Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities

Marcella Alsan
Harvard Kennedy School
NBER

Crystal Yang
Harvard Law School
NBER

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Motivation

- Given recent spike in migrants fleeing to Europe and United States, many countries have intensified immigration enforcement.
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  - Majorities in developed countries now support deporting unauthorized immigrants (Gonzalez-Barrera and Connor 2019)
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  ▶ Majorities in developed countries now support deporting unauthorized immigrants (Gonzalez-Barrera and Connor 2019)
▶ Large-scale deportation generates fear and insecurity not just among immigrants but also co-ethnic citizens (Lopez et al. 2018)
▶ If fear of deportation is not limited to non-citizens, can immigration enforcement impede other government objectives?
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- In this study, we explore the connection between social and immigration policy by asking whether non-citizen expulsions influence co-ethnic citizen take-up of MTSI programs
This Paper

- Examine whether immigration enforcement affects participation in SNAP and SSI among Hispanic citizens

\[
\text{ITE} = \frac{E(Y_1 - Y_0 | T = 1, E = 0)}
\]

- Not measuring direct effects, or difference in potential outcomes among those eligible for enforcement (i.e. non-citizens, for whom \(E = 1\))

- Watson (2014); Vargas and Pirog (2016); Cascio and Lewis (2019)

- To estimate ITE, leverage relatively new federal enforcement program known as Secure Communities (SC)
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Anecdotal Evidence of ITE
Hispanics Forgo Health Services to Avoid Officials’ Attention - Washington Post

“We’re afraid of maybe getting sick or getting into an accident, but the fear of my husband being deported is bigger”
Anecdotal Evidence of ITE

Fear of Deportation Drives People Off Food Stamps in US - Associated Press

“They just make do on menial amounts of food. They’re okay with rice and beans”
Other Evidence Consistent With ITE

- UCLA Luskin Survey of Quality of Life (2017)

- Handful of studies in public health literature that links status or specific raids to worse health, including for infants of U.S.-born Hispanic women (Korinek and Smith 2011; Novak et al. 2017)
Other Evidence Consistent With ITE

► UCLA Luskin Survey of Quality of Life (2017)
  ▶ 37% of surveyed LA residents worried that they, a family member, or a friend would be deported
  ▶ Among those who endorsed such a concern, 80% said that they, a friend, or family member would be at greater risk by enrolling in a government health, education, or housing program
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Immigration Raids and Prenatal Health

Novak et al. 2017, IJE

Figure 1. Descriptive graph: rates of low birthweight (LBW) in the 37 weeks following the Postville raid compared with the same time period 1 and 2 years earlier.
The Mental Health of Hispanic/Latino Americans Following National Immigration Policy Changes: United States, 2014–2018

Emilie Bruzelius MPH, and Aaron Baum PhD

[.] Author affiliations, information, and correspondence details

Emilie Bruzelius is with the Department of Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York, NY. Aaron Baum is with the Department of Health System Design and Global Health, Icahn School of Medicine, Mount Sinai, New York, NY.
Correspondence should be sent to Aaron Baum, PhD, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, 1216 5th Ave, New York, NY 10029 (e-mail: aaron.baum@mssm.edu). Reprints can be ordered at http://www.ajph.org by clicking the “Reprints” link.
We exploit SC rollout across counties and differential impact on Hispanics in a DiDiD framework
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Suggestive evidence that findings are driven by fear
Outline

1. Background on Secure Communities
2. Background on Safety Net Programs
3. Data
4. Estimation Strategy + Results
5. Mechanisms
6. Conceptual Framework
Outline

1 Background on Secure Communities
2 Background on Safety Net Programs
3 Data
4 Estimation Strategy + Results
5 Mechanisms
6 Conceptual Framework
Prior to Secure Communities

- Typically, when person arrested and booked by state or local law enforcement, fingerprints sent to FBI
  - FBI conducts criminal background check, which is forwarded to state or local authorities
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- Prior to SC, non-citizens in violation of immigration laws identified by inmate interviews in local jails or prisons (CAP, 287(g) agreements)
  - Interviews were labor intensive, federal and local officials authorized to conduct interviews screened < 15% of local jails and prisons
Secure Communities

