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THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Nurturing an
Ecosystem for Peace

A White Paper and Compendium

A collaborative project guided by the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, PeaceNexus Foundation, Environmental Peacebuilding Association, Environmental Law Institute, and International Union for Conservation of Nature, and written by Oli Brown and Giuliana Nicolucci-Altman

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This paper tries to reflect, as best it can, the wisdom of the crowd. And what a crowd! It is the product of a multi-lingual, multi-stage, consultative process carried out over many months with 154 authors writing the 50 chapters in the Compendium (a listing of the authors is in Annex 1) and more than 150 people being involved in consultation and reviews of different iterations of the paper.

The project was developed through a collaboration among five organizations: the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the PeaceNexus Foundation, the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP), the Environmental Law Institute (ELI), and the Environmental Peacebuilding Association (EnPAX). The GPP is a joint project of five institutions: the Graduate Institute's Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP); the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); DCAF – Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance; Interpeace; and the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva (QUNO). It was guided by a Steering Committee made up of Carl Bruch (ELI, EnPAX), Rainer Gude and Achim Wennmann (GPP), Hannah Moosa (IUCN), Hesta Groenewald, Daniela Bosnjak, and Heloise Heyer (PeaceNexus). It was facilitated by Annika Erickson-Pearson of GPP.

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What is clear to me is that peacebuilding that ignores the environment is not complete. This White Paper is transforming the way in which we approach the emerging field of Environmental Peacebuilding. //

FOREWORD

My name is Josephine Ekiru. I am a Turkana woman from the Ngara Mara community in Isiolo County in Northern Kenya. Our pastoralist communities in northern Kenya face environmental conflict on a daily basis, often driven by land degradation and increasing pressure on the scarce natural resources in our region. My work focuses on trying to avoid or calm these conflicts: I am the Peace Coordinator for the Northern Rangelands Trust in Kenya, and the 2021 recipient of the US Institute of Peace's Women Building Peace Award.

In my work, I monitor the situation with a view to providing early warning of violent conflict so that the situation can be anticipated and addressed through formal and informal interventions that bring Government and other stakeholders together. We engage communities on peacebuilding activities alongside economic empowerment programmes which are essential components to creating long-term peace in northern Kenya.

What is clear to me is that peacebuilding that ignores the environment is not complete. This White Paper is transforming the way in which we approach the emerging field of environmental peacebuilding. It frames the core issues associated with nature-based conflict and identifies future approaches and areas of focus. Not only because environmental degradation or challenges brought by climate change are often at the root of conflict but also because it can be necessary for peacebuilding, such as using the shared environmental interests of parties in conflict to reach an agreement. Peace practitioners such as myself and academics will build our work on the shoulders of this exceptional contribution to the field of Environmental Peacebuilding.

Our experience in Northern Kenya has taught us that the best means of conflict prevention is building resilience through inclusive and sustainable development which addresses inequalities and strengthens community-led institutions. The White Paper can certainly contribute to bringing peacebuilders and environmentalists together by highlighting how close both disciplines are, which will strengthen future work, both in academia and in practice.

Josephine Ekiru



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The White Paper on the Future of Environmental Peacebuilding is the product of an 18-month process of research and consultation with environmental peacebuilding practitioners, researchers, and policymakers from all regions. The key findings of the White Paper on the Future of Environmental Peacebuilding are presented in four sections:

1. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

- Over the last five or so decades, the many links between the environment and our security have become a focus for political attention and academic research.
- With the end of the Cold War, some commentators were heralding the hopeful arrival of a ‘new world order’.
- However, a new world ‘disorder’ soon emerged, which triggered an urgent search to better understand the root causes of violent conflict.
- Environmental change and the poor management of resources increase the risks of conflict, especially in places already fractured by socioeconomic inequality, ethnic divisions, or ideological divides.
- The trade in conflict resources such as illegal timber, blood diamonds, and conflict minerals finances violence and encourages instability.
- The scale and cascading impacts of climate change mean it is increasingly being recognized as a security issue.
- Meanwhile, the environmental damage caused by war amplifies the human toll and complicates post-conflict recovery.
- Civil wars with a strong resource or environmental dimension tend to be harder to resolve and more likely to slip back into violence.
- Environmental issues can provide a platform for dialogue and a reason for cooperation that can help to resolve differences among communities.
- The greater appreciation of the role of environmental degradation, climate change, and natural resource management in violent conflict has real impacts on peacebuilding policy and practice.

2. CHALLENGES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

- While there has been general acceptance at a political level of the intuitive links between environment and violent conflict, actual action on environmental peacebuilding has rarely matched the rhetoric.
- Framing environmental issues in terms of their potential to trigger or sustain violent conflict can lead to the environment being seen as a security threat with the risk of serious, unintended consequences.
- Some environmental peacebuilding analyses have been criticized for being conceptually and methodologically sloppy.

- This may have resulted in a tendency for environmental peacebuilders to underestimate the ability of human societies to adapt to changing situations.
- Organizations active in, and setting the agenda for, environmental peacebuilding show little geographic or sectoral diversity.
- The field of environmental peacebuilding still tends to see women, Indigenous Peoples, youth, and other marginalized groups as passive targets for aid rather than as change-makers and knowledge-holders in their own right.

3. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

- Environmental peacebuilding has risen in prominence as its importance has been documented by a growing body of experience and evidence.
- Environmental peacebuilders are starting to have access to the necessary experience, technology, and data to be proactive rather than reactive.
- New legal processes are changing the landscape for environmental peacebuilding.
- There is a growing diversity of ideas and actors in the environmental peacebuilding field.
- There is a willingness to work together to innovate and learn.
- If managed carefully, there are ways to engage business actors constructively in environmental peacebuilding.
- A series of landmark events in 2022 are opportunities to galvanize the environmental peacebuilding movement: to share ideas and to accelerate action.

4. AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

- Shift the mindset of the environmental peacebuilding community towards greater inclusivity and self-awareness.
- Implement and encourage more bottom-up, community-based approaches.
- Advocate for leadership that provides the necessary political space, funding, and entry points for environmental peacebuilding.
- Embed environmental peacebuilding in policy frameworks at all scales.
- Push for the implementation of robust, binding international frameworks to hold states, armed groups, and companies to account for environmental damage during conflict.
- Anticipate and respond to environmental and natural resource-related tensions before they break down into violent conflict.
- Continue to build and share the evidence base for environmental peacebuilding.
- Bridge silos and operate in a peace-positive and a nature-positive way.

INTRODUCTION

Ask an ecologist and a political security analyst to name the countries and regions of gravest concern to them, and though their points of departure are different, their final lists might look surprisingly similar: Afghanistan,¹ Bangladesh, Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia,² Haiti, Iraq,³ the African Great Lakes region,⁴ Central Asia,⁵ the Sahel,⁶ Somalia,⁷ Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen, among others.

Over the past 50 years, policymakers, researchers, and practitioners have recognized that environmental degradation and contested natural resources are part of the reason why people fight and kill each other. Experience shows us that violent conflict can be driven by natural resource degradation and scarcity, by competition for control where resources are abundant, and by the enduring legacies of colonialism. Meanwhile, climate change is beginning to redraw the maps of the world with far-reaching consequences for lives, livelihoods, and political stability around the globe.

The environmental devastation wrought by violent conflict exacerbates the human toll and legacies of war, while the trade in conflict resources can incentivize continued fighting, extending the duration and severity of violence. And once fighting stops, shared natural resources and common environmental interests can provide opportunities for, but also risks to, successful and sustainable peacebuilding.

Environmental peacebuilding exists at the intersection of peace, conflict, and the natural world.⁸ It is inspired by a recognition of the many ways in which the management of environmental issues can support conflict prevention, reduction, resolution, and recovery.⁹ It recognizes the importance of peace and human security for environmental management and sustainable development. It grows out of a multi-disciplinary acknowledgement that a healthy environment is an essential part of conflict prevention.¹⁰ And it offers the opportunity to harness common resources and shared environmental challenges as a reason for cooperation, rather than a cause of division.

The term ‘White Paper’ is typically used in government circles to denote a publicly available, balanced document designed to help readers make decisions. This White Paper seeks to encourage debate and discussion over the challenges, opportunities, and possibilities for environmental peacebuilding in conflict-affected states and societies. It is not a consensus document, nor does it seek to provide a single, conclusive vision of environmental peacebuilding. On the contrary, the White Paper and accompanying Compendium seek to give voice to many different stories and points of view.

1 Compendium chapter: Alavi et al. (2022) *Out with War and in with Nature: Supporting climate resilience and sustainable livelihoods through mine clearance in Afghanistan*

2 Compendium chapters: Vargas et al. (2022) *Salvar el Futuro de la Amazonia Colombiana: Una agenda para detener la espiral de violencia, deforestación y cambio climático*; Morales-Muñoz and Gorricho (2022) *Conserving Biodiversity and Building Peace in Colombia: Enabling mechanisms that solve socio-environmental conflicts in protected areas through peaceful means enhances biodiversity conservation and peacebuilding*

3 Compendium chapter: Von Lossow, Schwartzstein and Partow (2022) *Water, Climate & Environment: Beyond Iraq’s obvious conflicts*

4 Compendium chapter: Refisch (2022), *Mountain Gorilla Conservation and Environmental Peacebuilding: Conservation as a common objective for peacebuilding*

5 Compendium chapter: Huda (2022) *Environmental Peacebuilding in Central Asia: Reducing conflicts through cross-border ecological cooperation*

6 Compendium chapter: Brachet and Chekchak (2022) *When Resilience is Not Enough: Learning from nature to regenerate social and ecological systems*

7 Compendium chapter: Yasin and Roble (2022) *Environmental Peacebuilding in Somalia: Civil society responses to environmental conflict*

8 Compendium chapter: Baden et al. (2022) *The Search for Meaning: Why clear definitions make for effective engagement in environmental peacebuilding*

9 Ide, T., Bruch, C., Carius, A., Conca, K., Dabelko, G., Matthew, R. and Weinthal, E. (2021) ‘The Past and Future(s) of Environmental Peacebuilding’, in *Environmental Peacebuilding, International Affairs*, London: Chatham House

10 Compendium chapter: Sample and Paulose (2022) *Our Future is Interdisciplinary, Inclusive, and Equitable: Acknowledging and redressing physical, structural, and epistemological violence in the environmental peacebuilding field*



The White Paper and Compendium on the Future of Environmental Peacebuilding are timed to mark the 50th anniversary of the 1972 Stockholm Conference, which is widely considered the birthplace of the modern environmental movement.¹¹ The paper and compendium are the product of a global conversation about the future of environmental peacebuilding and they draw from extensive academic work and practical experience.

Collaboration is the driving spirit of the exercise. The aim is to give a platform to a diversity of voices from across geographies and generations. The 50 chapters in the compendium are the work of 154 authors from more than 80 organizations across 30 countries. Most of the compendium chapters have been written by authors from two or more organizations from different sectors straddling civil society, Indigenous groups, government, academic institutions, think tanks, international organizations, and the private sector.

BOX 1: LANGUAGE MATTERS

The words we choose shape the way we see the world. Here are some definitions for commonly used terms in the report:

- **Natural resources** are natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be used for economic production or consumption.¹² They can either be renewable (i.e., replenishable within human timescales, such as forests, water or pasture¹³) or non-renewable (such as minerals or fossil fuels).
- **Violent conflict** involves at least two parties using physical force to resolve competing claims or interests. While a violent conflict may involve only non-state actors, the term is often used as a synonym for war that involves at least one government.¹⁴
- **Conflict resources** are natural resources whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute to, benefit from, or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under international law.¹⁵
- **Environmental peacebuilding** integrates natural resource management in conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery to build resilience in communities affected by conflict.¹⁶

11 The full name of this conference was the UN Conference on the Human Environment.

12 OECD (2005) *Glossary of Statistical Terms*, <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1740>

13 Though current levels of environmental degradation and pollution mean that parts, or all, of some nominally renewable natural assets, such as the Amazon rainforest or coral ecosystems, could collapse in a way that is not naturally replenishable within human timescales.

14 Frère, M.-S. and Wilen, N. (2015) *Infocore Definitions*, https://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/def_violent_conflict.pdf; We recognize that there are a variety of definitions of conflict and violent conflict, including concepts of “structural violence” (coined in 1969 by Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung), wherein some social structure or social institution may harm people by preventing them from meeting their basic needs.

15 Global Witness (2006) *The Sinews of War: Eliminating the trade in conflict resources*, https://cdn2.globalwitness.org/archive/files/import/the_sinews_of_war.pdf

16 Definitions for Environmental Peacebuilding vary. This one is that used by the Environmental Peacebuilding Association: <https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/>. Alternatives include “Environmental peacebuilding is the process through which environmental challenges shared by the (former) parties to a violent conflict are turned into opportunities to build lasting cooperation and peace” from Dresse et al. (2019)

// a diversity of voices and experience is essential if we are to build a resilient, dynamic 'ecosystem' for peace. //

Broadly speaking, each chapter in the Compendium proposes a 'big idea,' suggests a new approach, or relays the lessons from practical experience of environmental peacebuilding. Not all the chapter authors agree on the priorities for the future of environmental peacebuilding. Some have diametrically opposed views. That's ok: Just as a diversity of species is needed in a landscape to ensure resilience and health, so too a diversity of voices and experience is essential if we are to build a resilient, dynamic 'ecosystem' for peace.

This white paper is inspired by these many voices. Though concise, the white paper hopes to emphasize the growing assortment of approaches, ideas and visions for the future of environmental peacebuilding. The white paper is divided into four parts. The first gathers perspectives on the global context of environmental peacebuilding. The second points to some of the key challenges to environmental peacebuilding practice, while part three highlights important opportunities to harness the environment for peace. The fourth presents an agenda for the future of environmental peacebuilding.

1. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

"If we did a better job of managing our resources sustainably, conflicts over them would be reduced. So, protecting the global environment is directly related to securing peace."

Hon. Professor Wangari Maathai, Nobel Laureate

Over the last five or so decades the many links between the environment and our security have become a focus for political attention and academic research. While Indigenous groups have engaged in various forms of what we would now call environmental peacebuilding for centuries, the environmental peacebuilding movement in the Global North is a more recent phenomenon. It was born from a deepening public concern in the 1960s and 1970s over environmental degradation and the ecological carrying capacity of the earth, as well as the devastating effects of modern warfare. This growing environmental awareness resonated with the nerve-racking backdrop of Cold War uncertainty, and the recognition that humanity had, in the form of the nuclear arms race, invented the tools for its own destruction. In 1972, a landmark conference on the environment in Stockholm, organized by the United Nations, was a milestone in the emergence of environmental peacebuilding. It underlined the need for global solutions to tackle shared environmental challenges. It also led to the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and many other national environmental organizations.

With the end of the Cold War, some commentators were heralding the arrival of a hopeful 'new world order'. This, it was hoped, was one where human rights and the rule of law would be respected, and in which the UN might finally begin to function as intended by its founders. Symbolic of this renewed interest in multilateralism and cooperation around shared environmental concerns, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit saw the largest ever gathering of world leaders tackle questions of environment

and development, marking the arrival of the environment as a matter of considerable international attention. The massive civil society presence at the summit also underlined the crucial role of civil society movements—including environmental justice movements, women’s groups and Indigenous sovereignty movements—in putting the environment on national and international agendas.

However, a new world ‘disorder’ soon emerged, triggering an urgent search to better understand the root causes of violent conflict. In the early to mid-1990s the rise in bloody civil wars in Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan,¹⁷ and the former Yugoslavia led many academics, commentators, and policymakers to search with some urgency for an explanation, often looking for answers outside traditional models of state security.¹⁸ Some looked towards the role of environmental change and the management of natural resources in the causes and consequences of violence. Others focused on the power imbalances that deprive marginalized, often Indigenous Peoples of access to and control over natural resources. Such systemic forms of exclusion perpetuate an extractive relationship in which critical resources from the Global South are taken, often at great social and environmental cost, to the markets of the Global North.¹⁹ Nearly 30 years on, and the importance of the environment in peacebuilding is widely acknowledged. The importance of a healthy environment and a stable climate to peace and security has risen in prominence because it makes intuitive sense. But has also been borne out by a growing body of experience. This can be summarized in the following observations.

Environmental change and the poor management of resources increase the risks of conflict, especially in places already fractured by socioeconomic inequality, ethnic divisions, or ideological divides. For millennia humans (mostly men) have fought over land, water, and for control over precious minerals. The conflicts of today often have their roots in the actions of yesterday. The colonial conquests of Western Europe between the 15th and 20th centuries were built on a rapacious quest for natural resources to plunder, with enduring consequences for global inequality and artificial boundaries that reverberate today.²⁰ Corruption and mismanagement of natural resources such as minerals, oil, and timber—as well as biological resources, such as land,²¹ forests, and fishing grounds²²—have been closely associated with state failure, human rights violations, increased risk of community-company disputes, as well as wider violence. Some environmental conservation projects and large infrastructure projects, for their part, have been accused of undermining peace and security if, by erecting fences around national parks or flooding valleys for dam sites, they displace local communities and Indigenous Peoples, change their access to natural resources or dislocate their relationship to particular environments.

The trade in conflict resources such as illegal timber, blood diamonds, and conflict minerals finances violence and encourages instability. Valuable, lootable resources such as gold, minerals, timber, and diamonds have become spoils of war, changing the incentives of rebel groups and perpetuating violence. Since 1990, at least 35 major armed conflicts have been directly financed by the trade in high-value natural resources.²³ In some cases local and transnational companies have actively facilitated

17 Compendium chapter: Nielsen and Uras (2022) *Natural Resources Management, Environmental Governance and Peacebuilding in Darfur*

18 Peter, A., Bruch, C. and Zazykova, S. (2018) ‘Revisiting Securitization—An Empirical Analysis of Environment and Natural Resource Provisions in United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1946–2016’ in *Routledge Handbook of Environmental Conflict and Peacebuilding*, London: Routledge

19 Compendium chapter: Mutuku and Stern (2022) *Dealing with the Past in Environmental Peacebuilding: An African ecological perspective*

20 Compendium chapter: Acheson et al. (2022) *Environmental Peacebuilding through Degrowth, Demilitarization, and Feminism: Rethinking environmental peacebuilding to stay within planetary boundaries and to champion social justice*

21 Compendium chapter: Morales-Muñoz et al. (2022) *Using Land for Peace: How sustainable land use systems can foster climate action and support peacebuilding*

22 Compendium chapter: Robinson, Csordas and Wackernagel (2022) *Defining Limits: Ecological overshoot as a driver of conflict*

23 Bruch, C., Jensen, D., Nakayama, M. and Unruh, J. (2019) ‘The Changing Nature of Conflict, Peacebuilding, and Environmental Cooperation,’ 49(2) *Environmental Law Reporter* 10134-10154



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conflict by providing financial, military, or logistical support to one of the parties in an armed conflict as part of a ‘deal’ for natural resources.²⁴ Meanwhile, experts are starting to worry about the possible emergence of ‘green conflict minerals.’²⁵ These include the lithium, cobalt, and rare earth minerals required for modern energy systems and advanced technologies that have become increasingly geo-strategically significant, and so more likely to be fought over.

The scale and cascading impacts of climate change mean it is increasingly being recognized as a security issue. Often framed as a ‘threat multiplier’ or ‘conflict accelerant’, the direct impacts of climate change—such as extreme heat and reduced rainfall—can have severe impacts on the availability and quality of natural resources.²⁶ Meanwhile, population growth, growing demand for resources from our use-and-throw economy,²⁷ and environmental degradation are placing increasing pressures on scarce resources and societies that may, in places, exceed the capacity of existing mechanisms to share and manage resources.²⁸ Large-scale movements of people forced to leave their homes as a result of climate change can contribute to social tensions in the places they move to, while also exposing those people to huge personal risks. These dynamics can, at times, feed into nationalistic and xenophobic politics worldwide and fuel new tensions.²⁹

Meanwhile, the environmental damage caused by war amplifies the human toll and complicates post-conflict recovery. Wars damage infrastructure, cause pollution, and leave behind unexploded ordnance that render land unusable for agriculture or building. In recent years, some of the violent conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East have seen the deliberate targeting of environmental infrastructure (such as agricultural land and water treatment plants) in order to terrorize and displace civilian populations and expand territorial control.³⁰ Wartime breakdowns in governance as well as the coping strategies that people resort to often lead to the looting and unsustainable use of resources. The environment itself often falls victim to conflict, as direct and indirect environmental damage can result in environmental risks that further threaten people’s health, livelihoods, and security.³¹ The environmental cost of conflict prolongs human suffering and complicates recovery, and can itself generate its own tensions, setting in motion a vicious cycle of environmental damage causing new tension.

Civil wars with a strong resource or environmental dimension tend to be harder to resolve and more likely to slip back into violence. Since 1950, at least 40 per cent of all civil wars have had a link to natural resources.³² Where such links were present, conflict was more likely to recur within the first five years after a peace deal. Addressing natural resource issues and other environmental challenges in diplomacy and peace negotiations is increasingly being recognized as an important element in effective mediation practice. There is some evidence that peace agreements that do not take natural resources

24 Tignino, M. (2021) ‘Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence and Liability in Armed Conflicts: The role of the ILC Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment and the Draft UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights,’ *Questions of International Law* 83, 47-67.

25 Bruch, C., Jensen, D., Nakayama, M. and Unruh, J. (2019)

26 Compendium chapter: Bruch, et al. (2022) *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Environmental Peacebuilding: Considerations for a future of effective programming*

27 Compendium chapter: Robinson, Csordas and Wackernagel (2022)

28 Numerous reports address these relationships. For more see: Rüttinger, L., Smith, D., Stang, G., and Vivekananda, J., (2015) *A New Climate for Peace: Taking action on climate and fragility risks*, adelphi, International Alert, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, European Institute for Security Studies

29 Compendium chapter: McClain, et al. (2022) *Migration with Dignity: Opportunities for peace through migration with dignity*

30 Sowers, J. L., Weinthal, E., and Zawahri, N. (2017) ‘Targeting Environmental Infrastructures, International Law, and Civilians in the New Middle Eastern Wars,’ *Security Dialogue*, 48(5), 410–430. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010617716615>

31 Compendium Chapter: Pantazopoulos and Tignino (2022) *Strengthening the Thin Green Line: A call for an international monitoring mechanism for environmental peacebuilding law*

32 Matthew, R., Brown, O. and Jensen, D. (2009) *From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The role of natural resources and the environment*, United Nations Environment Programme. Geneva: UNEP

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into account are less likely to succeed and are more likely to slip back into conflict. Accordingly, governments and communities in post-conflict states have critical choices to make to reinforce peace, as do those companies and consumers that are buying the resources coming from conflict-prone countries. Decisions that are taken early on in post-conflict situations can determine development pathways for decades, but governments coming out of conflict are often in a poor position to plan for sustainable economic recovery or to negotiate good deals with business actors such as mining, logging, and agricultural companies. In areas suffering from or recovering from conflicts—in which local mechanisms to control the activities of foreign and local companies may be weak—activities by irresponsible private sector actors often have serious effects on the environment through various types of misconduct and neglect.³³

Environmental issues can provide a platform for dialogue and a reason for cooperation that can help to resolve differences among communities.³⁴ In international conflicts, transboundary natural resources (such as water³⁵ or wildlife³⁶) can serve as a starting point for cooperation between fighting parties and can sustain lines of communication that can help to defuse potentially explosive situations.³⁷ Transboundary collaboration between the three mountain gorilla states of Uganda, Rwanda and the DR Congo via the Transboundary Strategic Plan for the Greater Virunga landscape, went beyond the improved protection and management of mountain gorillas in the region, also tackling the history of violent conflicts between fishermen in the DR Congo and Uganda.³⁸ Environmental peacebuilding provides ways of harnessing our common resources and shared challenges to bring people together, rather than set them apart.³⁹ For example, in the Darfur region in western Sudan, which has experienced large scale armed conflict since 2003 as well as frequent droughts, a catchment management project that allows communities better access to the Wadi El Ku basin has managed to resolve local natural resource disputes, to re-establish trust between communities, and has enabled government staff to once again engage with the communities.⁴⁰ Environmental peacebuilding can happen at all scales, between communities as well as across international frontiers. Environmental issues can provide a rationale for collaboration at a technical level, even when the political climate does not permit normal relations. The Green Blue Deal for the Middle East, for example, proposes harnessing the sun and the sea to create region-wide desalinated water and energy security while educating younger generations on the importance of water and energy cooperation as an effective tool for conflict resolution and peacebuilding between Israel, Palestine and the wider region.⁴¹

33 Compendium chapter: Kerschbaum et al. (2022) *Off the Hook, On the Hook? Corporate Responsibility for Environmental Harm Abroad: Latest developments and future perspectives*

34 Conca, K. and Dabelko, G. (2002) *Environmental Peacemaking*, Woodrow Wilson Center and John Hopkins University Press

35 Compendium chapter: Hartog and Kortlandt (2022) *Blending Cross-Sectoral Approaches for Peaceful Cooperation Over Water*

36 Compendium chapter: Refisch (2022) *Mountain Gorilla Conservation and Environmental Peacebuilding: Conservation as a common objective for peacebuilding*

37 Kibaroglu, A. and Sayan, R.C. (2022) 'Water and 'Imperfect Peace' in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin,' *International Affairs*, 97 (1), 139–155

38 Compendium chapter: Refisch (2022) *Mountain Gorilla Conservation and Environmental Peacebuilding: Conservation as a common objective for peacebuilding*

39 Compendium chapter: Bromberg and Kaplan (2022) *The Climate Crisis as an Entry Point to Environmental Peacebuilding: Can the climate resilience policies of the "Green Blue Deal" promote environmental peacebuilding in the Middle East?*

40 Compendium chapter: Nielsen and Uras (2022)

41 Compendium chapter: Bromberg and Kaplan (2022) *The Climate Crisis as an Entry Point to Environmental Peacebuilding: Can the climate resilience policies of the "Green Blue Deal" promote environmental peacebuilding in the Middle East?*

The greater appreciation of the role of environmental degradation, climate change and natural resource management in violent conflict has real impacts on peacebuilding policy and practice.

In entities such as the UN Security Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),⁴² the African Union, and NATO⁴³ acknowledgement of these links is creating political space for more effort, attention and resources to be devoted to environmental peacebuilding. For example, between 1990 and 2016 an estimated 19 per cent of UN Security Council Resolutions contained references to natural resources and the environment, in contrast to just 2.6 per cent of Resolutions between 1946 and 1989.⁴⁴ It has helped to shape Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions, advanced the concept of human security, and informed agreements such as the 2018 Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Work by the International Law Commission, and many others, on the protection of the environment in areas affected by armed conflict has shifted the boundaries of what is considered permissible in conflict, drawing attention to the long-term and severe environmental damage left by conflict.⁴⁵ In October 2021 the UN Human Rights Council appointed a special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights in the context of climate change.⁴⁶

2. CHALLENGES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Environmental peacebuilding has moved from being a niche area of academic study to becoming one of much greater international interest. Environmental peacebuilding now provides the focus for dozens of NGOs and research organizations, the theme for hundreds of books and the subject of countless PhDs, training sessions, and workshops. But despite its growth in both profile and professionalism, the field of environmental peacebuilding has faced some challenges and criticism.

While there has been general acceptance at a political level of the intuitive links between environment and violent conflict, action on environmental peacebuilding has rarely matched the rhetoric. The international community has acknowledged the relationship between environment and conflict and its important role in peace and security initiatives,⁴⁷ but it remains a formidable challenge to argue for the allocation of political will and resources needed to invest in peace through environmental protection and climate cooperation.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, some countries have blocked action on environmental peacebuilding at the highest level, including at the Security Council. Generally, this has stemmed from two concerns: either that core security

42 In December 2021 the 28th Ministerial Council of the OSCE adopted a decision committing the organization to tackle the effects of climate change. OSCE Press release (2021) *OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Linde announces new OSCE commitments on climate*, 3 December 2021 <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/506738>

43 Compendium chapter: Veeravalli and Waleij (2022) *Integrating Climate Security into NATO's Plans and Operations: Lessons learned and ways forward*

44 Peter, A., Bruch, C. and Yazykova, S. (2018)

45 Lehto, M., (2021) *Overcoming the Disconnect: environmental protection and armed conflicts*. ICRC Blog. <https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2021/05/27/overcoming-disconnect-environmental-protection-armed-conflicts/>

46 OHCHR Press release (2021) *Human Rights Council appoints a Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights in the context of climate change and a Special Rapporteur to monitor the situation of human rights in Burundi*, 18 October 2021. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=27639&LangID=E>

47 Compendium chapter: Martinez, Rodríguez, and Won Bang (2022) *Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks: Leveraging the digital transformation for integrated climate and conflict-sensitive policy, programme, and business*

48 Compendium chapter: Nikitine and Scott (2022) *We Need Better Southern Ocean Protection: Reducing climate-related security risks, while ensuring a healthy planetary ecosystem*



institutions could be forced to work on topics that are out of their areas of competence, or that subjective assessments of environmental health could be used as grounds for interventionist action.

Framing environmental issues in terms of their potential to trigger or sustain violent conflict can lead the environment being seen as a security threat with the risk of serious, unintended consequences. This is a potential dark side⁴⁹ to environmental peacebuilding that can have adverse side effects including discrimination,⁵⁰ displacement, depoliticization, or degradation.⁵¹ For example, the militarization of environmental protection can also come at a cost.⁵² In the realm of wildlife conservation, for example, ‘green militarization’⁵³ lacks the ability to effectively address the root economic cause of poaching; it can also trample on the rights of Indigenous groups, put park rangers at risk, and pressure rangers to resort to ‘shoot-to-kill’ policies. Green militarization can also generate violence between local communities and conservationists.⁵⁴

Some environmental peacebuilding analyses have been criticized for being conceptually and methodologically sloppy. The field has been criticized as too deductive and theory-driven with claims that are reliant on anecdotal evidence and that can conveniently blur the line between correlation and causation.⁵⁵ Some have argued that the field has an inclination to see a crisis in every environmental trend.⁵⁶ It also means that early warning systems focused on environmental drivers of conflict have tended to show limited predictive power and have proven hard to sustain (financially) and to validate (in terms of their results). The result has been that some analyses may have been rather deterministic, overstating the role of environmental change and ignoring positive trends that might contradict the narrative.⁵⁷

This may have resulted in a tendency for environmental peacebuilders to underestimate the ability of human societies to adapt to changing situations. It also risks of downplaying the role of human agency in causing conflict and potentially gives dictators a free pass by allowing them to blame prevailing environmental conditions for human rights abuses.⁵⁸ For example, while the 2006–2009 drought in Syria may have been part of a chain of events that led to the onset of civil war in 2011, as some have argued,⁵⁹ that fact does not depoliticize the conflict, nor absolve the Assad regime of its actions.⁶⁰

Organizations active in, and setting the agenda for, environmental peacebuilding show little geographic or sectoral diversity. Climate change and environmental degradation, responsibility for which lies predominantly at the feet of countries in the Global North, have disproportionate effects

49 Compendium chapter: Ide (2022) *The Dark Side of Environmental Peacebuilding*

50 Compendium chapter: Mutuku and Stern (2022)

51 Compendium chapter: Kratzer and Hillert (2021) *Operationalizing Environmental Peacemaking: Perspectives on integrating the environment into peacemaking*

52 IUCN (2021). *Conflict and Conservation*. Nature in a Globalised World Report No.1. Gland, Switzerland: IUCN.

53 Compendium chapter: Dobelsky et al. (2022) *The Problem with Green Militarization: The need to explore peaceful alternative approaches to wildlife conservation*

54 Compendium chapters: Dobelsky et al. (2022); Fonseca et al. (2022) *Territorio, Biodiversidad, Desarrollo, Reconciliación, y Paz en Colombia: Las áreas protegidas, los guardaparques, y los defensores del patrimonio natural, en el marco del conflicto armado interno en Colombia*

55 Adams, C., Ide, T., Barnett, J. et al. (2018) ‘Sampling Bias in Climate–Conflict Research,’ *Nature Clim Change* 8, 200–203. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-018-0068-2>

56 Adams, C., Ide, T., Barnett, J. et al. (2018)

57 Buhaug, H. (2015) ‘Climate–Conflict Research: some reflections on the way forward,’ *WIREs Clim Change*, 6, 269–275. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.336>

58 Raleigh, C., Linke, A. and O’Loughlin, J. (2014) ‘Extreme Temperatures and Violence,’ *Nature Clim Change* 4, 76–77. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2101>

59 Ash, K., and Obradovich, N. (2020) ‘Climatic Stress, Internal Migration, and Syrian Civil War Onset,’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 64(1), 3–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719864140>

60 Ide, T. (2018) ‘Climate War in the Middle East? Drought, the Syrian Civil War and the State of Climate-Conflict Research,’ *Curr Clim Change Rep* 4, 347–354. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40641-018-0115-0>

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 ... a potential dark side to environmental
 peacebuilding can have adverse side effects
 including discrimination, displacement,
 depoliticization, or degradation //

on women, who represent the majority of the world's poor.^{61,62} There is also evidence that climate change affects Indigenous Peoples earlier and more severely than other populations. For example, they are among the first climate refugees in regions such as the Arctic and the Pacific, where sea-level rise is occurring.⁶³ Nevertheless, the weight of the actors active in the sector is heavily tilted towards think tanks and NGOs based in Europe (especially northern Europe) and North America. There is a distinct lack of voices from Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, youth, and other marginalized groups. Conventional peacebuilding processes conducted inside official government channels remain male-dominated.⁶⁴

Finally, the field of environmental peacebuilding still tends to see women, Indigenous Peoples, youth, and other marginalized groups as passive targets for aid rather than as change-makers and knowledge-holders in their own right.⁶⁵ Environmental peacebuilding, in common with environmental action in general, tends to suffer from Western centrism, which perpetuates the paternalistic idea that ecosystems and people in the non-Western world require 'saving' through interventions from the West. This mindset also tends to blame the non-Western world for being poorly governed and underdeveloped, and glosses over its own responsibility in causing these problems.⁶⁶ Yet, there is a long history of Indigenous Peoples themselves engaging in environmental peacebuilding. This experience is typically absent from the narrative on environmental peacebuilding, which is usually presented as some type of a Western invention. For example, in the Karamojong region of Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda, if inter-tribal conflicts become too violent, the elders call together warriors to sacred groves to symbolically break the spears and restore peace. These community-managed forest areas have long been important to both peacemaking and environmental security in the region, providing shade, harbouring wildlife, and preventing erosion, and so they provide important environmental as well as socio-cultural services.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, in Mashonaland Central, one of the Zimbabwe's most politically volatile provinces with high levels of gender-based violence, education programmes led by young Zimbabwean women and built upon Indigenous traditional practices rooted in Ubuntu that emphasize community, have promoted justice and accountability while challenging patriarchal norms and power structures that underlie existing environmental and governance issues.⁶⁸ And in the Arctic, where the melting of sea ice has resulted in the displacement of Indigenous Peoples as

61 UNFCCC (2019) *Differentiated Impacts of Climate Change on Women and Men; the integration of gender considerations in climate policies, plans and actions; and progress in enhancing gender balance in national climate delegations: Synthesis report by the secretariat*, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for Implementation Fiftieth session Bonn, 17–27 June 2019. FCCC/SBI/2019/INF.8

62 Compendium chapter: Åkesson and Åkerlund (2022) *We Are in This Together: Environment and climate actions and efforts for sustaining peace need to go hand in hand*

63 Maldonado J.K., Shearer C., Bronen R., Peterson K. and Lazrus H. (2013) 'The Impact of Climate Change on Tribal Communities in the US: displacement, relocation, and human rights', in Maldonado J.K., Colombi B., Pandya R. *Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples in the United States*. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05266-3_8

64 Compendium chapter: Ensor and Tai (2022) *Bridging the Gap: Gender-inclusive multi-track diplomacy as environmental peacebuilding*

65 Compendium chapter: Zenda et al. (2022) *Feminist Environmental Peacebuilding in Zimbabwe: Lessons learned from a grassroots organization centering women, peace, and everyday security*

66 Nair, C. (forthcoming 2022) *Dismantling Global White Privilege: Equity for a post-western world*, Berrett-Koehler Publishers: Oakland

67 Hsiao, E. (2021) *Protecting Biodiversity, Not Just From War, But For Peace*, Conflict and Environment Observatory, <https://ceobs.org/protecting-biodiversity-not-just-from-war-but-for-peace/>. Other examples exist, such as the customary tara bandu process in Timor-Leste. See: Ide, T., Palmer, L., and Barnett, J. (2021) 'Environmental Peacebuilding From Below: Customary approaches in Timor-Leste', in *International Affairs*, 97(1), 103-117. doi: 10.1093/ia/iiaa059

68 Compendium chapter: Zenda et al. (2022)

// Environmental peacebuilding ... tends to suffer from Western centrism, which perpetuates the paternalistic idea that ecosystems and people in the non-Western world require 'saving' through interventions from the West //

well as the rise in geopolitical tensions in the Arctic Ocean, Arctic Indigenous Peoples have already taken steps to promote a sustainable future for the region. Arctic Indigenous leaders have convened summits and put forth recommendations that promote the co-production of scientific and Indigenous knowledge in the international action addressing Arctic environmental change.⁶⁹

3. OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Fundamentally, environmental peacebuilding has risen in prominence as it has been borne out by a growing body of experience and evidence. It can offer no-regrets ways of doing something in what might otherwise seem like an impossible situation. Transboundary conservation, for example, is desirable on its own merits in terms of conserving important wildlife and ecosystems. But it becomes more beneficial if it can also help to address underlying tensions among the communities and countries that share that landscape.⁷⁰ The common challenge of co-managing a resource provides a reason for groups to talk, to share their ideas and, ultimately, to work together. And the structures created by an effective peacebuilding process—such as mechanisms for dialogue and the inclusion of marginalized communities—can, in turn, support more impactful and sustainable conservation. In Colombia, for example, where the legacy of armed conflict has perpetuated a weak state, unequal access to land and natural resources and a stark deterioration of the environment, efforts between local communities, Colombian authorities and international organizations to establish Protected Areas in zones highly affected by armed conflict have both promoted both biodiversity conservation and peace, by providing farmers and park rangers spaces for dialogue to deal with socio-environmental conflicts in a peaceful manner.⁷¹ Several new trends and developments provide important opportunities for environmental peacebuilding to further contribute to a peaceful, sustainable planet.

