision to temporarily suspend training activities to prevent any further involvement (Council of the EU, 2022a).

4.4.3 Coherence of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

The EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali work closely. Additionally, and since 2013, the EU has a Special Representative for the Sahel, “to foster political dialogue, coherence and coordination” between the EU, Sahel States and other international stakeholders, “including through regularly convening special envoy meetings” (Council of the EU, 2013b). The EUSR oversees the coordination of the EU comprehensive approach to the regional crisis, on the basis of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. Moreover, the EU is supporting a regionalisation approach in the Sahel since 2017 for its CSDP missions, through a Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC) based in Mauritania, which supports regional and cross-border cooperation in the Sahel and strengthens the national capacities of the G5 Sahel countries.

Coordination and cooperation between EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali were strengthened through pre-deployment training for the National Guard and optimisation of logistical and security support of EUTM decentralised missions. However, the training activities performed by EUTM are currently temporarily and reversibly suspended. EUCAP Sahel Mali also cooperated and coordinates with EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUBAM Libya on cross-border issues.
and exchange of best practices but there is the recognition of the need to better coordinate and complement EU actions (Council of the EU, 2022a).

Coordination between the two missions and the EU Delegation on site is performed twice a month. However, the political responsibility lines are different, therefore “there is a lack of structural measures, structures, to ensure this coherence” and “some actors did not care at all about coherence because there are various levels of coherence, there is coherence of Member States and the coherence of the EU and institutions. And it is one of our weaknesses and it is truly clear that we could do much better” (Interview 2).

With regards to the coordination and coherence between CSDP missions and international actors, to better facilitate the exchange of information, coherence and coordination, the Military Coordination Instance in Mali (ICMM) was created in 2018. It consisted of quarterly meetings of Barkhane, MINUSMA, EUTM, EUCAP and the Malian armed forces officials to strengthen cooperation on security, information exchange and support between the main actors in peace and security for the benefit of the Malian people (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020).

All these actors have worked from a different perspective and not from the exact same field. Barkhane has been doing the high spectrum [of military engagement], MINUSMA the medium one and EUTM the extremely low one. So there has been no real overlap because the angles were different from the start (Interview 5).

Nonetheless, MINUSMA and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime have provided joint assistance to the national specialised judicial unit in charge of the fight against terrorism and transnational crime (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2021). MINUSMA also trains the Malian police and gendarmerie on human rights, in collaboration with EUTM Mali and the UN Police. Further, MINUSMA and EUTM Mali have adopted standard operational procedures for the disposal of improvised explosive devices (UNSC, 2018). A point of divergence between EUTM and MINUSMA regards the database on trained soldiers, which is lacking in the EUTM mandate, contrary to MINUSMA which has a Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

In terms of vertical coherence, Member States have different understandings and assign different priority levels to the EU integrated strategy in the Sahel and the operational deployments in Mali. A strong vertical coherence is present in the case of France who directly engaged in the improvement of the security of the country and is improving in the case of Germany who proposed different frameworks for dialogue. However, the same commitment is not present in other countries (e.g. Poland and Finland) who would have preferred a different engagement in Mali. Poor levels of vertical coherence might be problematic in the performance of the missions, as well as in the definition of the new strategies and tools to ensure the security of the country and the region.

4.4.4 Sustainability of the CSDP Engagement in the Country

It has been widely agreed upon that environmental degradation and climate change are risks and threats multipliers in the Sahel region. Nevertheless, while some actions are undertaken to reduce the EUTM Mali’s environmental impact, this is not the core focus of the deployment.
This could be an area of improvement for the EU missions involved in the Sahel, especially when environmental factors such as drought, famine and poverty are key drivers of the conflict. EUTM Mali is reportedly “aware of this subject” (EUTM Mali, 2023b) as its actions fit in the EU Concept for Environmental Protection and Energy Optimisation for EU-led Military Operations and Missions (EEAS, 2021). Focus on environment is also present in EUCAP Sahel Mali, that has been selected as a pilot case for the refinement of Operational Guidelines for integrating environmental and climate aspects into civilian Common Security and Defence Policy missions. Guidelines will constitute a first framework for the Environmental Management System and environmental footprint reporting of CSDP missions, on both mission’s internal and external activities related to environmental footprint (EEAS, 2022c). As such, the mission has an environmental advisor (EEAS, 2022d).

In EUTM gender is not the main focus of the mission and the personnel responsible for the implementation of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and gender should be better supported by the missions (Council of the EU, 2022a). Moreover, there is the need to better identify ways to bring the EU values in the host country, by taking into account the local specificities. Nonetheless, gender is integrated into EUTM Mali’s training activities (Baudais & Maïga, 2022) and in the promotion of gender equality within the Malian armed forces (Forces Armées maliennes, FAMA) through the institutionalisation of the gender concept at the level of the Ministry of Defence of Veterans Affairs/Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali, 2023a). Furthermore, working groups on the promotion of gender equality within FAMA have been organised with the support of EUTM (EUTM, 2023a). Coming to the representation of female personnel in the mission, EUTM has a double-hatted human rights and gender adviser (EUTM Mali, 2023a) and women represented 4% of personnel in December 2020 (EEAS, 2022e, p. 63). Problems in the low representation of female personnel deployed are due to Member States’ inability to provide a balanced pool of candidates for secondment (Interviews 2, 5, 6, 22, 23).

Different is the case of EUCAP Sahel Mali, for which the promotion and transfer of norms—gender equality norm via SSR are part of the mandate of the mission (European Court of Auditors, 2018). References to the planning and reporting of the mission to gender equality improved over time as the 2020 mission’s strategic review contained more references to activities performed in this field than in 2018 (EEAS, 2022e, p. 29). The representation of women in EUCAP is the 16% of the personnel (23 women) (Pfeifer et al., 2021) and there is a gender advisor. Improvement in the attention given to gender is reflected in the creation of a single-hatted position that until 2021 was double-hatted and responsible for both gender and human rights (EEAS, 2022e, p. 38). Among the external activities performed, EUTM organised workshops on gender-based violence addressed to the local security and armed forces personnel and representatives of the civil society (EUCAP Sahel Mali, 2021).

The lack of an EU independent verification mechanism of the people trained in EUTM Mali is a major problem affecting the sustainability and the results of training activities (Bøås et al., 2018, p. 6). The unacceptability of the potential presence of EU-trained personnel engaging along with Russia-affiliated forces is among the reasons leading to the decision to temporarily suspend operational training. The same verification problem is present in EUCAP Sahel Mali.
In addition to training and reform, the mission can provide for the necessary equipment for schools and training centres for security forces.

So, we [EUCAP Sahel Mali] do the refurbishment, the rebuilding, and then we buy desks, chairs, laptops and whatever they need. And then you go there one year after and nothing is there, no one works there, and everything disappeared, and the building is not used anymore. I would never say that we have a money problem, we do not. We have a problem in investing correctly this money and get some feedback on how it is spent (Interview 6).

Coming to the political sustainability, the 2022 Holistic Strategic Review recognised the little knowledge the local population has on the EU engagement in the country, which might bring the population to confuse the French intervention with the EU mission. Moreover, representatives of the government also stated that foreign intervention focuses more on the effects than on the root causes of instability in the country, suggesting a negative perception of the foreign missions in the country (Al Jazeera, 2022).
Conclusions and Initial Recommendations

This working paper presented an analysis of selected EU deployments in Europe and Africa. The cases cover EU deployments from the inception of CSDP in 2003 to ongoing missions and operations, for both civilian and military engagement. All missions and operations were assessed using the same range of criteria to create a common basis of the analysis and enable comparisons across cases (see Table 2).

Over a period of twenty years, CSDP operational activity improved considerably when it comes to command-and-control structures and common procedures, which were still lacking in the first deployments in BiH and DRC. However, short mandates and frequent rotation of personnel, who in addition are not necessarily well qualified for the tasks at hand, are persistent challenges for the operational engagement of the EU.

Further efforts to better coordinate activities among different EU deployments and bodies in the country of intervention are also required, in line with the EU’s Integrated approach for Peace and Security. Furthermore, coordination with international organisations, i.e. the UN, has experienced a steady improvement, although at a slow pace. However, when it comes to the vertical coherence of action between Member States and the EU, diverging political priorities and understanding can represent a serious problem for operations and missions, as different levels of Member States’ engagement can undermine the EU’s capacity to act.

Improvements have been achieved regarding gender considerations and activities of the missions. The presence of gender advisors is now a compulsory feature of all CSDP missions and operations. A balanced representation of women however still represents a distant target, and in part a function of the composition of security and defence sectors at Member States level. With a forward-looking perspective, environmental sustainability is expected to be increasingly included in the planning and conduct of operations, recognising the importance of the climate-security nexus. Finally, improvements could be aspired to regarding political sustainability, which is currently characterised by low levels of awareness among the general public and limited inclusion of local requests in the renewals of the mandates.
Table 2: Cross-Analysis of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Coherence</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>- Short mandate (max 2-year)</td>
<td>- Short-term appointment cause a 'start-and-stop' of activities</td>
<td>- Non-recognition of Kosovo by all Member States represents a lack of vertical coherence and requires procedural adjustments</td>
<td>- Lowest female representation in the mission, but engagement with the local community on gender is ongoing</td>
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<td>- Delays in the performance of the tasks due to the length of appointments and procedural differences in the provision of personnel</td>
<td>- Decentralised tender procedures accelerate the procurement of equipment</td>
<td>- Coherence with international actors formally working but dependent on goodwill of the people on the ground</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia – Herzegovina</td>
<td>- EUPM mandates too ambitious for their duration</td>
<td>- Lengthy procurement procedures in EUPM.</td>
<td>- Poor horizontal coherence and coordination in EUPM</td>
<td>- Lack of environmental considerations in EUPM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Lack of common procedures and standards at the beginning of EUPM;</td>
<td>- Personnel responded to different national standards and procedures in EUPM; appointment too short</td>
<td>- Initial poor coherence and coordination among EUPM, operation Althea and EUSR limited through coordinating principles</td>
<td>- Inclusion of gender considerations in EUPM from 2006, low women representation in operation Althea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- EUPM fact finding mission inaccurate</td>
<td>- High level of deployment gaps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Effective planning of operation Althea thanks to Berlin plus, but problems related to Brexit and EUMS participation</td>
<td>- Poorly harmonised pre-deployment operational training in Althea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Operation Althea’s exit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy based on end-state</td>
<td>First use of (F)Pas for third countries’ participation in EUPM</td>
<td>No considerations on environmental sustainability</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>- National procedural differences affected both deployments</td>
<td>- Lack of EU-UN coordination mechanisms during Artemis. Situation slightly improved in EUFOR</td>
<td>- No reflection on gender in Artemis, first ever gender advisor deployed in EUFOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Strategic military capabilities</td>
<td>- Lack of EU-UN coordination mechanisms during Artemis. Situation slightly improved in EUFOR</td>
<td>- Social sustainability of Artemis tangible, but limited sustainability of results after the operation's withdrawal</td>
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<td>- Serious national caveats/ limitation to deployment</td>
<td>- Coordination with concomitant EU deployments performed during EUFOR</td>
<td>- Questionable long-term sustainability of EUFOR mission's results</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack of budget coverage for CIMIC</td>
<td>- Poor vertical coherence in the provision of agreed personnel and equipment from participating Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Non-standardised equipment prevented the use of common logistics support</td>
<td>- Effective implementation of the mandates, but dubious sustainability of the security situation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lack of CMC identified as a lesson learned, but missing in both deployments</td>
<td>- Multiple, national, logistic support structures and lack of strategic military capabilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Effective implementation of the mandates, but dubious sustainability of the security situation</td>
<td>- Coordination with concomitant EU deployments performed during EUFOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Rapid rotation of personnel, language barrier and insufficient understanding of the local context in both EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td>- Close coordination of EU missions in the country and in the region, but lack of structural measures</td>
<td>- EUCAP Sahel is a test-bed for the inclusion of environmental considerations in civilian CSDP mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Implementation of the missions affected by the</td>
<td>- Different national priorities negatively impact vertical coherence</td>
<td>- Need to better identify ways for greater inclusion of gender in the</td>
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<tr>
<td>local security situation and proactive engagement of the local authorities</td>
<td>between 2018-2020</td>
<td>external activities of both missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 4-year mandate of EUTM improves the mission's effectiveness to plan and perform activities</td>
<td>- Unbalanced distribution of the budget in favour of personnel protection in both deployments</td>
<td>- Lack of verification mechanisms prevent a better tailoring of activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>- National caveats for EUTM</td>
<td>- Lack of specialised personnel fluent in French and high rotation</td>
<td>- Little awareness of the missions among local population</td>
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</table>

Source: own elaboration

Despite the variety of activities and timeframes analysed in this working paper, the selection of the case studies did not allow for a thorough investigation of newer instruments and procedures in place for CSDP missions. One example is the EPF instrument, which is being extensively used in the most recent CSDP missions in Mozambique and Ukraine and would have provided better case-studies to analyse the functioning of this new instrument. Similarly, the novelty of implementing the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) Ukraine on the territory of the EU – rather than in the recipient country – constitutes a potential change in the tools available for the EU to deal with crisis outside the EU territory.

Despite these limitations, several initial recommendations to improve EU deployment under the CSDP framework can be defined.

**Recommendation 1: Longer mandates to align with the type of required activities.**

EU mandates for CSDP activities are limited in time and therefore focus on an end date instead of an end state (Interviews 11, 22, 23). While the political and financial support from EU Member States needs to be ensured and (re-)agreed upon over time (Interview 13) and the local situation re-assessed according to the changing situation on the ground, the short duration of the mandates strongly affects the effectiveness and sustainability of the missions. The types of activities CSDP deployments are meant to perform (crisis management, peace-building, state-building and training) necessitate a longer presence in the country than that indicated in the single mandates of the missions;\(^\text{11}\) something that has also been highlighted

\(^\text{11}\) Examples of this are EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Operation Althea, both of which belong to the longest EU deployments, in spite of their mandates having a limited duration of two years.
in the EU strategic reviews (Council of the EU, 2022a). This negatively affects the effectiveness of the missions as the limited length of mandates does not allow for mid- or long-term activities and projects, causing a constant “start and stop of mission activities” (Interview 11). If the time to perform internal reviews of the missions/operations is considered, the remaining time available for the implementation of the mission’s activities is further reduced. A longer mandate, which foresees the possibility of periodic operational re-assessment would make the EU engagement in the country clearer from the beginning.

**Recommendation 2: Further tailor the approach to local needs.**

Regarding the quality of the mandates, the specificities of the situation on the ground and of the activities to conduct should be considered in the planning stage of the missions/operations to ensure a tailored approach that also considers the political and cultural specificities of the host countries. While this aspect seems to be improving with the most recently launched CSDP missions, there is still the need to improve the understanding of the local dynamics to ensure the provision of the best possible tools (Interviews 22, 23, 25) in the most appropriate timeframe. This tailored approach should result from a closer dialogue with local authorities and communities. While on a formal level communication is already happening, this dialogue, should be further strengthened to take into consideration local needs and requests. An example is provided by the inclusion of gender considerations in the performance of activities for the host country. While training focusing on gender and dedicated to the female part of the population in the host countries exists, the gender approach should be improved with regards to the communication with local policy makers. A better coordinated action would entail a considerable effort in conducting discussions with military or political leaders in countries in which war or terrorist groups threaten the stability and security of the country (Interviews 20, 21).

**Recommendation 3: Increase transparency of communication with Member States and host country.**

The repeated engagement by the EU in state-building activities is not sufficiently accompanied by clear communication strategies on what this entails (Interviews 11, 12, 22, 23, 24, 25), resulting in incoherence between the political messages that are provided to member state and host country policy makers and populations. Policy makers should be made aware of the length of such engagements, and it should be acknowledged that it is not possible to disengage after a short period of time. Fostering a clear communication strategy on what the specific missions require in terms of time and nature of engagement is directly connected to the political support by EU Member States to the EU external action, as well as to the perceived sustainability of the EU engagement in activities related to state-building.

**Recommendation 4: Improve the provision of trained and qualified personnel.**

The provision of personnel is currently not efficient and the rules for the selection and appointment of personnel should be further improved. Several attempts have been made to improve the selection mechanisms, i.e. through the Civilian CSDP Compact for civilian deployments, but the lack of a mechanism to make agreed contributions compulsory hinders the capacity of the EU to ensure the availability of a proper level of competent personnel.
Moreover, and most importantly, the deployment in CSDP missions and operations is severely affected by the available pool of professionals in the Member States. As demonstrated in the case of EULEX and EUCAP Sahel Mali, there have been problems with the competences of people deployed, also due to the reticence of contributing states to temporarily renounce to competent personnel.

Recommendation 5: Review mechanisms and verification tools to improve horizontal coherence.

A considerable number of people interviewed (Interviews 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27) expressed concerns over the functioning of coordination and cooperation at different levels and with different structures. Interviewees highlighted the dependence of coordination and conduct of activities on the goodwill and personalities of people deployed, that is often accompanied by a lack of verification mechanisms. At the risk of creating more bureaucracy, a more centralised and harmonised delineation of duties and responsibilities of the actors present in the country or in the region could be developed. This should be accompanied by verification mechanisms to ensure compliance and improve horizontal coherence.

Recommendation 6: Improve the environmental sustainability of CSDP.

An improvement on the environmental sustainability of CSDP, both in terms of inclusion of environmental considerations in the planning and conduct of missions/operations, and in the analysis of security risks related to climate change and environmental degradation, is required. While in the military deployments guidelines and international standards have been guiding EU engagement, civilian deployments suffered from little consideration of these issues. The decision to include an environmental advisor to all CSDP missions by 2025 (EEAS, 2022d) is a positive development, but their presence needs to be accompanied by a clear commitment to limit the environmental footprint of CSDP in third countries.
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Appendix 1: Assessment Criteria

The following tables report the assessment criteria used for the performance of the assessment. Prior to the presentation of the assessment criteria and as mentioned in the methodology section, this annex presents some preconditions for effective deployment. These should be considered as preconditions impacting effectiveness.

