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SASPP is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank that supports the strengthening of national adaptive social protection systems in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal to enhance the resilience of poor and vulnerable households and communities to the impacts of climate change. The program is supported by Denmark, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

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## ACRONYMS

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACLED</td>
<td>Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRITAC</td>
<td>African Regional Technical Assistance Centre in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>General Assembly (Assemblée Générale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRHYMET</td>
<td>Regional Training and Support Centre for Agrometeorology and Hydrology (Centre régional de formation et d’application en agrométéorologie et hydrologie opérationnelle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAM</td>
<td>National Meteorological Agency (Agence Nationale de la Météorologie)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>African Risk Capacity</td>
</tr>
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<td>ARV</td>
<td>Africa Risk View</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP</td>
<td>Adaptive social protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYII</td>
<td>Area yield index insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPS</td>
<td>National Council for Social Protection (Conseil National pour la Protection Sociale)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNSA</td>
<td>National Food Security Council (Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAREF</td>
<td>National Commission for Refugees (Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESUR</td>
<td>Departmental Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (Conseil Départemental de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONASUR</td>
<td>National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (Conseil National de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPROSUR</td>
<td>Provincial Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (Conseil Provincial de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORESUR</td>
<td>Regional Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (Conseil Regional de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Technical Committee (Comité Technique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIM</td>
<td>Common interdepartmental expenses (Dépenses communes interministérielles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEIE</td>
<td>Department of Water Studies and Information (Direction des Études et de l’Information sur l’Eau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGB</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Budget (Direction Générale du Budget)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGEP</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Economy and Planning (Direction Générale de l’Économie et de la Planification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGESS</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Sectoral Studies and Statistics (Direction Générale des Études et des Statistiques Sectorielles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGPC</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Civil Protection (Direction Générale de la Protection Civile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGPER</td>
<td>Directorate-General for the Promotion of the Rural Economy (Development Direction Générale de la Promotion de l’Économie Rurale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGRE</td>
<td>Directorate of National Water Resources (Direction Générale des Ressources en Eau)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPBEP</td>
<td>Multiannual Budgetary and Economic Programming Document (Document de Programmation Budgétaire et Économique Pluriannuelle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRF</td>
<td>Disaster risk financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster risk management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHCVM</td>
<td>Harmonised Household Survey (Enquête Harmonisée sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAARF</td>
<td>Women's Income Generation Support Fund (Fonds d'Appui aux Activités Rémunératrices des Femmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FASA</td>
<td>Food Security Support Fund (Fonds d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIE</td>
<td>Environmental Intervention Fund (Fonds d'Intervention pour l'Environnement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNPS</td>
<td>National Fund for Social Protection (Fonds National de Protection Sociale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNS</td>
<td>National Solidarity Fund (Fonds National de Solidarité)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF</td>
<td>Green Climate Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIEWS</td>
<td>Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAH</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Animal resources and Fisheries (Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Ressources Animales et Halieutiques)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAASN</td>
<td>Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, National Reconciliation, Gender and Family (Ministère de la Solidarité, de l'Action humanitaire, de la Réconciliation nationale, du Genre et de la Famille)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINATDS</td>
<td>Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralisation and Security (Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et de la Sécurité)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEFIP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de la Prospective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORSEC</td>
<td>Emergency Organisation (Organisation des Secours)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PARM  Platform for Agricultural Risk Management
PFM  Public financial management
PFS  Safety Nets Programme (Projet Filets Sociaux)
PNOCOSUR  National Plan for Organisation and Coordination of Emergency and Rehabilitation Assistance (Plan National d'Organisation et de Coordination des Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation)
PNMR  National Multi-risk Plan (Plan National Multi-risques)
PNPS  National Social Protection Policy (Politique Nationale de Protection Sociale)
PNSAN  National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (Politique Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle)
PRSPV  Response and Support Plan for Populations Vulnerable to Food Insecurity and Malnutrition (Plan de Réponse et de Soutien aux Populations Vulnérables à l'Insécurité Alimentaire et à la Malnutrition)
PS-CNPS  Permanent Secretariat for the National Council for Social Protection (Secrétariat Permanent du Conseil National pour la Protection Sociale)
PTF  Technical and financial partner (Partenaire technique et financier)
RCP  Representative Concentration Pathways
RSU  Unique Social Registry (Registre Social Unique)
SAP  Early Warning System (Système d'Alerte Précoce)
SASPP  Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program
SDC  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SE-CNSA  Executive Secretariat of the National Security Council (Secrétariat Exécutif du Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire)
SONAGESS  National Company for the Management of Food Security Stocks (Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité Alimentaire)
THIMO  Labor-intensive work (Travaux à haute intensité de main d'œuvre)
UEMOA  West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine)
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNCDF  United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children's Fund
WII  Weather index insurance
WFP  UN World Food Programme
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the Centre for Disaster Protection’s support to the World Bank Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (SASPP), the UK-funded Sahel Shock Response Programme seeks to develop a baseline of in-depth analysis on the social protection and disaster risk financing (DRF) landscape in the Sahel region. This is the first in a series of diagnostic reports aimed at informing the design and programming of the Centre’s support to the SASPP.

Effective climate response via social protection hinges on swift scalability and adaptability. Adaptive social protection (ASP) systems aim to enhance short-term shock responses, prevent deeper poverty, and boost long-term resilience for vulnerable groups against climate-induced risks. DRF complements ASP by providing pre-arranged funds for timely and predictable responses and aiding post-shock recovery. It prevents vulnerable individuals from resorting to harmful coping measures, enhancing household resilience through predictable funding for disaster preparedness and faster recovery.

Burkina Faso’s economy relies heavily on agriculture, contributing over 18% of GDP and engaging 70%–80% of the workforce. Rainfed, subsistence-based farming on small plots heightens climate vulnerability. Escalating climate-related and human-made risks worsen food insecurity and have displaced about 2 million people, mainly in the Nord and Centre-Nord regions. The country faces agro-climatic threats from frequent droughts and floods across the Sahel, disproportionately affecting regions including Nord, Boucle de Mouhoun, Est and Centre.

Burkina Faso’s social protection landscape is characterised by fragmentation, with over 200 projects, where the top 20 programmes are driving nearly 80% of assistance spending. While most projects offer in-kind aid, a fraction provide cash transfers, aiding around 600,000 people through the World Bank-backed Safety Nets Project, aiming for adaptable support. Despite increased government investment, a coverage gap persists due to limited resources, while expectations of declining donor support and constrained debt financing challenge future prospects.

Key humanitarian agencies’ targeting strategies lack clear documentation, and while the Cadre Harmonisé guides aid decisions, the connection between government
social protection systems and humanitarian beneficiary registries is unclear. Lack of coordinated beneficiary selection and joint means of delivering cash transfers (specifically through mobile money) suggests high transaction costs for all parties at present. These are significant obstacles to effective vertical and horizontal scaling of social protection responses that have to continue to be addressed over the medium term.

**Recommendations**

The analysis presented in this report demonstrates that the existing national social safety net in Burkina Faso needs to be strengthened to respond rapidly and dynamically to climate-related disasters and other shocks.

Recommendations for improving public sector capabilities to plan for, finance and deliver funding to climate-related disasters and compounding shocks in Burkina Faso include:

1. **Strengthen government capabilities to estimate the macro-fiscal implications of disaster risk, and introduce more explicit linkages to multi-annual budget programming.** Impact modelling could inform financial allocations of public resources, as well as the design of instruments to implement the national budget.

2. **Scale up levels of disaster risk financing coverage (such as ARC and ARC Replica) to reduce the protection gap.** A sovereign insurance policy that can supplement the resources available for response in case of more severe shocks, as well as a reinforced market for microinsurance would contribute to ensuring that there is a lower pressure on government or humanitarian social protection schemes.

3. **Refine climate datasets and trigger design to capture pockets of drought and localised flooding.** Defining and introducing an early warning platform with data at commune level (admin 3).

4. **Develop and pilot dedicated protection and DRF instruments for pastoralists.** Pre-arranged plans and financial protection could help avoid further drivers of conflict in the northern areas of the country and along the border between rangeland-dominated and crop-dominated regions.

5. **Introduce tools to better estimate the financing needs of scaling up social protection in response to shocks.** Such tools could provide the basis for a more informed, strategic discussion among donors and implementing agencies, as well as with the government, on various ways of scaling cash transfers.

6. **Provide support across a range of domestic financing instruments to deliver ASP.** Technical work to strengthen the Food Security Support Fund (Fonds d’Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire, FASA) is ongoing, focused on the fund’s governance framework and its operational guidelines. A new operation could invest in strengthening the shock-responsive capabilities of other instruments to complement the FASA and diversify sources of adaptive social assistance.

7. **Actively integrate and consider the needs of internally displaced people (IDPs) and host communities as social protection systems and conflict dynamics evolve.** Design of social protection programmes should target and reach the rapidly growing number of IDPs.
INTRODUCTION

As part of the Centre for Disaster Protection’s (henceforth the Centre) support to the World Bank Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program (SASPP), the UK-funded Sahel Shock Response Programme seeks to develop a baseline of in-depth analysis on the social protection and disaster risk financing (DRF) landscape in the Sahel region.

This diagnostic report is the first in a series of discrete, complementary reports produced by the Centre, which seeks to inform the design and programming of the Centre’s support to the SASPP in its implementation phase; and to function as a resource to support and inform Centre staff, consultants and stakeholders working on the project, to understand its operating context, as well as relevant stakeholders and approaches.

The report focuses on the intersection between DRF and social protection in Burkina Faso, and provides an overview of:

1. The main disaster events resulting in significant impacts over the past 20 years.
2. Existing legislation, institutional arrangements and government programmes to deliver and finance disaster preparedness, disaster response and social protection.
3. Relevant DRF sources and instruments for adaptive social protection (ASP).

To develop this report, the authors have drawn on publicly available data and documentation, confidentially shared reports and targeted key informant interviews.

The report is structured as follows: section 1 provides an overview of the key sectors relevant to disaster risk and ASP in Burkina Faso, specifically the agriculture and social protection sectors; section 2 presents a profile of the principal hazards and vulnerabilities to disaster risk people face in Burkina Faso; section 3 summarises the data on humanitarian assistance flowing to Burkina Faso in response to various disasters and crises; section 4 analyses existing government institutional arrangements in place for disaster response and social protection; and section 5 describes the DRF instruments used in Burkina Faso. The report concludes with recommendations for the Centre and other stakeholders on improving DRF in support of ASP in Burkina Faso.

Disaster risk financing and adaptive social protection: what and why

The ability of social protection programmes and systems to respond effectively to climate-related shocks and disasters depends in large part on how flexibly and rapidly they can scale – to provide more or different support, to more or different vulnerable populations to cushion them against the effects of such shocks. ASP systems seek not only to improve responses to shocks and prevent people from sinking (further) into poverty, but to strengthen the resilience of vulnerable people over the longer term to manage risks arising from climate change.

Disasters and crises affect governments as well as vulnerable people: they create contingent liabilities that affect current and future government revenues and expenditures. Governments frequently bear the high costs of response, recovery, and reconstruction following fast- or slow-onset crises, including financing social protection systems.

ASP systems rely heavily on up-to-date information on vulnerable populations’ location, income, living conditions and exposure to various kinds of shocks and hazards. Although modalities exist for quickly and effectively delivering assistance to targeted populations in the event of a shock – most notably cash transfers, as used by many social protection programmes – realising the full potential of such modalities also requires adequate financing to be in place. The scale-up of social protection support is rarely budgeted or prepared for, leading governments to make costly decisions to meet additional financial demands during disasters.

Disaster risk financing covers the system of budgetary and financial mechanisms to credibly pay for a specific risk, arranged before a potential shock. This can include paying to prevent and reduce disaster risk, as well as preparing for and responding to disasters. Effective DRF is complementary to the objectives and features of ASP systems: it enables earlier action ahead of and in response to shocks through combinations of pre-arranged and unplanned funding, helping to prevent vulnerable and affected people from resorting to negative coping strategies. Effective DRF also serves to increase the resilience of households by allowing them to prepare for disasters, and shortening the time needed to recover. Finally, predictable assistance can reduce uncertainty.
following a disaster and enable households to invest in preparedness and adaptation.

Different types of DRF instruments are more relevant for different types of disasters. Instruments that transfer the risk of disasters to the private sector (e.g. insurance) are better suited to fund responses to very severe (and thus more costly) but infrequent disasters; whereas instruments through which governments retain and manage risk themselves (e.g. national disaster funds) are better suited to less severe (less costly) but more frequent shocks. Effective strategies for preparing and responding to disaster risk typically include combinations of such instruments, to manage as much of the range of disaster risks a particular country faces as possible, as shown in Figure 1.

Pre-arranged forms of financing favoured in DRF will include clearly defined conditions for the release of funds, usually referred to as triggers (objective and verifiable measures of specific indicators reaching predetermined levels), and planning at national level (how funding is channelled, whom this funding targets, and what it is spent on when it is triggered). Anticipatory or pre-arranged forms of finance are generally considered to arrive fastest and offer the greatest value in responding to disasters; whereas unplanned forms of finance (typically secured after crises have happened) are considered to be slower and more uncertain. Pre-arranged financing instruments also allow governments to spread costs over time at a predictable rate. They are found to better complement government disaster risk management (DRM) strategies, as they promote better preparedness and investment in risk reduction (Cummins and Mahul 2008; Broberg and Hovani 2019).

Leveraging DRF instruments for financing a particular ASP system involves determining the financial requirements for responses to particular types of shocks of varying magnitudes; identifying appropriate financial instruments to provide resources; and establishing distribution mechanisms to reach the identified beneficiaries. This report considers the extent to which these aspects are in place in Burkina Faso, and how they could be strengthened in future programming.

Figure 1: Illustration of a layered disaster risk finance strategy for governments

Source: Alton and Mahul (2017).

1 Analysis by the Centre for Disaster Protection, however, indicates that only a small share of overall crisis finance in 2021 was pre-arranged (USD1.9 billion which is only 3.7% of total crisis finance); (Plichta and Poole 2023).
SECTORAL OVERVIEW

This section summarises key facts and figures on significant economic sectors in Burkina Faso, with relevance to natural hazards and social protection.

