Russian War Crimes Against Ukraine

The Breach of International Humanitarian Law by the Russian Federation

The Global Accountability Network

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The Global Accountability Network Presents:

RUSSIAN WAR CRIMES AGAINST UKRAINE: THE BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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The Ukraine Task Force (UKTF) aims to produce non-partisan, high quality analysis of open-source materials and to catalogue that information relative to applicable bodies of law; including, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The UKTF primarily creates documentation products in a narrative and graphical format, as well as a quarterly and annual trend analysis of ongoing crimes. Furthermore, the UKTF publishes issue-specific white papers. Its clients include Transnational NGOs, the United Nations, U.S. Department of State, and the Public Interest International Law & Policy Group (PILPG).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document will primarily cover the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Russian Federation from February 24, 2022, to April 1, 2022. The basis of this report is founded upon open-source research and evidence collection by an inter-collegiate investigative team from across the United States, collecting reports, photographic, and video evidence of crimes occurred in Ukraine. The contents of this document will provide the reader with a brief, but important, historical overview of Ukraine and its relationship with the Russian State. In addition, it will articulate the international legal mechanisms of accountability, identify individuals most responsible for the commission of crimes in Ukraine, and provide a series of representative charges to be used in an international criminal tribunal. In its conclusion, this paper calls upon the international community to respond by utilizing the available international accountability mechanisms, as the Russian Federation is openly committing crimes of aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. For the readers reference, Section V contains a command-and-control diagram produced by the Global Accountability Network and its dedicated researchers.

In addition, this document contains appendices that provide the reader more detailed information regarding the Russian Federation’s criminal activity in Ukraine. Appendix A is a sample draft of an international criminal indictment against President Putin. Appendix B is a crime narrative detailing, by date, the crimes committed in Ukraine by the responsible party. In addition, Appendix C expands on the crime narrative and provides a more detailed breakdown of the violations of International Humanitarian Law, as well as documenting violations of the Ukrainian Penal Code.

Appendix D is a comprehensive dossier detailing the command-and-control structure of the Russian political and military senior leadership. This “dossier” lists the individuals responsible for the atrocities in Ukraine, and documents relevant information surrounding their responsibility and complicity.

Notably, there are omissions from this document that are deserving of discussion and further analysis. As of the writing of this very section, an atrocity has occurred in Bucha on a devastating scale. Recently, the bodies of 410 civilians have been recovered from areas in the wider Kyiv region after Ukrainian forces regained complete control, with reports of widescale murder, torture, and rape. While the atrocity of Bucha falls outside the temporal scope of this document, the efforts of the Global Accountability Network’s Ukraine Task Force does not end here. This document is merely the foundational document and will launch a series of subsequent investigations and analyses of crimes committed in Ukraine. The Ukraine Task Force will not allow Bucha to be forgotten and will be the centerpiece analysis of its next publication.
The Global Accountability Network created a Ukraine Task Force in late February 2022 to document crimes that the Russian Federation committed during the first two weeks of its invasion.

This two-week period is merely a snapshot of the toll the Russian invasion incurred on the civilian populace. The toll is likely much higher, and more investigations and committees will be needed to truly assess the destruction as a result of the Russian Federation’s invasion.

In addition to providing a description of where the majority of Russian crimes took place, this graph also identifies the scale and types of crimes committed by Russian forces.

More detailed descriptions, analysis, and documentation can be found in Appendices B & C of this document.
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY PROFESSOR DAVID M. CRANE*

*Only the dead have seen the end of the war.*
~ George Santayana

The historian John Keegan said that the history of mankind is the history of war, and the history of war is the history of mankind. With that, mankind has placed limits to the carnage of conflict with a set of laws to protect those found on the battlefield such as the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and especially civilians in and around the conflict. Failure in those protections puts an armed force in legal jeopardy under the violations of international humanitarian law, specifically the laws of armed conflict.

For decades, after the horror of two world wars, the world came together united, setting down a charter of United Nations who agreed to settle their disputes peaceably, resorting to force as a last resort. Through a series of conventions, treaties, and protocols, international humanitarian law sought to limit the scourge of war and to protect peoples around the world. It seemed at the beginning of the new century, twenty-two years ago, conventional conflict was a thing of the past. To control the dirty little wars that flared up from time to time, mankind used the laws of armed conflict to ensure a limitation of the extent of the damage that conflicts bring.

Despite all this, these dirty little wars proliferated with all parties ignoring the law that governs conflict. The result was the creation of a general set of accountability mechanisms that held those who perpetrated conflict by ignoring the set laws accountable. Under the concept that the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun, mankind developed an ability to hold heads of state, dictators, thugs, and their henchmen accountable under law. It seemed hopeful that laws governing conflict and international criminal law would reign in the beast of impunity. It was not to be.

An unanticipated rise of populism and nationalism has caused a political circumstance that has seen the international rule of law and the paradigm of the United Nations principle of peace questioned and weakened. In an apparent age of the strongman, nations have turned inward, and tyrants used this geopolitical moment to strengthen their positions domestically and regionally. Such a tyrant, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, clings to the false hope of a risen Soviet Union has seized on this moment to take the Ukraine in whole or in part back to Russia where he claims it belongs. This is a false premise, and the result of this deluded vision is an illegal invasion of a sovereign nation’s territorial integrity. An act of aggression, an international crime.