Environmental peacebuilders are starting to have access to the necessary experience, technology, and data that allow them to be proactive rather than reactive. We now have knowledge borne of experience of how environmental challenges can feed insecurity. Meanwhile, the sources of our information on those challenges are multiplying. We can anticipate problems that are just over the horizon. The powerful analytical capacities offered by innovative technologies such as satellite mapping, remote sensing, data analytics and artificial intelligence could provide massive amounts of data and analysis to help to improve early warning, conflict prevention, monitoring and evaluation

69 Compendium chapter: Miller and Stith (2022) *Environmental Peacebuilding in the Arctic: Reinforcing Indigenous Peoples' roles in securing a sustainable, just, and peaceful north*

70 IUCN (2021)

71 Compendium chapter: Morales-Muñoz and Gorricho (2022) *Conserving Biodiversity and Building Peace in Colombia: Enabling mechanisms that solve socio-environmental conflicts in protected areas through peaceful means enhances biodiversity conservation and peacebuilding*



// This diversity of actors results in a diversity of ideas and approaches //

of environmental peacebuilding interventions.⁷² We are in a better position than ever to develop new and improved early warning systems and policy options that can address the roots of conflict before violence breaks out.

New legal processes are changing the landscape for environmental peacebuilding. In October 2021 the UN Human Rights Council adopted a landmark resolution recognizing the human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.⁷³ The International Law Commission is codifying guidelines for the protection of the environment in relation to armed conflict. The 26 draft principles, if adopted by Member States, would consolidate the many developments of international law and improve the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict. At the same time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has updated its Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict, setting out detailed commentaries on rules and recommendations of international humanitarian law that protect the environment (such as demilitarized zones), of potential interest for environmental peacebuilding.⁷⁴ Likewise, regions such as the European Union have adopted new conflict minerals legislation that is also putting more responsibility on the end-users of minerals to ensure that their supply chains are conflict free.

There is a growing diversity of ideas and actors in the environmental peacebuilding field. As evidenced by the more than 150 authors of the compendium chapters, environmental peacebuilding is attracting ever more attention. There is interest in environmental peacebuilding across sectors—from Indigenous groups, to corporations, faith-based organizations⁷⁵ and governments. This diversity of actors results in a diversity of ideas and approaches. In particular, there are opportunities to increase youth engagement; with around 50 per cent of the world's population under 30, the inclusion of young people in environmental peacebuilding at the decision-making table and in the field represents an important inter-generational opportunity.⁷⁶

There is a willingness to work together to innovate and learn. The growing number of actors working on environmental peacebuilding at all scales means there is growing interest in interdisciplinary approaches. The fact that more people, from more backgrounds are working on variations of environmental peacebuilding (even if they might not use that term) at a variety of scales, from the intra-village to the international, is a source of great strength and innovation. The huge depth of knowledge and experience of environmental peacebuilding among Indigenous Peoples and civil society organizations present an important opportunity for environmental peacebuilders to bring together people from across cultures, sectors and organizations to contribute to creative solutions.

72 Compendium chapter: Bollettino and Darwish (2022) *Disaster Risk Reduction and Peacebuilding: Realizing the unexplored potential through environmental peacebuilding*

73 UN Human Rights Council (2021) Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council, *The Human Right to a Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment*, 8 October 2021 48/13, Resolution A/HRC/RES/48/13

74 ICRC (2020) *Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict*, International Committee of the Red Cross. <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/guidelines-protection-natural-environment-armed-conflict-rules-and-recommendations-relating>

75 Compendium chapter: Barron et al. (2022) *Three Pillars for Faith's Engagement in Environmental Peacebuilding: The transformative potential of faith and spirituality in relationship-building, dialogue, and healing*

76 Compendium chapter: Oberhauser et al. (2022) *Environmental Peacebuilding: The perspective of global youth*

If managed carefully, there are ways to engage business actors constructively in environmental peacebuilding.⁷⁷ There are many cases where local and transnational companies operating in fragile and conflict-affected states have triggered or exacerbated environmentally linked conflicts, particularly if they are engaged in large-scale extractive activities such as mining, agribusiness or logging.⁷⁸ That said, the majority of those business actors have, or should have, a long-term interest in peace and stability. If given the opportunity, they may be able to play a more positive role in conflict management.⁷⁹ Regardless of whether business actors have positive or negative impacts—or both—non-engagement will not improve the situation: business actors that are part of the problem will only become part of the solution through proactive, constructive engagement. For post-conflict countries, valuable natural resources can offer an economic boost and an incentive to keep the peace,⁸⁰ while better natural resource management can reinforce other peacebuilding objectives such as fostering democracy and strengthening civil society.⁸¹ However, if poorly managed, those same natural resources can help to create the conditions for a return to violent conflict. The current global shift away from fossil fuels and towards green, renewable energy sources means that the companies that are doing the majority of investment in new infrastructure and technologies in fragile states have a vested interest in supporting successful environmental peacebuilding.

A series of landmark events in 2022 offers opportunities to galvanize the environmental peacebuilding movement, share ideas, and accelerate action. The Second International Conference on Environmental Peacebuilding in February 2022 will involve perhaps the largest gathering yet of environmental peacebuilding practitioners and researchers. At the end of the year, the 27th meeting of the parties to the Paris Agreement in Cairo (COP 27) is an opportunity to advance a consensus on how to tackle the security impacts of climate change. In the meantime, Stockholm+50 will take stock of the global environmental movement. Scheduled for June 2022, the conference can inject new dynamism into global action on environmental challenges and draw attention to the opportunities offered by environmental peacebuilding.

4. AN AGENDA FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Environmental peacebuilding offers modest but tangible ways to tackle perhaps the most pressing challenge facing humanity: working out a way we can live together peacefully and equitably on a planet that is able to sustain both us and future generations.

But unleashing the potential of environmental peacebuilding requires courageous and transformational action. In truth there is no neat, unified agenda for the future of environmental peacebuilding. Instead, we need to encourage many different agendas, each reflecting the unique position and diverse experiences of environmental peacebuilding working on different issues, at many scales, across multiple sectors and in all countries around the world.

77 Compendium chapter: Foster et al. (2022) *Environmental Peacebuilding: The case for human rights and conflict sensitive approaches to business activities*

78 Tignino, M. (2021)

79 Kaye, J.L., Pachoud, G. and Boutellis, A. (2021) 'Including Business in Peace', *Business and Peace Series*, Paper No. 1, TrustWorks Global, July 2021. Though it is also important to note that their economic influence means that private sector actors can also wield significant influence at the peacebuilding table that can drown out other civil society actors.

80 Compendium chapter: Krampe, Hegazi and VanDeveer (2022) *Sustaining Peace through Better Resource Governance: Three potential mechanisms for environmental peacebuilding*

81 Rustad, S.A., Päivi L., and Le Billon, P. (2012) 'Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from the management of the high-value natural resources', in *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*. Abingdon: Earthscan

In essence we need an ‘ecosystem for peace’, in which a diversity of actors can bring together what are typically regarded as opposite camps: integrating both bottom-up and top-down approaches, combining the distinct knowledge of under-represented groups (women, Indigenous Peoples, young people) with big data and frontier technologies,⁸² bringing together those who argue for the intrinsic value of nature with those who insist on the primacy of human protection, promoting economic development while shifting away from polluting, extractive industries, and so on.

Frankly we don’t even know all the right questions, let alone have the right answers. Nevertheless, drawing on the many ideas in the compendium, there are eight important ways in which we can work to nurture this ‘ecosystem for peace’ for the future of environmental peacebuilding.

First, shift the mindset of the environmental peacebuilding community towards greater inclusivity and self-awareness. There needs to be a collective recognition of the uncomfortable fact that, regardless of the good intentions of its current proponents, the Western environmental peacebuilding field, such as it is, has its roots in a long history of global inequality and the legacies of colonialism.⁸³ This requires changing mindsets through education and actively striving to bring in different perspectives. This may help to shift away from what can too often appear to be a paternalistic saviour mentality, towards a new, more inclusive approach to environmental peacebuilding. New approaches to environmental peacebuilding must be co-created with women, youth, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities and be grounded in their everyday realities and lived experience.⁸⁴ Future efforts must recognize the gendered character of both environmental interactions and peace and conflict processes, integrate a gendered lens into environmental and conflict research,⁸⁵ and address the exclusion of women and feminist perspectives in environmental peacebuilding.⁸⁶ This sort of approach must go beyond just promoting inclusion and help to effect transformative and structural change.⁸⁷

Second, implement and encourage more bottom-up, community-based approaches. Community-based environmental governance is often successful in managing natural resources and mitigating environmental conflicts.⁸⁸ Indeed, bottom-up approaches also empower vulnerable and marginalized groups that lack seats at decision-making tables and suffer from the ‘slow violence’ of climate change and the destruction of their livelihoods and ecosystems.⁸⁹ In Mali, for example, cross-water collaboration conducted by the Water, Peace and Security partnership convened interlocutors at national, sub-regional, and local levels to develop a shared understanding of the links between water use, livelihoods, and related conflict in the Inner Niger Delta.⁹⁰ Environmental peacebuilding approaches can help to ensure that communities are informed of and included, as a matter of right, in the decisions that affect them.⁹¹ While this is starting to happen, bottom-up approaches can inform, work with and improve top-down national-level approaches.⁹²

82 Compendium chapter: Khaizourane et al. (2022) *Harnessing Science for Environmental Peacebuilding: How science diplomacy can support sustainable peace*

83 Compendium chapter: Sample and Paulose (2022); Tries, C. H., Auerbach, J. and Katti, M. (2021) ‘Decoloniality and Anti-Oppressive Practices for a More Ethical Ecology,’ *Nature Ecology & Evolution*, 5, pp. 1205-1212, <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41559-021-01460-w>

84 Compendium chapters: Zenda et al. (2022); Bruch et al. (2022); Miller and Stith (2022)

85 Ide, T., Bruch, C., Carius, A., Conca, K., Dabelko, G., Matthew, R. and Weinthal, E. (2021)

86 Compendium chapter: Ensor and Tai (2022)

87 Compendium chapter: Zenda et al. (2022)

88 Ide, T., Bruch, C., Carius, A., Conca, K., Dabelko, G., Matthew, R. and Weinthal, E. (2021); Compendium chapter: Mora and Cubillos (2022) *La Participación Ciudadana Como Elemento Transcendente de la Paz Ambiental: Presupuestos para su eficacia*

89 Ide, T., Bruch, C., Carius, A., Conca, K., Dabelko, G., Matthew, R. and Weinthal, E. (2021)

90 Compendium chapter: Hartog and Kortlandt (2022) *Blending Cross-Sectoral Approaches for Peaceful Cooperation Over Water: Lessons from the Water, Peace and Security Partnership*

91 Roberts, E. and Finnegan, L., (2013) *Building Peace around Water, Land and Food: policy and practice for preventing conflict*, Quaker United Nations Office

92 Compendium chapter: Eufemia et al. (2022) *Environmental Governance in State-Society Relations: Critical lessons from*



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 Ultimately all countries and all levels
 have to recognize they have a stake
 in, and a responsibility for, a
 peaceful, sustainable planet. //

Third, advocate for leadership that provides the necessary political space, funding, and entry points for environmental peacebuilding. Compelling political leadership and genuine political commitment that focuses on social justice, human rights, and the intrinsic value of nature is critical if environmental peacebuilding actors are going to have the mandate, funds, and capacity to fulfil their potential. This leadership is not, by any means, limited to the hallways of the UN, the corridors of power of governments in the Global North or the boardrooms of the development banks. While that is important and welcome, leadership and commitment also need to come from Indigenous Peoples,⁹³ women, youth, and local communities.⁹⁴ Ultimately all countries and all levels have to recognize they have a stake in, and a responsibility for, a peaceful, sustainable planet.

Fourth, embed environmental peacebuilding in policy frameworks at all scales. Leaders change or move on, so it is important to also ensure that entry points for environmental peacebuilding are woven into the fabric of national and international policy. This includes policies such as the UN's Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines (known as the Capstone Doctrine) which was released in 2008 and still shapes the UN's approach to peacekeeping,⁹⁵ and the ICRC's Military Guidelines on the protection of the environment in armed conflict.⁹⁶ These types of policies can institutionalize environmental peacebuilding in ways that outlive the career of any one charismatic leader.

Fifth, push for the implementation of robust, binding international frameworks to hold states, armed groups, and companies to account for environmental damage during conflict. This needs to address the responsibility of transnational companies to ensure high standards of corporate behaviour and support host States and the international community to prosecute cases of environmental harm by corporations.⁹⁷ It also needs to address the responsibility of States and non-state actors to avoid unnecessary damage during conflict, through the adoption of the International Law Commission's (ILC) draft principles on the protection of the environment in armed conflict.

Sixth, anticipate and respond to environmental and natural resource-related tensions before they break down into violent conflict. Environmental peacebuilders can increasingly harness big data and frontier technologies to project trends and predict where problems might happen, and to ensure that peacebuilding processes are informed by a solid understanding of environmental and climate processes.⁹⁸ Looking to the future, such technologies can play an important role in integrating local knowledge and needs into larger datasets, measuring the impact of different interventions on the ground, facilitating transparency across different scales supporting collective action, and ultimately helping communities recover from environmental stress and violent conflict.⁹⁹ However, big tech and big data also come with many ethical concerns and problems related to privacy and surveillance, and their use needs to be cautiously managed and carefully evaluated.

rural Colombia

93 Compendium chapter: Miller and Stith (2022)

94 Compendium chapter: Mai-Bornu et al. (2022), *Green Futures for Environmental Peacebuilding in Nigeria: Challenges and opportunities for oil producing communities in the Niger Delta*

95 UN (2008) *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and guidelines*, Department for Peacekeeping Operations

96 ICRC (2020)

97 Compendium chapter: White and White (2022) *Corporate Social Responsibility in the Age of Ecocide: The case for stronger corporate governance frameworks*; Compendium chapter: Foster et al. (2022)

98 Compendium chapter: De Coning et al. (2022) *Adaptive Peacebuilding: Improving climate-related security risk management through real-time data and analysis*

99 Ide, T., Bruch, C., Carius, A., Conca, K., Dabelko, G., Matthew, R. and Weinthal, E. (2021)

Seventh, continue to build and share the evidence base for environmental peacebuilding.

Environmental peacebuilders need to constantly make the case for action, bringing out the lessons of what is working and what is not working in ways that are accessible and understandable by actors outside of the field of peacebuilding. In particular this means we need to develop more robust monitoring and evaluation, and continue to find ways to share best practice and integrate environmental peacebuilding into education systems and capacity building programmes.¹⁰⁰ More sophisticated, consistent, and widespread monitoring and evaluation tools will provide accountability and learning for beneficiaries, implementers, and funders alike.¹⁰¹

Finally, bridge silos and be sure to operate in a peace-positive and a nature-positive way. If this White Paper has a single message, it is that creative solutions come from people working together across sectors and areas of expertise. The idea of bridging the silos is so oft repeated to have become a cliché, but for an area that inherently cuts across the domains of environmental science, international relations, and security analysis, it is absolutely essential. Meanwhile, environmental peacebuilding, by its very nature, should seek to go beyond do-no-harm approaches and excel beyond conflict sensitivity towards actual conflict resolution and conflict transformation.¹⁰²

CONCLUSION

We know that the human species is already in conflict with the natural world—a conflict in which we can only be victims, not victors. Experience shows that it is no longer simply desirable that peacebuilding interventions integrate environmental threats; it is now absolutely imperative that we mainstream integrated, effective, and sustainable environmental peacebuilding policy and practice to secure lasting peace for the future of our planet. With often similar root causes—including weak or corrupt institutions, discrimination, inequality, poverty, marginalization, over-exploitation—the converging crises of conflict and environmental degradation can be mutually reinforcing, with climate impacts potentially exacerbating the conflict cycle and violence weakening the institutions needed to build resilience.¹⁰³ Environmental peacebuilding can help us ensure a future that is more peaceful, equitable, and sustainable for people and planet.

100 Compendium chapter: McClain, Talla and Bruch (2022) *Monitoring, Evaluation, & Learning: Approaches for building resilience and sustaining Peace*

101 Ide, T., Bruch, C., Carius, A., Conca, K., Dabelko, G., Matthew, R. and Weinthal, E. (2021)

102 Compendium Chapter: Bruch et al. (2022)

103 Compendium chapter: Crawford, Hammill and Matthew (2022) *Building Peace and Climate Resilience: Aligning peacebuilding and climate adaptation in fragile states*

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of perspectives on the future of environmental peacebuilding

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1. FOUNDATIONS

Following page: art by [Shamsia Hassani \(Afghanistan\)](#)

Shamsia Hassani, born in 1988 to Afghan parents in Tehran, Iran, is a Master of Visual Arts from Kabul University of Afghanistan. As an artist, Shamsia has exhibited her works and created murals in more than 15 countries (3 continents, Asia, Europe and North America) around the world.



1/3/21
Hana
2021

1. THE SEARCH FOR MEANING: WHY CLEAR DEFINITIONS MAKE FOR EFFECTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Elyse Baden (Michigan State University); Anélyse Regelbrugge (Lewis & Clark College); Elsa Barron (The University of Notre Dame); Christianne Zakour

A clear definition of environmental peacebuilding that integrates a deeper recognition of different environmental narratives could make this emerging field more accessible to diverse stakeholders and facilitate long-term engagement towards collaborative environmental solutions.

CONTEXT

Defining a concept is paramount to common understanding and collaboration, and environmental peacebuildingⁱ is a relatively new field with diverse definitions and interpretations.

The intersection between environment and peacemaking was introduced to the academic world by Ken Conca and Geoff Dabelko in 2002. These scholars were concerned about hyper-securitization, which reinforces the perception of an inherently causal relationship between environmental stressors and conflict and limits the extent to which parties facing an environmental challenge can pursue peaceful, collaborative, and creative solutions. They offered an alternative approach that emphasized the potential for collaborative peace processes and encouraged action on shared natural resources or common environmental threats, as opposed to focusing on the potential for violence that had steered previous conversations.ⁱⁱ

Scholars, policymakers, and practitioners often employ different understandings of the phrase “environmental peacebuilding” in their work.ⁱⁱⁱ The Environmental Peacebuilding Association defines environmental peacebuilding as “integrat[ing] natural resource management in conflict prevention, mitigation, resolution, and recovery to build resilience in communities affected by conflict.”^{iv} Other definitions split

environmental peacebuilding strategies into three categories: technical (implementing technical solutions), restorative (rectifying past injustices), and sustainable (equitable resource distribution as a prerequisite for long-term peace).^v

Furthermore, whereas environmental justice has been popularized on platforms like social media, environmental peacebuilding largely remains within the academic community. Through a universal definition, the goals and methodologies of environmental peacebuilding can become more transparent, which could, in turn, raise awareness among stakeholders and promote peacebuilding efforts. Therefore, there is a need to define “environmental peacebuilding” in a manner that both relates it to and distinguishes it from other fields and addresses the full complexity of the concept.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Several components distinguish environmental peacebuilding from related topics. One is a focus on participatory processes that build towards self-sufficiency or resilience in stakeholder communities. This differentiates it from the field of environmental security, which focuses on the role of governments and militaries in addressing environmental issues.

// There is a need to define “environmental peacebuilding” in a manner that distinguishes it from other fields and addresses the full complexity of the concept. //

Environmental peacebuilding is also distinct from the field of environmental justice in its goals and scope. Environmental justice focuses on equitable and inclusive “development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”^{vi} In contrast, the field of environmental peacebuilding emphasizes collaborative solutions to and prevention of conflict scenarios.

Effective peacebuilding requires unique approaches to stakeholder engagement that account for the sensitivity of the individual. One such approach, known as environmental narrative analysis, as described by both William Cronon and Leila Harris, highlights how identifying and accounting for personal and community narratives can enable environmental peacebuilders to better facilitate cooperation towards positive environmental and social outcomes tailored to unique contexts.^{vii,viii}

By creating and using a new paradigm that recognizes these aspects of environmental peacebuilding, we can effectively respond to criticisms of the field, such as those presented by Tobias Ide.^{ix} Ide has identified six adverse effects of environmental peacebuilding projects that fail to adequately respond to the nuances of local, case-specific context: depoliticization, displacement, discrimination, deterioration into conflict, delegitimization of the state, and degradation of the environment. An increased emphasis on participatory processes, stakeholder

engagement, and situation-based conflict management could help mediate these concerns and increase the accessibility and credibility of the field.^x

LOOKING AHEAD

Those involved in environmental peacebuilding initiatives should expand efforts to distinguish environmental peacebuilding as a functional term for a field that is both highly interdisciplinary and fundamentally distinct from related fields. Such a definition will help clarify the goals of those in the field, create opportunities for collaboration (e.g., with the fields of environmental security and environmental justice), and raise awareness of the role that environmental solutions can play in conflict management.

Stakeholder involvement is vital to environmental peacebuilding. Practitioners can facilitate broad participation in environmental peacebuilding projects by accounting for unique methodologies, including environmental narrative analysis. Attention to narratives can illuminate participant views of environmental issues in conflict situations – perspectives that can guide future peacebuilding initiatives. All this merits further research and real-world application.

A definition of environmental peacebuilding that incorporates these methodologies will facilitate participatory processes while recognizing stakeholder differences; such a definition can also be adapted to pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict scenarios.

// Those involved should distinguish environmental peacebuilding as a functional term for a field that is both highly interdisciplinary and fundamentally distinct. //

2. DEFINING LIMITS: ECOLOGICAL OVERSHOOT AS A DRIVER OF CONFLICT

*Abigail Robinson and Viola Csordas (DCAF – Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance);
Mathis Wackernagel (Global Footprint Network)*

With overuse of the biosphere increasingly likely to undermine peace, it is essential to focus on biological resource security to stay ahead of emerging risks and vulnerabilities.

CONTEXT

With rising human demand, the availability of biological resources such as cropland, pastures, fishing grounds, and forests is limiting prospects for sustainable peace and development more than ever before. Humanity's use of these resources exceeds what our planet regenerates – its biocapacity – by at least 73 per cent.^{i,ii} The effects of this ecological overshoot are visible in climate change, groundwater depletion, soil erosion, fisheries collapse, deforestation, and other planetary boundaries.^{iii,iv} Biologically productive areas are now becoming more constraining than non-renewables such as fossil fuel reserves or metals and minerals.^v Overshoot will not continue indefinitely; it will end either by design or disaster.

In an era shaped by a growing imbalance between what is consumed and what the planet can regenerate, biological resources are likely to play an increasingly central role in security and conflict. Access to these resources has already been documented as contributing to patterns of violence, conflict, and forced displacement across regions including the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East; these effects are predicted to increase in the future.^{vi,vii,viii} While ensuring access to critical resources is already an integral part of national security, biological resource security has been underexplored as an integrating framework that can help security institutions and governments more broadly analyse and mitigate risks to both humans and the environment.

// Overshoot will not continue indefinitely; it will end either by design or disaster. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

National Footprint and Biocapacity Accounts, using UN data stretching from 1961 to today, track both demand on ecosystems and their regenerative capacity. Analysis of this data has revealed momentous shifts in the material relationship between people and the planet, as well as significant resource risk exposure for a growing number of countries.^{ix} Countries differ in the extent to which their own consumption exceeds domestic regenerative capacity, as well as their ability to postpone the inevitable consequences by purchasing resources from elsewhere. Seventy-two per cent of the world population already lives in countries with an ecological deficit and less than world-average income,^x rendering them particularly vulnerable to shocks.

So far, analyses of ecological overshoot have focused on biodiversity conservation, urban planning, international development and investment risks. However, the trends that have been observed also have clear implications for security and stability. The growing percentage of the world population living in countries in ecological deficit, combined with a steady decline

in the availability of biological resources, points to increasing fragility and risks of conflict. Five domains shape the supply and demand for biological resources. These offer a framework for analysing security risks and prioritizing interventions:

1. Conservation, restoration, and regeneration of the planet's ecosystems
2. Urban systems management and planning, which largely define energy, materials, and transport demands
3. Production and consumption of energy
4. Food production, distribution, and processing
5. Population size, which determines demand and the biocapacity available per person

LOOKING AHEAD

Human security is inextricably linked to the environment on which all depend. As competition increases for biocapacity, including carbon sequestration, food, fibre, energy and water, security policy, and practice must reflect the extent to which these resources determine development and security outcomes.

National security institutions can incorporate an analysis of ecological overshoot into planning to better anticipate emerging risks and vulnerabilities. Overshoot metrics can be used to assess the likelihood of resource-induced violence and conflict in regions of interest. Attention should be paid to the extent to which national policies are shifting the balance between consumption and regeneration; the five overshoot domains offer a framework for measuring trends toward greater vulnerability or resilience.

Security and justice institutions can also take steps to reduce overshoot. In the conservation domain, they can enforce environmental legislation, combat illegal practices contributing

to environmental degradation, and assist in restoring damaged ecosystems. As overshoot persists, radically reducing resource dependence will become an increasingly important part of national security strategies; these institutions' influence also enables them to advocate for addressing overshoot as a matter of national priority.

Overshoot is equally relevant at the subnational level. Significant differences in levels of insecurity and access to security and justice in peripheral regions play a key role in accelerating internal displacement, urban migration, and related resource pressures – trends that are also exacerbated by climate change. Drawing on localized data, governments can prioritize enhancing biological resource security and reducing conflict and crime in underserved areas. Subnational governments and their development partners can also use the five domains identified above to develop pilot projects that address resource pressures from multiple perspectives to reduce local risks of violence and conflict.

But involving security and justice actors should not come at the expense of empowering and resourcing other civilian institutions. Governments will need to use all existing capacities to address overshoot within a framework of human rights and accountability; security institutions offer innovative tools and approaches that can play a key role in broader strategies for shifting current trends. The time required to implement transitions to sustainable systems and infrastructure means that today's decisions about systems of production and consumption have far-reaching consequences for security and conflict prevention. Ultimately, sustainable peace and development will only be possible within the planet's biophysical limits.

3. OPERATIONALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEMAKING: PERSPECTIVES ON INTEGRATING THE ENVIRONMENT INTO PEACEMAKING

Sebastian Kratzer and Lina Hillert (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue)

While environmental issues are gaining traction in peacemaking practices, the sector needs to do more to ensure that mediation strategies, peace processes and agreements are sustainable and correspond to new realities.

CONTEXT

Environmental peacemaking starts with the assumption that the environment can help to sustain peace.ⁱ Although the UN set out guidelines in 2015ⁱⁱ to address the role and importance of natural resources in conflicts, standard mediation practice rarely incorporates environmental issues into peace negotiations and agreements. This paper defines environmental peacemaking as practices that (1) include, use, and frame the environment as an entry point for, and an element of, peace mediation, dialogue, and negotiation; and (2) produce both positive peace and environmental outcomes.ⁱⁱⁱ It outlines the status quo of environmental peacemaking, shares insights from the activities of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), and suggests future action.

Despite being aware of the complex connections between the environment, conflict, and peacebuilding, most mediators have paid little attention to the environment in peace negotiations and in the drafting of peace agreements. A recent study shows that of all peace agreements signed between 2010 and 2020, only 16.6 per cent addressed the environment,^{iv} and only five agreements concluded over the past ten years explicitly mentioned climate change.^v

The inclusion of environmental issues in peace negotiations can also backfire. Environmental cooperation can cause environmental degradation^{vi} if peace agreements are “little

more than coordinated resource exploitation.”^{vii} The role of the environment in peacemaking – especially how to incorporate these considerations into negotiations, agreements or other violence-reduction mechanisms – is often either overlooked or misunderstood.

// Most mediators have paid little attention to the environment in peace negotiations and in the drafting of peace agreements. //



Signing of agreements in the Koro Circle, Mali @HD Centre

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

To close the gap between theory and practice, the peacemaking sector is gearing up its environmental peacemaking capacity and expertise. The UN's Standby Team of Senior Mediation Advisers is adding a climate change and natural resources advisor to its 2022 cohort

and strengthened is Climate Security Mechanism; while civil society actors are also scaling up their research, advocacy, and operational efforts.^{viii} HD, as a private diplomacy organization, puts the concept of environmental peacemaking into practice. HD has facilitated dialogue between conflict parties on shared environmental

BOX 1: KEY COMMITMENTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KAFANCHAN PEACE DECLARATION CONCERNING THE ENVIRONMENT

Key commitments by farmers and herders concerning the environment:

- **Prohibit herders from letting cattle invade farms** and in the event that this happens, discuss with the farmers the **forgiveness or reparation of damages**
- In the event of destruction of farmland, **encourage herders to contact the owner of the farm**, as done traditionally
- Seek **amicable solutions, through dialogue**, between farmers and grazers and **refer unresolved cases to traditional and religious leaders**
- **Not cause the death of cattle**

Policy recommendations for the state and federal governments concerning the environment:

- **Establish a clear land-use plan** strategically identifying and placing water points for livestock to decrease the potential for conflicts and **promote shared resource management**
- Work with communities to **identify grazing reserves and areas**
- **Demarcate unclaimed land** as it legally belongs to the Nigerian State and **codify its usage**
- **Adopt pastoral laws and codes**
- Increase bilateral cooperation between countries where transhumance crosses borders

problems to promote cooperation in Ukraine, and supported countries in Asia in agreeing a framework that regulates coastguard interactions at sea to prevent an escalation of violence and environmental degradation. Meanwhile, HD has supported forest restoration in Asia to encourage dialogue across sensitive conflict lines. In Nigeria and Mali, HD is facilitating local agreements to resolve and prevent agro-pastoralist conflicts driven by the effects of climate change on scarce resources. In Nigeria, 29 communities signed the Kafanchan Peace Declaration^x in 2016, and 56 communities concluded the Southern Plateau Peace Declaration.^x

In both agreements, communities made commitments relating to land, pasture and water-sharing while addressing crop destruction, grazing reserves and livestock routes. In the Koro Circle in central Mali, the Fulani and Dogon communities signed three humanitarian agreements in January 2021^{xi} and one in February 2021. As a result, communities have set up committees to prevent tensions over natural resources from escalating into violence.

HD also launched a pilot environmental peacemaking programme in 2021. In Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, HD plans to test whether environmental dialogue tools developed in Ukraine are transferable to other ‘frozen’ conflicts. In Nigeria, a scoping exercise will identify how to help traditional authorities contribute to conflict resolution under the government’s National Livestock Transformation Plan. Moreover, in Asia, HD will facilitate dialogue among climate scientists and regional policymakers to assess climate-related conflicts and identify entry points for regional cooperation to help prevent future conflicts. Finally, in Syria, HD will assess and promote the steps needed to achieve a sustainable recovery of rangelands in areas and communities affected by the conflict.

// As environmental issues gain traction in peacemaking, practitioners need to integrate those issues into their mediation efforts. //

LOOKING AHEAD

As environmental issues gain traction in peacemaking, practitioners need to integrate those issues into their mediation efforts. Smart approaches to environmental peacemaking will cover all levels of peace processes – across local, national, and regional dimensions – and find ways to interlink them. Current initiatives by peace organizations are well-placed to inform future practice. By creating stronger and complementary partnerships and exchanges with climate and environmental experts, mediators will be able to improve their conflict analysis and better define sustainable peace and environmental outcomes of their work. Greater understanding can reduce the risks of unintended or neglected consequences of peace processes, such as environmental degradation due to unsustainable resource-sharing agreements, and elevate their positive potential. Better systematizing and sharing expertise, lessons learned, and practice-based evidence on what works will contribute to more climate-sensitive peace agreements in the future.^{xii}

Success will ultimately depend on peacemakers being able to make a convincing case to conflict parties, peace support actors, and their constituencies, of the important relationship between environmental issues and the prevention or resolution of conflicts – and on them having the knowledge and tools to do it well.

4. SUSTAINING PEACE THROUGH BETTER RESOURCE GOVERNANCE: THREE POTENTIAL MECHANISMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Florian Krampe and Farah Hegazi (SIPRI); Stacy D. VanDeveer (University of Massachusetts)

Natural resource management, including climate adaptation, can have positive effects on peace by facilitating inter-group cooperation; introducing environmental and other good governance norms; and providing access to public services to address communities' instrumental needs.

CONTEXT

Challenges associated with peacebuilding in conflict-affected states and societies are rarely straightforward, and the effects of war compound them further. Beyond reducing violence and preventing a relapse of violent conflict, peacebuilding efforts seek to help post-conflict countries reset their internal relations toward sustainable peace. The socio-economic and political effects of violent conflict cause long-term challenges to stability and development.ⁱ Environmental damage and climate change expose post-war populations and peace operations to further risks, exacerbating the impacts of conflict after active combat ends.ⁱⁱ

Although research has demonstrated that environmental projects can contribute to peacebuilding,ⁱⁱⁱ less research exists about how and why such projects contribute to positive peace legacies.^{iv} Recent research on environmental peacebuilding has made important advances.^v However, scholarship has been less successful in theorizing a causal understanding of the contribution of natural resource management to positive peace in post-conflict settings.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

We posit and illustrate three explanations through which environmental cooperation may facilitate processes that sustain positive peace.^{vi}

1. Contact hypothesis

The contact hypothesis suggests that increased contact and cooperation between adversarial groups can surmount prejudice and distance.^{vii}

Contact hypothesis research in post-conflict peacebuilding contexts indicates that intergroup bias can be lessened through contact between belligerents – potentially leading to reconciliation.^{viii} Recent findings indicate that post-conflict natural resource management offers opportunities for cooperation among community members that can contribute to peacebuilding by increasing community cohesion and trust building.^{ix}

In Nepal, community-based, climate-sensitive, micro-hydropower projects designed to bring electricity to rural villages illustrate the potential of this mechanism. This showed substantial socio-economic successes regarding women's empowerment, better access to education, increased economic opportunities, and increased community cohesion and stronger local governance structures.^x Although the project contributed to the local perception of a widened gap between Nepali state actors and the local community—a potential “dark side”^{xi}—successful implementation of the micro-hydropower project through local labour and financial contributions strengthened communities' sense of self-reliance and resilience.^{xii}

2. Transnational norm diffusion

Norms are essential to building and sustaining more peaceful and cooperative social and political institutions over time—and to engendering more sustainable resource governance.

International peacebuilding actors—both governmental and non-governmental—

promulgate norms as they engage local communities, thereby shaping local norms. Global environmental governance scholarship illustrates positive effects of transnational norm diffusion,^{xiii} and more complex co-construction and indigenization of global norms in local contexts.^{xiv} Natural resource management can thus facilitate trans-societal linkages among actors, which can positively affect peace formation and resource management outcomes.

The often invoked, but less often practiced, concept of gender mainstreaming serves as an example here. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was the first UN mission to include a dedicated Gender Affairs Unit.^{xv} Initially hesitant, UNTAET officials established the unit after pressure from East Timorese women's groups and other UN bodies.^{xvi} However, similar actions were largely absent in the water sector where local NGOs tasked with promoting women's participation in user committees argued that cultural patriarchal barriers were too challenging to overcome: "No effort seems to have been made [by national NGOs] to find alternative ways to involve women."^{xvii}

Women's lack of inclusion in these local water user committees shows why diffusion of norms relies on international actors adapting—to some degree—to local socio-cultural realities. The insufficient training of national NGOs tasked with implementing reforms and facilitating the inclusion of women produced incoherent outcomes, undermining the sustainability of the water systems provided through UNTAET. When done badly, environmental peacebuilding interventions risk worsening the marginalization of women and exacerbating discrimination.

3. *State service provision*

Fragile and conflict-affected states need to provide security and public services.^{xviii} By doing so, states build legitimacy, which supports peacebuilding.^{xix} By successfully providing services such as energy and water, state authorities can fulfil communities' fundamental needs. If states balance revenue extraction from communities with successful service provision,^{xx}

then delivering public services can encourage public support for the state.^{xxi} Researchers and environmental peacebuilding practitioners too often take overly technical approaches to natural resource management,^{xxii} ignoring the political nature of service provision and disregarding opportunities to provide services equitably, address grievances, reduce insecurity,^{xxiii} increase state legitimacy, and decrease the likelihood of future conflict.

Iraq provides an example of public service provision's ability generate legitimacy. Research shows how provision of drinking water services in Iraq increased citizens' trust in government, which improved state legitimacy when service distribution was equitable.^{xxiv}

LOOKING AHEAD

Our paper explores wider benefits of natural resource management in post-conflict states and develops three conceptually driven, causal mechanisms to explain how natural resource management can reduce political fragility in violent, conflict-affected countries, and help build sustainable peace. The three mechanisms doubtlessly have important interactions but are framed as theoretically distinct to afford future opportunities for empirical research and policy experimentation. They allow policy practitioners to conceptualize and operationalize development interventions—not least in delivering on the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

While the paper offers timely additions to environmental peacebuilding research, more research is needed to understand the mechanisms thoroughly and explore their relationships to the risks identified by Ide (2020). Comprehensive comparative research probing these mechanisms is urgently needed. Such analyses could be retrospective, looking back at post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives for evidence that the pathways manifested in particular cases and contributed to successful peacebuilding. Prospective research can be done to determine whether peacebuilding initiatives can promote the achievement of goals related to the articulated pathways.

5. TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Carl Bruch (Environmental Law Institute); Erika Weinthal (Duke University); McKenzie Johnson (University of Illinois); Tobias Ide (Murdoch University)

Environmental peacebuilding is an emerging and rapidly evolving field, and there is value in articulating a broad, integrated definition of the field to support its ongoing development and evolution.

CONTEXT

For more than 50 years, the international community has sought to address issues at the intersection of environment, conflict, and peace. With an initial focus on the environmental consequences of war (Vietnam War and the 1990-91 Gulf War) and resource-related conflicts, attention shifted in the early 2000s to the potential for cooperation around shared environmental interests to foster peace,ⁱ as well as the role of natural resources in post-conflict peacebuilding.ⁱⁱ

We argue for a broad definition of environmental peacebuilding that integrates diverse topics and disciplines across the environment-security-development nexus. As an overarching framework, environmental peacebuilding includes both the environmental dimensions of peacebuilding and the peace dimensions of sustainable development. It also considers an array of environmental issues that range from managing specific natural resources to protecting the global climate and oceans. By doing so, environmental peacebuilding comprises efforts to prevent environment-related conflicts, to build trust and establish shared identities, to facilitate integration between conflict parties, and to build capabilities for resilient and sustainable livelihoods.ⁱⁱⁱ Environmental peacebuilding can build both negative peace (e.g., by addressing conflict resources and other measures to end

conflict) and positive peace (e.g., by creating a context for cooperation and integration, making conflict unthinkable).

