The Institution’s Knowledge: Congressional Staff Experience and Committee Productivity

Congressional staff have often been called the “invisible force” behind members of Congress, earning themselves the title of “unelected lawmakers.” In this paper, I explore the link between United States Senate committees’ level of productivity and the experience of their staff. Utilizing publicly reported data on Senate staff experience and a new measure of committee productivity I find that a committee’s average years of staff experience is a significant predictor of committee legislative effectiveness. I find, however, that greater levels of staff experience only increase committee effectiveness when assessing the experience of senior or high-ranking staff. As non-senior staff experience increases, however, committees become less effective. These findings suggest that when making hiring decisions, Senate chairs and ranking members should prioritize years of experience in their senior staff while foregoing experienced general and administrative staff in order to achieve greater levels of committee productivity.

“A United States Senator is a constitutional impediment to the smooth functioning of staff.”
—Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa)

Along with electing the Speaker of the House and the Senate President Pro Tempore, some of the first actions taken at the start of each Congress are those electing the members tasked with leading each chamber’s standing committees. These newly selected chairs assume the responsibility of setting the committee’s agenda, scheduling meetings and hearings, appointing subcommittee chairs, influencing subcommittee agendas, and serving as a spokesperson on the committee’s agenda to the party and chamber (Deering and Smith 1997). One person, however, can hardly handle all of these responsibilities. A key step in setting up one’s
committee, therefore, and often the first step in which a new chair engages, is hiring her committee’s staff.

Committee staff are responsible for both the administrative tasks of simply turning on the lights—and knowing which Capitol Hill office to call when the lights do not turn on—to the legislatively intricate tasks of navigating the bill-drafting process—and knowing which lawyer in the legislative counsel’s office is best suited to aid in the formatting of a given bill’s text. It is not unreasonable to assert, therefore, that staff have an indispensable role in their committee’s day-to-day functioning. The knowledge held by these staff members can facilitate the passage of a chair’s legislative priority or the success of a critical oversight operation. On the other hand, the lack of knowledge, or overall inexperience, of a committee’s staff can be detrimental to a committee’s productivity. For this reason, I suggest that those staff members who have longer tenures working for their committee are better suited to tackle their committee’s responsibilities than a newly hired staffer, unfamiliar with the committee’s precedent and procedures. I argue that turnover in committee staff, and, therefore, levels of staff experience, has a substantial impact on the effectiveness of congressional committees.

In this paper, I demonstrate the value of congressional staff—namely Senate committee staff—and the effect of staff experience on legislative effectiveness. Using records of Senate committee staff experience and a new measure to quantify committee legislative effectiveness, I find that the experience of a committee’s staff does have a significant effect on that committee’s legislative effectiveness. The effect of this experience, however, depends on whether the experience lies with senior staff—those more high-ranking staff, such as staff directors, general counsels, etc.—as opposed to policy, communications, or administrative staff (hereafter, distinguished for simplicity’s sake as senior and junior staff).2

Despite the importance of both junior and senior staff, the latter is more immediately involved in the legislative process and success of the committee (DeGregorio 1995). As senior and junior staff differ in their responsibilities, I argue that the level of experience of those committee staff communicating frequently with the chair and directly involved in the promotion of the chair’s priorities—that is senior staff—will be more tied to the overall success of the committee. I find that more experienced senior staff is positively correlated with higher levels of committee effectiveness. Perhaps more surprising, however, I find that experienced junior
staff decrease their committee’s effectiveness. With my new measure of committee effectiveness I am able to demonstrate that committees with more experienced senior staff are more legislatively effective, while committees that employ more experienced junior staff are less productive.

These findings have substantial practical implications for newly installed chairs seeking to lead highly productive committees: committee chairs seeking greater levels of legislative effectiveness would do well to spend their limited staffing budget on senior staff with experience relevant to that committee while saving funds hiring less experienced junior staff and training them on the job. Furthermore, my findings suggest that committees should return to previous staffing models in which committees were largely staffed by non-partisan experts who were retained regardless of the partisanship of the chair. If committee chairs were to take these two suggestions seriously, they could improve dramatically the legislative output of their committees.

**Committee Chairs as Employers**

The member of the majority party with the greatest seniority on a given committee typically serves as chair. This practice, however, is complicated by party rules surrounding the selection and, most notably for the purposes of this paper, tenure of chairs. In both the House of Representatives and the Senate, for example, party rules limit Republican members of Congress to serve as chair for a maximum of three Congresses. When a chair has reached her term limit leading a committee—or if an election results in a change in the chamber’s majority party—she will be replaced by the majority party’s newly selected chair. This change in committee leadership—no matter if caused by a term-limited chair, a congressional election resulting in a new majority party, or a chair failing to secure reelection—results in a shakeup of not only the members sitting at the committee’s dais, but also the committee’s staff sitting behind the dais.

Congressional staff, whether serving on a personal or committee staff, fill an unusually personal role. As Fox and Hammond articulate, this job is predicated on “mutual trust, confidence, and loyalty to a member” (Fox and Hammond 1977, 3). Due to this inherently personal relationship between a chair and her staff, it is entirely within a committee chair’s prerogative to, and almost expected that she will, replace existing staff with those she finds
more loyal to her. As a new chair takes the helm of a committee, therefore, experienced staff find themselves interviewing for a position they might have previously held for decades. Furthermore, this change in committee leadership results not only in a change in personnel, but often comes with a sizeable shakeup in the staff’s total level of experience as senior staff—the individuals who worked most closely with the previous chair and wield the greatest influence over the committee’s agenda—are replaced with new staff especially loyal to the incoming chair (DeGregorio 1995).

With little instruction on how to run a committee, newly elected chairs often turn to these experienced senior staff for guidance. As such, chairs frequently announce their selections for senior staff in one of their first public acts of their tenure. On January 31, 2013—just 1 week after he was formally appointed chair—Senator Tom Carper (D-Del.) announced the individuals he selected to serve as his Staff Director, Deputy Staff Director, Chief Counsel, and Communications Director of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. Similarly, it was reported only 6 days following his formal selection as chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Representative Ed Royce (R-Calif.) had selected as his new staff director and deputy staff director. These prompt selections of senior staff are not unusual and are, in fact, quite strategic.

