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REPRESENTATION

When the age of mechanical reproduction separated art from its ba-
sis in cult, the semblance of its autonomy disappeared forever (227)

[F]or contemporary man the representation of reality by the film is
incomparably more significant than that of the painter, since it of-
fers, precisely because of the thoroughgoing permeation of reality
with mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality which is free of all
equipment. And that is what one is entitled to ask from a work of
art (234)

Before a painting of Arp's or a poem by August Stramm it is impos-
sible to take time for contemplation and evaluation as one would
before a canvas of Derain's or a poem by Rilke. In the decline of
middle-class society, contemplation became a school for asocial be-
havior; it was countered by distraction as a variant of social con-
duct (238)

Distraction and concentration form polar opposites which may be
stated as follows: A man who concentrates before a work of art is
absorbed by it. . . . In contrast, the distracted mass absorbs the
work of art (239)

To broach the concept of representation relative to the *Artwork* essay
could simply incite us to summarize its argument, for Benjamin's point
was to revisit the meaning of "represent" in light of new technology.
Yet the axes and thrust of his thinking did not emerge in a void, and it
might be useful to sketch the terrain onto which he ventured with this
text. Three conditions describe Benjamin's understanding of the art-
work in its new situation: it is no longer autonomous; it seems to be
deeply embedded in contemporary reality; it is no longer an object of
contemplation. While not exhaustive, these three are interconnected in
complex ways, notably when Benjamin insists that mechanically repro-
duced works of art so become a part of the cultural matrix that a so-
called higher order of existence becomes impossible. What were some
of the forces behind Benjamin's thinking? Or, keeping in mind that
"critical" thinking means generally "against the grain," we could ask:
against *what* grain?

Of course, Benjamin's interest in representation was not unique: we can signal, for example, that Martin Heidegger lectured in Freiburg, Zurich, and Frankfurt during 1935–36 on the origins of the work of art, lectures later incorporated into *Holzwege*. We cannot know how closely Benjamin followed Heidegger's work, but he was surely aware of the latter's meteoric rise in German academe, and the few letters in which Heidegger is mentioned suggest the existence of an intellectual—not to mention personal—rivalry. In short, there would be grounds for Benjamin to mark his own analysis of the artwork as clearly *not* Heideggerian. We might, for example, set Benjamin's claim that mechanical reproduction has liquidated the autonomy of art against Heidegger's 1935 mapping of its origins as self-enclosed and circular:

The Way of the asking about the origin of the work of art is a circular course. "*Origin*" means the ground that makes the work of art possible and necessary in its essence. The *starting point* of the question is found in the *workness of the work* and neither in its production by the artist nor in the object-being for the art market. (*De l'Origine*, 24)

Or, we could pit Benjamin's remark that painting can no longer match the immediate appeal of mechanically reproduced forms—so thoroughly are they part of everyday reality—against Heidegger's claim that works of art by nature both negotiate and instantiate a *rupture* in the world:

World is against Earth and Earth against World. They are in strife, and this, *because* they belong to each other. This strife is opened—that is, conquered—in the work as such. The work should neither suppress nor overcome this strife. It must itself *be* this strife, perform it, that is, conquer it. The staying-in-itself of the work says nothing other than the *conquering of this strife*. And this is the *essential feature* of workness. (*De l'Origine*, 32)

And, finally, Benjamin's notion of distracted attention—the end of contemplation and evaluation—stands sharply opposed to Heidegger's gambit of "great art" and the metaphysical basis of its evaluation:

Thus great art is never up-to-date art. Art is great when it brings its Being to full unfolding, that is, in its work sets *the* truth that shall become the measure for a time. The work can however not make itself up-to-date. There are of course such productions. But they are no *leap forward*, because they have no origin, but always only a supplement. In the wake of every real art is a supplemental art; it looks like the other, it often even succeeds better, and is yet different from great art by a leap—not only by degrees. (*De l'Origine*, 48)

