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
India's Theatre Command System: A Proposal

Discussion Document 2020-04

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Executive Summary

This discussion document proposes the structural framework for India's Theatre Command system with terrain and strategic threats being prime factors. Larger theatre structures facilitate flexible cooperation in greater quantities of military power and concurrent with inter-service integration would cater for centralised joint planning and decentralised application of military power. These aspects shape the structure of the four Theatre Commands proposed. The Northern Theatre Command will be responsible for the land border with China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, the Western Theatre Command for the Pakistan border, the South Western Theatre Command and the South Eastern Command for the Western part and Eastern part of the Indian Ocean. All Theatres would also be responsible for the hinterland areas based on state boundaries.

The existing Chiefs of Staff Committee would be renamed as Joint Commanders and Staff Committee (JCSC) comprising the Chairman-Joint Commanders and Staff Committee (CJCSC), three Chiefs and four Theatre Commanders. The JCSC will formulate military strategy. The operational directives to the Theatre Commands will emanate from JCSC. The Joint Operational staff (JOS) consisting of Component Commanders in the HQ IDS will task the Theatre Commands and provide resources, as required.

As a practical guide, the CDS hat is mostly worn during interaction with the political leadership and the civilian bureaucracy while the CJCSC hat is worn within the military structures.

Political Mandate

Through a political intervention that is certainly rare in the landscape of political guidance provided to the military, the choice of creating Theatre Commands is no longer a debate. The main aim of Theatre Commands is to facilitate integrated planning and coordinated application. The focus is on creating organisational structures and therefore the issue now is, what and how is it to be done?

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been specifically mandated in the Allocation of Business Rules¹ - “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands”.

The CDS also wears three hats. As CDS, he is the principal military adviser to the Raksha Mantri (RM). He is also the Head of Department of the newly created Department of Military Affairs (DMA). Both these functions being undertaken at the MoD level and has no operational role. At a level below in the HQ IDS, he is the Chairman, Joint Commanders & Staff Committee (CJCSC) and has an operational role. It is hoped that such an arrangement will facilitate better integration of the policy, strategy, planning and executive functions.

This discussion document is based on the notion of balance of power being underpinned by human ability to *cooperate flexibly and in large numbers*². Adopting these principles and marrying them with geography and threats is proposed as the conceptual foundation on which India creates structures for Theatre Commands.

Geography and Threats

Geography and threats are two key factors that must be given centre stage in the conceptual framework for restructuring. At a fundamental level, the main challenge for the Indian military is to strike a balance for military power between India’s continental and maritime space through a framework of cooperative flexibility accommodated within the largest structures feasible.

Primary threats to India are from China and Pakistan, with the potential threat from China being greater. There is also a possibility of a combined threat from a Sino-Pak nexus. China’s threat can manifest in the Continental domain, mostly through our Northern borders and in the maritime space that includes the Indian

Ocean and the South China Sea. Threats will also manifest through the domains of cyber and space. However, the strategic value of these threats lies in acting as a layer on the physical spaces on earth – air, sea, and land.

The China Threat

The threat on the Northern borders is primarily one of ‘salami slicing’³. It is also possible for the military imagination to conceive large threats which would involve large scale application of China’s military power across the Himalayas. In geopolitical terms, such types of war are things of the past, as there is a nuclear equation involved and also the difficulty of maintaining a sizeable force across the Himalayas for long periods and especially in winters; this would provide India with sufficient attrition opportunities that can be leveraged and therefore deter China from engaging in the ‘big fight’. Also, China’s main military problems are with Taiwan and countries in East Asia and the South China Sea. If it engages in a ‘big fight’, India has the military power to weaken its potential for military application against the primary threats. The nature of the threat calls for being on the strategic defensive on the land border which is supplemented tactically by offensive defence and leverages the defensive power bestowed by the Himalayas. This also implies that the capability for tactical offensives rests mostly on brigade sized forces that can be airlifted, if required.