To run a successful committee, a chair must entrust a great deal of authority to her staff—especially her senior staff. These senior staff members serve in roles that are entirely distinct from their junior counterparts. Among other roles, senior staff serve as the chair’s right hand, protecting them from surprises and negotiating with other offices to promote the chair’s priorities (DeGregorio 1995). Senior staff, as compared to junior staff, meet frequently with their chair and are often the chair’s first contact with any committee-related questions. Furthermore, these senior staff often rely on their expertise to provide crucial policy information and rely on their network to build coalitions. Junior staff, on the other hand, assist in administrative tasks such as answering phones, preparing hearing rooms, and drafting legislative text, statements, and press releases. Junior staff are unarguably necessary for the functioning of any successful committee, but I suggest they are less directly involved in the committee’s successes and failures. Once a chair hires her staff director and perhaps a handful of other key positions she typically bestows further hiring decisions
on the staff director, often while retaining the ability to serve as a final stamp of approval on the staff director’s recommended hires.

Faced with a fixed budget with which to hire staff and few limitations on how to divide the staff’s salaries, the chair and staff director are left with a careful needle to thread deciding which and how many experienced—and more expensive—staff to retain, and which inexperienced—yet likely less costly—staff to hire. While one chair might prioritize hiring senior staff who have experience working on her particular committee, another might choose to hire more junior staff she will need to train, yet in whom she can instill her preferred policy ideals. In either case, the new chair must contend with a fixed staffing budget and make tradeoffs between retaining the experienced staff who will consume more of her budget, or bringing on inexperienced staff who she can likely compensate less. I demonstrate that the optimal strategy for chairs making hiring decisions is to retain senior staff with greater levels of experience while bringing on less experienced junior staff. I show that years of experience are more valuable at the senior level than junior level, and chairs should, therefore, allocate more of their budget to ensure the retention of these experienced senior staff while foregoing more experienced junior staff.

**Staff Experience**

Congressional staff have long been called the “invisible force” behind members of Congress (Fox and Hammond 1977). Others have been blunter in their assessment of staff’s role calling congressional aides “unelected lawmakers” (Malbin 1980). However one chooses to define this class of political aides, few dispute their importance. Political scientists have long sought to understand the role that congressional staff play in the lawmaking process. Many have addressed foundational questions of who these staff are (Fox and Hammond 1977; Kammerer 1951; Patterson 1970; Salisbury and Shepsle 1981), what experience they have (Cain and Drutman 2014; Leal and Hess 2004; Romzek and Utter 1997), and what responsibilities they hold (Curry 2015; DeGregorio 1994; Kofmehl 1962). Others have conducted more nuanced assessments of a staffer’s responsiveness to her boss’ positions (DeGregorio 1988), responsiveness to constituents’ positions (Hertel-Fernandez, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2019), the accountability of congressional staff (Romzek 2000), and the strength and effect of staff networks (Burgat ad Hunt 2020; McCrain 2018;
Montgomery and Nyhan 2017; Rich 1977). Few studies, however, have focused on the role of committee staff, and even fewer on the effect of these specialized staff on a given committee’s productivity.

Over the past 10 years, the size of the congressional workforce has hovered at around 15,000 staff (Petersen 2016; Petersen and Wilhelm 2016). Approximately 1/6 of these staffers, however, are not employed by a member of Congress directly, rather they serve as committee staff. Congressional committees are staffed by anywhere from 20 to 200 total majority and minority staff who serve at the pleasure of the chair and ranking member, respectively. Unlike personal-office staff who are tasked with developing a cursory level of expertise on a broad swath of legislative topics, committee staff are hired because of their expertise on a specific policy area within the committee’s jurisdiction. Within this area of expertise, committee staff serve several functions for the chair or ranking member: they protect their boss from surprises and attacks, provide factual information on the substance of relevant legislation, and report on the political forecasts of proposed or pending legislation (degregorio 1994; Patterson 1970). Additionally, these highly specialized staff rely on their deep networks to build legislative coalitions aiding in the passage of a bill under the committee’s purview. The success of committee staff in accomplishing these key responsibilities depends largely on their previous experience in this role. Only a handful of scholars, however, have argued that continuity of a committee’s staff has any determination on the committee’s success (Kofmehl 1962; Patterson 1970; Romzek and Utter 1997).

Continuity of staff, from the perspective of sheer size, is relatively well documented. The size of committee staffs has fluctuated substantially since the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 first authorized committees to hire professional staff (Kammerer 1951), growing steadily through the 1970s and 1980s (Malbin 1980) until being trimmed back again in the 1990s (Ornstein, Malbin, and Mann 2002). In the past 10 years, however, Senate committee staffs, in particular, have been growing, reaching a peak in the 113th Congress and remaining relatively constant in the congresses since. As mentioned previously, however, even if the overall size of these staffs has remained relatively constant in recent congresses, the makeup of the staff varies substantially—especially when a committee is taken over by a new chair.

New chairs typically take the helm of a committee for one of three reasons: (1) the previous chair retired or lost her race,
(2) the previous chair was term-limited out of her position, or (3) the party controlling the chamber’s majority flipped, resulting in a new chair from the newly installed majority party. In any of these cases, however, staff are vulnerable to being replaced. From any given Congress to the next, the average percentage of committee staff returning to serve on that same committee in the subsequent Congress is about 75%. As existing research suggests, however, committees that are staffed by more experienced staff are better equipped to accomplish the key legislative responsibilities of committees. For this reason, I anticipate that those committees with higher levels of staff experience will be more successful in accomplishing legislative goals. Just as members of Congress improve their legislative effectiveness as their tenure increases, I argue that staff tenures have a similar effect on legislative effectiveness (Volden and Wiseman 2014).

Committee Staff Tenure and Legislative Effectiveness

As Speaker Sam Rayburn analogized frequently, “Any jackass can kick a barn door down, but it takes a carpenter to build it back.” Rayburn’s infamous quip suggests that he believed there to be particular qualities that make some individuals better suited to certain jobs than others. More specifically, he insinuated that some members of Congress possess skills that make them more effective lawmakers than others. Measuring this effectiveness quantitatively, however, is a task that scholars have only taken on recently.