Much has been written about Benjamin's use of *distraction* to describe the attention of "mass" audiences, where self-conscious "humanist" subjects give way to anonymous consumers of mechanically reproduced imagery. When joined to the idea that such images become an "aspect of reality" in and of themselves, we sense Benjamin's materialist bias, and usually ascribe it to his contact with Marxism, however odd that contact may be. There is, however, another figure whose work seems to have produced a creative resistance to Benjamin's thinking, a figure later described by Theodor Adorno as "the most influential French sociologist of the generation which is represented by names like Max Weber, Simmel, Troeltsch in Germany" ("Einleitung zu Emile Durkheim," 245). This person is Emile Durkheim, whose *Sociology and Philosophy* [*Sociologie et Philosophie*] (first published in 1924) seems pertinent to Benjamin's *Artwork* essay on three fronts. First is Durkheim's insistence on the materiality of representations: "[It] is not at all necessary to imagine representations as things having a separate existence; it is merely sufficient to admit that they are not non-entities, that they are phenomena but endowed with reality, with specific properties" (15). Second is the idea that "all representations from the moment that they come into being affect, apart from the organs, the mind itself. That is to say, they affect the present and past representations which constitute the mind" (17). Finally—and most important—is Durkheim's suggestion that this secondary effect may be subconscious because "we are always to a certain extent in a state of distraction . . . all distraction has the effect of withdrawing certain psychic states from the consciousness which do not cease to be real for all that, since they continue to function" (21). In short, representations cluster in unpredictable ways:

If one can say that, to a certain extent, collective representations are exterior to individual minds, it means that they do not derive from them as such but from the association of minds, which is a very different thing. No doubt in the making of the whole each contributes his part, but private sentiments do not become social except by combination under the action of the sui generis forces developed in association. In such a combination, with the mutual alterations involved, *they become something else*. (26)

It seems clear that Durkheim was struggling to explain how a "mass" might emerge from a play of representations rather than, say, from a shared economic state. How this happens remained something of a mystery to him, for he admitted that "certainly we do not know exactly how these combined movements do give rise to a representa-

tion" (27). Ultimately Durkheim appealed to *spirituality*—which fuses individual thoughts into collective "social facts" the way individual brain cells "join" to become an organ capable of thought—and he suggested it operates as a spreading process over time: "The whole is only formed by the grouping of the parts, and this grouping does not take place instantly as a result of a sudden miracle. There is an infinite series of intermediaries between the state of pure isolation and the completed state of association" (30).

This is terrain where Benjamin could not travel, a weakness in Durkheim's otherwise attractive (anti-Heideggerian?) scheme he could not accept. But Benjamin *did* recognize that a "sudden miracle," which spreads representation like wildfire and in ways largely unconscious, now exists: mechanically reproduced images, especially film, whose technique "not only permits in the most direct way but virtually causes mass distribution" (n. 7). On opening day, thousands of viewers, in hundreds of nearly identical, darkened rooms, experience collectively the powerful "shock effect" of a new film, yet only partially (distractedly) understand what they have shared. Representations fully saturated with "reality," films become almost immediately social facts, "mass" phenomena that—as Durkheim predicted—"once a basic number of representations has been thus created, they become . . . partially autonomous realities with their own way of life. . . . [T]hey are immediately caused by other collective representations and not by this or that characteristic of the social structure" (31). Here we discover some of the conditions for representation "against the grain" of Heidegger: image-material that circulates and generates meaning, but which refuses to become a locus of "truth."

The Destruction of Representation

Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay in the Present Age

The task of confronting Benjamin's *Artwork* essay today seems to require that we supersede his diagnosis in favor of new developments in the arts and their technical reproduction and that we regard the essay as a cult text, even if it is no longer representative.¹ Yet such a demand would overlook the fact that Benjamin's diagnosis is also a prognosis. Benjamin safeguarded his text against such a misreading by a double gesture, in epigraph and preface, toward the future. As the opening excerpt from Valéry announces, the growth of technical means "stellt uns in nahe Zukunft die eingreifendsten Veränderungen in der antiken Industrie des Schönen in Aussicht" [presents us in the near future with a view of the most intervening changes in the antique industry of the beautiful]. These changes affect not only the modes of technical reproduction of the work of art but also the possibility of its representation, thus opening the question of representation in the artwork essay and the question of representation of the essay as artwork.