- Pilot started under President George W. Bush in Oct 2008, expanded under President Obama

- Fingerprints for arrested sent directly to FBI and DHS

- ICE compared fingerprints against Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) database that stores biometric and biographical information on:
  - Suspected terrorists, criminals, immigration violators, and all non-citizen travelers when they cross through airports, seaports, or borders, and when they apply for visas overseas
  - If ICE had “probable cause,” i.e. fingerprint matched an individual not supposed to be in the country due to overstay a visa or “entered without inspection” → issued detainer
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Secure Communities

- Stated objectives of SC were to:
  - identify immigrants in U.S. custody who committed serious crimes and deport them
  - prioritize enforcement actions to ensure removal of immigrants convicted of serious offenses
  - transform criminal immigration enforcement processes
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  - identify immigrants in U.S. custody who committed serious crimes and deport them
  - prioritize enforcement actions to ensure removal of immigrants convicted of serious offenses
  - transform criminal immigration enforcement processes
- SC increased the probability immigrant arrestees who would otherwise have been released were subject to detention and removal
Approx. 40 mil fingerprint submissions, 2 mil matches, and over 380,000 individuals forcibly removed from the interior. Removals under Obama admin’s SC comprised 20% of the approx. 2 mil removals during the time period, highest in recent U.S. history.
Secure Communities 2.0

- Stopped in Nov. 2014 by Obama ("deporter-in-chief"), replaced with PEP program
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- Stopped in Nov. 2014 by Obama ("deporter-in-chief"), replaced with PEP program
- Re-activated by Trump in 2017 (Executive Order No. 13768)
- Response by some communities to disregard detainer order (i.e. sanctuary cities)
Safety Net Programs

- We focus on participation in SNAP and SSI - two of the fastest growing means-tested programs in the U.S.
  - SNAP participation increased from 20 to 40 million participants between 1990 and 2010 (CBO 2012). Reached $78 billion in spending in 2011, exceeding both EITC ($64 billion) and TANF ($29 billion)
  - SSI grew from 4.6 million beneficiaries in 1989 to 8.4 million in 2013 (Daly and Burkhauser 2003; Duggan et al. 2015). Benefits tripled over the same time period, from $14.6 billion to $44.4 billion
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- Both SNAP and SSI have fairly uniform eligibility requirements across states.
SNAP Eligibility

- SNAP, previously known as the Food Stamp Program, is the largest near cash means-tested transfer program in the United States.
- In general, households must have an annual income $\leq 130\%$ of FPL and $\leq $2,250 in assets.
- Unauthorized immigrants are ineligible to receive benefits.
  - However, if a household has at least one eligible person, then the household can apply for benefits for the eligible person(s).
- The process typically involves filling out online or paper application followed by an interview.
SSI Eligibility

- SSI is the largest cash welfare program in the United States
  - For nearly 60% of recipients, SSI is only source of income
- SSI provides benefits to blind or disabled children, blind or disabled working-age adults, and individuals 65 or older with no requirement of disability
  - In general, countable income must not exceed FBR and individual assets must not exceed $2,000 (or $3,000 for a couple)
- As with SNAP, unauthorized immigrants are ineligible for SSI

SSI Application
Outline

1. Background on Secure Communities
2. Background on Safety Net Programs
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4. Estimation Strategy + Results
5. Mechanisms
6. Conceptual Framework
Data from ICE and DHS

- Obtained through numerous FOIA requests
- Information on exact timing of SC roll-out in each county
- Micro-level data on universe of detainers and removals (date issued, crime level, country of origin, county detainer was issued, and demographics), county-level data on fingerprint submissions and matches
  - Approx. 2 million detainers issued between 2002-2015
  - Annual detainers ranges from 881 to 306,095
  - Mean age 32.2, 95% male, 93% Hispanic
Data from SNAP/SSI

