INTRODUCTION

Policing has been reforming for at least the last 50 years. The leadership of innovative police executives and community members, the adoption of technology, use of data and analysis, and research on “what works” has made policing fairer and more effective today than any time in history.

But improvement must be continuous.

The civil unrest in the summer of 2020 in response to the killing of George Floyd reiterated that police departments must continue to rebuild trust and legitimacy amongst community members. Public opinion data shows that confidence in police was at its lowest in nearly three decades in 2020. While confidence levels have risen in 2021, Black adults in the U.S. have little confidence in the police (Jones, 2021).

The gun violence spikes seen in 2020 and again in 2021 in many cities show the crime reductions experienced over the last three decades are fragile (Major Cities Chiefs Association, 2021). Cities must have comprehensive strategies to create and maintain safe communities.

Police agencies also face staffing challenges. Some elected officials have cut police budgets, which almost entirely go to officer salaries and benefits so there are fewer officers on the street. Normal attrition has also coincided with early retirements and recruiting challenges. Nearly 78% of police agencies have reported difficulties recruiting qualified candidates (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2019), and resignations, particularly among officers with less than 5 years of service, have increased (Police Executive Research Forum, 2019). Speak to any police leader and you will instantly understand their concern over staffing levels.

Policing faces a turning point. The past 50 years of improvements can be built upon by doubling down on what is known to work, leaving behind what has been ineffective, and critically researching promising innovations. However, an intentional effort must be made to continue policing’s evolution or the last 50 years’ gains could be lost.

In this white paper, we lay out Precision Policing 2.0 – a framework for the future of American policing. Drawing on extensive professional experience, ideas from the original Precision Policing framework, and the research on “what works” in policing, the plan is organized by four tenets:

1. Evidence-Based Crime & Disorder Prevention
2. Community Engagement & Protection
3. Transparency & Accountability
4. Officer Performance, Safety, and Wellness
Below we introduce each tenet and provide recommendations for the next generation of policing. Future white papers will provide more details and recommendations that communities, elected officials, and police leaders can adopt to improve their local police agencies.

**TENET 1: EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME & DISORDER PREVENTION**

Sir Robert Peel invented the first-modern police department, the London Metropolitan Police, in 1829. Anticipating the public’s resistance to having uniformed, state actors patrolling the streets of London, Peel also purportedly developed guiding principles in order to ensure legitimacy amongst Londoners.¹ Peel’s first principle stated the police existed to “prevent crime and disorder...” (see Home Office, 2012).

We believe that basic principle is the guiding tenet for policing – then, now, and in the future.

However, two empirical facts have improved how we think about crime and disorder prevention.

First, most crime is concentrated at just a few micro-places – or “hot spots”. The idea of micro-places is key. Micro-places are single addresses or street blocks. About 1% of micro-places host 25% of crime and 3% of micro-places experience about 50% of crime (Weisburd, 2015). Even within a neighborhood labeled "high crime", crime levels will change from block to block or even address to address on the same block.

Second, most crime is committed by a small number of people – or “prolific offenders”. Roughly 50% of crime is committed by about 6% of people (Piquero et al., 2003). For gun violence, 1% or less of a neighborhood’s population commits all shootings (National Network for Safe Communities, 2016).

These scientific facts mean that crime and disorder prevention strategies must be focused precisely on just the places and people driving crime. But this has not always been the case...

For much of policing’s history, crime and disorder prevention strategies were focused imprecisely. The introduction of police cars, two-way radios, and ultimately 911 systems revolutionized policing in the second half of the 20th Century. Officers randomly patrolled large police beats waiting for 911 calls to be dispatched. Once a 911 call was received, officers responded rapidly with the goal of making an arrest at the scene. If all else failed, then detectives would react by opening an investigation and trying to arrest the offender later (see Kelling & Moore, 1998). This early 20th Century policing strategy can be summarized by the Three R’s: (1) random patrol, (2) rapid response, and (3) reactive investigations (Sherman, 2013).

A series of studies in the late-1970s, however, raised doubt on the Three R’s. Random patrol in large police beats had no measurable effect on crime and disorder because the dosage of presence was spread too widely (Kelling et al., 1974). Arriving to calls for service more quickly had little impact on the likelihood of an arrest because most crimes were reported well after they occurred and the offender had left the scene (Pate et al., 1976).² Detective work was relatively mundane with most crimes solved based on information provided by witnesses at the scene (Chaiken et al., 1977). Certainly, the logic that led to these strategies is not hard to understand, but more data and research unfortunately showed no matter how well-intended, imprecise policing did not reduce crime.

¹ We recognize the questions raised about the origins of Peel’s Principles (Lentz & Chaires, 2007). Given their widespread influence in policing at this point, we still find them instructive despite these questions (Home Office, 2012).
² We recognize more recent research has found a link between faster response times and increased likelihood of arrest (Vidal & Kirchmaier, 2018).
But in the mid-1990s, precise policing strategies guided by the scientific facts that crime is concentrated within a small number of places and people began to emerge.

Sherman and Weisburd (1995) in partnership with the Minneapolis Police Department, first demonstrated what many suspected – police presence can reduce crime and disorder if precisely delivered in hot spots. In this study, police presence was focused precisely at 55 randomly selected addresses and intersections where crime-related calls for service were concentrated. Statistical analysis showed the increased patrols in the “treatment hot spots” reduced crime-related calls for service relative to the 55 randomly selected “control hot spots”. Since then, numerous rigorous studies have shown that crime decreases when (1) police patrol in cars or on foot, (2) increase enforcement actions, (3) focus on prolific offenders, or (4) use problem-solving to develop tailored responses in crime hot spots (Braga et al., 2019).

Proactively focusing on prolific offenders has been a core component of Precision Policing since its inception (Bratton & Murad, 2018). Focusing precisely on prolific offenders, especially those who are members of gangs and groups, has been implemented in a variety of ways over time.

In the New York City Police Department (NYPD), the following approach was used:

1. Precinct-based field intelligence officers (FIO) identified known violent crime offenders
2. Specialized units were empowered to enhance cases involving violence, guns, and/or gangs
3. A geographically based unified investigations model was developed.

Created in 2001, the FIOs report to both their precinct command and a centralized Intelligence Bureau in order to consolidate information throughout the city. FIOs establish relationships with community members, track recidivists, recruit confidential informants, and build a detailed picture of each precinct’s unique crime problems and prolific offenders. FIOs also interview most arrestees from the precinct about shootings, guns, robberies, and active offenders. Starting during Commissioner (ret.) William J. Bratton’s second tenure at the NYPD (2014 to 2016), the Intelligence Bureau reinvigorated its oversight of the FIOs, encouraging them to initiate cases based on debriefings (The New York Police Department, 2016, p. 48).