1.1 Macro-fiscal profile

Burkina Faso is a low-income, landlocked country in West Africa, with a population of close to 23 million people. Its current macro-fiscal position reflects a gradual recovery to pre-pandemic levels of economic growth that is being challenged by rapidly increasing price levels. From an economy that has grown at an average rate of over 5.5% per year since 2000, a series of exogenous shocks, including an unstable political and security context, supply chain disruptions following the covid-19 pandemic, and rising global food and energy prices, are rapidly eroding fiscal buffers and limiting growth.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates year-on-year GDP growth to have been 2.5% in 2022, down from 6.9% in 2021, with annual inflation having risen sharply from 4% to 14% between 2021 and 2022. Since the onset of increasing levels of insecurity in 2018, spending on the security sector has risen substantially, to over USD 1 billion in 2023 (close to 7% of GDP), with a substantial share going to fuel imports, driving up the current account deficit. Yet while price levels are expected to stabilise in 2023, the fiscal deficit has grown considerably in the past five years. The IMF projects that the fiscal deficit will be close to 8% of GDP in 2023, driven up further by increased government spending on subsidies in response to rising global food and energy prices.

Although public debt has remained at comparatively moderate levels (54% of GDP), external (and especially concessional) financing is expected to decline as major donors reduce support following successive coups. This limits fiscal space in a context in which deficit financing is challenging – the cost of financing on the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) bond market is high. However, the highest share of public debt is high-interest domestic debt (World Bank n.d.). The Ministry of Finance (MINEFIP), meanwhile, is optimistic; it projects a return to growth and a reduction in the budget deficit, although it expects a large increase in debt financing from multilaterals and domestic bond issuances (see Table 1). It does not expect a return to the UEMOA target rate of a fiscal deficit under 3% of GDP before 2027.

Table 1: Projected evolution of key macroeconomic indicators (2022–25)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables (in %)</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget deficit (including grants) to nominal GDP ratio</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual inflation rate</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debt to nominal GDP ratio</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of payroll to tax revenues</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax to GDP ratio</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINEFIP (2022a).
The IMF Board in March 2023 approved a disbursement of USD80.77 million from the Rapid Credit Facility, in response to the rapidly deteriorating food security outlook in Burkina Faso. The emergency disbursement was intended to enable the government to provide food assistance, improve drinking water and protect livestock in light of the higher energy, agricultural input and food prices the most vulnerable households faced. The funding allocation was made alongside government commitments to introduce key public financial management (PFM) reforms, including improving expenditure controls, establishing a single Treasury account, and ensuring greater transparency in spending on cash transfers and food emergency spending.

1.2 Agriculture

Burkina Faso’s economy depends heavily on agriculture, forestry and livestock farming, as well as exploitation of mineral resources. Agriculture was estimated to contribute 18.4% of GDP in 2020, and the sector employs between 70–80% of the workforce (Raithatha 2022; Allen, Heinrigs and Heo 2018). The main food crops produced in terms of volume include sorghum, millet and maize, with cotton a cash crop (FEWS NET 2017).  

Output from agricultural production mainly originates from southern, western and central regions of the country. Crop production is mainly seasonal and rainfed, and is the main source of food.

Three distinct agroecological zones make up the territory of Burkina Faso as shown in Figure 2: the Sahelian zone covering the northern regions; the Sudano-Sahelian zone covering central regions and the Sudanese zone in the southwestern regions of the country. These zones are distinguished by different levels of precipitation, temperature and altitude, as well as different agricultural and pastoral practices (present especially in the north of the country) that are adapted to each zone. The main difference between the zones is in the volume of rainfall, which ranges from 400mm to 900mm on average, with 50–70 rainy days annually. Monthly temperatures range between 25.8ºC and 29.6ºC on average. The Sahelian agroecological climate experiences much higher temperatures than the other zones, at around 45ºC on average.

**Figure 2: Agroecological zones in Burkina Faso**


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2 Burkina Faso is one of the leading cotton producers and exporters in Africa.
Burkina Faso has a single agricultural season, which differs slightly by type of crop as shown in Figure 3. Harvests are typically in September–November. However, there are also important temporal and spatial variations in rainfall. The northern zone has a predictably longer dry season, while the two Sudanese zones typically see more rainfall than the Sahelian zone.

The agricultural sector is primarily subsistence based and rainfed, with most farms smaller than 5ha (FAO 2014), thus limiting the financial resilience of farmers or their access to loans to make investments in irrigation or climate-smart techniques. This and other factors significantly limit the adaptive capabilities of the agricultural sector, heightening its vulnerability to climate change, which is expected to significantly affect the sector in Burkina Faso in the coming decades.

An annual average temperature increase of 1°C or more is expected for the 2011–2040 period, compared with the 1981–2010 period. The temperature increase is expected to be higher (up to 1.5°C) in the east, accompanied by more frequent heatwaves during the dry season (October–March). However, longer-term modelling efforts are not conclusive about whether rainfall will become more variable (Le Cotty et al. 2021). Nevertheless, temperature increases and more very hot days are expected to affect agricultural output by reducing grain ripening times, contributing to water stress. These changes are expected to result in steadily diminishing yields for key food crops in the coming decades, as shown in Figure 4.
1.3 Social protection

Social protection encompasses measures provided to protect people against economic and social distress. The design and delivery of such measures by the public sector comprise systems intended to help poor and vulnerable people cope with crises and shocks, find jobs, invest in their own and their children’s health and education, and protect ageing people.

Although the Government of Burkina Faso has increased its investment in social protection over the past decade, rising to a total of 2.4% of GDP in 2021 (World Bank 2021), there is a large gap in the numbers of vulnerable people covered by social protection programmes and initiatives – in part, due to very high rates of poverty and the relatively low level of public expenditure on social protection. Based on the World Bank’s estimates, ‘well-designed social protection programs are cost-effective, costing countries on average about 1.5% of GDP’ (ibid.). Burkina Faso’s expenditure on social protection is less than 5% of GDP, which is comparable with other countries in the West Africa region.4

Social assistance in Burkina Faso is limited, consisting of a multitude of fragmented safety net programmes delivered by various NGOs with limited coverage, coordination and efficiency. Over 200 distinct social assistance programmes were recorded in 2019, with the extent of coverage varying greatly from programme to programme – the largest 20 programmes account for close to 80% of total social assistance spending (World Bank 2022b). Most such programmes have favoured in-kind support, with only a small fraction deploying cash transfers to support vulnerable people (see Table 2).

Figure 5: Public investment in social protection (% of GDP, 2021)

Source: ILO (n.d.).

4 See: https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/WSPDB.action?id=15
Table 2: Summary of social assistance provided by main government-led cash transfer programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries (recorded year)</th>
<th>Average volume of transfer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THIMO for Youth (PEJDC component)</td>
<td>To provide immediate temporary employment for out-of-school young people (aged 16–35)</td>
<td>7,000 (urban), 1,510 (rural) (2016)</td>
<td>FCFA37,000, monthly, over six months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash for Work Programme</td>
<td>To strengthen productive means of the most vulnerable people, such as those affected by natural hazards</td>
<td>38,535 (2016)</td>
<td>FCFA20,000 monthly, over three months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconditional Cash Transfers to Poor in Sahel and Central North</td>
<td>To provide poor and vulnerable people with a safety net to help them avoid falling deeper into the poverty trap</td>
<td>2,770 (2016)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkin-Naong-Sa Ya (Projet Filets Sociaux)</td>
<td>To reduce structural poverty in the most vulnerable regions through income support; and lay the foundation for a basic safety net system (including in Nord, Est, Centre-Est, Centre-Ouest)</td>
<td>540,000 (2021)</td>
<td>Quarterly cash transfers of FCFA35,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The various social protection programmes cover close to 600,000 people, largely as a result of the reach of World Bank-funded Safety Nets Programme (Projet Filets Sociaux (PFS) or Burkin-Naong-Sa Ya), which is the most significant cash transfer programme and the largest poverty-targeted social assistance intervention in Burkina Faso. It aims to increase poor households’ access to safety nets through the provision of regular and shock-responsive cash transfers, and to lay the foundations of an adaptive safety net system in Burkina Faso.

The PFS has supported the provision of regular and adaptive cash transfers and accompanying support measures to vulnerable households. In 2021, the project reported having delivered cash transfers to 540,000 people in Burkina Faso, 80% of whom were estimated to be in the poorest two quintiles of the population, based on the most recent World Bank Economic Outlook (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Social safety net targeting (by % share of beneficiaries)

Source: adapted from World Bank (2022f).

5 In addition to this table, UNICEF provided cash transfers to 3,700 households in the Boucle du Mouhoun region from 2020 to 2022; see Kreidler and Ouédraogo (2022).
Aside from social safety nets, the most sizable forms of cash transfer support are assistance provided in response to the lean season, and support to internally displaced people (IDPs).

The largest lean season assistance programmes are provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), supporting around 17,000 households, and ‘emergency development’ support provided by international humanitarian NGOs Terre des Hommes and Action Contre la Faim to around 3,000 households. WFP provides humanitarian aid to IDPs in the form of cash transfers (to around 900,000 people across Burkina Faso), as do the Burkinabé Red Cross (to over 4,000 IDPs) and Oxfam (to 4,250 displaced households in the Sahelian zone).

Overall, few people in Burkina Faso benefit from any form of recurrent social protection. Coverage of social assistance is limited, with less than 10% of the population estimated to have access to any social protection scheme. For comparison, the poverty level is 30% across the country, based on the international poverty threshold of USD2.15/day, and higher than 40% in the Sahel, Est and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. Cash transfers have been estimated to reach only 0.7% of the total population, compared to 4.9% for food distribution and 8.6% for school feeding. (ILO, n.d.; World Bank, 2021; 2022f).

The coverage of social safety nets across the different regions in Burkina Faso, meanwhile, does not align well with the distribution of people in poverty or those affected by food insecurity, as shown in Figure 7. This is likely because social safety net assistance is principally targeted based on food security. Benefit levels tend to be low, furthermore, which alongside low coverage levels means vulnerable people and households turn to negative coping strategies to smooth their consumption.

Figure 7: Poverty levels by district (% of population living on less than USD2.15/day, 2022) (left) and distribution of social safety net (% of people covered by region in 2018) (right)

Source: authors’ representation, based on social safety net coverage data (World Bank 2021), Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC 2023) and poverty headcount using 2017 PPP from World Bank Open Data (2023). Poverty is calculated as the share of people living on less than USD2.15/day.
1.4 Key sectoral features for social protection programming

The overview of key sectoral features in Burkina Faso can be summarised as follows to frame a wider assessment of social protection programming in the near term:

**Agriculture is a key sector for the economy, with limited ability to adapt to climate change.** Projections suggest that temperature increases, and possible increased variability in levels of rainfall, will gradually reduce yields of key food crops. These trends are expected to increase the vulnerability of large numbers of vulnerable people active in the agricultural sector and beyond.

Although many social protection initiatives exist in Burkina Faso, these cumulatively provide limited coverage both in terms of numbers of people covered and amounts of support provided. There is significant scope to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of targeting and delivery of assistance: just over a third of these programmes use cash transfers to deliver social assistance (although these are the largest programmes), and the coverage of social safety nets does not fully align with the distribution of poverty and food insecurity.

**Current cash transfer-based disbursements provided as part of social protection programming only partially meet monthly household consumption needs** – currently estimated at just over FCFA113,000 (around USD195).\(^6\) The main scalable social protection programme, PFS, meets less than a third of this need in key months (July and August), in line with the average gap for food expenses, estimated by the 2021 minimum expenditure basket. This difference between support provided and consumption needs is likely to significantly widen in the event of climate-related shocks, although no specific evidence of this exists.

**Most social protection programmes target beneficiaries in a limited number of provinces to manage the operational complexity and cost in light of high levels of need.** This does not incentivise harmonised and coordinated approaches – notably to targeting – across programmes, and leaves specific beneficiary groups (especially IDPs) at risk of receiving insufficient assistance overall.

**Government projections of multilateral and debt financing are likely to be overly optimistic in the face of a challenging macro-fiscal outlook.** Limited overall fiscal space, paired with a sharp increase in spending on security, suggests that – despite stabilising food and energy prices, and IMF financing support – planned increases in public sector spending on social protection measures are unlikely to be fully realised.

**External financing from the IMF will put a renewed focus on specific areas of PFM reform in the near term.** Notably, the government will be expected to present more detailed reports and audited accounts for the implementation of the support provided through the IMF’s Food Shock Window\(^7\) – and hence of spending on the PFS and food emergencies, including details of public procurement contracts.

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\(6\) This figure reflects the minimum expenditure for a family of seven people as estimated in the minimum expenditure basket developed by the Cash Working Group in 2021.

\(7\) The Food Shock Window is a financing instrument of the IMF. It is designed to support coordinated international responses to global food shocks at country level by serving as contingency financing to address urgent balance of payment needs in light of global food shocks where other instruments are not feasible or necessary. The window is part of the Rapid Credit Facility and the Rapid Financing Instrument. See: [https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/global-food-crisis-and-food-shock-window](https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/global-food-crisis-and-food-shock-window)
KEY HAZARDS AND VULNERABILITIES

This section provides an overview of the frequency and impact of disasters that have been recorded in the country (especially floods and droughts), notably the most severe ones, and analyses the different sources of vulnerability that can impede a quick response or livelihood recovery from such events. The compounding effect of increasingly frequent and localised extreme phenomena alongside chronic food insecurity, conflict and displacement have already resulted in a situation of worrying food insecurity, with more than 3.3 million people estimated to be food insecure in Burkina Faso in 2023.

2.1 Hazard profile

Burkina Faso is a high-risk agro-climatic environment, owing to the high frequency of both droughts and floods across the Sahel. Droughts are the most severe type of disaster, impacting millions of people. The 2014 drought was the most significant event of the past 20 years, followed closely by the 2022 drought, as shown in Table 3. According to EM-DAT, the International Disaster Database,8 the highest numbers of people were affected in 2014 and 2022. The numbers reported to be affected by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Drought Number of events</th>
<th>Drought People impacted</th>
<th>Floods Number of events</th>
<th>Floods People impacted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,120</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25,610</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121,043</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>121,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,870</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>151,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>151,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>133,362</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>133,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,850,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11,396</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28,925</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34,893</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,500,928</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3,500,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,250,928</td>
<td>676,053</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ own, based on data from EM-DAT (2023).