The primary method by which scholars have evaluated individual members of Congress’ legislative productivity and success is through Craig Volden and Alan Wiseman’s legislative effectiveness scores (2014). In their book, Legislative Effectiveness in the United States Congress, Volden and Wiseman make the case that, “Representation in U.S. legislative politics depends crucially on the ability of elected representatives to take the issues that are important to their constituents and translate them into public policy” (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 18). And this understanding of legislative effectiveness is, of course, consistent with David Mayhew’s discussion of members’ position taking and credit claiming to secure electoral security (Mayhew 1974). Members seeking to retain their current office are incentivized to engage in acts that are visible to their constituents and allow members to claim credit for policies benefitting constituents. The most straightforward mechanism by
which members can engage in these activities is through sponsoring legislation. Volden and Wiseman’s legislative effectiveness scores, therefore, reward members who sponsor legislation that progresses successfully through the legislative process, awarding higher scores to those bills that are of greater substantive significance.

If members do seek to achieve legislative success, we can expect them to act strategically so as to increase the likelihood of their bill’s passage. It is not unsurprising, then, to observe members crafting bills carefully to ensure they are referred to friendly committees—namely, those on which the bill’s sponsor holds a seat (Schiller 1995). Despite members of Congress drafting legislation strategically to aide in its smooth passage, we know little about the level of effectiveness of one committee to the next. Volden and Wiseman’s scores are helpful for evaluating what criteria make some legislators more effective than others at the individual member level, yet what I seek to address, however, is how this legislative effectiveness might be evaluated at the committee level. Furthermore, I seek to uncover the role that committee staff play in their committee’s effectiveness.

As staff—and committee staff in particular—provide crucial institutional knowledge to members of Congress, I argue that their years of experience on Capitol Hill will prove to be consequential for how effective their committees are. To capture levels of staff experience, I utilize publicly reported expenditure records from 1993 to 2020 to measure aggregate years of employment for a given committee’s staff. I suggest that for any given committee, higher total years of staff experience will lead to a more effective committee. Those committees with lower levels of staff experience will be less legislatively effective, all else equal. Furthermore, I anticipate that the experience of senior staff will translate more directly to committee effectiveness than junior-staff experience. As senior staff—such as chiefs of staff, staff directors, and policy directors—are the key individuals taking direction from the chair and subsequently directing committee staff, I expect that greater senior-staff experience will be strongly predictive of a committee’s legislative effectiveness.

Due to the nature of committee chairs being faced with fixed budgets with which to hire staff, if senior-staff experience is, in fact, positively correlated with committee effectiveness, I expect that effective committees will also have fewer experienced junior staff. If chairs leading effective committees spend more of their budget to secure experienced senior staff, that will result in a
smaller portion of their budget remaining with which chairs can hire experienced junior staff. When making hiring decisions, chairs are faced with tradeoffs with respect to where they should allocate their funding. I argue, and demonstrate in the following sections, that chairs seeking to lead effective committees should dedicate a larger portion of their budget to hiring experienced senior staff while foregoing experienced junior staff.

**Committee Effectiveness Score**

When assessing the impact that staff tenures have on a committee’s effectiveness, it is essential to define this measure of effectiveness. Borrowing from Volden and Wiseman’s (2014, 2018) legislative effectiveness scores (LES), I develop a metric by which each Senate committee can be evaluated for its legislative effectiveness in the 103rd Congress through the 116th Congress. Volden and Wiseman’s (2014, 2018) pieces quantify the relative effectiveness of individual members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively. These novel measures provide the framework by which to apply such a measure to committees, creating what I call a committee effectiveness score (CES).

Using Volden and Wiseman’s designation of legislation as commemorative, substantive, or substantive and significant, I am able to assign all legislation referred to any Senate committee between the 103rd and 116th Congress a significance value. Combining these significance codes with data from the Congressional Bills Project (Adler and Wilkerson 2020) on each of these bills’ status, I sort legislation by the committee to which the legislation was primarily referred (REF). I then add an identifier to each bill indicating if it was reported out of the committee to which it was primarily referred (REP), if it passed the Senate (PASS), and if it was ultimately signed into law (LAW).

In the same manner that Volden and Wiseman weigh their legislative effectiveness scores, I assign weights to each bill depending on its previously assigned substantive significance: commemorative (C), substantive (S), and substantive and significant (SS). Commemorative bills were weighed by a value of $\alpha = 1$, substantive bills by $\beta = 5$, and substantive and significant by $\gamma = 10$. The reported term, for example, is the number of bills reported out of committee $i$ in Congress $t$, weighted by each of the bills’ significance, divided by the total sum of bills reported out of all committees $N$ in Congress $t$, weighted again by $\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\gamma$. 
Lastly, I normalize each committee effectiveness score by multiplying each score by the total number of committees (20) and dividing the score by the number of progress checkpoints (4). This produces scores with a mean of one and minimum value of zero. The equation for deriving committee effectiveness scores is, therefore, as follows:

$$
C_{\text{ES}}_{it} = \left[ \begin{array}{l}
\frac{\alpha \text{REF}^C_{it} + \beta \text{REF}^S_{it} + \gamma \text{REF}^{SS}_{it}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{REF}^C_{jt} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{REF}^S_{jt} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{REF}^{SS}_{jt}} \\
\frac{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{REP}^C_{jt} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{REP}^S_{jt} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{REP}^{SS}_{jt}}{\alpha \text{PASS}^C_{it} + \beta \text{PASS}^S_{it} + \gamma \text{PASS}^{SS}_{it}} \\
\frac{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{PASS}^C_{jt} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{PASS}^S_{jt} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{PASS}^{SS}_{jt}}{\alpha \text{LAW}^C_{it} + \beta \text{LAW}^S_{it} + \gamma \text{LAW}^{SS}_{it}} \\
\frac{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{LAW}^C_{jt} + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{LAW}^S_{jt} + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^{N} \text{LAW}^{SS}_{jt}}
\end{array} \right]^{-1} = \frac{N}{4}
$$

This committee effectiveness score can be applied easily to both House and Senate committees, but for the purposes of this project, I limit the scope of my analysis to Senate committees to account for the relatively high turnover of members of Congress on House committees versus Senate committees. As the membership of Senate committees is far more stable than House committees, due to elections every six years rather than every two, I am able to better isolate the effect of staff turnover—rather than a changing membership—on committee effectiveness. After sorting and assigning all legislation to each of these significance categories and progress checkpoints, I am left with a unique committee effectiveness score for each of the 20 Senate committees in the 103rd Congress through the 116th Congress.