Use two data sources to measure program take-up

- Restricted PSID (2005-2015) with county identifiers
  - Approximately 9,000 households (25,000 individuals) each wave
  - Demographics (age, race/ethnicity, # kids, poverty, employment)

- Publicly available data ACS (2006-2016) at PUMA level
  - Includes demographics (age, race/ethnicity, gender) and household-level data on poverty, # kids, employment

- Focus on fragile "connected" household heads (< HS degree, citizens/U.S. born)
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- For both ACS and PSID, focus on fragile “connected” household heads (< HS degree, citizens/U.S. born)
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Estimation Strategy: DiDiD

\[ Y_{rcst} = \alpha + \beta_1 I_{ct}^{post} + \beta_2 (I_r^H \cdot I_{ct}^{post}) + \beta_3 (I_r^B \cdot I_{ct}^{post}) + \Omega' X_{rcst} + \mu_c \cdot I_t^{memo} + \delta_{st} + \theta_{rs} + \kappa_{rt} + \Gamma'_1 X_{cst} + \Gamma'_2 (X_{cst} \cdot I_r^B) + \Gamma'_3 (X_{cst} \cdot I_r^H) + \epsilon_{rcst} \]

\( Y_{rcst} = \) share of households that take up food stamps/SSI

\( I_{ct}^{post} = \) indicator for post-SC activation (2008-2013)

\( I_r^H \) and \( I_r^B = \) Hispanic and black race indicators

\( \mu_c \cdot I_t^{memo} = \) county-memo FE, \( \delta_{st} = \) state-year FE, \( \theta_{rs} = \) race-state FE, \( \kappa_{rt} = \) race-year FE

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- \( X_{rcst} \) and \( X_{cst} \) include demographic and county-level controls such as poverty, children, share citizen, employment and crime rates.

- \( \beta_2 \) is coefficient of interest
Identifying Assumption for DiDiD Approach

- Rollout of SC arguably not unconditionally random, correlated with border counties and percent Hispanic (Cox and Miles 2013)

- To address nonrandom timing, we compare across groups within counties that activated at the same time

- In addition, we:
  - Drop border counties
  - Drop MA, NY, and IL who tried to opt-out of SC
  - Use different sets of fixed effects
  - Predict activation dates using ICE criteria
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### DiDiD Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>F-Statistic (1)</th>
<th>p-value (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log Poverty</td>
<td>2.141</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Children</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>0.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Employed</td>
<td>1.104</td>
<td>0.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Citizen</td>
<td>2.980</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Food Stamp</td>
<td>1.715</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share SSI</td>
<td>2.415</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ Log Poverty</td>
<td>0.668</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ # Children</td>
<td>2.477</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∆ Share Employed</td>
<td>1.599</td>
<td>0.172</td>
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<tr>
<td>∆ Share Citizen</td>
<td>2.326</td>
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<tr>
<td>∆ Share Food Stamp</td>
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<td>1.508</td>
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Note: Pre-SC regression of Hispanic-White difference on year-of-activation fixed effects.
Food Stamps - Event Studies

Hispanic Coefficients

Years to Activation

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Food Stamps - Event Studies

Coefficients by Race

Years to Activation

Hispanic

White
Food Stamps - Event Studies

Coefficients by Race

Years to Activation

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4

Hispanic
White
Black
SSI - Event Studies
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Coefficients by Race

Years to Activation

Hispanic
White
SSI - Event Studies

Coefficients by Race

Years to Activation

Hispanic
White
Black
Food Stamps - Hispanics Relative to All Non-Hispanics

Hispanics

Non-Hispanics

SSI - Hisp vs. Non-Hisp
**Main Results**

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<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post</td>
<td>$-0.021^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$(0.008)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$(0.004)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black × Post</td>
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Pre-Period Hisp. Mean 0.218

Fixed Effects: State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton

Baseline Controls Yes

Observations 80,977

Number Clusters 2,759
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<tr>
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<td>(0.008)</td>
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<td>Post</td>
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<td>Baseline Controls</td>
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<tr>
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</table>
Robustness Checks