As part of the NYPD’s Precision Policing model, specialized units such as the gang division can then adopt cases, with the ability to focus on enforcement in ways that patrol officers or precinct detectives — with more situationally driven workloads — may not. Specialized units also have the time and prosecutorial relationships to explore new tools. In the 2010s, many gang-based violent actors moved away from narcotics conspiracies, but also began using social media to brag openly about their actions and their networks of associates. The gang division saw great success with “violence conspiracy” cases by finding evidence on the Internet, leveraging confidential informants, identifying patterns of violence, and linking multiple involved actors (The New York Police Department, 2016, p. 44).

Bratton also assigned approximately 30 officers to a Gun Violence Suppression Division in 2014. By 2021, the unit had more than 200 officers, and from May to July of 2021 the unit took down five major gangs (Johnson, 2021). Recent academic research on gang takedowns in New York suggests they were effective in reducing gun violence (Chalfin et al., 2021). Investigations are only effective, however, when paired with prosecutions, and for some time the NYPD achieved success on that front. In January 2016, leaders from the NYPD, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Citizens Crime Commission, and the Office of Court Administration, as well as New York City’s two US attorneys and five
district attorneys created Project Fast Track. In addition to consolidating all police investigations related to illegal guns, shootings, and gangs under the Gun Violence Suppression Division, Fast Track enhanced relationships with prosecutors and judicial hearing officers with the goal of resolving gun cases within six months of their inception while ensuring due process (Citizens Crime Commission of New York City, n.d.; Office of the Mayor, 2016).

The unified investigations model meant restructuring the department’s various investigatory units so that their chain of command reported based on geography rather than their subject-matter silos. Each borough, like the Bronx or Brooklyn North, had an investigative chief who was responsible for the borough’s precinct detective squads, homicide squad, night watch, narcotics, vice module, and gang squad. Investigative chiefs worked closely with borough patrol chiefs to coordinate the use of these resources. The borough investigative chief had the authority to: (1) deploy investigative resources to particular incidents, (2) combat emerging crime trends, and (3) help suppress violence in a geographic area (The New York Police Department, 2017, p. 65).

In Philadelphia, an offender-focused strategy was combined with a hot spots approach. Violent crime hot spots were identified, and district commanders used their discretion to determine the best way to disrupt the offenders who were causing violence in the hot spots. Tactics ranged from simple conversations to serving outstanding warrants. Serious violent crime – shootings, beatings, and muggings – declined by about 40% (Groff et al., 2015).

Many U.S. cities have also used the offender-focused strategy “focused deterrence”, or what has been recently rebranded as “group violence intervention” (GVI), but is probably best known as “Operation CeaseFire” from its roots in Boston in the 1990s (Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy, 1997, 2011). While the strategy has sometimes varied by jurisdiction, it generally has the following components:

1. All groups/gangs responsible for gun violence are identified through intelligence
2. Historical shootings are reviewed in order to determine the nature of the shootings and which groups/gangs were responsible
3. An overall problem analysis of group and gang violence is prepared
4. With the above analyses in hand, groups/gangs are prioritized for precise engagement
5. Call-in sessions are arranged where gangs/groups hear from prosecuting attorneys, police officials and community leaders that violence will no longer be tolerated
6. An offer of social services is made for anyone looking for a way out of an offending lifestyle
7. Custom notifications are also delivered in the field to individuals who did not show up to the call-in (see Kennedy & Friedrich, 2014)
8. Any gang/group who fails to heed the deterrence message and continues to engage in gun violence is dismantled via proactive investigations

Numerous studies have established that focused deterrence is an effective gun violence reduction strategy that may also work for drug markets or intimate partner violence (Braga et al., 2018).

In Miami-Dade County, GVI has been integrated into a place-based approach by centering it on gun violence hot spots. In total, nine “hot places” were identified for intervention during an initial group audit and incident review. In addition to the standard GVI model, Walking One Stops were held in each of the nine places and served as an entrée into those neighborhoods. Walking One Stop is a police-community
collaborative that uses technology to reduce harm, catalyze reconciliation, and improve police legitimacy (see Rawlins, 2021). Walking One Stop brings social and economic resources to the doorstep of residents who have experienced reoccurring gun violence. Walking One Stop is data driven, using gunshot detection to pinpoint where gun violence is acute at the address-level, create a profile of those driving the violence, assess the readiness of “hot people” for change, and focus targeted interventions that get to the root of cognitive behavioral challenges. Through Walking One Stop, individuals can begin to heal after years of repeated incidents of unresolved trauma that may have begun as early as gestation. As a problem-solving strategy, Walking One Stop assesses and addresses the specific needs of residents in gun violence hot spots.

Walking One Stops begins with a short but robust briefing at the local police station that serves the targeted area. During the briefing, the station commander provides representatives from governmental and non-governmental organizations with an overview of recent violent incidents, doorhanger bags are filled with information from different service providers, and veteran “Walkers” (e.g., elected officials, criminal justice professionals, community activists, social and economic service providers, and concerned residents) role play interactions with residents. After the briefing, “Walkers” are escorted by marked patrol cars to a neighborhood that has experienced recent or persistent incidents of gun violence. While onsite, neighborhood resource officers provide security as “Walkers” assess the needs of residents. Many needs are often addressed immediately at the Walking One Stop staging area or later by the appropriate referral source. The local workforce development board routinely deploys their mobile unit to the staging area where residents receive on-the-spot assistance with employment and vocational training. An evaluation of residents who completed registration in the Employ Florida Marketplace during Walking One Stop from October 2014 – February 2017, yielded an impressive 41.8% placed in employment. At the Walking One Stop, relationships between police, service providers, and residents are fostered (Rawlins, 2021).

At this point, two key ideas should be emphasized. First, Precision Policing 2.0 does not advocate for large scale enforcement across communities. In fact, it calls for the opposite; an approach that uses minimal enforcement focused on the individuals who are driving serious crime and harming the community. Second, offender-focused strategies do not have to be punitive. Certainly, there will be times when enforcement is necessary, such as when a gang is driving violent victimization in an area (Chalfin et al., 2021), but tactics and programs designed to support community members are also key. In practice, enforcement on a small number of prolific offenders and resource support for the wider community will need to be implemented together – with the latter potentially falling to non-police agencies.

Readers knowledgeable about policing history will recognize two key ideas from the last 50 years have been absent until this point: (1) community policing and (2) problem solving. These are key ideas and understanding how they fit into the future of policing is nuanced.