**Preconditions**

**Precondition 1: Alignment of national and EU interests**

**Metric: Cooperation Impact on Rational Interests and Goal Achievement**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation does not enhance the fulfilment of national goals and interests</th>
<th>Cooperation has a low-level impact on the fulfilment of national goals and interests</th>
<th>Cooperation has a medium-level impact on the fulfilment of national goals and interests</th>
<th>Cooperation has a high-level impact on the fulfilment of national goals and interests</th>
<th>Cooperation allows the achievement of national goals and interests more effectively than would occur outside the cooperative framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Precondition 2: Implementation of the mandate**

**Metric: Effective Implementation of the Mandate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The mandate is implemented with chronic delay and excessive costs</th>
<th>The mandate is implemented with delay and ineffective costs management</th>
<th>The mandate is timely implemented, but suffers from ineffective costs management</th>
<th>The mandate is almost always timely and cost-effectively implemented</th>
<th>The mandate is timely and cost-effectively implemented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Precondition 3: Quality of the mandate

**Metric: Effectiveness of the Mission/Operation Planning**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate is inadequate, planning is ad hoc and not informed by TAM, partners are not involved</th>
<th>Mandate is sufficiently adequate and not scalable, planning was conducted, partners are involved at a later stage</th>
<th>Mandate is mostly adequate and scalable but no adaptation to the (inter)national situation is possible, planning was mostly thought-out, TAM was conducted, partners are involved</th>
<th>Mandate is adequate and scalable but its adaptation to the (inter)national situation is complex, planning was well though-out, TAM was conducted successfully, partners are involved early on</th>
<th>Mandate is adequate, scalable, and can be adapted to the changed (inter)national situation, planning was very well thought-out, TAM was successful and informs planning, partners are involved from the start</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Metric: Mission/Operation Reviews and Exit Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periodic review of the achievements is not foreseen, exit strategies are not present</th>
<th>Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen but not performed, exit strategies are not present</th>
<th>Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen but rarely performed, exit strategies are present from the beginning</th>
<th>Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen and performed mostly regularly, exit strategies are present from the beginning</th>
<th>Periodic review of the achievements is foreseen and regularly performed, exit strategies are present from the beginning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Precondition 4: Continuous operational assessment

**Metric: Effectiveness of the Operational Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The operational assessment is performed occasionally and is concentrated on either military or non-military goals, assessment does not consider local authorities and/or international experts views and requirements</th>
<th>The operational assessment is performed occasionally and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals, assessment does not consider the views of local authorities and/or international experts</th>
<th>The operational assessment is performed occasionally and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals, assessment is informed by local authorities and/or international experts</th>
<th>The operational assessment is performed regularly and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals, assessment is informed by local authorities and/or international experts</th>
<th>The operational assessment is performed regularly and is concentrated on both military and non-military goals, assessment is done in conjunction with local authorities and/or international experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Precondition 5: Personnel provision**

**Metric: Effective Provision and Management of Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before deployment personnel are not trained</th>
<th>Before deployment personnel are trained, training is not informed by the reality on the ground and does not include civil-military joint training</th>
<th>Before deployment personnel are trained, training is informed by the reality on the ground but does not include civil-military joint training</th>
<th>Before deployment personnel are trained, training is informed by the reality on the ground and includes civil-military joint training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Metric: Adherence of Training to International Standards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training does not adhere to shared standards, nor is there a verification mechanism</th>
<th>Training adheres to shared standards, but there is no verification mechanism</th>
<th>Training satisfies shared standards, but their application is not verified by an independent mechanism</th>
<th>Training satisfies shared standards and their application is verified by an independent mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Precondition 6: Effective and transparent management of funds**

**Metric: Transparency and Management of Funds**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No goals are set, no formal processes are established, reporting is non-existent, mismanagement is not prohibited or averted</th>
<th>Basic goals are set, management processes are inefficient, reporting is done arbitrarily and sporadic, mismanagement is identified too late</th>
<th>Lose goals are set, management processes are adequate, reporting is done frequently, lessons-learnt and mismanagement are identified but not acted on</th>
<th>Short-term goals are set, management processes have been adapted, reporting is done periodically, mismanagement and lessons-learnt are identified and acted on with moderate success</th>
<th>Clear mid- to long-term goals are set, management processes are streamlined, reporting is done timely and periodically, lessons-learnt and mismanagement are identified and promptly acted on</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Precondition 7: Definition of common goals, timeline and efforts in cooperation with third actors

**Metric: Joint Definition of Common Goals and Timeline with the Third Actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals, timeline and efforts have been set individually without coordination, free riding is facilitated and unrestrained</th>
<th>Goal, timeline and efforts have been set by minority, free riding is not impeded</th>
<th>Goals, timeline and efforts have been set with solid support, free riding is loosely constricted</th>
<th>Goals, timeline and efforts have been set with majority support, free riding is severely constricted</th>
<th>Goals, timeline and efforts have been defined and set jointly, free riding is prohibited through agreed on measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Precondition 8: Exploitation of partners contributions

**Metric: Exploitation of Partner Contributions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation limits partners contributions</th>
<th>Cooperation residually allows to exploit partners contributions</th>
<th>Cooperation partly allows to exploit partners contributions</th>
<th>Cooperation mostly allows to exploit partners contributions</th>
<th>Cooperation fully allows to exploit partners contributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Precondition 9: Degree of the added value of cooperation and transparency

**Metric: Added Value and Transparency of Cooperation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation duplicates efforts, creates no lessons-learned, actors incur high and unbalanced costs, reporting is non-existent</th>
<th>Cooperation duplicates several efforts, lessons-learned are not identified, costs are unbalanced and unevenly distributed, reporting is done very infrequently</th>
<th>Cooperation duplicates some efforts, lessons-learned are identified, costs are high but more balanced, reporting is done semi-regularly</th>
<th>Cooperation reduces duplication, lessons-learned are identified and considered, costs are balanced and even, reporting is done regularly</th>
<th>Cooperation eliminates duplication, lessons-learned are identified and utilised, costs are evenly distributed, reporting is periodic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effectiveness

Criterion 1: Internal goal attainment

**Metric: Adherence of Cooperation to its Objective and Mandate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation activities contrast with the objective or the mandate</th>
<th>Cooperation is just partially in line with the objective or the mandate</th>
<th>Cooperation is mostly in line with the objective or the mandate</th>
<th>Cooperation is in line with the objective or the mandate</th>
<th>Cooperation perfectly fulfils the objective or the mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Efficiency

Criterion 1: Presence and use of common warehouses

**Metric: Use of Warehouses in Joint Deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There is no warehouse, definition of contribution is loosely defined and it is not possible to relocate resources to other missions</th>
<th>There is a warehouse, a clear definition of states’ contributions to required equipment is missing, relocation of resources to other missions is not performed</th>
<th>There is a permanent warehouse, a clear definition of states’ contributions to required equipment is missing and economies of scales are limited, relocation of resources to other missions is not performed</th>
<th>There is a permanent warehouse, there is a clear definition of states’ contributions to required equipment creating economies of scales, relocation of resources to other missions is not performed</th>
<th>There is a permanent warehouse, a clear definition of states’ contributions to required equipment and its actual provision create economies of scales and allow the relocation of resources to other missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 2: Straightforward and comprehensive provision of equipment to third countries

**Metric: Provision of Equipment to the Third Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment is not being provided</th>
<th>Provision of equipment is insufficient, process is complicated</th>
<th>Provision of equipment is limited, process lacks clarity</th>
<th>Provision of equipment is adequate, process is sufficiently straightforward</th>
<th>Provision of equipment is complete and inclusive, process is uncomplicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criterion 3: Efficient management of personnel

**Metric: Efficient Management of Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The management of personnel leads to additional costs and use of resources</th>
<th>The length of the appointment leads to delays in the implementation of the mandate, competence building and transfer of knowledge is performed sporadically</th>
<th>The length of the appointment leads to delays in the implementation of the mandate, competence building and transfer of knowledge is problematic but regularly performed</th>
<th>Personnel is managed efficiently and the length of the appointment allows for a straightforward implementation of the mandate, competence building and transfer of knowledge is problematic</th>
<th>Personnel is managed efficiently and the length of the appointment allows for a straightforward implementation of the mandate, competence building and transfer of knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 4: Has the EU been able to achieve higher or better results through cooperation with other actors on the ground (i.e. NGOs, UN, NATO, coalitions)?

**Metric: Scale of Results in Cooperation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation negatively impacts EU results</th>
<th>Cooperation has no effect on EU results</th>
<th>Results match the level the EU would have been able to achieve alone</th>
<th>Cooperation slightly improves EU results</th>
<th>Cooperation significantly improves EU results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 5: Does the framework used for the participation of third countries and actors in the EU missions/operations allow to reduce bargaining costs?

**Metric: Bargaining Costs of the Negotiation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bargaining costs are too high to agree on a cooperative framework</th>
<th>Negotiation suffered from considerable political and time bargaining costs, cooperative agreement is limited to one activity</th>
<th>Negotiation suffered from political costs and required a considerable amount of time, cooperative agreement foresees multiple actions</th>
<th>Negotiation suffered from limited political and time bargaining costs, cooperative agreement foresees multiple actions</th>
<th>Negotiation did not suffer from political and time bargaining costs, cooperative agreement foresees multiple actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coherence

Criterion 1: Coherence between strategy/actions for the country with the wider strategic goals and values of the EU

Metric: Policy Alignment and Goal Achievement Input

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partners and EU policies diverge completely, no input towards goal achievement is made</th>
<th>Partners and EU policies diverge in large part, minimal input towards goal achievement is made</th>
<th>Partners and EU policies converge on some issues, limited input towards goal achievement is made</th>
<th>Partners and EU policies converge in large part, considerable input towards goal achievement is made</th>
<th>Partners and EU policies are fully aligned, goals are addressed with adequate input</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 2: Coherence of action during deployment

Metric: Coordination of Concurrent EU Missions/Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There is no coordination among different missions/operations</th>
<th>Coordination of different missions/operations is seldom performed and it involves just some aspects</th>
<th>Coordination of different missions/operations is regularly performed, but it is performed just on some aspects</th>
<th>Coordination of different missions/operations is regularly performed</th>
<th>Coordination of different missions/operations is constantly performed and benefits from shared procedures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 3: Coherence among simultaneous missions/operations belonging to different actors

Metric: Coherence between CSDP Missions/Operations and Missions/Activities of Third Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions diverge completely, coordination of activities is non-existent</th>
<th>Missions diverge mostly, activities are inconsistent and uncoordinated</th>
<th>Missions partly align, activities are loosely coordinated</th>
<th>Missions are aligned, coordination of activities is significant and noticeable</th>
<th>Missions are fully aligned and coherent, activities are well coordinated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62
Criterion 4: Coherence between the mission/operation mandate and the policy goals or priorities of the EU

**Metric: Coherence of Missions/Operations with EU Policy Goals or Priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation/mission mandate</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mandate does not fulfil EU policy goals or priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mandate fulfils few EU policy goals or priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mandate partially fulfils EU policy goals or priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mandate mostly fulfils EU policy goals or priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mandate fulfils EU policy goals or priorities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 5: Coherence among national procedures to start a deployment

**Metric: Procedural Similarities for Operational Deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Different national systems and procedures</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>substantially affect cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moderately affect cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limitedly affect cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are similar and residual differences do not affect cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are similar and residual differences do not affect cooperation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 6: Vertical coherence

**Metric: Alignment of National Goals and Interests with the EU Ones**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National goals and interests are not in line with the EU ones</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National goals and interests are limitedly in line with the EU ones</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National goals and interests are partially in line with the EU ones</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National goals and interests are mostly in line with the EU ones</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National goals and interests are fully in line with the EU ones</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Metric: Support by Member States to the Framework and Implementation of its Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States do not contribute to the cooperative framework</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States contribute to the cooperative framework but do not provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States contribute to the cooperative framework but seldom provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States contribute to the cooperative framework and mostly provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States contribute to the cooperative framework and provide the necessary political support to implement cooperative activities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Sustainability

## Criterion 1: Political sustainability of the cooperative activities

### Metric: Fulfilment of EU Policy Goals and Priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation is not in line with the EU policy goals and priorities</th>
<th>Cooperation is conceptually in line with the EU policy goals and priorities, but the format does not help in fulfilling them</th>
<th>Cooperation is in line with the EU policy goals and priorities, but the format allows for their minimal fulfilment</th>
<th>Cooperation is in line with the EU policy goals and priorities, but it just partially helps in fulfilling them</th>
<th>Cooperation is in line with and helps in fulfilling the EU policy goals and priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Metric: Political Sustainability by Decisionmakers and Local Entities Involved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission mandate is defined without local involvement, related activities enjoy no local support, communication strategies and shared political messages are absent</th>
<th>Mission mandate is defined with little to no local input, related activities enjoy little to no local support, sporadic communication and one-sided political messages are conducted</th>
<th>Mission mandate is defined with minimal local input, related activities enjoy basic local support, essential communication is conducted with limited shared political messaging</th>
<th>Mission mandate is defined with sufficient local input, related activities enjoy significant local support, good communication strategies and considerable shared political messaging are conducted</th>
<th>Local entities are fully involved in defining mission mandate, related activities are fully accepted locally, clear communication strategies and shared political messages are conducted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Metric: Political Sustainability by the Local Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local community is not aware of the activities of the mission, and the mission is mostly unaccepted by the population</th>
<th>Local community is aware of some of the activities of the mission, and there is little acceptance by the population</th>
<th>Local community is aware of some of the activities of the mission, and the mission is mainly accepted by the population</th>
<th>Local community is aware of the activities of the mission, and the mission is mainly accepted by the population</th>
<th>Local community is aware of the activities of the mission, and the mission is largely accepted by the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criterion 2: Implementation of a defined burden sharing and provision of equipment and personnel

**Metric: Coverage of Costs, Provision of Equipment and Personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation does not define burden sharing, provision of equipment and personnel</th>
<th>Cooperation provides information on burden sharing, provision of equipment and personnel, states do not always satisfy the requirements</th>
<th>Cooperation foresees a well-defined burden sharing, provision of equipment and personnel, states do not always satisfy the requirements</th>
<th>Cooperation foresees a well-defined burden sharing, provision of equipment and personnel, states satisfy the requirements but there is no accountability mechanism</th>
<th>Cooperation foresees a well-defined burden sharing, provision of equipment and personnel, states satisfy the requirements for which they are accountable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 3: Environmental footprint

**Metric: Environmental Sustainability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental impact or protection were not considered in definition of mission’s sustainability and are not enforced in personnel behaviour or equipment specifications</th>
<th>Environmental impact was considered in definition of mission’s sustainability but not included in final document, no enforcement of environmental protection rules</th>
<th>Environmental impact is included in definition of mission’s sustainability, equipment and personnel behaviour regarding environmental protection are loosely enforced but have limited repercussions</th>
<th>Environmental impact is included in definition of mission’s sustainability, equipment and personnel behaviour are in line with environmental protection, rules are enforced</th>
<th>Environmental impact is included in definition of mission’s sustainability, equipment and personnel behaviour are in line with environmental protection, rules are strict and enforced intransigently</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Metric: Limitation of Environmental Impact**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperation did not help limiting or reducing the environmental footprint, but generated additional environmental impact</th>
<th>Cooperation did not help limiting or reducing the environmental footprint</th>
<th>Cooperation did not have an impact on the level of environmental footprint, otherwise created without the cooperative framework</th>
<th>Cooperation contributed to limiting the environmental footprint, otherwise created without the cooperative framework</th>
<th>Cooperation contributed to reducing the environmental footprint, otherwise created without the cooperative framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criterion 4: Gender sustainability

**Metric: Gender Sustainability in Deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender considerations are not included in the planning of the mission/operation</th>
<th>Gender considerations are included in the planning of the mission/operation, standards for female inclusion are not considered</th>
<th>Gender considerations are included in the planning of the mission/operation, standards for female inclusion are residually satisfied</th>
<th>Gender considerations are included in the planning of the mission/operation from the beginning, standards for female inclusion are partly satisfied</th>
<th>Gender considerations are included in the planning of the mission/operation and satisfy standards for female inclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Metric: Gender Representation in Deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender considerations are not included in the planning of the mission/operation, nor in its management and implementation</th>
<th>Deployment suffers from an unbalanced representation, there is no gender advisor to the mission</th>
<th>Deployment suffers from an unbalanced representation, the presence of a gender advisor to the mission is contemplated in the planning but no dedicated budget line is foreseen</th>
<th>There is a satisfactorily balanced representation at all levels and a gender advisor to the mission, budget line for the latter is not foreseen from the beginning</th>
<th>There is a balanced representation at all levels and a gender advisor to the mission, for whom a dedicated funding line is in place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Metric: Gendered Impact of Deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The mission does not include external activities related to gender. No external action is performed</th>
<th>The mission does not include external activities related to gender. Activities at the benefit of the local population regarding gender are irregularly performed and only in the framework of other activities</th>
<th>The mission does not include external activities related to gender. Nonetheless, activities at the benefit of the local population regarding gender are conducted on an irregular basis</th>
<th>The mission foresees the performance of external activities related to gender. There is a clear commitment in the performance of activities at the benefit of the local population regarding gender</th>
<th>The mission explicitly includes external activities related to gender. There is a clear commitment in the performance of activities at the benefit of the local population regarding gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Criterion 5: Local social sustainability of EU CSDP missions/operations

**Metric: Impact on Social Sustainability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The activities of the deployment have a negative impact on human rights and living conditions in the place of implementation</th>
<th>The activities of the deployment do not have an impact on human rights and living conditions in the place of implementation</th>
<th>The activities of the deployment residually improve human rights and living conditions in the place of implementation</th>
<th>The activities of the deployment improve to some extent human rights and living conditions in the place of implementation</th>
<th>The activities of the deployment have an evident impact on human rights and living conditions in the place of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Full Assessment of Case Studies

This annex presents the full assessment of the considered case studies, succinctly reported in the main body of the working paper.

Kosovo

Preconditions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precondition 1: Alignment of national and EU interests and goals</th>
<th>Metric: Cooperation impact on national interests and goals achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comment:</strong> Only 22 EU Member States recognise Kosovo as an independent state which complicates the implementation of EULEX’s activities. EULEX references to Kosovo are, therefore, in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) (lacking the recognition of Kosovo independence) and the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, both of which remove any ambiguity on Kosovo’s status (1). Nonetheless, while the five Member States not recognising Kosovo support the mission, they also try influencing the results of the mission in a way that does not allow the country to advance on its independence path (2). Additionally, regardless of the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, the central administrations of the personnel deployed in the mission have national agendas (3) that might diverge from the EU ones (4).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **References:**  
3. Interviews 11, 12, 13, 14, 15  
4. Interviews 11, 13, 14, 15 |
Precondition 2: Implementation of the mandate

Metric: Effective implementation of the mandate

Comment:
A 2012 report by the EU Court of Auditors evaluated EULEX as not “sufficiently effective” due to its little to modest contribution to capacity building and fight against organised crime, as well as a poor coordination between the Commission and the EEAS (1). Moreover, the mission’s executive mandate was foreseen to be concluded by 14 June 2018 (deadline that was already extended in 2016) (2), and to be followed by the transfer of the mission’s responsibilities concerning investigations, prosecutions and trials to the Kosovar authorities. Despite the extended deadline, the mission was unable to complete handover its competences until December 2018 (3). Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that the delay in the implementation of the mandate was, and is, dependent on the counterpart’s engagement and ability to take over such responsibilities. It is thus difficult to assess to which extent was the delay caused by mis-employed or mis-exploited resources within EULEX.

References:

Criterion 3: Quality of the mandate

Metric 1: Effectiveness of the mission/operation planning

Comment:
The mandate was modified several times from the start of the mission. The tension between the scope of the mandate and the (reduced) length of the mandate is one of several aspects that have been identified as problematic (1). In June 2010, EULEX’s 2008 mandate was prolonged until 2012 and modified to reconfigure the mission into two sections: (a) the Executive Division and (b) the Strengthening Division. Two further objectives were also added to the original mandate: (a) restoring the rule of law in northern Kosovo (North Initiative) and (b) providing technical support to the implementation of the rule of law-related agreements reached by the EU-facilitated dialogues (Supporting Dialogue Implementation). From 2014, following the reconfiguration of court panels locally, EULEX started progressively handing over its competences to Kosovo’s justice system (except for northern Kosovo) and during the mission’s fourth renewal in 2018, a new compact for transferring executive competences to Kosovar authorities was agreed upon (2). EULEX’s mandate was then renewed in 2020 and 2021 without changing the mission’s structure and the current mandate covers the period until June 2023. The Programmatic Approach, which reports on the mission’s progress, is “at the same
time the exit strategy for EULEX” (3). Before the renewal of the mission in 2014, an exchange of letters between the President of the Kosovo Republic and the EU’s HR/VP occurred (4).

The build-up of the Kosovar legal system required cooperation as performed for example under the Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board (5).

Prior to starting the planning phase, the EU conducted a fact-finding mission to test the acceptability of a potential EU Planning Team (EUPT) in Kosovo. The team was established in April 2006 and asked to start thinking about the mission’s potential exit strategies (6).

References:
1. Interviews 11, 12, 13

Metric 2: Mission/operation reviews and exit strategies

Comment:
EULEX mandate does not have an explicit exit strategy as the mission is meant to finish when its activities can be transferred to national authorities (1).

A report on the mission is presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) every six months. The document is, however, not publicly available, and it is not clear whether it contains a review of the mission’s achievements (2).

The UN Secretary General issues periodic reports on the activities of EULEX, where it is possible to read considerations on the mission’s advancements (3). In addition to this, the mission undergoes periodic strategic reviews to evaluate its progress and shape the renewal of its mandates. This process is led by the EEAS and includes representatives of the mission, Commission, as well as the local authorities and civil society (4).

References:


Precondition 4: Continuous operational assessment

Metric: Effectiveness of the operational assessment

Comment:
As mentioned above, a report on the mission is presented to the PSC every six months. The document is not publicly available, and it is unclear whether it contains operational assessment (1). In addition to the periodic reports, the Head of Mission regularly updates the PSC. OPLAN have also been revised throughout the years (2).

A 2012 ECA report specified, that at the time of the review there were no formal mechanisms in place to monitor and analyse the performance and cost-effectiveness of the activities related to MMA and the mission’s executive functions (3).

Assessment of the activities involving cooperation with the local community is performed with the collaboration of respective local authorities (4).

References:
2. See for example: ST 10314 2016 EXT 1 - PARTIAL DECLASSIFICATION, Revised Operation Plan (OPLAN) for the European Union rule of law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO. Subject matter: COPS, CIVCOM, JAI, EU-LEX, CSDP/PSDC, RELEX, CFSP/PESC, COWEB. Search results - Consilium (europa.eu)
**Precondition 5: Personnel provision**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric 1: Effective provision and management of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comment:</strong> The mission’s personnel must follow the mandatory “Pre-Deployment Training in accordance with the CSDP agreed Training Policy, or a national alternative of the course” (1). Personnel is also expected to comply with the Upgraded Generic Standards of Behaviour for CSDP Operations (2), particularly those related to mainstreaming of human rights and gender. Training for the Head of Mission is provided by the EU’s structures (3), whereas the Member States are expected to provide pre-mission training for the remaining staff (4). In several cases, however, personnel was inadequately formed or unfit for the role (5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>References:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Interview 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric 2: Adherence of training to international standards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comment:</strong> EULEX personnel must follow the mandatory “Pre-Deployment Training in accordance with the CSDP agreed Training Policy, or a national alternative of the course” (1). Additionally, as stated in the 2011 OPLAN, Member States are expected to provide pre-mission training (2). Based on Implementing Guidelines, the overall aim of the training architecture is to allow interoperability and harmonise training standards. When it comes to EULEX, there are no official reports on the appropriateness of training with regards to mission activities. Nonetheless, a report based on field interviews assessed that the quality of the training was not satisfactory (3). Similar to other CSDP Missions, EULEX has, between 2011 and 2017, benefited from pre-deployment trainings conducted by ENTRi (4), still conducted in 2019 (5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>References:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Precondition 6: Effective and transparent management of funds**

**Metric: Transparency and management of funds**

**Comment:**
It is possible to find the list of contracts awarded by EULEX on the mission’s website. In 2014, an investigation on alleged collusion and corruption was opened against the mission’s former prosecutor, following which the HR/VP Mogherini requested a report on the mission which was to investigate whether the necessary procedures to limit corruption were in place. The 2015 report did not find evidence confirming the allegations (1). Nevertheless, in September 2022 an arrest warrant was issued by the Basic Court of Justice in Pristina against the same person and for the same accusations, with EULEX supporting the preliminary procedure (2).