This act of aggression has resulted in an international armed conflict not seen since the 1940’s. The conduct of the invading Russian armed forces has been reprehensible, particularly the intentional targeting of protected persons and places. These are war crimes and crimes against humanity. Vladimir Putin, as head of those armed forces and the commanders, should be held accountable for bearing the greatest responsibility for these international crimes.

This paper will lay out the facts and circumstances, for the first time in a considered way, these international crimes. It is an initial review with a continued subsequent effort to capture all of the alleged crimes perpetrated by Russian Federation armed forces. The methods used in this review are based on tried-and-true procedures used by the world’s first hybrid international criminal court, the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone, to account for the crimes of another sitting head of state, President Charles of Taylor of Liberia. He was arrested, indicted, tried under law,
and found guilty of aiding and abetting the murder, rape, mutilation, and maiming of around 1.2 million human beings.

We have done this once before and we can do it again with the International Criminal Court prosecuting the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity and a United Nations backed Special Court for Ukraine, the world’s second hybrid international war crimes tribunal. Its mandate to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility for the aggression against Ukraine must include President Vladimir Putin. You will see the beginning of that effort in this paper, which aims to show clear evidence of international crimes committed by Russian Federation armed forces and a sample indictment of Vladimir Putin for all of the international laws he has violated.

II. THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S INVASION OF UKRAINE

The Russian Federation, led by President Vladimir Putin, invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022 by stating that the goal is to “demilitarise and de-Nazify the nation.” In addition, on the day of the attack, Vladimir Putin called the invasion a “special military operation” in which the words were circulated as propaganda domestically in Russia. Grounded in baseless claims and state-sponsored lies, Russia invaded Ukraine seeking a quick surrender, only to be met by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy leading the defense of the nation with a call on Ukrainians to take up arms.

The Russian government invaded Ukraine on three fronts through Belarus, east of Ukraine, and from the south of Ukraine. Since the first day of invasion, Russia has continued its attacks on not just Ukrainian military, but its civilian population as well, forcing approximately 3.5 million Ukrainians to leave Kyiv. Furthermore, there have been reports of war crimes by Russian government through its acts of shelling an orphanage, maternity hospital, children’s hospital.

* Professor David M. Crane, author of Every Living Thing: Facing Down Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs in West Africa—A Story of Justice, was the founding Chief Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone from 2002 to 2005 after being appointed by Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan. He served with the rank of Under-Secretary General and indicted the President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, the first sitting African head of state in history to be held accountable. Prior to this position, he served over 30 years in the U.S. government. He holds a J.D. from Syracuse University, a M.A. in African Studies and a B.G.S. in History from Ohio University.

2 Id.
3 Id.
6 Id.
The international response has increased since the initial invasion. Economic sanctions against the Russian government and Vladimir Putin, as well as Russian oligarchs, have crippled the Russian war-fighting effort. Economic sanctions against the Russian government and Vladimir Putin, as well as Russian oligarchs, have crippled the Russian war-fighting effort.10 Russian banks have been blocked from engaging in global transactions and its economy has taken a hit from the economic sanctions.11 Further, the U.S. and European nations have provided military equipment to Ukrainian government.12 From Stalin’s USSR to Putin’s Russia, time and time again, Ukraine’s nationhood has been in peril.13 From starving 3 million Ukrainians to the invasion of the territories in Donbas in which Ukrainians were raped and murdered, Ukraine is no stranger to attacks on its nationhood.14 Ukrainians are fighting back, with the memory of atrocities and oppression by the Russian state still festering as an open wound.15 Yet, this will not be enough. The people of Ukraine are not in this fight alone, and the international system of justice must step up and fulfill its role as a mechanism of accountability. Without it, the painful and brutal history of Ukrainian occupation will continue unabated, leaving democracy and justice around the world in peril.

III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRECEDING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S INVASION OF UKRAINE

A. Brief Description

Ukraine is a country in Eastern Europe that regained its independence in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.16 Use of “the” before “Ukraine” is a rejected usage by both the Ukrainian government in its Declaration of Independence and Constitution as well as western media.17 The capital of Ukraine is Kyiv (the Russian “Kiev” pronunciation and spelling are also

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10 Hookway & Trofimov, supra note 5.
11 Kirby & Guyer, supra note 7.
12 Hookway & Trofimov, supra note 5.
14 Id.
15 Id.
“Ukraine” means borderland. Ukraine borders Russia to the east and northeast; Belarus to the north; Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to the west; Romania and Moldova to the south; and has a coastline along the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea (See Figure 1). The Dnieper River flows through the center of Ukraine (See Figure 1).

B. Eurasian Chernozem Belt

The Eurasian Chernozem Belt—a rich, fertile soil, high in humus, phosphorus, and phosphoric acids—runs across two-thirds of Ukraine. In addition to Ukraine, the Eurasian

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19 Ukraine, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/word/ukraine (last visited Mar. 19, 2022) (explaining “from Russian or Polish Ukraine, literally “border, frontier,” from u- “at” + krai “edge.” So called from being regarded as the southern frontier of Poland or Russia.”); Steinmetz, supra note 2 (explaining “Ukraine’s name is thought to come from the Slavic word for borderland”).