// Environmental peacebuilding includes both the environmental dimensions of peacebuilding and the peace dimensions of sustainable development. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Over the past decade, scholars and practitioners have experimented with, learned from, and developed conceptual frameworks related to the environmental dimensions of peace and conflict.^{iv} This includes the environmental causes of conflict, good environmental governance as a tool of conflict prevention, targeting of the environment during armed conflict, environmental incentives to end conflict, and environmental dimensions of post-conflict recovery.^v

// Environmental peacebuilding challenges the traditional silos of peace, security, environment, and development. //

Moreover, it is increasingly clear that environmental peacebuilding includes the peace dimensions of sustainable development. In 2015, Sustainable Development Goal 16 integrated peace into the global sustainable development agenda. In line with this, global actors have made conflict-sensitive programming a central component of sustainable development initiatives.^{vi}

Environmental peacebuilding integrates different dynamics, actors, and resources across the conflict lifecycle. This integrative role is important in breaking down institutional, temporal, sectoral, and disciplinary barriers that have often challenged peacebuilding efforts. This integration is facilitated by environmental peacebuilding's considerations of political economy, equity, and—increasingly—decolonization, to address the economic, identity, power, and social aspects of the linkages between environment, conflict, and peace. Environmental peacebuilding challenges the traditional silos of peace, security, environment, and development.

Finally, environmental peacebuilding operates at different scales (from the local to the national to the international) and in different conflict contexts (from social disputes and structural violence to armed conflict and war). While much of the early environmental peacebuilding literature focused on international conflicts and approached the analysis from a top-down perspective, recent literature tends to be localized and bottom-up, often focusing on social justice.^{vii}

Indeed, environmental peacebuilding activities at war's end increasingly operate simultaneously at multiple scales so that these top-down and bottom-up efforts can reinforce each other and offer integrative and resilient outcomes.^{viii} Effective environmental peacebuilding efforts have, thus, been characterized by inclusive participation, adaptive governance, and justice and equity considerations. Given the diversity of issues, topics, disciplines, and actors, scholars and practitioners have struggled since its inception to define environmental peacebuilding in a way that promotes a common language and framing.

LOOKING AHEAD

In making an initial attempt to outline a definition of environmental peacebuilding, we are not calling for a single, hegemonic definition. We are seeking to more clearly articulate a definition that is overarching and inclusive so that the concept can be debated, tested, and contrasted with other understandings of the linkages between environment, conflict, and peace. For the field to grow and become more robust, it needs these definitional debates to understand the conditions under which and the mechanisms by which the environment relates to conflict or peace. A broad framing can foster an integrative approach to research, policy, and practice at the intersection of environment, conflict, and peace. It broadens the range of tools beyond cooperation, and can help frame how environmental, security, humanitarian, and development institutions engage on these issues, especially since many are contributing to environmental peacebuilding but may not recognize the larger picture. Recognizing that role makes it easier to engage with other actors and in different ways than they might otherwise contemplate.

6. THE DARK SIDE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Tobias Ide (Murdoch University)

Research, as well as project planning, implementation, and evaluation must address the potential adverse effects of environmental peacebuilding.

CONTEXT

Environmental peacebuilding integrates environmental management into processes to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflicts.ⁱ Do tensions over a shared water source escalate between states or communities? Can shared environmental problems create entry points for hostile groups to work together? Are armed groups drawing on the extraction of diamonds, metals or timber to finance war? Should former combatants be provided with productive land to recover their livelihoods after a peace agreement?

In these and many other cases, the proper management of natural resources can reduce tensions, facilitate peace and—in the best cases—mitigate both environmental problems and societal tensions. Environmental peacebuilding success stories have been reported from around the world and at international, national, and local levels.ⁱⁱ

Despite these success stories, I urge researchers and practitioners of environmental peacebuilding to use caution, as such approaches can also have adverse impacts in terms of peace, sustainability, and development. In most cases, these are unintended consequences that are outweighed by positive impacts, but they must nevertheless be addressed during project design, implementation, and evaluation. Even more problematic are instances where projects have

massive negative impacts on the environment or a group's livelihood, or where the label 'environmental peacebuilding' has simply been used as a cover for cooperative exploitation of the environment. A transboundary peace park between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, for instance, paved the way for increased state control and eventually oil exploration in the border regions.ⁱⁱⁱ

// I urge researchers and practitioners of environmental peacebuilding to use caution, as such approaches can also have adverse impacts. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Recent research has identified six potential adverse impacts of environmental peacebuilding projects, also known as the “six dangerous D's.”^{iv} First, depoliticization occurs when environmental cooperation between conflict parties focuses on technical aspects without addressing underlying political-economic causes of environmental destruction or conflict. Israeli-

// To maximize the benefits of environmental peacebuilding, we need to be aware of its potentially damaging effects. //

Jordanian-Palestinian cooperation to build a channel from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, for example, could have increased water and energy availability for the involved parties. However, the project was unable to address highly unequal patterns of water access and decision-making, particularly between Israelis and Palestinians, and was cancelled in 2021.

Second, displacement might occur when people have to leave their homes because they live in areas earmarked for transnational peace parks or cooperative hydro-energy schemes. Such displacement often has grave cultural and livelihood impacts. The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, for instance, was designed to build peace between Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, but also resulted in the exclusion of local communities from the protected area.

Third, environmental peacebuilding projects can be associated with discrimination against certain groups. These are either excluded from the environmental cooperation, do not benefit from it, or suffer the brunt of adverse impacts. Research shows that women, indigenous people and the poor are most likely to face such discrimination.

Fourth, resistance against the adverse impacts of environmental peacebuilding projects might result in a deterioration into conflict. A decade after the end of the civil war in 2002, for instance, Sierra Leone introduced some environmental and social standards for mining to avoid environmental destruction, the exploitation

of workers, and the use of minerals to finance insurgencies. However, many artisanal miners were unable to meet these standards, which led to intense and sometimes violent resistance against state institutions and larger mining companies.^v

Fifth, there is a danger of a delegitimization of the state. This is possible, for example, if international actors and NGOs deliver essential environmental and social services (including conflict mediation), while state agencies are unable to do so. When aid agencies provided water pumps in post-conflict Timor-Leste, for example, local people benefited, but they were often unable to maintain the pumps. The transitional government did not respond to public requests for support, so people grew frustrated with the state.^{vi}

Finally, environmental peacebuilding has also sometimes facilitated the cooperative degradation of the environment. Both community cooperation over groundwater extraction in Yemen and international agreement over water management in the Aral Sea basin have resulted in an overextraction of water resources. While these agreements eased tensions, at least temporarily, their long-term environmental consequences will be devastating.

LOOKING AHEAD

To maximize the benefits of environmental peacebuilding, we need to be aware of its potentially damaging effects. Researchers should spend more time studying these adverse impacts, while practitioners need to consider them when planning, implementing and evaluating environmental peacebuilding projects.

CHAPTER 1 - ENDNOTES

ARTICLE 1

i. Environmental peacebuilding has also been referred to as environmental peacemaking, and the two terms are generally seen as interchangeable. The connection between the terms was discussed by Tobias Ide. (Ide, T. (2019) ‘The Impact of Environmental Cooperation on Peacemaking: Definitions, Mechanisms, and Empirical Evidence’, *International Studies Review*, 21 (3): 327–346. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy014>)

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x. This conclusion is based upon the observations of the authors of this submission, and may be substantiated at least in part by examining the numerous reoccurrences of themes such as “local knowledge” and “participatory approaches” in the recent archived events of the Environmental Peacebuilding Association’s Events webpage (<https://www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org/events/?EventFilter=Archive&start=0>).

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iii. Positive environmental outcomes may refer to improved living conditions and human security in a stable and healthy environment with sustainable use of and access to vital resources and adequate governance of the natural environment, and mechanisms to address or prevent conflicts related to environmental issues.

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xii. A practitioner highlighted that it could be as simple as providing access to short practical case studies and learning events as ways to kick this off.

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2. NATURE

Following page: art by [Rosanna Morris](#) (UK)

Rosanna Morris is a printmaker and illustrator from the UK who has long been interested in sustainability, food sovereignty, and growing food. Many of her prints explore themes of agriculture, horticulture and the natural world, and she believes in the power of print as a means of communication and collaboration.



7. MOUNTAIN GORILLA CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING: CONSERVATION AS A COMMON OBJECTIVE FOR PEACEBUILDING

Johannes Refisch (Great Apes Survival Partnership, UNEP)

Access to natural resources is the root cause of many conflicts and resolving those conflicts can be complex and challenging. However, in comparison to partitioning energy and other high-value resources, conservation is an easy-to-agree-upon common objective for peacebuilding.

CONTEXT

Environmental peacebuilding offers a number of potential benefits: for countries with a history of conflict, conservation often provides an easy-to-agree-upon common objective for cooperation and peacebuilding. It promotes cross-border dialogue and understanding and creates expanded economic opportunities through larger scale and regional ecotourism projects and by funding community institutions that address the root causes of conflict.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

40 years ago, the population of mountain gorillas on the borders of Rwanda, DRC, and Uganda was critically endangered.ⁱ But since then, the population has doubled. There are many reasons why mountain gorilla conservation became a conservation success story, but environmental peacebuilding was a key part of that success:

Neither gorillas nor poachers respect international borders. Three national parks have a common border: Mgahinga in Uganda, Volcanoes Park in Rwanda, and Virunga Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Additionally, Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Uganda and Sarambwe Reserve in the DRC share a border. Thus, collaboration between the mountain gorilla states was instrumental for the animals' protection. Gorilla tourism generates

income for the communities and governments that are in charge of managing parks and the wildlife. The pre-condition for their success is collaboration: Countries realized that they could generate more revenue by marketing tourism at regional scale.

A major milestone was an agreement between the three countries to share revenues from tourism. When a habituated gorilla group crosses the international border, 50 per cent of the income from tourism goes back to the gorillas' country of origin (according to the revenue sharing agreement signed in 2005). This agreement paved the way for further transboundary agreements, such as a 10-year Transboundary Strategic Plan for the Greater Virunga landscape adopted in 2006, and the Greater Virunga Transboundary Secretariat that was created in 2008.

Key work areas of the secretariat include landscape management, community conservation, tourism development, and law enforcement.ⁱⁱ Transboundary collaboration culminated with the negotiation and signing of the Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration (GVTC) Treaty by the three countries in 2015.ⁱⁱⁱ

After years of successful collaboration and trust building, the three countries now collaboratively tackle issues that go far beyond mountain

// A technical and bottom-up approach allowed the transboundary initiative to continue even throughout high-level political dispute between the range states. //

gorillas. For example, a history of violent conflicts between fishermen in the DRC and Uganda led to a decision to include fisheries in the Transboundary Strategic Plan. There have also been informal discussions among partners to expand the mandate even further and include more sensitive issues such as illegal trade in timber. Under the facilitation of the transboundary secretariat, the DRC and Uganda are jointly redrawing the border between Sarambe Reserve in the DRC and Bwindi Impenetrable Forest National Park in Uganda because the river which forms the border has changed its bed.^{iv} The GVTC has also helped to reduce tensions between the countries by providing them with a platform from which their military forces can collaborate in a transparent way.

It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the benefits reaped from investing in ecotourism helped the local people and the governments collaborate. There are far more contentious issues, such as the transboundary exploitation of natural resources, but also here the transboundary secretariat plays an important role as inter-governmental body and facilitator.

LOOKING AHEAD

There are a number of lessons that can be drawn from the mountain gorilla example. A technical and bottom-up approach allowed the transboundary initiative to continue even throughout high-level political dispute between the range states. Mixed technical committees, consisting of experts from all three countries, facilitated information exchange

and collaboration, and helped prevent the prioritization of national interests. Natural resources are often the root causes of conflict and a conflict-sensitive approach to conservation is important. And finally, there is a need for a neutral facilitator in transboundary initiatives. This was, for many years, the International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP);^v much later, the transboundary secretariat was established.

However, there are also challenges of relying on tourism. With the COVID-19 related restrictions, the revenue from tourism has plummeted and this has had a massive impact on communities, and both local and national economies. The conservation community, including protected area authorities and communities, urgently has to diversify the income structure to make conservation enterprises less fragile. In 2020, for the first time in many years, Uganda lost a silverback gorilla to poaching. The gorilla was not targeted, but the poachers were charged by the gorilla while hunting for wild meat. This is partially the result of a lack of tourism income.

What does all this have to do with UNEP? Transboundary collaboration in the Virunga has been recognized by the UN as a functional and operational approach and platform to solve transboundary conflicts, and the Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration Secretariat has been participating in a number of events organized by the office of the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region. The region faces many challenges, and the peace process is very complex, with many countries involved. A focus on the greater Virunga landscape via its collaboration secretariat offers the opportunity to tackle specific issues at a smaller geographic scale; successful interventions could then be replicated elsewhere in the region. The UN-led partnership for the conservation of great apes (GRASP) has been supporting the Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration Secretariat in a number of activities^{vi} and has replicated some lessons learned in other transboundary areas in Africa.

8. USING LAND FOR PEACE: HOW SUSTAINABLE LAND USE SYSTEMS CAN FOSTER CLIMATE ACTION AND SUPPORT PEACEBUILDING

Héctor Morales Muñoz, Katharina Löhr, Michelle Bonatti, Tatiana Rodriguez, Martha Lilia Del Rio, Luca Eufemia, Patricia Perez, and Stefan Sieber (Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research, ZALF); Clara Viviana Rúa Bustamante (Corporación Agropecuaria de Investigación Agropecuaria, AGROSAVIA); Augusto Castro (Alliance Bioversity-CIAT)

Sustainable Land Use Systems reduce emissions from deforestation, promote socio-economic inclusion, and improve communities' resilience to climate change and illegal economies.

CONTEXT

Land is one of the most contested resources in conflict-affected contexts.ⁱ Meanwhile, land use change is driving global biodiversity loss, deforestation, and greenhouse gas emissions.ⁱⁱ Government failures to secure sustainable land access and use have led to conflicts related to land grabbing in Liberia, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste and elsewhere.ⁱⁱⁱ

In Colombia, unsustainable land use and unequal land access have been at the root of armed conflict, disrupting rural development.^{iv} Despite a peace agreement between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the state in 2016, land conflicts persist. Deforestation increased by 50 per cent (about 238,000 ha) in areas that had been previously inaccessible due to security restrictions.^v Additionally, over 700 social and environmental leaders were killed between mid-2016 and January 2021.^{vi}

// In Colombia, unsustainable land use and unequal land access have been at the root of armed conflict. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Sustainable Land Use Systems (SLUS) are a socio-technical approach to address unsustainable land uses. SLUS are productive strategies that integrate soils, water, animals, and plants to support livelihoods while respecting the preferences of local farmers, ensuring the long-term productive potential of resources, and maintaining those resources' environmental functions. As an example, some SLUS practices are based on conservation agreements in which farmers commit to conserve forest and restore ecological functions on their farms. In return, the farmers receive technical assistance to improve the productivity of cocoa and milk.

We have studied the impacts of SLUS strategies on [peacebuilding.in](#) Caquetá, a region in the Colombian Amazon that has suffered from the ravages of war, being one of the main territories of FARC operations and also a biodiversity hotspot with the largest deforested areas in the country.^{vii} Our results show that promoting SLUS enables the **creation of diverse and inclusive livelihoods**, including through payments for ecosystem services. Thereby, SLUS aligns the financial interest of farmers with global demands to stop deforestation and protect biodiversity. When vulnerable farmers connect to sustainable value chains, this increases their resilience against illegal economies (e.g., illegal mining and drug trade).^{viii}

// SLUS aligns the financial interest of farmers with global demands to stop deforestation. //

SLUS can enable vulnerable populations to join discussions about land access and use, as well as fairness, stability in prices and access to better markets. This is important because the populations most affected by armed conflict have been historically excluded from such discussions, and our research shows they are eager to help protect the environment within their territories. Furthermore, SLUS extension activities that promote cooperation among farmers promote a sense of belonging and build trust.

LOOKING AHEAD

- SLUS practitioners should include capacity building in conflict transformation in their work. This will support farmers' participation in decision-making and thus increase the impact of SLUS on climate action and peacebuilding.^{ix}
- Governments should facilitate sustainable development models and mediate between large private firms and vulnerable populations, ensuring equitable access to natural resources.
- Governments should align market models with the principle of equity to promote the resilience of agricultural communities.
- Extension agencies should combine producers' knowledge with scientific knowledge.
- A comprehensive extension network must integrate young people, ethnic communities and women in decision-making roles and pay attention to cultural and agroecological conditions.

- National governments should increase coordination between institutions that influence environmental conservation, agricultural performance and conflict transformation.
- International donors and aid agencies can use SLUS to break silos and design hybrid financial instruments to support climate action and peacebuilding.



"Peace is not made only between humans but also with nature"
© Luca Eufemia

9. SALVAR EL FUTURO DE LA AMAZONIA COLOMBIANA: UNA AGENDA PARA DETENER LA ESPIRAL DE VIOLENCIA, DEFORESTACIÓN Y CAMBIO CLIMÁTICO

Jennifer Vargas y Juan Carlos Garzón (Fundación Ideas para la Paz); Katarina Schulz, Lukas Rüttinger, Beatrice Mosello, Daria Ivleva y Markus Buderath (adelphi); Julia Gorricho (WWF)

Read the English version of this article at www.ecosystemforpeace.org.

En la fase de implementación del Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia, la creciente deforestación y el deterioro de las condiciones de seguridad han generado una grave crisis ecológica, de seguridad y social en la Amazonia colombiana. Una alianza de ONGs y centros de investigación nacionales e internacionales proponen un camino a seguir.

CONTEXTO

La sostenibilidad ambiental, cultural y social de la Amazonia colombiana está amenazada. De acuerdo con el World Resources Institute, desde 2016, la pérdida de bosque primario en Colombia ha sido mayor que en cualquier otro año del que se tenga registro; los seis municipios con mayores niveles de deforestación en Colombia están en la región amazónica. Esta es una de las zonas más peligrosas del mundo para los defensores, gestores y organizaciones medioambientales. Se trata en su mayoría de líderes sociales, indígenas y campesinos; también los funcionarios de Parques Nacionales Naturales han sido objeto de ataques.

La implementación del Acuerdo de Paz en 2016, firmado por el gobierno y la guerrilla Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), trajo consigo cambios en la gobernanza, la aceleración del acaparamiento de tierras y la explotación inadecuada de los recursos naturales.

Además de esto, el cambio climático está haciendo que la región amazónica sea más cálida y seca, con patrones de lluvia menos predecibles, más eventos extremos e impactos negativos en la biodiversidad. Al mismo tiempo, la dinámica de la inseguridad económica está impulsando actividades económicas ilegales e insostenibles que degradan aún más el medio ambiente e impulsan la deforestación, contribuyendo así al cambio climático.

En conjunto, las altas tasas de deforestación y la violencia contra los defensores del medio ambiente son claros indicadores de que la Amazonia colombiana se enfrenta a una creciente crisis de seguridad, de derechos humanos y ecológica. Esta crisis no sólo amenaza al medio ambiente y a la población de la Amazonia colombiana, sino que también puede tener efectos desastrosos en el sistema climático mundial.

// Esta es una de las zonas más peligrosas del mundo para los defensores, gestores y organizaciones medioambientales. //

LO QUE YA SE HA HECHO

Teniendo en cuenta la grave afectación al ambiente, y las constantes amenazas que sufren sus defensores, un grupo de organizaciones motivadas por el trabajo que se realiza en la región amazónica y la existencia de alianzas orientadas a la conservación, formaron un grupo de trabajo en el segundo semestre de 2020.

Este grupo está formado por el Equipo de Conservación del Amazonas (ACT), la Fundación GAIA Amazonas (GAIA), la Sociedad Zoológica de Frankfurt - Colombia (SZF), el Fondo Mundial para la Naturaleza (WWF), la Fundación para la Conservación y el Desarrollo Sostenible (FCDS), Tropenbos y la Dirección Territorial del Amazonas (DTAM) de Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia (PNN).

Estas organizaciones hicieron un llamado a la Fundación Ideas para la Paz—un centro de pensamiento colombiano enfocado en los temas de seguridad y construcción de paz—y adelphi—la organización alemana experta en clima, ambiente y desarrollo—para que se sumen a este esfuerzo conjunto, para avanzar en el análisis de la naturaleza del conflicto actual y la dinámica de la violencia organizada en los territorios amazónicos, el impacto que tiene en las áreas protegidas y sus funcionarios, y la gestión para la protección del territorio y sus defensores ambientales.

Como resultado de este esfuerzo, se elaboró un documento conjunto de incidencia política que visibiliza y llama la atención sobre la situación de seguridad y los retos a los que se enfrentan líderes, instituciones y organizaciones de la sociedad civil que trabajan por objetivos ambientales en la región amazónica colombiana.

Este informe aborda las interacciones entre los riesgos de seguridad, los impactos ambientales y el cambio climático; analiza las razones por las que las estrategias y respuestas existentes no logran abordar esta crisis de forma eficaz; además, ofrece recomendaciones para las acciones que las organizaciones ambientales, las instituciones estatales y las organizaciones internacionales deberían tomar a corto, medio y largo plazo.

MIRANDO ADELANTE

Es imperativo responder a la crisis de la Amazonia colombiana antes de que la degradación y la deforestación alcancen un punto de inflexión, se destruyan los medios de vida locales y el mundo pierda un importante sumidero de carbono.

La crisis de la Amazonia está arraigada y conectada a los retos más amplios del desarrollo sostenible a los que se enfrenta Colombia. Por lo tanto, las respuestas no pueden centrarse únicamente en la lucha contra los delitos ambientales y en el avance de la protección de la biodiversidad. También deben incluir inversiones significativas en las necesidades sociales y económicas más amplias de las comunidades marginadas y en el fomento de su resiliencia ante el cambio y la degradación del medio ambiente, incluidos los impactos del cambio climático y el conflicto.

Esto sólo puede hacerse abordando las diferentes dimensiones de esta crisis: las necesidades inmediatas de protección de las comunidades locales y los líderes medioambientales, la deforestación y las economías ilegales, y sus causas profundas. Sólo estableciendo y estabilizando instituciones de gobernanza que funcionen para las personas que viven y trabajan en la región será posible conservar el ecosistema, frenar el cambio climático y hacer que la región sea resiliente.

Estos son los principales llamados a la acción del informe “Un clima peligroso: Deforestación, cambio climático y violencia contra los defensores ambientales en la Amazonía colombiana”, presentado por primera vez en la Conferencia sobre el Clima y la Seguridad de Berlín (30 de septiembre de 2021) y posteriormente al gobierno de Colombia, los países cooperantes y al público en general.

10. CONSERVING BIODIVERSITY AND BUILDING PEACE IN COLOMBIA: SOLVING SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS IN PROTECTED AREAS THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS ENHANCES BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND PEACEBUILDING

Héctor Morales Muñoz (Humboldt University of Berlin and Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research, ZALF); Dr. Julia Gorricho (WWF)

A multidimensional approach to strengthening governance in protected areas is key to conserving biodiversity and building peace. It involves the development of participatory information systems, a culture of dialogue and ensuring the availability of sustainable production alternatives for communities.

CONTEXT

Protected Areas (PA) are critical for biodiversity conservation, as well as providing natural solutions to climate change, health, and well-being. Recent studies have found that protected areas can support peaceful and inclusive societies by helping to maintain environmental stability, thus providing a framework for good governance and human security.ⁱ In Colombia, after the peace agreement signed in 2016 between the rebel group FARC (Spanish acronym) and the State, many challenges remained, including unresolved structural causes of the conflict—such as a weak State, limits to political participation, and a lack of equal access to land and natural resources,ⁱⁱ a re-configuration of war economies around natural resources,ⁱⁱⁱ and a stark deterioration of the environment. As an example, natural areas that were restricted previously due to security reasons are increasingly accessible, resulting in increasing deforestation by 50 per cent (about 238,000 ha) across the Andes-Amazon Transition Belt.^{iv} Nevertheless, some consider the Colombian peace agreement to be an opportunity for environmental protection because it seeks to close the agrarian frontier, preventing cultivation from encroaching further on the Amazon rainforest.^v National and international organizations have helped the Colombian government to develop and enhance PA in zones highly affected by the armed conflict. However, there remains the challenge

of understanding the extended impacts of PA on peacebuilding and its mechanisms.^{vi}

// Protected areas can support peaceful and inclusive societies by helping to maintain environmental stability. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

WWF Colombia has been working for more than 25 years in partnership with the Colombian PA authority and local communities, primarily in the designation of new PAs, to increase the effectiveness of its management and to improve social governance. We analysed the “Protected Areas and Peace (P&P)” project, which aims to provide more effective protection, restoration, and management of six PA, and to reduce the deforestation rate, land-use change, and associated conflicts in the areas. We analysed the project’s contributions to peacebuilding through a mixed-method approach. First, we conducted a literature review of PA and peace, as well as a review of internal and official documents; second, we undertook semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders (n=22); third,

// International organizations and local partners play a key role in facilitating dialogue in environmental governance structures. //

we held one virtual workshop implementing the Do No Harm methodology (n=15); and fourth, we did a biological expedition in the Peasant Reservoir Zone (Zona de Reserva Campesina) in Pato Balsillas (April 2021), located on the border of the Natural National Park, Cordillera de los Picachos, in Caquetá.

The results show that international organizations and local partners play a key role in facilitating dialogue in environmental (local) governance structures. Such structures are key to institutionalizing mechanisms to solve conflicts by peaceful means. WWF's approach is multi-dimensional. First, WWF engages local communities through collective capacity building in environmental conservation and dialogue, to co-produce technical information, which allows the communities to have better tools and participate with a clearer voice in decision-making scenarios. Second, WWF's moderation in multi-stakeholder dialogue has been seen as a great asset to end stalemates in conflict situations. Third, WWF's support in the creation of sustainable livelihood alternatives allows local communities and the government to respond to communities' demands to use the forest for their own economies and while also supporting the conservation goals set out by the government. Finally, WWF's efforts to generate resources to help finance the maintenance of the PA is essential in the long run.

However, the unrest in Colombia following the agreement (which has included assassinations and threats to socio-environmental leaders)^{vii} presents new challenges and reduces the potential impacts of natural conservation work on peacebuilding.

LOOKING AHEAD

Conflict sensitivity is a great tool for understanding environmental peacebuilding mechanisms. It helps to avoid unintended consequences and adapt to challenging contexts while enhancing the impact of conservation actions in peacebuilding processes. As a result of the Do No Harm implementation in the P&P project, WWF's Colombia team identified dividers (sources of conflict) and connectors (factors that bring social cohesion or capacities for peace) that were affected by the project's strategies. Then, they elaborated on "opportunities for peace" as adapted strategies to diminish the dividers and enhance the connectors. As an illustration, designing dialogue processes to formalize peasants land tenure with the participation of national agencies motivates farmers to sign conservation agreements that secure their livelihoods and protect biodiversity.

WWF's case shows how biodiversity conservation in PA contributes to addressing root causes and socio-environmental conflicts between farmers and park rangers by providing spaces for dialogue to deal with disputes in a peaceful manner. Finally, in the context of post-peace agreement Colombia, a good practice that should be replicated by international agencies is the engagement of former combatants together with park rangers and community members in biological expeditions. The aim of such expeditions is to make an inventory of areas that, due to security conditions, were previously unexplored but that can now be open to the public for ecotourism. Through mechanisms such as participatory community system monitoring, local communities develop skills and tools to be actively involved in PA management. These initiatives can generate spaces for reconciliation and economic opportunities along a value chain of service providers. If properly managed (e.g., ecosystem's bearing capacity and local governance recognition), they can also protect biodiversity treasures such as those in the Amazon region.

11. CONFLICT-SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A FUTURE OF EFFECTIVE PROGRAMMING

Carl Bruch and Shehla Chowdhury (Environmental Law Institute); Alec Crawford (International Institute for Sustainable Development); Amanda Woomer (Environmental Peacebuilding Association); Geeta Batra and Anupam Anand (Independent Evaluation Office of the Global Environment Facility)

Environmental peacebuilding practitioners and their funders must be prepared for the unique challenges of operating in conflict-affected contexts by creating responsive and effective policies, practices, safeguards, and risk-mitigation strategies to ensure safe, successful, and sustainable interventions.

CONTEXT

Conflict-affected or otherwise fragile settings present unique operating challenges: they are typically volatile, marked by complex social cleavages, and in some situations, physically unsafe. To ensure the success, sustainability, and safety of interventions in these contexts, practitioners and their sponsoring institutions must understand the complex dynamics and manage the risks associated with their work. Employing a conflict-sensitive approach to programming does this by seeking to ensure that activities—whether they be conservation, humanitarian, peacebuilding, or of another nature—do not exacerbate or create conflicts but contribute to conditions for peace. For environmental peacebuilding, the importance of conflict sensitivity stems from the recognition that interventions involving decisions about who can use natural resources and for what purposes, made in contexts of conflict, can and often do result in increased grievances and tensions. With conflict risks minimized through a participatory and conflict-sensitive approach, programme planning and implementation can identify opportunities to build peace alongside sustainable, positive environmental outcomes.

Doing environmental peacebuilding does not inherently mean the work done is sensitive to conflict. Practitioners often blur the lines

between environmental peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive conservation, reflecting a larger trend of using the term “peacebuilding” as a catch-all. However, such a conflation can obscure the important role that conflict sensitivity should play in environmental peacebuilding efforts. It can also make environmental practitioners wary of engaging with conflict in complex contexts, as they may believe that peace as a goal is unrealistic or outside the organization’s mandate and expertise. Understanding both the differences and linkages between conflict-sensitive conservation and environmental peacebuilding will open doors to different ways of engaging with conflict, peace, and the environment, including through the incorporation of specific conflict-sensitivity strategies at each phase of the project life cycle.


WHAT’S BEEN DONE

Environmental peacebuilding practitioners can gain valuable lessons from the experiences of other conflict-sensitive conservation interventions. A 2020 evaluation of Global Environment Facility (GEF)-supported programming in conflict-affected and fragile situations revealed a statistically significant, negative correlation between countries’ fragility classifications and project outcomes, sustainability, monitoring and

evaluation (M&E) design, M&E implementation, and execution quality. This analysis, which was conducted by the GEF Independent Evaluation Office and the Environmental Law Institute, also demonstrated that a country's fragility classification

has a significant impact on whether a project will be cancelled or dropped.ⁱ Review of the GEF's project documents highlighted several pathways through which conflict and fragility can impact projects (Figure 1).ⁱⁱ

Figure 1. Key pathways through which conflict and fragility affect GEF projects.



Analysis shows that when practitioners acknowledge and manage the risks posed by a context's conflict dynamics, they can adjust their project's design, implementation, and M&E strategies to address existing and potential dangers. Figure 2 illustrates the primary risk-mitigation strategies used by GEF implementing staff: avoidance, mitigation, peacebuilding, and learning. These approaches are consistent with those of other institutions.ⁱⁱⁱ

Practitioners should start by developing a contextual understanding of the conflict. Conflict-sensitive interventions often begin with a conflict analysis, whereby practitioners gather information on the nature, causes, actors, and dynamics of local conflicts alongside other stakeholders. Working with stakeholders, they can then identify entry points for conflict risk reduction and peacebuilding, including making more informed decisions on

project investments and partnerships, adapting benefit distribution mechanisms, incorporating lessons learned from similar settings or past interventions, and designing localized dispute resolution mechanisms.

// The importance of conflict sensitivity stems from the recognition that interventions in contexts of conflict can result in increased grievances. //

Once practitioners have built fluency with local conflict dynamics, they can proceed to design their projects around this understanding. Practitioners can use a variety of strategies, including those exhibited in Figure 2, to mitigate risks and

maximize peacebuilding outcomes. At this stage, practitioners can also benefit from building flexibility into their implementation plans, M&E strategies, and budgets. By preparing contingency scenarios and setting aside emergency funding, practitioners anticipate volatility and minimize conflict-related impacts to their work.^{iv}

LOOKING AHEAD

To integrate conflict-sensitive practices into an organization’s culture, management needs to provide the guidance, policies, safeguards, training, resources, and follow-up required to support staff in conflict-sensitive programming. For funders, standardizing conflict sensitivity measures into funding decisions can help ensure the uptake of these strategies, beginning even at the project proposal stage. Proposals can, for example, include a conflict analysis, a discussion of risk mitigation strategies, and the incorporation of conflict sensitivity into M&E frameworks and budgets. This will help ensure that implementers are prepared for conflict dynamics and situations. Interviews conducted with GEF implementing staff revealed that difficulties obtaining funds for conflict and fragility-related contingencies

presented challenges in handling crises as they erupted. Thus, ensuring that institutional budgeting practices allow additional funds for conflict-related challenges and emergency preparedness could improve both project flexibility (and thus success) and staff safety.

Another way to improve conflict-sensitive programming could be the development of an international code of conduct for environmental interventions in conflict-affected and fragile situations. The creation of an international standard would promote the uptake of these strategies and ensure a basic minimum of due diligence and understanding when it comes to the line between conflict sensitivity and environmental peacebuilding. Whether an international standard is developed or an institution-specific approach is taken, conflict-sensitive programming should be grounded in conflict analysis; it should also be participatory, inclusive, gender-responsive, rights-based, flexible, transparent, accountable, and sustainable.^{v,vi,vii}

Figure 2. Risk management strategies.



CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES

ARTICLE 7

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3. JUSTICE

Following page: art by [Shar Tuiaso](#) (Hawai'i, USA)

Shar Tuiaso is a Pasifika illustrator from the island of O'ahu, Hawai'i, where she was born and raised. After earning her BFA in illustration from California, she headed home to spend her time in the ocean, enjoying the vibrant culture of her home, and imagining and creating for her illustration business, Punky Aloha Studio.



12. DEALING WITH THE PAST IN ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING: AN AFRICAN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Munini Mutuku (Environmental Peacebuilding Association); Rachel N. Stern (University of British Columbia)

Environmental peacebuilding in Africa should incorporate African environmental philosophy in transitional justice processes to better address past environmental crimes and abuses.

CONTEXT

Since the early 1990s, several dozen Sub-Saharan African countries have attempted to deal with past grievances, having realized that “the future is largely a result of the past.”ⁱ The concept of transitional justice is indispensable to recovery from conflict. It comprises four main pillars: right to know (or truth-telling), right to justice, right to reparations, and guarantee of non-recurrence;ⁱⁱ memorialization has been suggested as a fifth pillar.ⁱⁱⁱ

While transitional mechanisms provide a platform to address the lasting impacts of violations of humans, they seldom seek to redress violations of the environment. The environment is often a silent casualty, with ecosystems treated as exploitable resources for diverse goals.^{iv} Justice efforts and recurring compensations are based on the damages inflicted to the human population, not the damage inflicted to nature and its ecosystems. People are compensated, while nature and its ecosystems, independent of their value to people, seldom benefit.^v

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

African environmental philosophy recognizes the interconnectedness of all beings and expresses concern over environmental degradation for future generations and ecological health.^{vi} The

underlying belief of the philosophy is the ethical linkage of nature, community, and humans.^{vii} It brings to light the African dual ontology, which comprises both spiritual (invisible and intangible) and physical (visible and tangible) beings.^{viii}

Connecting the human, natural, and spiritual realms is drawn from the concept of Ubuntu, which is critical for developing an integrated approach to justice for environmental harms.^{ix} Ubuntu “represents an indigenous African philosophy of justice centered on healing, forgiveness and reconciliation aimed at restoring the humanity of both victim and perpetrator. It encapsulates the notion of an interdependent humanity, the core of traditional African cosmology.”^x

The African metaphysical worldview^{xi} suggests an approach to transitional justice applicable to environmental justice and environmental peacebuilding work in Africa’s post-conflict societies.

LOOKING AHEAD

The future work is two-fold. First, environmental peacebuilding must expand to include transitional justice ideas and mechanisms.

Second, transitional justice must integrate the African environmental philosophy that “pays attention to the epistemological and metaphysical dimensions of the worldviews of the African people in order to understand the environmental attitudes and values in African traditions of thought.”^{xii}

Practitioners should embrace approaches to environmental justice that focus on fair and equal distribution of environmental burdens and benefits, especially to redress historical environmental inequalities.^{xiii} Reparation programmes should be “eco-sensitive” and explore “the possibilities of transformative reparations.”^{xiv}

Humanity’s relationship to the environment^{xv} and its influence on peacebuilding should be emphasized. Post-conflict rapid assessments should serve as truth-telling processes.

With conflicts creating a legacy of chemical contamination and degraded landscapes, ^{xvi} securing future ecological sustainability and restoration is key.^{xvii} Post-conflict resource restoration ought to evolve into a comprehensive and integrated effort^{xviii} that draws on the five transitional justice pillars.

Future environmental peacebuilding work in Africa has to embody both transitional justice tools and African ideologies of environmental justice to create sustainable systems of peace tailored to African realities.

// Connecting the human, natural, and spiritual realms is drawn from the concept of Ubuntu, which is critical for developing an integrated approach to justice for environmental harms. //



Seedlings - 2014 © UN Environment



Women in agriculture - 2015 © UN Environment

13. TERRITORIO, BIODIVERSIDAD, DESARROLLO, RECONCILIACIÓN, Y PAZ EN COLOMBIA: LAS ÁREAS PROTEGIDAS, LOS GUARDAPARQUES, Y LOS DEFENSORES DEL PATRIMONIO NATURAL, EN EL MARCO DEL CONFLICTO ARMADO INTERNO EN COLOMBIA

Libardo Suárez Fonseca, Natalia Galvis, Antonio Martínez N., Héctor Velásquez, Rosa Ladino, Pilar Lemus E, Juan Carlos Troncoso, Gisela Paredes-Leguizamón, Víctor Setina, Natalia Jiménez y el Colectivo de Guardaparques (Sistema de Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia)

Read the English version of this article at www.ecosystemforpeace.org

Producto del proceso de recuperación de la memoria histórica de los últimos 60 años desde la experiencia y vivencia cotidiana de conservación de la biodiversidad en Colombia, y elaboración del informe presentado al Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia Reparación y No Repetición, el Colectivo de Guardaparques identifica los efectos del conflicto armado interno, y la necesidad del reconocimiento del daño sobre la naturaleza, el territorio, las áreas protegidas y los defensores del ambiente, proponen unas recomendaciones para replantear políticas públicas y sectoriales como una oportunidad para la construcción de la paz ambiental, el logro del desarrollo territorial incluyente fundamentado en los derechos humanos y de la naturaleza.