**References:**

**Precondition 7: Definition of common goals, timeline and efforts in cooperation with third actors**

**Metric: Joint definition of common goals and timeline with the third actors**

All contributing non-EU Member States signed (framework) participation agreements with the EU for the deployment of personnel to the mission. The agreements are done in a way that does not preclude the EU’s autonomy in making decisions, which is why third countries are not involved in the definition of the mission’s goals.

The third countries that contributed or contribute to EULEX are Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. The US was present since the beginning and it is said to have "had the biggest influence" on EULEX, thanks to the presence of Political Adviser and Assistant to the Head of Mission. Nowadays, the US role is reduced, partly due to the missed expectations on the role the country would have played in the mission (1).

**References:**
Precondition 8: Exploitation of partners contribution

Metric: Exploitation of partners contribution

Comment:
Given independence of the EU’s decision making on CSDP missions, partners’ contributions to the mission cannot be evaluated as allowing a full exploitation of non-EU participating states (please refer to the answer under Criterion 5 for further details). However, in the case of the US, the reduced role the country has in the mission does not preclude it to be a relevant actor in the mission’s prosecution. The influence exercised by the US on the local authorities is another aspect that should be taken into consideration (1).

References:
1. Interviews 9, 12, 14

Precondition 9: Degree of the added value of cooperation and transparency

Metric: Added value and transparency of cooperation

According to the 2012 ECA report, the performance and selection of judges, alongside the prosecutorial allocation of cases, were not sufficiently and transparently assessed (1). Reporting on the management of the mission is nonetheless periodic (2) and it involves dialogues with the Court of Auditors or other EU bodies specialised in assessing the management of funding.

In terms of the cooperative outputs, EULEX has provided several lessons learned and improved practices. Lessons learned, however, were not always taken into consideration in the redefinition of the mission’s mandate (3).

References:
2. Interviews 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14
3. Interview 14

Efficiency

Criterion 1: Presence and use of common warehouses

Metric: Use of warehouses in joint deployment

Comment:
Unlike other CSDP missions, EULEX has centralised functions related to programming, procurement and personnel (1). Following a tender in 2011 (2), the mission’s warehouse was relocated from the Industrial Zone Veternik (3) to Str. Sejdi Kryeziu No. 24 Pejton (4), which is closer to the capital’s centre as well as the EULEX headquarters located at St. Muharrem Fejza, P.O. 268 in Pristina (5). The warehouse harbours various...
logistics equipment, including consumables (6), vehicle workshop equipment (7) and IT equipment (8), the latter of which is used either for internal purposes or donated as part of aid to Kosovar civilian needs.

References:

2. PROC/287/11/EULEX Compound Project Design and Build (EuropeAid/132152/L/WKS/XK)
3. EuropeAid/134716/M/SUP/XK/ Framework Contract for the Supply of Tyres No. 5 (PROC/430/13). Microsoft Word - Tender Dossier_Tyres No. 5 (eulex-kosovo.eu)
4. PROC/409/13/Relocation of Warehouse/logistics elements to the EMC Kosovo. proc_notice_en (eulex-kosovo.eu)
7. PROC/246/10/ Vehicle Workshop Equipment, EuropeAid/130800/ M/SUP/XK. Consolidated Tender Dossier.PDF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion 2: Straightforward and comprehensive provision of equipment to third countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metric: Provision of equipment to the third countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion 3: Efficient management of personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metric: Efficient management of personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comment: The short-term character of the appointment, as well as the quality of seconded personnel were evaluated as inappropriate for an efficient use of resources that would match the requirements of the mission’s mandate (1). The prosecutorial and judicial role of the mission as well as the usual length of EU deployment did not allow for proper exploitation of resources. In certain cases, judicial proceedings had to be re-started by subsequent prosecutors, loosing time and employing resources inefficiently (2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:

1. Interviews 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14
### Criterion 4: Has the EU been able to achieve better results through cooperation with other actors present on the ground (i.e. NGOs, UN, NATO, coalitions)?

**Metric: Scale of results in cooperation with third actors**

**Comment:**

When it comes to EULEX and KFOR, their cooperation has previously been described as an example of good practice in civil-military relations, with the two missions sharing a joint operation procedure and participating in joint trainings. A lack of coordination (especially concerning a clear division of responsibilities) has nevertheless been identified in certain riot and border control situations between the EULEX police, Kosovo police and KFOR military units (1). Since 2018, the coordination between the three security responders (with the Kosovo Police being first, EULEX FPU second and KFOR third) has improved, with the 2021 joint crowd and riot control (CRC) exercise (2) being of particular significance. Joint CRC workshop between EULEX and KFOR also took place early this year (3), followed by another exercise focused on enhancing security coordination between the two missions (4) only a month later. In September, EULEX police officers have also joined KFOR-led “Golden Sabre” exercises (5). Security coordination with, and resources of, KFOR are thus necessary for EULEX to successfully continue performing its tasks as a second responder.

In terms of EULEX and OSCE cooperation, a good example is provided by the training of the Kosovo police, where EULEX has taken over the previously OSCE-managed process of police education (6). OSCE further complements EULEX in terms of its expertise on judiciary, with the Justice Transparency Forum being a good example of such cooperation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that whilst complementary, cooperation between the two remains limited to the EU’s financial (contributions to the OSCE budget) and symbolic support (e.g. participation of EULEX judges in panel discussions for OSCE’s Media Justice Transparency Initiative). OSCE’s intelligence sharing with EULEX (e.g. information from both the OSCE and UNMIK monitoring reports on North Kosovo) is also integrated into EEAS reports (7).

Finally, when it comes to EULEX and UNMIK, cooperation seems to be the most limited, pertaining mainly to the area of UNMIK’s dormant pillar of civil administration. The 2022 activities have been mainly in the area of human rights, showing EULEX’s symbolic support for UNMIK’s activities, and the added value being thus rather unidirectional (8).

### References:

3. EULEX. (2022, January 12). *Joint Crowd and Riot Control Workshop between EULEX’s Formed Police Unit and KFOR’s Multinational Specialized Unit [Press Release]*. [Joint Crowd and Riot Control Workshop between EULEX’s Formed Police Unit and KFOR’s Multinational Specialized Unit - News - EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (eulex-kosovo.eu)]
<p>| | |</p>
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### Criterion 5: Does the framework used for the participation of third countries and actors in the mission/operation allow for the reduction of bargaining costs?

**Metric: Bargaining costs**

**Comment:**

All contributing non-EU Member States, except Switzerland, have a Framework Participation Agreement in place with the EU covering their contributions to the EU’s CSDP missions and operations. This provides contributing states with a general framework for participation, without the need to redefine the general legal framework for their contributions. The Swiss case, however, requires the definition of participation agreements for each mission/operation in which the country decides to participate. The types of equipment necessary to complement EU forces is defined by the EU’s structures as soon as there is an understanding of the capabilities and personnel EU Member States are able to provide at the disposal of the mission. Specific contributions are then agreed upon between the EU and the contributing non-EU states on a case-by-case basis (1).

Overall, the participation of third countries in CSDP missions and operations is guided by political considerations.

**References:**

1. Interview 12
Coherence

### Criterion 1: Coherence between strategy/actions for the country with the wider strategic goals/values of the EU

**Metric:** Policy alignment and goal achievement input

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some of the main problems concern the lack of policy alignment between EU Member States on Kosovo (1) as well as the presence of different national priorities (2). This can translate to the inability of the mission to do some activities differently, due to its need to satisfy the national requests. Given the lack of a host country agreement with Kosovo caused by the lack of recognition of the country by the totality of EU Member States, the mandate is defined by the Member States, with the mission needing to establish &quot;a relation that make these contradictions work in practice&quot; (3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**
1. Interviews 8, 12, 13, 14
2. Interviews 8, 11, 12, 14, 15
3. Interview 8

### Criterion 2: Coherence of action during deployment

**Metric:** Coordination of concurrent EU missions/operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N.A.</th>
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</table>

### Criterion 3: Coherence among simultaneous missions or operations belonging to different actors

**Metric:** Coherence between CSDP missions/operations and missions/activities of third actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EULEX coexists in Kosovo with KFOR. While the former is civilian and the latter military, both play complementary roles in the security realm and some of their tasks are similar. The two missions and the Kosovo police define a coordinated response to security risks, with the Kosovo police as first respondent, EULEX as second and KFOR as third. Cooperation is, however, not without problems. In the early 2010s, EULEX FPU did not commit to riot control functions, forcing KFOR to increase its efforts, which led NATO commander to publicly complain (1). Cooperation between both actors evolves around informal practices in field operations, from staff-to-staff field cooperation to community practices, the latter of which are defined by Wenger as the combination of three dimensions: (a) mutual engagement, (b) joint enterprise and (c) shared repertoire (2). Staff-to-staff field cooperation occurs at different levels in both operations. At the highest level, the EU Head of Mission and the KFOR Commander participate in periodic meetings, giving – on an ad hoc basis – updates on the security situation in Kosovo to guarantee a &quot;stable environment, freedom of movement and security&quot; (3). These periodic meetings were said to be efficient in the case of the October 2013 election management, especially in the Northern part of Kosovo. In July 2013, a Joint Operational Procedure was signed by EULEX Head of Mission and KFOR Commander ensuring the appointment of two full-time liaison officers in both missions, allowing information exchange at a senior management level (4). Apart from this, cooperation between both missions appears to be mainly informal, some mentioning personality-driven relationships between staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**
1. Interviews 8, 12, 13, 14
2. Interviews 8, 11, 12, 14, 15
3. Interview 8
4. Joint Operational Procedure
members (5). Among the most recent examples, EULEX personnel have collaborated with KFOR in the field of security, conducting joint exercises in March 2022 (6). Cooperation between EULEX and UNMIK covers fields like an initiative for the incarcerated Kosovar women in 2021 (7).

Political staff at lower levels also meet informally to discuss topics of common interest, including the content of political messages sent back to Brussels, national capitals and the embassies in Pristina. There is an understanding among the political staff in both organisations that sending similar messages about the progress made and challenges faced by EULEX and KFOR to their respective headquarters and chiefs of staff is desirable (8).

Finally, at the regional level, EULEX regional advisers and KFOR Liaison Monitoring Team meet with Kosovo Police (KP) representatives. Cooperation between all organisations is also initiated at the local level, specifically with the EULEX police pillar on the topic of arrests (9).

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). Although the mission is still active, Kosovo’s declaration of independence modified its mandate, from providing an interim administration to the promotion of security, stability and respect for human rights in Kosovo (10). The implementation of EULEX in 2008 decreased UNMIK’s role, with its competencies being transferred to EULEX, which, similarly to UNMIK, operates under the Resolution 1244. Hence, as a result of the open-ended character of Resolution 1244 and its silence on the final status of Kosovo, UNMIK is de facto dormant, although it remains active in so-called community issues (such as those pertaining to ethnic minorities). It also maintains a rump police presence that overlaps with the EULEX police (11). There is little evidence of official coordination between UNMIK and EULEX, apart from the report on the latter’s activities presented as part of the UNMIK Secretary General’s bi-annual report. Another international mission in Kosovo is the OSCE mission. Although there are areas in which the two missions diverge, with the OSCE mandate being more comprehensive, there are also areas of convergence and coordination. These concern the rule of law, policing, elections and gender equality. Under their current mandates, both EULEX and OSCE are responsible for monitoring of the Kosovo justice system in terms of procedural, substantive and human rights law compliance. Both have also been involved in monitoring and supporting of the Kosovo police, electoral process and, upon request, election facilitation, all whilst ensuring that their activities comply with internationally recognised gender equality standards.

The continuing lack of transparency within Kosovo’s justice system provided a particularly fruitful ground for cooperation between the two missions, with the Justice Transparency Forum (12) launched in 2016 being an example of a successful joint initiative that led to organisation of several events attended by both EULEX and OSCE Head of Missions (13). Regular meetings between the two Head of Missions continued after 2016, with different events co-organised by the two missions providing a common meeting ground. The most recent activities that involved a level of coordination between EULEX and OSCE were in areas of gender-based violence (14) and youth career development (15).

References:
Criterion 4: Coherence between the mission/operation mandate and the policy goals/priorities of the EU

Metric: Coherence of mission/operation with EU policy goals/priorities

Comment:
The EU's regional policy in the Western Balkans consists of both neighbourhood and enlargement policies, both of which are focused on the integration of the European model and criteria posed by EU membership. The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) was launched in 1999, and it comprises three objectives: (a) stabilisation of the region and transition to a market economy, (b) promotion of regional cooperation and (c) possible membership in the EU (1). Following the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, the EU has strengthened its regional approach to integration in the Western Balkans, with an aim to increase the EU's credibility and stability in the neighbouring region. Hence, the SAP includes contractual relationships, based on the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) which constitute the framework for SAP on a case-to-case basis. The
SAP also implements trade relations to facilitate flow of goods and services into the Single Market and procures financial assistance through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). Regional cooperation is at the heart of the EU’s regional policy in the Western Balkans, and it is one of SAP’s main pillars. Among such cooperation frameworks is the Regional Cooperation Council, which is part of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP), functioning as “a forum for diplomatic and political dialogue set up in the aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia” (2). The EU is also directly involved in the advancement of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, but the non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU Member States does not contribute to improving the dialogue (3).

References:
3. Interviews 8, 14, 15

**Criterion 5: Coherence among national procedures for starting a deployment**

**Metric:** Procedural similarities for operational deployment

**Comment:**
Different timelines and rules for the deployment of personnel abroad caused deployment delays and it was at times difficult to plan the involvement of countries to the mission (1).

**References:**
1. Interviews 7, 9, 13, 15

**Criterion 6: Vertical coherence**

**Metric:** Alignment of national goals and interests with the EU ones

**Comment:**
The non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the entirety of the EU Member States is a clear indication of misalignment between EU and national goals and interests. This translates to the lack of advancement when it comes to adopting Council proposals regarding Kosovo (1). Moreover, personnel on the ground, despite working for the mission, tend to follow national agendas, which causes problems in the daily management of the mission (2).

**References:**
2. Interviews 7, 11, 12, 14
**Criterion 1: Political sustainability of the cooperative activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric 1: Fulfilment of EU policy goals and priorities</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As highlighted in previous sections, EULEX mandate is in line with the EU policy goals and priorities for the country and for the Western Balkans region, despite the divergent stances of EU Member States over the status of Kosovo.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric 2: Political sustainability by decisionmakers and local entities involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comment: Cooperation with the local community is an aspect that developed and improved over time. Following the adoption of the UN Resolution 1244, the international community has decided to help the Kosovar authorities in defining the country’s constitution and legal basis, both of which were adopted by the parliament. Kosovo’s legal framework is based on four different legal codes that are chosen according to the case in question (1). Between August 2008 and April 2011, there were difficulties in holding constructive dialogues with the local community due to the lack of local interlocutors, but such interlocutors have since been included in the dialogue on reshaping of the mission’s mandate and activities (2). This is evidenced by the exchange of letters on the renewal of the mission’s mandate (3) that were preceded by meetings during the mission’s Strategic Review (4). Given the types of activities performed, cooperation between EULEX and the local authorities is necessary for the advancement of the mission and the takeover of the mission’s activities (5). Another example of good cooperation with the local authorities concerns the support provided by EULEX for the implementation of the Istanbul Convention (6). This should, however, be seen as an exception rather than a rule, given the recurrence of the same requests from the local authorities in different strategic reviews (7). Nevertheless, the local perception of EULEX has improved considerably since the termination of the mission’s executive tasks in 2018, with Kosovo authorities being reportedly happy with what the mission is doing, especially when it comes to its robust monitoring figure (8).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**

1. Interview 12
4. Interviews 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14
Metric 3: Political sustainability by the local community

Comment:
The plan to have an EU mission that would recognise Kosovo was perceived positively by Albanians, who have remained dissatisfied once EULEX started operating under the UN mandate that is neutral on the issue of Kosovo’s recognition (1). Despite its long presence in the country, EULEX suffers from the lack of public trust among all strands of Kosovar population. This is partly due to declarations that did not meet expectations (e.g. the capacity of EULEX to take on “the big fish”) (2). With reference to the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB), the trust in EULEX has been consistently low, although there seems to be lack of data since the last published KSB report in 2018. According to the first report, which was published in 2012, only 22% of respondents expressed satisfaction with, and acceptance of, EULEX, which remained fairly constant until 2018, when the last edition of KSB reported 24% satisfaction/acceptance rate (3). Although EULEX is not perceived particularly positively (at least as far as its coercive capabilities are considered) among neither Kosovar Albanians nor Kosovar Serbs (4), with both groups seeing the mission as politicised and biased, the 2018 KSB report found particularly low levels of trust among the Kosovar Serbs (5).

In comparison, KFOR has consistently enjoyed more public trust among the local public, due to its perceived stronger capacity to exercise coercive power. The low level of the latter in EULEX is seen as preventing it from fulfilling its rule of law mandate (6). The Public Pulse briefs have also reported low levels of satisfaction with the EULEX police, although the EULEX police consistently ranked among institutions with the lowest levels of perceived large-scale corruption (7). EULEX is also perceived as having made little effort to communicate with the locals, who reported having very little contact (only 7% in 2015) with the mission (8). The perception of EULEX is also dependent on the general perception the country and local community have of the EU in general. Despite serving the interests of the EU, the fact that the current HR/VP is a national from a country that does not recognise Kosovo’s independence, hampers the perception and credibility the local community has towards the EU (9).

Finally, in December 2022, a EULEX reconnaissance patrol was attacked by a grenade in the northern part of the country, as a consequence of rising tensions (10).

References:
2. Interview 12
5. Ibid., p.12.
7. UNDP and USAID. (2020). *Public Pulse Brief 17*, p.15. [English17 (1).pdf](#)
9. Interview 12

### Criterion 2: Implementation of burden-sharing and provision of equipment and personnel

**Metric: Coverage of costs, provision of equipment and personnel**

**Comment:**
The provision of equipment and personnel is indicated before the start of the mandate and agreed upon among involved partners. However, the provision of personnel is one of the major problems affecting the performance of the mission (1), as secondments tend to be challenging when it comes to the expertise of preselected people (2). With regards to the provision of equipment, no major difficulty was identified (3).

**References:**
2. Interviews 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14
3. Interviews 13, 14

### Criterion 3: Environmental footprint

**Metric 1: Environmental sustainability**

**Comment:**
When EULEX mandate was defined, there was no clear indication of the CSDP rules pertaining to environmental protection and limitation of the civilian missions’ footprint. The 2012 EU Military Concept on Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency for EU-led military operations referred only to EU-led operations and missions of military nature (1), with the Initial Guidelines on Climate Protection being issued only in July 2022 (2).

**References:**
### Metric 2: Limitation of environmental impact

**Comment:**
EULEX launched Carbon Offsetting through Tree Planting Initiative to offset the mission’s carbon footprint and contribute towards mitigating the harmful effects of air pollution in Kosovo (1). Because of its civilian character, carbon emissions are minimal compared to military missions and are linked mostly to infrastructure functioning (energy, heating, electricity). EULEX Kosovo has nevertheless showed an interest in making environmental protection a matter of the rule of law, by taking on cases of environmental crimes.

**References:**

### Criterion 4: Gender sustainability

### Metric 1: Gender sustainability in deployment

**Comment:**
Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 (1) specified that the activities of the mission need to respect international standards on HR and gender mainstreaming. There is, however, no mention of gender in the following documents delineating the mission’s legal basis, and the different OPLANs consider gender with a variable degree of detail (2). Nevertheless, EULEX does provide the tools for female inclusion, with Gender Adviser and Gender Focal Points being present at the mission and specialised training being provided (3).

**References:**

### Metric 2: Gender representation in deployment

**Comment:**
The share of female personnel decreased considerably and remained the lowest among all civilian CSDP missions. There are two reasons behind this: (a) the downsizing of the mission and (b) the almost all-male Formed Police Unit (FPU) (1). FPU is the second security responder in Kosovo after the Kosovar police and constitutes the mission’s most important deployment of personnel, which explains the low percentage of women in EULEX. In 2021, EULEX personnel comprised of 36 women (approximately 15% share), making it a civilian CSDP mission with the lowest level of women among international staff (2). Women constituted only 10% of the operational staff (3) and the situation seems to have worsened, since
women constituted 21.68% of the total staff in 2010 (4). The mission’s low level of gender balance is, however, dependant on the situation within the EU Member States and the ratio of female professionals in the participating states (5).