See: https://www.emdat.be/
drought are confounded with the food insecurity numbers, which might have other sources of impact besides drought. It is a challenge to separate the two effects, since the IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé only collect reports of people affected and capture all sources of food security.⁹

EM-DAT reports suggest flood-related disasters occur more frequently; most often, they are generated by heavy rains that lead to riverine floods (88% of all flood events). The most severe flood events occurred in 2009, 2010 and 2020 (see Table 3).

In terms of geographical disaggregation of disaster occurrence, the regions most impacted by both floods and droughts are Sahel and Centre-Nord (more than 60% of events impacted these regions, as shown in Figure 8). These are closely followed by Nord, Boucle de Mouhoun, Est and Centre (including Ouagadougou).

Figure 8: Number of disaster events by province (2002–2022)

Complementing the EM-DAT reports, FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS) Country Briefs archive for the 2013–2022 period (FAO n.d.) gives more details about years with unfavourable conditions that have significantly affected the production of the main agricultural crops (maize, millet and sorghum). FAO has indicated 2017, 2019, 2020 and 2021 as years of ‘bad’ production. There does not seem to be much overlap between FAO and EM-DAT on the worst years, except for 2014, which FAO notes was a year slightly drier than usual, but with no major abnormalities, and 2022. None of the GIEWS reports give floods as the driver of production anomalies, except for mentions of ‘erratic rains’ (FAO n.d.).

However, the GIEWS Country Briefs mention that drought events and insect infestation in 2017 and 2021 had the greatest negative impact on national crop production (FAO n.d.), while the significant drop in production in 2022 – when national production fell by almost 1 million tonnes, to levels comparable to 2013 – was mostly attributable to increased insecurity, which prevented farmers in affected areas in the north from accessing their fields (see Figure 9).

⁹ The Cadre Harmonisé (https://www.cadreharmonise.org/) is a standardised framework for data and analysis on current and projected food and nutrition security. It classifies the severity of food and nutrition insecurity based on the international classification scale through an approach that refers to established functions and protocols. These are communicated in a consistent format, and are widely used for national-level decision-making on responses to food and nutrition insecurity.
Negative effects of erratic rains, pest attacks and insecurity

Below-average cereal production due to worsening conflicts

The same reports also present the disaggregated impact of the production loss for the three main crops. The greatest impact is due to significant drops in the production of millet, followed by sorghum. In recent years (2020–22), total national production of millet fell by 35% and sorghum by 18% (see Figure 10).
Mapping production levels by province (admin 2 level) for both millet and sorghum, we can conclude that significant shares of the productive basins for millet (55%) and sorghum (38%) are situated in areas of high insecurity and conflict. This finding also confirms the conclusion of GIEWS reports indicating that increased levels of insecurity have contributed to lost production in recent years (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: Top 10 provinces in terms of millet and sorghum production (2020)

![Chart showing millet and sorghum production for top 10 provinces](chart.png)

Source: authors’ own, based on FAO (n.d.) and ACLED (n.d.) data (2020–22).

A study by the Platform for Agricultural Risk Management (PARM), which drew extensively on Directorate General for Sectoral Studies and Statistics (DGESS) data (Le Cotty et al. 2021), found drought to have the greatest impact on risk to households given its high loss potential and relatively high frequency of occurrence. The same study found that smallholder farmers involved in low-intensity farming in the Sahel are subject to severe climatic shocks, in addition to an already heightened range of risks, including increasingly frequent drought and flooding events, which compound their potential production losses.

Figure 12: Average maize yields by region before and after drought events (kg/ha)

![Chart showing average maize yields by region](chart2.png)

Source: Le Cotty et al. (2021).

10 Defined as total share of production in provinces where fatalities from attacks on civilians were above the national average in 2022, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED): [https://acleddata.com/](https://acleddata.com/)
Climate change projections of national crop land area exposed to at least one drought per year suggest that drought exposure could increase up to fourfold under the RCP 6.0 scenario (Tomalka et al. 2020). On a separate note, consensus is growing among technical partners and implementers – the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Pula (an agricultural insurance and technology company) – that the frequency of floods is expected to increase significantly in the coming years. Stakeholders in Burkina Faso have also consistently emphasised the relevance of this risk for the vulnerable people they seek to support. As Figure 13 shows, exposure of urban areas to flood risk is not projected to change significantly in the medium to long term, noting significant modelling uncertainty with regard to flood risk.

Figure 13: Modelled projections of exposure to drought and flood risk (up to 2080)

![Graph showing projections of exposure to drought and flood risk](image)

Source: Tomalka et al. (2020).

### 2.2 Food insecurity

The relative importance of the agriculture sector, combined with the high frequency and severity of climate-related and human-made hazards, means food insecurity levels in Burkina Faso are significant. Based on historical numbers of food insecure people measured according to the IPC system, long-term averages indicate that up to 240,000 people are in acute food insecurity or livelihoods crisis (IPC classification level 3 (IPC3+)) in any given year. The distribution in the map in Figure 14 clearly shows northern, central and eastern regions as being disproportionately food insecure compared with the rest of the country.

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11 Under the medium/high emissions scenario (RCP 6.0), median climate model temperature increases amount to 2.0°C in 2030, 2.6°C in 2050 and 3.6°C in 2080.

12 These figures summarise the median results of multiple climate models and scenarios. The blue lines reflect the trajectory of greenhouse gas concentration that maintains global temperature rise below 2°C (Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6) while the red lines reflect the trajectory where global temperatures rise by 3–4°C in the coming century (RCP 6). Corresponding shaded areas reflect the likely and very likely ranges of model projections.
The long-term averages include periods over which there was no reporting of food insecurity trends (indicated by the area in grey), likely linked to the escalation of insecurity, and thus should be considered in light of these limitations (see Figure 15).

The sharp rise in the numbers of food-insecure people in recent years shows that food security in the Nord and Centre-Nord regions of Burkina Faso has degraded since the intensification of conflict in 2018, as summarised in Figure 16.
Using the same historical IPC and Cadre Harmonisé reports, we can also calculate the average time a person or household spends in various stages of food insecurity. This can have implications for the design of unconditional cash transfer programmes (in terms of their duration and amount), since the protection gap for people in IPC3+ will be more significant given the level of food supplies needed.

The same analysis also estimates the length of time people spend in various food insecure states – demonstrating that people in northern Burkina Faso can spend up to 6 months in any given year at medium risk of food insecurity (IPC2+), and up to 1 month at high risk of food insecurity (IPC3+) (see Figure 17 below). This can have implications on the projected duration of the unconditional cash transfers provided, as well as on their volume, since the protection gap for people in IPC3+ will be more significant given the level of food supplies required to meet their need. Finally, there is a lot of diversity observable between districts in need, although, as demonstrated in Figure 17, all evidence points to levels of food insecurity being highest in the northern provinces.
In contrast to the relatively low historical average of food-insecure people, levels of food insecurity have sharply increased in recent years due to the compounding effects of dry spells, conflict and displacement. Data from March 2023 indicates a total of 1.9 million people were in the equivalent of IPC3+, with 327,000 people in the equivalent of IPC4+. It was projected that by July that year 786,000 people would be added to IPC3+ and 364,000 to IPC4 and IPC5.

**Figure 18: Current and projected people in IPC3–5 (March 2023)**

Comparing provincial levels of food insecurity against poverty levels and current social safety net coverage by government systems indicates that coverage is — for a variety of reasons — not yet closely aligned to needs in provinces across Burkina Faso, as highlighted in Table 4. Among the reasons for such disparities are lack of access to agricultural fields in some areas, given high insecurity and conflict; and because the types of programmes the government favours are better suited to urban areas than rural ones (e.g. higher education stipends).

**Table 4: Comparison of projected shares of people in IPC3+, below poverty levels and covered by social safety net (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Projection du pourcentage de la population en IPC3+</th>
<th>Pourcentage de la population en dessous du seuil de pauvreté</th>
<th>Couverture par un FPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boucle du Mounhoun</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-Nord</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-Sud</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sud-Ouest</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-Est</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre-Ouest</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascades</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau Central</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Est</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hauts Bassins</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ calculations, based on (World Bank 2022b), Burkina Faso Harmonized Framework for March 2023 (IPC 2023) and poverty headcount (2017 PPP) using 2017 PPP from World Bank Open Data (2023). Poverty is calculated as the share of people living on less than USD2.15/day.

Note: SSN = social safety net
2.3 Conflict
Conflict significantly compounds natural hazard events, limiting farmers’ and government services’ access to parts of the country, and resulting in very high levels of displacement. The security context has rapidly deteriorated since 2018, with a high incidence of political violence and consequent fatalities in the northern and central regions, coinciding with and compounding high poverty and baseline food insecurity levels. Violence decreased during the covid-19 pandemic, likely as a result of quarantines, only to spike again towards the end of 2020, before reaching historically high levels in 2022, as shown in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Incidence of political violence events and reported fatalities (2010–2022)

Source: authors’ own graphic representation, based on ACLED data (n.d.) on number of conflict events resulting in civilian fatalities (2010–2022).

Moreover, the observable trend is an expansion of pockets of violence and increased fatalities towards the central and eastern regions (see Figure 20).

Figure 20: Comparison of number of reported fatalities for 2021 (left) and 2022 (right)

Source: authors’ own, based on ACLED data (ACLED, n.d.).
As of 2022, over 1.5 million IDPs were registered in Burkina Faso, accounting for 98% of the total number of forcibly displaced people in the country. This figure is expected to reach close to 2 million people in total over the course of 2023, as shown in Figure 21.

**Figure 21: Evolution of internally displaced persons numbers (millions 2018–2023)**

![Graph showing the evolution of internally displaced persons numbers (millions 2018–2023)](source)

IDPs mainly originate from conflict-affected regions in the northern and eastern regions, with the impact of displacement increasingly moving into southern and eastern regions, as shown in Figure 22.

**Figure 22: Distribution of internally displaced persons by region (2023)**

![Map showing the distribution of internally displaced persons by region (2023)](source)
Although recent increases in displacement are principally the result of the higher incidence of violence in many regions of Burkina Faso, transhumance pastoralists also migrate from northern to southern regions in the lean season. The onset of greater violence has also put pressure on mechanisms for managing resource conflicts between agricultural and pastoral communities at various levels, and is one of the factors constraining cattle movements, leading to the growing vulnerability of pastoralist communities in Burkina Faso.

### 2.4 Other vulnerabilities

The country faces considerable development challenges. The 2019 Human Development Index for Burkina Faso stood at 0.452, placing it 182nd out of 189 countries (UNDP 2022c). Development challenges are further exacerbated by increasing instances of violent conflict in northern and central regions, leading to significant population displacement and intra- and intercommunal tensions, as outlined in the previous section.

In addition to being highly exposed to the impacts of natural and human-made hazards, Burkina Faso’s population is also exposed to high levels of pre-existing socioeconomic vulnerability. The INFORM index, a composite index of a broad range of vulnerabilities, ranks Burkina Faso 12th in the list of highest-risk countries in the world in 2022 (DRMKC n.d.). After having seen improvements in its risk score in the years before 2020, Burkina Faso’s INFORM index risk score has spiked again in recent years, driven by an increase in the ‘human’ component of the hazard, an indication of human-made risks such as conflict and displacement.

**Figure 23: INFORM Risk index scores (current and trend, 2014–2023)**

Source: DRMKC (n.d.).

**Figure 24: Breakdown of INFORM Risk index by components for Burkina Faso**

Source: DRMKC (n.d.).
The most significant dimensions of vulnerability in Burkina Faso include high levels of poverty (as shown in Figure 25) and high levels of dependency on international aid, addressed further in section 3 of this report.

Figure 25: Poverty levels by district (% of population living on less than USD2.15/day, 2022)

Beyond these indicators, there is no clear baseline for measuring households’ exposure to crises and disasters. This is expected to be estimated as part of the second round of the UEMOA Harmonised Household Survey (EHCVM), coordinated by a UEMOA commission with support from the World Bank.
2.5 Implications of hazards and vulnerabilities for social protection programming

Drawing on the data summarised in the sections above, several implications stand out that serve to frame priorities for social protection programming:

**Drought risk is by far the most significant source of risk, with flood risk also notable.** Although projected trends for these risks are not conclusive about whether they will increase substantially in coming years, present levels of exposure to droughts and floods generate a high probability of significant household losses, even before overlaps with other risks (notably conflict) are taken into account. Further geospatial analysis could be conducted to highlight at a more granular level (commune level) which areas are particularly exposed to compounding climate vulnerabilities. This could assist in targeting support offered through ASP systems.

**IPC analysis suggests that social assistance measures to anticipate or respond to food insecurity are most urgently needed in Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord and, increasingly, the Est regions of Burkina Faso.** However, social safety net coverage is still evolving to align with the rapid increases in acute food insecurity levels in these regions and in others. This suggests there is considerable scope to better target and align government-led social assistance programmes in those areas. In addition to generally insufficient coverage, there is scope for improved efficiency of duration of coverage and value of payments for vulnerable groups, particularly in vulnerable regions. The estimated amount of time a food-insecure person in Burkina Faso spends in IPC2+ and IPC3+ suggests that sustained, lower-value assistance is appropriate for targeting people in alert levels of food insecurity, whereas people in emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC3+) could equally (or complementarily) benefit from higher-value, one-time cash transfers.

**High numbers of displaced people – due both to increasing levels of violent conflict, but also as a result of the southward movement of transhumance pastoralists during the lean season – will make targeting social assistance considerably more difficult.** Government-led social assistance programmes risk missing or underserving close to 2 million vulnerable people if IDPs are not adequately considered in government-led social protection programming.

**Given the high baseline vulnerability of the Burkinabé population, as described in section 2, even small shocks can threaten to increase the risk of severe food insecurity, leading to negative coping strategies or even escalation of conflict (e.g. between farmers and pastoralists in northern areas).** In the absence of a solid and integrated social protection system, initiatives to address the risk of disasters should not overlook the most frequent recurrent shocks, such as pockets of drought or localised flooding, which severely impact local people and are not always captured in national reports of disasters (as demonstrated in this section by the lack of alignment between historical records). In this sense, any future ASP system should firstly be based on a solid and granular early warning system, which is geared to capture these smaller and localised shocks.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

This section captures the amounts of humanitarian assistance flowing to Burkina Faso in response to crises and emergencies, and funded through awareness-raising campaigns and appeals.