Chernozem Belt also cuts across parts of Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Siberia.\textsuperscript{21} USAID notes “With over 41 million hectares of agricultural land, covering 70 percent of the country, agriculture is Ukraine’s largest export industry.”\textsuperscript{22} Ukraine is the fifth-largest wheat exporter in the world, the third-largest barley exporter, and the first-largest sunflower seed exporter.\textsuperscript{23} The flag of Ukraine, consisting of equal horizontal stripes of blue over yellow, is a nod to its fertile soil because it represents “blue skies over golden wheat fields.” (See figure 2).\textsuperscript{24}

![Figure 2, Image Credit: WorldAtlas](image)

Foreign investment has targeted Ukraine for its fertile soils.\textsuperscript{25} However, “Since 2001, there has been a moratorium prohibiting transfers of a major part of agricultural land. Therefore, most

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[1]{Earth from Space: Chernozem cropland, THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.esa.int/Applications/Observing_the_Earth/Earth_from_Space_Chernozem_cropland; Marques Hayes, supra note 5.}
agricultural companies, regardless of their shareholders’ residency (Ukrainian or foreign), do not own agricultural land and instead lease it for agribusiness from individual landowners.”26 On March 31, 2020, the Ukrainian Parliament passed the law that, starting July 1, 2021 allows Ukrainian citizens to purchase agricultural land and starting January 1, 2024 allows Ukrainian companies owned by Ukrainian shareholders to purchase agricultural land.27 Under the law, “Foreigners and companies with foreign shareholders or beneficiaries cannot purchase agricultural land (whether directly or through a Ukrainian company) and will get this right only if a national referendum decides so.”28 However, a substantial part of Ukraine’s most productive agricultural land is located in its eastern regions, parts currently under Russian attack. (See Figure 3).29

Figure 3 on next page.

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27 Id.

28 Id.

Figure 3, Image Credit: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service
C. Soviet-Era Ukraine

1. Holodomor

The irony of Ukraine having some of the most fertile soils in the world is that it also suffered one of the deadliest famines human history has knowledge of.30 More than 3.9 million Ukrainians perished of hunger between 1931 and 1934.31 In Red Famine: Stalin’s War On Ukraine, Anne Applebaum explains how the famine was described at the time as the Holodomor “a term derived from the Ukrainian words for hunger—holod—and extermination—mor.”32 The Soviet Communist Party, led by Joseph Stalin, perpetrated genocide against Ukrainians using a dual systematic strategy to bring about the “Sovietization of Ukraine.”33 The strategy consisted of first, the Holodomor, and second, “the repression of the Ukrainian intellectual and political class[—]Anyone connected to the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic, which existed for a few months from June 1917, anyone who promoted the Ukrainian language or Ukrainian history, anyone with an independent literary or artistic career, was liable to be publicly vilified, jailed, sent to a labour camp or executed.”34 Furthermore, “Raphael Lemkin, the Polish-Jewish lawyer who invented the word ‘genocide,’ spoke of Ukraine in this era as the ‘classic example’ of his concept.”35 Despite the fact that from 1933 until 1991 the Soviet Union refused to recognize that a famine even took place, seventeen United Nations countries and Vatican City now recognize the Holodomor as genocide, including the United States, Australia, Canada, and Poland.36

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32 Id.
33 Id. at xxvi.
34 Id. at xxvi. (“The Soviet Union’s disastrous decision to force peasants to give up their land and join collective farms; the eviction of “kulaks,” the wealthier peasants, from their homes . . . . At the height of the crisis, organized teams of policemen and party activists, motivated by hunger, fear, and a decade of hateful and conspiratorial rhetoric, entered peasant households and took everything edible: potatoes, beets, squash, beans, peas, anything in the oven and anything in the cupboard, farm animals and pets . . . . As the famine spread, a campaign of slander and repression was launched against Ukrainian intellectuals, professors, museum curators, writers, artists, priests, theologians, public officials and bureaucrats.”)
35 Id. at xxvii.
36 Id. at xxviii (explaining “The Soviet state destroyed local archives, made sure that death records did not allude to starvation, even altered publicly available census data in order to conceal what had happened.”); Alya Shandra, See which countries recognize Ukraine’s Holodomor famine as genocide on an interactive map, EUROMADIAN PRESS (Nov. 24, 2018), https://euromaidanpress.com/2018/11/24/see-which-countries-recognize-ukraines-holodomor-famine-as-genocide-on-an-interactive-map/ (also including Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, and Ukraine).
2. Chernobyl

The Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster was the worst nuclear power plant disaster in history.\(^{37}\) On April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear plant in northern Ukraine (about 80 miles north of Kyiv) exploded, releasing 400 times more radiation than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. (See Figure 4).\(^{38}\) On April 27, 50,000 residents of the close town Pripyat were evacuated.\(^{39}\) While the Soviet government tried to keep the nuclear disaster a secret, the radioactive fallout was devastatingly conspicuous to the international community.\(^{40}\)

![Map of Ukraine showing the location of Chernobyl and Kyiv.](image_credit.uktf_team)

*Figure 4, Image Credit: UKTF Team*

After 206 days, an initial Sarcophagus was erected above the disaster site to contain further radiation.\(^{41}\) This initial Sarcophagus was replaced in 2017 by a new “tomb” which took two decades to make, is the biggest object humans have ever moved—Bigger than Wembley Stadium and taller than the Statue of Liberty—and it will entomb the disaster site for 100 years. (See Figure 5).\(^{42}\)

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38 Id.