EULEX has a “full-time International Gender Adviser, who offers strategic advice on gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the mission’s mandate” (6). The Gender Adviser also delivers gender training courses and is assisted by the Gender Focal Points, who integrate gender issues to internal and external work of the mission.

In 2008, the mission started with four dedicated gender positions, two held by international and two by national personnel (7). In 2012, the Gender Adviser was moved under the Deputy Head of Mission’s Office, allowing the Adviser to be present at board meetings and advise on the mission’s implementation plans, reports and strategic planning. Nowadays, the Head of MAC, Political Adviser and the Head of Mission’s Office are all women (8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric 3: Gendered impact of deployment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In terms of activities at the benefit of the female part of the population, these ranges from awareness campaign (1), legal support to victims of violence and monitoring of legal processes on gender violence, to training of the police frontline officers to identify and deal with cases of domestic violence (2).</td>
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<table>
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<th>References:</th>
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</table>
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Preconditions:

### Precondition 1: Alignment of national and EU interests and goals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Cooperation impact on national interests and goals achievement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Given the EU’s aspirations for its eventual enlargement to the Western Balkans, both EUPM and Althea align with the 2003 Thessaloniki’s Declaration. With regards to EUPM, despite difficulties related to the launch of the mission - lack of previously agreed procedures, command and control structures, planning - EU Member States had a strong commitment in giving &quot;a positive answer to the UN and to show the overall readiness of the EU to implement the newly defined ESDP&quot; highlighting an alignment of national interests and goals with the EU ones (1). The alignment of national and EU interests is even more evident in operation Althea, that, operating within the Dayton framework, possesses a UNSC executive mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This also gives it a specific purpose within the framework, that of implementing the military annexes of the Dayton Accords, as well as supporting the EU’s comprehensive strategy for BiH, ensuring safety and security in the country and training and exercising with the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AF BiH) (2). Currently, Althea is increasingly operating in conjunction with Community instruments as part of the &quot;EU’s Integrated Approach in BiH&quot; (3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**

### Precondition 2: Implementation of the mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Effective implementation of the mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPM: The EUPM mandates experienced different problems that were also related to the host country specificities. As an example, during the implementation of the first mandate (2003-2005) there were 15 different police agencies in the country and it was challenging to prevent their politicisation (1). The different mandates were considered to be too ambitious, compared to their length (2). Towards the end of the last mandate, &quot;despite the progress and results achieved, the law enforcement system remained insufficiently cohesive and subject to political pressure&quot; (3) which led to the extension of the mission's activities until the end of 2012.</td>
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**Althea:**

The effective implementation of operation Althea can be evaluated by looking at the maintenance of security in the country. Thanks to the improving security situation within BiH, Althea has decreased significantly in size and now consists of 1,100 personnel (the 600 soldiers normally in theatre plus an additional 500 activated in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a precautionary measure), highlighting a relative stability in the country (1). Furthermore, the training of the armed forces of BiH continued in line with the mandate and includes the periodic EUFOR – Quick Response exercise, in conjunction with other international actors (2).

**References:**

**EUPM:**

2. Interviews 11 and 19

**Althea:**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Criterion 3: Quality of the mandate</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Metric 1: Effectiveness of the mission/operation planning</strong></td>
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</table>

**EUPM:**

Throughout its lifetime the EUPM underwent five iterations (2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012), changing in focus, tasks, personnel numbers, funding and desired end state. Before the setting up of the mission, the EU deployed a Fact-Finding Mission to Sarajevo to explore the possibilities of commencing an EU mission under the ESDP framework. The estimations of the mission resulted to be too low in terms of personnel and funding (1).

The EUPM was launched in January 2003 as the first ESDP/CFSP policy. During the EUPM I period, the mandate was rather vague, but this was refocused for EUPM II and, thus, by 2006 the EUPM was mandated to support the police reform process and the fight against organised crime and corruption (2). Operating within the Dayton framework, these tasks were considered as part of rule of law reforms, in line with the EU accession process. Indeed, as BiH advanced in the EU accession process, the mandate (EUPM IV) changed to explicitly include helping the BiH authorities

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88
to "identify remaining police development needs which could be addressed through Community assistance" (3). Thanks to the relative success of the EUPM, as assessed in the 2010 strategic review conducted by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the European Commission began to plan, in cooperation with the EUPM, the exit strategy (4). Thus, EUPM V’s mandate was focused on providing strategic level advice for law enforcement agencies and ensuring a successful handover between the EUPM and the EUSR Office which would be taking the lead on rule of law matters under the pre-accession framework (5).

Althea:
Althea was launched on 2 December 2004 to take over from NATO SFOR which itself had been established to take over from the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), which had been established to enforce the Dayton Accords (1). As it is a security mission, operating within the Dayton framework, the mission possesses a UNSC executive mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (2). Althea’s mandate comes in two parts due to its role within the theatre. The executive mandate is provided by UNSC Resolutions 1551 (2004), which welcomed the EU's intention to launch a mission in BiH, and 1575 (2004), which authorised the EU Member States to establish EUFOR for one year as the legal successor to SFOR (3). These have been supplemented by further UNSC Resolutions to extend the mandate (4). As the successor mission to SFOR, the mandate for Althea is circumscribed as it is, unlike the EUPM, operating explicitly within the Dayton framework. Its primary focuses are:
- supporting the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH;
- ensuring a safe and secure environment in the country, especially by supporting BiH authorities;
- performing combined and collective training and exercises with the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) (5).
However, under these headline focuses, there has been a refocusing of the mission throughout time.

References:
EUPM
5. Ibidem, pp. 43–44
### Metric 2: Mission/operation reviews and exit strategies

**EUPM:**
Statutorily, the mission was subject to a six-month review process in coordination with the EUSR and EUFOR (1). Further, the short length of the missions meant that mission progress was being repeatedly checked against the desired end-state, in preparation for the subsequent updating of the mission and commitment (2). There were also periodic, ad-hoc reviews with which the EUPM was involved, either as a subject of the review or as a participant. In 2005, the PSC of the European Council undertook a review of CFSP/ESDP actions in the country. This resulted in the refocused mandate for the EUPM (3). There was also a further review under the lead of the CMPD in 2010 which assessed that significant progress had been made under the EUPM and which recommended that an exit strategy be planned and the mission be wound down (4). The EUPM IV iteration started to plan an exit strategy (5).

**Althea:**
The original mandate for Althea set out the exit strategy for the mission as “based on progress in building efficient state level structures”. While this was acknowledged to be primarily under the control of the BiH authorities, it is also highlighted that EUFOR should “be prepared to contribute to the overall assessment process” both for itself and for other, CSDP missions in the theatre (1). Due to the improving security environment in BiH and the desire to reduce troop numbers by certain EUMS (2) Althea was progressively decreased in size and tasks were refocused in several mandate revisions. Specifically, in 2012, Althea was reconfigured to focus on Capacity Building and Training (CB&T) while retaining the original obligations towards preserving a secure environment. From 2018, the official CB&T program concluded and Althea now focuses on embedded training alongside AF BiH (3). Overall, Althea has been reconfigured five times since inception and the last extension of the mandate was approved in November 2022 (4). The operation underwent different (quarterly) reviews and three strategic reviews (5). In addition, according to the UNSC Resolution 2183(2014), Althea/NATO are supposed to report to the SC at least on a six-month basis (6).
## References:

### EUPM:

### Althea:
Precondition 4: Continuous operational assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Effectiveness of the operational assessment</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPM:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The periodic assessment of the mission was performed regularly (1). Considering the nature of the activities of the mission, cooperation with local authorities was necessary to advance in the implementation of the mission and some of the aspects following mandates' renewals reflected the dialogue with local authorities (2). Periodic reports were also sent to the UN Security Council for their awareness on the advancements of the mission (3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Althea:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As EUFOR is a statutorily required instrument of the Dayton Accords these reviews do not particularly take into account the perceptions of local authorities beyond confirming their acquiescence to the mission and noting the positive and improving relationship between EUFOR forces and AFBiH. (1) A classified lessons learned report on the planning phase of Operation Althea was produced in May 2005 (2). The large Comprehensive Review of EU Activities in BiH, launched in autumn 2005 by then HR/VP Solana, led to changes in the mandates and coordination practices of the EUPM, EUFOR and EUSR in 2006 (3). Althea has also undergone three Strategic Reviews of the Operation since inception, with the most recent review completed in June 2021, which focused on the relevance of EUFOR for the overall EU strategy in BiH (4). These wider reviews involve a variety of stakeholders to assess the operational performance of Althea and, as per the review, collect information from &quot;all relevant stakeholders within the EEAS were consulted, including the Operation at all levels of command, the EU Special Representative, the EU Delegation, authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, relevant Commission services and EU Member States” (5).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:

**EUPM:**
1. Interview 11

**Althea:**


### Precondition 5: Personnel provision

#### Metric 1: Effective provision and management of personnel

The seconding EU Member States were responsible for providing adequate training to individuals before their arrival in BiH. Individuals were also trained on their specific tasks and roles upon arrival (1), with such training sometimes lasting up to four days (2). Training for all new members of the missions included a module on gender (3). Secondments were for a minimum of one year, with some extensions recommended by the EUPM (4). The four contracted individuals were the four heads of mission and, as such, received specific Head of Mission training not applicable to other members of staff (5). The mission provided a programme to train local staff (6).

On the quality of the personnel provided, in some instances there was a misalignment between the required competences and the qualifications of the civilian personnel (7). After the 2008 financial crisis, finding qualified personnel became more difficult. This was particularly acute in the later stages as the EUPM was also competing for hires with Community projects and the time-limited nature of the assignment hampered the ability to hire qualified individuals (8).

In operation Althea the provision of pre-deployment training is a responsibility of Member States, that appeared to be insufficiently harmonised (9).

### References:

3. Ibidem, p.102
7. Ibidem, 32

### Metric 2: Adherence of training to international standards

**EUPM:**
At the time of first deployment, definition of European and international standards "were at best subjective and as no definition was provided, different contributing national police services interpreted these terms differently" (1). Moreover, some of the personnel was taken from the previous UN mission. This generated mixed outcomes, as personnel had a knowledge of the local situation, but at times did not have the right qualifications (2).

**Althea:**
Each company personnel of the Multinational Battalion needs to undergo standardisation training IOT upon arrival, to test the competencies acquired during the training activities performed in the home country (1).

### References:

**EUPM:**
2. Interviews 11 and 19

**Althea:**

### Precondition 6: Effective and transparent management of funds

**Metric: Transparency and management of funds**

**EUPM:**
EUPM was the first mission conducted under the then ESDP and it was lunched while procedures were still being defined (1). The EUPM found itself in an odd position, due to its structure, of having two chains of command: one bureaucratic and one financial, as it reported to the OHR and European Council and yet was funded by the Commission (2). While the financial situation was initially acceptable, as were levels of financing, the funding levels required constant readjustments. The initial Fact-Finding Mission "identified the need for only two local staff for the planning team whereas at the end of 2002 this number had necessarily risen to nearly 200. Similarly, the Council Fact-Finders underestimated the costs of software licences by a factor of 10" (3). Start-up costs and yearly running costs were covered by the community budget and the Head of Mission was responsible to the Commission for the financial administration of the mission (4).
Althea:
As a more straightforward CSDP mission, the EUFOR budget was governed by the Athena financial mechanism whereby costs were paid for through contributions by EUMS based on GDP (1). Due to the fluctuations in mission size, the overall costs have decreased throughout time from EUR 71.7million/y at the outset to EUR 27million/y in 2009 (2), when the mission consisted of 2,200 personnel (3) and finally to EUR 16.3m/y in early 2022, with 600 personnel (4). However, it is worth noting that these figures are only for common costs and that the true cost of the mission is not easily identifiable as each contributing EU Member States budgets individually for their contribution, making the costs diffuse across the different EU Member States as per the Athena regulations (5). With the shift in 2021 to the European Peace Facility as the source of funding for CSDP missions, no change in the financing procedure or distribution of financial burden sharing is foreseen (6).

References:
EUPM:
2. Ibidem, 17
3. Ibidem, 62
4. Ibidem, 58

Althea:

Precondition 7: Definition of common goals, timeline and efforts in cooperation with third actors

Metric: Joint definition of common goals and timeline with the third actors
All contributing non-EU Member States signed participation agreements with the EU for the deployment of personnel to the mission. The agreements are done in a way that does not preclude the EU autonomy in taking decisions, therefore, non-EU contributions follow this principle and third countries are not involved in the definition of goals of the mission. The signed agreements included the number and type of personnel
to be deployed to the mission, thus highlighting a minimal level of coordination between the EU and the third party in the definition of potential contribution (1). Same considerations apply to operation Althea.

References:

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<th>Precondition 8: Exploitation of partners contribution</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Metric:</strong> Exploitation of partners contribution</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUPM:</strong> The type of contribution from third countries participating in EUPM was minimal and up to 6 police officers and/or civilian experts per year. Such levels of contribution represented, over the entire period of deployment, less than 7% of the personnel deployed to the mission (1). Therefore, it is difficult to assess the extension of the partners’ contribution exploitation. However, third-states’ contribution were considered to be mainly political (2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Althea:</strong> The setting up of third countries contributions to the operation proved complicated at the early stages, particularly on the definition of financial burden sharing (1). Nonetheless, Turkey is the major non-EU contributor to the mission (2), underlining the capacity of the operation to overcome difficulties in the exploitation of partner’s contributions. However, after the completion of Brexit, the UK does not contribute anymore to the operation (3) and Malta and Cyprus were never allowed to contribute, due to differences in NATO-EU memberships (4).</td>
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References:
**EUPM:**

**Althea:**
### Efficiency

#### Criterion 1: Presence and use of common warehouses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Use of warehouses in joint deployment</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUPM:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment was procured centrally by the EUPM, including vehicles, IT-equipment and pieces of hardware and software (1). Due to the double chain of command, with the Commission providing funding, all discussions around equipment had to be cleared with the Commission during the extension of the mission mandates (2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>When the mission downsized the equipment was sent to a “temporary warehouse”. This included the remaining equipment such as 120 vehicles, down from 231 in 2007 (3) and the remaining technical equipment (4). The EUPM stored them in this facility until the end of the mission and indeed afterwards for a short period as EUMS did not decide on a location for a permanent warehouse for CSDP equipment (5). Most of the materiel was transferred to the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), some was sent to EULEX (6), but the remainder was sent to the CSDP strategic warehouse (7). Indeed, the experience of the EUPM, especially at launch, led to the development of the CSDP strategic warehouse to ensure a basic level of provisions were prepared for future missions at short notice (8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>References:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Interview 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Operation Althea took over directly from a NATO mission, a significant amount of equipment and resources were already present in theatre. The OHQ is outside of the theatre, at SHAPE. Within BiH the Headquarters of EUFOR and National Headquarters Sarajevo were and are co-located within Camp Butmir, in Sarajevo (1). In addition to this, there were several camps of various sizes which acted as repositories for various amounts of equipment (2).

References:

**EUPM:**

3. Ibidem, p. 44

Criterion 2: Straightforward and comprehensive provision of equipment to third countries

**Metric: Provision of equipment to the third countries**

The provision of equipment to BiH, has been increased thanks to the activation of the European Peace Facility. Since November 2021, the EU is further providing assistance to build local capacity to upgrade the capabilities of the AFBiH through the provision of adequate equipment (1). The provision of further equipment will help increase the efficiency of the mission as one of the identified problems of the mission was the lack of provision of equipment to the trained AFBiH (2).
### Reference:
2. Boštjančič I., Muherina M., & Pejić N. (2016). Analysing the effectiveness of EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia in European Perspectives, *Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans, October 2016, Volume 8, Number 2 (15)*

### Criterion 3: Efficient management of personnel

**Metric: Efficient management of personnel**

**EUPM:**
In EUPM personnel rotation represented a problem, as the appointment period of one-year did not allow a complete performance of the activities of the mandate (1). Moreover, the definition of European and international standards "were at best subjective and as no definition was provided, different contributing national police services interpreted these terms differently" (2). A further deficiency regarding personnel, was identified in the "deployment gap", i.e. the difference between the seconded individuals in theatre and the total budgeted by the OPLAN, which reached 35% in 2009 (3), as well as in the presence of different national caveats.

**Althea:**
Inefficient personnel management was present also in operation Althea, where the poorly harmonised pre-deployment training (1) is mitigated by a standardised IOT training offered to the personnel of the Multinational Battalion upon arrival (2). During the first stages of operation Althea, a deficiency was represented by the lack of a lead nation on force deployment. Consequently, some nations were required to advance resources to others and “lengthy negotiations” were necessary to produce “a high amount of laboriously negotiated agreements” on financial burden sharing (3).

**References:**
**EUPM:**
1. Interviews 11, 26;

**Althea:**
1. Boštjančič I., Muherina M., & Pejić N. (2016). Analysing the effectiveness of EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia in European Perspectives, *Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans, October 2016, Volume 8, Number 2 (15)*
### Criterion 4: Has the EU been able to achieve better results through cooperation with other actors present on the ground (i.e. NGOs, UN, NATO, coalitions)?

**Metric: Scale of results in cooperation with third actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUPM:</th>
<th>The European Council Secretariat ensured that the EUPM was authorised by the UN Security Council (UNSCR 1396) and coordinated with NATO, in particular the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR), at launch (1). As the EUPM was taking over from UNIMBH, it was essential to receive such certification. UN cooperation increased with the creation of the EU-UN steering committee in 2003, which meets bi-annually to coordinate broader EU-UN actions across various theatres (2).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Althea:</td>
<td>Operation Althea coordinated, and coordinates, very closely with both the UN and NATO. It provides quarterly activity reports to the UN and the mission mandate is redefined by the UN (1). Also, at launch, Althea was almost entirely staffed by NATO personnel and maintains its OHQ at SHAPE which allowed, and allows, for easy access to NATO equipment, personnel and specialist knowledge. It is hard to overstate the depth of this integration. Almost all equipment was sourced from NATO, including all communication and information assets and the transfer of the NATO intelligence database which assisted in operational planning (2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**

**EUPM:**

**Althea:**
Criterion 5: Does the framework used for the participation of third countries and actors in the mission/operation allow for the reduction of bargaining costs?

**Metric: Bargaining costs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Participation Details</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine | Participated in EUPM and from 2002 to 2004 10 acceding EU Member States contributed forces to the mission (1). All participating third countries signed standard and general participation agreements with the EU for their force contribution. Their participation (from 4 to 6 seconded personnel per country and/or civilian staff) can be considered to be mainly political (2). Same type of agreements were signed for the participation of third-countries to Althea (3). | References:  

Coherence

**Criterion 1: Coherence between strategy/actions for the country with the wider strategic goals/values of the EU**

**Metric: Policy alignment and goal achievement input**

As highlighted in previous sections, the EU engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is in line with the actions for the country and with the regional priorities for the Western Balkans.

**Criterion 2: Coherence of action during deployment**

**Metric: Coordination of concurrent EU missions/operations**

EUPM: Initially, coordination between the EUPM and the other missions proved a challenge (1). The presence of two CSDP missions operating in tandem with the EUSR, all with divergent organisational cultures and mission objectives, created pressures often deriving from divergent responses to similar situations (2). These issues led to the adoption in 2005 of seven coordinating principles among the three EU actors in the theatre (the
EUPM, EUFOR Althea and the EUSR) to help ensure strategic synergy (3). Additionally, constant update on the mission to the institutions in Brussels was ensured through monthly reports in the EU capital (4).

Althea:
The initial inclusion of the fight against organised crime and rule of law support, created significant coordination problems vis a vis the concomitant EUPM mission. The 2006 creation of guidelines to manage relations between EU missions in BiH subsumed EUFOR to the EUPM regarding issues of organised crime and banned EUFOR from conducting independent operations against organised crime unless there was a pressing security need (1). This rather strict change was due to the issues of EUFOR launching independent policing actions such as seizing property at BiH’s borders from suspected smugglers, raiding suspected criminal networks and launching aerial drones to photograph suspected illegal cannabis farms in Herzegovina. The appropriateness of these actions and the ensuing bureaucratic and political fallout if and when they were not implemented in line with BiH’s legal frameworks, called into question the usefulness of Althea’s rule of law mandate (2), hence its removal.

Additionally, timelines of the reviews of the EUPM and EUFOR were aligned, along with that of the EUSR, to allow for increased coherence among them (3).