To control for varying baseline levels of legislative productivity and expected legislative action across committees I utilize the same tool the Senate employs to account for a committee’s level of relative importance and expected legislative activity. Senate Rule XXV establishes three classes of committees (A, B, and C) and imposes restrictions on the number of committees on which a given Senator may serve within each class. Committees in the A class are deemed the most legislatively important, followed by B, concluding with C. This classification corresponds with each class’ legislative output. In the 115th Congress, for example, Class-A
committees were referred 90% of all bills introduced that Congress, and 83% of all bills signed into law were referred to a Class-A committee. In raw numbers, this means that Class-A committees were tasked with evaluating over 4000 bills in the 115th Congress, whereas Class B and C were collectively referred one-tenth of that. Sorting each of the Senate’s 20 committees by their classes allows for a more helpful evaluation of effectiveness, allowing for comparisons across committees of equal legislative importance and expected legislative workloads.

Figure 1 depicts the committee effectiveness scores for all committees in Class A. This class has the greatest amount of variation in committee effectiveness scores. It is clear, however, that very few committees’ effectiveness scores remain relatively constant across time, indicating that the variance in effectiveness scores by group is not attributable just to differences across committees, but rather committee’s effectiveness changing over time. The Class-A committee that achieved the lowest CES in a given Congress is the 106th Congress’ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The Intelligence Committee received a score of 0, indicating that not only did they not pass any legislation, but they were not referred any legislation. The maximum score, however, was achieved in the same Congress by the Senate Energy and Natural Resource Committee. They received a score of 5.123, which is the highest CES across all three committee classes. In the 106th Congress, the Energy and Natural Resources Committee was referred 411 bills—over a fourth of which were signed into law. The mean CES for

![FIGURE 1
Class A Committee Effectiveness Scores](image)
Class-A committees across the span of the data is 1.367, which is, unsurprisingly, the highest mean CES for all three classes.\(^{16}\)

Class-B committees also exhibit substantial variation across time, yet in a much more limited range of scores. As is apparent in Figure 2, the lowest CES for Class B is 0, which was the CES for the Special Committee on Aging. This committee held a score of 0 for all 14 Congresses, indicating that it was not the committee of primary referral for any piece of legislation in this time period. Class B’s maximum CES, however, only reached 1.274, which was achieved by the Rules Committee in the 103rd Congress.

Lastly, Figure 3 depicts the committee effectiveness scores for Class C committees. Again, the minimum observed value is 0 (achieved by the Ethics Committee), and the maximum for this class was 1.111 (achieved by the Indian Affairs Committee). Class C’s mean CES is the lowest of all three classes, with a value of 0.382. This is unsurprising as Class-C committees are generally not regarded as legislatively active.\(^{17}\)

One might make the argument that a given committee’s effectiveness score is highly correlated with its chair’s legislative effectiveness score, yet I demonstrate in Figure 4 that this is not the case. The overall Pearson correlation coefficient across all three classes of committees is 0.4322, indicating a moderate level of correlation.\(^{18}\) It is clear the chair’s legislative effectiveness score is not entirely predictive of her committee’s effectiveness score, yet the correlation is high enough to warrant the inclusion of the chair’s LES as a control variable in my subsequent models.

Lastly, one might suggest, that the role of a committee is often to stop the progress of legislation. A committee succeeding in this capacity might, therefore, not have much legislation reported out of its committee, but still should be considered effective. It is for this reason that I award committees credit for the number of bills they were referred. Processing large swaths of legislation and

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**FIGURE 2**

Class B Committee Effectiveness Scores

![Graph showing Class B Committee Effectiveness Scores](image-url)
determining what is worthy of a committee’s attention is a time-consuming endeavor and should be rewarded as active “work” on the part of a committee, even if this effort does not result in a piece of legislation progressing past the committee stage of the legislative process. This is why I have included the total number of bill referrals as a component of a committee’s effectiveness score.

These committee effectiveness scores represent the first quantitative attempt to classify committees’ productivity. Members’ individual legislative effectiveness has been the focus of much attention—with Volden and Wiseman’s (2014) legislative effectiveness scores serving as a preeminent breakthrough in quantifying this effectiveness—yet this new committee effectiveness score takes
the first step at applying such a measure to committees. As mentioned previously, this model for obtaining Senate scores could be applied to the House of Representatives, allowing for methodological assessments of House committee effectiveness, as well. In the next section, I will present my model of these Senate committee effectiveness scores as a function of multiple dichotomous parameters, in addition to the key independent variable of interest—staff experience—to determine the effect of staff tenure on committee effectiveness.

**Methodology**

To demonstrate the impact of committee-staff tenure on committee legislative effectiveness I employ a data set of staff experience to serve as the key independent variable, along with a number of control variables, in predicting my previously outlined committee effectiveness scores. Three control variables, in particular, are worth highlighting. First, I include a binary indication of whether or not a given committee had a new chair or ranking member in a given Congress. With the understanding that it takes time for committee chairs and ranking members to successfully navigate their new positions, I expect that controlling for a change in the gavel will have a negative effect on a committee’s effectiveness score. Additionally, I control for the average level of experience of the senators on a given committee. If a committee is comprised of senators who have served long tenures on this committee, I expect the baseline level of effectiveness to be higher. These senators have had time to learn the committee’s legislative history and build relationships with one another, allowing for higher levels of legislative productivity (Curry and Roberts Forthcoming). Lastly, I control for the chair’s legislative effectiveness score. As mentioned above, I expect committees led by effective chairs to be more productive than those led by less effective chairs. I maintain, however, that while controlling for these variables, staff experience will still have a significant effect on a committee’s productivity. This section details my data-collection process and relevant dependent and independent variables.