The push for community policing was a natural offshoot of the history of policing (Kelling & Moore, 1998). The 1950s through the 1970s – centered on the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War – were complex and tumultuous decades in U.S. history. Police officers were called to the frontlines of civil rights or anti-war demonstrations, and they often concluded with violence and arrests. As policing sought to become more professional through an emphasis on the “Three R’s”, officers increasingly saw their communities
from a police car window at 25 miles per hour, and police-community relations deteriorated. Policing needed strategies that could improve police-community relations.3

This was precisely the motivation for the Boston Fenway Neighborhood Policing Initiative led by coauthor Commissioner Bratton – then Sergeant Bratton – in the late 1970s. Initially, Bratton approached community meetings in a data-driven, crime-centric way. He brought data about crime and response times. He prepared crime-prevention tips and shared updates about major crimes. But he quickly learned that the neighbors who attended weren’t interested in statistics; they wanted to talk about what are now called “quality-of-life issues.” In the mid-1970s this came as a shock, although perhaps it should not have. As Bratton (2021: 89) writes in The Profession: “Few people get robbed at gunpoint, fewer still know someone who had been killed in a violent confrontation. But everybody had a daughter, son, husband, wife, friend, or acquaintance who felt threatened walking by a drunk in the street. Everyone had to pass by stores that were tagged by graffiti, or was sometimes kept awake by raucous noise at night, by the gang on the corner. Nobody wanted to fight his way through a lineup of hookers to get home. The community didn’t want to feel besieged.”

Recognizing this became a key of the Boston Fenway Program. Bratton assigned the same officers to the same neighborhoods, and changed the emphasis of how they addressed those neighborhoods: it was problem-driven, not incident-driven, because although the latter was incredibly important to individual victims and captured the “response” part of policing, the former was about the community and focused on “prevention.” These ideas were consistent with what eventually became the core components of community policing across the country.

Community policing was practiced in some form by nearly every U.S. police agency. In textbooks, community policing includes three components (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2012):

1. Community engagement: getting to know the community and its priorities, often via community meetings, foot patrol, knock and talk, etc.
2. Problem solving: working with the community to identify and solve crime and disorder problems
3. Organizational change: aligning the organizational structure, policies, personnel, and data collection systems to support community engagement and problem solving.

In practice, community policing meant whatever an agency decided it meant and it was practiced differently from agency to agency. Without a clear definition, it became hard for researchers to show community policing was effective for reducing crime and disorder, but some elements likely improved police-community relations (Gill et al., 2014). Some general ideas of community policing are integrated into Tenet 2: Community Engagement & Protection described below.

On the other hand, research shows problem solving or Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) is one of the most effective crime and disorder prevention strategies available (Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Hinkle et al., 2020). While problem solving was a part of many agencies’ community policing programs, it also came to be described as a standalone strategy. In other agencies, the term Community Problem-Oriented Policing (CPOP) was used to emphasize the importance of community involvement in the problem-solving process.

In practice, problem solving includes much of what is known to be effective in crime and disorder prevention. While it is often given a different name, like SARA or PANDA, problem solving mimics the scientific process: (1) identify a crime or disorder problem, (2) use data, intelligence, and analysis to understand why the problems exist, (3) develop a tailored response to make the problem go away, and (4) evaluate your success to determine whether you can move to the next problem or if you need to adjust your response (Ratcliffe, 2018). In crime hot spots, research suggests problem solving is the most effective tactic (Braga et al., 2019). GVI (described above) was an extension of problem solving that applied to violent gangs and groups (Kennedy, 2011).

Cops solve problems all the time. Certainly, there are varying levels of formalities and documentation depending on an agency’s operations and strategies, but cops are problem solvers. No one knows a neighborhood’s crime or disorder problems better than the citizens who live there and the cops who patrol it on a daily basis. Great officers listen to their community, develop an understanding of their crime and disorder problems, and come up with a response. With training, analytical support, processes, and policies, agencies can develop robust problem-solving strategies that include various community stakeholders and address neighborhood crime and disorder problems with innovative responses.

Developed under Commissioner Bratton, NYPD’s Neighborhood Policing Program (NPP) is an example of a formal problem-solving strategy. The program had its origins in both the Boston Fenway Project and the LAPD’s “Senior Lead Officer” program, and its goal was developing a deeper relationship between the public and the police. Traditionally, patrol officers spend most of each shift “chasing the radio,” and answering calls for service. It is a responsive model, but not preventative. In the wake of calls for reform after the deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson and Eric Garner in Staten Island, the NYPD created the NPP to restructure patrol and give officers time to engage with neighbors, identify problems, and work toward solutions. The department assigned officers to steady sectors and directed them to devote 33 percent of each shift to community-based, proactive, and problem-solving activities (The New York Police Department, 2017, p. 11). To support the sector officers, the department designated two officers in each sector as neighborhood coordination officers (NCOs). NCOs are liaisons between the police and the community, as well as key crime fighters and problem-solvers in the sector. NCOs do not generally answer radio calls, but instead focus on the conditions that ultimately produce calls. NCOs attend community meetings with neighborhood leaders and clergy, visit schools, follow up on previous incidents, and use creative techniques and adaptive skills to address crime and solve other problems in their particular sectors. Both steady sector officers and NCOs are more resource-intensive than normal patrol. In fact, the NPP would have been impossible without nearly 1,300 new police officers hired in 2015, the first headcount increase the NYPD had seen in nearly 15 years. This reiterates the point that good policing requires more, not fewer resources.

Tracing through policing’s abbreviated history alongside some practical examples provides a clear picture that policing crime and disorder has been under a continuous state of reform for the last 50 years. The key difference between the ineffectiveness of the policing strategies dominated by the Three R’s and modern and effective strategies is the precision in which the places and people driving crime are focused on.

Precision policing was made possible only with new technologies and data that were not available for most of policing’s early history. With improvements in computing power, police agencies gained the
technical ability to store large volumes of data and access it quickly as well as the software needed to map data at micro-places, create social network link charts, and other analytical products.

At the same time, innovative police and community leaders alongside researchers began to learn about what did not work in the past, adjust, and set policing on a more effective path. As we lay out in more detail when discussing the next Tenet, community also took a centralized place in everything police agencies do.

**Tenet One Summary**

Moving forward, Precision Policing 2.0’s First Tenet recommends:

1. Police agencies develop a robust strategy to deal with the small number of places that drive crime & disorder
2. Police agencies develop a robust strategy to deal with the small number of prolific offenders who drive crime & disorder
3. Police agencies develop a robust problem-solving strategy to ensure that police and community are partnering to solve crime and disorder problems together

To support these recommendations, Precision Policing 2.0 embraces the following:

1. Investment in quality data and intelligence collection, storage, and analysis through the use of advanced hardware and software tools
2. Investment in a robust analysis team who can provide actionable analytical products to support agency strategies and decisions – which may require advanced training
3. Investment in advanced technologies that support Precision Policing strategies, like advanced case management software, records management systems, etc.
4. Development of an accountability process, like CompStat, where organizational leaders regularly review data and agency progress towards its goals to ensure coordination and effectiveness
5. Embrace research to determine if crime and disorder prevention strategies are effective, and support new research when not enough evidence exists about a strategy

**TENET 2: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT & PROTECTION**

In order to effectively prevent crime and disorder, police agencies must collaborate with the communities they serve and build trust, legitimacy, and satisfaction. Some of Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles discussed before are helpful here (Home Office, 2012):

1. “To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.”
2. “To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.”
3. “To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.”
In other words, since modern policing’s invention, the importance of the community has been emphasized. And, simply stated, there is no future for policing without continued recognition that the communities police agencies serve must be central to agencies’ missions.