The maritime space is a conjoined one, now officially accepted as the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Ocean is the primary maritime space for exercise of naval power. The South China Sea and other global maritime spaces are the secondary areas which will ideally require cooperation with other actors like QUAD plus that includes the ASEAN for the South China Sea. The primary military posture in the maritime domain of the Indian Ocean is that of a strategic offensive which can exploit the geographic advantage provided by peninsular India jutting out like a sword into the Indian Ocean and which provides tremendous advantage for defending the sea lines of communications (SLOCs). China’s reliance on these SLOCs is well known and despite its search for overland alternatives, its dependency on it will endure as it is economically unviable in relative costs to transport goods overland for more than 1000 kilometres, as land transportation by rail or road cannot carry the volume and weight that modern ships can. Moreover, there are also several soft targets like fishing and survey vessels in the Indian Ocean which can be suitable for operations other than war.

The Pakistan Threat

The nature of the primary threat from Pakistan is of terrorism. In case of a terrorist attack, Indian military power must be able to strike swiftly without posturing. Such capability requires air power, missiles, and long-range artillery and in some cases, be combined with Special Forces. Concomitantly, a capability for shallow land thrusts would also be required. In addition, internal security deployment of Armed Forces is likely to continue in Jammu & Kashmir.

In the maritime space, India’s naval power should be capable of a strategic offensive. A limited conventional land threat from Pakistan is feasible, especially if it is part of a Sino-Pak nexus. Any Sino-Pak nexus threat is therefore best deterred by adopting a strategic defensive that can tactically be ‘offensive defence’ in the North and West, which is the continental space and adopting a strategic offensive in the maritime space.

There is a need to recognise the importance of the fact that land and sea operations are interdependent and should be synergised to meet national strategic objectives. The land and maritime strategies must be perceived of being part of a singular military weapon. Such thinking and its practical realisation can only be incubated, groomed, and fructified in joint organisational structures.

Proposed Theatre Command System




Figure 1 -A proposal for creating theatre commands with individual components

DMA

The mandate of the DMA in the MoD is essentially of dealing with military specific issues, in contrast to the DOD under the Defence Secretary, which deals with the broader issues of defence including capital procurement. The efforts of the other departments of the MoD should be directed to improve the military instrument that is represented by the DMA. There will be a large measure of overlap that will demand working closely with each other.

The issue that needs to be flagged is that CDS as head of DMA is responsible for the RM's Operational Directive which is a policy document that must be crafted for the RM, with the DMA being the nodal agency. This will involve widespread consultations with the HQ IDS, other departments of the MoD as well as the other elements of the national security system. Presently, this process is also handicapped by the lack of a National Security Strategy that would have provided the strategic direction for the RM's political guidance. Notably, national strategy is concerned with application of force for political purposes, while military strategy is predicated on the threat and application of violence.

It is important that those who craft military policy at the MoD are separate from those who craft military strategy. Policy will indicate the goals/objectives that strategy will have to achieve. In essence, DMA under the CDS decides what to do (Policy) and HQ IDS under the CJCSC will have to work out how to get it done (Strategy). Both these processes require the harmonisation of means and ends and therefore has to be based on realistic expectations of budget allotment. It is therefore the responsibility of the CDS to get requisite budget allotted for both Capital and revenue through an interaction with the Defence Secretary and RM.

Policy has a longer life span than military strategy, as strategy will have to occasionally adjust to changing circumstances. This will require a perpetual dialogue between the policy level of MoD and military strategy level of HQ IDS, with the three hatted CDS playing the bridging role.

Due to the government, having laid down that the DMA staffing is to be carried out within available manpower pool, in practice, the main staff at HQ IDS are all double hatting in the DMA. This can at best be a temporary arrangement and would conflate policy and strategy. Ideally, there should have been two verticals

in the DMA dealing with policy and strategy. The government approval has kept the HQ IDS at a level below and not integrated with it. The challenges for staffing the DMA are huge and a solution has been suggested by the author⁴.

DM-CJCSC - HQ IDS




Figure 2: Tactical Linkages between commanders

In the proposed theatre system, the present COSC will also include the Theatre Commanders and therefore it must be renamed as the Joint Commanders & Staff Committee (JCSC) headed by CJCSC. The System predicates that the operational responsibility rests with the Theatre Commanders. The corollary is that the Chiefs can no longer have complete command of their service assets and do not have operational responsibilities. The Octet of the CDS, Chiefs and Theatre Commanders will therefore constitute the highest Joint Military Decision making body. Based on issues being discussed, special invitees can always partake and could include Secretaries of various departments. The JCSC is convened by the CJCSC and its quorum tailored to the issues under discussion. The concept is illustrated in the diagram:

Joint Commanders Staff Committee(JCSC)




Figure 3: Composition of the Joint Commanders Staff Committee

The JCSC has flexible composition while dealing with different issues. For an issue like military strategy and operational planning, it would be necessary for the full JCSC to meet. However, for issues like joint training, only the CJCSC and the Chiefs would do. Similarly, if the issue is purely operational, only CJCSC and the Theatre Commanders would suffice. So, apart from full quorum of the JCSC; CJCSC + Chiefs or CJCSC + Theatre Commanders or any other mix can be tailored with a prefixed minimum Quorum. A bi-annual institutionalised JCSC meeting would deliberate on major issues. The JCSC will be serviced by the present secretariat of the COSC, which should be supplemented, as necessary.

The three service Chiefs would not have operational responsibility but instead be primarily responsible for planning, training, human resources, administration, and Acquisition for their respective Service. The role of Chiefs while being curtailed is still crucial in resolving service specific issues and they would be plenty of them. The service chiefs will have to exercise their functions through service specific structures. They would have direct access to the Raksha Mantri.

In practice, the CDS hat is mostly worn during interaction with the political leadership and the bureaucracy while the CJCSC hat is worn within the military structures.

Military strategy is a derivative of political guidance and is the prime determinant of force structure planning and force application. Military strategy is crafted by CJCS in consultation with the Chiefs and Theatre Commanders at the level of JCSC.

The present CISC in HQ IDS could be renamed as VCDS (A) and be responsible for supervising the operations and staff functions including intelligence and planning. He will be the Head of the Joint Operational Staff (JOS) which will include representatives of the three Services. This will involve integration of most elements of the existing Operational Directorates now under DGMO, DGNO and DG Air Ops and become the HQ JOS. Under the VCDS (A) would be the component commanders of three Services, Space, Cyber & Special Forces. Space and Cyber will be a sub-set of national civilian structures. In addition, the VCDS(A) will supervise Joint Training. Based on RM's political guidance, military strategy will be crafted by the JCSC. The JOS through an integrated planning process will formulate the Operational instructions for the Theatre Commands. A parallel appointment of VCDS (B) would also be required and would have pertinent Component Commanders, dealing with Acquisition, Logistics and Human Resource Management.

Notably, the CDS hat has no operational responsibility, but the COSC has always had one in terms of operational and logistic planning and that must continue with nomenclature of CJCS. CJCS, Chiefs and Theatre Commanders are involved in the military strategy level as well as the operational planning level. In addition, the Theatre Commanders are instruments of force application at the operational and tactical levels. In the nuclear command chain, it will be the CDS who will provide advice to the political leadership; but exercise administrative control as CJCS of Strategic Forces Command and be responsible for implementing tasks as ordered by the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority.

In summary, the HQ IDS will have two main functions - integrated planning and coordinated application at military strategic and operational level. It will also drive the modernisation process through capability planning and prioritisation based on the military strategy. It is the highest structure for joint planning and will obviate the previous practice of each service planning separately and trying to integrate later. With this structure, planning is joint at all stages of the process. Integrated planning, coordinated application, monitoring and course corrections will be its most important functions. Planning and allocation of resources for out

of area contingencies will be done at this level and executed under relevant Theatre Commanders.

Integrated Theatre Commands (ITC)

ITC is an integrated force that is assigned specific geographical theatre and can operate independently. Conceptually, the theatre should be as large as possible so that cooperative flexibility in large numbers is possible. Integrated Theatre Commanders will be responsible for operational planning and tactical execution of all war fighting within the theatre based on operational directives of the CJCS.

Ideally, considering India's geographic characteristics the largest ITC configurations could be two theatres - Continental and Maritime. The Continental Theatre would be primarily built on Army and Air force elements. The Maritime Theatre would be primarily Navy, which also incorporates elements of the other two Services as well. However, though these are the largest possible theatres which can be directly under the HQ IDS, a single Continental Theatre would be unwieldy, to be managed by a solitary theatre commander. Therefore, the continental theatre is split into two theatres with the one theatre responsible for the North (Northern Theatre Command- NTC) against China and a second theatre for the West (Western Theatre Command- WTC) against Pakistan.