40 See supra note 37.


42 Borys, supra note 41.
On February 24, 2022, Russian forces took control of all the facilities of the Chernobyl nuclear plant.\textsuperscript{43} The control levels of gamma radiation dose rates in the Chernobyl exclusion zone were exceeded—likely due to “disturbance of the top layer of soil from movement of a large number of heavy military machinery through the exclusion zone and increase of air pollution.”\textsuperscript{44} On March 9, 2022, the Chernobyl nuclear plant lost connection to the grid but later on March 14 external power was restored and the plant was reconnected to Ukraine’s electricity grid.\textsuperscript{45}

3. Ukraine Declaration of Independence

Ukraine declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991.\textsuperscript{46} “In Ukraine, from the end of August through December 1991, the Communist Party of Ukraine was dissolved, its property was nationalized, and the KGB was banned, while party and ideological pluralism was established and all individuals living on the soil of the Ukrainian socialist republic were granted citizenship in the emerging independent state.”\textsuperscript{47} The Constitution of Ukraine was


\textsuperscript{45} Ukraine: Russia-Ukraine War and Nuclear Energy, supra note 43; Chernobyl Accident 1986, supra note 39.


\textsuperscript{47} Minakov, supra note 46.
adopted on June 28, 1996. The Post-Soviet democratization of Ukraine, while having its ups and downs, has existed as an independent and sovereign state. However, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the war in the Donbas that left portions of Luhansk and Donetsk in the hands of Russian-backed separatists, and the current Russian invasion of the entirety of the Ukrainian territory threatens its independence and sovereignty.

D. Russia-Ukraine War

In 2004, Viktor Yushechenko became the first president of Ukraine who was not a part of the Communist Party. He was a member of the Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc party that ran on an anti-corruption platform. His opposing party, Viktor Yanukovych, was Kremlin. During his presidential campaign, he was found to be poisoned slowly by dioxin, an assassination attempt, which ultimately disfigured his face.

On October 31, the election results declared Yanukovych the winner. The clearly rigged election enraged Ukrainians who took to the streets to protest the election results by flooding the streets while wearing orange, Yushchenko’s campaign color. On November 23, 2004, the Orange Revolution signaled an end to speech suppression and an increase of European identity for the Ukrainians, which further separated them from Russia.

The Orange Revolution consisted of approximately 500,000 people, including Ukrainian youths marching in the Independence Square. This is one of the first instances in modern Ukraine where the people found semblance of taking back their political power after losing it for so long.

The importance of the Orange Revolution is highlighted by the confidence that Kremlin had in his chosen contender, Yanukovych. Vladimir Putin traveled to Kyiv on election day’s eve to advise Ukrainians on the importance of voting for Yanukovych, exasperating Ukrainian’s negative sentiment towards Kremlin.

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48 The Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 17.
51 APPLEBAUM, supra note 31, at 350-1.
53 Id.
54 Id. (noting that he made a full recovery after the attack).
55 Id.
56 Id.
The Orange Revolution both liberated Ukraine and tightened Kremlin’s hold on its own Russian population. The Russian Government began a Pro-Putin youth movement, which started in April 2005 to establish an unbreakable relationship to the Russian government, comparable to that of the Hitler Youth organization.

Shortly after the Orange Revolution, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ordered a recount of the votes against the wishes of Yanykovych supporters. After the recount, Yushchenko was declared the winner.

1. Revolution of Dignity/Maidan Revolution/Euromaidan

The Orange Revolution of 2004, culminating in the election of Viktor Yushchenko on December 26, 2004, brought with it the hope that Ukraine was making a final turn away from the corruption and authoritarianism which plagued the post-Soviet world and towards a closer relationship with the West. Those hopes foundered on factionalism, a challenging economic environment, and changes to the Ukrainian constitution demanded by supporters of Yushchenko’s predecessor Viktor Yanukovych, which sharply limited the powers of the President and heightened political rivalries at the expense of effective reform.

After his re-election in 2010, Yanukovych quickly undid all the constitutional changes which his supporters and others had used to hamstring his rival Yushchenko and added new powers for his own benefit—both politically and personally. He took control of the courts, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and turned the police and the state security service (the SBU) into agents of his regime rather than servants of the State. In 2011, he had his most prominent opponent, former Prime Minister Yuliia Tymoshenko tried, convicted, and imprisoned on corruption charges related to an unfavorable gas deal with Russia. He also manipulated election laws and elections to ensure that his defeat in 2004 could not be repeated. Yanukovych continued making economic overtures with the EU, however, pursuing the possibility of a closer relationship with the EU even as he personally enriched himself and his family at the expense of the country. By late 2013, Ukraine was on the verge of default due in part to the transfer of over $70 billion into foreign accounts controlled by Yanukovych, his family, and his friends.

As economic default loomed and the national mood turned sour, Ukrainians turned toward the EU for relief. On November 28, 2013, two long-negotiated agreements signifying political

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62 Dickinson, supra note 57.
63 Dickinson, supra note 57.
65 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
72 Id.
73 PLOKHY, THE GATES OF EUROPE, supra note 66, at 338.
74 PLOKHY, supra note 66, at 338.
association and economic integration, the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, would be signed in Vilnius, Lithuania. These agreements would open the country to badly needed foreign investment and allow for free trade of Ukrainian good across the EU. They would also serve as a bulwark against Russian efforts to turn Ukraine back to its sphere of influence. Many Ukrainians, particularly students, professionals, and city-dwellers believed their future lay with Europe and the West and not a return to the lesser status of a Russian vassal state – Malorossia “Little Russia.” When Yanukovych announced a suspension of the agreement a week before the signing, Ukrainians were not happy and some took to the streets.