The phrase "stellt . . . in Aussicht" points beyond itself toward a change in the present condition, a change where the distant immediacy of the eye [*Aus sicht*] is mediated by the penetrating hand [*ein greifendsten*]. This change marks a loss of representation, effected by a replacing, by an "An-die-Stelle-setzen" (as Benjamin repeatedly formulates it) of the "Dar-" in "Darstellung" [representation] with an "in Aussicht" [prospect] that opens onto the future and indicates direction and mobility. The change also signifies a displacement of the artwork from its authentic location, a shift that destroys the condition of its representa-

1. *Editors' Note:* Parenthetical references in the text and notes of this essay are keyed to the edition listed in the Bibliography as: Benjamin, "Das Kunstwerk" (*Illuminationem*). All English translations are the author's own.

tion. What is thus “in Aussicht gestellt” and presented as a promise of the text, is a theory of representation that becomes visible in its very destruction, rescued from the ruin that the work undergoes in time. It therefore seems that a confrontation is not in order, but rather a critique that will complement and complete Benjamin’s work. Such a critique, I will propose, must trace the constellation of “Stellen,” “stellen,” and “Stellung” in the text and indicate the directions in which they point.² Benjamin takes literally the etymological meaning of “Darstellung”—the bringing of an object before our eyes by making it stand up there and so remain or endure—by extending this image to its crisis: the shaking of the foundation (cf. 152, 155) which leads to its fall, to the “Ausfallen” (159, 161) of the aura. The representation of the destruction of representation, or representation as destruction, therefore *represents itself*—thereby doubling itself—and does so in a distracted fashion, scattered among the parts of the text.

Benjamin’s text anticipates the charge that it is no longer valid by predicting its own destruction. Like Marx, Benjamin “directed his efforts in such a way as to give them prognostic value” (148). This prognosis by and about the text—its destruction—coincides with the development within the text—the destruction of representation. Benjamin’s text is therefore no longer representative of *something* in the traditional sense: its object (destruction) does not precede representation but arises only in and through representation itself. The essay’s representativeness lies in its exhibition value: it exhibits the destruction of representation, the representation of something that is no longer there—the representation of representation.

Prophetic with regard to both the text and the future, the *Artwork* essay’s preface actualizes Benjamin’s prognosis with the triad “Darstellung,” “Herstellung,” and “Abschaffung.” Like Marx, Benjamin undertakes a representation of the “basic relations of capitalistic production”

2. Just how deliberately Benjamin has placed derivatives of “stellen” within his text becomes evident when he quotes an early film critic’s contention that, from the point of view of film as art, it would “ein ganz unvergleichliches Ausdrucksmittel darstellen” [represent an incomparable means of expression] (159; my emphasis). Benjamin uses “darstellen” only when the prerequisites for representation are given. The critic’s view reveals itself as inadequate, for he proceeded with his “voreilige Fragestellung” [rash posing of the question] and reached his conclusion “ohne die Vorfrage sich gestellt zu haben” [without having posed the preliminary question] (159; my emphasis) of whether the character of art has been fundamentally changed by the invention of film. Similarly, what Franz Werfel “stellt . . . fest” [ascertains] (160), is wrong in Benjamin’s eyes, because it results from the same “voreilige Fragestellung.”

to let emerge “the production of conditions which would make possible the abolition” (148) of capitalism itself. Likewise, “Darstellung” [representation] is replaced by “Herstellung” [production], which brings about “die Abschaffung seiner selbst”—the abolition of “Darstellung” itself.

I

Benjamin begins his reflections on representation and its destruction from the perspective of the work of art. The characteristics required for an artwork to become representable display a unifying quality: the work is set apart by its uniqueness, its duration, its being a “Gegenstand” [object], its “Feststellung” [becoming fixed], and its distance from the observer. The work’s uniqueness and unity are brought about by its singular location in space—its presence in the here and now—which also defines its aura (cf. 151). This static position in space [*Standort*] grounds the work’s duration, making possible a “Feststellung” (indispensable for “Darstellung”) that authenticates the work by determining and fixing it in space. The artwork is made complete by the phenomenon of its aura, “the unique appearance of a distance, however close it may be” (154). By granting a work its distance, aura lets it appear as a “Gegenstand” or “gegenständlichen Vorwurf,” an objective pro-jection that stands opposite to [*Gegen-*] or before [*Vor-*] a subject (155–56).