CONTEXTO

La persistencia del conflicto armado interno en Colombia es un resultado de la implementación de políticas públicas basadas en un modelo de desarrollo que no ha logrado resolver los problemas estructurales del país. La corrupción, la contradicción entre políticas del Estado y de desarrollo sectoriales, la implementación de modelos de seguridad nacionales basados en el uso de la fuerza para combatir las economías ilegales; causan daño irreparable a los territorios y también son las principales fuentes de financiación de la guerra.

Áreas y territorios protegidos y los defensores del ambiente, ubicados en lo más profundo de la ruralidad, afrontan conflictos socioambientales, que el modelo de desarrollo no logra resolver y que se acrecientan con la presencia del conflicto armado. Estos territorios socioecológicos son invisibles, lejanos a los intereses estratégicos que tienen los centros de poder que privilegian intereses particulares.

Los colectivos y sus territorios son las víctimas: el conflicto armado convierte los recursos naturales en botín para el financiamiento de la guerra, intimidación y el terror. También son usados para controlar la población y corredores de movilidad. Un acuerdo de paz exige la formulación de políticas públicas que viabilicen la conservación y reparación de los daños ambientales y psicosociales ocasionados al territorio y a los defensores del ambiente.

Resolver problemas estructurales como la tenencia de la tierra, marginalidad y pobreza rural, ausencia del Estado, y proponer modelos de desarrollo sostenibles, debe iluminar siempre la búsqueda de la paz ambiental.

LO QUE YA SE HA HECHO

La gestión de las áreas protegidas ha facilitado el diseño e implementación de metodologías y procesos sociales e interinstitucionales que concretan la planeación participativa, pertinente

y contextualizada a las características ecológicas, culturales, sociales, y territoriales. Estos procesos identifican problemáticas y proponen alternativas de solución, buscando conservar el patrimonio natural, cultural, y mejorar las condiciones de vida de poblaciones locales.

También son estrategias que han permitido contribuir en el reconocimiento de derechos étnicos territoriales. Parques Nacionales y autoridades indígenas formulan Regímenes Especiales de Manejo para áreas traslapadas y acuerdos de uso con comunidades locales.

Varios principios importantes, que se enumeran a continuación, deben articularse a varios sectores estratégicos de la economía (incluido infraestructura y minero energético). Esto debe hacerse de manera oportuna, y debe demostrarse que es parte integral del cumplimiento de los principios constitucionales y ambientales que rigen en Colombia. Los principios son los siguientes:

- La conservación de la naturaleza debe ser reconocida como derecho fundamental para la conservación de la vida en todas sus formas.
- Las políticas públicas deben armonizarse con las condiciones especiales de las áreas protegidas, especialmente aquellas que buscan: frenar la deforestación y combatir los cultivos de uso ilícitos, la minería ilegal, y la extracción de recursos naturales.
- Deben incluirse en los programas de educación la protección de patrimonio y valores culturales y la promoción de conductas de cuidado de la naturaleza para el logro del desarrollo pertinente.
- Los guardaparques, defensores del ambiente y las áreas protegidas deben ser reconocidos como víctimas y sujetos de reparación en el marco de la justicia transicional

MIRANDO ADELANTE

La sociedad contemporánea se enfrenta hoy con un desafío global: la sobrevivencia de la especie humana. Es impostergable formular y gestionar políticas públicas, que faciliten la solución de los

conflictos socioambientales, que impiden lograr la reconciliación y avanzar hacia la consolidación de la paz. Para tal fin es fundamental:

i) Lenguaje incluyente: No ver la naturaleza y las áreas protegidas como fuentes inagotables de recursos y a los defensores del ambiente como enemigos del desarrollo; a cambio, reconocer que la naturaleza es un elemento central para la conservación de la vida en todas sus formas.

ii) Un salto cuántico en el paradigma de desarrollo: Pasar de economías extractivas a modelos alternativos de desarrollo que posibiliten conservar el patrimonio natural y cultural, midiendo la competitividad no solo en términos de ganancias económicas de corto plazo sino en la conservación a perpetuidad de los ecosistemas y sus servicios, ampliación de la protección y valoración de la cultura.

iii) El fortalecimiento de los sistemas de áreas protegidas y de los Sistemas de Parques Nacionales: Los gobiernos además de reconocer, deben fortalecer la inclusión de los Parques Nacionales y otras áreas protegidas, como asunto de interés nacional en las políticas de desarrollo, ordenamiento territorial y sectorial, destinando el presupuesto necesario para el cumplimiento de su misión.

iv) Una reforma rural integral: Cumplimiento del derecho de las comunidades rurales al acceso y a la formalización de la propiedad de la tierra y dotación de servicios públicos e infraestructura.

v) El reconocimiento de los derechos: Reconocimiento de derechos y por tanto sujetos de protección, reparación y restauración: A la naturaleza, el territorio, las áreas protegidas y los guardaparques. El Estado debe reconocer y dignificar la labor de los guardaparques ante la sociedad colombiana y el mundo. Esto significa establecer un régimen laboral diferenciado para los GuardaParques, y en el marco de la memoria histórica, establecer una réplica en cada sede de las áreas protegidas, que evidencie el daño ocasionado a los guardaparques, los defensores de la naturaleza, y al territorio.

14. OFF THE HOOK, ON THE HOOK? CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HARM ABROAD: LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Alisa Kerschbaum (Leiden University); Anne Fock (European University Viadrina); Patience Ikpehobaulo and Bridget Osakwe (West Africa Network for Peacebuilding)

Activities by transnational companies often seriously impact the environment, challenging States to find appropriate legal responses and to ensure effective access to justice for victims.

CONTEXT

In a globalized world, transnational companies (TNCs) conduct business in different settings, including conflict-affected regions. Where local societies suffer from violent conflict, local mechanisms to control the activities of foreign corporations are often weak, opening opportunities for various types of misconduct. In the Niger Delta region, for instance, oil spills and gas flaring caused by oil extracting companies have contaminated local ecosystems.ⁱ Such damage not only irreparably harms the environment, but also significantly impacts local populations' physical, social, and economic security.

Under increasing pressure from civil society, more and more States take measures to regulate harmful environmental activities by corporations abroad, resulting in legal frameworks at international, regional, and domestic levels. However, these mechanisms require further refinement, in particular, the adoption of a binding international treaty, the development of effective domestic laws, and ensuring victims of environmental damages have access to justice.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

International and regional frameworks:
International environmental law contains obligations of States regarding environmental protection.ⁱⁱ The Draft Principles on the Protection

of the Environment during Armed Conflict by the International Law Commission,ⁱⁱⁱ for instance, ask States to take appropriate legislative measures addressing the environmental impact of corporate behaviour before, during, and after armed conflicts.

Against this backdrop, there is a growing tendency in international law to formulate binding responsibilities of corporations. This development, however, has so far been limited to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights,^{iv} and does not explicitly cover environmental risks emanating from corporate behaviour. Some initiatives, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,^v aim at regionally closing this gap but lack binding force. Binding frameworks such as the European Union's draft corporate due diligence law or the Human Rights Council's draft treaty on business and human rights are currently being negotiated and are a step in the right direction.

National frameworks:

Correspondingly, several States in the Global North have recently adopted or proposed legislation to regulate extraterritorial business activities of companies domiciled in their territory. Examples of adopted laws include the French *Loi de vigilance* (2017)^{vi} and supply chain laws in Germany (2021)^{vii} and Norway (2021)^{viii}. Similar corporate due diligence laws are proposed by the governments of Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium.

While these approaches reflect increasing willingness by States to regulate transnational corporate activities, three observations are noteworthy. First, most of these domestic laws primarily focus on corporate responsibilities to respect human rights and contain only few, if any, explicit provisions on environmental protection. Second, significant barriers to accessing remedies for victims remain, such as limited resources to bring action before the courts in companies' home States. Third, the scope of these laws is often limited to larger companies, thus significantly limiting these laws' applicability.

Case study: Niger Delta region

As one of the largest oil producing regions and one of the most fatally damaged environments worldwide,^{ix} the Niger Delta, demonstrates a direct link between negligent corporate activities and environmental harm, as well as the challenges of accessing remedies for victims.

The Nigerian government has passed several laws^x to prevent and respond to environmental harm caused by the oil industry. However, representatives of local communities have repeatedly criticized these laws as insufficient and have pointed out a lack of compliance by corporations,^{xi} resulting in a series of lengthy lawsuits—most prominently against Royal Dutch Shell and its Nigerian subsidiary.

In the early 2000s, Nigerian courts ordered Shell and its partners repeatedly to pay compensation to local communities affected by Shell's leaking oil pipelines.^{xii} Nevertheless, it was only after proceedings before Dutch^{xiii} and British^{xiv} courts that Shell accepted its responsibilities for two oil spills and agreed to assist in the clean-up.^{xv} Notably, Dutch courts also found that the Dutch parent company Shell had violated its duty of care for failing to maintain leaking pipelines.

This case study reflects three developments. First, the most appropriate and convenient forum for victims of environmental harm to seek justice are the host States' courts. Second, in absence

of effective remedies in host States, victims increasingly turn to courts of parent companies' home States.^{xvi} Third, bringing claims before foreign courts also offers a platform to increase public pressure on TNCs and States to ensure effective protection.

LOOKING AHEAD

Existing initiatives regulating corporate environmentally harmful activities abroad are a step in the right direction. However, to ensure effective protection of both the environment and human life, decision-makers should consider the following recommendations:

1. Adopt a comprehensive international framework: Current attempts demonstrate shortcomings of existing initiatives, but also the readiness of the international society to secure TNCs' responsibilities for environmental harm. Future frameworks need to address TNCs' responsibilities in a binding manner to ensure minimum standards of corporate accountability.
2. Design effective national laws to strengthen victims' access to justice: Latest initiatives by States to regulate business activities abroad are a positive development. However, most of these laws require further refinement, in particular, regarding their scope of application, explicit environmental obligations, and effective access to justice for victims.
3. Support capacity building within host States: From a victim's perspective, the most convenient forum to hold TNCs accountable for environmental damages is the jurisdiction of the State in which harm was inflicted. Bringing cases before TNCs' home States should remain a complementary mechanism. The international community should focus on strengthening the capacities of host States to investigate these cases to foster peace and development.

15. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AGE OF ECOCIDE: THE CASE FOR STRONGER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS

Braiya White (SAGE Environmental Services); Hannah White (Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)

We need to harness environmental peacebuilding principles and toolsets to develop stronger corporate governance frameworks that promote holistic environmental protection.

CONTEXT

The increasing impact of human activity on the global environment has led to the recognition of the need for environmental principles that prevent irreversible impacts. Deforestation, industrial fishing, and the use of fossil resources are rapidly transforming Earth beyond a liveable standard. These widespread changes to the environment have inextricable links to corporate activity and commercial gain, carried out for human benefit.

The need to hold corporations liable for the environmental damage that they inflict due to their operations is being recognized in legal and social settings. In some cases, corporations hold more power than States, making their actions more influential than State action overall. The actions they choose transcend international borders.

The recent development of a legal definition of ecocideⁱ promises new avenues for holding corporations liable for gross environmental destruction caused by their activities. Corporations have been held accountable for extensive environmental destruction, and even ecocide, under national jurisdictions. For example, the Guatemalan law of ecocide was successfully used in 2015 to hold Empresa Reforestadora de Palma de Petén SA (REPSA) accountable for the “criminally negligent” pollution of the La Paison River with pesticides used in Palm Oil plantations.ⁱⁱ Additionally, the recent incorporation of draft principles

related to protecting the environment during armed conflict from the International Law Commissionⁱⁱⁱ may provide sufficient legal obligation for corporations to develop stronger governance related to environmental protection. Specifically, these draft principles identify the need for corporate due diligence and provide avenues to assign liability for environmental damages caused during armed conflict.

However, the legal definition of ecocide and these draft principles have not yet been widely accepted by the international community. They are non-binding on nation States and, in turn, multinational corporations.^{iv} We have entered the age of ecocide with a system of international law that, although evolving, is not yet fit for purpose. In these circumstances, corporate social responsibility has never been more important. The enduring nature of corporations places them in a unique position to assume a role as stewards for the environment through their actions.

// Weak corporate governance on environmental issues is largely due to the absence of legal frameworks that identify the obligations of corporations. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Changes in the socially perceived role of corporations over recent decades have perpetuated the need for corporate responsibility in promoting and positively engaging with environmental, social and governance (ESG) outcomes. An example of ESG in the business context is the expectation that the governance of modern corporations does not violate human rights, cause unnecessary damage to the environment, or further corrupt practices. The requirement to prevent human rights abuses and corruption in business are recognized in law, internationally and within individual States.^v This legal recognition has subsequently enabled corporations to develop frameworks and toolsets that enable them to identify violations and provide measurable data on their compliance with such legislation.

The implementation of corporate governance for environmental protection, however, has not shared the same success. It is often limited in scope to corporations committing to non-binding targets related to waste minimization, greenhouse gas emission reduction, or the promotion of “climate-friendly” action at the individual level. Weak corporate governance on environmental issues is largely due to the absence of legal frameworks that identify the obligations of corporations.

In the age of ecocide, environmental protection depends upon the establishment of effective corporate governance frameworks. The mechanisms of environmental peacebuilding that promote institutional change^{vi} need to be harnessed to generate a dialogue with corporations that acknowledges the power these entities have in standardizing and mainstreaming practices that are environmentally protective.

LOOKING AHEAD

We propose the development of clear legal and policy frameworks that allow corporations to make their intentions and actions towards environmental protection transparent to the

public and the law. Such frameworks not only offer legal and regulatory benefits, but can strengthen a corporation’s social licence to operate.^{vii} Appealing to the stakeholder desire for more protective environmental practices can boost their public favour and can also translate to greater investor confidence. We propose that these frameworks should be developed using principles and toolsets that empower and encourage corporations to address their social and legal obligations to the environment and educate them on the interconnectedness of environmental protection to peace and security.

These principles should be implemented alongside existing corporate governance frameworks to avoid any hesitation to commitment that may be driven by “compliance fatigue.”^{viii} As such, working within frameworks such as the UN Global Compact (UNGC) Principles^{ix} and UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights^x can allow a new set of environmentally-centred principles to be developed for businesses. UNGC Principle 8 provides an avenue for developing an agenda that recognizes environmental peacebuilding and business, stating that businesses should undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility.^{xi}

These principles should be developed collaboratively with environmental peacebuilding practitioners, corporations, and local stakeholders to reflect best practices and existing principles within areas of environmental and humanitarian law. Efforts should be made to connect with professional organizations, particularly those servicing the engineering, construction, and environmental industries, to disseminate knowledge on this topic and the field of environmental peacebuilding more broadly. The creation of transparent and measurable strategies for environmental protection at a corporate governance level will enable the bottom-up action required to place holistic environmental protection at the forefront of corporate activities.

16. ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING: THE CASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE APPROACHES TO BUSINESS ACTIVITIES

Florence Foster and Alice Munnelly (Quaker United Nations Office); Hannah Peters and Jessica Johansson (Swedwatch); Elsa Benhöfer, Caroline Kruckow, and Sylvia Servaes (FriEnt)

A conflict-sensitive *and* rights-based approach to business activities are essential to ensuring that social and environmental impacts do not negatively affect marginalized populations.

CONTEXT

Environmental challenges, particularly those linked to business activities, are part of a complex web of actors, interests, and stresses: not the sole root cause of conflict. They are often connected to unaddressed grievances and human rights violations ensuing from scarce resources, increasing inequality, political oppression, dispossession, displacement, and a discriminatory political economy.ⁱ

Environmental peacebuilding must address these root causes. A holistic approach that combines conflict-sensitivity *and* a rights-based approach is key to adequately understanding and addressing these challenges.ⁱⁱ The 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda calls for a multisectoral approach to sustainable development, inviting business actors to consider their role to contribute to sustainability and peace—as further outlined by the 2020 report on business and conflict by the Business and Human Rights Working Group.ⁱⁱⁱ

A rights-based approach to environmental challenges is one that is grounded in international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting them. It analyses and seeks to redress inequalities which lie at the heart of people’s grievances. Such an approach when applied by business actors is not merely an obligation but part of a process to sustainable business engagement and peace. As a central document the Aarhus Convention^{iv}

sets apart three procedural rights relating to the environment, namely the right to access to information; participate in decision-making; and justice^v—echoing Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration.^{vi} When states, legitimate local authorities, and business actors uphold these rights, they foster resilient, just, peaceful, and inclusive communities, which in turn creates enabling business environment for *all*.^{vii}

A sustainable business engagement necessarily also includes a conflict-sensitive approach.^{viii} This requires a sound understanding of context-specific intergroup tensions, gender constructions, and potential divisive issues—which often include environmental challenges—and the two-way interaction between activities and the context.^{ix} Conflict sensitivity requires actors, including businesses,^x to act upon that understanding to avoid negative impacts on social relations and to avoid fuelling further division.^{xi} The following case study illustrates how a well-intentioned project subsequently failed on its own terms—illustrating how necessary both approaches are to business.

WHAT’S BEEN DONE

The “Addax Bioethanol SL” project in Sierra Leone—product of a policy push to attract foreign direct investment by the government of Sierra Leone and supported by numerous development finance institutions (DFIs)—

was meant to set the bar for good practice in agriculture and renewable energy projects. Established in 2010, it aimed to produce ethanol from sugarcane for the European market, while providing jobs and supplying electricity for the national power grid. Instead of constituting an example of best practice, however, civil society organizations soon reported negative impacts of the project on the local population, including environmental pollution, food insecurity, the violation of land rights, and a consequent increase in local conflicts and violence.^{xii}

Following pressure from human rights groups, human rights due diligence measures, including multistakeholder dialogues, were implemented while the project remained under Addax ownership.^{xiii} However, the project lacked a thorough conflict and context analysis, resulting in increasing intra- and inter-community conflict. The land lease, for instance, was negotiated between local authorities, such as Paramount Chiefs, and company representatives, without direct involvement of the landowners and land users.^{xiv} Though not uncommon, this practice exacerbated already existing conflicts between the local chiefs and communities as well as inter-community relationships. Multistakeholder meetings, a Farmer Development Service and vegetable gardening programmes were not enough to mitigate negative impacts on livelihoods in the communities, including loss of income, growing inequality, and increasing frustrations around a perceived lack of transparency. Consequently, as business activities contributed to people losing access to their land and subsistence as well as clean water, tensions and (domestic) violence increased.^{xv} The company and DFIs were not prepared to compensate for those unintended impacts.

As the Addax project illustrates, a conflict-sensitive and rights-based approach to business activities throughout the project cycle and changes in ownership are necessary to avoid negative impacts on women and men, the environment, and peacebuilding.

LOOKING AHEAD

Environmental peacebuilding should be obligatory for all actors, including business. Business actors and their financial supporters (including DFIs) should:

- Regularly conduct conflict mapping and human rights due diligence (HRDD) assessments, alongside environmental and social impact assessments of their activities.
- Implement processes of meaningful engagement and inclusive consultation of communities while negotiating concession agreements.
- Enhance transparency by making information on business activities accessible and understandable.
- Develop exit strategies to secure continuity of conflict mapping and long-term HRDD measures throughout ownership changes and compensation for harm occurred.

Governments should:

- Adopt legislation on mandatory conflict sensitive HRDD, including accountability measures, to ensure that business actors conduct conflict sensitivity and HRDD throughout their activities, value chains, and investments.
- Develop policy measures and mechanisms to implement the right to information, meaningful participation, and access to remedies concerning the prevention of destructive conflict relating to the environment. Measures should ensure that grievance mechanisms set up by business actors are accessible to affected communities.
- Be strongly supported by international donors in this endeavour.

Moving forward, a focus on policy implementation is crucial. Ensuring objective monitoring through civil society remains critical throughout. Future action in environmental peacebuilding will also need to address the open question as to why guidelines and international jurisdiction are not sufficiently implemented. Is there simply a need for more due diligence? Or is there, instead, a need for more complementarity between peacebuilding and human rights-based approaches?

17. STRENGTHENING THE THIN GREEN LINE: A CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL MONITORING MECHANISM FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING LAW

Dr. Stavros-Evdokimos Pantazopoulos (University of Helsinki and Athens Public International Law Center); Dr. Mara Tignino (Geneva Water Hub and University of Geneva)

An international mechanism is urgently needed to monitor the implementation of the applicable legal frameworks during and after armed conflicts relating to environmental protection. Such a monitoring mechanism could improve the compliance of actors in post-conflict settings with applicable environmental laws, and hence serve as an indispensable tool for environmental peacebuilding where it is most needed.

CONTEXT

Environmental damage during and after armed conflicts harms the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable people and populations, degrades sensitive ecosystems, and undermines the prospects for lasting peace. This has been clear in Iraq where the Islamic State's attacks on oil infrastructure led to widespread contamination; in biodiverse Colombia, with its spiraling rates of deforestation and habitat loss; and in Afghanistan, where the legacy of decades of conflict-linked environmental degradation have left it acutely vulnerable to climate change. Environmental remediation and restoration in the aftermath of armed conflicts remains under-prioritized, if not entirely neglected.

On top of the above challenges, adherence to the applicable international legal rules of environmental peacebuilding remains poor.ⁱ For one, belligerent parties tend to push the observance of environment-related provisions to the background. The attendant lack of accountability after the cessation of hostilities only serves to reinforce such irresponsible and unlawful conduct. Moreover, the scope and the contours of related norms suffer from lack of clarity. Without a robust international mechanism tasked with the restoration of wartime environmental damage, responses remain fragmented and ineffective. To this end,

we urgently need an international mechanism to keep track of the implementation of the law of environmental peacebuilding, which, in turn, may strengthen the prospects of an enduring peace where it is most needed.

// A plethora of legal initiatives have been pursued by different international actors, which aim to clarify different aspects of the law of environmental peacebuilding. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The international community has undertaken various legal initiatives in its attempt to strengthen the normative landscape of environmental peacebuilding. The 1991 establishment of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) by the United Nations Security Council to address reparation claims following the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait marked a watershed moment, as the UNCC was also endowed with the competence to adjudicate environmental claims.ⁱⁱ The UNCC, a subsidiary quasi-judicial organ of the UN Security Council,

was established as a claims resolution facility to settle a large number of claims in a reasonable time. Even though the UNCC made significant contributions to ‘evidence, burdens and standards of proof, questions of causation, standards of reparation, the importance of allocating funds for assessment,’ⁱⁱⁱ its achievements were unique, for the conditions that enabled its creation are unlikely to be recreated.

Turning to more recent times, a plethora of legal initiatives have been pursued by different international actors, which aim to clarify different aspects of the law of environmental peacebuilding. The growing momentum is aptly evidenced by the 2019 draft principles on the ‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts’ adopted, on first reading, by the UN International Law Commission,^{iv} the 2019 Geneva List of Principles on the Protection of Water Infrastructure,^v the 2020 updated International Committee of the Red Cross Guidelines,^{vi} and the 2020 Harvard Principles for Assisting Victims of Toxic Remnants of War.^{vii}

All these initiatives draw from the wide spectrum of norms of international law applicable during and after armed conflicts which includes—but it is not limited to—international humanitarian law, human rights law and international environmental law. These different areas of international law constitute the different facets of the law of environmental peacebuilding which should be taken into account for long-term peace. Despite the increasing efforts of the international community, compliance with the applicable provisions in post-conflict settings remains poor. Accordingly, the proposed international monitoring mechanism carries the potential to influence the post-conflict environmental performance of the actors involved, serving at the same time as a valuable instrument of environmental peacebuilding.

LOOKING AHEAD

These are important steps, but the field of environmental peacebuilding suffers from the lack of a clear and mutually recognized monitoring system for implementation. Although it is well-known that states are primarily responsible for implementation, it is often the case that civil society actors attempt to lure states into compliance.^{viii} The Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS), a UK-based NGO, has already undertaken a review of UK’s and Canada’s environmental conduct relating to armed conflicts with reference to the ILC’s draft principles.^{ix}

The international community should create a solid monitoring international mechanism that will be assessing the environmental conduct of relevant stakeholders, such as states, international organizations, and non-state armed groups, pertaining to environmental peacebuilding. This implementation mechanism should ensure the widest possible participation of interested and affected stakeholders and should operate transparently. In addition, local actors should be better included in the process of monitoring the applicable law dealing with environmental peacebuilding. Local communities are the most affected by the lack of compliance with international norms. Interested actors could participate in monitoring the implementation of the applicable laws, exchanging information, and adopting recommendations for both States and non-State actors so as to prevent and remediate environmental damage in conflict-affected areas. Improved compliance with the applicable environmental peacebuilding law reduces the chances of a relapse into conflict and enhances the prospects for durable peace.

At this critical juncture for the future of environmental peacebuilding, the international community should build on the increasing momentum around environmental peacebuilding and create an independent mechanism monitoring the compliance of actors operating in conflict-affected settings with their commitments and best practices.

18. OUR FUTURE IS INTERDISCIPLINARY, INCLUSIVE, AND EQUITABLE: ACKNOWLEDGING AND REDRESSING PHYSICAL, STRUCTURAL, AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIOLENCE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING FIELD

Emily Sample (The Fund for Peace); Regina Paulose (International Criminal Law Attorney)

The scholars, practitioners, and community leaders who make up the environmental peacebuilding field must recognize how we as individuals and as a group benefit from and contribute to environmental racism and work to end and rectify past harm through justice and empowerment of Black and Indigenous communities, and communities of colour.

CONTEXT

The environmental peacebuilding field grows out of a multi-disciplinary acknowledgement that the environment is an essential aspect of future conflict prevention. Building upon the vast scholarly and grey literature of both peace studies and environmental science, the field also brings with it certain theories, methodologies, biases, and historiographies that perpetuate the harm initiated by its disciplinary forebears. The resulting issue is two-fold: 1) environmental racism in practice, and 2) replicating systems of white, settler colonialist supremacy within the field.

First, environmental racism is a form of structural violence, in which white supremacist systems of power allow and perpetuate environmental harm against specific populations.ⁱ This issue was first publicly acknowledged in the United States in the 1970s when the predominantly Black community of Warren County, North Carolina, rallied against an attempt to relocate polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-laced soil to their local landfill, which led to the first official study recognizing that hazardous waste sites were disproportionately sited near majority-Black or ethnic minority communities in the United States.ⁱⁱ

Second, the proclaimed superiority of white science, medicine, and epistemology followed the transoceanic, colonial commodification of the land and its resources, and led directly to mass environmental destruction in both the long- and short-term. From imperialist resource harvesting and extraction to the monopolization of scholarly, political, and even activist leadership, white supremacy continues to dominate every sphere of environmental management.

// Environmental peacebuilders should engage in reflective praxis to decolonize their own work. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The modern environmental justice movement, as well as the burgeoning climate justice movement, focuses on environmental racism and its effects. The environmental justice movement gained visibility in 1990 when a group of activists wrote a series of letters to call attention to the

whiteness of the “Group of 10”, a nickname for ten of the major environmental organizations in the United States at the time.ⁱⁱⁱ In 1992, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established their Office of Environmental Justice. They define their role in this field to be the “involvement of all people regardless of race, colour, national origin, or income, with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”^{iv} The Federal Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice (EJ IWG), established by Executive Order in 1994, has established a framework for how federal agencies can integrate an environmental justice lens onto future projects, including methods for mitigating community harm in cases of “unavoidable adverse impacts.”^v However, there continues to be little progress on justice methods (e.g., reparations, free or reduced healthcare, land repatriation, etc.) for current or previous harm done, outside of direct litigation.

The nascent climate justice movement overlaps in mission with the environmental justice movement, but with specific focus on the imbalance between the countries and communities affected by climate change and those causing climate change. These activists, advocates, and scholars work to highlight the economic, infrastructural, political, and social inequalities that are and will be exacerbated by the adverse effects of climate change.

The creation and support of these movements over the last 30 years has exponentially diversified the environmental field. This is of specific importance for environmental peacebuilders because of the essential intersections between conflict prevention, identity, inclusion, and justice from the grassroots to the highest level of multilateral stakeholders.

LOOKING AHEAD

While improvements have been made to diversify the field, much of the visibility and leadership of the mainstream environmental

movement remains dominated by white men. Those who identify themselves as environmental peacebuilders should actively engage in reflective praxis in order to acknowledge, investigate, and decolonize their own work. This can manifest as more inclusive hiring practices, locally informed national and international lobbying agendas and platforms, diversifying and ethically divesting funding streams, and mindful representation and inclusion of a variety of identity groups.

Environmental peacebuilding scholars can increase equity and access by actively seeking out diverse scholars and methodologies for citations and syllabi, centring BIPOC epistemologies and skills, advocating for open access to journals, and increasing funding and mentoring options for students, scholars, and practitioners from historically excluded communities and countries.

Further, the environmental movement is severely lacking in the voices and practices of those who historically have the most experience and knowledge of environmental management: Indigenous Peoples. While many around the world focused on the wildfires that burned uncontrollably in Australia and in California, the solutions were portrayed as out of reach. The response of extinguishing wildfires is a shift from the cultural practices that were once utilized by Native Americans in California known as controlled burning.^{vi} In many cases of environment management, the knowledge and practices of Indigenous Peoples have been erased, further perpetuating the demise and erasure of Indigenous Peoples and their knowledge systems. It is of significance to note that many environmental organizations and movements have appropriated the knowledge and practices of Indigenous Peoples without acknowledgement.^{vii}

It is thus of vital importance that credit be given where credit is due. This translates to incorporating honest environmental history and justice in all aspects of environmental discussions in order to create a holistic picture that does not eliminate any people or narratives just to fit into the traditional understanding of “environmental peacebuilding.”

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4. INCLUSION

Following page: art by [Sonya Montenegro \(USA\)](#) of [The Far Woods](#)

Sisters Sonya and Nina Montenegro are illustrators, printmakers, menders, quilters, and gardeners. In 2013 they founded The Far Woods, a creative collaboration making artwork that seeks to contribute to a culture shift in which there is a land ethic, reverence for nature, rejection of the dominant throw-away mentality, and direct connection to where our food and the things we use come from.



19. THREE PILLARS FOR FAITH'S ENGAGEMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING: THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF FAITH AND SPIRITUALITY IN RELATIONSHIP-BUILDING, DIALOGUE, AND HEALING

Elsa Barron (Hoosier Interfaith Power and Light); Huda Alkaff (Wisconsin Green Muslims); Elyse Baden (Michigan State University); Katie Chustak (Red Cloud Indian School); Matthieu Guillier (Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies)

The environmental peacebuilding field can benefit from incorporating perspectives, values, and leadership from faith communities around the world.

CONTEXT

Given the severity and urgency of current environmental crises affecting all regions of the world, future environmental peacebuilding efforts must strive to incorporate a diverse and inclusive range of voices in dialogue and action. One specific demographic that has great potential for engagement in these efforts are individuals who identify with a faith tradition, which, according to a 2015 Pew Research study, includes 84 per cent of the global population.ⁱ

While each faith has its unique belief system and set of practices, many faith traditions emphasize the importance of valuing and caring for the environment. Furthermore, many traditions value peace and peacebuilding processes, making individuals of faith great partners for environmental initiatives.ⁱⁱ It is clear that faith is a powerful foundation to motivate environmental peacebuilding and should be highlighted as a future direction for the field. We, therefore, propose three pillars to guide future faith-based environmental peacebuilding initiatives: relationship to environment and community, dialogue and collaboration, and healing through justice and reconciliation.

//

Faith is a powerful foundation to motivate environmental peacebuilding. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Relationship to environment and community:

Faith traditions provide individuals and communities with a system of belief that instills relationality and sacredness. With faith tradition, environmental activism does not stem from scientific or economic insight alone, but rather emerges as the means for caring for the environment as a good relative or a good steward. It also operates as a means of caring for other persons, communities, and nations across the globe who are most impacted by climate change and environmental degradation.ⁱⁱⁱ Regenerative agriculture practices, renewable energy, and conservation become moral tenets. This relationship to environment and community shifts dialogue from assigning monetary value to the environment and its ecological services, to that of honouring its intrinsic value. This sacred relationship is radical in societies driven by capital gain that measure the health of a system by its wealth and economy. As climate justice continues to rise as an imperative, diverse faith traditions offer a unique framework for the necessary kind of radical relationship building.

// Environmental care is an avenue for symbolic reconciliation across communities and spiritualities as well as between communities and the ecosystems they inhabit. //

Dialogue and collaboration:

Many faith communities are sensitive to the circular nature of the world we live in. Our world is intrinsically connected, a reality well illustrated by our shared climate system. The goal of interfaith environmental dialogue is to build a mutual collaboration, informed by our interconnectedness, that addresses the moral sustainability issues of our time. Faith communities engaging in this dialogue often perceive themselves as sharing a dependence on and relationship with a common and balanced ecosystem.^{iv} Imagining sustainable social, economic, and environmental health and well-being rooted in sacred teachings is key to environmental and community peacebuilding. Instead of conflicting over religious differences, a focus on our human relationships grounded in accountability towards all parts of the ecosystem, responsible care for our neighbours, and an awareness of the intersectionality of the problems and solutions, can bring faith communities together. In so doing, faith communities have the power to rise to spiritual, collective action guided by their values to unite for environmental justice and peace for all.

Healing through justice and reconciliation:

In addition to shared concern around the environment, many faith communities have traditions around processes for mediation and healing.^v These practices can be applied to reconciliation with the environment, drawing from the idea that we are in relationship with the world around us: a relationship that is strained by extractive and exploitative practices.

Environmental care is an avenue for symbolic rapprochement and reconciliation across communities and spiritualities as well as between communities and the ecosystems they inhabit. Reconciliation takes place with the backdrop of care for a shared creation. This ethics of care resonates with an onus for restorative justice as a way to repair society and manage resources outside of an extractive approach. Within the framework of faith, climate action is not just about ensuring a future that is liveable through technological advance. It also includes acknowledgment of past wrongdoings against the environment and those in relationship with it (i.e., Indigenous Peoples) and the need for healing through transforming an ethic of consumption to one of reconciliation and relationship. The depth of this reconciliation and healing resonates with the values of environmental peacebuilding and can be used to inform future directions of the field.

LOOKING AHEAD

Faith communities have an important role to play when it comes to envisioning and enacting environmental peacebuilding. They bring critical values to the table, including a relationship to land and community, opportunities for dialogue and collaboration, and tools for healing through justice and reconciliation. In addition to these guiding principles, faith groups have networks and trusted leadership expanding across the world, meaning faith-based initiatives have the potential to garner widespread attention.^{vi} While the values, vision, and work of many faith groups overlap with the environmental peacebuilding field, their networks often remain disconnected. In the future, environmental peacebuilding practitioners can and should collaborate more meaningfully and more often with faith communities and join forces in their collective efforts to build a more sustainable, just, and peaceful world.

20. FEMINIST ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING IN ZIMBABWE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM A GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATION CENTRING WOMEN, PEACE, AND EVERYDAY SECURITY

Sandra Zenda, Glanis Changachirere, Tinotenda R. Chihera and Constance Mushayi (Institute for Young Women's Development); Sophia Rhee, Meredith Forsyth and Mikaela Luttrell-Rowland (The Earth Institute)

Continuing to sideline women-led local activism as marginal to top-down peacebuilding efforts ignores critical expertise directly implicated in local arenas of security and crisis.

CONTEXT

The evolution of environmental peacebuilding as an inclusive framework has been driven as much by practice as it has been by theory and research. Yet, the field continues to focus on women as victims and passive targets for aid rather than as change-makers and knowledge-holders for building peace and addressing environmental harm.

As a collective of activist-scholars in the Global North and South, we echo calls from recent literature that emphasizes the importance of looking to women's activism—particularly that of BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Colour) women—to highlight broader perspectives at the intersections between individuals, communities, and ecosystems.ⁱ Women's activism across the globe is in many ways rooted in an approach that addresses not only immediate/evident examples of insecurity, but also questions of attenuated and structural violence that often go unnoticed or unaddressed. This is evidenced by Indigenous women in Colombia whose quest for reparative environmental justice broadens our notions of victimhood,ⁱⁱ and to women in the Pacific Islands whose views of security acknowledge the “slow violence” of rising sea levels and climate change as inseparable from the effects of militarism and colonialism.ⁱⁱⁱ

The Institute for Young Women's Development (IYWD), based in Zimbabwe, provides an important model for environmental peacebuilding which centres feminist analysis to hold governments and corporations to account for environmental harm. Their work demonstrates how gendered forms of knowledge and networks, including feminist economics and movement building, play a role in creating new avenues for dialogue and trust for peacebuilding,^{iv} as well as widen opportunities to advance justice for the “slower acts of violence leading to insecurities that are felt in the individual's everyday life.”^v

// The field continues to focus on women as victims and passive targets for aid rather than as change-makers and knowledge-holders for building peace and addressing environmental harm. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Located in Mashonaland Central in Zimbabwe, one of the country's most politically volatile provinces with high levels of gender-based

violence, IYWD’s advocacy and policy work links systemic environmental harm and social, political, cultural, and environmental conditions. By intertwining political education and feminist movement building, and often building upon Indigenous traditional practices rooted in Ubuntu that emphasize community help and common action (such as *Mushandirapamwe* and *Nhimbe*, which mean ‘collective community work for a common goal’), IYWD works to foster unity and promote justice and accountability while challenging patriarchal norms and power structures that underlie existing environmental and governance issues. The organization, founded and led by young Zimbabwean women, upholds a multi-faceted approach to environmental peacebuilding, ranging from mobilizing young women through rights education and social accountability training, to disseminating regenerative farming practices to local communities.

At the core of how IYWD enacts everyday peacebuilding is an attention paid to structural inequalities and gendered power relations. For example, noting the deterioration of social services attributed to the misappropriation of funds and neglect in rural farming and mining communities, they initiated a series of Tax Justice Dialogues. While at first, IYWD’s initiatives around tax justice may not appear to fit within existing “environmental peacebuilding” narratives, ultimately, by focusing on the tax contributions and challenging the corporate social responsibility of multinational mining companies and local authorities to advocate for improved social services, their work addresses systemic factors contributing to environmental harm and weakened governance.

In another recent campaign, IYWD organized dialogue platforms for young women to hold their local authorities accountable in light of water shortages caused by artisanal mining activities in the Mazowe River. Here, grassroots women’s mobilization was central to addressing the actors directly responsible for water services and infrastructural investment in order to change

policy agendas. By using consistent advocacy to confront the municipality and engage with stakeholders, IYWD’s movement-building demonstrates how a feminist lens enables a stronger model of democratic accountability for local environmental peacebuilding.