**Multi-Level Perspective on Community Engagement & Protection**

We encourage a multi-level, multi-faceted strategy for community engagement and protection:

- At the lowest level, every interaction between a citizen and an officer is an opportunity to forge a relationship.
- At the community level, police commanders must have a strategy to engage their community and become co-producers of crime and disorder prevention via community problem-oriented policing (as described in the Tenet One).
- At the organizational level, police agencies must have a strategy that centers community engagement and protection throughout the agency as well as engages the community on jurisdiction wide matters.

The idea that every police-community interaction is an opportunity to build police-community relations is consistent with procedural justice (Tyler, 2006). When interacting with the public, officers should (1) treat citizens with dignity and respect, (2) display trustworthy motives, (3) make unbiased decisions, and (4) give citizens an opportunity to express their views. Procedural justice is important because it can enhance citizens’ perceptions of police legitimacy and increase their willingness to obey the law (Tyler, 2006). However, it is important to remember that citizens views of the police can be influenced by simply hearing about others’ experiences with police (Brunson, 2007). One coauthor, Dr. Haberman, has also previously shown that residents’ satisfaction with police in violent crime hot spots is tied to both their perceptions of social disorder and how they perceive they’ll be treated when interacting with police – thus crime and disorder prevention strategies must incorporate procedural justice in order to improve police-community relations (Haberman et al., 2016). Under Tenet 4, we discuss the idea of procedural justice training in more detail, but for now the larger point is that community engagement starts with individual police-citizen interactions.

Second, the importance of community engagement and protection at the community level is emphasized. Police agencies often work with larger geographic areas like precincts, districts, or beats, but local neighborhoods may be the more meaningful unit for community members. Police supervisors overseeing their own areas need community engagement and protection strategies that can help improve community trust, legitimacy, and satisfaction. These strategies need to be tailored to each neighborhood. To be most effective, co-developing community policing strategies with the community being served is recommended. These strategies might include activities like regular community meetings, “knock and talks”, Coffee with a Cop, neighborhood cleanups, cookouts, sporting events, backpack giveaways, and so on (Gill et al., 2014). Focusing these efforts on those who are at the highest risk for having negative police interactions, including communities that have experienced ineffective social, economic, and political policies that have led to concentrated poverty, unemployment, trauma and violence, likely to be communities of color, is recommended. Working with community partners to identify and engage particular groups, instead of calling them out for their non-participation, seems especially worthwhile.
Third, police agencies need an overall community engagement and protection strategy. The agency-level strategy, led by the chief executive, will be broader but influence the individual and community-level strategies. Many features will overlap, such as hosting recurring community meetings and events. The focus, however, will be on agency or citywide matters that impact all communities collectively.

Generally, having community members serve as trusted advisors and equal partners when creating or revising agency policies or implementing new strategies and programs can be vital in gaining community support and building long-lasting relationships. Engaging the community after decisions have been made may be even more problematic than never engaging the community at all. So, it makes sense for agencies to develop community advisory panels that routinely provide feedback, but also create ad-hoc opportunities, like community surveys or speaking forums, any time a major policy change or new initiative is considered. For example, in Cincinnati (OH), a City Manager’s Advisory Group (MAG) was created to provide “information, analysis, advice, and recommendations to the City Manager” related to police reform. The MAG is comprised of leaders from government and the community to ensure a diverse group of voices informs police reform in Cincinnati.4

Recognizing the shortage of sworn personnel, budget cuts and shortages, and public mistrust and anger, more than ever before, police departments would be well served to develop strong partnerships through collaborative problem solving with communities that experience the most crime and victimization. Making CPOP a major part of an agency’s crime and disorder prevention strategy, as described above, however requires agency-level commitment. Problem solving is difficult to implement and potentially requires changes in organizational structure and accountability tools as well as investments in consultants, training, data infrastructure, analytical capacity, and so on. But it is the best way to ensure police agencies are working on crime and disorder problems that are most important to the communities they serve in the ways the community prefers.

Police agencies’ command staffs then have to incorporate community engagement and protection into their accountability mechanisms, like CompStat. If mid-level supervisors are expected to meet with and engage the community, then that work should be tracked and reviewed by executive commanders to ensure the work is occurring. For example, coauthor Dr. Haberman sits on the Cincinnati (OH) Police Department’s quarterly CPOP internal review board, where District Captains present their on-going CPOP projects for questions and feedback from the board.

The ideas presented under Tenet 3, Transparency and Accountability, should further advance police agencies’ community engagement and protection strategies specifically in the context of transparency and accountability using approaches that are already popular among many agencies. We do not repeat that material here for brevity.

Community Collaboration

Having dedicated programs that include social workers, mental health clinicians, victim advocates, credible messengers, violence interrupters, clergy members, and youth trauma response teams seem promising. In reality, there’s not a police executive in the country who would not prefer to send professionals with specific expertise to situations, like calls for service involving persons experiencing mental health crises. But despite their promise, there remains a lot more to learn about these programs

4 More information about the Cincinnati MAG can be found here: https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/manager/manager-s-advisory-group-mag/
Calls-for-service that might seem like candidates to be shifted to other first responders may be infrequent (Lum et al., 2021), and it is often difficult to predict the nature of a call ahead of time (Ratcliffe, 2021). Similarly, it is a misguided belief that starting these programs will make it possible to “defund” police agencies. Rather effective and fair policing that is promoted in this Precision Policing 2.0 framework likely requires investments into agencies. Local governments will have to find funding for implementing and evaluating these programs as their efficacy is still unknown.

In the future, cross-sector collaborations that include police, community, and other frontline partners that work to get non-enforcement resources to communities in greatest need of assistance and support should be a priority. In these vulnerable communities, police officers are often the first and only government responders in times of crisis. Police are asked to navigate and intervene in complex situations stemming from social, economic, and physical and mental health problems. In these communities, intentional efforts by non-police experts may prove most effective in dealing with these issues that police sometimes are not trained to address but often called to respond to. For example, coauthor Mr. Rawlins created Walking One Stop in Miami-Dade County to be an entrée into neighborhoods experience gun violence and bring social and economic resources to the doorstep of residents. Walking One Stop includes police as a partner, but they do not lead the initiative (described above but also see Rawlins, 2021).

**Using Technology to Enhance Community Engagement & Protection**

Precision Policing 2.0 embraces technology, and it is easy to see how various technological tools might enhance these efforts. For example, gunshot detection technology, like ShotSpotter, might be used to pinpoint areas of child, youth, and family trauma related to exposure to gunfire (including sounds), even when citizens do not call 911 to report the gunfire, and then communicate with school districts to help implement programs that support students and their families. By doing this, cities can more effectively mobilize outreach and trauma response teams to provide services and support. By utilizing technological tools to move beyond enforcement, police agencies can better pinpoint social problems and unaddressed traumas. This approach would allow police agencies to better serve the public through their community collaborations and partnerships, perhaps just by sharing data, even when citizens are not trusting enough to call 911. We expect many police agencies and communities will be able to develop additional technology-assisted programs. But we emphasize scientific evaluation of these promising programs to ensure their efficacy.