- Results are robust to:
  1. County-year fixed effects
  2. Counties that activated 2009-2012
  3. Using predicted year
  4. Accounting for pre-SC activation trends in take-up
  5. Sample including HS grads
  6. Dropping cities with largest Hispanic populations
  7. Spatial lag in enforcement
  8. Female head only
## Food Stamps - Robustness

<table>
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<td>−0.020**</td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.005</td>
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<td>−0.007*</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
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<td>56,312</td>
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</table>
Permutation Test – SNAP

$\beta = -0.021$

p-value = .012

Hisp*Post Coefficient on Food Stamp Take-Up

$\beta = -0.021$

p-value = .012
Permutation Test – SSI

$\beta = -0.016$

$p$-value = .042

Hisp*Post Coefficient on SSI Take-Up

Density

-0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.03

Hisp*Post Coefficient on SSI Take-Up
Outline

1 Background on Secure Communities
2 Background on Safety Net Programs
3 Data
4 Estimation Strategy + Results
5 Mechanisms
6 Conceptual Framework
Mechanisms

- Information
- Compositional Changes
- Measurement Error
- Fear
- Estimate results for prior users following Aizer and Currie (2004)
- Evidence not consistent with information (and unlikely to be stigma)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome Sample</th>
<th>Share Food Stamp</th>
<th>Share SSI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All (1)</td>
<td>Prior User (2)</td>
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<td>Post</td>
<td>0.060 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.096)</td>
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Pre-Period Hispanic Mean: 0.341, 0.728, 0.040, 0.493
Fixed Effects: State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton
Baseline Controls: Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes
Observations: 19,596, 10,643, 18,051, 3,156
Number Clusters: 628, 369, 610, 178
Compositional/Employment Responses

- No evidence of changes in composition, employment, or migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th># Child (1)</th>
<th>Log Pov (2)</th>
<th>% Emp (3)</th>
<th>% Moved (4)</th>
<th>HH Weight (5)</th>
<th>% Mixed (6)</th>
<th>% Citizen (7)</th>
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<td>0.003</td>
<td>−0.870</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(2.896)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>−0.017*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>−0.001</td>
<td>−2.206</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.003*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baseline Controls</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>80,977</td>
<td>80,977</td>
<td>80,977</td>
<td>80,977</td>
<td>80,977</td>
<td>25,342</td>
<td>25,342</td>
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</table>

Baseline Controls:
- State-Yr
- State-Race
- Race-Yr
- County-Morton
Measurement Error

- Enforcement might change response to citizenship
  - No evidence of compositional changes in percent citizen

- Enforcement might change percent Hispanic
  - Results robust to controlling for percent Hispanic

- Enforcement might reduce willingness to report taking up SNAP
  - No change in the gap between administrative and survey based measures of SNAP take-up following SC activation
Fear - Correlation Between Fear and Detention

![Graph showing correlation between fear and detention]

- Share Fearful Friend/Fam Deported
- Share Know Detained

States: AZ, CA, FL, TX

Correlation coefficients:
- 0.2
- 0.4
- 0.6
To measure awareness/deportation fear, we use data from internet search patterns at DMA level.

Use commonly searched terms related to the Deportation topic:
- deportation, abogados de inmigracion, deportacion, immigration, inmigracion, immigration lawyer, indocumentado, undocumented

Normalize by search terms that are popular in the Hispanic community, such as deportes (sports) and telenovelas (soap operas) to account for differential access to internet.
Fear - Google Deportation Searches
Fear

We hypothesize that if fear driving results, effects should be **stronger** among:

- Locations where there are more low-level nonviolent detainers issued relative to violent detainers
- Locations where deportation fear has increased more
- and weaker in sanctuary cities
- and weaker in areas with more Puerto Ricans and Cubans who have zero to minimal risk of deportation
Fear

- We hypothesize that if fear driving results, effects should be stronger among:
  - Locations where there are more low-level nonviolent detainers issued relative to violent detainers.
Fear