The protests began with a Facebook post by Mustafa Nayyem on November 21, 2013, calling students to assemble in Kyiv’s Independence Square – the Maidan. The students and their supporters demanded that the agreement process continue but, while Yanukovych did attend the EU summit, he refused to sign the agreements. Protests grew and clashes with the police intensified on the outskirts of the Maidan. On November 30, the Berkut, a special operations unit of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior attempted to clear the protesters from the square in an operation so violent it galvanized that nation.

What had been a limited protest became a national movement. 700,000 people attended a rally in the Maidan the next day and the protest area was turned into an encampment with barricades, a mechanism of self-government, logistical support, and militia modeled on the Cossacks of Ukrainian history. The Maidan protesters did not align themselves with any specific political party, but instead represented a range of political, economic, and cultural views and perspectives. A small but vocal percentage of the protesters were nationalists connected with far-right political movements, an unfortunate reality which the Russian government and others would later use to tar the entire movement.

The Berkut made another effort to clear the square on December 11 but were successfully rebuffed and two days later, Yanukovych offered overtures to leaders of the movement offering amnesty for detained Maidan participants and the identification of government security officers who took part in the worst of the violence. At the same time, however, he also concluded a deal with Russia for $15 billion in economic aid, a renegotiation of gas prices, and the lifting of an existing blockade on Ukrainian imports. The infusion of Russian money and economic support,
along with the minor concessions to the protesters might have resolved the crisis in Yanukovych’s favor, but video of journalist and activist Tetiana Chornovol’s brutal beating outside of Kyiv enflamed the nation once more and on December 29 the protesters presented the Manifesto of the Maidan which called for, among other things, international sanctions against Yanukovich, his family, and his friends.\textsuperscript{89} Mass demonstrations closed out the year as over half a million people filled the Square on New Year’s Day.\textsuperscript{90}

All government efforts to discredit, disrupt, and disperse the protests failed and so on January 16, 2014, the Supreme Council, at Yanukovych’s direction, passed a sweeping package of laws which criminalized anything that could be interpreted as connected to the Maidan protests and limiting free speech, privacy, and due process to such a degree that even his Chief of Staff resigned in protest.\textsuperscript{91} This marked a new phase of the Maidan movement, where the protests quickly accelerated into revolution.\textsuperscript{92} Government forces, backed by Russian operatives, became more violent, beating and shooting protesters indiscriminately and abducting the wounded from hospitals for detention, torture, and in some instances execution.\textsuperscript{93} Although Yanukovych continued offering small concessions, including the installation of two opposition politicians in the government, the actions of his security forces belied any promises he made.\textsuperscript{94} The conflict culminated in a battle on the Maidan and in nearby government buildings from February 18 – 20 when government security forces and police, including the SBU and the Berkut, backed by snipers and at Viktor Yanukovych’s direction, killed 60 people.\textsuperscript{95} This, along with the threat of more international sanctions imposed on them personally, was too much for the Supreme Council and with mediation by representatives from Poland, Germany, France, and a special envoy from

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure6.png}
\caption{Figure 6, Image Credit: Atlantic Council}
\end{figure}

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\textsuperscript{89} Harasymiw, supra note 71.
\textsuperscript{90} Harasymiw, supra note 71.
\textsuperscript{91} Harasymiw, supra note 71.
\textsuperscript{92} Harasymiw, supra note 71.
\textsuperscript{93} Harasymiw, supra note 71.
\textsuperscript{94} Harasymiw, supra note 71.
\textsuperscript{95} PLOKHY, supra note 66.
\end{flushleft}
Russia, an agreement was reached on February 21 to reinstate the 2004 Constitution, suspend the Interior Minister who controlled the SBU and the Berkut, and free Yuliia Tymoshenko. By the time the agreement was concluded, Viktor Yanukovych was on the run, moving first to Kharkiv, and then to Crimea, before turning up in Russia to announce that he was still President of Ukraine. The Supreme Council disagreed, and declared that he had abandoned his office before scheduling new elections for May 2014.

Exact numbers are uncertain but over 100 protesters, subsequently enshrined in the national memory as the “Heavenly Hundred” and at least 13 police and security officers were killed during the Euromaidan, or Revolution of Dignity. The Revolution stands as a statement of Ukrainian independence and identity, as well as a belief in the rule of law, and it is likely not a coincidence that after Yanukovych’s departure and the subsequent revelations of the close relationship between his administration and the Russian regime, that the Russians seized the Crimea outright and instigated Russophone separatist movements in Luhansk and Donets. Indeed, Putin himself claimed that he made the decision to “return” Crimea to Russia on February 22 when Yanukovych was in transit to Moscow. Without a compliant Ukrainian government to facilitate his ends, he would have to turn to more aggressive options.