3.1 Overall funding flows

Humanitarian assistance is a significant source of funding for the response to natural disasters and food insecurity. The large amount of external support flowing into Burkina Faso over the past 10 years illustrates an overall low degree of financial resilience or preparedness to deal with humanitarian shocks. Responses to humanitarian emergencies are largely financed ex-post, either through donor and humanitarian assistance or, to a lesser extent, through budget reallocations. More recently, the amount of humanitarian funding deployed in Burkina Faso has grown to be similar in size (in terms of percentage of GDP) to the overall investment the government has made in social protection (1.99% and 2.4%, respectively, in 2021).

Table 5: Historical development of humanitarian aid as a share of GDP (USD million, 2012–2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>UN Coordinated humanitarian appeal requirements</th>
<th>Funds raised in response to appeal</th>
<th>Humanitarian aid as percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12,561</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>13,444</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>13,943</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>11,832</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>12,833</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>14,107</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>15,890</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>16,178</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>17,934</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>19,738</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ own representation, based on data from the World Bank (2023) and humanitarian aid information from OCHA Financial Tracking Service portal (FTS n.d.).
The significant increase in funding for the OCHA-coordinated Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) in Burkina Faso from 2019 onwards, as captured in Figure 26, is most likely linked to renewed conflict in the country – recurring drought events alone have not been reflected in clearly observable increases in humanitarian assistance. Notably, data on funding flows does not appear to align with key drought and flood years (2014, 2020, 2022), especially for the period 2020–22, when other compounding risks such as conflict and displacement contributed to a spike in the need for humanitarian interventions.

Figure 26: Secured funding for humanitarian response plans and appeals as compared to total annual humanitarian funding requirements (USD million)

Source: authors’ calculations, based on FTS (n.d.).

Figure 27: Financial Tracking Service flows relating to food insecurity or drought (% 2010–2020)

Source: authors’ own, based on FTS (n.d.).
Burkina Faso has received more than USD1 billion in financing through humanitarian appeals over the past five years, with 65% of this financing being implemented by one of three main agencies: UNHCR, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) or WFP. Consequently, humanitarian programmes and responses have tended to focus on food security, malnutrition and displacement, in particular. Based on existing Financial Tracking Service (FTS) reports, the role of the government in implementing international humanitarian assistance is minimal.

Figure 28: Overall funding of humanitarian appeals and main implementing agencies (USD millions, 2018–2022)

The principal contributors funding the humanitarian appeals are the US, DG ECHO, OCHA’s Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), Germany, Japan and UK. In 2022 the contributions from Japan and UK diminished significantly, while Germany more than doubled its contribution.

Figure 29: Main financing sources of humanitarian appeals (USD millions, 2018–2022)

Note: although UNICEF also mobilises and implements significant volumes of humanitarian assistance in Burkina Faso, the level of detail in annual reporting is insufficiently detailed to add value to this report’s analysis.
The implementation of this financing is guided by an OCHA-coordinated HRP and informed by the Cadre Harmonisé in terms of levels of need – meaning that beneficiaries are generally targeted according to a household economy approach for lean season assistance programmes.

However, targeting for social safety nets or IDP support is not standardised among humanitarian agencies. Moreover, in parallel with the HRP, the government has released its own Response and Support Plan for Populations Vulnerable to Food Insecurity and Malnutrition (PRSPV), which creates potential difficulties in the coordination of aid distribution between humanitarian and national organisations.

### 3.2 World Food Programme financing flows

WFP has scaled up its presence and operations in Burkina Faso in light of the rapidly deteriorating food security situation. WFP has received over USD400 million through humanitarian appeals in the past five years, including a significant increase in funding volumes in 2020 and 2021. Annual reports\(^\text{14}\) indicate that WFP more than doubled the number of beneficiaries covered annually, from just over 1 million people in 2019 to 2.4 million in 2021. Close to 950,000 beneficiaries were displaced people, almost half of all the displaced people in Burkina Faso.\(^\text{15}\)

#### Table 6: World Food Programme-reported beneficiary data (2019–2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>By gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>489,233</td>
<td>981,811</td>
<td>1,154,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>567,224</td>
<td>1,039,513</td>
<td>1,267,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,056,457</td>
<td>2,021,324</td>
<td>2,422,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By residence status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>722,983</td>
<td>1,068,841</td>
<td>1,451,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>23,629</td>
<td>14,806</td>
<td>20,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>309,845</td>
<td>937,677</td>
<td>949,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,056,457</td>
<td>2,021,324</td>
<td>2,422,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By type of assistance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash transfer</td>
<td>436,457</td>
<td>671,882</td>
<td>990,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food distribution</td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td>1,349,442</td>
<td>1,431,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,058,476</td>
<td>2,021,324</td>
<td>2,422,189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ calculations, based on WFP (2019, 2020 and 2021).

Although over 40% of all beneficiaries in 2021 benefitted from unconditional cash transfers, WFP has scaled up its in-kind food assistance more rapidly in recent years. An important scaling-up of in kind assistance could reflect limitations in terms of market access in the areas of WFP’s intervention, which restricts the usability of cash transfers.

The amount of support WFP provides in in-kind and cash distribution to beneficiaries has increased alongside the scaling-up of its operations since 2019, to an average of USD40/person. The total value of cash transfers delivered increased five-fold from 2019 to 2020, and by a further 50% from 2020 to 2021.\(^\text{16}\)

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14 The 2022 annual report was not publicly available when this report was drafted in Q1 2023.

15 After three years benefiting from coverage, IDPs are ‘graduating’ from the assistance programme and cannot be covered by the same mechanisms.

16 WFP is currently planning to develop an impact study on the distribution of ARC Replica payouts in 2022 and 2023. However, development of this report and delivery of the 2023 support have been delayed.
Table 7: World Food Programme-reported humanitarian interventions (USD, 2019–2021)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funding flows from humanitarian appeals</td>
<td>36,086,670</td>
<td>83,332,407</td>
<td>101,941,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditures*</td>
<td>35,733,139</td>
<td>104,588,256</td>
<td>122,347,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash-based transfers</td>
<td>5,238,746</td>
<td>27,513,888</td>
<td>40,580,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of support per beneficiary (in-kind and cash)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ calculations based on WFP (2019, 2020, and 2021).
Note: * monetary value of goods and services received and recorded within the reporting year (including logistics, but excluding any overheads).

In addition to WFP’s annual humanitarian interventions during the lean season, WFP uses macro- and microinsurance programmes as part of its response programme in Burkina Faso. This notably includes an ARC Replica programme policy, described in more detail in section 5.2. The ARC Replica policy helps ensure that WFP is resourced to respond with actions that coordinate with and complement those of the government in the event of catastrophic drought.

3.3 UNHCR financing flows

UNHCR coordinates the response for all refugees in Burkina Faso with the National Commission for Refugees (CONAREF) and other government partners, UN agencies, and other local and international partners. Direct interventions are undertaken with local, regional and national authorities, including the National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation (CONASUR). UNHCR leads the Protection, Shelter/Core Relief Items and Camp Coordination and Camp Management Clusters. Regarding IDPs, UNHCR contributes to the emergency and protection response through a number of key activities such as registration, protection monitoring and response to protection cases (including gender-based violence).

UNHCR only distributes a small amount of support in the form of cash-based transfers. In 2021, it distributed a total of USD1.7 million to around 8,000 beneficiaries, with no record of other cash transfers distributed by UNHCR to IDPs.

For its activities in relation to protection, response and empowerment of displaced people between 2020 and 2022, UNHCR has been the second-largest recipient of funding for humanitarian response in Burkina Faso. UNHCR has received a total of USD129 million through the OCHA coordinated HRP, based on UNHCR’s own annual reports (UNHCR 2023) and FTS data (n.d.).

Figure 30: UNHCR funding for humanitarian operations (USD millions, 2020–22)

Source: author’s own, based on UNHCR Factsheets (UNHCR 2023) and FTS (n.d.)
3.4 Implications for adaptive social protection programming

Burkina Faso relies almost entirely on external donor support to respond to new as well as protracted humanitarian emergencies, including rapidly rising internal displacement. The set-up of future ASP systems needs to accommodate and aggregate funding from donors for ASP into a common vehicle, with strong governance and allocation rules to ensure different external sources of finance can be accommodated in a transparent way.

Drawing on the data summarised in the sections above, further implications stand out for ASP programming:

**Funding flows for humanitarian aid have significantly increased, with the overall volume doubling from 2020 to 2022, and are most clearly driven by increased levels of insecurity.**

The donors providing the largest contributions to humanitarian aid in the past three years have been the US, DG ECHO and Germany. These donors will continue to play a significant role in financing responses to crises. Given that they can be expected to have lessons to share on disbursing funds and allocations for humanitarian needs, their involvement in the design and coordination of future ASP support operations and instruments is relevant. In the case of the US, in particular, a significant amount of funding is channelled through international NGOs that is not disclosed, hence creating possible fragmentation and duplication. There is scope to reduce operational costs and increase transparency, as well as to improve the timeliness of responses through coordinated shock response as part of ASP.

**Funding levels vary significantly between different humanitarian actors, with distinct roles for WFP and UNHCR, focusing on responding to high levels of food insecurity and displacement, respectively.** UNHCR offers support and protection in the form of housing and access to basic services. WFP’s aid is split between in-kind food support, which accounts for the highest spend in terms of type of aid, and unconditional transfers. These agencies are expected to remain the preferred channel of delivery for lean season assistance and support for displaced people for some donors given their long-standing experience in Burkina Faso. As with the principal development assistance actors, their involvement in the design and coordination of future ASP support operations and instruments is relevant.

**Delivering humanitarian assistance in the form of cash transfers has increased significantly, particularly WFP’s contribution, amounting to a total of USD39 million in 2021 and to an average benefit of USD40–44/person.** These are recurrent cash transfer programmes that respond to chronic food insecurity during the lean season on an annual basis. Analysis of the most recent years could provide important insights into the duration and locations of responses, and likely volume, so that recurrent needs can be better programmed, including at government level. Given its experience in delivering cash transfers, WFP could play a stronger role as a government partner in distributing aid, and reinforce government capabilities to reach beneficiaries, on the one hand ensuring a more timely response and on the other a transition towards greater government ownership of the distribution of cash-based transfers.

**Limited detailed information is available on the targeting approach that the major humanitarian agencies use.** While the Cadre Harmonisé is used to inform decisions around how humanitarian support is targeted geographically, it is unclear how government systems or beneficiary registries are used by or reinforced as a result of the annual interventions. Both WFP and UNHCR target and reach IDPs and refugees; it is less clear whether and how government social protection programmes reach IDPs. Any new ASP system would need to use a shared social registry owned by the government, and which key humanitarian actors would ideally be able to access and have input into.

**Despite the high volumes of humanitarian aid deployed in Burkina Faso, little evidence is currently available that assesses the timeliness, efficiency and equity of aid in response to chronic food insecurity.** More evidence and discussion are needed on effective and appropriate social protection modalities and interventions among humanitarian agencies, and between humanitarian and development assistance actors, as well as with the government.
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

This section provides an overview of the relevant public sector institutions in Burkina Faso in place for disaster risk preparedness and response through social protection. It includes domestic policies, strategies, legislation and agencies of the Government of Burkina Faso.

The analysis in this section draws on an assessment framework developed by the World Bank’s Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program, the Disaster Resilient and Responsive Public Financial Management Assessment tool (World Bank 2022a), which aims to help stakeholders identify opportunities to improve laws, regulations, policies and systems for managing disaster-related risks. The framework has been modified to align more closely with the scope of this report.

This section applies a subset of the areas covered in the assessment tool to provide an accessible overview of what tools and capabilities the government has in place to prepare for and respond to disasters through social protection programming. Although the tool focuses on how institutions support and deliver disaster resilience and response, the application in this section will introduce additional notes on the appropriateness and efficacy of institutional arrangements for delivering social protection.

4.1 Institutional mandates

The legal basis for defining and managing disasters, disaster preparedness and response in Burkina Faso is Loi No. 12-2014 (Loi d’orientation relative à la prévention et à la gestion des risques, des crises humanitaires et des catastrophes), which offers a definition of disasters as distinct from humanitarian crises and is relevant to a wide range of hazards. However, it does not distinguish specifically named, although provisions are included particular to flood response, owing to legislation being drawn up after flooding in 2012.

Loi No. 12-2014 notes that the prime minister is responsible for declaring a disaster once an event has affected multiple (more than one) administrative regions and/or when a disaster proves to be of a high severity; the level of severity is not explicitly defined. When a disaster affects one administrative region, the governor of that region is responsible for declaring a disaster. The party which declared the state of disaster should declare an end to the disaster once ‘the circumstances no longer justify’ upholding the declaration; however, no specific criteria are given.

The lead agencies implementing the mandates provided under this law are CONASUR for disaster risk, and crisis prevention and crisis management, and the Directorate-General for Civil Protection (DGPC) for disaster response. CONASUR has a somewhat broader mandate, being classified as an inter-ministerial structure (housed in the Ministry of Solidarity) and having been at the forefront of engaging with donor agencies since its inception. CONASUR also more closely coordinates its work with other stakeholders in the social protection space, being the principal implementing agency in crisis management that leads on coordinating the delivery of various types of support funded and procured by key government agencies, whereas the DGPC collaborates more closely with subnational structures. CONASUR’s growing prominence is in part a result of greater coordination with humanitarian agencies: as the government agency responsible for registering and coordinating delivery of support to IDPs, it is increasingly aligning its response plans to the HRPs.
Although there continues to be some confusion over the respective roles of CONASUR and the DGPC in crisis management (notably, in the absence of a formal mechanism for coordinating the two agencies), recent perceptions indicate that stakeholders feel the DRM system has become more effective and ‘active in mobilising communities on aspects of preparedness and prevention’ (African Union 2022). That said, the overall disaster preparedness and response structure is still nascent, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the lack of political and financial leverage of these institutions is reflected in their limited capabilities (Ouédraogo and Sanfo 2018).

**Figure 31: Overview of public sector actors and strategies for disaster risk management and social protection**

![Diagram of public sector actors and strategies for disaster risk management and social protection](source)

**Source:** Authors’ own.

**Note:** CORESUR, CODESUR and COPROSUR are subnational structures of CONASUR at regional, departmental and provincial levels, respectively.