Figure 4: Theatre Commands and Functional Organisations

The Indian Ocean and our commitments in the Indo-Pacific lend themselves into a single theatre which due to reasons of threats from two nations could have two Maritime Commands located in the East and West and largely conform to the existing area of responsibility of the Western Naval Command and Eastern Naval Command. These two commands could be part of a single Maritime theatre Command. But two factors work against singularity. First – the maritime vision is one of expanding capabilities to the waters beyond the Indian Ocean and that would make a single maritime theatre unwieldy. Second, the permeability of external and internal threats demands that Theatre Commands share the internal continental space. The internal space that one maritime based Theatre would have to share is sizeable and evident from the map above. Therefore, the two existing Western and Eastern Naval Command are re-designated as South Western Theatre Command (SWTC) and South Eastern Theatre Command (SETC). Each would be based on fleets, Area Headquarters of the Army and Operational Groups of the IAF and have tri-service Component Commanders with assets allotted by the HQ IDS. The existing Integrated Andaman & Nicobar Command will come under SETC.

The Theatre Commander would be solely responsible for integrated planning and coordinated application. Each Theatre Command should also have Deputy Theatre Commander of three-star rank of C-in-C status. The Theatre Commands would each have its Component Commanders who will exercise operational control over their own service specific assets. Depending on requirements and availability there would also be Component Commanders for Special Forces, Internal Security etc. The Deputy Theatre Commander will coordinate the functions of maintenance, personnel, administration, and logistics. These broad areas will have to be grouped under a three-star head.

The theatres would have broadly two types of assets under their control – primary assets over which they would exercise full control and secondary assets that are located within their theatre but whose allocation for operations is decided by the JOS. This will cater for flexibility as all tri-service assets of the Theatre can be used flexibly depending on the tasks and missions on hand. Additional resources when required can be requisitioned from JOS.

All theatres including maritime theatres would have responsibility in the hinterland with boundaries preferably along state boundaries. However, and especially at the edges, in places like Kutch and Ladakh with Himachal Pradesh, district boundaries may have to be followed.

Below the Theatre Commands, the Corps/Areas of the army should be restructured as required, especially with respect to creating Joint operational assets, internal security commitments, logistics and administrative integration. The Air Force Stations/Squadrons of the Air force should be grouped into operational groups consisting of 2-3 Wings, under an Air Vice Marshal who will report to the Component Commander. The Maritime Theatres will have Fleets as their subordinate structure.

Northern Theatre Command

The Northern Theatre would be based on the existing configuration of the Army's Eastern and Central Command and would include Component Commanders of the three services. It will be responsible for the borders with China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. The Army Component Commander would have 3/4/33/17 Corps, 9 (I) Brigade in the Central Sector of Himachal Pradesh and any other additional resources allotted by HQ IDS. The Air Force Component Commander would have the resources of the Eastern Air Command and Central Air Command as also any other resources allotted. The Naval Component Commander would have a restricted role, as the shoreline is the responsibility of the Southern Eastern theatre. The Army's Central Command assets can be redistributed and some assets can be grouped under the Internal Security Component Commander at the Theatre level.

Due to the terrain configurations and the preponderance of the land power, the C-in-C of the NTC should be from the Army. He could also be from the IAF, but such decisions can be taken later after the transitions has been done and experience gained. The Deputy Theatre Commander should be from the IAF.

There is a case for the ITBP and Assam Rifles to be under the operational control of the Theatre Commander. Like J&K, the BSF deployed on the perennially active Line of Control, are under operational control of the Army. The Northern Borders and the Myanmar border are likely to remain un-demarcated and active and therefore the case for ITBP and Assam Rifles are similar to BSF elements on the Line of Control. This is an incredibly old turf battle and demands political intervention of the PM.

Western Theatre Command (WTC)

The WTC would be based mostly on the existing configuration of the Western and South Western Air Command. The Army Component Commander would have 14, 15, 16, 11, 10, 12 Corps as also the three Strike Corps. This seems too unwieldy for one theatre as it will also have with it the three strike corps. 14 Corps is deployed against both China and Pakistan. However, because of terrain imperatives it is preferable to be grouped with WTC.