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and weaker in sanctuary cities
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- Locations where deportation fear has increased more

and weaker in sanctuary cities

and weaker in areas with more Puerto Ricans and Cubans who have zero to minimal risk of deportation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post</td>
<td>0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × Petty vs. Severe</td>
<td>-0.057**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × % PR/Cuban</td>
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Fixed Effects: State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton
Baseline Controls: Yes
Observations: 65,903
## Fear

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<td>Hispanic × Post × Petty vs. Severe</td>
<td>−0.057**</td>
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<td>(0.025)</td>
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<td>Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear</td>
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<td>Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City</td>
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**Fixed Effects**: State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton  
**Baseline Controls**: Yes  
**Observations**: 65,903 76,800
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic ( \times ) Post ( \times ) Petty vs. Severe</td>
<td>(3) (-0.025^{**\ast\ast\ast}) (0.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic ( \times ) Post ( \times ) Δ Pew Fear</td>
<td>(2) (-0.057^{**}) (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic ( \times ) Post ( \times ) Δ Pew Fear</td>
<td>(3) (-0.213^{**\ast\ast\ast}) (0.050)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hispanic ( \times ) Post ( \times ) Sanctuary City</td>
<td>(2) 0.036^{**} (0.010)</td>
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**Fixed Effects:** State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton

**Baseline Controls:** Yes Yes Yes

**Observations:** 65,903 76,800 86,407
### Fear

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<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
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<td>Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear</td>
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<td>−0.213***</td>
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<td>Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>65,903</td>
<td>76,800</td>
<td>86,407</td>
<td>77,465</td>
</tr>
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</table>

SSI Mechanism 57 / 78
Fear - “Intensity” of Treatment

Coefficient
Primary Spec
Share Mixed
Share Non-Citizens
Exposure Index
SNAP
SSI

58 / 78
Fear - Sanctuary Cities Event Studies

Panel A: Hispanic

Sanctuary Cities

Non-Sanctuary Cities
Panel B: Black

Sanctuary Cities

Non-Sanctuary Cities
Fear - Sanctuary Cities Event Studies

Panel C: White

Sanctuary Cities

Non-Sanctuary Cities

White Coefficient vs. Years to Activation
Outline

1. Background on Secure Communities
2. Background on Safety Net Programs
3. Data
4. Estimation Strategy + Results
5. Mechanisms
6. Conceptual Framework
Stylized Model of Participation

- Extend Moffitt (1983) model to include spillover effects and deportation related costs of participation
- We incorporate $ITE$ by allowing the utility of the citizen household head (the participation decision-maker) to depend on others in network
  - Cost of fear modeled as the subjective probability of deportation ($\pi$)
  - Deportation is costly if citizen decision-maker is connected to non-citizens ($\lambda_n$)
Stylized Model of Participation

Household decision-maker problem:

\[
EU_{ijl} = \lambda_i \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} \mathbb{1}_{i \in C} \cdot (B_i)) + \lambda_c \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} B_{j,-i}) + \lambda_n \cdot (Y_j - \pi_{jl}(p_{ijl}))
\]

- for head \( i \) of household \( j \) in location \( l \), with \( C \) citizens and \( N \) non-citizens and \( T \) total members, with welfare weights \( \lambda_i, \lambda_c, \lambda_n \)
- Participation \( p_{ij} \) gives benefit \( B_j \) to citizens but increases deportation cost \( \pi_{jl} \) to non-citizens

\[
\Delta \pi_{jl} = \beta \cdot D_l + \varepsilon_{jl}, \text{ where } D_l \text{ is enforcement in location } l \\
\varepsilon \sim F()
\]
Stylized Model of Participation

Household decision-maker problem:

\[ EU_{ijl} = \lambda_i \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} \mathbb{1}_{i \in C} \cdot (B_i)) + \lambda_c \cdot (Y_j + p_{ijl} B_{j,-i}) + \lambda_n \cdot (Y_j - \pi_{jl}(p_{ijl})) \]