If “Darstellung” is based on the uniqueness of the artwork, “Herstellung” for Benjamin, by contrast, is always “massenweise” [mass production] (149). Production in quantity (*reproduction*) suspends the possibility of traditional representation, for the singularity of its object gives way to a multiplicity that re-places it. An artwork is unique by dint of occupying a “Stelle”; in reproduction, however, the place of unique existence is taken by a plurality of copies (cf. 153). Moreover, Benjamin emphasizes that *technical* reproduction, having had no place of its own, has conquered a “place” for itself among the artistic processes and reached a “Standard” [standard], literally an upright position that indicates its newly won authority (151).

With reproduction, the work loses not only its place but also its duration and thus its “Feststellung.” It is now subject to “Herstellung” [production], which gives it a direction and mobility. The duration or “Be-stehen” [ex-istence; my emphasis] of the work further contrasts with the quick appearance and disappearance of images and sounds in our homes that are produced instantly, for they are summoned by a

“movement of the hand” (151). Benjamin describes this arrival of sound and image with the verb “sich einstellen” [here: to present oneself], which also evokes its opposite, “ausstellen” [to turn off]—that is, the “movement of the hand” that terminates their presence. Furthermore, “sich einstellen” indicates that technically reproduced sounds and images—unlike representation—are changeable, for they adapt to the hand that adjusts them.

Technical reproduction dissolves the unity of the work of art and threatens its distance by subjecting it to a twofold mobility, each effected by an intervention of the hand. It exposes the original to an adjustable [*verstellbaren*] lens whose alterable focus³ is able to manipulate the exposure (152). Not only can the lens be moved in the direction of the object, but the artwork itself—in the form of one of its reproductions—can be brought closer to the receiver and thus into a situation where it leaves its original place (152). Place defines the unity and uniqueness of the original, and its unique presence at a place is a prerequisite of its “Darstellung.” Thus, re-presentation of the technically reproduced object becomes impossible, for its position has already been altered. With this increased mobility, the work’s authority—its aura—begins to sway and finally recedes (152).

Works of art, for Benjamin, can acquire a third kind of mobility that threatens their representation. Apart from the movements by which lens and artwork approach each other, the artwork also becomes mobile when it begins to circulate in exhibitions. The possibility of exhibiting a portrait bust “that can be sent here and there,” its “Ausstellbarkeit,” dissolves the “festen Ort,” the fixed place of the statue of a deity inside a temple (157). However, “Ausstellbarkeit” in itself does not seem to jeopardize representation; only *repeated* exhibitions dissolve the object’s representability. Benjamin remarks that while a cave-man might have exhibited his portrait of an elk to his fellow men, it was intended for the spirits (156): “Ausstellbarkeit” only undermines the possibility of representation when it affects the artwork’s situatedness—that is, when it removes the object from its original location.

The cultic object—the artwork in the state of representation—is not exposed but concealed from view. Similarly, Benjamin has hidden a central aspect of his theory of representation in a footnote, namely the reason why situatedness is so crucial to representation.

3. Or “Einstellung,” a word Benjamin uses later in the essay (cf. 160). The “Einstellung” of the camera corresponds to the film’s “Ausstellung” (164) of the actor’s performance.

II

The principle governing Benjamin’s understanding of representation is buried in the fourth footnote of the *Artwork* essay. Here, the link that connects his examples—the artwork and the actor on stage or before the camera—is provided by a group of physicians who are represented as figures (actors) in a painting (artwork). These physicians do not only illustrate the principle of representation but also—as “Operateure” [surgeon, cameraman, projector] who cut—demonstrate the workings of technical reproduction (166). In the footnote, Benjamin draws attention to a sixteenth-century painter who is able to represent a group of physicians representatively (177). To effect such a double representation, the artist has to paint them on location—that is, present them in a scene where their profession and the place of its praxis coincide. The twofold character of representation is thus grounded in the duplicity of thing and location, in the object’s situatedness in place.

The doubling of object and place generates the phenomenon of aura as a near distance. In the aura of an object, the distant “Erscheinung” [appearance] is coupled with its “Materie” [matter], its near physical presence, yet they do not coincide: rather, they keep a distance from each other which is crucial for representation (177, n. 5). Aura thus becomes representative of the object that gives rise to its appearance; they are coexistent. The doubling of the object into matter and appearance, which makes auratic representation possible, is a function of the object’s “situatedness.”