What must catch our attention here is that though we say that China is a greater adversary, most of India's military power is postured towards Pakistan. This is understandable to some extent, but the pertinent question would be why should most India's land power have a Pakistan orientation when the major threat is in the form of terrorism, which demands a capability to strike without posturing in the form of fire power of long range vectors including aircraft and missiles, Special Forces application and shallow land thrusts. There is therefore a case for the army to restructure and rebalance from the West to the North. A case that the author has been making for several years.⁵ The restructuring of the Strike Corps and a shift to Integrated Battle Groups is probably the way forward. Resources of South West Army Command, Southern Command and South West Air Command can be redistributed. The Headquarters of the Western Theatre could be in Delhi.

Considering that force application without posturing is an important element of this theatre, the C-in-C should be initially from the IAF. The issue of it being rotational between the Army and IAF can be taken after experience has been gained. The Deputy Theatre Commander should be from the Army.

South Western/South Eastern Theatre Commands

India's power projection ability will be primarily anchored in the Maritime Theatre Commands and will therefore host India's Out of Area capability. Both commands will have the strategic offensive elements that can be applied synergistically. The areas of responsibility of these commands is primarily in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. As and when resources permit and international cooperation is institutionalised, it should envision expanded coverage of the maritime space in the Pacific and Atlantic. Admittedly, resources constraints presently shrink the space, but the vision for expanding maritime space, must guide the development of maritime power. When resources permit, an expeditionary Command must be

created to provide muscle to the vision. At present at least a two to three brigades of amphibious forces must be raised that can also serve to defend our island territories.

While creating both theatres, Army and Air assets for the South-Western Theatre and South- Eastern Theatre would be beefed up from Southern Army Command, South Western and Southern Air Command. The HQs of the SWTC and SETC will be at Mumbai and Vishakhapatnam respectively. They would also be responsible for hinterland areas based on state boundaries as shown on the map.

While the C-in- Cs should be from the Navy, the Deputy Theatre Commanders should preferably be from the Army due to the responsibilities in the hinterland. Both Maritime Theatres will be tasked and allotted resources for Out of Area Contingencies including for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR).

There is a strong case for the Coast Guard to be brought under the DMA in the MoD and being grouped with the Maritime Theatres. The argument that the Coast Guard is a quasi-civilian force and therefore must be kept separate, does not withstand scrutiny other than for turf protection. The Coast Guard has also to deal with threats from terrorism and must operate in close coordination with the navy. Moreover, Jointness through integration of maximum elements produces the best synergy in terms of outcome due to the commonality with the Navy in many functional areas. This is of course an issue that has been discussed for several decades and would require political intervention for realisation.

Air Power

The IAF has consistently maintained that due to lack of resources and the fact that we have no expeditionary missions, there is no need to restructure Integrated Theatre Commands. This argument is misleading as ITCs have nothing to do with expeditionary ambitions. They are simply the modern way of fighting wars. Also, structural integration promotes better utilisation of available resources. Since it is not desirable to allocate permanent dedicated air power assets below the theatre level, key air power assets would be controlled by the Component Commanders at the highest level of JOS/Theatre Command level. Because of its reach and speed of application, distributed deployment and flexible application would be feasible.

A controversy has already arisen, since the CDS, supposedly without proper consultation and study, has decided that there shall be a functional Air Defence Command. This must be avoided, as the Air Component Commanders at the JOS and the Theatre level must be solely responsible for all missions, both offensive and defensive. It is regrettable, if it is true, that proper study and consultations were not undertaken, prior to a public announcement by the CDS⁶. Going forward, it is a major lesson for Joint decision-making protocol, which must first answer the question, how does such decisions impact the Theatre Commands?

Functional Commands

The Functional commands would in principle follow the Operational Command model. Training, Logistics, Intelligence, Communications, Cyber, Space and Special Forces etc will have to be configured to support the joint operational structure. The creation of operational and logistics support elements will involve tri-service structural integration at multiple levels and should exploit the potential for merging service assets and optimal use of resources. Cyber, Space and Special Forces would be under their Component Commanders in the JOS. Human Resource Management, Joint Training, Administration and Maintenance would be under VCDS (B). There would be many service specific functions including training, administration, Human Resource Management will remain under the Chiefs.