**Tenet Two Summary**

Moving forward, Precision Policing 2.0’s Second Tenet recommends:

1. Police agencies develop community engagement and protection strategies that are multi-level and recognize the importance of individual police-community interactions, community, and organization-level needs
2. Police agencies develop strategies to engage communities through localized events and programming
3. Police agencies develop strategies to engage with key community stakeholders when large-scale policy changes or new policies and programs are implemented
4. Police agencies develop a community problem-oriented policing strategy
5. Police agencies develop cross-sector collaborations to solve important, non-law enforcement problems, such as calls-for-service involving persons with mental health disorders
6. Police agencies develop a mechanism to measure and track community perceptions over time
To support these recommendations, Precision Policing 2.0 embraces the following:

1. Embrace accountability mechanisms that ensure agency personnel are implementing community engagement and protection strategies as designed
2. Embrace cross-sector collaborations for solving problems, particularly non-law enforcement problems that require specialized expertise
3. Embrace the potential of technology to develop more robust community engagement and protection strategies
4. Investment in training and consulting as needed to implement community engagement and protection strategies
5. Investment in the collection and analysis of community perception data

**TENET 3: TRANSPARENCY & ACCOUNTABILITY**

Effective strategies for crime and disorder prevention and community engagement and protection should be complemented by a clear strategy for transparency and accountability. Transparency in policing emphasizes making policies and procedures, data and information, and decision-making open to the public. And while transparency makes it easier for stakeholders to hold police agencies accountable – after all you cannot ask about what you do not know about – agencies should certainly develop ways to deliberately foster accountability at all levels of the organization. The challenge with transparency and accountability strategies is that they may not have research support. In a sense, each community is left to determine a strategy that works best for it. Below we lay out some promising practices in the field and highlight some examples of how they have been implemented, but more evaluation is needed to determine the “best” approaches for transparency and accountability in policing.

**Making Information Publicly Available**

The easiest way for police agencies to improve transparency is to make information – such as organizational charts, policies and procedures, yearly reports, and data on calls for service, crime incidents, traffic stops, field investigations, or arrests, and so on – public. With the Internet, it has become easier for police agencies to share information online. For example, posting police policies and procedures online allows community stakeholders to easily understand how their local agencies operate. Similarly, listing the contact information for police supervisors over specific functions or neighborhoods makes it easier for community stakeholders to communicate with their agency.

Providing data gives community the opportunity to understand trends in calls for service, crime, enforcement levels, disparities in police actions, agency or officer characteristics, or anything else that may be of interest to local stakeholders. Of course, raw data requires analytical skills and subject matter expertise to contextualize any findings. For example, there is debate over which analytical tools to use for assessing disparities and bias in police enforcement actions, and an analysis deemed rigorous by one expert might easily be criticized by another (Haberman et al., 2020).

Producing routine reports or publicly facing analytical dashboards can help ease the community burden of analyzing data. For example, the NYPD has a public version of its internal CompStat report, called

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Page 12 of 31
Revised: February 1, 2022
CompStat 2.0, which goes beyond the public PDF sheets showing CompStat data that were the old norm, and instead allows users to search and build their own datasets about crime and enforcement activity in every precinct (New York City Police Department, 2021). In Burlington, Vermont, where coauthor Murad is chief of police, the police have a Transparency & Data page that links to an interactive Open Data Dashboard where users can self-sort data on arrests, traffic stops, and use-of-force incidents. That page also contains monthly reports about every use of force, including demographic data and narratives; press releases and a police blotter; and a variety of monthly and annual reports (City of Burlington, 2021).

But any analyses produced for the public should be tailored to community needs, and include community input in their design (Haberman et al., 2020). With a consensus on the types of analyses preferred by communities, policymakers could easily mandate the analyses agencies must routinely produce.

Using Technology to Increase Transparency

Technology can be used to improve transparency and accountability too. Technological developments have made body-worn cameras (hereafter BWC; and to a lesser extent dashboard cameras) one of the most widely discussed tools in policing. Both community and police see camera footage as a tool for providing an independent account of police-citizen interactions – perhaps providing evidence in the event of police misconduct or officer corroboration in the event of frivolous complaints. Studies, however, have found mixed impacts of BWCs. Some studies report BWCs help reduce outcomes, like use of force or complaints against police, and others suggest they had minimal impact. BWCs effectiveness may even depend on whether or not agencies have a policy requiring BWC activation (Lum et al., 2019). Another promising idea is to routinely audit BWC footage to assess officer performance (Morgan et al., 2017). This process could be a teaching tool to identify and correct poor performance or highlight and reward good performance. At this point, we do not know exactly how BWCs should be used. Outfitting officers with BWCs is just the first step. Innovative ideas from police and community leaders for using BWCs are needed, and more research should be encouraged.

Of course, releasing BWC footage can be controversial. Community almost always asks for videos to be released immediately following a critical incident. Prosecutors, internal affairs investigators, and police leaders may seek to withhold footage until all investigations or disciplinary/court proceedings are completed. When BWC footage is not released, people are quick to assume malicious intent, but police executives usually just want to make sure that any outcomes resulting from BWC footage are arrived at using a fair process. Obviously releasing video footage is a transparent act, but best practices in releasing video footage are yet to be established (Todak et al., 2021). Police agencies, communities, legislatures, and policy makers would be wise to critically consider video footage release policies.

Other technologies also show promise for improving transparency. Tracking officers and patrol vehicles in the field with global positioning systems (GPS) will help agencies and communities understand where officers are working – which might improve place-based policing strategies and officer safety. Systems that record when weapons, like TASERS and firearms, are unholstered and simultaneously turn-on BWCs will improve use of force tracking and accountability during critical incidents (Shjarback et al., 2021). And with technology rapidly changing, the field will likely continue to see new technologies that improve transparency and accountability. These technologies should be embraced, but carefully evaluated.

Developing Accountability Mechanisms

Both internal and external accountability mechanisms have been advocated for recently.

Page 13 of 31
Revised: February 1, 2022
Good police executives have no interest in protecting officers who violate policies and/or laws. And good cops have no interest in working with other officers who do so. Internally, police executives can develop special units to investigate excessive uses of force or police misconduct. As George Floyd’s murder and the protests that followed illustrated, improper or unlawful uses of force can have implications on a national scale. Even proper, justified uses of force can receive public scrutiny, particularly when they are “lawful but awful”—instances of force that are within guidelines but are nevertheless troubling. Accountability and transparency are key components of maintaining police legitimacy when it comes to force. In 2004, as part of the consent decree in Los Angeles, and in the wake of the 1998 Rampart scandal, in which officers were found to have beaten and shot citizens while stealing drugs and committing other acts of corruption, coauthor Commissioner Bratton overhauled how the LAPD investigated uses of force (Bratton, 2021). Bratton created a Force Investigation Division (FID; Los Angeles Police Department, 2022), and its early leaders like Captain Kris Pitcher shared its mandate widely: bifurcated, parallel, simultaneous administrative and criminal investigations that ensured both officers’ rights to due process and the public’s right to be free from unconstitutional policing.