Similarly, a more unified basis for public sector social protection emerged with the introduction in 2013 of the National Social Protection Policy (PNPS). The PNPS emerged at a time when the government intended to demonstrate greater solidarity towards the poor and strengthen social cohesion as a presidential campaign promise, supported by international agencies that were making the case that improved social protection would bring the country social and economic gains.

As noted in the strategy, social assistance and support structures were fragmented across half a dozen implementing agencies, which were underdeveloped and underfunded at the time. The policy introduced a national coordinating body for social protection, the National Council for Social Protection (CNPS), which notably established the public sector standard for registering and targeting beneficiaries, and guidance on transfer values and frequency as well as lean season assistance. Yet the CNPS, and successive reorganisations of the various agencies involved in delivering public sector social protection over the past decade have not greatly harmonised the structure and delivery of social assistance. However, this has reportedly improved in recent years. The number and diversity of public sector as well as non-governmental social assistance programmes has further increased since the PNPS was introduced. But interviewees noted that the policy has not resulted in greater coordination, in particular, of the various types of social protection interventions. Whereas different types

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17 UNICEF and Oxfam are the only implementing organisations to indicate that they fully comply with this guidance.
of programmes merit different forms of implementation, the significant variation observed in the transfer values (FCFA4,000–7,000/person across the various social safety net and lean season response programmes), frequency (from monthly to quarterly) and duration (2–36 months) among the larger programmes, despite coordination efforts, illustrates the overall lack of harmonisation still present in social protection delivery in Burkina Faso.

The principal ways in which the PNPS indicates that social protection is part of a comprehensive disaster response is in the provision of in-kind nutritional support to people affected by disasters; this is a prominent component of the strategy overall, next to various forms of social insurance. The strategy defines CONASUR’s role in the delivery of such nutritional support, as well as the roles of specifically named international and domestic support partners. However, the extent to which the PNPS has guided the introduction of social protection responses to disaster risk appears to have been limited in practice.

Although the food security response is considered one of the better-coordinated and -financed parts of Burkina Faso’s overall crisis response arrangements, an overview of the structure of the response, as in Figure 32, highlights the complexity of the multitude of stakeholders involved. However, despite this complexity, stakeholders perceive that the annual PRSPV provides an adequate basis for coordination. Beneficiary selection has also been easier to align among stakeholders, as most take the approach set out by the Cadre Harmonisé. However, like the PNPS, the PRSPV gives no indication on roles and responsibilities for climate adaptation as part of crisis preparedness, greater resilience or ASP.

**Figure 32: Overview of food insecurity response**

![Figure 32: Overview of food insecurity response](image)

Source: authors’ own.

Notes: AG = General Assembly; CT = Technical Committee; DGPER = Directorate General for the Promotion of the Rural Economy.
Similarly, the PNPS and CNSP have not brought greater clarity on whether and how IDPs are to be included in national social protection programming. Although humanitarian agencies draw on the registry of IDPs that CONASUR maintains, it is unclear how beneficiaries for various programmes (national and humanitarian) are selected.

Each national plan has areas of overlap with others, and all are outdated in the sense that they were developed prior to significant changes in Burkina Faso’s governance and security context. Anecdotal evidence suggests that implementation of most national plans and strategies has been limited (Kreidler and Ouédraogo 2022; African Union 2022). A new social protection strategy is currently under development following the expiration of the PNSP in 2022, which is expected to be approved over the course of 2023 for a five-year period, with greater emphasis on measures to build an ASP system. Meanwhile, revision of Loi No. 12-2014 is expected to specify the procedures and definitions for monitoring and exchange of risk data, while the HYDROMET project is expected to establish a shared platform for risk monitoring and data exchange between the key meteorological agencies, the DGPC and CONASUR, over the course of 2023.

Disaster prevention and management is also reflected in national frameworks and strategies, including the latest National Economic and Social Development Programme 2021–25 (PNDES II), which includes performance indicators on the reported satisfaction of how displaced people’s needs have been covered, and the proportion of households affected by disasters and humanitarian crises. The plan is less specific with regard to strengthening vulnerable people’s resilience, reducing exposure to extreme climate events and enhancing adaptation, including the viability and resilience of food production systems.

4.2 Institutional arrangements supporting adaptive social protection programming

While the PNPS mentions cash transfers as an important support delivery mechanism, most progress in terms of government institutional capabilities since its introduction has happened in the space of delivering in-kind support. This includes the introduction of permanent national and regional food reserves, and better methods for distributing these through CONASUR.

The first large-scale government-led social safety net programme – the PFS – was launched in 2014 with support from the World Bank, which piloted shock-responsive interventions in response to droughts affecting pastoral and agropastoral areas, targeting the most food-insecure areas. This pilot established a partnership between the early warning system (SAP) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAH)’s, delivering cash transfers of FCFA20,000 to more than 7,500 beneficiaries via their mobile phones at the beginning, middle and end of the lean season. The beneficiaries remained the same over the 2017–19 period. The intention is to scale up this pilot in current and future programming.

Most current social protection programming funded by external assistance is committed to providing unconditional cash transfers, mainly delivered through mobile money, in line with the PFS. Most donor-funded programmes provide transfers on a monthly basis, with the PFS providing quarterly transfers outside of the lean season and monthly transfers during the lean season. This programme has nevertheless started to lay the foundations for a wider-reaching ASP programme. It has begun the process of establishing a central Unique Social Registry (RSU), though this process is still in its early stages.

In practice, the various government and international agencies implementing social protection (related) programming continue to maintain largely separate registries of beneficiaries, with significant variation in the quality and comprehensiveness of what they cover. Standards for data quality and sharing have yet to be put in place. In the near term, data updates and quality control are likely to be made primarily to proprietary databases, which have limited interoperability. A range of government and non-government actors also collect and store information on household vulnerability and estimation of shocks. Currently, only a limited proportion of the people most at risk of climate related disasters are likely to be included in the single registry.

However, government and international agencies’ efforts to adopt digital payment solutions mean there is capability to ensure funds reach beneficiaries, and for social protection systems to flexibly and effectively expand horizontally. Capabilities are being developed to deliver mobile money transfers to targeted beneficiaries nationwide, with most programmes already using one
preferred mobile money operator and discussions underway on a shared agreement with this provider. However, implementing agencies have noted challenges not only in ensuring that beneficiaries (notably IDPs) have access to mobile money infrastructure (e.g. they have access to phones, are in locations that have a phone signal, have IDs to be able to open mobile money accounts, etc.), but more critically that they can cash out or otherwise use cash transfers.

Existing limitations in data for targeting and modalities for reaching beneficiaries, furthermore, imply significant transaction costs for social protection programming. This is likely to increase further if and when more programmes align to harmonised guidance on transfer values set out in the minimum expenditure basket. Altogether, such operational challenges limit the potential for existing social protection programming to effectively scale in response to disaster-related shocks. However, efforts are underway to address these challenges: the USD56 million allocated to the PFS project was topped up with additional financing of USD110 million in May 2020; and a new World Bank operation is expected to start formally in 2024, with renewed focus on strengthening these building blocks for ASP.

4.3 Early warning systems, data collection and analysis

The institutions responsible for issuing weather and hydrological reports are the National Agency for Meteorology (ANAM), under the Ministry of Transportation, Urban Mobility and Road Safety, and the Directorate of National Water Resources (DGRE).

ANAM has a mandate to collect and forecast weather information at a national level; it is the national provider of drought, dry spell, dust, extreme precipitation and heatwave forecasts. It has an observation network that includes manual synoptic stations (meeting World Meteorological Organization criteria), as well as automatic stations spread across the country. In collaboration with regional weather monitoring centres at the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development and the regional Training and Support Centre for Agrometeorology and Hydrology (AGRHYMET), ANAM issues seasonal forecasts of rainfall and agrometeorological conditions covering the rainy season (June–October). ANAM does not issue drought forecasts, but it has expertise in developing seasonal forecasts of crop water requirements using SARRAH crop modelling software.

No in-depth assessment of the quality and accuracy of ANAM’s projections has been performed recently, although the World Bank reports recent gradual improvements in forecasts for mean temperature and precipitation (just over 60% in 2021). However, interviewees for this report have noted that some aspects of ANAM’s observation network are better maintained than others, and that the agency has struggled to find effective solutions to maintaining the quality and quantity of observations in the face of rising levels of insecurity. With quality of data anecdotally improving, data scale and coverage present significant capability gaps (World Bank 2018; UNDP 2022b; African Union 2022).

The DGRE is the institution in charge of reporting and predicting hydrological indicators in Burkina Faso. It has a network of 95 hydrological stations, of which 50% are automatic, spread across the country. Given a lack of capacity and resources, the DGRE does not currently have the capability to predict floods (flash floods or river floods). The agency’s Department of Water Studies and Information (DEIE) is nevertheless receiving support from various partners, including HYDROMET19 and Météo France. Although this support is expanding the DGRE’s network of stations and improving data collection and transmission, such improvements are starting from a low base.20

Burkina Faso’s Early Warning System (SAP) is responsible for information services on food security and nutrition monitoring throughout the agricultural season, delivered for the National Food Security Council (CNSA). As a department under the MAAH’s statistics directorate (DGESS), the SAP gathers critical information and distributes it to citizens, decision-making organs (CNSA) and responders (CONASUR and the DGPC), as well as information that feeds into regional observation initiatives including the Cadre Harmonisé.

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19 HYDROMET is a programme launched by the World Bank, World Meteorological Organization and African Development Bank to increase awareness of, and investments in, reliable and sustainable hydrological and meteorological services. See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2017/12/01/hydromet
Although the SAP has in recent years produced food security data and information at a greater variety and frequency, notably with support from the World Bank-financed HYDROMET project, the department continues to face constraints on data collection, storage and transmission. Notable current constraints are that limited data is collected (by any of the three institutions noted) at local (commune) level. Indications are that the SAP makes limited and largely informal use of satellite imagery – at present, it is understood to conduct a simple assessment of Normalized Difference Vegetation Index images to confirm agricultural production estimates in November. In addition, the SAP has limited access to data on internal displacement from CONASUR. Support from HYDROMET is expected to continue until early 2024, with continued support being discussed through a follow-on social protection operation.

**4.4 Social inclusion**

Social inclusion is not clearly emphasised across the relevant legislation and policy documents. Loi No. 12-2014 includes minimal references to or provisions for people with disabilities, or women and gender, acknowledging the need to address vulnerabilities without identifying or specifying what these are or particular types of groups or individuals. No particular reference is made, for instance, to minority groups, children or people with disabilities. Loi No. 12-2014, as well as the National Plan for Organisation and Coordination of Emergency and Rehabilitation Assistance (PNOCSUR), make reference to specific vulnerabilities of people exposed to natural hazards, but do not define inclusion gaps.

The principal agency responsible for disaster risk, crisis prevention and response – the Ministry of National Solidarity – also contains departments, programmes and funds specifically designed to address particular inclusion gaps. For instance, the Women’s Income Generation Support Fund (FAARF) is intended, in particular, to promote women’s employment opportunities. However, the fund and comparable programmes only provide assistance to a small number of beneficiaries. Meanwhile, a variety of non-governmental and civil society organisations operate projects of various sizes that support the inclusion of specific groups.

The limited emphasis on social inclusion in recent government plans and strategies is partially a result of limited data being available that could be used to promote inclusion. A review of data for monitoring the implementation of the PNPS indicates significant gaps in data collection beyond food insecurity and education (the two best-financed social sectors). Although disaggregated data on gender and age is available for some indicators, there is limited consistent or high-quality data on other specific vulnerabilities. In addition, there are concerns with regard to the quality of data collection, including bias towards data collection in urban centres and more densely populated areas.

**4.5 Planning and budgeting for disaster risk management**

**Fiscal risk assessment**

The government has not developed and published a detailed fiscal risk assessment specific to climate-related disasters and natural hazards. However, in 2022 the Ministry of Finance’s budget directorate began producing annual budgetary risk statements (with the support of the IMF’s African Regional Technical Assistance Centre in West Africa (AFRITAC West)); the latest one includes high-level estimates for the macro-fiscal effects of a small set of defined risks across the 2023–25 period, as well as a section on climate risk that draws on a report published in 2021 by PARM, outlining and comparing annual average losses for droughts, floods and other hazards (such as wildfires, crop pests, price shocks, etc.).

The macro-fiscal effects of key risks are based on internal modelling conducted by the Directorate-General for Economy and Planning (DGEP). Most relevant for climate-related disasters and social protection, the model estimates the effects of a hypothetical 10% decline in grain production on government revenues, economic growth, the fiscal deficit and consumption, as shown in Figure 33.

21 [https://www.p4arm.org/country/burkina-faso/](https://www.p4arm.org/country/burkina-faso/)
Although PARM provides detailed estimates of average annual estimated losses for specific hazards for 2008–2019, estimates of consequent quantified economic losses are more dated (from 2008), with no evidence of current modelling initiatives or disaster risk capabilities, notably in relation to historic and probabilistic data for significant disaster events. The last government-led assessment of disasters affecting Burkina Faso dates back to 2012; it did not include estimates of the financial cost of disasters or sources of financing. Government and international agencies have conducted incidental economic assessments of the anticipated and direct costs, and economic effects of specific disasters (e.g. flood impact).

The budgetary risk statement lists overall cost estimates for previous climate disaster risk response and mitigation plans and initiatives, but contains limited information on actual spend against these plans, and there are no current estimates of contingent liabilities. In addition, there is no explicit linkage between estimated costs of disaster exposure and loss, and annual budget programming. These costs are not clearly reflected in medium-term budget planning documents (the Multiannual Budgetary and Economic Programming Document (DPBEP)), and whereas government agencies are expected to take into account environmental effects (including natural hazards) in developing their programme budgets, no specific tools or indicators are provided for this as part of budget planning and preparation.