References:
EUPM:
2. Council of the EU. (2006c). Co-Ordination and Coherence between the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR - Althea) and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH): Case Study and Recommendations for the Future’, REV 1, p. 2.
4. Interview 11

Althea:
3. General Secretariat of the Council, ’Co-Ordination and Coherence between the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Military Operation (EUFOR - Althea) and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH): Case Study and Recommendations for the Future’, p.8.
### Criterion 3: Coherence among simultaneous missions or operations belonging to different actors

**Metric:** Coherence between CSDP missions/operations and missions/activities of third actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUPM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPM took over operation UNMIBH-IPTF. To ensure coordination in the transition of the operation, Mr Frederiksen, then head of IPTF was double-hatted as head of the EUPM planning phase in 2022 and became EUPM Head of Mission from January 2003 (1). According to an interviewee, the UN did not granted the EU access to some of the documents on the mission (e.g. personnel selection) in the planning phase, thus delaying the start of the mission (2). UN cooperation increased with the creation of the EU-UN steering committee in 2003, which meets bi-annually to coordinate broader EU-UN actions across various theatres (3). An example is provided by the Gender Coordination Board, which was created to coordinate a project jointly run by the EUPM, EUFOR, the UN Development Fund for Women and a local NGO (4).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Althea:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Althea coordinated, and coordinates, very closely with both the UN and NATO. It provides quarterly activity reports to the UN due to the executive mandate. Also, at launch, Althea was almost entirely staffed by NATO personnel and maintains its OHQ at SHAPE which allowed, and allows, for easy access to NATO equipment, personnel and specialist knowledge. It is hard to overstate the depth of this integration. The current SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Brice Houdet, is the current operational commander and is supported by both EU and SHAPE staff. Prior to Brexit, the British were mission leader under Deputy SACEUR but, since Brexit, the French have taken over the mission under the leadership of the SHAPE Vice Chief of Staff (1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**

**EUPM:**
2. Interview 11

**Althea:**
### Criterion 4: Coherence between the mission/operation mandate and the policy goals/priorities of the EU

**Metric: Coherence of mission/operation with EU policy goals/priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUPM:</th>
<th>The EUPM was established to transform the police from what was believed to be a war-time militia into an international standard police force (1). Given the EU’s aspirations for eventual enlargement to the Western Balkans, the EUPM was launched to take over the work of UNMIBH and to help BiH complete the necessary reforms to begin negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). As such, it was considered that the launching of the EUPM, in line with strategic policies of the OHR, could help advance the reform process (2). Therefore, the mission’s mandate was coherent with the EU policy goals and priorities for the Western Balkans region.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Althea:</td>
<td><em>Althea</em> operates within the same crowded theatre as the EUPM, operating within the pre-accession regional policy. Currently, <em>Althea</em> is increasingly operating in conjunction with Community instruments as part of the “EU’s Integrated Approach in BiH” (1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**

**EUPM:**
2. Ibidem, pp. 18–20

**Althea:**

### Criterion 5: Coherence among national procedures for starting a deployment

**Metric: Procedural similarities for operational deployment**

Both deployments experienced problems related to national procedural differences of participating Member States. In EUPM, different standards for police negatively affected the performance of the operation (1). In case of Althea, national caveats and different understandings of the attributions of the operation, constituted the main problem in the implementation of activities defined by the mandate or Operational Plan (2).

**References:**

1. Interview 11
2. Interview 27
**Criterion 6: Vertical coherence**

**Metric: Alignment of national goals and interests with the EU ones**

The EUPM was initially strongly supported by all parties, being explicitly invited by the host state and explicitly supported by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the PIC (1). However, there were issues of coordination between various EU Member States and other powers. The diversity of actors involved in the mission and in BiH “created at some stages and in some places protectorate-like behaviours which limit EU leverage” (2). Moreover, each participating member state had its own national agenda on the ground, that do not necessarily was in line with the EU ones (3).

References:
3. Interviews 11, 13, 19

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**Sustainability**

**Criterion 1: Political sustainability of the cooperative activities**

**Metric 1: Fulfilment of EU policy goals and priorities**

The EUPM was established to take over from the outgoing UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) which had been established under Dayton to “transform the police from what was believed to be a war-time militia into an international standard police force” (1). Given the EU’s aspirations for eventual enlargement to the Western Balkans, the EUPM was launched to take over the work of UNMIBH and to help BiH complete the necessary reforms to begin negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), the first step in EU accession for the Western Balkans region. As of 2000, the EU had created a “Road Map” of 18 essential reforms before BiH could undertake a feasibility study to open SAA negotiations. As such, it was considered that the launching of the EUPM, in line with strategic policies of the OHR, could help advance the reform process (2). Once the mission was considered complete in 2012, the EUPM transferred its competencies to Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) programs (3). Althea is increasingly operating in conjunction with Community instruments as part of the EU’s Integrated Approach in BiH (4).

References:
2. Ibidem, pp. 18–20
3. Ibidem, p. 45
Metric 2: Political sustainability by decisionmakers and local entities involved

Like following CSDP missions, the local authorities sent an invitation letter to the EU for the establishment of the mission (1). EUPM was initially strongly supported by all parties and remained supported at some level. However, a loss of political support from key constituents in the host country for certain objectives prevented the mission from completing its mandate as initially proposed. The proposed police reform, in particular, ran up against significant political and constitutional issues which prevented it from being completed as originally foreseen (2). Fundamentally, the EUPM’s local political support was high while also tainted by its association with unsuccessful, externally imposed reform plans (3). Despite some inabilities of the EUPM in making the local authorities accept proposal for modification of the national system, projects were defined in coordination with the local authorities, particularly from 2008 onward (4). During the first mandate, instead, local authorities were not involved in the definition of activities (5).

As EUFOR is a statutorily required instrument of the Dayton Accords the mission reviews do not particularly take into account the perceptions of local authorities beyond confirming their acquiescence to the mission and noting the positive and improving relationship between EUFOR forces and AFBiH (6).

References:
5. Interview 19

Metric 3: political sustainability by the local community

The perception of EUPM, initially suffered from the bad reputation the UN’s IPTF had and from which the mission took over (1). However, the local community was aware of the activities of the mission, as mission’s personnel participated in TV and radio shows and were involved in activities with local communities (2). One interviewee highlighted the need to better engage in communication activities and public awareness with the local community (3).

References:
2. Ibidem; Interview 11  
3. Interview 11 |

**Criterion 2: Implementation of burden-sharing and provision of equipment and personnel**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Coverage of costs, provision of equipment and personnel</th>
</tr>
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</table>

**EUPM:**

At the outset, the mission faced no significant staffing issues due to the high rate of commitment by EUMS. However, as the mission needs changed, and after the 2008 financial crisis, finding qualified personnel became more difficult. This was particularly acute in the later stages as the EUPM was also competing for hires with Community projects and the time-limited nature of the assignment hampered the ability to hire qualified individuals (1). As such, the EUPM often suffered from a "deployment gap", i.e. the difference between the seconded individuals in theatre and the total budgeted by the OPLAN, which reached 35% in 2009 (2). Additionally, the short length of the personnel appointment and the variety of activities to conduct created difficulties at times in having continuity of personnel on the ground and necessary expertise (3).

**Althea:**

The provision of personnel was deemed to be appropriate in the latest strategic review (1). Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and Turkey provide personnel to the mission (2) and in July 2022, the German parliament authorised the contribution to the operation with a maximum deployment of 50 soldiers (3). However, during the first stages of operation Althea, a deficiency was represented by the lack of a lead nation on force deployment. Consequently, some nations were required to advance resources to others and "lengthy negotiations" were necessary to produce "a high amount of laboriously negotiated agreements" on financial burden sharing (4).

**References:**

**EUPM:**

3. Interview 11

**Althea:**


3. Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Start of German participation in EUFOR-ALTHEA, the EU stabilisation force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 August 2022, [https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europe/-/2537380](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europe/-/2537380)


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**Criterion 3: Environmental footprint**

**Metric 1: Environmental sustainability**

**EUPM:**
There were no particular steps taken to mitigate the environmental impact of the mission. It is not mentioned in the declassified sections of the concept of operations (1).

**Althea:**
The mandate for Althea states clearly that “EUFOR and the [troop contributing nations] have a collective responsibility for the protection of the environment” (1). However, little information is available as to how this was put into action. While it is unclear the extent to which Althea’s mandate has been revised to include an increasing focus on the environment, the repeated extensions of Althea’s mandate have been mentioned in other documents as a key factor to be considered when planning for the environmental impacts of missions (2).

Annex T to OPLAN Althea include the environmental support of the operation and the environmental protection standards have been developed further. Furthermore, as it operates under the Berlin plus agreement, Althea has to comply NATO and international standards, such as ISO 14000, NATO MC 469 or STANAG 7141 EP (3).

**References:**

**EUPM:**

**Althea:**

Metric 2: Limitation of environmental impact

EUPM:
No specific action was taken to limit the environmental footprint of the mission. However, at the end of the mission, the equipment remained in the temporary warehouse was liquidated by the Head of Mission who became the Head of the Liquidation team (1).

Althea:
A large task of Althea is to support AF BiH in demining operations and training which has the advantage of improving the natural environment in the country (1). There is also evidence that the operation performed in-/out-processing surveys and analysis to assess the environmental state of sites (2).

References:
EUPM:

Althea:

Criterion 4: Gender sustainability

Metric 1: Gender sustainability in deployment

EUPM:
While not stated in the original mandate, the EUPM had a clear gender perspective, in line with the EU’s gender policy for CSDP missions, since 2006. The focus was on the promotion of women in policing, with gender included in the training for all new and returning staff (1). Gender was also included in both later Concept of Operations and Operational Plan, with the latter explicitly stating the mission’s aim for gender balance (2).
Althea:

Operation Althea did not have at the start, but has developed, a gender focus. At the moment of inception, the original concept for the mission only contained one mention of gender stating that “[a]n aide-memoire will provide guidance to commanders on the standard of behaviour, gender issues and human trafficking” in the section on the use of force (1). However, planning documents for the mission specified that the security needs of both men and women should be considered and gender matrices were applied by the LOTs (2). Further, the HQ team included one civilian gender adviser and two senior military officers who were appointed as gender advisors, with the civilian being full-time deployed while the others are rotated on a six month basis (3). These advisors performed roles within the mission, providing advice and guidance and also participated in ad-hoc activities in theatre such as organising or participating in workshops on gender and security or women in the security sector (4). Members of the mission also receive both pre-deployment training and in-theatre training on gender, and the pre-deployment training lasts between one hour and three days (5).

References:

EUPM:

Althea:
3. Ibidem, p. 31;

**Metric 2: Gender representation in deployment**

EUPM:

Women represented an average of 40-45% of all EUPM staff members, out of which 10-15% were international (1). Since 2008 the EUPM had a specific Gender Advisor and a formal Gender Coordination Board, which was created to coordinate a project jointly run by the EUPM, EUFOR, the UN Development Fund for Women and a local NGO (2). The Gender Advisor was not a full-time position, though, and was double hatted along with the position of Human Rights & Legal Advisor (3).
In 2009 the EUPM carried out a research of the gender situation in the different police services, focused on the situation of female police officials in terms of representation, recruitment, training and promotion, as well as their working environment and conditions, and, more specifically, discipline and sexual harassment, parenthood and family life. This resulted in a report Women in Police Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prepared by the EUPM and the BiH Agency for Gender Equality. The medium term impact of which led to an increasing number of women being employed in the security sector and broader institutions (4).

Althea:
The limited consideration of gender in the initial stages of the operation was carried forward into the gender distribution of initial forces, with around 95% of personnel being male between 2004 and 2007 (1). This did not significantly improve by 2016 when all 19 international civilian consultants were male and only 36 out of 821 military personnel attached to the mission were women (2).

References:
EUPM:
2. Ibidem, p. 101

Althea:

Metric 3: Gendered impact of deployment

With reference to the activities at the benefit of the population, EUPM had to support and assist national institutions in the inclusion of gender, from the training of local police, to the evaluation of laws on police officials and sensibilisation on the social acceptance of victims of gender-based violence (1).

References:
Democratic Republic of Congo

Preconditions:

**Precondition 1: Alignment of national and EU interests and goals**

**Metric:** Cooperation impact on national interests and goals achievement

**Comment:**

**Artemis:**

Operation Artemis received the necessary unanimous support from the EU Member States. There was not significant opposition to the Operation itself, the bigger question was instead the degree to which the EU Member States were willing to contribute financially, resources and personnel to the Operation. Instead, the EU Member States were for most part either supportive of the mission, or at minimum ambivalent. While the French and Belgians to lesser extent were heavily invested in having the Operation taking place, the UK also politically supported the mission. To this end, there was significant informal coordination taking place in the Council structures to ensure sufficient degree of political support. The Operation as overall was seen as a good political opportunity for the EU Member States to strengthen the ESDP, heal some of the divisions that had emerged during the 2003 Iraq War, strengthen the EU-UN relationship and raise the UN's global significance. Germany remains an interesting case. While the Bundestag authorised over 300 personnel to be sent into the DRC, the actual contributions were significantly smaller, only around 40. The Defence minister at the time of troop generation explicitly ruled out the possibility of sending combat troops, with reasons being both hesitance to commit combat troops in Africa and already stretched situation of Bundeswehr due participation in Afghanistan (1).

**EUFOR Congo:**

At the time of EUFOR Congo the lack of an advanced planning capability and the delay in the activation of the OHQ in Potsdam (Germany) compromised the Union’s preparedness to deploy EUFOR on time (1). The force generation process with the EUFOR was slow and only after informal discussions between France and Germany, did the planning process together with the force generation get rolling (2). The strong French and to a lesser extent Belgian advocacy for the mission, allowed for securing the support to the mission but highlight the discrepancies between national and EU goals and priorities (3), which however would have been more difficult to reach at national level. Also, there was the willingness of EU Member States to get involved in these kinds of mission (4).
Precondition 2: Implementation of the mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Effective implementation of the mandate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemis was effective in the implementation of its mandate. It succeeded in securing the territory of Bunia and in transferring its responsibilities to the MONUC mission (1). Nonetheless, the mandate was evaluated to be extremely narrow in space and time, affecting negatively its potential and not including considerations on the maintenance of security after the termination of the deployment (2). Indeed, MONUC was not able to maintain security after Artemis left the country (3). Similar considerations can be drawn for EUFOR Congo. The Joint Action 319/CFSP did not include redeployment or a &quot;draw-down&quot;-phase, whereas the UN mandate by using broader language, did. As such, when the Council deemed the EUFOR having ended on 30 November, the redeployment stage had not been conducted. EU discussions for extending the mandate for the duration of redeployment ended without granting one following resistance from Berlin (4). This contributed to the discrepancy in the mandates, which in return ended up having operational impacts. Most importantly, the EUFOR personnel did not have a clear rule of engagement, until the PSC gave an emergency one only for self and force-protection during redeployment phase. This meant that during the redeployment stage, the EUFOR was not authorised to intervene in a case of violence. Bulk of the EUFOR left the DRC before Christmas 2006, with final team leaving on 31 January 2007 and the Council deactivated the OHQ in February 2007 (5). As such, in the end the EUFOR mandate was not extended or altered after the initial one.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
3. Interview 1

**Criterion 3: Quality of the mandate**

**Metric 1: Effectiveness of the mission/operation planning**

**Artemis:**
The EU’s objectives for the Operation Artemis followed the UN Security Council resolution 1484 which authorised the overall mission. The specific military tasks for Artemis were: “to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia” and “if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and humanitarian presence in the town” (1). The mandate however, was limited in space and time, affecting negatively its potential (2). After the end of the mandate on 1 September 2003, the Operational Commander French General Thonier transferred the responsibilities to the MONUC commander.

Given France pre-deployed forces on the ground, Paris ‘Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations’ (CPCO) had begun drawing plans for the Artemis a month before the EU, based on pre-existing planning scenarios. For this reason, the Artemis is seen as a success also at the political level, in fostering closer support amongst the EU Member States on the ESDP (later CSDP).

The mandate, however, was dependent on the UNSC Resolution and did not have robust rule of engagement for the use of force, limiting the effectiveness of action. The definition of guidelines for the protection of civilians during EU-led Crisis Management Operation, as well as the necessity to have EU Status Of Forces Agreement were also identified as a lesson learned after the end of the operation (3).

**EUFOR:**
The mandate for the EUFOR RD Congo was based on the Chapter VII format UN Security Council resolution 1671 of 2006, which delineated the objectives of the operation: “support MONUC to stabilise a situation, in case MONUC faces serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing capabilities”, “contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, “contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa”, “ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as well as the protection of the installations of EUFOR RD Congo”, “execute operations of limited character in order to extract individuals in danger” (1).

Before the start of the operation, the EU performed several fact-finding missions to determine the possibilities of deploying an EU operation in the country and assess what kind of effort and contributions were deemed necessary (2). Following the initial German demand that the EUFOR was to last a specific and limited duration, the length of the mandate was set to expire four months from the first round of Presidential elections, with six weeks of deployment at the beginning and redeployment in the end (3). The overall decision-making and planning process of the EUFOR was seen as having been cumbersome and slow, following the French-German negotiations, besides trying to ensure broad EU support for the mission. It was pointed out that especially force generation process with the EUFOR was slow and only after informal discussions between France and
Germany, did the planning process together with the force generation get rolling (4). It was further argued that there was strong French and to a lesser extent Belgian advocacy for the mission, which was crucial for securing the support.

After the set end of the operation, EUFOR re-deployed. During the redeployment phase, EUFOR personnel did not have a clear rule of engagement, until the PSC issued an emergency one exclusively for self and force-protection. This meant that during the redeployment stage, the EUFOR was not authorised to intervene in a case of violence. The bulk of the EUFOR left the DRC before Christmas 2006, with final team leaving on 31 January 2007 and the Council deactivated the OHQ in February 2007 (5).

Secondly, the conduct of operations, despite mostly achieving their initial objectives, were not without their own challenges: EUFOR’s chain of command was incoherently set-up, the CIMIC operations and PsyOps, tasks were underfunded, despite the lessons learned from the Operation Artemis identifying this as a problem. Planning did not included CMC nor Military strategic options due to compressed time and used instead an option paper.

References:
Artemis:
4. Ibidem
5. Council of the European Union, PSC Report on the way ahead following operation Artemis lessons learned, 6322/04; Interview 1

EUFOR:
Metric 2: Mission/operation reviews and exit strategies

Artemis:
The Artemis’s mandate was not renewed, as the initial one included a clear exit strategy whereby the Artemis would transfer its responsibilities to the reinforced UN MONUC following the end of mandate between 1 and 7 September 2003 (1). During the performance of the mission, hosts of EU delegations and national authorities visited the mission (2). Due the fixed and relatively short duration of the Artemis, mission review was only carried as a part of the lessons learned documents. During the Operation, the PSC maintained constant multilateral oversight in the form of regular updates from the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (CEUMC), who in return received regular updates from the Operational Commander in Paris. The PSC however retained the mandate to invite the Operational Commander at any time. Following the Operation, the EU published two comprehensive Lessons Learned document following the operation Artemis (3). These lessons learned documents were prepared by the EUMC (military lessons learned) and the Council Secretariat (political and institutional lessons learned).

EUFOR Congo:
The mandate included an end date for the operation from the beginning. The end date, however, did not allowed for the evaluation of the situation on the ground for the finalisation of the intervention. Moreover, the lack of flexibility in the mandate resulted in the operation’s redeployment after November 2006 without legal basis to use force outside of self-defence (1). After the end of the operation, the Council General Secretariat prepared a lessons learned document, in which three priority areas for improvement were identified: “planning, conduct of operations, and remaining (enabling) issues” (2). The review assessed that even if political decision was taken promptly, there was a delay between the political decision and the initialisation of military planning process. The pause of one month in the process in spring 2006 delayed the start of military staff and subsequent operational planning (3). Additional problems were mentioned by the EUMC, such as a separate political strategic and military operational “option paper” from the EUMC and CIVCOM advice. Also, the parallel establishment of OHQ and FHQ reduced the room of manoeuvring for the FCdr, as the OpCdr was forced to make operational/tactical level planning.

The EUMC outlined three priority areas for improvement: “planning, conduct of operations, and remaining (enabling) issues” (4). Firstly, when looking at planning, while the EUMC concluded that political decision was taken promptly, there was a delay between the political decision and the initialisation of military planning process. The pause of one month in the process in spring 2006 delayed the start of military staff and subsequent...
operational planning (5). Additional problems were mentioned by the EUMC, example, a separate political strategic and military operational "option paper" from the EUMC and CIVCOM advice. Also, the parallel establishment of OHQ and FHQ reduced the room of maneuvering for the FCdr, as the OpCdr was forced to make operational/tactical level planning. These challenges have been linked to the complex and at times messy political process behind the EUFOR. Germany, and to a lesser degree France, despite being the Framework Nations, did not exercise leadership. Instead through caveats and domestic political concerns, they managed to slow down and overtly complicate the planning process contributing to above-mentioned idiosyncrasies (6).