In 2014, Bratton created an FID in New York, bringing investigatory uniformity to incidents involving high-level uses of force (primarily firearm discharges). With 54 seasoned investigators and staff, FID reports directly to the First Deputy Commissioner. The NYPD also overhauled its use-of-force policies, with new, broader definitions about what constituted a use of force. It created comprehensive rules describing an ascending investigative hierarchy: (1) direct supervisors for physical force or pepper spray, (2) command-level executives for physical injury or suspected excessive force, (3) the Internal Affairs Bureau for serious physical injury, and (4) FID for firearms discharges and deaths in custody. Policy and accountability have to be accompanied by training, and the NYPD doubled down on de-escalation and crisis intervention training. To foster transparency, the NYPD created a data-rich annual report built on the foundation of a long-standing Annual Firearms Discharge Report co-created by coauthor Murad in 2007 (New York City Police Department, 2007).

Accountability can also be achieved through external review systems.

In Burlington, Vermont, Murad has taken this to a logical extreme: each month, the police report every use of force in detail, including a narrative of the incident, demographic data about the officers and citizens involved, and descriptions of the types of force used (City of Burlington, 2021). Furthermore, the department has pledged to release body-camera footage for all incidents involving injury or the use of tools like pepper spray (although this currently awaits the employment of a redaction specialist to handle video review in accordance with freedom-of-information-law requirements). In this way, the external review system is the community itself.

Formal civilian oversight is a frequently discussed external tool for increasing accountability. In the past several decades, more than half of major city police departments (Stephens et al., 2018), and about 11% of all local police agencies have established civilian oversight (Brooks et al., 2020). Civilian oversight can take different forms (De Angelis et al., 2016). In some places, civilian oversight might be reviewing internal affairs investigation reports and providing recommendations to police executives. In other places, civilian oversight groups may have investigatory powers and conduct independent investigations of complaints against officers that include disciplinary recommendations. External monitors who review an agency across a variety of performance areas also can be considered civilian oversight. Such wide variation...
presents a challenge for making policy recommendations. To date, studies have not found that civilian oversight can reduce complaints or excessive use of force (Cao et al., 2000; Cao & Huang, 2000; O’Guinn, 2022; Willits & Nowacki, 2014; Worrall, 2002). One study even reported civilian oversight produced more complaints against police (Cao et al., 2000), perhaps because citizens may believe their accusations of misconduct are taken more seriously when a jurisdiction has civilian oversight (Worrall, 2002). With community members increasingly asking for civilian oversight, adopting it may improve police-community relations but the best model for civilian oversight is speculative at this point. More research is needed.

Local government officials can provide another means of accountability. Government officials can easily call police executives to public government or committee meetings to provide updates on key areas, policy, and so on. For example, the City of Cincinnati operates a Law and Public Safety Committee that includes a permanent police department liaison – a lieutenant – and frequently requests testimony from the police chief or other relevant personnel when new policy is being considered. Coauthor Dr. Haberman, routinely observes the Law and Public Safety Committee’s meetings and notes the tone of the meetings is often inquisitive with the police department asked to present data in support of their own policies and programs or for consideration by the Committee for new legislation. While the Committee does not easily lend itself to scientific evaluation, the individual meetings certainly increase transparency into the police department’s operations and provide a public forum for elected officials to provide accountability. The committee and meetings could be easily replicated in other cities with local variations.

Overall, all of these accountability mechanisms are promising, but there is no guarantee they accomplish their goals without evaluation. Agencies should develop their own accountability strategies based on the above examples, and consider evaluating their impacts.

**Sentinel Event Reviews**

Sentinel event reviews (SER) are another useful way of thinking about how police departments can improve transparency (Browning et al., 2015). But SER are not necessarily about accountability in a traditional sense. SER start with the idea that sometimes complex events end with bad outcomes – sentinel events. Bad outcomes are not always “somebody’s fault”, however, and may be just the result of a series of unfortunate events within a flawed system. Now policing is high-stakes and high-risk work – after all the job is to show up to some of the most serious and dangerous events in society – so bad outcomes, like loss of life, should be taken very seriously but that does not mean somebody purposively wanted a bad outcome to occur. As such, SER call for a working group to review what led to the bad outcome, with a focus on system flaws, in order to learn from it and prevent it in the future. Reports from SER can be used for continuous improvement and publishing SER reports is certainly an act of transparency. Overall, the use of SER is a sign of a mature police agency that embodies continuous learning by seeking to learn from past mistakes.

**Tenet Three Summary**

There is no debating that police agencies must be transparent and accountable. There likely will be debate on the best ways to do so. And, unfortunately, there is little research to guide which efforts will be most effective. Community engagement can help a lot in this regard as community members can communicate their expectations and approaches for transparency and accountability. The best transparency and accountability strategy likely will be those developed in partnership by police and the local community.

Within that context, Precision Policing 2.0’s Third Tenet recommends:
1. Developing a robust information and data sharing strategy via the Internet, likely on the agency’s website
2. Using routine performance indicator analyses to monitor police outcomes of interest to the community, such as racial bias in traffic stops
3. Adopting technologies, like BWCS or holster sensors, to be able to track and publicly report on police actions
4. Implementing internal and external accountability tools for monitoring officer and agency performance and taking appropriate action as needed
5. Using Sentinel Event Reviews to identify systemic failures during past sentinel events in order to improve an individual agency and possibly the overall field of policing

To support these recommendations, Precision Policing 2.0 embraces the following:

1. Investment in technologies that make the above recommendations possible
2. Community engagement to develop internal and external oversight tools
3. Investment in training for both officers and other relevant stakeholders to understand any policies and programs ultimately adopted
4. Accompanying new technologies or programs with policies and accountability processes to ensure implementation
5. Investment in research to learn if adopted recommendations have their intended impact

**TENET 4: OFFICER PERFORMANCE, SAFETY, & WELLNESS**

To effectively address the challenges that face 21st Century policing, especially the recruiting and retention crisis, it is more important than ever that police officers are given the tools and support they need to succeed. This means that efforts to improve officer performance, safety, and wellness must be priorities in every jurisdiction across the country.