**Committee Membership**

To obtain a complete record of Senate committee membership I used the publicly available membership records from
Charles Stewart and Jonathan Woon (2017). These data include complete rosters for every Congress from the 103rd through the 115th Congress, in addition to records on committee turnover, seniority, and indications of a new or returning chair. I updated this data to include membership and turnover records for the 116th Congress and added a unique committee-identification code to facilitate matching with staff data. I calculate senator experience by summing the number of congresses in which a senator currently serving on committee $i$ in Congress $t$ previously served on committee $i$, divided by the number of senators serving on committee $i$ in Congress $t$. Similar to this calculation for senator experience, I obtained values for staff experience for all 20 committees in every Congress from the 103rd to the 116th.

**Staff Tenure**

Using a publicly available data, cleaned and verified by LegiStorm, I was able to assess staff tenures for Senate committee staff. LegiStorm is a non-partisan, nonprofit organization that has collected detailed biographical information on all congressional staff since 2011. LegiStorm’s records include complete staffing histories (lacking biographical information) beginning in October, 2000, so I mapped these data onto the full committee membership data from Stewart and Woon, creating a data set that spans the 103rd Congress to the 116th Congress (1993–2020). LegiStorm’s data are not without flaws—namely the fact that it is a relatively new data set that lacks historical completeness—yet it represents the most comprehensive data set of congressional staff available for analyses such as this. Only a handful of recent studies have employed these data (Cain and Drutman 2014; LaPira, Drutman, and Kosar 2020; LaPira and Thomas 2014; McCrain 2018; Ritchie and You 2021; Shepherd and You 2020; Strickland 2019), yet this new use of LegiStorm’s resources to assess staff experience represents a significant advancement in the congressional-staffing literature.

This staff data required intensive organizing and cleaning, in which I isolated only those staff records for individuals employed by Senate committees in the time period of interest. This left me with a data set of 5759 unique staff members.

As committee staff are hired for their specific area of expertise, for the purposes of obtaining a given committee’s total years of staff experience I only consider years in which staff worked
for that particular Senate committee—not a different committee, personal office, or the House of Representatives. I calculate staff experience, therefore, in the same fashion as senator experience: summing the number of congresses in which a staffer currently employed by committee $i$ in Congress $t$ previously worked for committee $i$, divided by the number of staff employed by committee $i$ in Congress $t$. There are some instances in which experience on one committee might transfer to another (e.g., working on the Armed Services Committee might equip a staffer well to serve in a role on the Foreign Relations Committee), yet for the purposes of this analysis, I argue that direct committee experience equips staffers with the most impactful tools to be an effective staffer. While policy expertise might translate across groups of committees, years of experience working with relevant departmental bureaus and interacting with decades of legislative precedent are unique to each committee. It is for this reason that I consider experienced committee staff to be only those staffers who have previously worked on the committee by which they are currently employed. The average years of staff experience for a Senate committee in a given Congress is 4.58, with Senate Armed Services Committee in the 113th Congress achieving the highest level of staff experience, with 8.73 average years of experience.

**Staff Seniority**

Furthermore, to assess the impact of different levels of staff responsibility on committee effectiveness, I add a binary indicator for whether or not each staff member served as a senior or junior staffer in a given Congress. Burgat and Hunt (2020) employ the use of four staff categories (senior, policy, communications and administrative) in their analysis of committee staff, yet only recently have committees begun to prioritize communications staff. To contend with the lack of communications staff in the earlier congresses in my period of analysis, I limit my categorization to two groups: junior and senior staff.

To accurately designate staff as junior or senior, I employed a strategy consistent with Melinda Ritchie and Hye Young You’s assessment of the seniority of personal-office staff in the House of Representatives (2021). Like Ritchie and You, I consulted Congressional Research Service and Congressional Institute descriptions of staff responsibilities to classify staff as junior or
senior staff. Of 12 generally accepted committee staff positions, I designated six as senior staff: staff director, deputy staff director, policy director, general counsel, communications director, and parliamentarian/clerk.24 I corroborated this designation by consulting six current or former committee staff and having them individually assign levels of seniority to these 12 staff positions. There was unanimous agreement that four of these six positions should be considered senior, and the final two I assigned to the senior-staff category (parliamentarian/clerk and policy director) were included by a majority of these six staffers. As the specific titles assigned to individual staffers vary substantially across committees and Congresses, I used a combination of regular expressions and hand coding to determine whether each title included in my data set fall into these six senior-staff positions or should be considered junior staff.25 With this designation, just over 15% of all committee staff are considered to be senior staff.

I then calculate both the committee’s average senior-staff experience and junior-staff experience.26 I suggest that those staff members who are the primary individuals responsible for communicating the chair’s preferred policies and political strategies to the rest of the staff will have a greater impact on the committee’s overall effectiveness than those serving in more administrative roles. I argue that this distinction in experience levels between junior and senior staff has substantial consequences as a junior staffer who lacks experience has the opportunity to be mentored by experienced senior staff, yet an inexperienced staffer at the helm of a committee will likely lead to junior staffers lacking direction, resulting in an entirely ineffective committee. Junior staff are necessary for the functioning of a successful committee, yet their roles are not of the same highly specialized nature as those of senior staff. Junior staff fill a crucial need on any committee, yet they are more easily replaced than a staff director or general counsel who possess the key institutional knowledge of Capitol Hill and their committee’s legislative history.

The average years of senior-staff experience is only slightly higher than general staff experience at 5.59 years, yet the committee with the highest level of senior-staff experience is the Senate Appropriations Committee in the 115th Congress at 12.19 years. Junior staff, on the other hand, have a mean experience level of 4.14 years. The Armed Services Committee in the 113th Congress had the highest level junior-staff experience with 8.46 years of experience.
Across the 14 congresses included in my data set, the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee had both the lowest general staff experience and the lowest junior staff experience levels, with 3.40 and 3.00 years, respectively. The Rules Committee had the lowest levels of senior staff experience across the 103rd to 116th congresses at 4.42 average years.\textsuperscript{27} Consistent with the individual-Congress scores, the Armed Services Committee had the highest overall staff experience, averaging 6.26 years, and highest junior staff experience, averaging 6.06 years. The Appropriations Committee had the highest average senior-staff experience across the time period of my analysis, with an average of 8.27 years of senior-staff experience.