Of the two conceptions of “Darstellung” at stake here—the relation of representation to its object and representation as a self-reflexive act—Benjamin is concerned not with the question of whether the work of art is a representation of *something*, but whether the artwork and the actor are able to represent themselves to an audience. Thus, the crucial aspect of film is not “daß der Darsteller dem Publikum einen anderen als daß er der Apparatur sich selbst darstellt” [that the actor represents another to the audience but that he represents himself to the apparatus] (161). The artistic performance of the stage actor—“dem Publikum durch diesen selbst in eigener Person präsentiert” [presented to the audience by himself in person]—is a double representation (160). Being doubly present as person and performer, the actor is representative of himself as he acts “in eigener Person” [by himself in person].

The actor on stage is present with his entire being, and this full presence allows his aura to emerge. In film, however, the screen actor

loses his presence to the apparatus. His aura, too, vanishes before the apparatus, for it cannot be reproduced at a place different from that which gave rise to it. The screen actor's representation to the audience is mediated by the apparatus of the camera: "dagegen wird die Kunstleistung des Filmdarstellers dem Publikum durch eine Apparatur präsentiert" [the artistic performance of the screen actor, however, is presented to the audience through an apparatus] (160).⁴ Filmic production generates a twofold replacement: it puts "an die Stelle des Publikums die Apparatur" [the apparatus in the place of the audience] (162; emphasis mine) and also places the actor in a new situation where the doubled nature of his appearance is lost (161). In short, the screen actor still represents someone, but without his aura.

Benjamin observes that film has thrown the theater into a crisis (cf. 162), which is a crisis of representation.⁵ It is through the very loss of representation that its constitutive elements are brought into relief. Technical reproduction has shattered representation by dissolving its essential doubleness into sequence and seriality—into film as a series of images (cf. 158). The camera no longer serves as a means of analogical representation that faithfully transmits the image of the actor to the audience. Rather, it violates the totality of the actor's art, for the apparatus "nimmt . . . laufend . . . Stellung": it adopts a continually changing position vis-à-vis the work, which Benjamin describes as the camera's "Bewegungsmomente" [instants of movement] and "Spezialeinstellungen" [special takes]. It is thus a "Folge" von Stellungnahmen" (160; my emphasis), a series of partial takes whose multiplicity destroys the uniqueness of the actor's performance by splitting its unity into isolated frames that only later are combined into a montage.⁷ This

4. The immediate relationship between art object and viewer can be interrupted by other devices besides the camera: witness how magazines have begun to put up [aufzustellen] textual directives that serve as signposts to the photographs (158).

5. In the form of a "Krise der bürgerlichen Demokratie" [crisis of the bourgeois democracies], this crisis of representation also enters the political arena. Politicians are exposed to the same "Veränderung der Ausstellungsweise durch die Reproduktionstechnik" [change in the mode of exhibition caused by the technique of reproduction] that affects an actor when his audience is no longer a public (or the parliament) but the camera (180, n. 12).

6. Benjamin regards "Folge" as consequence *and* as series. The way in which we perceive a single image in a film is the consequence [Folge] (160) of the series [Folge] (158, 160) of all the preceding images. Both meanings coincide in the statement "Die Folge von Stellungnahmen . . . bildet den fertig montierten Film" [The series/consequence of partial takes . . . forms the finished montage of the film] (160).

7. The film's montage character is manifest in the way the "Installation" of lighting breaks down the "Darstellung eines Vorgangs" [representation of a process] into a series

montage is created out of individual shots that were not necessarily filmed in the order they afterward assume. A representation of something that did not exist before, the finished film is "zusammengestellt" [put together] and thus takes on a totality that is no longer uniform (162).

The camera's "Stellungnahme" [partial take], Benjamin observes, is testing the screen actor's performance, and, as such, mediates between the actor and the audience (cf. 160).⁸ With the direct contact to the actor thus blocked, the audience's desire to empathize with the actor is displaced onto the apparatus: the audience takes over the camera's attitude and, Benjamin argues, likewise begins to test the actor (cf. 161). Theatrical empathy—vicarious experience of an actor's feelings, thoughts, and so on through identification with him—is made impossible by technical reproduction.