**Officer Wellness**

It is no secret that policing is one of the most stressful occupations. Most calls-for-service will be uneventful and maybe conclude with lengthy paperwork, but a few will see officers running into life threatening situations that everyone else is running away from. Officers also face stress from the long and irregular work hours, poorly resourced organizations, and more. This stress negatively impacts officers’ mental health through disorders like anxiety and depression and increased suicide rates (Liberman et al., 2002; Maguen et al., 2009; Velazquez & Hernandez, 2019), physical health through obesity and heart disease (Hartley et al., 2011; Violanti, 2012), alcohol abuse, and job performance for outcomes like firearm accuracy, memory impairment, aggression, and fatigue (Allisey et al., 2013; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2011; Violanti, 2012).

Recognizing the detrimental effects that stress can have on officer wellness and performance, agencies have used a number of programs to help officers identify and manage stress (Fiske et al., 2021), such as cognitive-behavioral interventions, self-regulation training, resilience training, relaxation training, and mindfulness training (Patterson et al., 2014). But we do not know enough about the effectiveness of these trainings due to a lack of quality studies. A recent summary of the research on stress management interventions found that these programs, overall, had no significant effect on psychological, behavioral, and physiological outcomes (Patterson et al., 2014). Certain programs, such as those involving cognitive-
behavioral training (J. K. Jones et al., 2021; Patterson et al., 2014; Tanigoshi et al., 2008), mindfulness and resilience training (Christopher et al., 2016; Grupe et al., 2021; Kaplan et al., 2017), might achieve their goals but more research will be needed.

Mobile phone software applications (“apps”) could provide an alternative tool for improving officer stress, mental health, and wellness. For example, CordicoShield is a customizable and confidential mobile wellness app developed to help connect officers with mental health resources. This app offers a number of assessments and counseling resources to help address problems including, but not limited to, alcohol abuse, anxiety, burnout, depression, and stress management. Similar apps are available, such as the Wisconsin Law Enforcement (WILE) Guardians App, the Chicago Police Department’s Officer Wellness Telehealth Pilot app, mResilience or mRes, and ResponderStrong (Police Executive Research Forum, 2021). Unfortunately, no available studies have assessed the apps’ effectiveness, so research is needed to know if they are a good investment of scarce resources.

Virtual reality (VR) is another technological advancement that has potential for officer performance and wellness. VR environments are customizable in the sense that they can be used to train officers to effectively communicate with citizens, respond to a variety of emergency situations, use various tools or weapons, pursue suspects in vehicles, or practice any other skills (Hormann, 1995). VR training programs allow officers to safely practice moving through highly stressful situations before they face them in the real world. Practicing these skills may help reduce officer stress levels associated with these kinds of incidents by improving decision making and building resiliency. Some studies suggest VR training programs are just as effective as traditional training methods, but little research has examined VR in policing (Saunders et al., 2019).

Career Satisfaction

A broader issue for officer performance and wellness is career satisfaction. Stress can erode officers’ career satisfaction leading to burnout, low morale, poor job performance, and higher turnover (Paoline & Gau, 2020). Improving officers’ career satisfaction may be done in a variety of ways.

Innovative police leaders know signs of support can go a long way in building officer morale and improving job satisfaction. When coauthor Commissioner Bratton took over the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority Police Department, he pushed for resources to change the uniforms and cars and upgrade weapons and communication technology (Bratton & Knobler, 2021, p. 110). Academic studies have linked issues ranging from substandard equipment and vehicles to low pay and poor benefits to job dissatisfaction (Paoline & Gau, 2020). Renovating police buildings, upgrading vehicles, providing officers with smartphones and body worn cameras (BWC), and adding tactical and safety equipment are a few examples of improvements that could improve officer morale and performance. Of course, these changes require investments in policing as opposed to defunding (Bratton & Murad, 2018).

Some policy changes may also boost officer morale and performance – in return helping with retention and recruitment. In Austin and then Houston, Chief (ret.) Art Acevedo changed department policy to allow officers to display arm tattoos on duty (Acevedo, 2017). The rationale was simple: why make cops wear long sleeves in the Texas heat when tattoos are common among the communities officers serve and a

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5 See: https://www.cordico.com/shield/
6 Coauthor, Dr. Haberman, and a research team is currently testing the utility of VR for police training. To learn more, visit: http://ming3d.com/new/2020/08/03/vr-for-police-training/
way that officers can express themselves? Other chiefs, like Luther Reynolds in Charleston, SC, have relaxed their grooming policies to allow officers to have facial hair – again, a simple change to respect officers’ individuality, make officers more reflective of the community, and make policing more inclusive (Dillane, 2020). The point is simple: there are relatively mundane policy changes agencies can make to treat officers as individuals, potentially reduce stress, and increase inclusivity and representativeness.

Another way to support officers is through career planning and development. Relying on progression planning, rotational assignments, and creating additional opportunities for promotion are several potential methods to address this issue (Bratton & Murad, 2018; Walker, 2019). Progression planning gives officers a roadmap for their careers, detailing the requirements for each stage of advancement. Rotational assignments provide officers the opportunity to periodically transition from patrol to other roles within agencies so that they develop new skills in preparation for promotion. And ensuring personnel know how to apply for agency support for advanced training, such as the Police Executive Research Forum’s Senior Management Institute for Police program, when appropriate also may be key. There is potential for decisions on who is sent to advanced training to be perceived as unfair or biased if they are not transparent.

The bottom line is that agencies must take deliberate steps to improve officers’ career satisfaction. It does not take a Noble Prize-winning study to know that few people want to do a job without the proper equipment, where their interests and individuality is not respected, and there is not a clear path for advancement.

**Officer Performance**

It is hard to argue against any employee of any organization receiving more training, but that is especially true of a high skilled profession like policing. The key questions are what training and how much of it. With so many calls for more training in policing, that training also should be shown to measurably improve officer performance after it is delivered.

Recently, there have been calls for training on different skills and techniques, such as de-escalation, procedural justice, communication, and implicit bias training.

De-escalation training has become especially popular since the publication of President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. De-escalation involves the use of verbal tactics and communication during potential use of force encounters with citizens to stabilize the situation and alleviate the need for officers to use force (Todak & James, 2018) – which makes it likely most police academies have included de-escalation as part of their curriculum for a long time. Although de-escalation training is becoming widespread among police departments across the U.S., only recently has its efficacy been examined. The few studies that do exist are mixed. In one study, de-escalation training had no significant effect on officer use of force (McLean et al., 2020), while an internally developed training in Tempe (AZ) evaluated by Dr. Mike White and colleagues resulted in officers being “less likely to use a condescending/patronizing tone with the citizen; more likely to attempt to build rapport with the citizen; less likely to fail to transfer control to another officer, if necessary; less likely to use charged/imposing body language (e.g., unnecessarily having their hand on their firearm); and more likely to resolve the encounter informally, especially not issuing a ticket/citation” (see Bennell et al., 2021, p. 127). Absent evidence of backfire effects, it is hard to craft an argument against de-escalation training – its potential is too promising. But blindly administering costly training hardly seems like a path forward either. We need to know it works as intended. Is the
difference in effectiveness across studies due to which training program is delivered, other changes during the time the training was delivered, like the local use of force policy, or something else? Agencies looking to implement de-escalation training might consider enlisting academic evaluators to understand the training’s impact in their agency.