Results

Existing knowledge about legislative effectiveness is member-centric, and only recently has it been assessed as a function of staff expertise. The following models move the collective knowledge forward to answer the key question of interest from a committee-centric view: how does a given committee’s level of staff experience affect its legislative effectiveness? The data presented in this section allow for a positive conclusion, indicating that committee staff do, in fact, affect committee effectiveness. I show, further, that the specific type of staff matters when assessing committee effectiveness, and that this holds true across all classes of Senate committees.

Consistent with my expectations, Table 1 presents two models demonstrating a strong relationship between committee staff experience and committee legislative effectiveness. Both models—ordinary least squares regressions—allow me to assess committee effectiveness scores from 18 Senate committees from the 103rd Congress to the 116th Congress.\textsuperscript{28}

The first model considers all staff experience as a predictor of the dependent variable—committee effectiveness scores. In this model, it is clear that the relationship between staff experience and committee effectiveness is significant, yet the model indicates that there is a negative relationship between levels of staff experience and committee effectiveness (see Figure 5). As the average level of experience of a committee’s staff increases by one Congress (two years), a committee’s effectiveness decreases by nearly 0.3 points. In the 114th Congress, a difference of 0.3 points in committee effectiveness scores was equivalent to the difference between the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee and
The Energy and Natural Resources (ENR) Committee. The ENR Committee was referred approximately 80% of the legislation the HELP Committee was referred, yet only managed to have six bills pass the Senate and be signed into law. The HELP Committee, on the other hand, had 26 bills in its jurisdiction pass the Senate, 10 of which were signed into law—all substantive in nature but one, which was both substantive and significant. And consistent with my findings, the HELP Committee had a lower average experience level than the ENR committee, which scored lower in committee effectiveness, indicating a negative relationship between staff experience and committee effectiveness.

### TABLE 1
Explaining Committee Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Committee Effectiveness Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Experience</td>
<td><strong>−0.275</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Congress)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Staff Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Congress)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Staff Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Congress)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senator Experience</td>
<td>0.105*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Congress)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Chair</td>
<td>−0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Congress)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ranking Member</td>
<td>0.139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair’s LES</td>
<td>0.248***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class-B Committee</td>
<td><strong>−0.971</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Congress)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class-C Committee</td>
<td><strong>−0.811</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Congress)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.123***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Ordinary least squares estimation with standard errors in parentheses. Excluding the Ethics Committee and Select Committee on Aging due to a lack of data on senior staff. Includes data from the 103rd Congress to the 116th Congress.*

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. 

...
In a second model, I test the effect of specific levels of staff experience on committee effectiveness. Because chairs are faced with a fixed budget when hiring staff, they must make tradeoffs in determining where to allocate their funding. When chairs allocate more of their budget to retaining experienced senior staff they must sacrifice the retention of experienced junior staff. This second model in Table 1 provides statistically significant results consistent with my theoretical expectations: a chair who prioritizes experienced senior staff will see that decision reflected positively in her committee effectiveness, whereas a chair who chooses to retain higher levels of junior staff will achieve lower levels of committee effectiveness. In this model, junior staff experience is predictive of a decrease in committee effectiveness, indicating that for every one unit increase in junior-staff experience (equivalent to one Congress) a committee’s effectiveness score decreases by 0.712 points.

Figure 6 further emphasizes this result. As junior-staff experience increases from one Congress (the minimum amount of experience a committee can have at the end of the period in which effectiveness is evaluated) to a high of 4.232 Congresses (8.464 years), it is evident that committee effectiveness decreases. In practical terms, a one-year increase in junior-staff experience
can translate into a committee having 30 fewer bills signed into law. This result suggests that chairs seeking to improve their committees’ legislative productivity should be careful not to over-invest their staffing funds in experienced junior staff, as this allocation of resources can, in fact, decrease their committee’s effectiveness.

When Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) took the helm of the Senate Appropriations Committee in the 110th Congress at the age of 89, the committee saw a decline in its effectiveness score by over an entire point, earning the Appropriations Committee the ranking of the third least effective class-A committee that Congress. Byrd’s tenure as chair of the Appropriations Committee was a point of great concern, prompting multiple Senate Democrats to quietly mull whether or not he was capable of continuing to serve in this position. My data only highlight this ineffectiveness. Further, my data indicate that had he made more strategic choices about which staff to retain, his committee’s effectiveness would have seen vast improvements.

As he made the transition from ranking member to chair, Byrd retained a significant portion of his staff and actually increased the overall experience level of his committee. He made two key errors, however. The first being that he did not retain
his previous staff director who had accumulated 8 years of experience as a senior-staff member, and instead appointed a new staff director who had no experience working for the Senate Appropriations committee. He did, however, retain enough senior staff to result in a net increase in senior-staff experience from the 109th Congress to the 110th Congress. Byrd’s second miscalculation, however—the choice to retain a large share of the junior staff on the Appropriations committee—demonstrates clearly the effect of junior-staff experience on overall committee effectiveness. The net increase in junior-staff experience on the Appropriations Committee from the 109th to the 110th Congress is the second largest increase in junior-staff experience for the Appropriations Committee over the scope of my study. As is evident in the second model in Table 1, an increase in junior staff experience results in a decrease in overall committee effectiveness, explaining at least part of Senator Byrd’s lack of effectiveness as chair in the 110th Congress.

It is clear from Table 1, and highlighted by the 110th Congress’ Appropriations Committee, that an increase in junior-staff experience has a negative effect on a committee’s effectiveness score, yet senior staff, however, have an opposite effect on committee effectiveness. As is apparent in Figure 7, for every one-unit increase in senior staff experience, a committee’s effectiveness score increases by 0.295 points. In tangible terms, a one-year increase in senior-staff experience can result in a committee having 15 more bills signed into law that Congress. This finding is in line with my theoretical expectation, that those senior employees leading the rest of the staff will have a greater positive impact on committee effectiveness than junior staff.