Secondly, the conduct of operations, despite mostly achieving their initial objectives, were not without their own challenges. The EUMC document (7) criticise the EUFOR’s chain of command, which was incoherently set-up to begin with, but was made worse following individual factors. It is noted that the OpCdr was accused of micromanagement, further eroding the room for maneuvering by the FCdr. This together with national caveats along unclear interaction between military and political strategies contributed significant challenges. Furthermore, the CIMIC operations and PsyOps, tasks were underfunded, despite the lessons learned from the Operation Artemis identifying this as a one to done.

References:
Artemis:
2. Interview 1

EUFOR Congo:
Precondition 4: Continuous operational assessment

**Metric: Effectiveness of the operational assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artemis:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the Operation, the PSC maintained constant multilateral oversight in the form of regular updates from the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, who in return received regular updates from the Operational Commander in Paris. The PSC however retained the mandate to invite the Operational Commander at any time. The Force commander also performed debriefings after the handing over of the operation to the UN (1).</td>
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<th>EUFOR Congo:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The lessons learned performed at the end of the operation included coordination with CGS directorates, commission, EUSEC, EUPOL, EUSR office - DGE VIII/EUMS (1). However, the length of the lessons learned document was substantially reduced from the original version due to political sensitivity among Member States (2).</td>
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<th>EUFOR Congo:</th>
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<td>2. Interview 16</td>
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Precondition 5: Personnel provision

**Metric 1: Effective provision and management of personnel**

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<th>Artemis:</th>
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<tr>
<td>During the Operation, the PSC maintained constant multilateral oversight in the form of regular updates from the Chairman of the EU Military Committee, who in return received regular updates from the Operational Commander in Paris. The PSC however retained the mandate to invite the Operational Commander at any time. The Force commander also performed debriefings after the handing over of the operation to the UN (1). France (Framework Nation) provided majority (at highest level around 85%) of all personnel used in the Operation Artemis (2). Germany remains an interesting case. While the Bundestag authorised over 300 personnel to be sent into the DRC, the actual contributions were significantly smaller, only around 40. The Defence minister at the time of troop generation explicitly ruled out the possibility of sending combat troops, with reasons being both hesitance to commit combat troops in Africa and already stretched situation of Bundeswehr due participation in Afghanistan (3). As</td>
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<td>1. Interview 1</td>
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<th>EUFOR Congo:</th>
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<td>2. Interview 16</td>
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such, majority of the German troops consisted of an Airbus-310 for equipped for medical purposes (which was never used during the Operation), with the associated medical unit, but Germany also sent two officers into the OHQ (4).

EUFOR Congo:
Each participating country oversaw their troops pre-deployment training. This lead to discrepancies in the manner and amount of training that participating personnel received (1). While the participation of larger number of the EU Member States reduced the burden on France and Germany, it brought some internal challenges. Mainly, as points out, quite a few countries, such as Spain and Germany, placed serious national caveats/limitations on where and when their troops could be used (2). In this instance, German/Dutch troops were only to be used inside Kinshasa. Spanish FCIR units had multiple conditions on when and where (only in Kinshasa) they could be used, with national authorisation required for operations. These limitations caused significant operational challenges to the FCdr and limited his operational options. If such limitations were to put in place in future, they should be made clear during planning and force generation process. This way it would be possible to plan and complement requirements accordingly (7633/07).

References:
Artemis:
1. Interview 18

EUFOR Congo:

Metric 2: Adherence of training to international standards
Artemis:
During operation Artemis no major problems related to personnel was identified (1). Nonetheless, the preference for the French initial deployment in DRC to avoid problems related to the multinational character of troops, suggest difficulties related to differences in operational cultures of participating Member States.
**EUFOR Congo:**
Training of personnel was lacking on the CSDP functioning (1) and Member States did not necessarily send the personnel who have been trained (2). However, during the preparation phase, the FHQ senior operational staff received human rights training. The aim of this was to provide personnel to Kinshasa who could then act as focal points for human rights among the troops (3).

**References:**
Artemis:
1. Interview 1
EUFOR Congo:
   Interview 16
2. Interview 16

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**Precondition 6: Effective and transparent management of funds**

**Metric: Transparency and management of funds**

**Artemis:**
The operation mandate foresaw a financial allocation of EUR 7 million and requested the Council to establish procedures for post settlement of costs. "Barracks and lodging for the forces as a whole, as well as expenditure related to transportation of the forces as a whole" were not considered eligible as common costs (1). There was no common funding for CIMIC, and the Force HQ had to resort to Commission funding (2). Furthermore, in the lessons learned document the Council indicated that more equal distribution of the costs should have been implemented, indicating that participating Member States were not fully satisfied with the distribution of operational costs (3).

**EUFOR Congo:**
Common costs were covered by the Athena mechanism, on which however detailed knowledge was missing. Moreover, there was no common funding for CIMIC and the FHQ had to resort to the commission fundings (1). The Athena mechanism was however only used during the second phase of the operation, meaning that barracks, lodging or initial transport of the forces was not covered under the Athena mechanism (2). The lack of common funding for CIMIC was identified as a lessons learned at the end of the deployment (3).

**References:**
Artemis:
3. Ibidem
Precondition 7: Definition of common goals, timeline and efforts in cooperation with third actors

Metric: Joint definition of common goals and timeline with the third actors

Artemis:
One of the initial purposes of the Artemis was to stabilise Bunia and immediate area around it, allowing the UN members to reinforce the MONUC. Therefore, the process that lead to the activation of the mission and its handing over at the end of the mandate to the UN’s MONUC mission required an agreed definition of the roles and responsibilities among parties. At the operational level, the Framework and mandate of the Artemis included clear need for coordination between Artemis and MONUC commanders in Bunia. The Artemis Operational Plan laid down “detailed coordination mechanism” between the Artemis and MONUC on “issues relevant […] to mission”. (1). Framework document of Artemis also discussed that the EU-UN cooperation was essential for information strategy.

When it comes to third-country contributions, a problem was related to the lack of possibility, for the third country, to meaningfully engage in conversations on a potentially different type of force contribution. While formally having the right to express their stances, the meeting convened in specific formats and could not take part in the PSC/Council meetings on the Operation (2)

EUFOR Congo:
As with Operation Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo was launched based on UN’s initial request to support the MONUC in the DRC, as reflected in the initial Council mandate (1). The EU Council secretariat in New York cooperated with the UN DPKO during pre-planning stage of what would become the EUFOR. This cooperation included technical agreement of logistics and intelligence (2). However, there “was the lack of understanding between the EU and the UN as to the requirements of the UN for EU support (objectives, tasks and timelines)” (3). This followed in different understandings about the role of the EUFOR RD Congo. The UN and MONUC envisioned the EUFOR RD Congo to be a supplementary force to the MONUC, whereas the EU and EUFOR RD Congo ensured that they were independent and able to act on their own. Eventually, the EUFOR RD Congo was given independence and necessary mandate to act on their own, whilst providing support and coordinating with the MONUC. On organisational level, during the EUFOR operation, the coordination between the MONUC and the EUFOR came under the responsibilities of the FHQ and his staff. The majority of the problems between the two missions originated from “from inadequate cooperation mechanisms, coordination problems and a lack
of mutual understanding” (4). First issue was that making requests for a shared operations was too cumbersome, with request taking up to 24 hours during an exercise to be processed since it had to be taken at the level of UNSG and EU HR/VP/PSC. Instead of waiting full 24 hours, the EUFOR FHQ resorted to acting after twelve hours.

References:
Artemis:
2. Interview 18

EUFOR Congo:

Precondition 8: Exploitation of partners contribution

**Metric: Exploitation of partners contribution**

The mission's lessons learned document highlighted the necessity to improve intelligence sharing at strategic and operational levels among EU structures, centres and Member States (1). As an interviewee pointed out it was at times difficult to receive intelligence information from above, forcing the forces on the ground to work "in a fog at the operational level“ (2). The successful conclusion of the mission, however, suggests that these issues did not affect substantially the conduction of the operation. However, contributing third countries did not have many opportunities to negotiate a different type of cooperation which could have led to a better exploitation of resources (3).

Similar lessons learned were identified during operation EUFOR, particularly for the cooperation with MONUC. For further details please refer to the next precondition.

References:
Artemis:
2. Interview 1
3. Interview 18
Precondition 9: Degree of the added value of cooperation and transparency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Added value and transparency of cooperation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemis:</td>
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<tr>
<td>As the Operation Artemis was the first mission of its kind, it provided multitude of the lessons learned. The key ones, which have been implemented to a varying degree were the benefit of framework nations (in place to this day), the need for development and maintenance of rapid reaction forces and the importance of comprehensive approach between civil-military actors (1). Furthermore, perhaps most significant lesson learned from the Artemis was the contribution that the mission made to the Athena mechanism (2). Whereas Artemis common funds were distributed by an ad-hoc mechanism, this was deemed too cumbersome as a permanent solution, necessitating a more formal institutional set-up. (3). Operation Artemis also served as a reference model for the development of the EU’s Battlegroup Concept. Moreover, following the operation, action was taken to ensure better and more secure communications and intelligence sharing and define EU SOFA. Nevertheless, some shortfalls identified in the course of Operation Artemis, like the lack of strategic airlift or the need to improve interoperability, remain on the EU’s agenda. Finally, Operation Artemis catalysed the institutionalisation of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Congo:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problems of cooperation between EUFOR and MONUC were present also during EUFOR, during which intelligence sharing and coordination between the two faced three major challenges. Firstly, there was no formal framework for sharing of intelligence, but this issue was later overcome in the field as the two operations shared daily and weekly situation reports. Secondly, since the EUFOR and MONUC (and by extension the EU and the UN) did not have an agreement on sharing classified information, some of the situation assessments were not shared, with the intelligence reports shared by the EU were “sanitised” (1). Thirdly, the MONUC lacked necessary technical resources, such as secure communications, to enable the EUFOR RD Congo to maintain active coordination and intelligence-sharing. Nonetheless, especially the UAV provided aerial intelligence, were of assistance to the MONUC which lacked similar capabilities. As such, while the cooperation between the EU and UN had improved since 2003, it continued to face institutional challenges, but a lot of these challenges were overcome by positive relations and frequent interaction between the MONUC Force commander and the EUFOR RD Congo Force Commander. The institutional challenges for more effective cooperation were mostly related to lack of formal cooperation mechanisms in some areas and differing organisational capabilities and operational logics, with MONUC having a more civilian-driven approach and being poorly resources, compared to military-driven and well-equipped and trained EUFOR DR Congo. Despite these challenges, the EUFOR was generally seen having done what it was mandated to, namely, to support the MONUC during the election process in the DRC, even though crowd control was not in its mandate. The EU carried out extensive “lesson learning process” on the EUFOR operation, especially on strategic planning. The core of the lessons learned process was an initial assessment by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) published 23 February 2007 (2). Based on this and other inputs, the PSC approved on 8 May 2007 the analysis on the lessons learned (3).</td>
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Following the initial assessments and analysis from EUFOR, the EUMC prepared an action plan July 2007 to improve its internal processes. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) sub-sequentially presented a document to the EUMC “outlining priorities and timelines ‘for advancing lessons from EUFOR RD Congo related to doctrine’ identifying three priority areas for improvement: planning, conduct of operations and remaining (enabling) issues (4). This report was then presented to the Council by the SG/HR Solana and based on the report’s findings concrete suggestions for restructuring the EUMS were advanced. The Council endorsed outlined suggestions and recommendations in the report on November 2007 (5).

It has been already highlighted that multiple lessons from the Artemis were not implemented, such as lack of sufficient resources for CIMIC, resulting in avoidable problems during the EUFOR. The Council admitted in 2007 (6) that the list of lessons learned was so significant that not all could be implemented rapidly, if at all. As an example, they show that enhancing the EU’s strategic planning continued to appear on the policy agenda even in 2011.

Most significant implemented lessons learned where however in EU-UN cooperation. Liaison officers were exchanged between the EUMS and the UN DPKO, at the HQ level. In addition, joint planning templates facilitated sub-sequent planning for operations between the EU and the UN. Both parties also agreed to continue the EU-UN Steering Committee meetings, including in the crisis situations, along with joint EU-UN lessons learned exercises. Following implementation and continuation of these various lessons, the EU-UN cooperation improved in future operations, such as the EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

References:
Artemis:

EUFOR Congo:
5. Ibidem
### Efficiency

**Criterion 1: Presence and use of common warehouses**

**Metric:** Use of warehouses in joint deployment

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<tr>
<th>Artemis:</th>
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<tr>
<td>There was no warehouse for the operation. Nonetheless, participating Member States’ contributions were agreed upon before the deployment at the Paris Force Generation Conference (1). Despite the general lack of strategic airlift capabilities among EU Member States, contributions have been assessed as appropriate (2). No relocation of resources was reported after the completion of the mission.</td>
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<th>EUFOR Congo:</th>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo did not have a specific shared each participating country provided what was deemed necessary for the EUFOR. Each of the participating nations oversaw their own logistics and provision of equipment. However, the participating nations did coordinate some of the logistics through multinational logistic organisations, such as the Host Nations Support (HNS) and Third-Party Logistic Service Support (TPLSS), to achieve “economies of scale” (1).</td>
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**References:**

**Artemis:**
2. Interview 1

**EUFOR Congo:**

### Criterion 2: Straightforward and comprehensive provision of equipment to third countries

**Metric:** Provision of equipment to the third countries

| N.A. |
**Criterion 3: Efficient management of personnel**

<table>
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<th>Metric: Efficient management of personnel</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Artemis:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The number of troops was around 2,200 at highest operational peak but was still deemed sufficient due the narrow mandate and operational area of Artemis. However, while France maintained strategic reserve of four infantry companies in Chad, Gabon and Djibouti, this reserve was not seen as sufficient for the operational combat troops in Bunia (1). While France reportedly sought increased Hungarian contribution to the reserve forces, this was turned down by Hungary (2). Nonetheless, with the narrow parameters, highly capable and trained troops, the reserve troops were never activated. Majority of the operational combat troops deployed in Bunia were drawn from the French and Swedish special forces and other highly capable, highly trained and well-equipped units. This was deemed necessary considering the short time between the initial UN request, UN and EU mandates, and the time when the troops were needed to be operational in Bunia.</td>
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<td><strong>EUFOR Congo:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The management of personnel was complicated by the presence of national caveats. Some countries, such as Spain and Germany, placed serious national caveats/limitations on where and when their troops could be used. In this instance, German/Dutch troops were only to be used inside Kinshasa (1). &quot;Most German troops were not deploy to Kinshasa, but instead spent most of their time in hotel facilities in Gabon.&quot; (2) Spanish FCIR units had multiple conditions on when and where (only in Kinshasa) they could be used, with national authorisation required for operations. These limitations caused significant operational challenges to the FCdr and limited his operational options (3). While the challenges brought by diversity in operational cultures was partially addressed with the high-quality and training of the participating EUFOR troops, some friction between units reportedly remained based on feelings of uneven contributions by other participating countries (4). If such limitations were to put in place in future, they should be made clear during planning and force generation process. This way it would be possible to plan and complement requirements accordingly (5).</td>
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**References:**

**Artemis:**


**EUFOR Congo:**

| 2. | Interview 16 |

**Criterion 4:** Has the EU been able to achieve better results through cooperation with other actors present on the ground (i.e. NGOs, UN, NATO, coalitions)?

**Metric:** Scale of results in cooperation with third actors

N.A.

**Criterion 5:** Does the framework used for the participation of third countries and actors in the mission/operation allow for the reduction of bargaining costs?

**Metric:** Bargaining costs

*Artemis:*

The legal mandate for participation of third-party countries was outlined in the Joint Decision 2003/423. Based on this, individual bilateral agreements were negotiated with each of the participation country and applied only in the context of the Artemis. (1)).

*EUFOR Congo:*

Switzerland and Turkey contributed RD Congo. While Turkey decided to sign a framework participation agreement in 2006 for the country’s contribution to CSDP missions and operations (1), Switzerland opted for an ad-hoc participation agreement for the definition of which there was an exchange of letters between the EU and the Swiss confederation government (2).

**References:**

*Artemis:*


*EUFOR Congo:*


Coherence

Criterion 1: Coherence between strategy/actions for the country with the wider strategic goals/values of the EU

Metric: Policy alignment and goal achievement input

Please refer to other sections in the annex.

Criterion 2: Coherence of action during deployment

Metric: Coordination of concurrent EU missions/operations

During the performance of Operation Artemis, no concurrent EU missions was deployed in the country. However, the Political Advisor to the OHQ was helpful in ensuring a constant coordination between the Operational HQ and the Brussels institutions (1).

EUFOR Congo:

At the time of EUFOR RD Congo, the EU maintained a police mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) and Security Sector Reform mission (EUSEC RD Congo) in the DRC. The coordination between the EUFOR, EUPOL and EUSEC took place at operational and political level. As per the initial mandate in 423/2006/CFSP, the Force Commander (FCdr) and his command group oversaw coordination with the EUPOL and EUSEC on operational level in Kinshasa (1). In addition, the FCdr also oversaw coordination with local actors, such as Congolese authorities and the MONUC. This included sharing intelligence between the EU missions (2). FCdr Command group also coordinated with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) Mr. Ajello and his team on regular basis.

On political level, the EUSR played an essential role in ensuring coordination and reporting between the three EU missions. The EUSR accompanied OpCdr Lieutenant General Viereck on his trips to DRC and supported the OpCdr on political issues vis-à-vis both the PSC and the local government in the DRC. As the EUFOR, EUPOL and EUSEC all maintained close coordination with the EUSR, he was reported to have played a key role in coordination (3). Nonetheless, from the EUFOR RD Congo perspective an on-the-ground individual with the mandate to coordinate the various EU operations and represent the EU to local parties would have been welcome. This was because the EUSR was not always present in the country and was not specifically mandated for that task.

During operational phase, the EUFOR and EUPOL, along with French-trained Congolese Rapid Intervention Police Units (PIR) were reported to have coordinated their action in the instance of containing riots. However, the operational mandates of the three missions were significantly different,
since the EUFOR was envisioned as a military support for the MONUC during the elections, with correspondingly narrow and time-limited mandate, the EUPOL and especially EUSEC had much more long-term and structural focus. Overall, the EUFOR was reported to have followed through the mandated coordination with EUPOL and EUSEC on operational level. On political level, significant part of the coordination however fell to the EUSR instead of the EUFOR Operation Commander.

References:
Artemis:

EUFOR Congo: forse non giusti controlla

Criterion 3: Coherence among simultaneous missions or operations belonging to different actors
Metric: Coherence between CSDP missions/operations and missions/activities of third actors

Artemis:
Mission de l'Organization des Nations Unies en Congo (MONUC) was put in place by the UN security Council in 1999. The limited resources of the mission led the UN to request assistance. Following the French initiative, the EU quickly arose as the most suitable and willing international actor to respond the UN call and the mission’s mandate was based on the UN Resolution n. 1484. The objective of the mandate was to stabilise and secure the area surrounding Bunia, to let the MONUC mission regain control and conduct activities. Therefore, coordination with UN forces on the ground was performed, as well as coordination in preparation of the handing over of responsibility at the end of the EU mandate, for which a UN staff was installed to let them become aware of the operation(1).

Close coordination with the UN and ways to improve practical cooperation was also identified as a lesson learned resulting from Operation Artemis, highlighting the missed potential of a better coordination and cooperation (2). This resulted in the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management (24 September 2003), with which the organisations established a joint consultative mechanism to increase cooperation on planning, training, communication and best practices. Nonetheless, coordination occurred also in the form of direct reporting from HR Solana to the UNSC (3).
In addition to coordinating with the UN, the mission deployed liaison officers to coordinate with humanitarian agencies operating on the ground (4).
EUFOR Congo:
As with Operation Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo was launched based on UN’s initial request to support the MONUC in the DRC, as reflected in the initial Council mandate (1). The EU Council secretariat in New York cooperated with the UN DPKO during pre-planning stage of what would become the EUFOR. This cooperation included technical agreement of logistics and intelligence (2). However, there “was the lack of understanding between the EU and the UN as to the requirements of the UN for EU support (objectives, tasks and timelines)” (3). This followed in different understandings about the role of the EUFOR RD Congo (4). The UN and MONUC envisioned the EUFOR RD Congo to be a supplementary force to the MONUC, whereas the EU and EUFOR RD Congo ensured that they were independent and able to act on their own. Eventually, the EUFOR RD Congo was given independence and necessary mandate to act on their own, whilst providing support and coordinating with the MONUC. On organisational level, during the EUFOR operation, the coordination between the MONUC and the EUFOR came under the responsibilities of the FHQ and his staff.

of the problems between the two missions originated from “from inadequate cooperation mechanisms, coordination problems and a lack of mutual understanding” (5).

Secondly, during the operation the intelligence sharing and coordination between the two faced three major challenges.(6). Thirdly, the MONUC lacked necessary technical resources, such as secure communications, to enable the EUFOR RD Congo to maintain active coordination and intelligence-sharing. Nonetheless, especially the UAV provided aerial intelligence, were of assistance to the MONUC which lacked similar capabilities. The institutional challenges for more effective cooperation were mostly related to lack of formal cooperation mechanisms in some areas and differing organisational capabilities and operational logics, with MONUC having a more civilian-driven approach and being poorly resources, compared to military-driven and well-equipped and trained EUFOR DR Congo.