In order to illustrate the difference between audience and apparatus, Benjamin suggests the analogy of a surgeon, who is an "Opérateur" like the cameraman (166). His "Stellungnahme" is a physical "Einfühlung" [empathy] that literally involves his hand. Penetrating the sick person's body, the surgeon disregards three basic premises of representation: he violates that body's totality; he eliminates the physical distance between himself and the patient; and he thereby assumes a position where he is unable "seinem Kranken sich von Mensch zu Mensch gegenüberzustellen" [to face his patient as man to man] (166; my emphasis). No longer opposite the surgeon, the patient ceases to be an object of representation. The figure of the surgeon appears in Benjamin's essay at both ends of representation: shown at his workplace in the painting, he constitutes a totality; when actually at work, he cuts into his patient's flesh and causes a loss of totality, thus destroying the possibility of representation.

of individual shots (162). The partial quality of the actor's performance is also illustrated by Rudolf Arnheim's remark, quoted by Benjamin, that the actor should be inserted "an der richtigen Stelle" [in the right place] (162).

8. See the entry "test" in Partridge, *Origins*, 708: "[He] who stands in the third part, he who stands by, a third party, as it were an intermediary between accuser and accused." The *Grimmsche Wörterbuch* makes an interesting semantic connection between witness, representation, and production by translating the Latin *productio testis* as "Zeugendarstellung" [representation by witnesses] (Grimm and Grimm, vol. 2, columns 791–92).

III

Benjamin approaches the concept of representation from two perspectives: on one hand, from the actor's point of view, the self-reflexive "Art, wie der Mensch sich der Aufnahmeapparatur [*darstellt*]" [the way in which man represents himself to the camera]; on the other, "wie er mit deren Hilfe die Umwelt sich darstellt" [how he represents the environment to himself with its help] (168). Screen actors are unable to represent themselves, for their aura dissolves before the camera. The requisite doubleness of representation, however, has "*stellenweise*" [partially; my emphasis] been regained through a "*Verschiebung*" [displacement] (165). Russian film, as Benjamin suggests, unites representation and production and thus allows representation and filmic reproduction to coincide. Like the physicians in the sixteenth-century painting, Russian workers are shown *at work*, so that some Russian "Darsteller sind nicht Darsteller in unserem Sinn, sondern Leute, die *sich*—und zwar in erster Linie in ihrem Arbeitsprozeß—darstellen" [actors are not actors in our sense but people who represent *themselves*—primarily in their work process] (165; Benjamin's emphasis). Human beings represent themselves as human beings by reproducing themselves through work.

The "filmic" or "artistic representation of reality" (167, 183) is an illusion,⁹ however, for there is no "real" reality that corresponds to the artistic reality: it is based on the duplicity of representation—on its *deceptive* character—not on its reflexive doubleness. The finished film creates the illusion of a nature free of the camera that has penetrated it, while the artistic reality is in fact a reality-cum-apparatus (cf. 167). Furthermore, the "reality" that is displayed in a movie never occurred as such prior to the filming, but is created together with its representation. Composed of independent shots that are assembled into a whole,¹⁰ film therefore both destroys the doubleness of (traditional) representation by splitting the composite of appearance/material presence, and it illustrates Benjamin's notion of representation as constellation—a constellation of things. Just as the arrangement of individual "Stellungnahmen" by the apparatus makes up the representation of the fin-

ished film, the gathering together of "Stellen" [places, positions] creates a new configuration of materials that organize themselves into a "Darstellung." Benjamin "stellte sie so dar, daß sich aus ihnen ergab" [represented them in such a way that there resulted from them] (148) a "materialistische Darstellung" [materialist representation] (cf. 180, n. 11).

As argued above, the traditional form of representation presupposes a structural duplicity: the coincidence of object and place in the aura. This mode of representation is destroyed by a *replacing* that shatters the auratic unity of the object and installs a multiplicity in its stead. Scattering the parts of the whole into many places within itself, Benjamin's text enacts and represents the destruction of representation, and yet yields a constellation that is also a theory of representation—Benjamin's theory of representation. The essay is a "Zusammenstellung" [assemblage], a set of "Stellen" brought together, pieces of text about "Stellen." Together, they form a new doubleness: a representation of representation. It is in this sense that the text, a representation of the destruction of representation—representation *as* destruction—lets appear a constellation that is only *there* in destruction, arising only in and through the representation of something that no longer exists.

9. Thus, the film industry attempts to engage the masses by "illusionäre Vorstellungen" [illusionary representations] (165).

10. The crisis of traditional representation in film can be explained by the fact that its mode of production, which works from scattered pieces, does not correspond to its mode of representation, which is a unified whole.