LOOKING AHEAD

Solutions to some of the most pressing issues of our time must be co-created with and grounded in the everyday realities and lived experiences of women. A powerful lesson for policymakers is to move beyond the often-performative “add women and stir” approach, as social and environmental well-being is collective and rooted in larger questions of gendered power. Grassroots women’s activism like that of IYWD looks toward embedding processes of evaluation and accountability that attends to structural, geopolitical, and systemic concerns in peacebuilding and policymaking processes. By demystifying and deconstructing power, and creating and demanding spaces for change, they work to emphasize power with, as opposed to power over—as IYWD states, “to change one person, it takes changing the community.” IYWD highlights what is lost when gender-focused policy is limited to promoting inclusion over transformative and structural change. We argue that the future of environmental peacebuilding must broaden who is considered an “expert” and recognize that social change flows not only from decision-makers in positions of power, but also from women’s grassroots movement building.

// IYWD demonstrates how a feminist lens enables a stronger model of democratic accountability for local environmental peacebuilding. //

21. BRIDGING THE GAP: GENDER-INCLUSIVE MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY AS ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Dr. Marisa O. Ensor (Georgetown University); Nyachangkuoth R. Tai (Assistance Mission for Africa)

Ensuring gender balance in multi-track environmental diplomacy creates opportunities to leverage women's differentiated knowledge, diverse perspectives, and experiences, including existing coping capacities and sources of resilience, thereby mitigating human and environmental security threats.

CONTEXT

Balanced gender representation in peace processes results in agreements that are more durable and less likely to relapse into conflict.ⁱ The increasing participation of women in community-level environmental peacebuilding efforts is also recognized as a positive development. It is thus critical to ensure that women from different backgrounds are able to participate in peacebuilding negotiations. They also need to contribute to the design and implementation of environmental governance initiatives on an equal footing with their male counterparts. Track I diplomacy conducted through official government channels remains, however, male-dominated. Women's voices are thus sidelined; their human capital not applied to its full potential.

Effective multi-trackⁱⁱ environmental diplomacyⁱⁱⁱ requires that we expand our conception of who the relevant decision-makers are, and that we promote the meaningful participation of all significant stakeholders, including women. Ensuring better gender balance in environmental diplomacy creates opportunities to leverage women's differentiated knowledge and diverse perspectives, including existing coping capacities and sources of resilience. This helps identify a broader set of solutions to environmental peacebuilding challenges by providing a more holistic understanding of local issues. Women's participation in environmental diplomacy is, however, not without risks, as women are

often the targets of violence. When women environmental peacebuilders can safely and meaningfully contribute to inclusive diplomacy processes, inter-state relations between countries sharing resources are improved, and human security threats are mitigated.

// When women environmental peacebuilders can meaningfully contribute to inclusive diplomatic processes, relations are improved and human security threats are mitigated. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

An illustrative example of this approach is a set of rehabilitation initiatives for female war survivors in South Sudan collectively known as the "Beam of Hope Project."^{iv} The women in this programme are being trained in peaceful conflict resolution strategies. They are receiving counselling, training, and assistance with various livelihood schemes. These involve cooperative management of animals, land, and riparian resources. Through these activities, women are engaging in locally led peacebuilding,



Dr. Marisa O. Ensor (dressed in tan and animal print) and Ms. Nyachangkuoth R. Tai (far right) conducting a focus group discussion with participants of the Beam of Hope Project, Ganyliel, Unity State, South Sudan. Summer 2019.

participating in conservation, and contributing to their community's food security.

Several members of this programme, in addition to both authors of this contribution, participated in a Joint Peace Committee and Traditional Leaders Conference organized by Assistance Mission for Africa (a South Sudanese peacebuilding NGO) and partners in early September 2018.^v This conference was marked by the active participation of women, many of them members of various local Women's Peace Committees. A formal Peace Agreement was signed on September 12th, 2018, putting an official end to the South Sudanese Civil War. Female civil society leaders acted as official observers in this process. Women comprised 25 per cent of the delegates, while one woman served as a mediator.^{vi} Women demanded a broader political agenda to include protection, education, health, and attention to environmental issues, particularly as they impact livelihoods.

It is worth noting that although most political violence has abated since the signing of the Peace Agreement, high levels of violence against women have persisted.^{vii} Women activists are often specifically targeted. Confronting deeply engrained cultural and social norms dictating a subordinate, mostly silent role for females may place women environmental peacebuilders in a difficult, and even dangerous position. As other studies of conflict-affected females have also noted, "[r]esilience in the context of war often carries a high price."^{viii}

LOOKING AHEAD

The international environmental peacebuilding community must address the unequal power dynamics inherent in the aid sector. These dynamics play an important role in shaping relationships between international and local organizations, as well as among female and male members of organizations and communities. Examples of successful gender-inclusive multi-track diplomacy illustrate the opportunities and challenges of supporting women's leadership in deeply patriarchal countries which, like South Sudan, are undergoing major environmental and socio-political changes.

Often helping champion dialogue over dispute, women's leadership in environmental diplomacy has become even more critical given current challenges. We must incorporate gender-inclusive multi-track environmental diplomacy efforts, acknowledging the gendered web of interconnected activities, institutions, individuals, and communities that collaborate towards the common goal of a more peaceful and environmentally resilient world.^{ix}

We must elevate the participation of women environmental diplomats and ensure that gender issues are an intrinsic component of the peacebuilding agenda. Women environmental peacebuilders require tailored support and protection to ensure their safety, foster their ability to participate in environmental diplomacy discussions, and exercise their rights.^x

To facilitate these objectives, we must develop gender-disaggregated data and analysis, and targeted policies and programmes backed by sufficient funds in order to better address the impacts of conflict, environmental crises, and displacement on the lives of the affected women and girls, men and boys. Resulting findings on gender-differentiated contributions can help policymakers, development practitioners, and peacebuilders mitigate the risks of environmental insecurity and promote resilient, inclusive, and peaceful societies. In turn, empowering local women will enable conflict-affected and environmentally fragile countries like South Sudan to strengthen its environmental, economic, and political structures and institutions.^{xi}

22. GREEN FUTURES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING IN NIGERIA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES IN THE NIGER DELTA

Dr. Zainab Mai-Bornu (University of Leicester); Professor Fidelis Allen (University of Port Harcourt); Professor Roy Maconachie (University of Bath); Dr. Miho Taka (Coventry University)

Environmental challenges offer local actors opportunities for cooperative behaviour that transcend political and ethnic boundaries, giving women and youth a stake in environmental peacebuilding. They may be less politically sensitive than other issues, such as resource control, and could motivate various local actors to contemplate longer-term solutions to peacebuilding in the Niger Delta.

CONTEXT

Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and holds the second largest oil reserve on the continent, after Libya.ⁱ Yet, it is a country where grievances about the uneven distribution of the benefits and harms from oil and gas projects have long been a catalyst for violent conflict. The Niger Delta, the country's oil producing region in the south along the Gulf of Guinea, faces many environmental, economic, and political challenges. Farmlands and rivers have been severely polluted through oil spillages, destroying the livelihoods of the communities that traditionally depend upon farming and fishing. Despite the oil revenues produced from the region, these communities are deprived of adequate infrastructure and basic services including clean water, roads, schools, and health facilities. As such deprivation has endured, non-violent resistance by these communities has turned into violent conflict. Despite the continuing devastation in the Niger Delta and the global shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy, the Nigerian government seeks to finance oil exploration in the Lake Chad Basin in the north by allocating 30 per cent of the revenue from the state oil company through

the recently passed Petroleum Industry Bill. In this context, we ask a key question: what can we learn from the experiences of the affected communities in the Niger Delta who have been involved in environmental peacebuilding, in one form or another, for decades?

// Community movements are active in the processes of conflict and peacebuilding in natural resource management and the distribution of bottom-up benefits in Nigeria. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The development of environmental peacebuilding as a research and policy areaⁱⁱ will require further attention to the role of environmental social movements at the community level in the Niger Delta. Some groups that fall into this category include local community women and youth groups such as Ijaw Women Connect,

// A nuanced, bottom-up understanding of environmental peacebuilding efforts can inform locally grounded policy initiatives that resonate with local communities. //

Ogbia Women, Federation of Ogoni Women's Association (FOWA), Ijaw Youth Council, and the National Youth Council of Ogoni People. These groups have a major role to play in the management of natural resources in the Niger Delta. They are active in the processes of conflict and peacebuilding in natural resource management and the distribution of bottom-up benefits in Nigeria. The women's groups are always at the forefront of peaceful demonstrations. Being mothers, wives, and sisters, they exert their influence through peaceful dialogue between aggrieved youth groups within and between local communities. For instance, FOWA's actions go beyond protests; they engage in nonviolent advocacy, which recognizes the importance of the land to the Ogoni people. Women in the movement's organizations, however, are equally concerned about entrenched patriarchal attitudes. Some of them raise issues of patriarchy, marginalization, and lack of support at the local, state, and national levels.

LOOKING AHEAD

Focusing on the role that gender and youth play in environmental peacebuilding processes, our multi-disciplinary research has demonstrated how a more nuanced, bottom-up understanding of environmental peacebuilding efforts at the grassroots level can help to inform the development and implementation of locally grounded policy initiatives that have more resonance with local communities. Local communities are often successful in the management of natural

resourcesⁱⁱⁱ and environmental conflicts.^{iv} In the process, these bottom-up approaches serve as an empowerment tool for marginalized and vulnerable communities,^v whose voices often take a 'back seat' during peace and conflict negotiations.

We argue here that although environmental challenges offer opportunities for cooperation between local actors as they exceed political and ethnic boundaries—giving women and youth a stake in environmental peacebuilding—they may be less sensitive politically than other issues such as resource control and could motivate various local actors to contemplate longer term solutions to peacebuilding in the Delta.^{vi} Shared environmental issues may also open entry points for cooperation and peace-making^{vii} as well as the potential for a unified approach to grievances rather than context-specific battles.

As Nigeria's green energy transition evolves, stakeholders in oil-dependent communities face common challenges and opportunities for cooperative behaviour. Moving away from top-down solutions to environmental problems to bottom-up strategies designed in a conflict-sensitive way, alongside the inclusion of active women and youth groups to achieve the desired impact for post-conflict oil-producing communities, is important. The practical reconciliation of the federal government's interest in oil and gas and investments in a green future in the Niger Delta may be difficult to conceptualize. The green future for environmental peacebuilding opportunities in Nigeria remains high. In other words, despite the challenges, a green future based on active environmental peacebuilding analysis is possible. This in part is due to the growing possibility of a green world in which fossil fuels would have lost their hold on many countries' energy systems.

23. ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING IN THE ARCTIC: REINFORCING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' ROLES IN SECURING A SUSTAINABLE, JUST, AND PEACEFUL NORTH

Ruth Miller (Native Movement); Michaela Stith (Polar Institute, Wilson Center)

Arctic Indigenous Peoples are crucial to all peacekeeping and environmental protection efforts in the Arctic. As climate change rapidly and drastically affects the region, Traditional Knowledge and Indigenous leadership provide clear pathways towards a sustainable just transition.

CONTEXT

Across Inuit homelands, the story of Sassuma Aarna—the mother of the sea—exemplifies an Indigenous ethos of care for the environment. Many elements of her story span the Arctic: a young woman in conflict is thrown from her umiak (kayak), her fingers are cut off, and those fingers become fish, seal, walrus, beluga, bowhead, and other relatives who sustain life. Sassuma Aarna guards her creations so hunters cannot find food when humans pollute the land and seas. Only when her oceans are cleansed does she release the animals from her protective grasp. Today, young people across the Arctic are healing the trauma of colonization and forced assimilation by returning the tattoo markings of Sassuma Aarna to their fingers and recommitting to the preservation of Arctic lands and waters.

In Indigenous cultural practices, traditional stories hold millennia-long histories, encyclopedic knowledge, and advanced Indigenous sciences. Most importantly, they convey deep relationships to place and teach about reciprocity with lands and waters—lessons that preserve cultures and inspire action against anthropogenic climate change.

In the Arctic, average annual temperatures have risen at rates three times the global average.ⁱ At 1.5°C of global warming, one sea ice-free Arctic summer is projected per century.ⁱⁱ This likelihood increases to at least one per decade

at 2°C of global warming. These changes—melting sea ice, thawing permafrost, changing weather patterns—transcend national borders and undermine the political stability of the region, providing access to waters that were previously frozen and inaccessible but to their first Indigenous Peoples.

Indigenous Peoples make up at least 1/8th of the region's population and maintain approximately 80 languages. Though Indigenous Peoples are the least responsible for historic carbon emissions and globally guard 80 per cent of the world's biodiversity,ⁱⁱⁱ Arctic Indigenous Peoples are on the frontlines of drastic environmental change. For example, food insecurity rises as whale migration patterns shift due to changing sea ice and warmer temperatures. Increased shipping traffic, sonar interference, and greater potential for pollutants and toxic spills are poised to further endanger their traditional, international routes.^{iv} Disruptions to animal migrations force people in remote villages to choose between food and other expensive commodities. More than 40 primarily Indigenous villages in Alaska must be relocated due to coastal erosion and storm surges caused by sea level rise. Indigenous Peoples will be the first to suffer these losses, and their traditions, ways of lives, and cultures may follow.

This challenging reality necessitates collaborative solutions among nations, as well as the deep integration of Indigenous leadership. However,

// Arctic
 Indigenous
 Peoples are on the
 frontlines of drastic
 environmental
 change //

the ice-reduced Arctic Ocean has emerged as a new geopolitical battleground of regional security interests, increased trade, and militarization. The Russian Federation and China have already procured vast fleets of icebreakers,^v and military exercises have increased in the Bering Strait and the North Atlantic. Despite peace in the Arctic since the Cold War's end, climate change and rising global tensions now exacerbate the potential for conflict.^{vi}

But the active participation of Indigenous Peoples' organizations has grounded and maintained cooperation between the Arctic Council's members in past instances of geopolitical tension. Arctic Indigenous communities are therefore at the nexus of regional peacebuilding, economic development via maritime trade, human rights, and climate justice.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Arctic Indigenous Peoples are already taking effective action to promote a sustainable future for the region. The six Indigenous organizations with Permanent Participant status in the Arctic Council have held six international "Arctic Leaders' Summits" since 1991.^{vii} The Declarations of the VI Arctic Leaders' Summit and the I Arctic Youth Leaders' Summit, signed in Roavvenjárga (Rovaniemi, Finland) in 2019, guide the path forward for emergent Arctic policy.

Arctic youth have continued to iterate their recommendations for security, sustainability, and cooperation. At The Arctic in 25 Years: First Annual International Youth Symposium, the Wilson Center's Polar Institute virtually gathered

21 emerging Arctic leaders from the Permanent Participants and all eight Arctic states to inform and influence potential Arctic policy for the next generation in May 2021.^{viii}

LOOKING AHEAD

A number of recommendations emerged from the proceedings of The Arctic in 25 Years, including the wholesale adoption of Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples (as guaranteed by the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) when considering development in the Arctic Region. Similarly, the delegates said Indigenous Peoples must be integrated into bottom-up policy approaches founded in healthy relationship-building. They said co-production of knowledge, including science and Indigenous knowledge, must be elevated in international action addressing Arctic environmental change. In this way, research and decision-making can be informed by marginalized communities who face the greatest impacts.

International forums and peacekeeping operations, as well as climate research, mitigation, and adaptation, can improve Indigenous diplomatic representation by using these recommendations as a baseline for equitable, just, and inclusive policy. International fora should replicate and further investigate collaborative models for Indigenous representation in environmental peacebuilding. Arctic states should fund the operational work of Indigenous organizations in environmental peacebuilding. Overall, policymakers must remove any barriers to effective community-based solutions.

By learning from the Indigenous ethos and traditions of reciprocity, interconnectedness, and profound respect, Arctic nations may avoid pervasive regional conflict. As Sassuma Aarna reminds us, we in the Arctic must return to balance.

24. LA PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA COMO ELEMENTO TRANSCENDENTE DE LA PAZ AMBIENTAL: PRESUPUESTOS PARA SU EFICACIA

Jorge Iván Hurtado Mora (Universidad Externado de Colombia); Lizeth Carolina Quiroga Cubillos

Read the English version of this article at www.ecosystemforpeace.org

Sin duda el conflicto interno que gobernó a Colombia por épocas produjo efectos dramáticos relatados por la doctrina jurídica.ⁱ Sin embargo, es quizás el ambiente como víctima de la guerra, el elemento que ha pasado con menos suceso por la investigación teórica. De hecho, en el Acuerdo de paz, el ambiente no encontró un lugar autónomo, sino que se tomó como un elemento transversal. Con todo, hay un gran reto para reestablecer el desequilibrio producido por años de intervención ilegal en los territorios, y es fundamental la generación de espacios democráticos para prevenir y superar conflictos socio ambientales, y procurar espacios eficaces de intervención ciudadana.

CONTEXTO

La intervención ciudadana en la gestión ambiental es el resultado de una estructura constitucional basada en el Estado Social de Derecho y la Democracia Participativa, que sugieren la reivindicación del bienestar común y la necesidad de garantizar espacios democráticos para una relación directa entre sociedad y administración pública. Desde 1991, se ha adoptado una nueva perspectiva ambiental para Colombia, donde el ambiente es a la vez una responsabilidad del Estado un derecho colectivo, una limitante a la propiedad privada,ⁱⁱ y un direccionador del modelo de desarrollo económico.

// Siendo el ambiente un derecho colectivo, su protección debería ser considerada una cuestión de Estado. //

En el marco del Acuerdo de paz firmado por el Estado colombiano y las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército del Pueblo (FARC–EP) en 2016, se señaló que la participación ciudadana era fundamental pues “la implementación se haría (...) con la

participación de las autoridades territoriales y los diferentes sectores de la sociedad.”ⁱⁱⁱ En este sentido, el acuerdo reconoce las necesidades y particularidades económicas,^{iv} culturales, y sociales de las comunidades, garantizando la sostenibilidad socio-ambiental; y busca implementar las diferentes medidas con la participación de los ciudadanos, sin perjuicio de las competencias legales de las autoridades ambientales y locales quienes desempeñan un rol esencial en la planeación y ordenamiento ambiental del territorio. Esto implica el cierre de la brecha participativa en el país, hacia nuevos espacios de construcción de paz.

En suma, este marco constitucional dimensiona la necesidad de proteger un derecho superior del ambiente, y garantizar el rol de las comunidades en las decisiones de conservación que permitan avanzar hacia una gobernanza ambiental desde un enfoque de paz territorial.^v

LO QUE YA SE HA HECHO

El Gobierno Nacional recién actuó en la búsqueda del más alto nivel de garantía del derecho a gozar de un medio ambiente sano y a la participación ciudadana en el marco de una paz estable y duradera:

//
 La participación ciudadana
 en la gestión ambiental debe
 trascender de la retórica. //

Primero, el Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Minambiente) creó los Centros Regionales de Diálogo Ambiental como una estrategia para la gestión y transformación positiva de los conflictos socio ambientales generados por el acceso y uso de los recursos naturales. Fueron pensados como procesos educativos y participativos que contribuyan a la gestión, ordenamiento ambiental, y paz territorial de acuerdo con el principio 10 de la Declaración de Río de Janeiro de 1992 y el Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible—ODS 16—“Paz, Justicia e Instituciones Sólidas.”

En segundo lugar, el Minambiente inició en el año 2018, la construcción del Plan de Zonificación Ambiental, a partir de espacios de participación que involucraron actores claves como sectores institucionales, productivos, sociales, ambientales, grupos étnicos, mujeres, jóvenes, y demás sectores. En este sentido, el Minambiente adelantó pilotos participativos incluyendo uno en Chocó, Córdoba, Antioquia, Cauca, Nariño, y Valle del cauca en 2019 el cual incluyó la identificación de conflictos socio ambientales y la búsqueda de alternativas productivas.

MIRANDO ADELANTE

Siendo el ambiente un derecho colectivo, su protección debería ser considerada una cuestión de Estado, lo cual impediría que un proceso político pudiese permearlo fácilmente, sobre consideraciones científicas basadas en evidencia. En adelante, quedan algunas recomendaciones para que la intervención ciudadana en el manejo sostenible del ambiente contribuya con eficacia a la paz ambiental:

1. La participación ciudadana en la gestión ambiental debe trascender de la retórica, los espacios ciudadanos y los insumos que allí se generen deben involucrarse con suficiencia dentro de la toma de decisiones públicas.
2. Sin información de calidad no hay participación eficaz. Es decir, garantizar a la ciudadanía el acceso a la información pública ambiental que sea pertinente para que a partir de ella, la intervención sea efectiva. Si la información de calidad es casi siempre técnica, surge la obligación por parte de la administración pública, de garantizar su comprensión y entendimiento por el ciudadano.
3. Es imperante diferenciar la participación de la socialización. Por participación debe entenderse involucrar al ciudadano en el proceso para comprender el problema y construir las soluciones para la decisión pública. Y por socialización, refiere informar al ciudadano, el resultado de un proceso donde no intervino.
4. Es impostergable por parte del Estado colombiano ratificar el Acuerdo de Escazú catalogado como un instrumento internacional sobre derechos de acceso a la participación ciudadana amplia suficiente y eficaz; a la información pública y a la justicia ambiental.
5. A corto o mediano plazo debe plantearse la conveniencia de crear una jurisdicción ambiental, compuesta de jueces con formación ambiental integral, para que las ordenes y sentencias impartidas involucren la defensa del ambiente y tengan en cuenta tiempos y efectividad de ejecución. Se debe avanzar del simple reconocimiento de un derecho para lograr la eficacia material de esa protección.

CHAPTER 4 - ENDNOTES

ARTICLE 19

- i. Pew Research Center. (2017). The Changing Global Religious Landscape. <https://www.pew-forum.org/2017/04/05/the-changing-global-religious-landscape/>
- ii. One such example of this is the fact that Islam literally translates to peace, showing the religion's integral emphasis on the concept.
- iii. As one example in a North American Indigenous faith tradition, Mitákuyé Oyásin is a central Lak óta teaching, meaning "all my relations." The land, the water, the air, plants, animals, and people are known to be interconnected as relatives.
- iv. For example, Ecopeace Middle East has produced the Jordan River Covenant, bringing together religious leadership to express their attachment to the river and commitment to the rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan River. Similarly, the Interfaith Center for Sustainable Development showcases the relationship between ecology and religion in different traditions. In the United States, the Wisconsin Faith and Solar Initiative and the Faithful Rainwater Harvesting (FaRaH) have brought communities of widely differing faiths together in Wisconsin around the potential of solar energy, water conservation, and sustainable development.
- v. The three great monotheisms alone have a long history of mediation and healing processes, from Jewish traditions of diplomacy to Muslim arbitrators and the transformative objective of Christian peacebuilders.
- vi. This potential is exemplified by the 2015 encyclical *Laudato Si*, authored by Pope Francis, which led many Catholic communities of faith around the world to urgently take up action on the environment, notably through the concept of integral ecology, stewardship, and care for the most vulnerable.

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- v. AMA's partners on this Peace Conference included UNMISS (UN Mission in South Sudan), PAX (a Dutch peacebuilding INGO operating in South Sudan), USAID/VISTAS (United States Agency for International Development/ South Sudan Viable Support to Transition and Stability), AID and Development Botswana, and the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission.
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
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5. MOVEMENT

Following page: art by [Samuel Kambari](#) (Rwanda | Uganda)

Samuel Kambari is an artist from Rwanda whose work tells stories of African culture, beauty, and togetherness. He is chief executive at Inshuti Art Gallery, Kigali, and is known for his colours and textures that show striking, semi-figurative depictions of female empowerment and gender equality concepts.



25. ADDRESSING THE SILENT CRISIS: THE IMPACT OF SLOW-ONSET ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ON HUMAN MOBILITYⁱ AND CONFLICT

Alice Baillat and Sarah Zingg (IOM); Alec Crawford (IISD); Elaine Hsiao (Kent State University School of Peace and Conflict and IUCN CEESP); Kanta Kumari Rigaud (World Bank); Richard A. Matthew (University of California Irvine and IUCN CEESP); Lauren Herzer Risi (Woodrow Wilson Center); Galeo Saintz (IUCN CEESP)

Working across the scales of decision-making and relevant fields—including humanitarian, peacebuilding, development, nature conservation, and resource management sectors—is crucial to address slow-onset environmental change and mismanagement of natural resources as underlying causes of migration, displacement, and conflict, and mitigate related risks for the security of migrants and communities.

CONTEXT

Slow-onset environmental change and associated future risks have severe impacts on the availability and quality of natural resources, which undermine people’s livelihoods, security, well-being, and resilience.ⁱⁱ While degradation and depletion of natural resources do not automatically lead to conflict, they can exacerbate tensions in conflict-affected and fragile contexts, especially when coupled with policies that fail to address the underlying causes of tension and undermine local mediation and dispute resolution mechanisms that can diffuse frictions.ⁱⁱⁱ

These dynamics can lead to diverse human mobility outcomes: internal and transboundary migration, on a temporary or longer-term basis, by individuals, households, and communities, moving voluntary or forcibly displaced, as well as “trapped populations” that are either unable to move or resist displacement.^{iv} Concurrently, the mobility of different groups, for which migration patterns in many areas are changing due to climate change, may compound environmental degradation and increase social tensions in transit and destination settings by putting an additional burden on the natural resource base and increasing real or perceived competition over resources.^v

The interplay between slow-onset environmental change, conflict, and human mobility is having catastrophic environmental and human impacts in many places (e.g., Darfur, Somali region of Ethiopia, Sahel, Syria, Central America’s Northern Triangle); these impacts are likely to worsen as climate change impacts accelerate. In some cases, the challenges are well known and documented; in others, they are happening outside of public attention. In the context of rising humanitarian needs, these dynamics are undermining existing peacebuilding and sustainable development efforts. Urgent action is needed.

// Left unaddressed, underlying causes of slow-onset environmental degradation, including poverty, demographic change, and resource mismanagement, will have a multiplier impact on crises, with further effects on migration and displacement. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Migration and displacement mainly take place within national borders. State and local institutions thus play a key role in rights and practices around water, land, and natural resource access and use. Inclusive^{vi} and local forms of resource management—whether customary or statutory—and locally-owned, community-driven conflict resolution mechanisms, have proven effective on the ground. In areas in Yemen with large numbers of displaced persons and host communities, the engagement of local water-user associations and women in the mitigation of water conflicts have helped to resolve competition and inter-communal conflicts over the limited water supply.^{vii} In Nepal, the management of local forests by community associations has helped to enhance the resilience of the forests to climate change and the ability of communities to cope with impacts of armed conflict, especially in community forest groups led by, or inclusive of, women.^{viii}

Left unaddressed, underlying causes of slow-onset environmental degradation, including poverty, demographic change, and resource mismanagement, will have a multiplier impact on crises, with further effects on migration and displacement. Several existing tools can help us understand how environmental change affects human mobility, and inform decision-making at various levels:

- IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix captures the role of environmental factors as drivers of human mobility or immobility, through the inclusion of environmental considerations in data collection on displacement and migration.^{ix}
- The World Bank's Groundswell approach introduces slow-onset climate impacts into a model of future population distribution and development pathways to build robust projections of internal climate migration.^x
- IOM's Transhumance Tracking Tool in West Africa identifies shifts in the timing, direction, and size of herd movements, thus supporting the deployment of appropriate stabilization and management interventions, enabling a local approach to conflict mitigation and pre-empting herd-related conflicts.^{xi}

LOOKING AHEAD

Efforts are needed to identify the stressors brought on by slow-onset environmental change, and to address their impacts on communities, particularly those groups that may be more vulnerable (e.g., women, Indigenous Peoples, resource-dependent groups).

Locally-driven solutions and mechanisms, through inclusive and just processes, and the strengthening of local institutions,^{xii} are essential to support people whose livelihoods depend on local resources—especially those living in already fragile or conflict-affected areas—to adapt to slow-onset environmental change, mitigate the risks of conflict over resources, and prevent displacement.

There is also a need to work across the scales of decision-making—from local to national, regional, and international levels—to ensure the development of inclusive and just climate adaptation and conservation policies that are conflict- and gender-sensitive, rights-based, and that do not lead to further conflict or displacement.^{xiii} There is an opportunity to pursue more integrative solutions that combine attention to underlying causes of migration along with immediate and urgent needs of stakeholders, building off experiences and lessons from ongoing projects.^{xiv}

Furthermore, peacebuilding initiatives need to take into consideration the interplay between the challenges associated with slow-onset environmental change and other social, economic, and political factors.^{xv} Including an environmental lens in efforts to build peace and strengthen institutions will enable societies to simultaneously increase their resilience to environmental change and head off future conflicts related to natural resources.

Lastly, it is imperative to monitor local environmental, socio-economic, political, and mobility indicators through inclusive community processes, and detect differentiated risks to the well-being of affected communities, in order to enhance resilience, mitigate conflicts, and prevent forced displacement. Anticipatory approaches that use robust analytics and data modeling will be increasingly important to reduce or to avert future crises.

26. MIGRATION WITH DIGNITY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEACE THROUGH MIGRATION WITH DIGNITY

Shanna McClain (NASA); Mikiyasu Nakayama (University of Tokyo); Brian Kelly (International Organization for Migration); Jennifer Seru (College of the Marshall Islands); Carl Bruch, (Environmental Law Institute)

The Migration with Dignity Framework focuses on the dignity of individuals: the framework stresses the importance of skill-building, practical knowledge, and protections essential for building peace.

CONTEXT

A confluence of dynamic factors—including environmental change, climate change, altered resource distribution and access, and livelihood impacts—can increase the likelihood of migration. If mishandled, this migration can catalyze conflict and exacerbate conditions that contribute to violent extremism.

For example, climate-related factors in the Lake Chad Basin have depleted the size of the lake and its resources, disrupting livelihoods, incomes, and food supplies, and exacerbating income inequalities, particularly among youth, making it easier for extremist organizations like Boko Haram to recruit young soldiers and perpetuate violence in vulnerable communities.ⁱ And in Mali, historic drought and flooding pushed many farmers and herders into urban and peri-urban areas, fueling grievances and conflict linked to poor governance, which resulted in a lack of access to basic services like food, clean water, and healthcare.ⁱⁱ

The concept of “Migration with Dignity” seeks to maintain the cultural integrity of migrants and ensure their access to education, employment, and healthcare without losing their skills and knowledge gained from their country of origin. Building from the vision of then-President of Kiribati, Anote Tong, “migration with dignity” embodied the ability for Kiribati people to decide whether, when, and how they migrate.ⁱⁱⁱ It also

recognized the need to build the educational and vocational capacity of Kiribati residents to achieve a life that was equal to or better than the one they were leaving behind.

From this vision, researchers from the Environmental Law Institute, the Dignity Rights Initiative, Delaware Law School, the International Organization for Migration, and the Ocean Policy Research Institute drew upon the large body of law on dignity rights, applied in the context of migration, to give life and legal force to Migration with Dignity. The framework is being tested across a number of contexts (e.g., discrimination, gender, COVID-19) and throughout the different stages of migration (e.g., pre-migration, during transit, post-migration/arrival, upon return).^{iv}

Following this process, the Migration with Dignity Framework reflects the unique experiences and perspectives of those who migrate and provides six key dimensions that are central to supporting human rights and dignity across the migration cycle. By focusing on the dignity of individuals, the framework stresses the importance of skill building, practical knowledge, and protections essential for building peace.

// Building from the vision of then-President of Kiribati, Anote Tong, “migration with dignity” embodied the ability for Kiribati people to decide whether, when and how they migrate. mismanagement, will have a multiplier impact on crises, with further effects on migration and displacement. //

WHAT’S BEEN DONE

The Migration with Dignity Framework reflects the fundamental aspects of the migration experience that are central to supporting human rights and dignity rights across the migration cycle:

1. freedom of movement, including the right to stay where you are, return to where you are from, or move somewhere else;
2. the right to be secure in one’s person and free from rape, slavery, torture, and labour exploitation;
3. the right of equality, to be treated equally under the law in a nondiscriminatory manner;
4. the right to a basic quality of life, including rights related to employment, housing, and food;
5. the right to access services, including health care, education, and utilities; and
6. civil and political rights, including identity, free speech, and participation in political decision-making.

The Migration with Dignity framework intends to reduce human suffering and promote human dignity and can be used as a conflict prevention tool, particularly in the context of climate migration. The Framework—which benefits migrants, origin countries, and receiving countries alike—can also help countries and partners that are looking for an alternative model to addressing migration patterns impacted by climate change and other variables.

For example, following consultations on the Migration with Dignity framework with

Marshallese residents in Springdale, Arkansas, it was learned that the professional certificates and degrees of Marshallese were not being recognized in Arkansas,^v which forced a number of skilled workers forced to take low-skilled positions with little opportunity for upward mobility. Further research revealed that agreements existed between Utah’s Brigham Young University (home to a small population of Marshallese) and the College of Marshall Islands (CMI), to facilitate equitable transfer and acknowledgement of education and certificates, thus allowing the Marshallese population to work in their professional field. This approach has since informed the development of agreements between CMI and the University of Arkansas (home to a large population of Marshallese). Currently, graduate-level education is not available for those living in the Republic of the Marshall Islands; therefore, arrangements such as these also enable the attainment of higher education that can be brought back to Marshallese communities.

LOOKING AHEAD

The Migration with Dignity Framework is relevant across geographies, scales, reasons for migration, legal systems, and capacities. Further outreach and engagement are needed—particularly with affected communities and individuals, as well as governmental authorities and service providers—to ensure that the Migration with Dignity Framework addresses their priorities, realities, aspirations, and capacities. To move from theory to practice, the framework must be tested in different contexts and at different stages of the migration cycle: pre-emigration, transit, post-immigration, and return to origin or resettlement.

The ability to test and replicate the framework across these settings would help validate the key dimensions of dignity across the migration cycle; it would also provide additional evidence of the application of the framework across different crises and disasters. Finally, additional opportunities exist to apply the framework in relation to diversity, equity, and inclusion—such as conditioning the dimensions to be responsive to gender, age, and ability—and to identify opportunities to ensure greater inclusion of marginalized groups.

27. SUSTAINABLE ENERGY AT THE 'TRIPLE NEXUS': CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING ORGANIZATIONS

Philip Sandwell (Imperial College London); Eva Mach (International Organization for Migration); David Mozersky (Energy Peace Partners); Thomas Fohgrub (United Nations Institute for Training and Research)

Policy coordination and closer cooperation across sectors and organizations can help realize the benefits of sustainable energy in fragile and displacement contexts.

CONTEXT

Fragile contexts and situations of displacement often exist at the 'triple nexus' of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding organizations. Such situations are commonly marked by scarce resources and energy poverty: an estimated 80 per cent of people living in refugee camps rely on the most basic stoves and fuels for cooking,ⁱ while 86 per cent of the global population without access to electricity live in fragile states affected by conflict and instability.ⁱⁱ

The provision of energy for displacement-affected people is not a formal priority within the humanitarian system, and organizations rarely have the means to go beyond meeting the most basic needs of affected communities. Yet programming often has energy-relevant implications; for example, collecting firewood is a common requirement for cooking. Large population movements can increase demand for firewood, contributing to the depletion of forests and competition for environmental resources. This can contribute to community tensions, security risks, and threats of violence, particularly against women and girls who are usually responsible for gathering cooking fuel.ⁱⁱⁱ

Humanitarian and peacekeeping operations often rely on diesel generators for power;

they also typically have one-year funding cycles that inhibit long-term planning. This is discordant with international commitments and organizational sustainability targets, including the UN system-wide strategy to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of its operations by 2030.^{iv} Progress is compounded by complex regulatory environments that can limit integration with national policymaking and stifle private sector involvement in providing sustainable solutions for organizations and communities.

// Policy recognition,
intersectoral coordination
and multi-year planning
are necessary to realize the
benefits at the triple nexus. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Policy recognition, intersectoral coordination and multi-year planning are necessary to realize the benefits at the triple nexus.^v Migration issues and their associated energy and environmental challenges were recognized by UN Member

States in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,^{vi} and the consequent Global Compacts, which demonstrate the will of signatory countries to address these issues together.^{vii} The New Way of Working encourages humanitarian agencies and development actors to work together^{viii}—as soon as practicable—for the longer-term planning necessary to embed environmental considerations within wider humanitarian, development and peacebuilding programmes.^{ix}

Somalia offers two pioneering examples of how sustainable energy can support triple nexus objectives. In 2020, the UN Support Office in Somalia signed a power purchase agreement with a private sector developer to build a new solar system in Baidoa, to power both the UN and the local community, with ownership of the system to transfer to the local government after 15 years.^x Separately, a UN-led project tackled unsustainable charcoal production throughout Somalia: by switching to efficient stoves, demand was reduced in more than 6,000 households, including those internally displaced, while charcoal producers were offered sustainable alternative livelihoods such as livestock raising.^{xi} In both examples, long-term planning and intersectoral coordination enabled the use of sustainable energy to support environmental peacebuilding.

LOOKING AHEAD

Harnessing sustainable energy to support peacebuilding is a relatively new approach,^{xii} and solutions should be sensitive to the specificities of fragile and displacement situations. Implementing organizations should design projects in partnership with affected communities, building on lessons learned regarding sustainable energy's potential to support durable solutions and structural poverty reduction,^{xiii} especially in migration settings.^{xiv} This will help elevate community needs and priorities, amid both crisis recovery and longer-

term poverty alleviation and development efforts.

Organizations working at the triple nexus should encourage the transition to clean energy and have a tangible plan to phase out fossil fuels. Sustainable cooking solutions and increased electricity access could lessen environmental impacts, reduce insecurity, and increase economic opportunities. Transitioning to renewable energy generation for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations could reduce emissions, energy costs and security issues from transporting fuel and leave a long-term legacy of peace dividends after missions draw down.^{xv}

Policymakers should consider sustainable energy as the 'new normal' and a fundamental enabler for the benefit of affected people, organizations and the environment. Meeting emissions reduction targets will require a transition to cleaner alternatives, while new sustainable energy in fragile settings could alleviate resource conflicts and provide a new foundation for peacebuilding. Policymakers should therefore ensure coherence between their climate commitments and activities at the triple nexus and use sustainable energy to create synergies between them.

// Policymakers should consider sustainable energy as the 'new normal'. //

CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES

ARTICLE 25

i. This contribution uses the generic term “human mobility” to encompass different types of movements in the context of environmental degradation and climate change: migration, displacement, and planned relocation. This is in line with the language adopted in official documents of the UN-FCCC, such as the Cancun Climate Change Adaptation Framework, as well as with the language of the Task Force on Displacement established by the Paris Agreement under the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.