**Expenditure planning for disasters**

Table 8 lists the current budget programmes for DRM and response included in the national budget.
Table 8: Overview of ongoing disaster risk management and response programmes included in the national budget (million FCFA, 2017–2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Annual average budget allocation</th>
<th>Annual average spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale, de la Démcentralisation, et de la Cohésion Sociale, DGPC</td>
<td>Protection civile – Gestion des sinistres, catastrophes et opérations de secours d’urgence</td>
<td>436,542</td>
<td>360,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et du Développement</td>
<td>Programme d’urgence pour le Sahel du BF (PUS-BF)</td>
<td>52,685</td>
<td>56,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de la Femme Solidarité Nationale Famille Action Humanitaire, DGSNAH/Cellule Environnement/CONASUR/ COMUD-H/Fonds National de Solidarité</td>
<td>Promotion d’une culture de solidarité</td>
<td>4,489,890</td>
<td>5,115,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Renforcement de la gestion des catastrophes et des crises humanitaires</td>
<td>884,359</td>
<td>956,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection et promotion des personnes handicapées</td>
<td>234,646</td>
<td>263,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection et promotion des personnes âgées</td>
<td>20,518</td>
<td>5,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lutte contre l’exclusion sociale – Projet Filets Sociaux</td>
<td>256,391</td>
<td>271,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère de l’Agriculture et des Aménagements Hydro-agricoles</td>
<td>Mettre en œuvre le projet resilience de la population insécurité alimentaire au Centre Nord et du Sahel</td>
<td>69,356</td>
<td>58,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination et animation du dispositif de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires et nutritionnelles</td>
<td>2,103,664</td>
<td>2,527,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Renforcement et gestion des stocks de sécurité alimentaire</td>
<td>6,006,716</td>
<td>7,484,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appui à la production agricole dans les zones structurellement déficitaires au profit des groupes vulnérables</td>
<td>361,405</td>
<td>406,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accès aux financements et aux instruments de gestion des risques agricoles (PRAA)</td>
<td>190,572</td>
<td>251,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mettre en œuvre le projet ‘Resilience and food security in the Central Plateau region (RESA-PCL)’</td>
<td>32,355</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mettre en œuvre le Programme d’Appui aux Statistiques Agricole et au Système d’Information sur la Sécurité Alimentaire (PASA-SISA)</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capitalisation des données statistiques</td>
<td>1,542,462</td>
<td>1,432,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministère des Ressources Animales et Halieutiques</td>
<td>Prévention et gestion des crises et vulnérabilités en élevage</td>
<td>146,191</td>
<td>191,590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s own analysis, based on World Bank (2020).
Despite a multitude of existing programmes, overall resource allocations to DRM and social protection are consistently low. The core programme that captures the overlap between DRM and social protection (050 Solidarité nationale et gestion des catastrophes – see Table 9) accounts for around 0.3% of the budget on average (at around FCFA6.5 billion on average), over 70% of which has historically been allocated to the personnel costs of the nationwide sub-programme for ‘enhancing a culture of solidarity’. Execution of DRM and response budget lines, including those in the social protection space, is typically high, at an average of more than 90% of allocated budgets executed.

CONASUR and the DGPC implement the principal programmes specific to disaster response, with funds largely invested in transfers to fund CONASUR’s disaster management and relief activities, the National Solidarity Fund (FNS – see Section 5) and salaries of the DGPC, respectively. Allocations to CONASUR have gradually increased in recent years. Yet although this programme is by far the largest within the Ministry of National Solidarity, it is in the 10th percentile of government-funded programmes by budget allocation. Only a relatively small share of the overall programme has been allocated to disaster prevention and response (15% on average) and social inclusion (8%).

Table 9: Appropriated and forecast expenditure for principal public sector disaster management programmes (FCFA, 2021–25)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Allocation type</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2022</th>
<th>2023</th>
<th>2024</th>
<th>2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>050 – Solidarité nationale et gestion des catastrophes</td>
<td>Commitment appropriations</td>
<td>400,000,000</td>
<td>1,190,690,000</td>
<td>2,519,596,000</td>
<td>746,000,000</td>
<td>721,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payment credits</td>
<td>19,454,079,000</td>
<td>29,914,780,000</td>
<td>44,349,613,000</td>
<td>23,714,474,000</td>
<td>13,239,949,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- of which estimated to be spent on DRM</td>
<td>2,918,111,850</td>
<td>4,487,217,000</td>
<td>6,652,441,950</td>
<td>3,557,171,100</td>
<td>1,985,992,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- of which estimated to be spent on social inclusion</td>
<td>1,556,326,320</td>
<td>2,393,182,400</td>
<td>3,547,969,040</td>
<td>1,897,157,920</td>
<td>1,059,105,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>013 – Protection civile</td>
<td>Commitment appropriations</td>
<td>3,095,473,000</td>
<td>2,045,472,000</td>
<td>2,238,322,000</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Payment credits</td>
<td>8,347,472,000</td>
<td>5,910,064,000</td>
<td>4,134,692,000</td>
<td>2,429,786,000</td>
<td>2,899,460,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s own analysis, based on MINEFIP (2021, 2022a).

Available budget execution data is insufficient to determine a clear trend in terms of how the programme has performed. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that expenditure on transfers to vulnerable people through the programme and the FNS scaled rapidly in 2020 and 2021 compared with previous years. Transfers almost doubled, from around FCFA770 in 2018 to FCFA1,450 in 2019, and then increased by more than 600% to over FCFA10,000 as part of the government’s covid-19 response plan. This shows some capability for scaling investments in social protection.

4.6 Budget management, control and reporting systems and practices

Beyond committed funds in the budget outlined in section 5, the Ministry of Finance can leverage various budgetary instruments in preparation for, and in response to, crises and disasters as part of the provisions in the public finance legislation (Loi organique No. 073-2015/CNT) and common interdepartmental expenses (DCIM) that exceed specific departmental mandates. Notably:
In the event of emergencies and cases ‘imperative to the national interest’, the Council of Ministers can approve additional funds, as well as changes to the structure of the budget – the National Assembly needs to be informed and has to ratify these changes at its next session. It is not specified whether government can spend these funds in the meantime, although in practice the executive will begin to commit expenditure ahead of approvals.

The Ministry of Finance is mandated to define and launch a supplementary budget process. The government has to develop and present a supplementary or adjustment budget (‘loi de finances rectificative’) if the budget is no longer tenable – particularly if appropriations or credits need to be advanced or cancelled, as would be typical for most disasters. Supplementary budgets were common to most financial years up to 2012/13, when they were used in response to disasters or national crises. Their use has become more common in recent years, following the deteriorating security situation and the covid-19 pandemic.

The Ministry of Finance can leverage an allocation to manage short-term, counter-cyclical actions (typically up to FCFA500 million) or the minister of finance can make use of a 0.5% margin of the overall size of the budget. The allocation is an appropriated part of the budget, but neither measure is commonly used.

The minister of finance can use virements (both before and after disasters or crises) to transfer funds from special funds into programme budget allocations.

Although the flexibility afforded to the Ministry (Minister) of Finance to unilaterally reallocate funds and spend on purposes not in line with the appropriation is highly constrained on paper, reallocations are possible in discussion with other government agencies. Spending agencies can reallocate spending within their expenditure ceiling for specific programmes with prior authorisation of the Ministry of Finance, within specific constraints. Allocations can be moved from the personnel budget to other expenditure types (e.g. goods and services, transfers, capital spend) or from goods and services towards capital spend or transfers. Virements between programmes can be made by agreements between the Ministry of Finance and the relevant spending agency, limited to 10% of the programme’s allocation. Any changes beyond this amount will need the minister’s approval. There is no publicly available information on the extent to which these rules are commonly applied.

Regulations for the public finance law on public procurement (Loi No. 039-2016/AN) have introduced important simplifications to the procurement process. Decree No. 2017-049 notes that the publication timeframe for public competitive tenders in case of emergencies can be reduced from 30–45 to 7–15 days, and that direct procurement and delegation of public services to (pre) approved contractors is possible in the event of disasters or emergencies, with a contract period up to a maximum of two years. Such measures need information to and approval from MINEFIP and/or the Court of Auditors. Procurements above FCFA500 million need further approval by the Council of Ministers or a regional council. Conditions with regard to verification and supporting documentation can be specifically determined for each direct procurement. Such procedures are generally followed.

The government is introducing additional layers of flexibility in PFM in light of recent crises. Decree No. 2020-418 of 26 August 2020 was introduced as part of the government’s response to the covid-19 crisis. It introduced measures to streamline decision making and reporting on public resource allocations during crises and disasters to ensure agility and transparency. The decree is intended as a template for financial management and transparency for other crises – notably introducing a financial oversight committee consisting of MINEFIP and the auditor general. MINEFIP furthermore introduced several decrees in late 2022 to clarify and expedite public spending in areas affected by insecurity (‘zones fragiles’), which may also improve the responsiveness of expenditure control in post-disaster situations. Given that these regulations are fairly new, the extent to which they are widely known and used is as yet unclear.

Tracking budget allocations to and expenditures on disaster preparedness and response, or indeed on social protection, is possible at a relatively high level. However, there are weaknesses in accounting for and tracking such expenditures. Expenditures are not earmarked by disaster
Defining and monitoring performance indicators still needs strengthening, meaning little information is available on the return on investment of public expenditures. National funds – including the FNS and funds for specific social protection programmes – are subject to standard internal audit procedures, as are all agencies responsible for disaster preparedness and response, although no specific post-disaster audit procedures are in place.

The only disaster response-related audit available concerns a review of expenditure in 2020 against the government’s covid-19 Response Plan (Plan de Riposte du COVID-19), which found irregularities in flows of funds (e.g. response funds being channelled through agencies’ regular operating accounts, instead of special accounts earmarked for covid-19-related spend) and expenditure justification (e.g. lack of adequate checks on vendors’ documentation for contracts issued, lack of prior approval of operational expenses, etc.), as well as the underperformance of some allocations. The scope of the special audit is comprehensive and most agencies have responded to the recommendations made. However, the quality of responses varies, and it is unclear whether the audit report has received the necessary legislative scrutiny or was largely produced to satisfy requirements for grant financing for the response plan. It nevertheless offers a good basis for disaster-related audits.

4.7 Implications for adaptive social protection programming

Drawing on the information summarised in the sections above, several implications stand out for ASP programming:

Institutional arrangements and capabilities for both disaster response and social protection are nascent, with an overall structure consisting of agencies with overlapping mandates and limited political and financial leverage. Such arrangements are relatively clearer and better resourced in the education sector; and in delivering food and nutritional support, notably in response to droughts. This area is also where the otherwise fragmented parts of the DRM system interact most closely. However, the respective roles and responsibilities of CONASUR, the CNSA and MAAH in designing and delivering this shock response could be more clearly defined; there is no explicit role for climate adaptation in these institutional arrangements, as would be expected as part of an integrated ASP response.

Current delivery of social assistance of various kinds is not adequately coordinated. The sizeable variations in the level of transfer values, and frequency and duration of transfers suggest limited harmonisation of modalities between government and humanitarian programmes, with implementers having divided themselves into their respective geographic and vulnerability caseloads. Furthermore, the lack of coordinated beneficiary selection and joint means of delivering cash transfers (specifically through mobile money) suggests high transaction costs for all parties. Significant obstacles to effective vertical and horizontal scaling of social protection responses remain in the medium term.

There is limited emphasis on strengthening social inclusion in the current social protection policy and institutional landscape, and limited clarity on which institutions or agencies are in charge of addressing specific (climate-related) vulnerabilities. Discussion around finalising and implementing a new national social protection policy, and ongoing revision of the national food security and nutrition policy offer opportunities to emphasise this more clearly as part of ASP responses.

Burkina Faso’s SAP early warning system is established and maturing, while facing some risk of setback. With both ANAM and the SAP able to produce and disseminate relevant disaster risk monitoring data with increasing relevance and breadth, a good basis exists for more integrated disaster preparedness and response planning, including early action and response. There is scope for further improvements in the data; notably, little operationally useful data is being produced that enables flood risk monitoring. However, in the context of fragile governance and continued insecurity, there is a substantial risk that public services not actively prioritised by the administration may gradually worsen as a result of diminishing finances, staff changes and damaged infrastructure.

Introducing more comprehensive ways to promote social inclusion in disaster preparedness and response or in social protection will require more consistent and high-quality disaggregated data on specific vulnerabilities, particularly on exposure to climate-
related vulnerability. Ongoing efforts to integrate and strengthen the RSU can support this, by emphasising indicators for inclusivity as a key requirement for the completeness and quality of data as various data sources and databases are integrated into the RSU.

Public finance legislation and regulation offer a variety of budgetary instruments for rapidly mobilising funds in response to crises. The most frequently used instruments – notably, supplementary budgets – are fairly common and comparatively inefficient (Allan and Bayley 2023). The focus of these regulations has also been on strategic allocations or justification of the use of resources, rather than streamlining disbursement of funds. However, recently introduced provisions to facilitate the mobilisation of resources in preparation for and in response to crises indicate that the government recognises the limitations of existing UEMOA-standard PFM practices in crisis situations and is taking steps to streamline procedures. These are as yet untested, specifically for delivering scalable social assistance, but offer scope for more established practices to mobilise and deliver greater volumes of public resources more rapidly. This could come at a cost of transparency and accountability, which are already limited in relation to crisis related public expenditure.

Nascent capabilities for assessing fiscal risk offer an entry point to better reflect disaster risk preparedness and response in the national budget. Fiscal risk modelling can be improved by drawing on existing disaster risk data. Linking this to the planning of public resources is challenging – few Ministries of Finance consistently, effectively and comprehensively make the linkage between estimated losses from disasters and (multi)annual budget programming. In various cases, key sectors are enabled to better allocate and use resources when such modelling forms the basis for bringing stakeholders together – the Directorate-General for Budget (Direction Générale du Budget (DGB)) has a privileged position to promote such sectoral programming, at a time when discussions on implementing a new social protection strategy are likely to take place.
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR DISASTER RESPONSE AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

The introduction to this report outlines how DRF can help to ensure that the right amount of funds are made available at the right time, when cash transfer programmes need to be able to scale up in response to disasters and other climate-related shocks. It outlines the set of instruments that can be used to pre-arrange financing for such scaling as part of a DRF strategy.

The annual average financial loss in agriculture from all risks (including, but not limited to, climate shocks) at the national level is close to USD100 million, as estimated by both PARM and a recent Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) policy note developed by the World Bank (World Bank 2022c). The authors of the policy note estimate that Burkina Faso may face losses equivalent to USD344 million once every 100 years or equivalent to USD402 million once every 250 years.