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- Participation \( p_{ij} \) gives benefit \( B_j \) to citizens but increases deportation cost \( \pi_{jl} \) to non-citizens
- Subjective change in deportation risk: \( \Delta \pi_{jl} = \beta \cdot D_l + \varepsilon_{jl} \), where \( D_l \) is enforcement in location \( l \) and \( \varepsilon \sim F() \)
Share not participating in location $l$ is given by:

$$s_l = 1 - F(\bar{\gamma}_l - \beta \cdot D_l)$$

where $\bar{\gamma}_l = \frac{(\lambda_i + \lambda_c) \cdot (B_j)}{\lambda_n}$ averaged over location $l$

Non-participation decreasing in benefit ($B$), decreasing in welfare weight on self ($\lambda_i$), increasing in connection to non-citizens ($\lambda_n$), increasing in enforcement ($D$)
Share **not** participating in location \( l \) is given by:

\[
s_l = 1 - F(\bar{\gamma}_l - \beta \cdot D_l)
\]

where \( \bar{\gamma}_l = \frac{(\lambda_i + \lambda_c) \cdot (B_j)}{\lambda_n} \) averaged over location \( l \)

**Non**-participation decreasing in benefit \( (B) \), decreasing in welfare weight on self \( (\lambda_i) \), increasing in connection to non-citizens \( (\lambda_n) \), increasing in enforcement \( (D) \)

**In contrast**, \( s_l \) is increasing in \( \lambda_i \) when head is non-citizen:

\[
\bar{\gamma}_l = \frac{(\lambda_c) \cdot (B_j)}{\lambda_i + \lambda_n}
\]

averaged over location \( l \)
Conclusion

- We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that SC had a chilling spillover effect on participation in public welfare programs by Hispanic citizens
  - Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that as a result of SC, Hispanic households forgo over $212 million and $77 million in food stamp and SSI benefits per year

- Hispanic households likely experienced worse contemporaneous health outcomes, as well as intergenerational declines in health and economic self-sufficiency (Tiehen et al. 2012, Hoynes et al. 2016)

- Increased non-violent immigrant removals and proposed public charge rule may induce responses
Conclusion

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  - Back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that as a result of SC, Hispanic households forgo over $212 million and $77 million in food stamp and SSI benefits per year
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▶ Hispanic households likely experienced worse contemporaneous health outcomes, as well as intergenerational declines in health and economic self-sufficiency (Tiehen et al. 2012, Hoynes et al. 2016)
▶ Increased non-violent immigrant removals and proposed public charge rule may induce responses
### SNAP Application

#### SNAP Eligibility

**STATE OF CALIFORNIA - HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY**

**CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES**

**6a. HOUSEHOLD’S INFORMATION**

Complete the following information for all persons in the home that you buy and prepare food with, including you. If applying for noncitizens, please complete question 6b and 6c. If not, go to question 6d.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPLYING FOR BENEFITS</th>
<th>NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)</th>
<th>How is the person related to you?</th>
<th>DATE OF BIRTH</th>
<th>GENDER (M OR F)</th>
<th>U.S. CITIZEN NATIONAL (✓ check Yes or No) if no, complete question 6b below</th>
<th>SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>SELF</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Yes No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Yes No</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Please list the names of anyone who lives with you that does not buy and prepare food with you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME:</th>
<th>NAME:</th>
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</table>

**6b. NONCITIZEN INFORMATION** - Complete for those listed in question 6a above who are not citizens and are applying for aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Entry into U.S. (if known)</th>
<th>Give one of the following (if known): Passport Number, Alien Registration Number, etc.</th>
<th>Sponsored? (✓ check Yes or No) if yes, complete question 6c below</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>DOCUMENT TYPE: DOCUMENT NUMBER.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DOCUMENT TYPE: DOCUMENT NUMBER.</td>
<td>Yes No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does anyone listed above have at least 10 years (40 quarters) of work history or military service in the USA? If yes, who?

Does anyone listed above have, or have they applied for, or do they plan to apply for a T-Visa, U-Visa or VAWA status? If yes, who?