References:
Artemis:
1. Interview 1
4. ibidem

EUFOR Congo:
1. Council, 2006/423/CFSP
4. Interview 10
Criterion 4: Coherence between the mission/operation mandate and the policy goals/priorities of the EU

Metric: Coherence of mission/operation with EU policy goals/priorities

Both operations operated under the UN Charter and contributed to the stability of the DRC. As such, the operations were in line with the EU Treaty and with the involvement of Member States in stabilising the country.

Criterion 5: Coherence among national procedures for starting a deployment

Metric: Procedural similarities for operational deployment

Artemis:
According to the lessons learned document on operation Artemis, EU Member States did experience some problems that affected cooperation, that were mainly related to different systems and procedures.
A first example in this regard was provided by the different classification systems among EU Member States and partners, with the result that the sharing of information was negatively affected during the operation (1). Furthermore, the necessity to activate national preparatory measures before and during the EU planning process suggests that coordination of different national systems could have been time intensive. This aspect was also highlighted by two interviewees who referenced to the EU acceptance of the French first entry, since this reduced the risks during the first phase of the intervention. In particular, multinational character of forces was evaluated to be negative due to different know-how and management of the operational field (2). Against this background, Ireland was initially willing to provide 50 soldiers from its special force’s unit (The Army Ranger Wing), but France turned this offer down, to “ensure the maximum effectiveness of the force”, which limited the accommodation of number of different units (3).
All this divergencies, however, did not prevented the operation to be conducted and performed.

EUFOR Congo:
National caveats to the deployment of forces and differences in equipment were a problem in EUFOR RD Congo(1). One example of differences in equipment was provided by the presence of different logistic supports from participating Member States, that was necessary given the non-standardised equipment, or the use of common phones to communicate among themselves due to the differences in used systems (2). Coming to the more operational aspects, “it was difficult to lead an operation with two lead countries, with Germany in the OHQ in Potsdam and the French on the ground in the FHQ. The real problem was the lack of trust between the both nations”(3).
These challenges have been linked to the complex and at times messy political process behind the EUFOR. Germany, and to a lesser degree France, despite being the Framework Nations, did not exercise leadership. Instead through caveats and domestic political concerns, the planning...
process slowed down and was overly complicated (4). Differences were also reflected at the personnel level. Indeed, while the challenges brought by diversity in operational cultures was partially addressed with the high-quality and training of the participating EUFOR troops, some friction between units reportedly remained based on feelings of uneven contributions by other participating countries (5).

References:
**Artemis:**
2. Interviews 1, 16

**EUFOR Congo:**
2. Interview 16
3. Ibidem
### Criterion 6: Vertical coherence

**Metric:** Alignment of national goals and interests with the EU ones

| In both deployments there has been an evident engagement and initiative coming from France, suggesting the country’s alignment of national goals to the EU ones. A further alignment of goals was present, although with a lesser extent, in the cases of Germany and the UK. While the former agreed to host the OHQ of EUFOR, it did not engage substantially in the performance of the mission. Same considerations are valid for the UK that reduced its force contribution due to other engagements of the country. |

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### Sustainability

### Criterion 1: Political sustainability of the cooperative activities

**Metric 1: Fulfilment of EU policy goals and priorities**

| Comment: Cooperation was in line with EU policy goals and priorities, and with UN policy goals. Despite this was not recognised as a problem in the original mandate, the limited timeframe and scope of the operation did not prevent the return of combatants after the end of the operation, although the mission’s results can be evaluated to be satisfactory. One issue undermining the sustainability of the Operation and the adherence of the cooperation to EU policy goals and priorities was the reported use of torture and disproportionate use of force by French soldiers. Instances were reported by the Swedish soldiers seconded to Artemis and was followed by a 2008 joint enquiry conducted by French and Swedish officials that declared allegations as not funded (1). Same considerations on the political sustainability of the operation can be drawn for EUFOR Congo. Compared to the Operation Artemis, which had combat troops only from two countries and relatively limited number of countries contributing into the OHQ, the EUFOR had a broader participation amongst the EU Member States, suggesting a higher fulfilment of EU policy goals and priorities. |


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### Metric 2: Political sustainability by decisionmakers and local entities involved

**Artemis:**

Operation’s mandate was based on UNSC Resolution. Moreover, the EU agreed to cooperate within the framework of the Ituri Peace Commission which included local representatives (1). The coordination of activities with Congolese representatives was meant to ensure the involvement and awareness of local community (2). Updates on the situation on the operational activities were shared with Congolese representatives (3). Diplomatic master messages were issued and evaluated to have been “important tools to communicate the intent of the EU to local communities” (4).

**EUFOR Congo:**

Exchange of letters with local authorities was performed before the deployment of the mission (1). While the EUFOR DRC was generally well-received in public at the end of the mission, it is questionable whether it was able to provide long-term impact (2). This is because the timeframe of the EUFOR was very limited and specific, along with on-the-ground objectives being geographically limited.

### References:

**Artemis:**

1. Gerhard MARCHL, Operation Artemis – Eine Bilanz aus ethischer Sicht, Bundesheer, 2010,
2. Ibidem; Interview 1
3. Interview 1

**EUFOR Congo:**


### Metric 3: political sustainability by the local community

N.A
Criterion 2: Implementation of burden-sharing and provision of equipment and personnel

Metric: Coverage of costs, provision of equipment and personnel

Artemis:
Provision of personnel and capabilities was defined during the Force Generation Conference held in Paris in June 2003 and under the direction of France as Framework Nation. Local infrastructures were considered to be insufficient (1) and the remoteness of the zone of engagement caused some problems in terms of necessary military means (2). However, personnel provided was deemed to be appropriate for the conduction of the operation (3). The shortage of strategic airlift capabilities among EU MS was identified during the mission - strategic lift capabilities were provided by France, Belgium, Canada and Brazil - and recognised as a strategic capability shortage in the lesson learned document (4). On the coverage of costs, France bore costs for its own troops and equipment, transportation costs and the costs of the Force Headquarters (5). Following the operation, the EU recognised the need of modifying shared financing mechanisms for shared costs of military operations, deemed inappropriate (6).

EUFOR Congo:
During the planning phase, the framework nation (Germany) hosted two force generations conferences in May, followed by two logistics conference in May and June. The force generation process was inefficient and slow as the individual EU Member States could not finalise their internal processes on time, mostly due German reluctance to assign its OHQ in Potsdam and to mobilise necessary resources (1). Key problematic issue during the conferences were airlift capabilities, for strategic, tactical and MEDEVAC. After numerous bilateral meetings between potential participating the EU Member States, the issues were in the end resolved. Overall, the EUFOR RD Congo did not have a specific shared warehouse, but instead each participating country provided what was deemed necessary for the EUFOR.

References:
Artemis:
2. Interviews n.1, 18
3. Interview1
| **EUFOR Congo:**  

**Criterion 3: Environmental footprint**

**Metric 1: Environmental sustainability**

**Artemis:**
Neither the Council Joint Conclusion 2003/432/CFSP, nor the UNSC Resolution 1484, which both authorised the Operation Artemis make clear reference to environmental footprint in the context of Artemis (1). Furthermore the military concept on environmental protection and energy efficiency for EU-led military operations was first agreed upon in 2012 (2). Nonetheless, Council joint decision 2003/319/CFSP referenced the EU’s overall DRC country strategy updated during the spring 2003, which included consideration on the overall environmental destruction and challenges inherent in the DRC conflicts, both in fuelling the conflict and how the conflict is impacting the environment of the DRC (3).

**EUFOR Congo:**
Environmental concerns were not included in the initial mandate as outlined in the 2006/316/CFSP nor in the UN resolution 1671(2006). This led to the second issue, namely that the mandate of the EUFOR was kept very limited and narrowly focused on maintaining stability and security in Kinshasa during the presidential elections (1). However, it should be noted that the EUFOR OPLAN annex does refer to "environmental support", but it is unclear what this entails. As such, it can be assumed that the EUFOR did on operational level in DRC make consideration to environmental issues.

**References:**

**Artemis:**
2. European Union Military Staff, Military concept on environmental protection and energy efficiency for EU-led military operations, EEAS 01574/12  
**Metric 2: Limitation of environmental impact**

Activities of Artemis did not include activities or guidelines on the limitation of environmental impact (1).

**References:**

**Criterion 4: Gender sustainability**

**Metric 1: Gender sustainability in deployment**

Artemis:
Neither the Council Joint Conclusion 2003/423/CFSP, nor the UNSC Resolution 1484, which both authorised the Operation Artemis make clear reference to the gender in the context of Artemis. Furthermore, neither lessons learned documents nor the Framework document for Artemis make explicit references to gender. Lack of inclusion of considerations on gender was also confirmed by one interviewee (1).

EUFOR Congo:
On gender issues, the EUFOR RD Congo was a first case of the EU actively implementing gender in its CSDP institutional structures. The EUFOR was the first EU CSDP operation that included a female Gender Advisor at the OHQ in Potsdam, from May 2006 onwards (1). "She was the only advisor for 2400 soldiers" (2). While in the beginning there was some resistance towards the inclusion of Gender advisor, by placing the advisor directly working with the Operational Commander and his Deputy, the resistance decreased over time. This was for the most part seen as high effectiveness of the Gender advisor during the EUFOR operation (3).

As the Gender advisor was part of the Op. Cdr’s team, gender dimension was systematically incorporated into all phases of the mission operation. This had the advantage of ensuring that gender dimension was specifically designed for the EUFOR’s operational guidelines and strategy, instead of being generalist approach. This was especially significant considering that there was no pre-existing EU-level framework or approach for inclusion of gender dimensions into military operations. As such, the gender advisor relied on close cooperation with different branches of the operation, working especially closely with Civil-Military cooperation (CIMIC) branch J9 in both the OHQ and the FHQ. This cooperation was especially necessary in the case of the FHQ as there was no gender advisor directly placed in the DRC or Gabon delegations. Significant part of the Gender advisor’s reported work included gender training of the personnel at the OHQ, together with the OHQ. In the “Soldier card” (a short briefing for EUFOR soldiers on the mission) emphasised that any sexual based violence would be treated as a serious misconduct indicated inclusion of gender to the every-day operational considerations.
EUFOR presented first instance of including gender dimension into EU operations and highlighted the need for such inclusion in all future EU operations (4). Like all institutional firsts, it relied heavily on the personal effort Gender Advisor due limited resources and lack of pre-existing guidelines and procedures. Nonetheless, through local engagement and visible presence of female soldiers, the EUFOR was perceived locally in a positive light when it comes to gender dimensions.

References:
Artemis:
1. Interview 1

EUFOR Congo:
2. Interview 16

Metric 2: Gender representation in deployment

Artemis:
The personnel deployed on the ground was mainly male, with a very limited female component (1).

EUFOR Congo:
The Gender Advisor did have individual budget assigned to her, instead gender dimension was part of the wider CIMIC funding in both the OHQ and FHQ. However, it was reported that CIMIC itself lacked necessary budget to be as effective as desired on operational level (1). As a part of the every-day approach to gender, EUFOR sought to ensure that every patrol included a female soldier and that there was regular outreach with local women rights organisations and activists (2). When it comes to the female representation on the ground, the unbalanced representation in mission reflect the composition of the Member States’ armed forces and it is in the hands of Member States to provide a balanced pool of personnel (3).

References:
Artemis:
1. Interview 1

EUFOR Congo:

3. Interviews 22, 23

**Metric 3: Gendered impact of deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artemis:</th>
<th>n.a.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Congo:</td>
<td>Through local engagement and visible presence of female soldiers, the EUFOR was perceived locally in a positive light when it comes to gender dimensions (1). No more specific information is available on the gendered impact of the cooperation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References:**
Artemis:
EUFOR Congo:


**Criterion 5: Local social sustainability of EU CSDP missions/operations**

| Metric: Impact on social sustainability |
|---|---|
| Local community was aware of the activities of the operation. The use of French among the forces facilitated cooperation with local community and improved intelligence. Local community profited from the improved security situation in Bunia. A considerable number of people who lived in Bunia returned to the city at the end of August 2003, the economic life in the city of Bunia experienced a normalisation of activities. Furthermore, humanitarian support could resume thanks to the improved security situation. This also allowed for the Interim Ituri Administration and the Ituri Assembly to resume work towards a negotiation between the government and the belligerents (1). |

**References:**
Artemis:

### Precondition 1: Alignment of national and EU interests and goals

**Metric: Cooperation impact on national interests and goals achievement**

| The impact of cooperation on national priorities and goals varies among EU Member States. The EU involvement in Mali represents a perfect match of interests with those of the French administration, who has been directly involved in trying to improve the security of the country through operations Serval/Barkahne and Takuba. Particularly after the migration crisis, the interest of Germany in stabilising the Sahel region increased and Berlin was the promoter of several initiatives (e.g. G20 African compact), therefore the EU intervention is in line with national interests. Despite these examples, in the case of EUTM there is a misalignment of position as the mission is not the preferred option for all EU Member States (i.e. Poland) nor the preferred type of intervention (i.e. Finland).

**References:**

### Precondition 2: Implementation of the mandate

**Metric: Effective implementation of the mandate**

| EUTM: The implementation of the mandate was not considered to be effective enough in the 2022 Holistic Strategic Review. The plethora of actors, the short rotation of personnel, the presence of EU national caveats for the deployment of personnel, the language barrier and the constant insufficient understanding of the local context and interests are all major limitations to the effective and timely implementation of the EUTM mandate.

However, the successful and timely implementation of the mandate is dependent on the political acceptance of the mission and related activities, as well as on the local security situation. Both conditions, currently do not allow for a different and full implementation of the mandate.

EUCAP Sahel Mali:
The implementation of the mission’s mandate has been affected by the local security situation and only six out of the twenty agreed Secure Development and Governance Poles in the central region of the country were accessible in the first part of 2022. Nonetheless, the training related part of the mandate was evaluated to have produced good results.

**References:**


EUTM:

   https://media.euobserver.com/cce019f3357aff2c61c7717085550bacb.pdf
3. On the political sustainability of EUTM Mali, please see the related criterion in the "Sustainability" section.

EUCAP Sahel Mali:


Criterion 3: Quality of the mandate

Metric 1: Effectiveness of the mission/operation planning

EUTM:

EUTM Mali has had five different mandates.
Between 2013 and 2014, the EUTM Mali first mandate’s objective was to train 4 battalions of the Malian army (combat, logistical support and logistical support) as well as to provide advice and assistance to the Malian Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the command structure to “contribute to improving the military capacities and the effectiveness of the Malian armed forces” (1).

In the second mandate, from 2014 to 2016, priority areas were defined: training and capacity-building activities; training and advice on command and control, logistical chain and human resources; training in international humanitarian law (IHL), protection of civilians and human rights; and strengthening conditions for political control by legitimate civilian authorities. In line with the objective to advice the Malian MoD, the Advisory Task Force (ATF) has been created, though not foreseen in the original mandate (2). It enabled the achievement of Mali’s first-ever Military Programming Law (Loi d’orientation et de Programmation Militaire - LOPM), which defined FAMa priorities between 2015 and 2019 (3).

The third mandate (4) between 2016 and 2018 extended the area of operations beyond southern Mali up to the southern bank of the Niger River. It began support, through decentralised training activities to the Units and Headquarters of the Military Regions and provided support to the national armed forces of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel). Upon Malian request, EUTM also started to contribute to Mali’s disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process in coordination with the UN MINUSMA (5).

The fourth mandate (2018-2020) (6) does not include much change, but a strengthening support to the operationalisation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force (JF-G5S) through training and advisory activities. Training activity in the field of human rights has also been intensified by integrating in the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) modules a cadre of instructors which combine a civilian expert and military instructors and offers a more tailored package capable of influencing the perception of Malian soldiers.

EUTM’s mandate (7) currently running from 2020 until 2024 was the first the Council extended for a period of 4 years, following an Holistic Strategic Review process. It includes an expansion of the area of operations that now covers the whole of Mali and military assistance for other G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso and Niger), to take into account the regional EUTM lessons learned. It shifts the operational centre of gravity...
from Bamako to the centre of Mali, thus implying decentralised activities, including non-executive accompaniment (8). According to an April 2022 PSC decision, training activities in Mali are temporarily and reversibly suspended, due to the local security situation. When it comes to the involvement of local community in the planning of the mission, the strategic review recognises the need to better respond to the local requirements, which can be done if higher levels of trust between parties is ensured (9).

EUCAPI Sahel Mali:
On 20 February 2014, the Republic of Mali sent a letter inviting the Union to deploy an EU civilian mission to support the Malian security forces. The mission’s mandate underwent five reiterations. The first mandate (2015-2017) provided assistance and advice to Malian internal security forces (ISF): the national police, the national gendarmerie and the national guard in the implementation of security reform in close coordination with other international partners (1). During its second mandate (2017-2019), a strategic consultancy activity in border management and counterterrorism has been added to a human resources consultancy activity focused on "skills management" and aimed at developing a management framework, principles and tools (organisation charts, statutes, career paths, databases, internal controls, etc.) (2). Following the 2019 strategic review and within the framework of the regionalisation of CSDP missions in the Sahel, four priority activities were assigned to the mission in its third mandate (2019-2021): strengthening capacities to fight terrorism and organised crime (i), supporting border management and migration management activities (ii), training to other G5 Sahelian countries without CSDP mission (Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Chad) (iii), further develop training outside of the central training centre in Bamako (iv) (3). The fourth mandate 2021-2023 (4) aimed at bringing support to improved governance and the fight against impunity in the security forces; the redeployment of internal security forces and return of the State and civil administration; the transition authorities and internal security forces in securing the electoral process. This mandate adjusts the mission “to enhance its ability to assist and advise the Malian internal security forces by supporting a gradual redeployment of Mali’s civilian administrative authorities to the centre of Mali.” (5) The latest mandate of EUCAPI Sahel Mali, in force since February 1st, 2023, authorises the deployment the mission until the end of January 2025 (6). Additional tasks of the mandate are to facilitate the deployment of internal security forces in the south of Mali and to support the strategic communication of the EU, in line with the recommendations of the 2022 Holistic Strategic Review (7). The set length of the mandate does not define per se an exit strategy and there is at the moment no defined transition plan to terminate the mission (8).

References:
EUTM:
3. EUTM is currently involved in the redaction of the second LOPM, which covers the 2020-2024 period.


Council of the EU. (2022a). *Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM Mali and EUCAP SAHEL Mali 2022*

EUCAP Sahel Mali:


Council of the EU. (2022a). *Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM Mali and EUCAP SAHEL Mali 2022*

**Metric 2: Mission/operation reviews and exit strategies**

In 2022, the EEAS issued a Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM Mali and EUCAP SAHEL Mali. It is emphasised the Review "has been developed by the EEAS in consultation with relevant EU Commission services, EUSR team, the Malian authorities, EU Member States, including through a food-for-thought paper and partners. It has been informed by an ISP-led fact-finding mission which took place in Mali in April 2022, as well as two ISP exploratory missions, one in Burkina Faso in December 2021 and one in Niger in February 2022. A discussion with several Malian and international civil society organisations was facilitated by EPLO on 29 March 2022." (1). Both deployments should focus towards a redeployment of the internal security forces in the South of Mali. The redeployment in the Center will remain "suspended" until the PSC "decides otherwise”. Activities with the National Guard will be limited to a minimum, to “better governance of the forces”. The objective of improving the capacities of the national police remains present to strengthen regional security, on key subjects: transnational organised crime, terrorism and illegal migration. As for the gendarmerie, the accent will be placed on the training of trainers and support for specialised training on investigative topics (criminology, criminal investigation). The transfer of responsibility for the aforementioned objectives constitute the mission's exit strategy (2)

Missions’ periodic reviews are regularly performed, but they are performed "by members of the hierarchy in Brussels [...]. I think if you really want to improve you have to look at more of an outsider critical look at what is being done” (3).

References:
2. Ibidem, p. 31
3. Interview 2

**Precondition 4: Continuous operational assessment**

**Metric: Effectiveness of the operational assessment**

One of the major problems of EUTM Mali relates to the mission’s lack of monitoring capacity of its training activities (1). The mission does not accompany the trainees into the field (this was previously done by Barkhane and Takuba), nor does it know where the trainees are deployed. There is also no database of training courses and participants and so the mission is extremely limited in its ability to assess the performance and behaviour of the trained armed forces, which is of particular concern amidst the increasing number of human rights violations committed by these forces (2).