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iv. Ibid.

v. Ibid.

vi. Farvar et al. (2018) “Whose ‘Inclusive Conservation?’”, *Policy Brief* no. 5 (ICCA Consortium)

vii. IOM and FAO have partnered on two ongoing UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) funded interventions aiming at engaging water associations to devise solutions which enhance access to the resource for water users on various parts of the site. The project is implemented with a gender focus, to strengthen the role of women in conflict resolution through natural resource management at community level in rural areas (<http://www.fao.org/3/cb4637en/cb4637en.pdf>).

viii. Karna, B.K, Shivakoti, G.P and Webb, E.L. (2010) ‘Resilience of community forestry under conditions of armed conflict in Nepal’, *Environmental Conservation* 37(2): 201-209.

ix. IOM (2020) *Human mobility in the context of environmental and climate change. Assessing current and recommended practices for analysis within DTM*, International Organization for Migration: Geneva.

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xii. Hsiao, E. and Aijazi, O. (2014) ‘Build Robust Local Organizations. Conflict-sensitive Adaptation: Use Human Rights to Build Social and Environmental Resilience’ Brief 7, Indigenous Peoples of Africa Co-ordinating Committee and IUCN CEESP. (https://www.academia.edu/28899975/Build_Robust_Local_Organizations_Conflict_sensitive_Adaptation_Use_Human_Rights_to_Build_Social_and_Environmental_Resilience)

xiii. IOM (forthcoming 2021) ‘Exploring the climate change-conflict-mobility nexus’, Migration Research Series, International Organization for Migration: Geneva; Risi, L., S. Goodman, R. Pulwarty, A. King and J. Quispe. (2020) *An Evidence-Based Collaborative Framework for Improving Predictive Capabilities*. The Wilson Center: Washington, DC.

xiv. See: Rigaud, K.K.; Heuser, S.; Abu-Ata N.; and Arora, A. (2021) *Operational Experiences and Lessons Learned at the Climate-Migration-Development Nexus – A World Bank Portfolio Review with a Focus on Sub-Saharan Africa*. World Bank: Washington, DC.

xv. Ibid.

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iii. See IOM, n. 1.

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6. MILITARY

Following page: art by [Ed Oner](#) (Morocco)

Mohamed Touirs, under the artist name Ed Oner, is the current revelation of Moroccan street art. Between exhibitions and urban murals, he has forged his reputation nationally and internationally, and continues to follow his creative path both digitally and on the walls and streets of Morocco.



28. OUT WITH WAR AND IN WITH NATURE: SUPPORTING CLIMATE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS THROUGH MINE CLEARANCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Ayub Alavi (formerly at United Nations Environment Programme); Linsey Cottrell (Conflict and Environment Observatory); Dr. Sarah Njeri (Humanitarian Policy Group at ODI); Dr. Peter Whitbread-Abrutat (Future Terrains)

Nature-based solutions in mine action areas can help to sustain peace, ensure sustainable livelihoods, and build communities' climate resilience.

CONTEXT

In 2020, roughly 1,593 square kilometers of land in Afghanistan contained anti-personnel mines, improvised mines, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW), with almost every province affected.ⁱ Humanitarian mine action (HMA), which includes clearing mines and ERW, is critical to communities' safe access to land and natural resources.

It is essential to undertake HMA in a manner that does not cause adverse environmental impacts, and then to support local communities with resources on how to use cleared land in a sustainable way. For example, tree cover and forests provide multiple benefits, but it is estimated that in the east of Afghanistan—which includes Afghanistan's Eastern Forest Complex—between 50 per cent to 80 per cent of tree cover was lost between 1977 and 2002.ⁱⁱ

A Nature-based Solution (NbS) approach can redress unsustainable land use of recently cleared land. Such an approach covers an umbrella of measures that benefit both people and the environment, such as improved farming and grazing practices, forest management, afforestation, reforestation, grassland protection, and groundwater recharge.ⁱⁱⁱ An approach that aligns HMA with well-designed NbS can protect and restore ecosystems, whilst also supporting livelihoods and helping communities adapt to climate change. Without this aligned approach, there are increased risks of a rapid deterioration

of already marginal land and the related peace and security implications if livelihoods cannot be supported.

// Humanitarian mine action is critical to communities' safe access to land and natural resources. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

There are strong synergies between NbS and mine action programmes—both work to empower local communities and secure sustainable livelihoods.^{iv} In Afghanistan, access to water is a critical factor and the incorporation of NbS into HMA programmes must be thoughtfully designed and implemented, with full engagement and consent across local communities.^v HMA actors working in explosive ordnance risk education, community liaison, and clearance activities, can help identify local priorities and communicate these to others.^{vi}

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the estimated shortfall in HMA funding was US\$1 billion, a shortfall that will likely increase in future. Projects can appeal to donors by promising, and delivering, the multiple social and environmental benefits of the type that

linked HMA with NbS initiatives can provide. Between 2017 and 2019, HMA actors undertook ERW clearance in Afghanistan’s Eastern Forest Complex (EFC), providing safe access to forests, grazing and land suitable for farming. Embedding a sustainable, post-clearance land use policy will enhance HMA programmes such as this. From the onset, partnerships between HMA, environmental authorities, organizations, and local groups experienced in participatory NbS can facilitate an improved approach. For the EFC, a NbS initiative would work with local communities to reduce deforestation rates; improve local capabilities to protect remaining forest and wildlife; accelerate restoration of natural forests; provide sustainable livelihoods; support community cohesion through collaborative ventures; and boost climate resilience.

//
A Nature-based Solution
approach can redress
unsustainable land use of
recently cleared land. //

LOOKING AHEAD

NbS and HMA share common challenges such as participation, governance, balancing environmental and socio-economic needs, and overall project facilitation.^{vii} The 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan has impacted all humanitarian, environmental, and development projects but the need for projects that support livelihoods, biodiversity, and climate resilience is undiminished.

NbS programmes are context specific, reflecting the unique environmental setting and challenges, culture, and socio-economic needs of local people. A framework for NbS adoption in HMA would require the following key actions, with NbS allocated as a specific funding and project design component of HMA:

- Map current NbS initiatives and opportunities against regions with HMA programmes, then explore collaborative approaches and identify potential partnerships.
- Use pilot-scale projects to demonstrate NbS success, ensuring that the potential environmental, socio-economic and cultural impacts of the initiative are well understood, monitored and communicated.
- Follow the IUCN Global Standard for NbS criteria,^{viii} and use NbS as a stimulus for other socio-economic benefits such as education and training.
- Secure trust between local people and external parties through early and meaningful engagement, ensuring that the needs and structure of local communities are understood and met. This includes advocating to the new regime the benefits of linking NbS and HMA programmes.
- Incorporate succession planning and funding to ensure the NbS initiative is sustained over time.

Information useful to others must be disseminated to encourage adoption elsewhere. This will also help inform funders/decision-makers, especially where donors have supported traditional HMA.

National natural resource management strategies must reflect the opportunity to coordinate mine action with the adoption of NbS. A database of land-use outcomes for land previously released back to communities could help identify other NbS opportunities. HMA provides measurable benefits for communities and can be strengthened by also helping communities adapt to climate change.

29. CHANGE WE CAN FIGHT FOR? THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ADDRESSING CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Dr. Louise van Schaik (Clingendael Institute); Dr. Beatrice Mosello (adelphi); Dr. Maria-Gabriela Manea (DCAF – Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance)

Integrating “climate-security practices” into multilateral peace operations can galvanize exceptional action in this area, despite mounting controversy regarding the role of the military in addressing climate-related security risks.

CONTEXT

Climate change is one of the defining challenges of the 21st century, straining the natural environment with far-reaching implications for sustainable development, peace, and security. Climate change can affect livelihoods, socio-political dynamics, and community resilience, exacerbating security risks or contributing to new security challenges that require political action beyond the environmental and climate sectors.ⁱ Many countries that are highly vulnerable to climate change are also affected by violence and instability; most UN peace missions take place in countries and regions beset by a warming climate, environmental degradation, and scarcity of vital natural resources, such as water.ⁱⁱ

In the last two decades, militaries have begun considering the impact of climate change on their own activities and, in some cases, taking steps to limit their ecological footprint. However, it is only recently that climate-related security risks have made it into the strategic planning of multilateral organizations involved in peacebuilding operations. In 2018, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was among one of the first UN peacebuilding missions mandated to report on climate-related security risks and deploy appropriate risk management strategies.ⁱⁱⁱ With the support of the German Federal Foreign Office, UNSOM is also hosting the first UN climate and security expert within the framework of a UN peace mission.^{iv}

Climate change will aggravate the complex and highly political field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. But framing climate change as a security issue could galvanize exceptional action in this area, creating opportunities for cooperation on environmental and climate-resilient activities on the ground. This joint contribution responds to such new policy needs by proposing relevant climate-security practices,^v through which military forces deployed in peace operations may foster environmental peacebuilding.

// Humanitarian mine action is critical to communities’ safe access to land and natural resources. //

WHAT’S BEEN DONE

As awareness of climate-related security risks increases, so do initiatives to address them as part of conflict prevention and sustaining peace efforts. At the multilateral level, the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs established a Climate Security Mechanism together with UNDP and UNEP in 2018 “to address climate-related security risks more systematically.”^{vi} The EU’s “Climate Change and Defense Roadmap” placed climate and environmental considerations

under the mandate of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy.^{vii} Equally, NATO has recently adopted a climate change security strategy to increase its understanding and ability to adapt and mitigate climate-related security risks.^{viii}

Further initiatives to create synergies between climate change and security interventions to promote environmental peacebuilding exist at state, intergovernmental, and non-state levels, as documented by the Planetary Security Initiative on Climate Security Practices.^{ix} Practices associated with the good governance of local security sectors^x were found conducive to conflict prevention and sustainable peace,^{xi} and security sector reform^{xii} has become a central part of the UN peacebuilding architecture.^{xiii} Therefore, Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) can also provide a framework for integrating climate-related security risks in security strategies and policies in a democratic and accountable way, ensuring the ownership of local actors and preventing the securitization of climate change. If security sector institutions fail to meet local security needs and lack legitimacy in the community, they most likely won't be able to mitigate climate-related security risks. To be inclusive, people-centred, and context-specific in their climate-related security actions, local security sectors and military missions must be aware of local customs and practices; they must also engage in multi-stakeholder dialogues. To counter the risks of securitizing climate change, there is also a need to develop appropriate "climate-security practices" in dialogue with local actors and other policy communities.

LOOKING AHEAD

Multilateral organizations and states (sending and hosting peace operations) can take the following steps to further integrate climate-security practices into multilateral peace operations:

- Integrate climate-sensitive conflict analysis in all phases of peace operations and related policy frameworks and share this—especially the entry points for environmental peacebuilding—with colleagues from humanitarian, development, and climate

sectors.

- Prepare and commit deployed militaries (and their sending states) to deal with these challenges and contribute to their mitigation through specific peacebuilding activities tailored for each local context.
- Allocate resources for climate-related activities.
- Ensure that deployed militaries operate under a framework of good SSG and are under firm democratic control when dealing with climate-related security risks, to avoid the risk of securitizing climate change responses.^{xiv}

Deployed militaries should:

- Be informed about context-specific climate-related security risks.
- Have the professional skills, equipment, training, and management capacity to fulfil their missions without aggravating local climate-related security risks.^{xv}
- Not exacerbate environmental degradation.
- Strengthen both capacity and democratic governance of local security sectors in general, and in regard to climate-related security risks.
- Increase the resilience of affected communities to climate and environmental pressure beyond the duration of the peacebuilding intervention.
- Follow an integrated approach that jointly focuses on building peace and climate resilience.

Both should:

- Work in close collaboration with host governments, civil society, and the humanitarian, development, security, and climate communities to ensure risks and needs are adequately identified and addressed, and that there is no duplication of work and better knowledge transfer.
- Undertake climate security risk assessments of both immediate and longer-term climate change impacts that are reflective of the perspectives of different groups and individuals.^{xvi}
- Support local actors' efforts to prevent and address climate-related security risks by providing a safer operating environment.^{xvii}

30. THE PROBLEM WITH GREEN MILITARIZATION: THE NEED TO EXPLORE PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO WILDLIFE CONSERVATION

Ezekiel Dobelsky; Christianne Zakour; Ellery Saluck; Navashna Gajathar

Militarized anti-poaching leads to human rights abuses and further marginalization and requires alternative approaches to address these issues.

CONTEXT

To counter the rise in wildlife poaching, foreign assistance commonly flows to “green militarization”—the use of military and paramilitary actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships as a conservation strategy.ⁱ Green militarization takes many forms, including the provision of military-grade weaponry and surveillance technologies to anti-poaching units.ⁱⁱ In some cases, formal security forces or private companies have been employed to protect wildlife.ⁱⁱⁱ To justify these practices, poaching and the illegal trade of wildlife have been framed in national security terms.^{iv} In 2014, the UN recognized poaching in Africa as a regional security threat.^v The association of poaching with a security threat enables governments to dispossess local communities surrounding parks more easily.^{vi}

Critics of green militarization argue it is unable to address the root economic causes of poaching; that it imposes pressure on rangers to implement “shoot-on-sight” and “shoot-to-kill” policies; that it has a tendency to lead to a perpetual arms race; and that it can breed animosity and violence between local communities and conservationists.^{vii} Tension between local communities and conservationists is rooted in a history of colonization, under which communities have been forcibly displaced from their own lands or restricted from hunting and accessing resources.^{viii}

Green militarization facilitates the abuse of local communities around protected areas or

parks. There have been numerous examples of anti-poachers and eco-guards committing human rights abuses.^{ix} There have been hundreds of allegations that park rangers in Malawi, Tanzania, and Botswana have committed murder or torture, or removed people forcibly.^x From 2010 to 2015, South African park guards killed nearly 500 Mozambicans.^{xi} In Cameroon, the indigenous Baka people were abused by WWF-funded eco-guards, a prominent example of Western finance being directly implicated in abuse linked to green militarization.^{xii} The militarization of anti-poaching and “shoot-on-site” directives further fuels these abuses.

// Tension between local communities and conservationists is rooted in a history of colonization, under which communities have been forcibly displaced. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

An alternative to green militarization is “inclusive anti-poaching” (IAP), or community-based anti-poaching. Rather than utilizing funding to pit conservation enforcement against local communities (which tend to be involved in poaching), IAP aims to win the support of local communities by involving them in anti-poaching activities. In the Mangalene region

of Mozambique, IAP is being used by hiring local scouts to aid in anti-poaching efforts. These scouts, hired through the Mangalene Community Scout Program (MCSP), provide intelligence to anti-poaching units, facilitate conflict resolution within their communities, and monitor parts of the 40-kilometre perimeter fence.^{xiii} The presence of the MCSP has seen reduced poaching through a combination of preventive and proactive anti-poaching activities.^{xiv} Issues arise when community benefits from anti-poaching are minimal, as scouts are perceived to be interrupting a potential livelihood opportunity. When communities have ownership over wildlife, however, they are much more likely to support community scouts in their anti-poaching efforts.^{xv}

Examples of IAP within communities also display a gendered dimension, like that of the Black Mambas in South Africa, an all-female anti-poaching unit. This initiative primarily seeks to prevent poaching but additionally empowers local impoverished communities, specifically young rural women who are often excluded from conservation efforts.^{xvi} Zimbabwe’s “Akashinga” women-only conservation effort also displays this local empowerment of women. The unit comprises of “unemployed single mothers, abandoned wives, former sex workers, survivors of sexual and physical abuse, wives of imprisoned poachers, widows and orphans,”^{xvii} all who receive formal law-enforcement training, like their male counterparts. Empowering these women has yielded positive results as women are less likely to resort to violence in tense situations; they are also less susceptible to bribery.^{xviii} This notion is supported by studies on how men and women responded differently to the use of force in the Gulf War.^{xix} These women-only anti-poaching units are a compelling alternative to green militarization, as rangers often utilize non-violent means of combating poaching. Female rangers are largely unarmed and make use of information gathering and tracking poachers in their efforts.^{xx}

The Mali Elephant Project is another example of a community-based approach that uses local intelligence and improves community welfare. As a result, from February 2017 through March 2018, no elephants were poached—which is

unprecedented considering the prevalence of violent insurgency at the time.^{xxi} This can be a very effective and peaceful alternative to green militarization.

LOOKING AHEAD

Integrating local communities into anti-poaching efforts is an effective conservation strategy; it can also lay the foundation for peace between conservation law enforcement and locals. Wildlife conservationists should employ strategies like IAP alongside demand-reduction strategies for a more peaceful and more sustainable world.

Incorporating a gendered approach is vital, as prior efforts have allowed gender stereotypes to exclude a large percentage of key community players from combating wildlife trafficking. This highlights the need for a context-specific approach to future action across the globe. A one-size-fits-all “solution” such as green militarization will not work and will continue to perpetuate human rights abuses upon local communities.^{xxii} It is important to consider all the reasons that poaching occurs, including the use of wildlife as a food source and the killing of wildlife to protect crops. Therefore, a context-specific approach when undertaking IAP is necessary.

The solution to wildlife trafficking does not lie in doling out more severe punishments but in rewarding positive behaviours.^{xxiii} Community-led anti-poaching efforts must be supported by multilateral demand-reduction campaigns funded by countries with the highest demand. Imprisoning or killing poachers at a local level will not eradicate the demand for wildlife products in other countries.^{xxiv}

// The solution to wildlife trafficking does not lie in doling out more severe punishments but in rewarding positive behaviours. //

31. INTEGRATING CLIMATE SECURITY INTO NATO'S PLANS AND OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED AND WAYS FORWARD

Swathi Veeravalli (USAFRICOM); Annica Waleij (Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI)

The mandate of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is to promote the freedom and security of its alliance members and partners through political and military means. Politically, it seeks to build trust and prevent conflict. If those efforts are unsuccessful, NATO will utilize military power to address the collective defence of the Alliance.ⁱ NATO's ability to carry out its core mission is contingent upon its ability to successfully operationalize climate security.

CONTEXT

NATO first began to address environmental issues in 1969. Before the end of the Cold War and until the mid-90s, NATO considered the environment as an opportunity to engage with countries from the former Soviet Union. In 2003, NATO released its first Environmental Policy for NATO-led military activities. This policy focused on minimizing the military's environmental footprint and was further formalized through several standardization agreementsⁱⁱ and then later in 2014 through the Green Defence Framework. NATO's involvement in the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC) demonstrated the shift from focusing solely on minimizing its environmental footprint to a more proactive stance, realizing the conflict prevention opportunities afforded by the environment.

// If the relationship between conflict and the environment is not considered systematically and holistically, it will invariably inhibit peacebuilding. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Lessons from Afghanistan and Bulgaria

NATO, previously having developed an environmental management program, sought to facilitate environmental shuras (an Afghan word describing a meeting of elders).ⁱⁱⁱ Developed in conjunction with US Forces in Afghanistan, these shuras were intended to strengthen relationships, share progress and lessons learned, and create synergies within the environmental community in Afghanistan. It has been noted, however, that the potential of these initiatives was limited in scope and ineffective at best.^{iv} NATO-led operations appeared to be more focused on the mission's strategic, operational, and tactical military objectives, and less on the environment. NATO's objectives of establishing a secure and stable environment for Afghans did not tangibly include the benefits of the environmental shuras, a missed opportunity for environmental peacebuilding. While there was an attempt to incorporate environmental considerations, the timing and intensity of the heightened and protracted conflict proved prohibitive for environmental peacebuilding. Conversely, if the relationship between conflict and the environment is not considered systematically and holistically, it will invariably inhibit peacebuilding as well as increase the human costs of war, as it did in Afghanistan.^v

The 2010 Strategic Concept outlined how key environmental and climate constraints will not only further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO, but also significantly affect planning and operations. Six years later, NATO created a Centre of Excellence in Bulgaria focused on crisis management and disaster response to engage in civil preparedness and emergency response to environmental disasters.^{vi} Focused on providing education and training opportunities, these initiatives demonstrated a transition for NATO policy to start systematically anticipating the impacts that both the environment and climate and weather could have upon their mission. The effects of changing temperatures, coupled with environmental degradation, can compound other conflict drivers while also becoming an additional security risk in itself.^{vii} Both of these issues undermine peacebuilding and conflict prevention.^{viii}

LOOKING AHEAD

While the combination of NATO's policies to date have started to anticipate and identify the impacts that environment, climate, and other risks have on their mission, action has fallen short of mandating the Alliance to start developing climate-aware defence planning. It is prudent for NATO to take steps to prepare for the security implications of changing climate regimes.

The organization must be able to assess and understand the short- and long-term implications of changing climate regimes upon each country and upon the Alliance as a whole. To that effect, the forthcoming NATO Centre of Excellence

for Climate and Security will facilitate not only more civil-military cooperation, but also more engagement with the scientific community. Such partnerships will yield more effective science-based decision-making capabilities for its members and partners.

NATO must incorporate the security implications of climate change into its plans, operations, exercises, and strategy. NATO should also operationalize climate security in each Alliance member's National Defence Planning Process (NDPP) cycle. Achieving both acts will help ensure NATO's operational readiness to the security implications of changing climate regimes.

In sum, NATO has been notably successful with its environmental peacebuilding activities and has started to develop climate security-based policy. In 2021, it even released a Climate Change and Security Action Plan and is updating its strategic concept in 2022. But if NATO is to “set the gold standard on understanding, adapting to, and mitigating the security impacts of climate change,” as stipulated by its own Secretary General, the organization must move beyond policy and operationalize climate security into strategy, plans, engagements, exercises, and operations.^{ix} Until then, NATO will not be adequately prepared, equipped, trained, or supported to achieve its own mission.^x

// NATO must incorporate the security implications of climate change into its plans, operations, exercises, and strategy. //

32. ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS OR ASSETS? EXPLORING THE ENGAGEMENT OF NON-STATE ARMED ACTORS ON THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Guillaume Charron (Independent Diplomat); Anki Sjöberg and Chloe Thomas (Fight for Humanity)

Engaging with non-state armed actors (NSAAs) on the protection of the environment is crucial because environmental degradation and armed conflicts are increasingly part of the same conversation, although these actors are often excluded from the equation.

CONTEXT

When talking about non-state armed actors (NSAAs) and environment, one immediately thinks of lawlessness, conflict, economic exploitation, and environmental degradation. Indeed, many NSAAs exploit natural resources to fund themselves through illegal and environmentally destructive logging, mining, or refineries. The myriad of armed non-state actors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,ⁱ the Kachin Independence Army in Myanmar,ⁱⁱ and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance in Senegal,ⁱⁱⁱ are examples. Such practices can exacerbate the general negative impacts of the conflict and cause civilians to abandon their homes, driving them into forced displacement camps or other locations where the need for food and fuel contributes to further deforestation and resource extraction.

But it should be noted that NSAAs are not the sole cause of the natural resource overexploitation, as conflicts often arise in contexts where resource scarcity already plays a crucial, if not catalysing, role in conflict outbreak. Moreover, with climate change and the current rate of environmental degradation, tensions surrounding the use and control of natural resources are being constantly fuelled, almost always to the detriment of local and indigenous populations.

Environmental degradation in conflict is partly caused by the fact that NSAAs tend to develop in neglected peripheries where resources are

already scarce, and state structures are often absent or weak.^{iv} Asymmetrical and entrenched warfare boosts these dynamics as NSAAs further deplete resources and isolate themselves while confronting governments or other enemies.

// Non-state actors tend to be aware of the limited resources at their disposal and the cost of their unsustainable exploitation. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Less commonly known is that NSAAs, particularly those with clearly stated political objectives, often have an acute awareness of the impact of environmental degradation, biodiversity loss, and climate change. This is because, albeit with some exceptions, they tend to protect and preserve the natural environment of the regions they emanate from and depend on. Moreover, because of their isolation, they tend to be aware of the limited and finite resources at their disposal and the cost of their unsustainable exploitation.

According to international humanitarian law, parties to conflict, including NSAAs, have obligations to protect the environment.^v

Arguably, NSAs are also bound by international human rights law, at least on a ‘sliding scale’ basis, meaning that those with greater capacities and resources would be expected to do more for the respect, protection, and fulfilment of human rights. NSAs have independently introduced policies for the protection of the environment.^{vi} Some have also undertaken and continue to develop their own protective actions. For example, setting up specific institutions to deal with environmental issues and regulating finite resources such as fish, game, water, forest, etc. This can be seen in Colombia, Syria, and Turkey, notably in mountainous and jungle areas.^{vii}

We still do not know much about the functioning and efficiency of the environmental regulations of NSAs. Arguably, post-conflict orders may become more destructive than the conflicts themselves, as the little protection there was may disappear and states may be unable or unwilling to step in and fill the ‘governance gap’ in remote, hard-to-reach areas. This is noticeable in Colombia’s peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),^{viii} or the Tamil areas of Sri Lanka.

Additionally, some organizations have decided to take more proactive environmental action by influencing and sensitizing other actors. The United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) presented its Green State Vision at COP26 in Glasgow,^{ix} and the Autonomous Administration of North and East of Syria (AANES) has organized forums and discussions to address issues of water scarcity.^x

LOOKING AHEAD

Where they exert *de facto* control over territory and population, NSAs can play a helpful role in protecting the environment and ensuring its sustainability. To disrupt their isolation, these groups should not only be recognized for their existing contributions to environmental protection, but also invited to share—directly and indirectly their experiences and challenges at relevant international environmental discussions.^{xi} To a different extent this applies to NSAs that are not administering territories, but

that have the potential to block or delay projects for environmental protection. They too could be proactively engaged and be participants—at different levels—in the formulation of environmental projects, policies, and their implementation.

In fact, as it is increasingly recognized that NSAs must be part of solutions to problems in areas that they control or influence, they are already being engaged on several issues—humanitarian issues, human rights, peace, etc. In such engagements, it is clear that when NSAs are integrated into the discussions, and their concerns and challenges are recognized and to some extent addressed, they are much more willing to participate in activities for the protection and well-being of the people affected by their actions. Moreover, just like humanitarian agreements, environmental agreements can be sought to limit the impact on the environment during conflict. Such measures can also help build confidence before and during peace processes.

Moreover, understanding the role that NSAs are already playing in environmental protection, for better or worse, can help us foresee and mitigate additional or increased environmental deterioration after the end of conflict. We must understand that NSAs can have simultaneous negative and positive impacts on the environment, as seen with the FARC in Colombia. Failure to do so may cost us—and the environment—dearly in the future.

Finally, the recognition of the right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment at the Human Rights Council in October 2021 is a positive development that helps us by setting a new framework for environmental protection and human rights. By formally recognizing the rights’ universality, we all become responsible for the environment and destroying it is a human rights violation. This provides an opportunity—and perhaps an initial tool—to engage with NSAs on the protection of the environment.

33. ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING THROUGH DEGROWTH, DEMILITARIZATION, AND FEMINISM: RETHINKING ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING TO STAY WITHIN PLANETARY BOUNDARIES AND CHAMPION SOCIAL JUSTICE

Ray Acheson, Nela Porobić, and Katrin Geyer (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom); Doug Weir (Conflict and Environment Observatory)

To be sustainable, conflict prevention and transformation would benefit from a structural root cause analysis informed by feminism, demilitarization, and degrowth economics.

CONTEXT

Environmental peacebuilding (EP) is predominantly concerned with the role of context-specific natural resources or ecologies in peacebuilding. Feminist and degrowth analysis, along with disarmament and demilitarization, can broaden approaches to EP, while also making the interventions more sustainable.¹

The problem

The growth imperative of the capitalist political economy is the leading driver of environmental degradation and the climate crisis. This is increasingly generating insecurity and conflicts, which will be used to justify ever-increasing military expenditure at the expense of investment in environmental protection, regeneration, and social infrastructure.

The capitalist growth imperative, perpetuated by militarization, is intrinsically colonial, requiring new frontiers from which to extract value, sustaining the dominance of the Global North over the Global South. The development and management of natural resources, such as timber, minerals, and oil, has been a focus of traditional EP, with resource revenues promoted to finance post-conflict recovery and the transition to peace. EP thus risks contributing to the unsustainable growth imperative that is driving environmental insecurity, making it incumbent on EP scholars and practitioners to address alternative models to endless growth.

Solutions

Ideas from the degrowth movement, coupled with feminist and Indigenous thinking and organizing, can help delink EP theory and practice from infinite growth. The degrowth movement focuses on reducing the world's consumption of energy and material goods in a way that is globally just, while accounting for inequalities created by colonialism and capitalism. Degrowth seeks to create an economy organized around human flourishing and ecological stability, rather than growth. Recognizing inequalities, degrowth calls for a radical decrease of resource and energy use in the Global North. It acknowledges that most countries in the Global South will need to increase their resource use to meet human needs. Within all countries, the degrowth movement argues that some sectors will still need to grow to ensure human well-being, such as public healthcare or regenerative agriculture, while other sectors, such as fossil fuels and the arms industry, should radically shrink.

Degrowth would alter patterns of resource consumption and their flows between the Global South and North. This may require a shift in EP's focus on "high-value" resources in post-conflict recovery and stabilization efforts; work should begin to explore what degrowth would mean for conflict-affected states with a high economic reliance on natural resources.

Intersectional feminist peace activism is informed by anti-racist and anti-colonial perspectives and complements values of the degrowth movement and the aims of EP. Feminist perspectives to degrowth and EP are essential to preventing women from shouldering the burden of social reproduction in a down-scaling economy. (Social reproduction is the labour that goes into reproducing social life, including biological reproduction and unpaid labour in the home and in communities.ⁱⁱ) A more sustainable, fair, and equal relationship between people and the planet must acknowledge and abolish the exploitation of (predominantly) women's social reproductive labour.

Feminist peace activism also addresses the effects of militarization, linking the political economy of violence with the capitalist growth imperative and global inequalities. Militaries are among the greatest polluters and consumers of resources. Ever-increasing military expenditure also stands in stark contrast to the lack of investment in environmental protection and regeneration, social infrastructure and care, and conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Intersectional feminists call for inclusive and transparent decision-making, including effective participation of the most marginalized groups of society to advance social justice and peace.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

While degrowth has yet to be implemented by states, Indigenous communities globally have lived by the understanding of reciprocity, interconnectedness, and care for the web of life for thousands of years. A number of recent initiatives reflect some of the ideas of the degrowth movement and can serve as models for others:

- In its report, *Growth without Economic Growth*, the EU Environment Agency urges a rethinking of growth as central to our economies and progress;ⁱⁱⁱ
- New Zealand, Colombia, and India have given rights of legal personhood to land, water, air, and plants, which means that harms against nature can be prosecuted;
- In Ecuador and Bolivia, the centrality of nature has been enshrined in constitutions;

- In Bhutan, Costa Rica, and New Zealand, national policies have been guided by principles of gross national happiness, or the spiritual, physical, and social health of citizens and environment;
- City planning in Amsterdam and Kokstad has centred human well-being within planetary boundaries.

On a grassroots level, many movements speak to different aspects of degrowth, including:

- Black Lives Matter, working for racial justice;^{iv}
- Fridays For Future, a global youth movement working for climate justice;^v
- “Purple deal,” a vision of an economy placing care at its backbone;^{vi}
- The Red Nation's call for a Red Deal for Indigenous liberation, life, and land, and the affirmation that colonialism and capitalism must be overturned.^{vii}

LOOKING AHEAD

Policymakers and practitioners should incorporate ideas from degrowth and feminist thinking as part of EP.

- EP must remain within safe ecological limits and be guided by human well-being and ecological regeneration, while acknowledging that conflict-affected countries need to increase revenues to meet human needs. Degrowth economic and environmental policies must be designed in an inclusive and transparent way.
- EP scholars and practitioners should examine how degrowth can challenge dominant models of managing natural resources for revenue and recovery, and to explore what a just transition would entail for countries heavily dependent on extractive industries.
- Governments should reduce military expenditure and pursue disarmament and demilitarization to help reduce environmental damage and free up resources for a degrowth economy as part of peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

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Accordingly, climate-security practices are defined as tangible actions implemented by a (local or central) government, organization, community, private actor or individual to help prevent, reduce, mitigate or adapt (to) security risks and threats related to impacts of climate change and related environmental degradation, as well as subsequent policies. They operationalize climate security objectives, from either institutional or non-governmental standpoint and are activities implemented on the ground.

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ARTICLE 32

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See for example https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_DR Congo MONUSCO OESG final_report.pdf, p.4.

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viii. See for example <https://ceobs.org/assessment-of-recent-forest-loss-in-conflict-areas/> for information on forest loss in conflict areas and specifically the case of Colombia. However, this is not unique for Colombia, as the Conflict and Environmental Observatory argues "Colombia represents an opposite story to the other areas covered in this report – deforestation has followed peace, not preceded it. That said, this is not a unique outcome, with a similar pattern seen in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Ivory Coast and Peru."

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ARTICLE 33

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7. GOVERNANCE

Following page: art by [Lynn Finnegan](#) (Ireland)

Lynn Finnegan is an illustrator and art director from Ireland whose work explores and celebrates the living planet, focusing on issues of ecology, non-violence, and sustainability. She seeks to tell empowering, solutions-based stories that provide a glimpse into the joys and beauty of the global movement of people quietly working towards a peaceful, living planet.



34. INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO PROTECT PEOPLE, PLANET, AND PEACE: BUILDING A UN SYSTEM-WIDE ENVIRONMENT, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA

Wim Zwijnenburg and Brittany Roser (PAX); Adriana Erthal Abdenur (Plataforma CIPÓ)

Systematic efforts should be taken to better integrate environmental peacebuilding and security measures into UN policies and responses to improve their coherence, effectiveness, and sustainability.

CONTEXT

Throughout history, armed conflicts have left a path of destruction on the environment, with devastating and long-lasting impacts on civilians. In recent decades, military deployments have consumed vast amounts of natural resources, emitted considerable volumes of greenhouse gases, and caused wide-scale destruction of ecosystems, pollution, and food and water insecurity throughout parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Conflicts have fuelled (and been fuelled by) environmental crimes such as illegal deforestation, logging, and mining.

//
Mainstreaming
environmental
peacebuilding could lead to
more integrated, effective,
and sustainable peace and
security policies. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Only recently has the international community begun to pay systematic attention to the links between wars and the environment. International policy discussions about the relationship between climate and security implications have intensified, particularly at the UN Security

Council (UNSC).ⁱ However, such discussions and their resulting outputs rarely address the impacts of conflict on the environment, instead focusing almost exclusively on climate change as a driver of conflict. Nonetheless, renewed efforts to mainstream environmental peacebuilding and security measures in other areas of international policy, including in humanitarian responses, strategies for the protection of civilians (PoC), and general conflict prevention approaches, could lead to more integrated, effective, and sustainable peace and security policies.

Indeed, from the UNSC, related debates on climate-related peace and security risks have spread to different parts of the UN system, including the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),ⁱⁱ as well as across the Secretariat.ⁱⁱⁱ The cross-agency UN Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) was established in 2018 and further launched the creation of an informal Community of Practice on Climate Security, a joint forum open to all UN staff to exchange and build knowledge on climate security issues. At the normative level, various UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) resolutions,^{iv} the work of the International Law Commission (ILC),^v UNSC Arria formula meetings,^{vi} and high-level UNSC and UNGA side events on the links between the environment, climate, and conflict,^{vii} have also drawn attention

to the issue and boosted political support among Member States. This can be further seen in current initiatives taken by Member States, with the encouragement of civil society organizations, to include conflict-linked issues and nature-based solutions within UNEA-5 discussions on “Strengthening Actions for Nature to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.”

Despite such progress, the international focus remains overwhelmingly on climate impacts and drivers of conflict, while the devastating impacts of conflict-related environmental degradation often remain overlooked. Furthermore, UN bodies, agencies, and international agreements currently deal with the impacts and relationship between the environment and armed conflicts in a highly fragmented fashion, if at all. As noted by Professor Ken Conca, despite a focus on human rights, peace, and disarmament, the lack of a coherent UN approach to conflict and the environment (as well as peace and the environment) represents a missed opportunity to utilize and engage the “full force of the UN mandate to bear on environmental challenges,” including those in relation to climate and conflict.^{viii}

LOOKING AHEAD

In order to truly mainstream the Environment, Peace and Security (EPS) agenda across the UN system, we suggest the following key recommendations:

- Adopt a thematic resolution establishing the EPS agenda and supporting efforts to mainstream environment, climate, and conflict angles throughout the work of the UN system to increase reporting and data sharing, provide a more uniform conceptualization and coherent UN approach, and improve the sustainability of UN response measures.
- Appoint a UN Special Representative on EPS to promote the collection of information and regularly report on the impacts of the environment-climate-conflict nexus and to foster international cooperation and coherence in incorporating environmental

and climate sustainability measures across the UN system.

- Support the inclusion of language in resolutions and raise concerns about environmental dimensions of armed conflict and climate security in national interventions in all relevant debates and briefings across the UN system.
- Establish a Core Group of Member States to begin developing a roadmap for EPS policy development, coordination, and implementation. Such an initiative could complement the work of the existing Group of Friends on Climate and Security^{ix} and the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security^x to allow States to work together to develop a meaningful set of criteria for mainstreaming the environment throughout all relevant UN policy discussions and response mechanisms.
- Integrate the EPS agenda with the mutually reinforcing aspects of related thematic agendas in peacebuilding, development, human rights, and security policies and practices, particularly Protection of Civilians, Climate and Security, Women, Peace and Security, and Youth, Peace and Security, among others. This includes relevant UNSC, UNGA, and PBC discussions, and extends to the Human Rights Council and UN Environment Assembly’s work where human rights and conflict linked issues should be part of relevant discussions.
- Prioritize the inclusion of data collection and information-sharing on environmental dimensions of armed conflict and linked climate security challenges in UN reporting and field operations. This must include identification, monitoring, analysis, and sharing of data on risks and impacts, particularly for civilians. Local communities, including women, youth, and indigenous groups, must meaningfully participate in such assessments and priority-setting for more inclusive and sustainable remediation and reconstruction efforts, including nature-based solutions.

35. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (DRR) AND PEACEBUILDING: REALIZING DRR'S UNEXPLORED POTENTIAL THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Vincenzo Bollettino (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Harvard University); Siad Darwish (The Initiative for Peacebuilding and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects)

Despite the increased recognition of the compounded risks of disaster, fragility, and potentially conflict, intersections between disaster risk reduction (DRR) and peacebuilding have remained largely unexplored. Environmental peacebuilding, with its focus on positive peace and environmental sustainability, is uniquely positioned to establish these linkages in policy, research, and planning.