2. Crimea

Just as Ukraine has been a borderland for more than a millennium, the Crimean Peninsula also has seen successive waves of invasion and settlement. Ukraine’s location, dominating the Black Sea and the mouths of several large rivers (the Dnipro, Dniester, Don, Danube, and Kuban) made it an attractive target for regional powers hoping to control trade, its mountains offered a refuge for remnants of earlier cultures seeking safety, and the Mediterranean climate on its coast drew colonists hoping to take advantage of its agricultural and economic opportunities. Mongols and Turkic Tatars, were the final major wave of settlement prior to the modern era and by the mid-15th Century they dominated the peninsula as the Khanate of the Crimean Tatars. They sacked Kyiv in 1482. For the next 300 years they would shift their allegiance between the Ottoman Empire, the Hetmanate (representing Ukrainian Cossacks), Muscovy, and Muscovy’s successor, Russia, which annexed Crimea in 1783. The Russians, hoping to cement control of their new territory, encouraged colonization and by 1917 Crimea was a multi-ethnic region of

96 Harasymiw, supra note 71.
97 Harasymiw, supra note 71.
98 Harasymiw, supra note 71.
100 PLOKHY, THE GATES OF EUROPE, supra note 66, at 340.
101 PLOKHY, supra note 66, at 340.
102 PLOKHY, supra note 66, at 341.
103 Volodymyr Kubijovyč et al., Crimea, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UKR., http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CC%5CR%5CCrimea.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2022) (As early as the 6th century BCE, the Greeks were building city-states on the Crimean coast. In the ensuring eight centuries, Scythians, Romans, Goths, Huns, Byzantines, Khazars, Venetians, Genoese, Armenians, Jews, and Slavs (under the Kyvian Rus) would all claim or settle parts of Crimea).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
Tatars, Ukrainians, Russians, Greeks, Germans, Jews, Armenians, and Bulgarians, though the first three groups would make up the largest percentages of the populations.107

Following the 1917 Revolution, Ukraine attempted to claim Crimea as Ukrainian territory.108 The Crimeans signed an agreement with the provisional Ukrainian government which would have given Crimea status as an autonomous region within the Ukrainian National Republic.109 However, when the Bolsheviks took power in 1919, they instead designated Crimea as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic under the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.110 Status as an ASSR was initially beneficial to the Tatar population in the 1920’s as Tatar language and culture were promoted and given special status in the region in a way similar the promotion of Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian SSR.111 But in both Ukraine and Crimea the Soviet Union’s cultural policies reversed dramatically in the 1930’s.112 Under Stalin, the Soviets aggressively pursued Russification; in Crimea this meant the language of advanced schooling and government was Russian, to the detriment of Ukrainian and Tatar speakers and the Tatar people were persecuted.113 This persecution led some Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea to welcome the German occupation of the region during WWII and some members of both groups actively collaborated, assisting not just the occupation but also the extermination of most of Crimea’s Jewish population.114

When the Soviets retook Crimea, the Tatars were collectively declared a traitor population and forcibly removed from their homeland to controlled settlements in Siberia and Uzbekistan.115 Of the roughly 240,000 people removed (this number also includes Germans, Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, and the Jewish Krymchak people who survived the Nazi death squads) substantial numbers died—estimates range from a low as 20% to as high as 50% within 5 years.116 The survivors and their descendants were subsequently barred from returning to Crimea and, although they were officially exonerated as a group in 1960, the USSR refused to recognize them as a unique ethnicity but instead only as former inhabitants of Crimea and left in place the 1956 decree forbidding their return home.117 Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union and after Mikhail Gorbachev’s Perestroika reforms allowed for Tatar return, only 1.5% of the population of Crimea was Tatar.118

107 Kubijovyč et al., supra note 103.
108 Kubijovyč et al., supra note 103.
109 Kubijovyč et al., supra note 103.
110 Kubijovyč et al., supra note 103.
112 Id.
114 Kubijovyč et al., supra note 103.
115 Id.
116 Pohl, supra note 113.
117 Id.
After the Nazi murder of the Jews and the Soviet expulsion of the Tatars, the Soviets began resettling Crimea in the late 1940’s with a mixture of Russians and Polish Ukrainians.\(^{119}\) In 1954, Crimea was transferred from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR.\(^{120}\) Shortly after the transfer, work began on the North Crimean Canal, to bring much needed water from the Dnipro River to the peninsula.\(^{121}\) The resulting network of canals, reservoirs, locks, and pumps supported cities, particularly those on the drier south coast of Crimea, and extensive agriculture operations.\(^{122}\) Notably, the canal begins in the Kherson Oblast, not in Crimea, and thus control of the water flow remained in Ukrainian hands after the 2014 invasion of Crimea.\(^{123}\) Ukraine subsequently dammed the canal after Russia refused to pay for the use of the water.\(^{124}\)