**6c. SPONSORED NONCITIZEN INFORMATION** - Complete for those listed in question 6b above who are sponsored noncitizens and are applying for aid.

Did the sponsor sign an I-864? [ ] Yes [ ] No If yes, please answer the rest of the question. If the sponsor signed an I-134 then skip this question.
24. (b) Name of placing agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Telephone Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(     )       -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Does this agency pay for your room and board?

- YES  Go to #38
- NO  If NO, who pays?  Go to #38

---

**HOUSEHOLD ARRANGEMENTS**

25. Check the block that describes your current residence, then Go to #26:

- House
- Apartment
- Room (private home)
- Room (commercial establishment)
- Mobile Home
- Houseboat
- Other (Specify)

26. Do you live alone or only with your spouse?

- YES  Go to #28
- NO  Go to #27

27. (a) Give the following information about everyone who lives with you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Public Assistance</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Birthdate mm/dd/yy</th>
<th>Blind or Disabled</th>
<th>If Under 22</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Social Security Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If anyone listed is under age 22 and not married, Go to (b); otherwise, Go to #28.
"First Stage" Effect of SC on Detainers

SC Activation

Coefficient on Log Detainers

Months to Activation

Coefficient on Log Detainers vs. Months to Activation
Predicted Rollout

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013
Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Event Studies

Hispanic Coefficient vs. Years to Activation

Non-Hispanic Coefficient vs. Years to Activation

Hispanics Relative to Non-Hisp
Panel A. Share Food Stamp
Non-Hispanic Blacks
Hispanics

Panel B. Share SSI
Non-Hispanic Blacks
Hispanics
### Panel B: Share SSI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No GR</th>
<th>County-Yr FE</th>
<th>Predicted Yr</th>
<th>Hisp/Nonhisp</th>
<th>Freyaldenhoven</th>
<th>&lt; College</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>−0.016***</td>
<td>−0.017**</td>
<td>−0.015**</td>
<td>−0.018***</td>
<td>−0.017**</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.006**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.008***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>80,977</td>
<td>79,946</td>
<td>80,977</td>
<td>56,312</td>
<td>71,660</td>
<td>89,671</td>
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</table>

*Food stamps robustness*
### Mechanism - SSI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Share SSI</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × Proportion Petty</td>
<td>−0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × Δ Pew Fear</td>
<td>−0.101***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × Sanctuary City</td>
<td>−0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post × % PR/Cuban</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Effects</td>
<td>State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>65,903</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01*
Measurement of Naturalized Log ACS Naturalizations

Measurement Error

Log ACS Naturalizations vs. Log DHS Naturalizations graph showing the relationship between the two datasets, highlighting states such as California, Florida, New York, Texas, and others.
### Additional Results I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Weights</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Hisp Share</th>
<th>Non-Citizens</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Hisp &gt; 25%</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post</td>
<td>−0.015 (0.011)</td>
<td>−0.027*** (0.010)</td>
<td>−0.023*** (0.008)</td>
<td>−0.021*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.012* (0.007)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel A: Share Food Stamp**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic × Post</td>
<td>−0.006 (0.006)</td>
<td>−0.016*** (0.006)</td>
<td>−0.017*** (0.006)</td>
<td>−0.016*** (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>0.007* (0.004)</td>
<td>0.006** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.007** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.006** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B: Share SSI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effects</th>
<th>State-Yr, State-Race, Race-Yr, County-Morton</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>61,997</td>
<td>80,327</td>
<td>80,977</td>
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*Measurement Error*
## Additional Results II

### Comparison of ACS Food Stamp Estimates to Administrative State Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Hispanics vs. Whites</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post</td>
<td>(1) -58060.667</td>
<td>(2) -11203.418</td>
<td>(3) -4676.916</td>
<td>(4) -14374.708</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70348.757)</td>
<td>(28268.512)</td>
<td>(8868.256)</td>
<td>(9897.761)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed Effects</td>
<td>State, Year</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>31</td>
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</table>

*Measurement Error*