CONTEXT

From 2004 to 2014, 58 per cent of all disaster-related deaths and 34 per cent of all people impacted by natural disasters occurred in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCAS).ⁱ Climate change is set to intensify this trend. The populations of 26 of the 39 states classified as highly fragile are at the greatest risk of exposure to chronic aridity, wildfires, floods, cyclones, rainfall abnormalities, and coastal erosion.ⁱⁱ Nine of these fragile states have at least one million people who are at very high risk from climate exposure.

DRR and Disaster Studies have long held that disasters are social and natural phenomena, created by the interaction between environmental hazards, such as short and rapid onset disasters, with economies, governance, and social systems. In FCAS, disasters come at greater human and environmental cost. Fragility limits adaptive capacities, or the abilities of communities to prepare for and cope with disasters and violent conflict, which further contributes to the degradation of vital resources.ⁱⁱⁱ Peace and security, in other words, are pre-conditions for the most effective DRR.^{iv} There is also emerging and contested evidence that disasters can serve as threat multipliers in existing conflicts; some of the states with a high compound risk of fragility

and climate exposure experience higher than normal rates of civic unrest, riots, and civil disobedience.^v Yet, while disasters may lead to fragility and conflict, they can also contribute to peace and social cohesion. A series of case studies in disaster diplomacy has demonstrated that disasters can have at least short-term positive outcomes on relations between warring countries.^{vi} Disasters here generally do not generate entirely new diplomatic efforts, but can serve as a positive catalyst for existing efforts, as has been the case after the 2004 tsunami in Aceh in Indonesia.^{vii}

// Fragility limits adaptive capacities, or the abilities of communities to prepare for and cope with disasters and violent conflict. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Disaster policy increasingly views disasters as complex adaptive systems that interact with other types of systemic risks such as health crises, economic downturns, and fragility and

conflict.^{viii} Despite these emerging recognitions of the interconnections between risk profiles and vulnerabilities, frameworks, tools, and concepts to address vulnerabilities across these different systems are still largely absent. In fact, the intersection between peacebuilding and DRR in particular has been recently described as “terra incognita.”^{ix}

However, there is some isolated case evidence that integrating social cohesion programming with disaster preparedness can turn compound risks into compound benefits, producing dividends for both disaster preparedness and peace.^x Also, while no empirical research confirms this yet, theoretical attempts have been made to adapt the Sendai Framework for DRR, the UN’s primary framework and that of many governments, for conflict prevention.^{xi}

// Peace and security are pre-conditions for the most effective Disaster Risk Reduction. //

LOOKING AHEAD

First, comparative research needs to answer some pressing questions: How are we to manage socio-natural systems so that they are more resilient to the compounded risks of disaster, conflict, and economic shocks? What kind of DDR practice is necessary in FCAS? Can we mobilize DRR to contribute to peacebuilding, and vice versa? Many of these questions are already being answered through environmental peacebuilding publications, but a robust transdisciplinary applied research agenda is needed.

In policy terms, DDR must be central to the triple nexus—Humanitarian, Development, and Peacebuilding—discussions, venues, and frameworks. A very promising avenue for the integration of DRR within the triple nexus is preparedness,^{xii} where DRR is particularly strong

in frameworks and practice. On the whole, however, in order to prepare for and mitigate the looming impacts of climate change, we need to develop systemic compounded risk frameworks and response mechanisms that allow us to understand and address vulnerabilities of social and natural systems across DRR, peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian interventions.



Agro-forestry - 2013 © UN Environment

36. BUILDING PEACE AND CLIMATE RESILIENCE: ALIGNING PEACEBUILDING AND CLIMATE ADAPTATION IN FRAGILE STATES

Alec Crawford and Anne Hammill (IISD); Richard Matthew (University of California)

Governments operating in contexts of fragility can design, finance, implement, monitor, and evaluate their National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process in a way that acknowledges and responds to potential and existing conflict dynamics.

CONTEXT

It can be difficult to make the case for climate adaptation planning in contexts defined by fragility and violence. Despite the often clear link between fragility, climate impacts, and climate vulnerability, it can be difficult to argue that limited time and resources should be put into plans for adapting to future and uncertain climate risks; governments and donors are understandably focused on alleviating immediate human suffering, re-establishing or strengthening public services, and generally creating the conditions for development and investment. However, a failure to integrate climate adaptation considerations into peacebuilding plans and post-conflict development agendas can undermine the long-term viability of both.

There are, of course, considerable barriers to adaptation planning in such contexts beyond the prioritization of more immediate needs. Governance is weak, as governments struggle with the hard work of rebuilding the social contract and re-establishing their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. Adaptation projects and progress may have been derailed by conflict; populations may have been targeted or displaced, staff evacuated, and project resources damaged or destroyed. A dearth of reliable and accurate climate data and information can also hinder effective policymaking. Finally, donor priorities may have shifted.

Unfortunately, with often similar root causes—weak institutions, discrimination, inequality, poverty, marginalization—the converging crises of conflict and climate change can be mutually reinforcing, with climate impacts potentially exacerbating the conflict cycle and violence weakening the governance structures and institutions needed to build climate resilience. One way to align peacebuilding, development, and adaptation strategies is through the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process.

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It can be difficult to
argue that limited time and
resources should be put into
plans for adapting to future
and uncertain climate risks

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WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The NAP process is a country-owned strategic process to integrate climate adaptation priorities into medium- and long-term development plans. For fragile states, the NAP process provides governments struggling with conflict, instability, and climate change the opportunity to align their peacebuilding, development, and adaptation

agendas and lay the foundation for lasting peace. The NAP process is not designed to address the drivers of conflict in a country; however, as an integrated approach to development and adaptation planning, it is well-positioned to support peacebuilding processes in some of the world's most climate-vulnerable countries in several ways.ⁱⁱ

First, the NAP process—similar to peacebuilding processes—requires that governments take a holistic approach to addressing vulnerabilities to climate change and conflict. It promotes both incremental and transformative actions to increase resilience across sectors and levels of government. Doing so effectively requires addressing the underlying causes of climate vulnerability—which in fragile states can overlap with the drivers of conflict, such as weak governance, inequality, and poverty. Second, both the NAP process and peacebuilding timelines are concerned with medium- and long-term planning horizons. While fragile states face urgent and immediate adaptation and stability needs, it takes an average of 22 years for an economy to recover from a major conflict.ⁱⁱⁱ A similar longer-term view, espoused by the NAP process, is required to adapt to a changing climate. Third, the NAP process is contextually sensitive, flexible, and structured to evolve; as an iterative process it is well-placed to take into account the changing dynamics of fragile states and to be adjusted over time to reflect the evolving realities on the ground. As with sustainable peacebuilding programmes, the NAP process is not imposed from outside, but rather is country-owned and participative. And finally, the NAP process, in articulating a country's adaptation priorities, can open the door to funding for technical support, capacity building, and institutional strengthening in countries often in dire need of resources for all three.

A review of submitted NAP documents indicates that governments are already using the process to integrate conflict dynamics and considerations into adaptation planning and efforts.^{iv} Several

countries, including Cameroon, Ethiopia, Colombia, and Brazil, see adaptation as a clear means to preventing potential conflicts around land and water resources. Others, such as Palestine, recognize conflict as a key source of their population's climate vulnerability. Still others—such as Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Colombia—note in their NAPs that adaptation plans need to recognize conflict as a driver of climate vulnerability and adaptation as a possible tool for conflict prevention.

// The NAP process is not imposed from outside, but rather is country-owned and participative. //

LOOKING AHEAD

There remains much to do to fully align NAPs with peacebuilding agendas in fragile states. Governments must ensure that their climate adaptation actions respond to conflict dynamics and, when possible, that they are designed to actively address the drivers of both climate and conflict vulnerability. This includes, at a minimum, ensuring that adaptation actions are conflict-neutral; interventions that do not, for example, consider the equitable distribution of adaptation benefits could cause more harm than good. They must also work to ensure that their peacebuilding plans and programmes are climate resilient and designed to cope with existing and expected local and national climate impacts. Donors also have a role to play; they must increase their support for conflict-sensitive, flexible, and autonomous adaptation planning in conflict-affected states, and fully support the transition from planning to implementation. and humanitarian interventions.

37. ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS: CRITICAL LESSONS FROM RURAL COLOMBIA

Luca Eufemia, Michelle Bonatti, Tatiana Rodriguez, Patricia Pérez, Katharina Löhr, Hector Morales-Muñoz, and Stefan Sieber (Leibniz Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research, ZALF, and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin); Wilmer Herrera-Valencia (Misión Verde Amazonía)

Integrated, inclusive and possibly more institutionalized schemes of participation present innovative solutions to the daunting past, present and future socio-ecological conflicts in Colombia.

CONTEXT

In post-conflict, natural resource-dependent systems, implementing practices of environmental governance is key to sustainable development and peacebuilding.ⁱ Yet, strengthening relations between the state and rural spaces for participation, as well as for effective decision-making, implies decentralized democratic assets and incentives that are additionally challenged by COVID-19. An increasing body of literature shows that conflict-affected countries are most exposed to negative effects of the pandemic, by not only exacerbating vulnerabilities in health, economic, and democratic governance systems, but also by producing and reproducing old and new forms of violence.ⁱⁱ

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Community-based institutions can and must play an essential role in environmental governance to prevent socio-ecological conflicts. //

In Colombia, political instability and institutional violence are worsening the underlying causes of its internal conflict. This is particularly the case in rural contexts beset with land property insecurity and unequal land distribution, poor access to public services, broken decentralized systems,

and high levels of corruption. Our hypothesis is that formal and informal community-based institutions can and must play an essential role in nurturing practices of environmental governance to mitigate and prevent socio-ecological conflicts and improve livelihoods.ⁱⁱⁱ In this context, this contribution explores real scenarios of community-based environmental governance to ask what critical lessons and policy interventions can balance power dynamics at the interface of state-society relations.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Our work builds on the Community-Based Governance Framework (CBG), an interdisciplinary method of political ecology designed to promote local voices.^{iv} The CBG was tested in the context of the peace process in Colombia in the departments of Caquetá and Cesar. This led to a synthesis of collective problems and the development of joint solutions.^v Over 120 locals contributed to this study's research through a three-step approach integrating: a literature review (~20 science-based studies), two participatory workshops using the "World Café" methodology (~55 participants) to build trust, constructive dialogue, and collaborative learning,^{vi} and individual semi-structured interviews (~40).

Our results show that spaces of decision-making and local participation such as the Local Municipal Rural Development Councils (CMDR) and the Community Action Boards (CAB), provide opportunities to strengthen both formal and informal power to balance power relations, holding the central government accountable by mobilizing local civil society agents to prevent/mitigate socio-ecological conflicts and strategically leverage central government authority to promote the right of locals to plan context-specific development strategies.

Yet, supporting such strategies for effective policy implementation remains a major challenge. Top-down regulations appear to be characterized by a misunderstanding (either direct or indirect) of local practice, rationale, and reality. In fact, one of the major challenges of Colombian decentralization is not the lack of legal basis for implementing reform, but rather the lack of capacity and resources of subnational governments and community-based institutions to implement existing policies.^{vii} In this regard, CBG could serve as a decentralization instrument for environmental governance.

// One of the major challenges of Colombian decentralization is not the lack of legal basis for reform, but rather the lack of capacity and resources of subnational actors to implement existing policies. //

LOOKING AHEAD

Our results confirm academic insights on the significance of participatory-led approaches to socio-ecological conflict management, especially in natural resource-dependent systems.^{viii,ix,x} They advance the agenda by suggesting more integrated, inclusive and possibly more institutionalized schemes of participation. Decision makers at the national level should conduct bottom-up law-implementation initiatives that pay closer attention to local realities and solutions. Such process could generate financial and non-financial incentives for innovative solutions to the daunting socio-ecological conflicts. Policies and economic efforts should particularly target rural contexts, where peacebuilding processes are most at stake.^{xi}

The peace agreement signed in 2016 between the government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) revealed challenges, such as land rights and collective territories, that were previously obscured during the internal war. However, it also revealed lessons from the practice of bottom-up environmental governance in a country tackling multiple crises. Integrating dynamic analysis of how local formal and informal institutions respond to their realities and affect socio-ecological processes^{xii} could generate a policy conversation about polycentric environmental governance. Such a model entails constant collaboration between multiple governing and non-governing bodies (e.g., NGOs, associations etc.) at many scales to enforce context-specific policies within the environmental policy arena, thus achieving successful collective action in the face of change and crisis.^{xiii} While more research and implementation are needed to scale up and transfer effective polycentricity, our comparative research represents a small step towards a more inclusive democratic environmental governance system.

38. WE NEED BETTER SOUTHERN OCEAN PROTECTION: REDUCING CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS WHILE ENSURING A HEALTHY PLANETARY ECOSYSTEM

James Nikitine (Blue Cradle Foundation); Karen Scott (University of Canterbury)

There is an urgent need for more marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean to protect ecosystems and species, boost climate change resilience, and ensure the planetary oceanic system continues to function.

CONTEXT

The Southern Ocean is the southernmost ocean in the world, with a surface of 20 million km². It circles the entire Antarctic continent and is home to a very large number of marine species, including mammals, penguins, and thousands of seabirds.

Its waters are highly productive, with deep, cold currents, and melting ice boosting nutrient production and supporting large populations of phytoplankton and krill. It performs a key role in regulating our climate by absorbing carbon dioxide as well as heat from the atmosphere and cooling the global ocean through its circulation patterns. Over the last century, however, the Southern Ocean has also been heavily exploited through industrial fishing, as many nations have plundered its highly sought-after natural resources, including seals, whales, and finfish. Today, rapid climate change, bringing warming waters and ocean acidification, threatens marine ecosystems and species. In 2020, the World Meteorological Organization recorded a temperature of 18.3C on the Antarctic Peninsula, the hottest temperature on record.

The Antarctic continent and waters below 60° South are governed under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1991 Environmental Protocol, and the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

(CCAMLR). The CCAMLR Commission was established under the Convention; its objective is “the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources.”

To protect the Southern Ocean, area-based management tools, including marine protected areas (MPAs) and other area-based effective conservation measures (OECMs) impose some restrictions on industrial fishing and mineral extraction in areas of significant ecological value. In 2009, the first CCAMLR MPA was declared around the South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf, an area of 94,000km². This was followed by the Ross Sea MPA in 2016, now the largest high seas MPA in the world at 1.55 million km², of which 1.12 million km² is fully protected, with designated fishing zones for “special research” and krill research.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

MPAs or OECMs bring an array of ecological, social, and economic benefits, and are used widely by governments and fisheries organizations to meet global biodiversity conservation targets under the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development Goal 14 (Life Below Water).

However, in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not expressly provide for area-based management tools such as MPAs. This is being addressed in an Intergovernmental Conference through the negotiation of an international legally binding agreement instrument under UNCLOS for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of ABNJ.

While the South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf MPA and Ross Sea MPA are good examples of high seas area-based protection, the process through which they were created was fraught with geopolitical tensions. Both original MPA proposals were watered down during negotiations through a reduction in the no-take area, and, in the case of the Ross Sea MPA, time-limited duration of 35 years for the General Protection Zone, and 30 years for the Special Research Zone.

LOOKING AHEAD

There are currently several other proposals for new MPAs under CCAMLR, such as the Weddell Sea and the Antarctic Peninsula region in East Antarctica. These have been under negotiation for some years.

However, in 2021, the status of existing and future MPAs is in jeopardy. The consensus decision-making model of CCAMLR allows individual states to veto new measures and there are tensions over the meanings of ‘conservation’ and ‘rational use’ in its mandate.

In this context, we call on CCAMLR members to accelerate the process of MPA creation to promote ecosystem resilience in the face of climate change. In addition, we call on the signatories of the Antarctic Treaty to create protected areas under the 1991 Environmental Protocol which entered into force in 1998, and to take other measures to explicitly support CCAMLR MPAs, and to

implement an ecosystem approach to Southern Ocean protection.

We believe that collaboration between Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR states and partners will achieve a greater level of protection of Southern Ocean marine biological resources.

As the world is embattled with multiple global crises, we want to highlight the importance of the commitment to peace and science in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean region. We would like to remind the world that there is no better place to start creating new international and fully protected marine protected areas than in the Southern Ocean global ocean common regions, places that we rely upon for life on our planet to continue to thrive.

Ultimately, in anticipation of a newly agreed legally binding framework to designate marine protected areas in the global ocean commons areas of the high seas, we can be grateful that CCAMLR and the 1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty are paving the way as viable forums for diplomacy and environmental peacebuilding. However, although we encourage global commons environmental protection through multilateralism and dialogue, as our crises accelerate, we need urgent political leadership and decisive action sooner rather than later.



Anthony Powell www.antarcticimages.com

39. NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND PEACEBUILDING IN DARFUR: HOW A ZERO-SUM GAME BECAME A WIN-WIN SITUATION WHEN FARMERS AND PASTORALISTS WERE INCENTIVISED TO FIND SHARED SOLUTIONS

Dr. Flemming Nielsen and Atila Uras (UNEP Sudan); Eissa Yagoub Musa and Awadalla Hamid Mohamed Osman (Practical Action Sudan); Co-authorsⁱ

Sharing a contested, limited resource is a difficult starting point for peacebuilding. The Wadi El Ku project improved Darfur's natural resource base, making the intervention conditional on local communities finding solutions to their resource conflicts.

CONTEXT

The Darfur region in western Sudan has experienced large-scale armed conflict since 2003. More than 300,000 lives have been lost. Violence continues despite the 2020 Peace Agreement. The Darfur genocide is often explained as an ethnic conflict between Arab tribes and the indigenous Fur people. However, it was the result of overlapping conflicts related to regional and national politics, competition over natural resources, failed state institutions, marginalization, population growth, desertification, climate change, and other factors that do not always follow simplistic ethnic divisions.

A recurrent factor is the limited natural resource base that provides livelihoods in the region. By the 1980s, all agro-ecological niches in Darfur were fully utilized, making it difficult to accommodate the rapidly growing population. The local leaders, who in the past had allocated natural resources to families and individuals, had seen their authority undermined by the spread of private land ownership and attempts to replace them by post-independence regimes. However, the state has not been able to fully implement various land reforms. The previously symbiotic relationship between pastoralists and farmers broke down. Successive droughts

during the 1980s resulted in massive population displacement. Conflicts over access to resources increased, escalating into a civil war in 2003. The movements of millions of people due to war and drought has resulted in multiple claims to the same land and other natural resources.

All peace talks and agreements have acknowledged that lasting peace in Darfur requires resolving contested land ownership and natural resource access. Yet, there has been little progress on these issues over the last decades, in part due to a lack of trust in both formal and informal institutions.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Agreeing to share a contested limited resource is a difficult starting point for peacebuilding. Instead, the Wadi El Ku Catchment Management project started by increasing the natural resource base, making the intervention conditional on the local communities finding solutions to their natural resource conflicts.ⁱⁱ A zero-sum game was then turned into a win-win situation where stakeholders were incentivised to find shared solutions.

Being close to the edge of the Sahara, rainfall in the area is just around 200 mm per year, but the vast catchment area of 36,000 km² collects significant amounts of water, albeit only for a few days or weeks every year.

The riverbed is up to two km wide of fertile loam and clay, but the lack of water means that much of it cannot be cultivated. The solution is low, long earth dams—‘weirs’—built across the Wadi to hold the water back long enough for the soil to become soaked, before releasing it downstream. The soil’s high absorptive capacity makes it possible to cultivate one, two, or in rare cases, three crops after the rainy season.

Before constructing a weir, each community in the area is supported in developing a vision and a land-use plan. The project facilitates the participation of government officials in this process. The next step is to bring several communities together to identify which resources are contested. The project’s interventions are conditional on the communities reaching a consensus. This creates a strong incentive for finding creative shared solutions.

The project facilitated a governance structure in which local farmers and pastoralists are represented through local community-based organizations that have representatives in a Natural Resource Committee (NRC) covering several communities. This helped parties reach consensus through the creation of trusted conflict resolution mechanisms. The NRCs have representatives at a Catchment Management Agency (CMA) hosted by the state government, in which all relevant government institutions are represented. An emphasis on bottom-up decision making ensures buy-in from farmers and pastoralists as they see such processes as a way to get formal recognition of their natural resource claims.

// The project turned a zero-sum game into a win-win situation where stakeholders were incentivised to find shared solutions. //

LOOKING AHEAD

The combination of “expanding” the natural resource base and simultaneously establishing trusted conflict resolution mechanisms has proved highly effective. It has managed to resolve numerous local natural resource conflicts, establish a level of interaction and trust between communities that have not communicated for decades, and enable government staff to engage with the communities again.

The approach of the Wadi El Ku project has been copied by several projects and has inspired many others. The national government is following the experience closely and has shown interest in using a similar model throughout Sudan. Moreover, the project has relevance for the whole Sahel region. Infrastructure investments should be accompanied by good governance mechanisms from the grassroots to state levels, to ensure sustainability and ownership by all actors.



UNEP Evaluation Shagra, North Darfur – Sudan
2014 © Albert Gonzalez Farran, UNAMID

40. WATER, CLIMATE, AND ENVIRONMENT: BEYOND IRAQ'S OBVIOUS CONFLICTS

Tobias von Lossow (Clingendael Institute and IHE Delft); Peter Schwartzstein (CCS and Wilson Center); Hassan Partow (UNEP)ⁱ

Environmental momentum offers a pathway for a new Iraqi Peace.

CONTEXT

After more than 40 years of intermittent conflict, dictatorship, and foreign intervention, Iraq is riven with socio-economic crises, sectarian and ethnic tensions, and fraying social cohesion, some of which risk contributing to further violence. Since the territorial defeat of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in 2017, however, Iraq has experienced few major hostilities, though the extremist group continues to terrorize certain areas. As job prospects and the quality of basic services have deteriorated, popular anger has spilled into protests against a political class and system that many Iraqis distrust and see as incapable of meeting the population's needs. Global and regional geopolitical tussles are adding to the fragility of an increasingly tenuous-looking peace.

Against this backdrop, Iraq is experiencing some of the region's most debilitating resource, climate, and environmental woes, which are exacerbating existing crises. Severe drought has compounded the failure of water supply services in the south. Extreme heat, which sometimes tops 50C, is overtaxing an electricity network already unable to meet demand, repeatedly plunging millions into dangerous temperatures without relief. The combination of water shortages, climate change, and environmental degradation is directly threatening people's lives and livelihoods and has helped to spur instability and mass mobilization, notably in Basra in 2018. Many Iraqis increasingly struggle with heat-related sickness or respiratory ailments as dust and sandstorms intensify. Farming and fisheries, the

bedrocks of the rural economy and vital planks in the state's bid to diversify away from the oil sector, are wavering in tougher conditions.

Between wildfires and infrastructure-eating floods in the north, and a particularly egregious water situation in the south, few people remain unaffected by these changes. Though the intensity and nature of environmental degradation vary across the country, these issues cut across sectarian, ideological, geographical, and socio-economic lines in ways that few other topics do. As a result, there are many opportunities for country-wide dialogue that can contribute to the peacebuilding efforts across Iraq.

Obstacles

The potential for environmental grievances to rally diverse political constituencies can prompt blowback from the state and non-state security actors, particularly as climate stresses become more pronounced. The political setting is becoming harsher for environmental civil society in Iraq, with many of its activists regarded with suspicion by militias and certain elements of the security services, not least because of their association with the 2018-2019 protest movement. Some have been intimidated, a number arrested, and at least one murdered in Basra for reasons that were at least partly related to her campaigning.

Environmentalists have enjoyed little success in bringing together the numerous ministries and other government bodies whose responsibilities

relate to the environment. Achieving this would require Iraqi policies to mainstream an environmental agenda, strengthen corresponding capacities, and develop relevant policies. Generally, environmental challenges and disasters need to be recognized as pressing problems with a major bearing on national security, not exceptional crises to be fobbed off with quick fixes. Another obstacle is that some see an environmental agenda as a threat to the oil sector, which bankrolls over 90 per cent of the government budget and provides some of the country's scarce jobs.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The Iraqi government appears eager to tackle environmental challenges. It ratified the Paris Agreement in January 2021, endorsed its Nationally Determined Contribution in October 2021, and has welcomed foreign assistance in addressing its water crisis. Leading politicians, such as President Barham Salih, have repeatedly stressed the gravity of the country's climate and resource challenges, though this also redirects popular rage away from Baghdad. The uncertain long-term outlook for fossil fuels makes the transition to a green and climate-resilient economy an opportunity for Iraq to usher in new jobs, improve health and living conditions, and promote stability.

On a civil society level, too, momentum is building. Environmental initiatives have been established; older civil society organizations have expanded into 'green' campaigning; and the country has a growing cohort of environmentally interested journalists. Although crises are often perceived as isolated challenges and the environmental movement remains fractured and weak, activists are developing pan-Iraqi networks. There are initiatives to educate campaigners from different governorates about one another's challenges, such as by taking Kurdish environmentalists to the marshes in the south and vice versa. Environmental NGOs are orchestrating workshops, for example, on the

use of drip irrigation and other water-saving techniques.

The continuing fallout from the emergence of IS has drastically illustrated the extent to which Iraq's stability is contingent on a healthy natural world. Having first taken advantage of battered agrarian communities to bolster its ranks, the group then used water as a weapon to achieve political and military goals, before laying waste to swathes of farmland as it retreated. The environmental toll of the conflict and successful efforts to rehabilitate some of the most devastating damage, such as around the oilfields at Qayyarah, have underscored how salvaging the environment can yield economic rewards while allaying some local grievances.

LOOKING AHEAD

Still a nascent concept, environmental peacebuilding in Iraq is likely to grow in significance. Locally led and internationally supported environmental initiatives need to be integrated into broader stabilization and recovery efforts in conflict-affected areas, as well as into development and governance programmes for the rest of the country. Environmental peacebuilding can help catalyse action on key issues, such as natural resource management, basic service provision, the return of displaced persons, job creation, grievances over pollution, and (transboundary) cooperation and dialogue, particularly on water. Current sources of instability, water, climate, and environmental issues could turn into desperately needed bridges to a better future.

CHAPTER 7 - ENDNOTES

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i. Co-authors: Kamaleldin Elsiddig Bashar Gido, Mariam Ibrahim Abubakr Mohammed, Mohamed Siddig Suliman and Siddig Yousif Ali Mohammed (UNEP Sudan); Abdalla Adam Osman, Adil Yousif Suliman, Ahmed Mohamed Ibrahim, Ahmed Musa Algazuli, Essameldin Yagoub Dawelbait Ibrahim, Howida Hamid Mohamed, Naserldin Ali Adam, Sakeena Adam Ibrahim and Tyseer Ahmed Mohamed Omer (Practical Action Sudan)

ii. A Wadi is a dry (ephemeral) riverbed that contains water only when heavy rain occurs.

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i. The views expressed in this paper are of the authors and do not reflect those of UNEP.

8. INNOVATION

Following page: art by [Victoria Nakada](#) (Japan | USA)

Victoria Nakada is an artist from Japan now residing in Hawaii, who is often inspired by nature and science. She is most known for her houses on stilts and characters called 'Moonies', which she uses to share the sense of home through her artwork.



VICTORIA
NAKADA

41. ADAPTIVE PEACEBUILDING: IMPROVING CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT THROUGH REAL-TIME DATA AND ANALYSIS

Cedric de Coning (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs); Diego Osorio (Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies); Frans Schapendonk, Grazia Pacillo, and Peter Laderach (CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security and Alliance of Bioversity International and the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture, CIAT)

Adaptive peacebuilding copes with emerging climate-related security risks through iterative inductive experimentation and learning. This process can be enhanced by feeding the adaptive process with real-time data and analysis. Strengthening cooperation between peacebuilders and researchers studying climate change and its effects on social systems can improve the effectiveness of adaptive peacebuilding.

CONTEXT

Despite a growing number of high-level statements from the UN Security Council and heads of state, international efforts to maintain international peace and security have not sufficiently taken the effects of climate change into account.ⁱ One reason for this is the insufficient availability of empirical data and analysis to drive the systemic integration of climate security risks into adaptive peacebuilding decision-making.ⁱⁱ

In the coming decades, climate change will increasingly undermine international efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace and will make peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian responses more complex and costly. The result will be conflicts that last longer, cause more suffering, and disrupt development.ⁱⁱⁱ Tools that help to generate robust, localized, and real-time data and analysis will generate the evidence-base needed to drive climate-sensitive adaptive peacebuilding. More cooperation will be needed between researchers and practitioners in the fields of climate change, social-ecological systems, peacebuilding, and security policy to develop and refine the methods needed to improve climate-related security risk management.^{iv}

// Tools that help to generate robust, localized, and real-time data and analysis will generate the evidence-base needed to drive climate-sensitive adaptive peacebuilding. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Efforts to integrate climate security risks into peace programming remain limited and ad hoc. For example, an assessment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) concluded that the Mission lacks the capacity to sufficiently monitor and integrate such risks, despite the salience of climate-related factors in Mali.^v A more institutionalized climate security-sensitive conflict resolution framework informed by localized and real-time climate security evidence could inform a more integrated approach in which the drivers of climate-related insecurity are systematically incorporated.

One exception is the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), which has since

2017-2018 experimented with a more integrated response to climate security risks. This included coordinating drought responses through the Drought Operations Coordination Centres and the Recovery and Resilience Framework. UNSOM's work in this area has been boosted by the deployment of an Environmental Security Advisor.^{vi} Sadly, the UNSOM example is still the exception, but it serves as a proof of concept for the need to consider how climate insecurities overlap and sustain other forms of insecurity.

The good news is that several tools to improve the integration of climate data and analysis into adaptive peacebuilding are under development. Some seek to improve early warning assessments with the aim of integrating climate fragility risks into planning processes. Others focus on climate fragility mapping to identify where climate stress and shocks are likely to occur.^{vii} As the climate security interface in any given location is constantly shifting, with both ecological and social systems continuously co-evolving, these tools need to be highly adaptive. Tools also need to take into consideration how the presentation of data and analysis can help (or hinder) the integration of climate-related security risks across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, and importantly also transcend global-local and formal-informal divides.

LOOKING AHEAD

One set of tools responding to the need for rapid, real-time, but also accessible data and evidence is the Climate Security Crisis Observatory (CSCO), one of the game-changing solutions proposed in Action Track 5 of the UN Food Systems Summit (UNFSS) Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus. The CSCO is being developed by CGIAR in partnership with stakeholders across Latin and Central America, Africa, and South-East Asia. The CSCO aims to provide real-time, inter-disciplinary analysis to generate policy-relevant climate-related security information at the regional, national, and sub-national level. Reducing the time between data collection, analysis, and the presentation of evidence-based

climate-related security risk information can increase the adaptive capacity of peace and security decision-making mechanisms.

For example, a symbiotic interface between climate security-sensitive support tools and the adaptive peacebuilding programme cycle can mutually enhance research and inform decision-making. Social and ecological systems are inseparably linked and form complex adaptive systems active across multiple spatial and temporal scales. As their dynamics are non-linear and emergent, their future behaviour is inherently uncertain. It also means that the exact outcomes of any intervention cannot be predicted. The best way to cope with this complexity is to experiment and continuously adapt to incorporate the feedback and knowledge generated from that experimentation. The two key operational factors of adaptive peacebuilding are variation—in the form of experimenting with multiple parallel interventions—and selection, through which effective interventions are selected, replicated, and scaled-up. This process enables practitioners to make use of real-time data and analysis to improve the monitoring of peacebuilding interventions in climate-sensitive and conflict-prone contexts.^{viii} It can be enhanced by increasing knowledge exchanges and establishing a transparent environment in which setbacks are seen as learning opportunities that drive adaptation.^{ix}

An important element of adaptive peacebuilding is the recognition that the emergence of resilient self-organizing social institutions is a prerequisite for self-sustaining peace. The active participation of the affected community and society in all stages of the adaptive process is therefore critical. Adaptive peacebuilding needs to be informed, shaped, and sustained by the knowledge and goals of the affected community. International partners can support these efforts by sharing networks, resources, comparative knowledge of other systems, and process facilitation.

42. MONITORING, EVALUATION, & LEARNING: APPROACHES FOR BUILDING RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINING PEACE

Shanna McClain (NASA); Patrice Talla (Food and Agricultural Organization); Carl Bruch (Environmental Law Institute)

Improved integration of monitoring, evaluation, and learning approaches to peacebuilding could enhance the evidence base for resilience and inform future programming on building resilience and sustaining peace.

CONTEXT

In an effort to better understand security risks relating to economic, environmental, social, and political shocks and stressors, and the impacts from environmental peacebuilding initiatives to manage these risks, growing attention has been placed on integrating approaches for monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) into the peacebuilding processes. Persistent evaluation gaps and little to no evaluation activity in settings of violent conflict exist. Therefore, little credible information exists about the effectiveness and results of peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts.¹

When evaluations do occur, they are often focused on process and mapping of the context of conflict, leaving questions regarding causality inadequately addressed. This can weaken efforts focused on learning and accountability. Further, there is an urgent need to ensure that not only are humanitarian response and development interventions on track, but that they are not causing further harm by exacerbating inequalities and the fragmentation of communities, or by weakening unifying ties among conflict-affected areas.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Peacebuilding is a complex process focused on creating conditions for positive and sustainable peace by addressing systemic structures and causes of violence. The settings of conflict and fragility are intricate, combining multifaceted change processes with high levels of unpredictability, lack of information, and sometimes intentional misinformation. Though no two situations of conflict and fragility are the same, they can share some common characteristics and contextual risks (e.g., re-emergence of violence, disasters); therefore, finding effective ways to monitor, evaluate, and learn from effective peacebuilding approaches can improve resilience within impacted communities.

Monitoring and evaluation are often-conflated terms that refer to oversight functions providing information to understand performance, outputs, and accountability. However, there are important differences between monitoring and evaluation, particularly in the context of peacebuilding. Monitoring typically serves as a management function for measuring compliance, where evaluations are conducted independently to provide an objective assessment of the effectiveness of programs and specific interventions. Information gained

from evaluating environmental peacebuilding approaches can provide evidence of what works or doesn't and can validate specific actions to be scaled up or to determine which are most effective in particular contexts.ⁱⁱ Matching conflict interventions to outcomes can prove challenging; therefore, developing more consistent, extensive, and refined MEL tools can provide opportunities for accountability and learning.

Despite the opportunities for MEL in environmental peacebuilding, the process can be complicated by a number of challenges, including myriad actors and organizations that can add uncertainty and complexity to data collection and attribution, the often protracted nature of conflict and crisis settings—which can complicate the evaluation of effectiveness of particular interventions—the dynamic and insecure context, and the diverse and sometimes conflicting objectives and metrics used for peacebuilding interventions.ⁱⁱⁱ

LOOKING AHEAD

There is much work to be done to advance the understanding of how to monitor, evaluate, and learn from peacebuilding initiatives effectively. Donor aid requires a focused shift from humanitarian response and short-term stability (i.e., cessation of hostilities) to a longer-term understanding of how interventions affect societal relations and prospects for developing a resilient, functioning, and legitimate state. Further elaboration of indicators and approaches to MEL approaches to peacebuilding are also needed, particularly where there is a bridge between environmental and peacebuilding indicators. It is also essential that evaluations prepare for risks, develop robust designs that integrate human and natural systems, and ensure sufficient flexibility to counter uncertainty and complexity experienced in conflict settings.

In addition to the development of more robust MEL approaches for environmental peacebuilding, institutionalization of these processes is also necessary. Because this process is often undertaken to satisfy donors and demonstrate effectiveness, there can be a reluctance to report honestly. However, if these processes become embedded programmatically, the cycle of improved learning, innovation, and scalability extend beyond a single programme to enable more systemic change. Recently, there has been a shift to focus more on theories of change rather than quantitative metrics, and to evaluate how a particular intervention contributed to a specific outcome instead of looking solely at attribution. Finally, to fully realize transformational peacebuilding, it is imperative that donors embrace risk.

Experience has shown that the international community tends to repeat mistakes despite sources of conflict varying significantly from place to place. Peacebuilding interventions may not always go as planned, but it is only through providing safe avenues to share failures that we can improve collective learning and adaptive responses.

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43. ADDRESSING CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS: LEVERAGING THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION FOR INTEGRATED CLIMATE AND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE POLICY, PROGRAMME, AND BUSINESS

Albert Martinez (United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP); Alejandro Martín Rodríguez (UNEP and European External Action Service); Ji Won Bang (Planet)

Emerging earth observation and artificial intelligence technologies could revolutionize environmental peacebuilding if policy makers can harness the right skills and public-private partnerships.

CONTEXT

The future of environmental peacebuilding needs to be reconsidered. Many international actors acknowledge climate-related security risks in their latest policiesⁱ but translation into peacebuilding practice is challenging. Peacebuilding interventions often lack climate adaptation, and climate change adaptation programmes fail to incorporate peacebuilding goals. Consequently, siloed responses cannot match the speed and spread of climate-related security risks.

Is it possible to solve future climate and conflict challenges with environmental peacebuilding approaches from the past? A profound structural transformation is needed where the digital revolution catalyses a 'digital by default' analysis and monitoring of climate and conflict and supports policymaking and integrated programming with cross-sectoral expertise. This transformation should feature an interdisciplinary approach that ensures that conflict prevention and mediation efforts are climate-sensitive, and that climate projects are conflict-sensitive.

To address climate-related security risks, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have jointly developed novel integrated environmental peacebuilding approaches to strengthen

social trust and resilience to conflict. Climate-conflict analysis based on mixed field and Earth Observation (EO) methods formed the basis of the project. This used remote sensing technologies to gather information on the socio-economic aspects of the local communities in the area, as well as their environmental systems, to enhance the understanding of climate-related security risks.

Opportunities to implement similar projects are now on the horizon. Instruments such as the EU's billion-euro development budget which require interventions in fragile countries to be based on solid and comprehensive conflict analysis, represent perfect entry-points for conflict- and climate-sensitive action that could serve as a model to be replicated by other institutions. To advance these programmes, new technologies must be leveraged appropriately.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Integrated conflict and climate analysis are increasingly used in environmental peacebuilding. They rely on new technologies that leverage cross-disciplinary data and insights to understand the security impacts of climate change on human systems.ⁱⁱ There is a critical barrier that prevents the successful leveraging of these technologies in practice: their complexity

requires technical skills and infrastructure. In fact, the rapid development and proliferation of digital technologies are leaving many people behind in what is becoming known as the ‘Digital Divide’.