Relatedly, improving officers’ communication skills is also commonly discussed – especially among community members reporting a previous negative experience. In fact, it is hard to imagine that officers with poor verbal communication and interpersonal skills would be effective at de-escalation (McDermott & Hulse, 2012). Unfortunately, this is another area where there is likely to be a lot of variation in training programs across agencies, and we do not know a lot about the impact of these trainings. The only study we could find to date involved officers learning effective communication skills and participating in role-playing scenarios where officers were presented with a hypothetical situation in which they used the skills. Supervisors then give the participating officers feedback on their communication. The evaluation ultimately found that officers who received the training were more respectful, reassuring, and less likely to use force or make arrests compared to officers who did not participate (Rosenbaum & Lawrence, 2017).

Procedural justice training, including at least some form of training for communicating respectfully with citizens, has also received widespread attention recently. Procedural justice is based on the idea that police legitimacy is boosted by officers who remain respectful, transparent, and neutral during encounters with citizens (Antrobus et al., 2019). Procedural justice training may then reduce the likelihood that officers will need to use force as people who view the police as more legitimate are more likely to cooperate and comply with police requests (Terrill et al., 2016). Only a few studies support the use of procedural justice training. When procedural justice training was implemented at the Chicago Police Department (CPD), citizen complaints were reduced by 10% and use of force incidents were reduced by 6.4% (Wood et al., 2020). Officers in the Seattle Police Department (SPD) who participated in procedural justice training were less likely to be involved in use of force incidents than those who did not receive the training (Owens et al., 2018). Others have found that procedural justice training can result in higher quality interactions with citizens (Mazerolle et al., 2012, 2013).

Finally, implicit bias training has been suggested as a means to reduce racial disparities in outcomes of police-citizen encounters such as arrest, use of force, traffic stops, and searches, which have the potential to damage police-community relations (Fridell, 2017). Implicit bias refers to the unconscious influence of stereotypes about groups of people on behavior. Training to address implicit bias often involves educating individuals about implicit bias, making them aware of its potential effects on behavior, and teaching skills to manage or reduce the influence of unconscious stereotypes on behavior (Fridell, 2017). Yet the effects of bias management skills appear to be weak (Forscher et al., 2019). The only available study evaluating the effects of this training on police behavior concluded that implicit bias training had no appreciable effect on disparities in enforcement (Worden et al., 2020), however, officers’ knowledge and understanding of implicit bias have increased after training on the subject (Jannetta et al., 2019). Again, we just do not know enough about the efficacy of implicit bias training yet.

Of course, there are many other, perhaps less frequently discussed, trainings that are just as important, such as training on interacting with persons under the influence of narcotics, experiencing mental health crises, experiencing homelessness, and so on. And, overall, it is hard to argue with increasing officer training in any of these important areas, but the reality is that we do not know a lot about whether or not these various trainings improve officer performance and relevant outcomes for citizens. This is extremely
important because training is expensive. Hiring consultants or developing internal training can cost tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars before factoring in the costs of paying personnel to attend training and back-filling their positions to keep agency operations running smoothly. Additionally, many training programs quickly develop into a second or third generation before we know much about the first generation’s effectiveness. To ensure the responsible spending of tax payer dollars, police training evaluation is extremely important moving forward. Nonetheless, well-trained police officers will require adequate training budgets. Ensuring officers can effectively deal with and triage the range of situations they face will require investing in robust training plans. At the end of the day, good policing by a professional police force is expensive (Siegel & Rappleye, 2021).

**Tenet Four Summary**

As coauthor Commissioner Bratton frequently says, “Cops Count. Police Matter”. Policing is one of the most important professions in the world – and the only one we have authorized to use coercive force against us. So, it seems common sense that efforts to improve officer wellness, safety, and performance should be widespread, well-funded, and continuously improving. Within some agencies that is likely true, but more work needs to be done. It is particularly telling that we do not know much about if some of the most widespread reforms, particularly training programs, achieve their outcomes. This lack of information is not without consequence. Officer training is expensive and logistically challenging – not only does the training have direct costs but overtime pay may be needed to both get officers to training and keep enough of them on patrol. Moving forward, a robust plan to improve officer performance, safety, and wellness is needed with a particular focus on determining that various policies, programs, or trainings are achieving their desired outcomes.

Precision Policing 2.0’s Fourth Tenet recommends:

1. Police agencies develop and implement programs to help reduce occupational stress among officers
2. Police agencies create department wide programs designed to support the mental and physical health of officers
3. Police agencies invest resources in career development and planning for officers
4. Police agencies develop continual training programs for officers on procedural justice, de-escalation, communication and interpersonal skills, implicit bias, and so on assuming these trainings can be shown to have a measurable impact on key outcomes

To support these recommendations, Precision Policing 2.0 embraces the following:

1. Embracing innovation in program and training delivery related to officer performance, safety, & wellness, particularly recognizing the potential of technology to change or enhance delivery or implementation (e.g., virtual reality)
2. Embracing research to determine whether policies, programs, and trainings are effective at achieving intended outcomes
3. Being willing to discard policies, programs, and training that cannot be shown to be effective, even when they are politically popular

**CONCLUSION**

This white paper started by recognizing three key challenges in policing today:
1. Police-community relations need to be improved
2. Violent crime is approaching historical levels in many U.S. cities after decades of decline
3. Policing faces a recruiting and retention crisis

Despite those very real challenges, however, we also highlighted that the last 50 years of policing history has been marked by reform. Given the relative infancy of policing compared to other social institutions, we are optimistic that the field of policing will continue to reform to become fairer and more effective. But this reform will not come without proper planning and investment.

Precision Policing 2.0 provides a framework to accelerate the next generation of policing within the larger context of public safety. Precision Policing 2.0 was designed around four core tenets that address the three key challenges in policing described above:

1. Evidence-Based Crime & Disorder Prevention
2. Community Engagement & Protection
3. Transparency & Accountability
4. Officer Performance, Safety, and Wellness

Within each tenet, we provided a set of recommendations based on the original Precision Policing framework and the best available scientific research that can guide police agencies into the next generation of policing. By embracing the latest academic research, data and analysis, technological innovations, and community collaboration, we believe that police agencies can reduce crime and disorder and increase police legitimacy by developing plans to implement these recommendations and investing the proper resources into executing those plans. Of course, the best plans for implementing Precision Policing 2.0’s guiding tenets will be tailored to local conditions and guided by collaborative efforts between city, police, and community leaders.
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This white paper was prepared by the Public Safety Research Center within the University of Cincinnati’s top-ranked School of Criminal Justice and Institute of Crime Science. For information about the Public Safety Research Center, Precision Policing 2.0, this white paper, or its authors, please visit www.publicsafetyresearch.org.