In the face of such high average financial losses in the agricultural sector alone, the government currently has no comprehensive DRF strategy in place, although the public sector has built up experience working with various DRF instruments. These have largely tended to be instruments that facilitate timely reaction to climate-related disasters or other crises – some of which are described in section 4.3 – although at times there have been efforts to add risk transfer instruments (insurance) to the range of DRF tools. This section describes the experience of using these instruments.

Table 14 summarises the instruments currently available in Burkina Faso to respond to disasters and food insecurity events. The amounts available are notably low, especially compared with the amounts of annual humanitarian assistance delivered through key UN Agencies (WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR). Risk transfer and risk retention instruments are similar in scale, amounting to a total of around USD15 million available annually (excluding pilot anticipatory action funding and the FASA, which has had a very limited and highly variable funding disbursement), in contrast to humanitarian flows, which have reached close to USD400 million in recent years.

Table 10: Summary of existing disaster risk financing instruments (USD million, 2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk retention (annual spending)</th>
<th>Risk transfer (annual coverage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Solidarity Fund (FNS)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Environmental Intervention Fund (FIE)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: authors’ own, based on Africa Risk Capacity (2023), OCHA (2022), World Bank (2022c).
This summary of DRF suggests that although national financing instruments can in theory scale to channel and deliver more significant volumes of resources in response to shocks, in the short term these are unlikely to displace the significance of humanitarian assistance reaching vulnerable people. This underscores the importance of ensuring greater alignment between government and humanitarian efforts to deliver support as part of an evolving ASP system.

5.1 Risk retention instruments

The government has a variety of risk retention instruments in place that complement and enhance funding allocated specifically for disaster risk reduction and management. A total of 20 national funds (‘fonds nationaux’) are listed in the national budget, of which 10 are directly managed and paid into by the state in line with an existing policy framework. Several of these funds finance activities in preparation for and response to climate-related disasters, including through social protection measures. Notable instruments are summarised in Box 1.

Box 1: Key risk retention instruments funded through the budget

The National Solidarity Fund (FNS) is the main fund the government uses to provide social assistance, including for disaster response and recovery, with a broad remit for mobilising and disbursing resources for social assistance payments to and credit support for vulnerable people or groups; emergency assistance to people affected by disaster; and post-disaster and -crisis rehabilitation. Its scope has recently been expanded to include building social resilience, and food security, although the fund is not explicitly linked to or guided by a single policy framework or strategy. The FNS has received incidental domestic and international donations (from ECOWAS, UEMOA and Ghana), but not from donor agencies. Spending on the FNS has nevertheless risen substantially since its inception, although government contributions to the fund have remained steady at FCFA300–400 million per year on average, and overall resourcing and expenditure of FCFA3–4 billion, with support reaching over 25,000 beneficiaries in recent years. One of the fund’s principal areas of financing is nutritional support for IDPs (amounting to close to one third of the fund’s average annual expenditures). Operating in line with government public finance standards and practices, the Ministry of National Solidarity sees it as a useful instrument for effectively delivering a broad range of support to different vulnerable communities, and it has hence enjoyed increasing levels of support. However, monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the fund is not systematic; the fund’s management sees that attracting additional funding from the donor community is a key factor in ensuring the fund’s continued relevance (World Bank 2022c).

The Environmental Intervention Fund (FIE), was established as part of the Ministry of Environment to finance initiatives to protect and restore the environment, sustainably manage natural resources, and mitigate and adapt to climate change. One of the fund’s response windows is specifically on DRM and disaster risk response, but only in relation to urgent action for protecting and repairing environmental damage (‘remédiation environnementale’). It provides matched funding for local-level initiatives (covering two-thirds of project costs), with year-on-year disbursements varying substantially, reaching FCFA2 billion in 2018, but settling closer to FCFA200 million more recently. The FIE is funded by annual government contributions of just over FCFA100 million, and support from donors including Sida, GIZ, LuxDev, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), and the World Bank as part of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD/REDD+). The fund is finalising accreditation for the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and currently implementing a UNCDF financed pilot to support three communes in implementing climate change adaptation activities, with a view to improved DRM, to be scaled up to 25 communes in 2023 and beyond.
The Food Security Support Fund (FASA) was introduced as a joint financing instrument for the government and its technical and financial partners (PTFs) to fund cereal replenishment of the National Company for the Management of Food Security Stocks (SONAGESS). It plays an important role in implementing the national food security strategy (National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (PNSAN) and Response and Support Plan for Populations Vulnerable to Food Insecurity and Malnutrition (PRSPV)). Managed by the Executive Secretariat of the National Security Council (SE-CNSA), the fund operationalises much of its work – its main funding window finances the maintenance of physical food reserves (‘stock d’intervention’, managed by SONAGESS), as well as coordination, implementation (including distribution of foodstuffs) and other operational costs, such as audits and evaluations of the CNSA. The FASA is intended to be resourced by the government through annual FCFA500 million contributions, although in practice the majority of its resources come from PTF contributions – largely historic contributions from eight different funders, with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) the only funder currently contributing to it. Spending levels from the fund are generally low with irregular or ad hoc disbursements, and with approximately FCFA8 billion outstanding at the end of recent audited years (2018–2020, with balances transferred into subsequent years). The payment and procurement processes could be made more efficient to speed up disbursement. Although the government manages the fund as a joint or pooled fund (‘fonds commun’) rather than a national fund, the FASA is not formally part of the national budget, which is reflected in the government’s reluctance to contribute to the fund, and its disconnectedness from public finance standards and practices. Nevertheless, it is viewed as an effective basis for PTFs and the government to coordinate and finance in-kind support in response to food insecurity – its flexibility enables it to finance activities not formally included in framework documentation, including the provision of livestock feed and cash transfers (World Bank 2022d).

Other funds finance activities that fall under a broad definition of social protection, including a fund for school feeding managed by the Ministry of National Education; and various funds that support health sector development, youth initiatives, unemployment and informal sector support, professional training, employment and promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises, and women’s entrepreneurship. Aside from the well resourced school feeding fund, the funds’ scale and scope are considerably narrower than those outlined above, with some demonstrating limited activity in recent years.

Across these funds, none appear to be immediately suitable for delivering and rapidly scaling up cash transfers to targeted vulnerable people. The FNS is the only fund that has repeated experience of delivering small payments to specific vulnerable people. Although its channels for delivering funds and other support could be scaled up (given existing agreements and established contracts), targeting efforts and the size of contributions have been limited and largely ad hoc.

Other funds, meanwhile, are almost entirely untested in their capability to respond to shocks, with expenditures tending towards incidental payments and procurements rather than routine and scalable transfers. The FASA has funded FAO to deliver cash transfers in response to drought in 2022, with mixed results. The limited reporting that exists on the various funds furthermore indicates that they lack the financing to adequately meet the needs of their targeted beneficiaries; and that there is considerable overlap of the aims and people the funds target.

The national budget otherwise includes few dedicated funds for reconstruction. In addition, the government has no contingency or reserve fund, or other contingent financing instrument in place specifically for disaster

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22 Interviewees noted that national funds and programmes funded through these – including the FNS – benefit from simplified or amended public procurement procedures for responding to emergencies more flexibly in coordination with MINEFIP. The FASA, which is not a state fund, does not benefit from such simplification.
response and recovery. Although a specific financing instrument for disaster preparedness and response is noted in Loi No. 12-2014, this has not been defined or implemented. A potential new National Fund for Social Protection (FNPS) is under discussion as part of consultations on a new social protection policy, which is envisioned as the central mechanism for mobilising, allocating and delivering resources to vulnerable groups in response to various shocks. The proposal is to finance the fund through a special purpose Treasury account (‘compte d’affectation spéciale du Trésor’), drawing on dedicated revenues from targeted tax measures.

Such special purpose accounts provide agencies with direct access to resources for particular government resourcing commitments, including social protection initiatives such as school feeding at secondary schools. Depending on the revenue sources they are linked to, such accounts have successfully mobilised and increased substantial resources – notably to resource Burkina Faso’s education system – but have not been used to fund scalable forms of support.

5.2 Risk transfer instruments

The government has made limited use of risk transfer instruments. Loi No. 12-2014 indicates that insurance is the preferred financing method for disaster risk and crisis prevention and response, with specific reference given to agriculture insurance, given the prominence of this sector for people’s livelihoods. Insurance products introduced for food crop production in Burkina Faso have exclusively covered drought risk, with no dedicated product covering the impacts of floods.

However, these products have mostly been pilot initiatives (including by MAAH) to introduce index-based agriculture microinsurance for drought-related risks. These have gained limited traction and proved difficult to scale, with smallholder farmers indicating that annual premiums are too high even after a 50% government subsidy. Most of these schemes have been dropped in light of the poor uptake and operational challenges encountered by private sector partners (Raithatha 2022). The main findings of a recent feasibility study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are that insurance providers should consider distributing products and funds through co-operatives, microfinance institutions and agriculture-focused banks that have a relationship with local people (ibid).

The only two agriculture insurance schemes operating in Burkina Faso are for cotton and maize. As Table 15 shows, the highest number of insurance initiatives are designed for cotton, which is the only cash crop and has the highest market potential (10 times the market size of any other crop).

### Table 11: Annual market size and sum insured in Burkina Faso (by crop)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Land under production (ha)</th>
<th>Market potential – total sum insurable (USD million)</th>
<th>Addressable potential (60%) (USD million)</th>
<th>Premiums (USD million) (current market rate used: 9%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>647,265</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1,135,405</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>1,183,792</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>183,871</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>1,860,260</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Raithatha (2022).

Note. Includes data from FAOStat (see: [https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home](https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home)) and Selina Wamucii ([www.selinawamucii.com](www.selinawamucii.com)), as well as proprietary data. The study assumed that 60% of the total sum insurable opportunity is the addressable market (Raithatha 2022).
Insurance firm Yelen Assurance in 2018 launched a weather index insurance (WII) product that covered a basket of the main cereals (millet, maize, sorghum, rice and cowpeas). It currently covers 30,000 farmers, in large part as a result of a successful partnership with WFP and ARC. WFP has been responsible for raising farmers’ awareness of the WII product, has fully financed the premiums and supported a cash-for-premium scheme for the farmers. ARC has done the technical work to design the WII product and offered it for free to Yelen. The product is available in Nord, Est and Sahel regions, where WFP is present and active, and where humanitarian need is greatest.

An area yield index insurance (AYII) programme for cotton implemented in Burkina Faso between 2012 and 2022 highlighted issues of affordability, limited uptake and a political dispute between SOFITEX (Société Burkina Faso des Fibres Textiles), one of the country’s main cotton companies, and the insurer, Inclusive Guarantee. The specific objective of the cotton AYII policy was to guarantee reimbursement of input credit in the case of default due to a reduction in cotton yields in target areas. Commercial entities (such as ECOBANK, Bank of Africa and Faitière des Caisses Populaires du Burkina) provide input credit for cotton production to groups of cotton growers.

Table 12: Overview of risk transfer data for weather index insurance product (2020–21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro-/mesoinsurance climate actions</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G.1: Number of people covered by an insurance product through risk transfer mechanisms supported by WFP</td>
<td>G.1.10: Total number of people covered by microinsurance schemes (premium paid with value voucher for services)</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.2: Total USD value of premiums paid under risk transfer mechanisms supported by WFP</td>
<td>G.2.2: Total USD value of premiums paid under microinsurance schemes (premium paid with value voucher for services)</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>40,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.3: Total sum insured through risk management interventions</td>
<td>G.3.3: Total sum insured through microinsurance schemes (premium paid with value voucher for services)</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>374,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.12: Total USD value disbursed as payouts of risk transfer mechanisms supported by WFP</td>
<td>G.12.2: Total USD value disbursed as payouts of microinsurance schemes (premium paid with value voucher for services)</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>6,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.11: Number of people benefiting from insurance payouts of risk transfer mechanisms supported by WFP</td>
<td>G.11.2: Number of people benefiting from payouts of microinsurance schemes (premium paid with value voucher for services)</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>2,849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Main index insurance schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurance provider</th>
<th>Underwriter</th>
<th>Other partners</th>
<th>Type of insurance</th>
<th>Crops and regions covered</th>
<th>Objective and outcome</th>
<th>Distribution strategy</th>
<th>Status end 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive Guarantee</td>
<td>SUNU Assurance (formerly Allianz); CORIS Assurances; Yelen Assurance</td>
<td>FEPA-B SOFITEX AICB Oxfam Intermón</td>
<td>WII and AYII</td>
<td>Cotton and maize in Boucle du Mouhoun, Cascades, Hauts-Bassins and Sud-Ouest</td>
<td>Drought and yield cover; 2,500 farmers received a payout in 2018</td>
<td>AYII: embedded with inputs</td>
<td>Inclusive Guarantee product ongoing; SOFITEX product discontinued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>SONAR IARD Re</td>
<td>MAMDA Re</td>
<td>WII</td>
<td>Maize in Boucle du Mouhoun, Est and Centre-Ouest</td>
<td>Drought cover: 830 farmers signed up (target: 5,000)</td>
<td>Voluntary, standalone product</td>
<td>Pilot ended 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Yelen Assurance</td>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>WII</td>
<td>Cowpeas, maize, millet, rice and sorghum in Nord, Est and Sahel</td>
<td>Drought cover: 407 farmers received a payout in 2022</td>
<td>Bundled with inputs</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L’Oréal</td>
<td>AXA SONAR OLVEA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Parametric and health</td>
<td>Shea butter in Centre-Ouest</td>
<td>Pilot tested in 2021</td>
<td>To be confirmed</td>
<td>Pilot conducted in 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Raithatha (2022).

producers, which is channelled through SOFITEX. Allianz (now SUNU Assurance) underwrites the insurance policy, with local and international companies providing reinsurance.

Two more smaller schemes are available, one implemented by MAAH, which includes a subsidy scheme, and the other by L’Oréal (Table 13).