Russification efforts continued both in Ukraine and in Crimea after Stalin’s death with some degree of success.\(^{125}\) In 1989, the majority of people in Crimea identified themselves as Russians and Russian-speakers.\(^{126}\) Despite this, however, the vote for Ukrainian independence on December 1, 1991 passed in the region by 54%.\(^{127}\) With independence, larger numbers of Tatars also began to return and by the mid-1990s it is estimated that close to 250,000 Tatars had made it back to Crimea where they began to rebuild their culture.\(^{128}\) These efforts were disrupted by the February 26, 2014 Russian invasion.\(^{129}\) After the initial seizure of the Crimean Parliament, Russia moved quickly, and with the aid of a small pro-Russian separatist party which had previously been able to muster only 4% of the vote and turncoat police and security forces, they engineered a Russian annexation referendum in mid-March 2014.\(^{130}\) Those favoring annexation claimed that 97% of voters supported their efforts, (in one district, Sevastopol, they reported a pro-Russian vote of 123% of registered voters).\(^{131}\) Following the referendum, on March 18, 2014, Vladimir Putin asked the Russian Legislature to formalize Russia’s annexation of Crimea.\(^{132}\) Since the annexation, leaders of the Crimean Tatar community have been arrested by Russian state security forces and, in a reprise of the fate suffered by their parents and grandparents, banned from returning to their homeland.\(^{133}\)

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119 Kubijovyč et al., supra note 103.
120 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. (On 26 February 2022, after securing control of the region, the Russian military blew up the dam, reopening the flow of water from the canal.)
125 Kravtiv & Kubijovyč, supra note 111.
126 Ethnic Composition of the Crimea, 1979 and 1989, supra note 103.
127 Kubijovyč et al., supra note 103.
128 Pohl, supra note 113.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
3. The Donbas

The Donbas, coming from the words Donets Basin, is a region in south-eastern Ukraine that carries its own historical, cultural, and economic value. The region borders both Ukraine and Russia. It contains two provinces called Donetsk and Luhansk. The region was predominantly used for a coal-steel industry in early 1900s. The region includes common day cities of Mariupol, Donetsk, and Luhansk. The population’s rapid growth in the region happened in a span of 60 years, in which the population grew from 700,000 to approximately 7 million people.

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136 Id.
138 Id. at 17.
The wage pay in Donbas was better than that of the surrounding regions; however, the dangers of working in the mines were proportional to the increased pay. The dangers of the coal mining industry was not changed for the better by either the October Revolution or the First World War. Some recreational activities included fist fighting whether it be between women or men which is aided by the rise in alcoholism in that region during the first half of the 20th century.

The two common languages spoken in the Donbas region are Russian and Ukrainian. In addition, the thriving industrialists in Donbas were Russians and so Russian became the language for the workers in the mining industry there. However, there were people of many ethnicities coexisting, such as Russians, Ukrainians, and Tartars (who are of Turkic ethnic group). Naturally, when many types of people live together, a class structure is born. In Donbas, the Tartars and Muslims were routinely targeted by the Slavs. Furthermore, the villages were usually a monolith, meaning that the Ukrainians and Russians rarely lived together in a village; it was either Ukrainians or Russians only. The tensions between Ukrainians and Russians were quite obvious in cities and workers’ settlements. It gave way to name calling, constant brawls (especially over women) which took the form of knife fights, and hostile treatments.

The Donbas is sometimes referred to as the ‘Wild East’ because of how of the many misfits that it attracted – such as the “runaway serfs, religious dissidents, criminals and black marketeers.” Some people fled to the Donbas to hide from police authorities where they can circumvent the rules there.

Nikita Khrushchev grew up in Donbas and identified himself as a proletarian instead of a Ukrainian because of the class’s peasantry connotation. The Great Terrors, including in the years 1937 – 1938 was part of Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s plan as well, in which the Ukrainian Communist Party was purged violently to kill the idea of Ukrainian freedom. After the purge ended in 1940, the region was devastated and the people there started to rebuild from scratch. The region was revitalized from the 1960s and most of the population chose to speak Russian so as to be able to pursue more opportunities and the Ukrainian language became a “backwards language.”

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139 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 27.
140 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 20.
141 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 28, 31.
142 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 42.
143 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 9.
144 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 42.
145 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 42.
146 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 42-3.
147 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 43.
148 Kuromiya, supra note 137, at 43.
149 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 131.
150 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 131.
151 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 292.
152 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 291-2.
153 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 292.
By 1980s, the idea of Ukrainian national movement was almost obsolete, with some activists still advocating in cities. A Majority of Russians and Ukrainians thought of Ukraine as a Russian province by that point.

IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

A. History of the Geneva Conventions

Swiss businessman Henry Durant is widely credited as the father of modern international humanitarian law due to his work in founding the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) after witnessing the brutality of war on the battlefield in Solferino, Italy, in 1859. Durant’s work led to the creation of the first iteration of the Geneva Convention of the Wounded on the Field of Battle (“Geneva I”) in 1864, which contained ten articles providing for the protection of hospitals, medical workers, and medical aid during times of armed conflict. These humanitarian protections for injured combatants were expanded in first in 1906, and again in 1929 in the aftermath of World War I, with changes to Geneva I as well as the creation of the original Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva II”).