Senator John Thune’s (R-S.D.) tenure as chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation illustrates the impact that an experienced senior staff can have on a committee’s effectiveness, especially when coupled with less experienced junior staff. Senator Thune was appointed chair of the Commerce Committee in the 114th Congress, following a two-year stint as ranking member during the 113th Congress. When he took over as chair, he retained nearly 80% of his senior staff, including his staff director, deputy staff director—who later became his staff director, and his general counsel—who later became his deputy staff director. Senator Thune identified those influential staff members with whom he worked as ranking member and was able to capitalize on their years of experience when he transitioned to chair.
Senator Thune’s prioritization of these key senior staff members likely consumed a sizeable portion of his hiring budget, forcing him to hire less experienced junior staff. The Commerce Committee’s overall level of experience declined in the 114th Congress due to Senator Thune’s hiring of inexperienced junior staff, but as both models in Table 1 illustrate, a decline in overall staff experience—especially when coupled with an increase in senior-staff experience and a decrease in junior-staff experience—is associated with an increase in a committee’s effectiveness score.

Furthermore, in the 115th Congress, as Senator Thune was beginning his second term as chair of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, he continued to retain those staffers he first held over in the 114th Congress. In both the 114th and 115th Congresses, the Commerce Committee was the third-most effective Class-A committee. Senator Thune’s strategic hiring in the 114th Congress—prioritizing those influential senior staffers with years of experience over retaining junior staff—combined with his ability to retain those same staffers into his second term as chair allowed his committee to achieve two effectiveness scores in the top 15% of all committee effectiveness scores in the 103rd through the 116th Congress.
The aforementioned committees are all deemed to be the some of the Senate's most legislatively productive, finding them-selves categorized into Class-A. To control for the theoretical ex-pectation that committees of varying classes will have different anticipated levels of legislative output, I employ fixed effects by committee class in both models. As expected, I find that Class-A committees are more legislatively effective than Class-B commit-tees, which are more legislative effective than Class-C committees.30

Lastly, in both models, the chair's legislative effectiveness score, as calculated by Volden and Wiseman, is a significant pre-dictor of his committee's legislative effectiveness score. In other words, as the chair becomes more effective, so does his committee. The chairs who lead the most effective committees, however, are not only those who are individually effective legislators, but those who make strategic hiring decisions. Namely, those who use their budget to hire experienced senior staff while spending less funding on their junior staff.

Discussion

As the committee gavel is passed from chair to chair, each Senator approaches the job with a certain set of goals and legis-la-tive priorities. Yet as new chairs are getting settled in the center of the dais, they are faced with the fact that a committee led by a new chair typically experiences lower levels of committee legis-la-tive effectiveness compared to committees with returning chairs. If a chair were to act strategically, however, perhaps she should take stock of the experience of existing committee staff and retain those individuals with more experience.

The instances in which the most amount of committee staff turnover occurs is at the beginning of a term for a new chair or ranking member as this new leader capitalizes on the opportunity to hire staff loyal to him or her. If this chair or ranking member, however, prioritizes legislative effectiveness, she would be wise to consider retaining existing staff with years of experience on that committee rather than hiring an entirely new team. The new chair should be especially aware of retaining senior staff with years of experience, as she could offset much of the decrease in committee productivity that comes with a new chair by keeping some of the institutional knowledge of the staff. It is, of course, entirely within a chair’s authority to retain only those staff she feels are truly loyal to her and replace all others with staff new to the committee. My
findings suggest, however, that as senators rise in the seniority ranks of the committees on which they serve, they should work more closely with committee staff so as to establish a relationship with experienced staff they could retain upon taking the gavel.

When considering factors that make one member of Congress more effective than another, scholars tend to focus on individual characteristics, such as a member’s experience, seniority, and a number of personal demographics. Only recently have scholars considered the effect of congressional staff on a member’s personal legislative effectiveness (Crosson et al. 2020; McCrain 2018). This research, however, extends existing scholarship to address the consequences of staff experience on committee legislative effectiveness. To increase Senate committee productivity and avoid the legislative bottleneck that often comes at the committee stage of the legislative process, committee chairs should hire and retain more experienced staff. My results demonstrate that the retention of experienced senior staff has real, practical consequences for the legislative output of a committee. Chairs seeking to enact policies consistent with their agendas should, therefore, retain these experienced senior staff upon taking the gavel.

The partisan nature in which Congress presently operates makes it difficult to imagine a return to the committee environment that existed in the mid-twentieth century. My findings suggest, however, that if committee chairs were to view their staff as non-partisan policy experts rather than partisan loyalists, they could take steps to improve their committee’s legislative output. If chairs prioritized highly specialized institutional knowledge over partisanship, committees would be better equipped to overcome the costs that come with a change in leadership.

In this paper I find evidence to confirm Romzek and Utter’s claim that staff provide “a thread of continuity, institutional memory, and expertise within the institution” (Romzek and Utter 1997, 1252). There are few constants on Capitol Hill following an election, yet those in positions to make hiring decisions regarding committee staff should seek to place a greater emphasis on continuity of the staff, preserving this source of institutional knowledge, bolstering their own committee’s legislative effectiveness.

Emily Cottle Ommundsen is a PhD Student in the Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, United States.
ENDNOTES

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1. E.g., Electing Members to certain standing committees of the House of Representatives, H.Res. 10, 117th Cong. (2021); A resolution to constitute the majority party’s membership on certain committees for the One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, or until their successors are chosen, S.Res. 28, 117th Cong. (2021).

2. As will be described in more detail in subsequent sections, a lack of detailed data prevent the further parsing of committee staff into more than these two categories.


7. Data on committee staff were obtained from LegiStorm.

8. For example, congressional staff—and committee staff, in particular—are often cited as a crucial component of the negotiations that ultimately led to the passage of the Affordable Care Act (Cohn 2010).