Frontier technological advances have been possible as businesses embraced social and environmental impact-driven purposes. This has resulted in a perfect context for leveraging complementarity. For the future of environmental peacebuilding, this means brokering collaborations to apply new technologies such as EO to improve climate and conflict analysis and monitoring. Recent EO breakthroughs have improved the temporal and spatial resolution of data. The greater integration and automation of analysis will allow non-technical users to better measure change and improve their decision-making. This, together with capacity-building efforts in digital literacy, is solving the long-standing problem that EO has been an expensive technology only accessible to highly trained scientists.

Planet, a leading environmentally mission-driven earth imagery company, offers some best practices of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for how to achieve these efforts. Planet has improved not only the availability and quality of geospatial data, but also its measurability, which is essential to capture change and impact. In early-warning and disaster risk reduction, for example, Planet has partnered with the EU’s Copernicus Emergency Management System to innovate early warning to floods, droughts, and wildfires by delivering faster analyses of large areas regardless of the time of the day and weather conditions.ⁱⁱⁱ Another illustrative case is Planet’s collaboration with the Government of Norway to provide high-resolution data of the world’s tropics with the aim of reducing tropical forest loss and conserving biodiversity.^{iv} Making this data publicly accessible not only enabled countries such as Brazil and Colombia to monitor their forests, but also helped Indigenous organizations to protect their territory.

A few lessons learned emerge from Planet’s experience. PPPs can empower end-users with better access to data, contributing to monitoring near-real-time environmental change to support data-informed decision-making. Technology companies with relevant expertise can support capacity building within public organizations and civil society, helping to bridge the lack of skills and resources. PPPs could also be replicated in realms such as livelihoods and security, servicing monitoring to track seasonal transhumance, identifying sites of illegal artisanal mining, timber exploitations, and oil bunkering.

LOOKING AHEAD

International actors hoping to address climate-related security risks can focus their attention on two key areas:

Preparing the community of practice to access new digital technologies and analytical techniques by enhancing digital literacy and including climate and security data-driven analysis for programme design. This action represents a necessary investment to ensure that digital technologies can predict and address climate-related security risks. Decision-makers should encourage capacity-building on digital literacy to enhance trust in technologies, especially regarding GIS for its relevance in spatial risk analysis. Digital public goods should be published on a regular basis showing real-time climate-security hotspots and options for nature-based solutions.

Promotion of PPPs to increase complementarity between business development and public missions in support of societal, environmental, and peacebuilding goals. This is needed for the delivery of data-driven climate and conflict analysis, which can only be significantly improved through PPPs where infrastructure and expertise are combined. Policymakers could start by developing standards, norms, and guidance frameworks that foster the emergence of PPPs such as facilitating data-sharing arrangements, enhancing trust-building among stakeholders, and developing licensing agreements and interoperability regimes.

44. HARNESSING SCIENCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING: HOW SCIENCE DIPLOMACY CAN SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE PEACE

Héléa Khaizourane (Montpellier University of Excellence, UNESCO Chair SIMEV); Steven Pineda (NGO Pentagon Wave for Research and Development); Gilbert Rios (UNESCO Chair SIMEV); Tobias Von Lossow (Clingendael Institute)

Integrating science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) into environmental peacebuilding programmes can empower youth and support sustainable local outcomes.

CONTEXT

Throughout history, science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) have impacted and often improved people's lives. Recent alarming trends in natural resource management require greater efforts to support prevention of resource-related conflicts and ways to bridge disciplines. Science diplomacy usually intervenes in international collaborations between scientists on specific topics. However, what if scientists become active stakeholders of environmental peacebuilding programmes? By involving STEM, new approaches can be developed for collective actions.

While scientific data and technological innovations play a role in environmental assessments, they have not yet been fully exploited as tools of diplomacy. This is in part because more than 5,000 scientific papers are published per day, and it can be difficult for practitioners to access, analyse, select, and use environmental data that are relevant to their projects. This contribution aims to showcase examples of how interdisciplinary relationships can be built with STEM sectors and how educational transformation processes for youth in rural areas can provide solutions to local environmental problems in those communities.

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

1. Dealing with data: Sharing knowledge and building bridges across sectors at the local level
SIMEV is an organization that was created in partnership between UNESCO and the Chemistry School of Engineering of Montpellier, France. It brings together water researchers and engineers specialized in providing robust solutions for water decontamination and treatment. This organization complements STEM sectors and acts as a mobile taskforce with the capacity to answer water issues faced by the local population. SIMEV develops a format of valuing STEM data by developing scientific and technological workshops based on concrete local and social water issues reported by the country host (industrial, agricultural, mining contaminations, etc.). This approach mobilizes universities, governments, communities, NGOs, and industrials intervening in the country on conflicts faced on the ground. As a result of such exchanges, partnerships made with industrials allowed the rapid development of water treatment stations. One of our projects was developed in Senegal, where conflicts have been linked to contamination of groundwaters by both fluorine and salt. The excessively high concentration of ions causes numerous diseases, creating economic and social conflicts among communities who have accused each other of intentional contamination.

This cross-sectoral collaboration between local actors, STEM, and industry led to the implementation of robust water technology combined with renewable energies. First, a local and accurate set of data was produced (water analysis, natural resources availability for renewable energy, etc.). Then, the specific design of robust technologies was developed (using adapted membrane filters and operational parameters) followed by the implementation of a pilot station by the industrial partner. In that particular case, STEM specialists provided data on the nuanced causes of these mutually impacting issues as well as a neutral background for reconciliation between communities. Their involvement empowered several young people to maintain the water station in close relation with the local university and to create a start-up.

2. Youth empowerment for environmental peacebuilding in rural areas

The Pentagon Wave for Research and Development NGO studies the transfer of STEM outcomes (biochemistry, neuroscience, etc.) combined with social sciences to deliver innovative methodologies for peacebuilding and conflict resolution. These methodologies aim to include STEM within the format of dialogue to motivate individuals, guided by experts. In the southern region of Nariño, Colombia, they were used as science diplomatic tools to address concrete challenges faced by peacemakers for the development of long-term projects on the ground, including with regard to social conflicts, self-empowerment, communication and trust.

The STEM methodology was implemented in one of the projects developed in partnership with schools to mobilize youth from rural areas for environmental actions. One hundred and fifty students from coca zones had a major concern with plastic pollution affecting rivers and their natural surroundings, which is also linked to a massive displacement of people coming to work in coca crops. The youth, women, and associations were able to participate actively to develop the project to present community solutions for the transformation of rubbish into recycled tiles. Using the local resources available, they ended with the development of prototypes and design of economic models.

LOOKING AHEAD

1. Work across disciplines

The integration of STEM expertise into environmental peacebuilding programmes is underdeveloped due to the difficulty of interdisciplinary dialogue, as well as challenges in the access to and orientation of STEM scientists and data. Greater efforts from both sides to link peacemakers and STEM sectors should emerge to address environmental peace projects. In order to overcome those barriers, STEM should be reorganized into clusters of knowledge addressing well defined themes of research and solutions that are easily identifiable by other institutions. This would facilitate cross-sector dialogues and partnerships between decision-makers, peacemakers, civil society organizations, and scientists, as well as easier access to data and expertise.

2. Involve local population and youth

The basis of any long-term environmental project is to reach a high level of engagement in the community and to inspire youth to take on leadership roles. To that end, it is essential to provide youth not just with theoretical concepts, but with the tools they need to build trust and leverage their capabilities. The implementation of more practical tools, in both rural and urban areas, should be carefully selected to foster collaboration and entrepreneurship, and to develop the passion, build trust, and enhance problem-solving skills.

// The basis of any long-term environmental project is to reach a high level of engagement in the community and to inspire youth to take on leadership role. //

45. WHEN RESILIENCE IS NOT ENOUGH: LEARNING FROM NATURE TO REGENERATE SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

Aline Brachet (Appia-Capacity); Tarik Chekchak (Institut des Futurs Souhaitables)

Conflict resolution and nature conservation practitioners should challenge the concept of resilience when contexts require social and ecological regeneration instead.

CONTEXT

In the Sahel, most interventions still mention community resilience as an objective, but such models no longer respond to people's needs. Instead, traditional communities are challenged by demographic changes, as youth now represent close to 70 per cent of the population and many villages have become suburbs. Meanwhile, globalization (of the economy, trade, and values) is shifting power relations. Resilience of Sahelians to such a dysfunctional context is not what is required, but rather a renewal of the local, national, and regional social contracts. In the Biovallée, the valley of the Drome River in southeastern France, the level of pollution of the river in the 1980s was the product of radical changes in human production and consumption systems (farming, dams, waste management): its own capacity to adapt to human intervention (its resilience) would not have been enough for the river to regenerate. What has been required was a total change in trajectory of the socio-ecosystem.ⁱ

This article makes the argument for and illustrates the necessary paradigm shift away from strengthening resilience and toward building the conditions required to regenerate both society and nature.

Both authors, in their respective fields of work, find that defining people or nature as 'resilient' is sometimes counterproductive. The concept

of resilience is based on the idea that nature and people can adapt to any shocks; it has thus become a means to encourage people (or ecosystems) to adapt to what should not be acceptable.

// Resilience is not what is required, but rather a renewal of the local, national, and regional social contracts. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The concept of resilienceⁱⁱ is helpful for understanding how a system can be dynamic, constantly evolving, and maintain its "identity"ⁱⁱⁱ despite the changes it undergoes. In nature and in society, it is often observed that after a crisis, species and humans adapt to, and even learn from, the stressful experience. Like the species of trees that requires a fire to germinate, or like Sahelian herders who diversify their cattle or adjust their path to overcome the yearly drought.

In socio-ecosystems, a situation does not instantaneously jump from harmony to violent conflict, and an ecosystem is rarely destroyed overnight. Along the way to negative change,

resilience plays a role. But there comes a point when any trigger can bring the entire system into a new identity: for example, a coral reef dies or a community system disaggregates. When such a threshold is passed, the concept of resilience becomes irrelevant.

In the socio-ecosystems we have studied, crises never happened once and they were never isolated from what was happening in the super-system or sub-systems. For example, the near collapse of the Drome River system in the 1980s was due to a succession of human interventions that had challenged its natural resilience so deeply that the river basin had shifted towards a new identity: a polluted water. This is not called a crisis, but a “revolt” in the Panarchy^{iv} model. In the Sahel, pastoralism is mistakenly described as a sector facing endless and repetitive crises. However, this may not be a crisis as such, but the signs of a “revolt” of a socio-ecosystem that has overcome the threshold that allows resilience to work. Unless the new identity of the socio-ecosystem in the Sahel is acknowledged and understood, the interventions designed to overcome the difficulties will fail.

LOOKING AHEAD

Two principles taken from nature could nourish peacebuilding practice. The authors invite readers to consider them, beginning with the Sahelian example:

Principle 1: Bet on the resources that are abundant in your system. In nature, abundant atoms, not rare ones, are used to synthesize all living materials. In the Sahel, one of the abundant resources is the population under 25. Youth have been the target of resilience programs for years. Governance structures, all of which vest decision-making power in elders, resist freeing this abundant resource from their system. What if youth were supported, not be resilient, but to fully achieve their revolt through other ways than by joining armed groups or leaving the pastoral zones for the cities?

Principle 2: Think of your system as both specific and dynamic; consider that it is able to shift to a different type of system, and anticipate what it might become (for example, borders and limits can be seen as cell membranes, not as solid walls that prevent exchanges with the outside world). In the Sahel, the “identity” of mobile herders is currently at stake: policymakers constantly ask them to “modernize” (read: “sedentarize”), driving the system out of its functional identity. Yet mobile cattle remain the only option for inhabitants of the Sahel to produce locally with a positive and balanced environmental, social, and economic impact. What if mobile pastoralists took control of their own future mobile identity through renewed exchanges with the outside (i.e., environmental and social contracts)?

From our practice, the most difficult aspect of applying these principles in the Sahel is resisting current dominant narratives of adaptation and resilience. We need to design the global framework for peaceful revolts within any dying system and better design and support social and ecological “identity” shifts. It requires time for regeneration, just as time has been needed for destruction. A desirable future cannot fit into a project’s logical framework. We need to shift from “project mode” to “process mode” to regenerate both nature and society.

// What if youth were supported, not to be resilient, but to fully achieve their revolt? //



Niger: building resilience
2014 ©CE/ECHO/Jean De Lestrange

CHAPTER 8 - ENDNOTES

ARTICLE 41

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ARTICLE 43

i. Only in the past three years, the [European Green Deal](#), the [EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Climate and Energy Diplomacy](#) and the [EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy](#). In addition, the African Union, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Group of 7 recognized the linkage of the two issues and their newly emerged policies reflect the relationship to promote integrated action.

ii. The [European Council Conclusions on Digitalization for the Benefit of the Environment](#), the [EU Data Strategy](#), the [European Digital Services Act](#), the [UN Secretary General's Roadmap on Digital Cooperation](#), the [UN Secretary-General's Data Strategy](#), the [Digital Transformation sub-programme of UNEP's Medium-Term Strategy](#) and the [Global Environment Data Strategy adopted by the UN Environmental Assembly in EA.4/Res.23](#).

iii. EU (2021) Copernicus Emergency Management Service (<https://emergency.copernicus.eu>)

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ARTICLE 45

i. Authors look at the context they engage in as a unique system composed of natural resources, governance rules and patterns, actors, relationships between human needs and eco-system health, etc. Those dimensions interact as a network and compose a socio-ecosystem.

ii. Defined by the Resilience Alliance network of researchers as: “the ability to absorb a disturbance and reorganize while maintaining essentially the same functions, the same structure and the same feedback loops, and therefore the same identity.”

iii. Identity refers to the definition of the functionality of any system (here a coral, a community)

iv. Panarchy is a framework of nature’s rules, hinted at by the name of the Greek god of nature—Pan—whose persona also evokes an image of unpredictable change. Panarchy draws the interconnection of the adaptive circles, trying to make sense of the interplay between change and persistence, between the predictable and unpredictable, Holling et al. 2002

9. COOPERATION

Following page: art by [Nina Montenegro \(US\)](#) of [The Far Woods](#)

Sisters Sonya and Nina Montenegro are illustrators, printmakers, menders, quilters, and gardeners. In 2013 they founded The Far Woods, a creative collaboration making artwork that seeks to contribute to a culture shift in which there is a land ethic, reverence for nature, rejection of the dominant throw-away mentality, and direct connection to where our food and the things we use come from.



46. ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING IN CENTRAL ASIA: REDUCING CONFLICTS THROUGH CROSS-BORDER ECOLOGICAL COOPERATION

Mirza Sadaqat Hudaⁱ (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Academy)

Cooperation on transnational natural resources can reduce tensions between states and communities.

CONTEXT

The economic potential of the Central Asian region is greatly constrained by environmental degradation and a plethora of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Ethnic and territorial conflicts dominate the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia, despite ecological linkages such as shared rivers and mountain ranges and commonalities in culture and history. These conflicts have led politicians in Central Asian countries to perceive natural resources from the perspective of sovereignty and national security. Myopic policies and poor governance have stymied regional approaches to water, energy, and climate change, and triggered multiple resource-based conflicts.

// Resilience is not what is required, but rather a renewal of the local, national, and regional social contracts. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

One of the many resources shared by the countries of Central Asia are the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins. Under the centralized system of the Soviet Union, the upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provided water to the downstream countries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan for

the irrigation of crops in the summer months. In turn, downstream countries provided electricity and fossil fuels to the upstream countries. This system of resource sharing collapsed with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Without guaranteed supplies of energy from downstream countries, the upstream countries became increasingly dependent on hydroelectric generation throughout the year, which meant that water release patterns changed from predominantly summer to winter. This resulted in less water for irrigation in the summer and increased flooding in the winter in downstream countries,ⁱⁱ which led to multiple violent conflicts between regional states. In addition, proposals by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to develop multiple hydroelectric dams have led to incendiary political rhetoric between upstream and downstream countries.

The poorly demarcated borders of Central Asia also cause communities to fight over water and pastoral land.ⁱⁱⁱ Ethnic cleavages in Central Asia often intersect with competition over scarce resources, leading to violent conflict. For example, the Ferghana Valley shared by three Central Asian countries has seen multiple ethnic clashes over water and land. These ethnic conflicts are expected to increase due to the effects of climate change and political rhetoric and can spill over into cross-border violence.^{iv}

In recent years, conflicts over natural resources in Central Asia have influenced and been influenced by rising ethno-nationalistic populism, migrant flows, the breakdown of inter-communal relations, increasing Islamist extremism, and a securitized approach to international borders, creating a volatile and conflict-prone region.^v The environment is thus one of the many compounding sources of conflicts in Central Asia. Scholars of environmental peacebuilding propose that if environmental issues can cause conflicts, cooperation over the environment can also reduce tensions and enhance trust and understanding. In this context, two broad pathways on environmental peacebuilding can be examined in Central Asia: cooperation between state-level actors and grassroots engagement between community members.

LOOKING AHEAD

State-level actors in Central Asia must actively engage in cooperation on shared rivers. In the past, state-level actors have utilized water and energy as bargaining chips in geopolitical conflicts, leading to the ineffectiveness of initiatives such as the Interstate Fund for saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) and the Almaty Agreement. In this context, state actors can use proposals for hydroelectric dams and transnational grids in Central Asia to create consensus on integrated approaches to water and energy.

While dams in Central Asia have created political controversy, they are an important element to energy transition as well as regional integration through initiatives such as the under-construction Central Asia-South Asia Power Project and the rejuvenation of the Central Asian Power System. Some studies propose that if hydroelectric development is used as an entry point for broader cooperation on flood and drought management, wastewater treatment, river erosion, and irrigation, it could enhance the potential for sustainable development as well as reduce conflicts between co-riparians.^{vi} For hydroelectric cooperation to spill over into broader forms of environmental peacebuilding, state-level actors must engage in the design and maintenance of dams; share the costs and benefits

of hydroelectric generation; and collaborate on the development of technical expertise, exchange of data and the formalization of early warning systems.^{vii} Successful cooperation on water and hydroelectricity at the bilateral level can lead to the creation of long-term, regional agreements on river basin management.^{viii}

Environmental programmes can also be used to address ethnic-conflict and societal tensions in Central Asia. Grassroots environmental programmes that focus on youth have been used to reduce xenophobia, deconstruct ethnic and religious stereotypes, and build relationships between members of different communities.^{ix} This can involve the development of experiential learning programmes that bring together youth from multiple ethnic communities to contribute to the conservation of water and the protection of wildlife and natural ecosystems. As demonstrated by similar initiatives in other regions,^x educational programmes that enable youth from different communities to live together and work collaboratively on ecological conservation projects can build societal resilience to ethno-nationalistic rhetoric while also enhancing environmental leadership in Central Asia. The impact of these programmes can be enhanced through social media and the development of educational curricula that emphasize the ecological interdependence of the region.

State-level and grassroots approaches to environmental peacebuilding in Central Asia can benefit from drawing on existing regional arrangements. For example, the Chu-Talas Commission is considered a successful example of water cooperation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Regional educational institutions, such as the American University of Central Asia, have brought together young people from diverse nationalities and ethnic backgrounds to engage with each other on common challenges and aspirations. The international community can engage with domestic institutions to facilitate local ownership of efforts to promote the ecological integrity and political stability of Central Asia.

47. BLENDING CROSS-SECTORAL APPROACHES FOR PEACEFUL COOPERATION OVER WATER: LESSONS FROM THE WATER, PEACE AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIPⁱ

Jessica Hartog (International Alert); Joyce Kortlandt (Wetlands International)

Water-related conflicts are inherently complex and require different sectors to work together in realizing lasting peaceful solutions that tackle their direct and indirect causes.

CONTEXT

There is increasing concern that this century will see a surge in water-related conflicts, especially at the sub-national level. Population growth and rapid economic development mean that demand for water is growing whilst supply is becoming increasingly scarce, unreliable, or unusable due to the impacts of climate change, ecosystem degradation, and water pollution. These developments risk increasing social tensions through direct competition over water resources, or indirectly by undermining livelihoods, health, and economies.

Whether this does contribute to an increased level of conflict depends on the resilience of communities and societies. There are no easy solutions to tackling this. We need to bring together a technical understanding of water availability and management with the contextual understanding of the wider political economy, governance, social cohesion, social and economic inequality, and marginalization. To achieve this requires that sectors work together with a truly integrated approach.

Calls for breaking the siloes are not new, yet it remains a challenge to bring actors from different sectors together to explore and agree on joint solutions. There are institutional barriers that hamper cross-disciplinary coordination and communication, further complicated by differences in education, language, and cultural background. However, if we are to address water-

related security risks, we must find ways to overcome these obstacles. The Water, Peace and Security (WPS) approach is one illustration of a partnership that is working to achieve this.

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If we are to address water-related security risks, we must find ways to overcome the institutional barriers that hamper cross-disciplinary coordination and communication. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The mission of the WPS partnership is to raise awareness around water-related security risks and to propose and support efforts to address these risks. Six partner organizations with expertise ranging from water, wetlands ecosystems, geopolitics, security, to peacebuilding, work together in motivating and supporting policy makers and communities to take coordinated action at an early stage. We are currently working in Iraq, Kenya, and the Sahel, where we take an environmental peacebuilding approach with the expectation that bringing different parties together from across different sectors will foster dialogue and cooperation over water resources. We recognize that for

this to be successful, we have to start from an understanding of the wider political economy and factor this into our interventions.

In Mali, we work to improve peaceful cooperation over water resources in the Inner Niger Delta. The area is embroiled in a violent conflict. The underlying causes of the crisis are long-standing and complex, but political choices prioritizing urban over rural needs have meant that increasing agricultural production and energy supply have come at a cost to rural communities and especially nomadic herders and fisher folk.

This situation is compounded by the increasing frequency and intensity of both floods and droughts. As a result, nomadic herders, farmers, and fisher folk compete over shrinking water resources. This situation is made even more vulnerable by the destabilization of the central government, resulting in poor governance of the remaining resources. Weak governance and lack of trust in, and protection by, the state opens the space for armed groups (Islamist insurgent groups, criminal groups, or self-defence militias) to capitalize on this absence. They offer an alternative model to populations that feel disadvantaged by the system, thus contributing to the destabilization of the government and fuelling conflict.

The challenges are multiple and complex. There are no easy fixes. This crisis requires a coordinated response that understands and engages with the challenges around water, agriculture, energy, environmental protection, and security. It requires a response that addresses the ecosystem problems while enhancing social cohesion and governance systems.

To address these challenges, the WPS partnership is convening interlocutors at national, sub-regional, and local levels. They develop a shared understanding of the links between water use, livelihoods, and related conflict in the Inner Niger Delta with help of qualitative and quantitative analysis. Using different datasets, actors zoom in on the local water resource system and jointly identify:

- Which groups of people may be impacted by changes in the water flow;
- Which environmental, social, institutional, economic, and cultural factors play a role in the impact this has on their lives and;
- What behaviour and choices each actor may develop in response.

Such discussions help to find common ground and potential entry points for conflict-sensitive water governance based on mutual understanding and trust. Ultimately, those tools will support informed, participatory decision making around the use of water resources in the Inner Niger Delta—which offers an opportunity to prevent water conflicts in the region.

LOOKING AHEAD

When pursuing environmental peacebuilding goals, there needs to be a shared understanding of what is driving these conflicts in each specific context, along with an understanding of each party's perspectives, interests, and methods, before being able to embark on a journey of joint solution seeking. In Mali, for example, preparing and using different quantitative and qualitative datasets in a dialogue process has been instrumental in gathering different sector and livelihood group representatives around the table and has helped facilitate a shared analysis of the different causes of water-related conflicts. This is not an approach that should be taken lightly. It requires trust-building among the sectors involved, raising awareness about the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration. The use of datasets to establish a common ground can be helpful, especially when discussing issues that require quantitative analysis to understand the water stress situation. This requires robust datasets based on and verified during a participatory process. Furthermore, the understanding and ability to use these datasets needs to be nurtured among local facilitators and participants in the dialogue process.

48. THE CLIMATE CRISIS AS AN ENTRY POINT TO ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING: CAN THE CLIMATE RESILIENCE POLICIES OF THE “GREEN BLUE DEAL” PROMOTE ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Gidon Bromberg and Shelby Kaplan (EcoPeace Middle East)

A set of policies around the EcoPeace Middle East’s proposed “Green Blue Deal” promoting shared climate resilience in Israel, Jordan, and Palestine could provide an effective entry point for environmental peacebuilding, particularly in climate hotspot regions.

CONTEXT

Climate change is often described as a threat multiplier,ⁱ in that its direct effects, like extreme heat and reduced rainfall, can exacerbate societal tensions including the scarcity of water and food. Climate-induced resource scarcity, especially of water availability, is often seen as a potential cause of conflict between riparian parties that share transboundary water resources.

However, if the threats posed by climate change can unsettle internal national stability and are of common concern to neighbouring states in the same region, the climate crisis could also be seen as a multiplier of opportunities, whereby nations or regions come to understand the need for cross-border cooperation in order to increase adaptive capacities and achieve more sustainable, equitable, and prosperous results region-wide.ⁱⁱ

EcoPeace Middle East’s call for a Green Blue Deal in the Levant is an example of the climate crisis serving as an entry point for cross-border peacebuilding efforts. The initiative seeks to inform the policy considerations of Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian decisionmakers, and the understanding of international stakeholders as they work to meet the challenges posed by climate change in the region. The Green Blue Deal model could be one of many effective approaches for the future of environmental

peacebuilding policy, particularly in climate hotspot regions.

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The climate crisis could also be seen as a multiplier of opportunities, whereby nations or regions come to understand the need for cross-border cooperation. //

WHAT’S BEEN DONE

EcoPeace’s “Green Blue Deal” proposes harnessing the sun and the sea to create region-wide desalinated water and energy security for all. It highlights the need to solve Israeli and Palestinian water allocations to achieve water equity; proposes climate-smart investments and green job development around the Jordan Valley; and recommends public awareness and education programmes that can engage the stakeholder publics, especially younger generations, to understand the importance of water and climate diplomacy as an effective tool for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.ⁱⁱⁱ

The recommendations in the Green Blue Deal report emerge from EcoPeace’s 27 years of

experience working on these issues. The report highlights regionally focused low-hanging fruit, including possible entry points for policymakers seeking to pursue their own countries' interests. It also aims to spur governments to create their own holistic “green blue” plans, and to provide opportunities for mutual gain and dialogue on region-wide programmes,^{iv} including more practical and solvable issues in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Since the release of the Green Blue Deal report, government representatives and the international community have publicly expressed support for the call for a Green Blue Deal initiative. In some cases, governments are already advancing initiatives inspired by the report, such as the recent signing of a water-energy deal between Israel and Jordan. This pivotal deal, which paves the way for the sale of Jordanian solar energy in exchange for Israeli desalinated water, changes the nature of the relationship between the two countries to one of healthy interdependencies, where for the first time each country has something to sell and to buy from and to the other. The declaration is being described, by both sides, as the most significant agreement between the two countries since signing the peace treaty in 1994. The initiative has further attracted the attention of the private sector, including leading international renewable energy companies, which have a vested interest in bringing strong investments to the region to meet the challenges of climate adaptation and mitigation.

LOOKING AHEAD

The EcoPeace report calling for a Green Blue Deal for the Middle East focuses on Jordan, Palestine, and Israel. However, a major facet of the strategy to advance a Middle East-wide “Green Blue Deal” is to find like-minded organizations that could advance similar thinking in other areas of the Middle East, for example, the Tigris/Euphrates basin, Arab Gulf, lower Nile basin, and other Eastern Mediterranean countries. Linking strategies and programmes across the Middle East would avoid siloed development and provide institutional linkages that would

connect these areas in a truly Middle East-wide Green Blue Deal.

Similarly, in other conflict regions around the world where climate change hotspots have been identified, civil society organizations, think tanks, and academia could research the rationale for developing Green Deal models that identify opportunities for peacebuilding in these areas.

For example, the Water Energy Nexus chapter of the EcoPeace Green Blue Deal report could be replicated in any region that has both coastal areas and desert hinterland. The nexus exploits the comparative advantages of coastal and desert hinterland areas. Coastal areas can produce large quantities of water through desalination, thus promoting regional water security and climate adaptation if the coastal areas sell large amounts of water to desert hinterland areas. In turn, hinterland desert areas can produce large-scale renewable energy as a climate mitigation measure, which can be sold to coastal areas who, due to high population density, often struggle to locate the land mass needed to produce the renewable energy required to meet their international climate commitments and to power desalination plants.^v The nexus can therefore create healthy interdependencies between neighbouring states, with each side having something of great value to sell to the other as an important contribution to stability and peacebuilding.

// The Green Blue Deal model could be one of many effective approaches for the future of environmental peacebuilding policy, particularly in climate hotspot regions. //

49. ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING IN SOMALIA: CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT

Hassan Mowlid Yasin (Somali Greenpeace Association); Anwar Ahmed Roble (FinnSom Society)

Environmental degradation and climate change shocks are exacerbating conflict and insecurity in Somalia, but civil society organizations have successfully trialled cooperative mechanisms that use ecological action to support peace and security.

CONTEXT

During Somalia's civil war, the environment was severely polluted. Even as the country has worked toward peace, natural resources have continued to be depleted unsustainably due to the lack of environmental regulation and policy implementation. Climate change shocks and unpredictable weather patterns have further reduced water and food availability.

Ongoing environmental degradation has caused drought, flood, and famine to become common. These environmental stressors have exacerbated local conflict and resource competition in the country. This circular relation between conflict and environmental destruction has been demonstrated through incidents like those described below.

1. *Conflict over territory has immediate implications for property rights and resource availability.* In Southern Somalia, the AMISOM-supported government has fought with various militant groups for control of land. The resulting violence has displaced farmers, leading to food shortages. Local communities have clashed over limited vital resources, resulting in both property damage and loss of life.
2. *Contrasting views on how resources should be approached has led to deadly violence.* In Galdogob, a man found another man cutting down trees that were a critical part of the

local ecosystem. A confrontation that began as an attempt for environmental protection escalated, and the tree-cutter was tragically killed in self-defence. The environmental defender returned his body to his family and offered reparations. Sadly, occurrences like this are all too common, as long-term insecurity makes it incredibly difficult to peacefully resolve environmental tensions.

3. *Resource depletion has necessitated migration, causing community clashes.* In central Somalia, pastoral communities have begun to move in search of pasture and water. Individuals and groups meet other communities looking for the same resources. Water sources and high-quality grazing land have become the site of frequent violence.

//
Local civil society organizations have played a major role in leveraging peace and security to improve environmental conditions. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

Recent efforts to address existing environmental issues in Somalia have included the Country Environmental Analysis, UNFCCC involvement, and numerous civil society initiatives.

The Somalia Country Environmental Analysis (CEA) report is the product of a multidisciplinary effort led by the World Bank and country government that sought to (1) consolidate available and credible information on Somalia's natural resource capital and (2) address knowledge gaps on the environmental factors affecting national growth. The CEA was developed using a scientific, data-driven approach. Literature reviews, primary data from national agencies, satellite imagery, remote sensing, and scientific methods such as water balance studies and vegetation assessments all contributed to its findings.

The Somali government has drafted its UNFCCC Nationally Determined Contribution for climate change planning and is engaging with COP26 and other international fora for climate action. Pillars identified in Somalia's NDC include security and economic development as well as adaptation and mitigation measures to combat climate change impacts. National laws around environmental management and climate change adaptation are further supporting the NDC and international planning.

Local civil society organizations have played a major role in leveraging peace and security to improve environmental conditions. Understanding the relationships between these issues, CSOs have also used environmental programmes to further the peace and security agenda. Examples of these multifaceted efforts are highlighted below.

1. *Investing in collaborative security schemes improves the environment while reducing the likelihood of conflict.* In Galkacyo, resource-related violence had become commonplace, especially between the north and south. At the instigation of a local peace organization, a new police force was formed with members from both sides; its aim was to collectively monitor the region and implement fair justice. The shared policing has proven to be incredibly successful, with no more conflict reported in the area.
2. *Environmental trainings build local capacity for climate adaptation while building relationships across groups.* The Somali Greenpeace Association, FinnSOM, the Bergof Foundation, and others have held workshops on climate policy, sustainable resource use, and equitable benefit sharing. Communities are learning how environmental conservation improves outcomes. A particular focus on deforestation helps keep valuable ecosystems from being degraded for short-term gains. Trainings have taken place throughout the country, including in Galdog, Muqdisho, Baidoa, and Abduwak. Diverse attendance at the training means that local authorities are actively interacting with and learning from youth, women, older persons, and people from different communities.

LOOKING AHEAD

Addressing environmental concerns, mitigating climate-induced insecurities, and promoting peace requires actions by both the government and civil society. Based on recent lessons from the Somali experience, we recommend the following:

1. National and regional governments should strengthen local conflict resolution mechanisms, creating processes that can help communities prevent, manage, and resolve environmental conflicts in a productive, peaceful, and equitable manner.
2. Communities should make use of traditional knowledge to help overcome resource scarcity and adapt to climate change.
3. Governments should support farmers in introducing new crops that are more resilient to climate change and that can help diversify agricultural production.
4. Governments and civil society should partner with the private sector to develop climate-resilient job opportunities for young people, who are at risk of recruitment by militant groups.
5. Governments should collaborate with civil society and local communities to co-develop environmental policies, resource plans, and water and sanitation services.

50. WE ARE IN THIS TOGETHER: ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE ACTIONS AND EFFORTS FOR SUSTAINING PEACE NEED TO GO HAND IN HAND

Ulrika Åkesson and Anna Åkerlund (the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida)

Sustainable development needs to stay within planetary boundaries and be peaceful, inclusive, and fair. The Swedish development cooperation therefore commits to integrate the environment perspective, conflict sensitivity, gender equality, a rights-based approach, and the perspectives of people living in poverty. These perspectives are also essential for environmental peacebuilding.

CONTEXT

With the adoption of the Agenda 2030, Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Development Finance, and the Paris Agreement, international development cooperation needs to relate to and include all three dimensions of sustainable development – economic, social, and environmental. This is the point of entry for the Swedish government's policy framework for international development cooperation from 2016.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was put forward as a plan for people, planet, and prosperity as well as a contribution to sustaining peace and forging new partnerships. But implementation is lagging, and progress has been stalled by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the meantime, environmental challenges and climate change manifest themselves acutely. The consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic combined with conflict, environment, and climate challenges have increased extreme poverty for the first time in a generation. Worldwide, three out of four people in extreme poverty live in fragile, often conflict-affected countries. People living in poverty are more exposed and vulnerable to climate change with less capacity and fewer resources to cope and recover.

Like other global crises, the climate crisis will put a strain on inter- and intrastate collaboration just where it is needed the most. However, we can rise to the challenges, forge partnerships, and secure continued human development and progress in a sustainable way. For that to succeed, the transition to environmentally sustainable development needs to be peaceful, inclusive, and fair.

// The climate crisis will put strain on inter- and intrastate collaboration just where it is needed the most. //

WHAT'S BEEN DONE

The challenges of sustainable development are complex and often interlinked. The Swedish Government is committed to integrate five central perspectives throughout the entire Swedish development cooperation. Particularly relevant to environmental peacebuilding are the interlinkages between environmental sustainability and conflict sensitivity. Unless systems and processes for the peaceful management of competing interests and tensions are robust enough to deal with difficulties in coping with climate change or biodiversity loss,

such tensions could fuel violence, especially when combined with inequality between groups. Violent conflict causes human suffering and material destruction and poses a serious obstacle to human development, as well as to progress in environment and climate action. This means that climate strategies need to take conflict sensitivity seriously, making sure to minimize negative impacts and maximize the positive impact on peace. Conversely, peace processes and agreements need to integrate environment and climate concerns so that they contribute to building societies that are able to sustain peace in the face of challenges to human security caused by climate change and biodiversity loss.

// The vision is for Stockholm+50 to promote international collaboration accelerating a just and inclusive transition that leaves no one behind. //

Three other perspectives are integrated throughout all of Sida's programmes and projects: the human rights-based approach, gender equality, and the perspectives of people living in poverty. A point of departure is that people living in poverty are agents and can express their needs, interests, and preconditions. They are also rights holders with legal entitlements and can hold duty bearers accountable to comply with commitments, including international obligations within the fields of environment and peace. Women and men, girls and boys are often affected differently by conflict as well as by climate change. Gender equality is both a human right and an important perspective to integrate into all programming in order to ensure that people of all genders benefit equally. Putting the Women, Peace and Security agenda at the centre of environmental peacebuilding helps to establish more inclusive processes and achieve more sustainable results.

Failing to take these five perspectives into account will make it difficult to achieve the

development goals and the 2030 Agenda, or contribute towards the overarching objective of Swedish development cooperation: creating the preconditions for better living conditions for people living in poverty and under oppression

LOOKING AHEAD

In 2022, the Government of Sweden will host a high-level meeting to mark the 50th anniversary of the first United Nations conference on the environment, the 1972 Stockholm Conference. The vision is for Stockholm+50 to promote international collaboration accelerating a just and inclusive transition that leaves no one behind. The aim is for Stockholm+50 to drive the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, and other international agreements; to reduce inequalities and human insecurity and to benefit people living in poverty. This needs to go hand in hand with more locally led conflict-sensitive action for environment and climate action as well as environment and climate sensitive conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Early warning signals of climate change as a risk multiplier for violent conflict should trigger early preventative action. The international community should make sure that climate action and adaptation strategies are firmly rooted in local realities and ideally designed in a way that contributes to trust-building. Broad involvement of women and men affected by climate change and biodiversity loss as agents of change may strengthen conflict sensitivity. The untapped potential in peacebuilding to contribute to protecting the environment and combating climate change needs to be explored.

In this way, we in the Swedish development cooperation, in partnership with other actors, should contribute to meet the enormous challenges facing us as a global community, and to do it in a way that works for and with people and communities that are most vulnerable. That is not only a moral imperative, but rather, it is more likely to yield sustainable results for the benefit of all.

CHAPTER 9 - ENDNOTES

ARTICLE 46

i. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek.

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THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PEACEBUILDING

Nurturing an
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A White Paper and Compendium

The White Paper on the Future of Environmental Peacebuilding is the product of an 18-month process of research and consultation with environmental peacebuilding practitioners, researchers, and policymakers from all regions. It aims to deliver a strong, cogent message about the relevance, evidence, and promise of environmental peacebuilding to the Stockholm+50 forum in June 2022. This project was developed not only to advance a policy agenda for environmental peacebuilding, but also to foster inter-institutional collaboration and shared innovation for the field.

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