Burkina Faso purchased sovereign insurance cover from ARC for the 2016/17, 2017/18 and 2018/19 seasons. Premium payments were made in 2017 and 2019, totalling around USD1.2 million and USD650,000, respectively, with payments budgeted but not made in subsequent years. The sums insured have been relatively small (USD10 million decreasing to USD6 million) compared to the need and the scale of typical humanitarian appeals for food insecurity. Sources suggest that the reason the government has not taken out a policy since 2019 lies with difficulties in justifying financing insurance premiums in view of their frustration at not having received payouts for the 2017/18 pool. This aligns with evidence that country-level buy-in for ARC is diminishing due to lack of payouts and frustration with selecting risk transfer parameters, and the Africa Risk View model customisation processes (Tetra Tech 2021), although discussions are underway over a potential new ARC policy.
WFP purchased an ARC Replica product for Burkina Faso to mirror its in-country finances for responses led by NGOs in the 2019/20, 2020/21 and 2021/22 seasons. The policy financed cash transfers to vulnerable people in the event of catastrophic levels of drought towards the end of the agricultural season. For the ARC Replica product, the sums insured fluctuated annually between 2019 and 2023, with the most recent policy returning to the original total insured sum of USD7 million, as Table 14 shows.

### Table 14: Overview of ARC Replica policy parameters and payouts in Burkina Faso (2019/2020–2022/2023)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroinsurance climate actions</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>2019/20</th>
<th>2020/21</th>
<th>2021/22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G.1: Number of people covered by an insurance product through risk transfer mechanisms supported by WFP</td>
<td>G.1.9: Total number of people covered by ARC replica or any other macroinsurance schemes</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>109,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.2: Total USD value of premiums paid under risk transfer mechanisms supported by WFP</td>
<td>G.2.1: Total USD value of premiums paid under ARC replica or any other macroinsurance schemes</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>683,034</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.3: Total sum insured through risk management interventions</td>
<td>G.3.2: Total sum insured through ARC replica or any other macroinsurance schemes</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>7,000,000</td>
<td>4,397,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payouts</td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>1,180,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This policy received payouts in both 2020/21 (USD1.18 million covering 21,101 beneficiaries in Bam province, Centre-Nord region) and 2022/23 (USD7.2 million, with disbursements to 180,000 people) (WFP 2023). The payout process involves preparing a financial implementation plan that states exactly which provinces and districts will be covered and the beneficiaries targeted. A multi-partner response plan follows a pre-defined process, as shown in Figure 34.
Figure 34: ARC Replica payout process

Payouts have enabled households to purchase food and agricultural inputs to prevent and reduce food shortages and malnutrition, with over 96% of beneficiaries reporting assistance was satisfactory. WFP has determined geographic priorities for targeting its support, as well as its support levels, in collaboration with government agencies (CNSA, with limited CONASUR involvement).

5.3 Other disaster risk financing initiatives

Aside from the risk transfer products and initiatives described above, a number of other planned initiatives are in their pilot or feasibility phases, with the purpose of complementing insurance products with anticipatory action products. The two most notable such products are being implemented by IFRC and OCHA.

The IFRC pilot is in its feasibility stage and has published a feasibility report listing the main risks it will focus on (including pockets of drought and heat waves). It does not yet have a final trigger mechanism, nor a funding source besides the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund. However, IFRC has implemented forecast-based finance mechanisms in other fragile contexts. Over the coming months, IFRC will attempt to engage local communities in focus groups; create a dedicated technical working group that includes all local stakeholders; and run an inventory of the capabilities and resources of ANAM that could be used to trigger an early response.

The OCHA anticipatory action product was launched in 2022 and has not yet been triggered during the 2022/23 drought season, as opposed to the ARC Replica product. OCHA will continue to monitor this product for another season; if the results are not satisfactory, OCHA might decide to discontinue it. The product is triggered based on a forecast rain index developed by the International Research Institute for Climate and Society at the University of Columbia. The trigger has two windows (in March and July); a trigger initiates a different set of anticipatory actions. The pilot has been launched in the areas with the greatest humanitarian need: Boucle de Mouhoun, Centre-Nord, Sahel and Nord.
5.4 Implications for adaptive social protection programming

Given the high baseline vulnerability of the Burkinabé population described in section 2, even small shocks can threaten to increase the risk of severe food insecurity, leading to negative coping strategies or even escalation of conflict (e.g. between farmers and pastoralists in the north of the country). Use of pre-arranged financing for shock response in Burkina Faso has been limited, with few targeted uses of risk transfer instruments. When used at scale and sustainably, such instruments have been shown to effectively and efficiently manage and finance disaster risk response in other contexts. However, given uncertainties in the security and governance context in Burkina Faso, a high degree of dependency on ad hoc external funding, as well as lack of awareness among stakeholders (including beneficiaries of the support funded through these instruments), most risk transfer instruments are small in scale and deployed in isolation.

Furthermore, the infrastructure supporting insurance-based risk transfer instruments is not currently well developed, with a small agriculture (micro-)insurance market, no effective nationwide banking and payment facilities, and shortcomings in the SAP early warning system, as outlined in previous sections. Agriculture insurance has consequently not demonstrated significant evidence of effectiveness and efficiency, and has not been scaled. Even if the experiences outlined above suggest that a gradual transition from reactive to proactive management of disaster risk is apparent, at least among donors and humanitarian agencies, at this stage none of these instruments are able to rapidly and convincingly scale to deliver more and better social support in anticipation or in the event of climate-related disasters.

Nevertheless, with targeted improvement, individual instruments could be part of approaches to more effectively pre-arrange financing for specific aspects of ASP. The types of disasters Burkina Faso is most exposed to – frequent lower-severity shocks – suggest that improvements in risk retention instruments and PFM practices in general are an equally relevant and pressing area for further investment. These will notably be relevant for responding to recurrent shocks such as pockets of drought and localised flooding that are not generally captured in national-level disaster reporting.

Domestic financing instruments included in the national budget, in particular, hold the potential for delivering targeted cash transfers, either funded through public resources or external aid. Such efforts are potentially a more productive starting point for working towards a more comprehensive government-led approach to DRF in the short term. Further, new instruments that are developed in the future to complement such funds will need to account for the fragile context and instability, as well as chronic food insecurity and displacement.
RECOMMENDATIONS

This section concludes the report by proposing a series of measures that would enhance domestic capabilities to better anticipate, plan for and finance social protection responses to climate-related disaster risk, particularly for increasingly severe droughts. The analysis presented in this report demonstrates that the existing national social safety net in Burkina Faso needs to be further strengthened before it has the capability to respond rapidly and dynamically to climate-related disasters or other shocks.

Recommendations have been formulated with a view to improving shock-responsive and adaptive capabilities of the social protection system. These recommendations draw on the analysis presented above, discussions with stakeholders working in and on Burkina Faso, as well as previous analysis conducted by the World Bank and others.

Recommendations are grouped into two categories. Firstly, this section notes general recommendations to improve government capabilities for responding to climate-related disasters and compounding shocks through social protection in the medium term. Subsequently, it provides a set of recommendations for the next phase of support to the PFS to strengthen ASP.

Recommendations to improve government capabilities

1. **Strengthen government capabilities to estimate the macro-fiscal implications of disaster risk, and introduce more explicit linkages to multi-annual budget programming.** Fiscal planning and budget programming could benefit from having better tools and capabilities to estimate the government’s contingent liabilities resulting from disaster risk. Although there are embedded macroeconomic modelling capabilities within the DGB, current models are geared towards estimating effects of simple scenarios on high-level macro fiscal indicators. There is no evidence of the socio-demographic and economic impacts of a historical catalogue of disasters (e.g. numbers of people affected or displaced, financial cost of disaster response, etc.) being used to inform financial allocations of public resources, nor in the design of instruments used to implement the national budget.

   With support from AFRITAC West, capabilities for improved modelling were being developed, also drawing on the ongoing PARM process to estimate the cost of different shocks to the agriculture sector. However, it is unclear whether this support is likely to continue in the short term. Targeted technical assistance could build on the foundation of existing capabilities and introduce ways for decisions on budget allocations for social protection programming to more clearly reflect high-level estimates of the implications of disaster risk. Notably, the DGB could be encouraged and supported to conduct sectoral planning and financial programming discussions involving relevant agencies and partners, following the adoption of the new social protection strategy.

2. **Scale up levels of disaster risk coverage (such as ARC or ARC Replica) to reduce the protection gap.** Assuming the WFP and ARC estimate of USD40–44/person is an accurate measure of need, and given the number of people in IPC3+ has consistently been above 2.5 million over the past three years, this suggests that the need for financial protection for people who are vulnerable to shocks in Burkina Faso has been at least in the range of USD100–110 million.

23 Based on Cadre Harmonisé reports for the period 2018–23 (IPC n.d.).
The only pre-arranged finance provided at present is an ARC Replica policy, which provides a total sum insured of less than USD10 million, with the remaining funding gap only being addressed through ex-post humanitarian aid. While such funding increased twofold from 2020 to 2022, ex-post assistance is unpredictable compared to pre arranged finance (with only 50% of all humanitarian appeals being funded on average) and almost all humanitarian assistance being depleted for lean season support, leaving vulnerable people and households largely unprotected against severe disasters.

A sovereign insurance policy that can supplement the available amounts in the event of more severe shocks, as well as a reinforced market for microinsurance for the production of food crops, would contribute to relieving pressure on government or humanitarian social protection schemes. Additionally, a more systematic approach to leveraging premium support through the African Development Bank’s Africa Disaster Risks Financing Programme and other donors could support continued country engagement in ARC.

3. **Refine climate datasets and trigger design to capture pockets of drought and floods.** Based on the latest climate change projections, localised erratic rainfall episodes will disproportionately impact certain areas of the country, although it is unclear whether such episodes are expected to increase in the medium term. Current risk finance solutions, from anticipatory action to microinsurance or sovereign insurance, use district-level medium or severe (admin 2) weather and food insecurity data sets to calibrate triggers, which might miss severe but more localised events at commune level.

The ongoing initiative to strengthen the national SAP early warning system would benefit from targeted support to better capture pockets of drought and localised flooding at commune level (admin 3), so there is a common repository of granular information ready for use by all responders (e.g. government, humanitarians, NGOs, etc.) to trigger and target climate-related disaster or lean season responses. The process of defining and introducing such an early warning platform should also be considered an opportunity to capitalise on recent gains in coordination among humanitarian agencies, and to start improving coordination between multilateral, humanitarian and non-governmental aid agencies that are active in supporting social protection.

4. **Develop and pilot dedicated protection and DRF instruments for pastoralists.** Currently, this group is not explicitly included in any government or humanitarian response programme, beyond small-scale responses funded through the FNS and FIE. High levels of poverty, exposure to climate change and conflict co-exist in areas where most pastoralist populations are present, making them a highly vulnerable group in need of dedicated support. Given the high impact of climate change and related conflicts in northern areas of the country, and along the border between rangeland- and crop-dominated regions during the dry season, pre-arranged plans and financial protection could prevent the migration of pastoralists southwards.

A feasibility study conducted by the International Livestock Research Institute and the World Bank for such support found that: ‘with targeted investments and supportive policies, an initiative targeting livestock keepers could be implemented in the extensive pastoral systems of Burkina Faso’ (ILRI 2022). Further efforts are needed to build on the positive findings of this study, as well as ARC’s technical support to develop dedicated risk finance products for pastoralists, and include them specifically in the development of any ASP system.

**Recommendations specific to the next phase of the Safety Nets Programme**

5. **Introduce tools to better estimate the financing needs of scaling up social protection in response to shocks.** The current proposed design for continued financing and support to the PFS extends the programme’s focus on building and strengthening the operational components of an effective ASP system in Burkina Faso. Further efforts to integrate the RSU and anchor the use of mobile money solutions are important ways to reduce the significant transaction costs of delivering cash transfers.

Aside from using the Cadre Harmonisé framework to forecast the number of people at risk from varying levels of food insecurity, there is at present no commonly agreed basis on which the government and its support partners can estimate the cost of
shock response (duration and stipend value) in relation to different types and intensities of local-level shocks. Implementing agencies are largely limited to discussing their response programmes within their respective geographic areas of operation, so support is limited to budget ceilings rather than estimated needs. The PFS can support the introduction of tools to better cost various ways of scaling cash transfers that could provide the basis for a more informed, strategic discussion among partners and with the government.

6. **Provide support across a range of domestic financing instruments to deliver ASP.** A few government-led funds are in place that can deliver scalable support to vulnerable people, largely designed to respond to frequent low-severity shocks. Although individually these programmes are not sufficiently funded or lack the capacity to meet the needs of their target populations, they offer relevant building blocks for a more comprehensive ASP response.

The current design of the new International Development Association operation financing the PFS envisions reforming and strengthening the FASA specifically to serve as the principal instrument for disbursing shock responsive cash transfers in response to severe droughts. Technical work to this end is already underway, firstly to review the fund’s governance framework and subsequently to revise its operational guidelines. Specific areas in which the FASA needs strengthening include efficiency of disbursement decision-making and approvals (internal control); flows of funds through preferred suppliers (procurement) and streamlined accounts (cashflow management); and transparency and accountability over managed funds (reporting and audits).

Despite the benefits of the FASA responding to severe drought, the new operation would benefit from investing in strengthening the shock-responsive capabilities of other instruments to complement the FASA. Specifically, the introduction of a new resilience window for the FNS and the potential establishment of the proposed FNPS offer opportunities to diversify instruments to deliver adaptive social assistance. These funds have distinct disbursement and resourcing benefits that the FASA cannot be expected to match. In addition, financing from the IMF’s Rapid Credit Facility will increase the level of scrutiny of public spending on cash transfers and in-kind food assistance, but these funds will most likely not be processed through the FASA.

7. **Actively integrate and balance the needs of IDPs and host communities as social protection systems and conflict dynamics evolve.** IDPs are at risk of receiving insufficient assistance. Although government-led social protection schemes focus on regions with high levels of poverty and food insecurity, there is no clear evidence that these programmes have targeted and reached the rapidly growing number of IDPs in the past three years. Separately, humanitarian assistance is reaching considerable numbers of IDPs across Burkina Faso (with 0.9 million people supported by WFP and 1.7 million people by UNHCR) yet is at this stage entirely reactive and based on figures reported by CONASUR. With conflict and displacement expected to continue in the short term, this growing population of vulnerable people is at risk of falling outside the gradually formalising social protection infrastructure. Specific initiatives to support relocation and (re)integration, delivered at communal or provincial level by UNHCR, are expected to become a more urgent need and would thus need to be supplemented as part of the broad range of national solidarity and social assistance programmes the government manages. At the same time, increased pressure from host communities needs to be addressed to ensure social cohesion.
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Cover photo: Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. December 2017. A farmer is selecting the seeds for the harvest. Credit: Luca Prestia

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