Joint Training would have to reorient the Professional Military Education of officers towards increased focus on Jointness and broaden the pedagogy to relate force application to political objectives. The creation of the National Defence University (NDU) will certainly be delayed further due to the inevitable budget squeeze. However, there is much scope in online learning courses to be conducted and therefore the NDU must commence as an online university without further delay.

The logistics organisation under the VCDS (B) would integrate all feasible common logistics functions to optimise, procurement, inventories, repairs, and supply chains. Codification, Standardisation and Quality Assurance would be important functions. It will also be the interface with Defence Acquisition Council, Research and Development and industries in the public and private sector. It will manage technology induction, procurement, provisioning, stocking, and supply chain management to frontline elements.

Human Resources Management

It would be obvious that the C-in-Cs of Theatre Commands like the Chiefs will have to be of four-star rank; all Deputy Theatre Commanders and several Component Commanders will have to be three-star rank and C-in-C status. Most functional Commands will be of three-star rank. The tri-service distribution of Commanders and Staff in the HQ IDS and Theatre HQs must be worked out and rotational appointments identified.

The present sanctioned strength of C-in-Cs and all other ranks are available to be accommodated within the new structure. This will require identifying the key posts, as also identifying rotational and service specific posts. The important point is that the sanctioned strength of three stars and other ranks does not change. However, since the four Theatre Commanders must be of four-star rank, it would require sanction of the CCS and done by upgrading from the sanctioned strength of C-in-Cs.

Career progression is an issue that requires foresight and delicate handling. Within integrated structures it will be more complicated and therefore need to be given special attention when joint staffing and command planning is done. There is need to identify appointment and promotion criteria based on training and experience in joint institutions. Annual Confidential Report channels in Joint Institutions must not be tied to original service and the reporting culture of the three services, harmonized through training and instructions that is also accompanied by deliberate institutional acculturation process that dilutes the differences that are natural to wearing different uniforms that reflects orientation derived from the different geographies of land, Sea and Air.

Transition – Role of Military Leadership

The military leadership will have to more than match the political vision that has mandated the Theatre Commands. Service parochialism must give way to combined services outlook. It will not be easy and the transition to Theatre Commands will be a challenging process and its main threat will come from within the armed forces. The IAF leadership, in particular, will have to gracefully accept and respect the political mandate. There is therefore a need to create and propagate the narrative of strategic advantages that accrue at the national and armed forces level. Propagating the narrative will be an exercise in internal armed

forces communications that must be driven by the CDS and also be part of the syllabus at training institutions. Such an initiative must not await the Theatre Commands to be established.

The decision of what to do in terms of doctrine and structure can be taken with the expertise available under the DMA/ HQ IDS. However, the transition to Theatre Commands is complex, and expertise for such transition is not available in the Government but is available in the Corporate sector. This is so because there is a similarity. The Corporate sector has been experimenting (sometimes unsuccessfully) with Strategic Business Units that has resemblance to the Concept of Theatre Commands. The expertise in the discipline of management available in the civil, must be harnessed to formulate a transition philosophy that must eventually have a transition plan as its product. The notion of secrecy should not be a spoiler as long as they are all Indian Citizens.

Conclusion

Conceptually, the process for creation of ITCs must first invent the skeleton operational structure that is guided by maximising space for cooperative flexibility and do so in the hugest structure possible which permits planning and de-centralised execution. This must emerge from a joint philosophy that is based on a common imagination of what sort of wars should the forces be prepared to fight. Electronic Warfare, Cyber, Precision Munitions and harnessing technology should be a priority jointly worked out. Integrated Theatres will also optimise resource utilisation⁷ and would certainly involve savings that can be utilised for force modernisation. The budget squeeze must hasten transition to Theatre Commands and not delay it.

The skeleton structure must be jointly evolved by the JCSC. The CDS wearing three hats has a delicate role to play and it must be sensitive to not being perceived as a domineering brother. The very idea that the Chiefs would ever agree to the possibility that dilutes their existing role, might have been preposterous earlier, but not anymore, as it is only a logical extension of a done deed. And there is no other way to create an effective transformation to ITCs. Incidentally, with a few exceptions, many Chiefs have stood in the way of such integrations. Now, the political leadership has left them no choice. Human ability to Cooperate flexibly in large numbers is the reason why they control the world⁸

and is a lesson for the military leadership while they navigate the turbulent waters of transition to a politically mandated Theatre Command System.

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