Regarding both deployments, the assessment of their effectiveness cannot be separated from the capacity of the local authorities to implement activities. As one interviewee highlighted, "EUCAP and EUTM can be only as effective as local authorities can be, because at the end of the day these are training and advisory missions, they are not executive ones, they do not make decisions for the Malian state. Their effectiveness as such can be extremely effective in terms of outputs, but much less effective in terms of impact if the country that is being supported or its authorities do not basically consider for make full use of the expertise that is being put at their disposition by the EU.” (3).
Precondition 5: Personnel provision

Metric 1: Effective provision and management of personnel

The high rotation of personnel and the lack of specialised personnel, who is also fluent in French, is an issue in affecting the efficiency of the EU CSDP missions in Mali (1). The duration of the personnel's appointment (from four to six months) in EUTM is insufficient to perform the tasks of the missions, particularly for what concerns the advisory role of the mission (2). When it comes to the pre-deployment training, this is a national responsibility, as confirmed in the EU Policy on Training for CSDP of April 2017 (3). Nonetheless, the Holistic Strategic Review underlines that it is necessary to further develop the understanding of the environment to maximise the impact of CSDP missions (4), suggesting the need to better prepare the personnel. During the set-up of the mission, deficiencies in pre-deployment training for EUCAP Sahel Mali led to delays (5).

References:
1. Interviews 2, 22, 23
2. Council of the EU. (2022a); Interview 2;

Precondition 6: Effective and transparent management of funds

Metric: Transparency and management of funds

EUTM:
While the EUTM Mali is the smallest mission operating in Mali in terms of budget (1), it represents the largest budget of all military CSDP operations, having mobilised EUR 46.4 million in 2021 and EUR 58.6 million in 2022 (2). However, these figures only represent the common costs of the mission, which have increased over time. The budget allocated for the mission is severely criticised by some analysts, for whom the instability prevents real progress on the ground since half the costs would be spent on protecting the trainers (4). As one of the interviewees underlined: "EUCAP and EUTM can be only as effective as local authorities can be, because at the end of the day these are training and advisory missions, they are not executive ones, they do not make decisions for the Malian state. Their effectiveness as such can be extremely effective in terms of outputs, but much less effective in terms of impact if the country that is being supported or its authorities do not basically consider for make full use of the expertise that is being put at their disposition by the EU." (5)
EUCAP Sahel Mali:

According to a European Court of Auditors’ report, the repartition of the executed total budget of the mission is mostly concentrated to the coverage of personnel costs (53%) and running expenditures (24%), while only the 4% of budget is dedicated to projects (1).

A major problem affecting both the efficiency and the sustainability of the mission is the lack of a verification and follow-up mechanism of the personnel trained by the mission. This led to the presence of EU-trained personnel under the military command of Russian-affiliated forces (2). As one of the interviewee underlined: "EUCAP and EUTM can be only as effective as local authorities can be, because at the end of the day these are training and advisory missions, they are not executive ones, they do not make decisions for the Malian state. Their effectiveness as such can be extremely effective in terms of outputs, but much less effective in terms of impact if the country that is being supported or its authorities do not basically consider for make full use of the expertise that is being put at their disposition by the EU" (3).

References:

EUTM:
5. Interview 5

EUCAP Sahel Mali:
1. European Court of Auditors. (2018). Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali: only limited and slow progress, p. 16
3. Interview 5

Precondition 7: Definition of common goals, timeline and efforts in cooperation with third actors

Metric: Joint definition of common goals and timeline with the third actors

There seems to be no common definition of goals and timelines for actions with third actors, but there has been a coordination of activities among the different international actors present on the ground. For further information, please refer to the coherence section.
Precondition 8: Exploitation of partners contribution

**Metric:** Exploitation of partners contribution

Georgia, Moldova and Montenegro participate in EUTM Mali (1); Canada Norway and Switzerland provide civilian experts in EUCAP Sahel Mali. Nonetheless, in both cases, third-countries’ contribution to the mission highlights the political importance of their contribution, more than their engagement in the country (2).

**References:**

Precondition 9: Degree of the added value of cooperation and transparency

**Metric:** Added value and transparency of cooperation

One problem of EUTM is the lack of an EU verification mechanism of the results of the training activities performed by EUTM. Reports on the results are redacted by the Malian armed forces (1).

The same verification problem is present in EUCAP Sahel Mali. In addition to training and reform, the mission can provide for the necessary equipment for schools and training centres for security forces. “So, we [EUCAP Sahel Mali] do the refurbishment, the rebuilding and then we buy desks, chairs, laptops and whatever they need. And then you go there one year after and nothing is there, no one works there, and everything disappeared and the building [is not] used anymore. I would never say that we a money problem, we do not. We have a problem in investing correctly this money and get some feedback on how it is spent” (2).

**References:**
2. Interview 6
## Criterion 1: Presence and use of common warehouses

**Metric:** Use of warehouses in joint deployment

No permanent warehouse is foreseen for the EUPM mission. In EUCAP Sahel Mali, instead, to enhance a smoother procurement of equipment, the Commission allowed to apply flexible procurement procedures (i.e. negotiated procedures without prior publication) given the difficult environment in which it operates (1). Since the creation of a CSDP Warehouse II in 2018 and until 2020 Mali was the country to which the warehouse has sent the most shipments (2).

### References:
1. European Court of Auditors. (2018). *Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali: only limited and slow progress*, p. 21

## Criterion 2: Straightforward and comprehensive provision of equipment to third countries

**Metric:** Provision of equipment to the third countries

**EUTM:**

The provision of adequate personnel and equipment proved problematic in EUTM Mali. On the provision of necessary equipment, there is a lack of power of the EU to provide equipment as part of military training missions. This resulted in the provision of equipment by the Malian state, while soldiers were being trained with equipment that they would not use in operations (1). Additionally, training facilities are scarce and in poor conditions, thus limiting the efficiency of the EU deployment in the country (2).

Mali was also the recipient of an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility (EPF). According to the Council resolution from December 2021, the measure for Mali should not exceed EUR 24 million over a period of 30 months (3). The measure was meant to help strengthen the capacities of the Malian armed forces by supporting the Non-Commissioned Officers Academy in Banankoro, renovating the training infrastructure in Sévaré-Mopti and providing non-lethal military equipment for three companies of the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd military region of Mali. As part of the assistance measures in the form of general programmes for support to the African Union (which were worth EUR 130 million in 2021 and are worth EUR 600 million for 2022-2024), EPF has also provided EUR 35 million for the G5 Sahel Joint Force (from which Mali decided to opt out in spring 2022), previously funded by the African Peace Facility. These assistance measures (with the exception of the support for Banankoro and the delivery of individual protective gears), as well as the EU’s operational training activities within EUTM Mali, have been suspended since March 2022, due to the local security situation (4).

**EUCAP Sahel Mali:**
With regard to EUCAP Sahel Mali, a major problem affecting the provision of equipment is related to the lack of a verification mechanism for the use of the equipment provided. For further information please refer to the assessment of the transparency of cooperation.

References:

Criterion 3: Efficient management of personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric: Efficient management of personnel</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUTM:</strong> The reality of the EUTM is complex: the plethora of actors, the short rotation of personnel, the language barrier and the constant insufficient understanding of the local context and interests are all major limitations to the ambition and objectives of EUTM (1). The duration of the personnel’s appointment (from four to six months) is evaluated to be insufficient to perform the tasks of the missions, particularly for what concerns the advisory role of the mission (2). “[A]nd in the African context, this is problematic because to establish a relationship with your counterparts, there is a minimum of confidence and of knowing each other that is required. And right now, when things start improving, they leave. Moreover, I would say that at least one in two of commanders do not speak French, which means they cannot really develop a close relationship with their counterparts. [...] This is very interesting and funny because I have seen that other missions [...] are frequently presented with the same issues in management and with the language which is very important. So it is interesting to see that we have similar issues in the EUTM” (3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUCAP Sahel Mali:</strong> The maximum length of the secondment of personnel is up to two years, which does not allow to plan mid-term activities, nor to acquire full knowledge of procedures and working conditions (1).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
EUTM:
2. Council of the EU. (2022). Holistic Strategic Review of EUTM Mali and EUCAP SAHEL Mali 2022 (Limited); Interview 2;
3. Interview 2
EUCAP Sahel Mali:
1. European Court of Auditors. (2018). Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali: only limited and slow progress, pp. 7–25

Criterion 4: Has the EU been able to achieve better results through cooperation with other actors present on the ground (i.e. NGOs, UN, NATO, coalitions)?

Metric: Scale of results in cooperation with third actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUCAP Sahel Mali:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. European Court of Auditors. (2018). Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali: only limited and slow progress, pp. 7–25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Criterion 5: Does the framework used for the participation of third countries and actors in the mission/operation allow for the reduction of bargaining costs?

Metric: Bargaining costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUTM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia, Moldova and Montenegro are non-EU contributors to the mission (1) and their contribution is based on the respective FPAs signed with the EU (2). Georgia contributes with one liaison officer since January 2016 (3) and Moldova with two military personnel since October 2018 (4). The three countries are exempted from the financial contribution to the budget of EUTM Mali (5).</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>EUCAP Sahel Mali:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada, Norway and Switzerland provide contributions to the EUCAP Sahel Mali. Switzerland signed a participation agreement in 2015 (1); Canadian (2) and Norwegian (3) contributions are based on FPAs signed in 2005.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:

**EUTM:**
Coherence

**Criterion 1: Coherence between strategy/actions for the country with the wider strategic goals/values of the EU**

**Metric: Policy alignment and goal achievement input**

| The 2011 Sahel security and development strategy (1) was the first comprehensive approach aimed at ensuring various external policy programmes and instruments converge towards common objectives. It outlined action in the key areas of (i) development, good governance and international conflict resolution; (ii) politics and diplomacy; (iii) security and rule of law; and (iv) the fight against extremist violence and radicalisation. The creation of the G5 Sahel partnership in February 2014 led to the expansion of the geographical scope of the strategy to include Burkina Faso and Chad in March 2014, covering all the G5 Sahel countries (Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania) (2). In April 2021, a new EU Sahel strategy (3) was adopted by the Council to strengthen mutual commitment and accountability with a focus on governance and human rights with partner countries from the Sahel region. Both short-term security responses and long-term approaches that promote sustainable economic, social and environmental development are now taken into account and respond to the priorities of the Sahel Coalition created in 2020 (4). |
Moreover, the EU is supporting a regionalisation approach in the Sahel since 2017 for its CSDP missions, through a Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC) based in Mauritania, which supports regional and cross-border cooperation in the Sahel and strengthens the national capacities of the G5 Sahel countries (5).
Both EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali are in line with the EU policy goals included in the aforementioned documents and the different activities performed in the country are coordinated by the EUSR in the Sahel, who has the responsibility of ensuring the alignment of activities to the EU regional integrated approach (6).

**References:**

**Criterion 2: Coherence of action during deployment**

**Metric: Coordination of concurrent EU missions/operations**

The EUTM Mali works in parallel to the EUCAP Sahel Mali mission. Additionally and since 2013, the EU has a Special Representative for the Sahel, "to foster political dialogue, coherence and coordination," between the EU, Sahel States and other international stakeholders, "including through regularly convening special envoy meetings." (1) Since July 2021, Ms Emanuela Claudia Del Re has held this position and oversees the coordination of "the EU's comprehensive approach to the regional crisis, on the basis of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel." (2).

Moreover, the EU is supporting a regionalisation approach in the Sahel since 2017 for its CSDP missions, through a Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell (RACC) based in Mauritania, which supports regional and cross-border cooperation in the Sahel and strengthens the national capacities of the G5 Sahel countries(3).

Coordination and cooperation between EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali was strengthened through pre-deployment training for the National Guard and optimisation of logistical and security support of EUTM decentralised missions. However, the training activities performed by EUTM are currently temporarily and reversibly suspended (4). EUCAP Sahel Mali also cooperated and coordinates with EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUBAM Libya on cross-border issues and exchange of best practices (5). The 2022 holistic strategic review recognises the need to better coordinate and complement EU actions.
There is also a coordination between the two missions and the EU Delegation in loco which should happen once every month, but in practice it occurs twice a month. However, the political responsibility lines are different and so, there is a lack of structural measures, structures, to insure this coherence and some actors did not care at all about coherence because there are various levels of coherence, there is coherence of Member States and the coherence of the EU and institutions. And it is one of our weaknesses and it is truly clear that we could do much better (6).

References:
5. Ibidem, pp. 34–35
6. Interview 2

Criterion 3: Coherence among simultaneous missions or operations belonging to different actors

Metric: Coherence between CSDP missions/operations and missions/activities of third actors

To better facilitate the exchange of information, coherence and coordination among the different actors involved, the Military Coordination Instance in Mali (ICMM) was created in 2018. It consisted of quarterly meetings of Barkhane, MINUSMA, EUTM, EUCAP and the FAMa officials to strengthen cooperation on security, information exchange and support between the main actors in peace and security for the benefit of the Malian people (1).

On a practical level, MINUSMA, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and EUTM Mali have provided joint assistance to the national specialised judicial unit in charge of the fight against terrorism and transnational crime (2). MINUSMA also trains the FAMA, police and gendarmerie on human rights, in collaboration with EUTM Mali and the UN Police. Further, MINUSMA and EUTM Mali have adopted standard operational procedures for the disposal of improvised explosive devices (3).

Nonetheless, despite the examples, the 2022 holistic strategic review recognises the need to better coordinate and cooperate with international actors on the ground (4).

References:


**Criterion 4: Coherence between the mission/operation mandate and the policy goals/priorities of the EU**

**Metric: Coherence of mission/operation with EU policy goals/priorities**

Please refer to Criterion 1

**Criterion 5: Coherence among national procedures for starting a deployment**

**Metric: Procedural similarities for operational deployment**

When EUTM Mali was launched, many Member States, including Germany, made the safety of their trainers a priority. They only agreed to contribute to the mission on the condition that the training would take place in safe areas, i.e. in Bamako and the south of Mali, excluding the centre and the north, which are exposed to the threat of terrorism. This lack of willingness to take risks could compromise the mission’s efficiency (1). The presence of national caveats from EU Member States is also present in EUCAP Sahel Mali and is recognised as a problem hampering the potential of the missions (2).

**References:**

**Criterion 6: Vertical coherence**

**Metric: Alignment of national goals and interests with the EU ones**

Member States have different understandings and assign different priority levels to the EU integrated strategy in the Sahel and the operational deployments in Mali. A strong vertical coherence is present in the case of France who directly engaged in the improvement of the security of the country and is improving in the case of Germany who proposed different frameworks for dialogue. However, the same commitment is not present in other countries (e.g. Poland and Finland) who would have preferred a different engagement in Mali (1).

**References:**
Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion 1: Political sustainability of the cooperative activities</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metric 1: Fulfilment of EU policy goals and priorities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As highlighted previously, the EU missions in Mali aim to contribute to the stability of the country and of the wider region, that is identified as an EU policy goal and priority in the 2021 EU Strategy for the Sahel.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Metric 2: Political sustainability by decisionmakers and local entities involved</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU intervention in Mali followed the request of the President of the Republic of Mali who sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy requesting an EU deployment. The Malian authorities are involved in the review process of the mission and can advance specific requests. Among those there is the request to provide a &quot;train and equip package&quot; to complement the training activities of EUTM, but the EU did not have the right instruments to satisfy the request. This limitation is considered to have had a negative repercussion on the political buy-in of the mission (1). Nonetheless, a further example of the capacity of the EU to accommodate Malian requests is represented by the EUTM contribution to Mali’s disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, in coordination with the UN MINUSMA (2). The support the mission enjoys from the local authorities is volatile and at the moment there is the prospect of a potential reduced support to both EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali due to the connections with Russian and Russian-affiliated forces in the country and the EU consequential suspension of training and advisory activities. The Malian authorities failed to provide the necessary guarantees on the absence of Russian-affiliated forces in the country, preventing the re-establishment of a relationship based on mutual trust (3). &quot;In Mali the preconditions for trustful and mutual agreed partnerships between Mali and the EU are currently under a huge pressure&quot; (4). Even before the recent developments, trust between EU and Malian authorities was already low, as &quot;the latter perceive that they are deprived of agency in rebuilding their own security sector because international partners, by their own admission, want to restructure the Malian army in their own image and according to their own model&quot; (5).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:
4. Interview 5
**Metric 3: political sustainability by the local community**

The 2022 holistic strategic review recognised the little knowledge the local population have on the EU deployments in the country, which might bring the population to confuse between the French intervention and the EU missions (1). Moreover, representatives of the government also stated that foreign intervention focuses more on the effects than on the root causes of instability in the country, suggesting a negative perception of the foreign missions in the country (2).

**References:**

**Criterion 2: Implementation of burden-sharing and provision of equipment and personnel**

**Metric: Coverage of costs, provision of equipment and personnel**

The budget allocated for the missions is severely criticised by some analysts, for who the instability prevents real progress (1). According to a European Court of Auditors’ report, the EUCAP Sahel Mali repartition of the executed total budget of the mission is mostly concentrated to the coverage of personnel costs (53%) and running expenditures (24%) (2).

Finally, there is a Manning shortfall affecting both deployments and the personnel sent from Member States do not always have the necessary linguistic skills (3).

**References:**
2. European Court of Auditors. (2018). Strengthening the capacity of the internal security forces in Niger and Mali: only limited and slow progress.

**Criterion 3: Environmental footprint**

**Metric 1: Environmental sustainability**

**EUTM:**

It has been widely agreed upon that environmental degradation and climate change are risks and threats multipliers in the Sahel region. Nevertheless, while some actions are undertaken to reduce the EUTM Mali’s environmental impact, it is not a core issue for its deployment and little information are to be found in open sources. It has not been recorded that any specific training targets environmental questions and issues at stake in the region. This could be an area of improvement for the EU missions involved in the Sahel, especially when environmental factors such as drought, famine and poverty are key drivers of the conflict.

EUTM Mali is reportedly “aware of this subject” (1) as its actions fit in the EU Concept for Environmental Protection and Energy Optimisation for EU-led Military Operations and Missions (2).
EUCAP Sahel Mali:
EUCAP Sahel Mali has been selected as a pilot case for the refinement of Operational Guidelines for civilian CSDP, which constitutes a first framework for the Environmental Management System and environmental footprint reporting of CSDP missions. Guidelines will constitute a first framework for the Environmental Management System and environmental footprint reporting of CSDP missions, on both mission’s internal and external activities related to environmental footprint (1). As such, the mission has an environmental advisor (2).

References:
EUTM:

EUCAP Sahel Mali:

Metric 2: Limitation of environmental impact
As any other EU-led military CSDP mission, EUTM Mali should satisfy the requirements and guidelines delineated in the “EU Concept for Environmental Protection and Energy Optimisation for EU-led Military Operations and Missions” of 2012, as modified in 2021 (1). The limitation of environmental impact in EUCAP Sahel should derive from the results of the pilot case on operational guidelines referred to in the previous metric.

References:

Criterion 4: Gender sustainability

Metric 1: Gender sustainability in deployment

EUTM:
Gender is not the main focus of the mission. Moreover, there is the need to better identify ways to bring the EU values in the host country, but this is something that costs a lot of effort to discuss with military leaders or political leaders in these countries which are affected by war or by huge terrorist threats (1). As a consequence, little time is allocated for issues related to the WPS agenda, which is integrated into EUTM Mali’s activities only in training activities (2).
EUCAP Sahel Mali:
Promoting and transferring norms—gender equality norm via Security Sector Reform (SSR) are part of the mandate of the mission. References to the planning and reporting of the mission to gender equality improved over time as the 2020 mission’s strategic review contained more references to activities performed in this field than in 2018 (1).

In both missions, the personnel responsible for the implementation of Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law and gender should be better supported (2).

References:
EUTM:
1. Interviews 20, 21

EUCAP Sahel Mali:

Metric 2: Gender representation in deployment

EUTM:
The representation of female personnel is low within EUTM, where in December 2020 women represented 4% of the personnel (1). However, the low percentage of female personnel deployed can be considered a Member States’ inability to provide a balanced pool of candidates for secondment (2). The mission has a double-hatted human rights and gender adviser (3). No differences in treatment is reported (4).

EUCAP Sahel Mali:
On gender representation in EUCAP Sahel, only 16% of the personnel were women in 2021 (23 women) (1). Nonetheless, improvement in the attention given to gender is reflected in the creation of a single-hatted position that until 2021 was double-hatted and responsible for both gender and human rights (2).
### References:

**EUTM:**
2. Interviews 5, 6, 22, 23
3. EUTM Mali (2023a, January 11). *Promotion of gender within the Malian armed forces with EUTM Mali assistance* [Press Release].

**EUCAP Sahel Mali:**

### Metric 3: Gendered impact of deployment

Gender is integrated into EUTM Mali’s training activities (1) and on the promotion of gender equality within the Malian armed forces through the institutionalisation of the gender concept at the level of the Ministry of Defence of Veterans Affairs/Malian Armed Forces. Furthermore, working groups on the promotion of gender equality within FAMA have been organised with the support of EUTM (2).

**References:**
2. EUTM Mali (2023a, January 11). *Promotion of gender within the Malian armed forces with EUTM Mali assistance* [Press Release].
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The European Commission’s support does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which only reflect the views of the author. The Commission is not responsible for any use of the information contained therein.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 962533.