9. See Appendix A for full staff counts by committee and Congress.

10. The lowest observed retention was the Special Committee on Aging in the 105th Congress, which only saw 25% of its staff returning in the 106th Congress. There are over 20 instances, on the other hand, in which 100% of a committee’s staff returned to continue working for that same committee in the next Congress.


12. It is important to note that while a not insignificant portion of Senate committee work consists of vetting and voting on executive nominations, this effectiveness score is limited to measuring legislative productivity and therefore excludes committee consideration of nominations. This definition of committee effectiveness leaves room for future work to include considerations of nominations and treaties.

13. See Volden and Wiseman (2014, 20–21) for a detailed explanation of the coding strategies for these three classifications of legislative significance.
14. See Appendix B for a complete list of Senate committees and their classes, as assigned by Senate Rule XXV.

15. Eight percent of all bills were referred to Class-B committees, and the final two percent were referred to Class-C committees. Thirteen percent of laws were referred to Class-B committees and four percent to Class-C committees.

16. See Appendix C for full summary statistics of the committee effectiveness scores.

17. As is evident in Figures 2 and 3, the committee effectiveness scores for the Special Committee on Aging and the Select Committee on Ethics rarely deviate from zero. For this reason, I exclude both committees in subsequent analyses. I demonstrate in models found in Appendix E, Tables E2 and E5, however, that including these two committees has no substantial effect on model results.

18. The Pearson correlation coefficients for classes A, B, and C are 0.439, 0.393, and 0.431, respectively.

19. A scholar embarking on this journey should, however, be conscious of the potential impact of higher levels of member turnover in House committees as compared to Senate committees.

20. To address a potential consequence of lacking complete data from the beginning of my time period of interest I employ statistical models on both the entire span of my data and the limited span that includes only the period in which LegiStorm’s data are complete. I am able to demonstrate that the statistical findings from the 103rd Congress to the 116th Congress match those of the 107th to the 116th. See Appendix E Table E3 for these results.

21. One could make the argument that a staffer with experience working on a House committee who made the jump across Capitol Hill to the committee’s Senate counterpart should be considered experienced, yet I maintain that these individuals should not be considered experienced for the purposes of this study as they are unfamiliar with the intricacies of the new committee. A staffer moving from the House to the Senate would be unfamiliar with its nominations process, and a staffer moving from either chamber to the other would be unacquainted with its legislative counsel, responsible for drafting legislation; its committee’s members, whose support is integral in the committee’s legislative success; and, perhaps most importantly, its chamber’s procedural differences. I do not dispute that these staff members, moving from a committee in one chamber to its counterpart in the other, have a unique level of experience that those staffers who are beginning their careers on Capitol Hill lack, yet I maintain that specific-committee experience is both unique to and greater than cross-chamber experience. Future studies could expand the scope of this project to assess the effect of this cross-chamber experience on committee productivity.

22. To confirm that committee-specific experience is valuable for predicting a given committee’s effectiveness score, rather than overall congressional experience, I run identical models in Appendix E8 with staffers’ full Capitol Hill experience and find substantively consistent results indicating that the consideration of committee experience alone is noteworthy.
23. In the 103rd Congress, for example, only one committee had a staff member whose title would be considered a communications staffer by Burgat and Hunt’s coding. It was not until the 107th Congress that over half of Senate committees employed at least one communications staffer. And in the 116th Congress, all but the Rules Committee and Select Committee on Intelligence employ at least one communications staffer. In order to assess the experience of these staff, however, I am unable to utilize the communications category as there simply were not many communications staffers at the beginning of this period of analysis.

24. The remaining six positions I consider to be junior staff are counsel, professional staff member, policy analyst, director of operations, press secretary/assistant, and staff assistant.

25. See Appendix D for a list of titles I consider to be “senior staff.”

26. I calculate senior staff years of experience by summing all the previous years of experience a staffer had on the committee in which they now serve as a senior staff member, regardless of if they served as senior staff in those preceding years.

27. The average senior-staff experience level for the Ethics Committee is 0.36 years lower than the Rules Committee, yet due to the lack of complete data on senior staff for both the Ethics Committee and Select Committee on Aging these two committees are excluded from all analyses.

28. As mentioned previously, I do not assess committee effectiveness scores from all 20 committees due to a lack of variation in committee effectiveness scores and a lack of data on senior staff serving on the Ethics Committee and Select Committee on Aging. Additionally, to test the accuracy of my findings, I ran an identical model including only the staff data from LegiStorm’s complete records—the 107th Congress through the 116th Congress—and found results consistent with my model that includes the full span of staff data. See Appendix E Table E3 for these findings.


30. I include in Appendix E4 the results of a model utilizing random effects, rather than fixed effects, by class. These results are substantively and statistically similar to those discussed above. While there exists some variance in the level of productivity across committees within classes, the limited number of observations within each committee prevents me from utilizing committee fixed effects to analyze this effect further. To attempt to discern the amount of variance within committees, I include in Appendix E4 the results of a model utilizing nested random effects. Models 3 and 4 depict the same model as that found in Table 1, yet with nested random effects by class and committee. It should be noted that while the effects of junior- and senior-staff experience are not statistically significant due to a lack of power, the coefficients remain in the intended direction. This lack of significance in models 3 and 4 provides evidence that some of the variance in effectiveness can be explained by committee random effects. While this suggests that the true effect of staff experience is smaller within than across committees, the lack of statistical power should not undermine the conclusions presented above.
REFERENCES


Petersen, R. Eric. 2016. “Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977–2020.” *Congressional Research Service*.


**Supporting Information**

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web site:

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Appendix D: List of Senior-Staff Titles
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Table E2. Explaining Committee Effectiveness, Including Data from the Ethics and Aging Committees
Table E3. Explaining Committee Effectiveness, Excluding Data from 103rd–106th Congresses
Table E4. Explaining Committee Effectiveness with Multilevel Modeling
Table E5. Explaining Committee Effectiveness with Multilevel Modeling, Including Data from the Ethics and Aging Committees
Table E6. Explaining Committee Effectiveness, Isolating Senior and Junior Staff
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