The atrocities committed during World War II, however, highlighted the major gaps in the existing international humanitarian legal framework. With significant input from both states and the ICRC, Geneva I and III were updated and two further treaties were drafted. These two new conventions included the Geneva Convention on the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (“Geneva II”), and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (“Geneva IV”). All four Geneva Conventions entered into force on October 21, 1950, and were widely adopted by States throughout the 20th Century. Two additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions were drafted and adopted in 1977, and one final Protocol was drafted and adopted in 2005. As all four Genevas as well as the First and Second Protocols have been widely adopted,

155 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 293.
156 Applebaum, supra note 31, at 293.
161 See Geneva Convention I.
162 See Geneva Convention III.
164 See Geneva Convention III.
165 See Geneva Convention IV.
166 The Conventions were ratified by 74 States in the 1950s, 48 States during the 1960s, 20 States during the 1970s, 20 States during the 1980s, 26 States during the 1990s, and by 7 States in the 2000s, bringing the current total of ratifications to 194 States: cf. supra, note 163.
167 Supra, note 163 (168 States have ratified the First Protocol, and 177 States have ratified the Second Protocol).
the principles contained within can also be applied as customary international humanitarian law when necessary.168

B. The Conventions

1. Object/Purpose of the Conventions

The Geneva Conventions are intended to provide protections to medical personnel, prisoners of war, injured or surrendering members of the armed forces, and civilians or other non-combatants during times of both international and non-international armed conflict as well as in times of peaceful occupation.169 Each Convention contains specific provisions that provide a minimum standard of treatment to which State parties must adhere during the course of any armed conflict or occupation. This minimum standard of treatment generally requires that State parties treat all protected persons with dignity; for example, State parties are not permitted to submit captured protected persons to any type of mutilation, torture, or other humiliating treatment, nor are State parties permitted to take hostages, kill surrendering opponents, perform extrajudicial killings, or interfere with humanitarian aid or civilian evacuation routes.170

2. Protected Persons Under the Conventions

Each of the Geneva Conventions provides specific protections to a different category of persons who may be at risk during an armed conflict or peaceful occupation. Geneva Convention I provides protections for sick or wounded members of armed forces and ad hoc militia groups, and Geneva Convention II provides protections for members of the armed forces who are sick, injured, or otherwise predisposed while at sea during an armed conflict.171 Geneva Convention III provides protections for prisoners of war, and Geneva Convention IV provides broad protections for any person who is not protected by Geneva Conventions I, II, or III.172 Geneva Convention IV further states that protected persons who are “wounded and sick,” as well as “expectant mothers,” are granted “particular protection and respect.”173 In essence, the Geneva Conventions protect every individual impacted by an armed conflict or peaceful occupation except healthy, uninjured, and uncaptured individuals who are members of the armed forces or other ad hoc militias.

3. Selected Protections Within the Conventions

i. Hospital Protections

Each of the four Geneva Conventions contains multiple provisions providing specific protections to hospitals, ad hoc medical facilities, medical personnel, and medical transport equipment. Geneva Convention I provides these protections in Articles 19 – 37, prohibiting State Parties from targeting, bombing, destroying, or otherwise attacking established hospitals and ad hoc medical facilities, medical transport, and medical personnel that have been established to provide medical care to wounded and sick members of armed forces.174 Geneva II provides these

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169 Geneva Conventions common art. 2 & 3.
170 See generally Geneva Conventions.
172 See Geneva Convention III, art. 4; Geneva Convention IV, art. 4
173 Geneva Convention IV, art. 16.
same general protections to hospital ships and other medical assistance provided to sick and wounded soldiers on the high seas.\textsuperscript{175}

Geneva Convention IV expands this prohibition on attacks on hospitals to civilian hospitals. Per Article 18 of Geneva Convention IV, civilian hospitals and medical facilities, including maternity hospitals, “may in no circumstances be the object of attack” and “at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.”\textsuperscript{176} The only circumstance in which civilian medical facilities can lawfully be the target of attack under Geneva Convention IV is enumerated in Article 19, which states that civilian hospitals which are used to “commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.”\textsuperscript{177} The act of providing medical service and other care to troops is not considered to be “harmful to the enemy,” and even when a civilian hospital is engaging in qualifying harmful conduct, a State party must first provide a warning to a civilian hospital before stripping it of its protection.\textsuperscript{178} State parties are also required to refrain from targeting or otherwise attacking medical transport units.\textsuperscript{179}

ii. \textit{Humanitarian Protections}

The Geneva Conventions all contain provisions that require State parties to treat all protected persons with a general standard of care. Geneva Convention I contains multiple provisions detailing the level of care that State Parties must provide to injured and sick members of armed forces, including providing a sufficient level of food, water, shelter, and medical care, and refraining from any type of discrimination.\textsuperscript{180} Geneva Convention I also prohibits State parties from engaging in any type of medical experimentation, torture, or other degrading or humiliating treatment and requires State parties to record and identify any enemy individuals who may fall under their care or control.\textsuperscript{181} Geneva Convention II requires this same level of treatment for members of armed forces on the high seas, and Geneva Convention III requires this same level of treatment for prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{182} Geneva Convention IV requires that State parties take reasonable measures to protect civilians from the impact of military operations, and requires states to provide a heightened level of human treatment.\textsuperscript{183} This level of protection for internees includes access to sufficient food, water, shelter, and medical care, but also requires State parties to permit internees to engage in religious and other important cultural practices, to maintain humane working conditions for internees, and to permit internees a certain level of contact with individuals outside of the internment.\textsuperscript{184}

4. \textit{Application of the Convention by International Tribunals}

The Geneva Conventions have been used in a wide array of international litigation, including contentious cases in front of the International Court of Justice and international arbitral tribunals, and in international criminal litigation. In \textit{Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo}, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) alleged multiple breaches of the Geneva Conventions by Uganda, including killing, injuring, and despoiling DRC nationals of their property, by failing
to take adequate measures to prevent violations of human rights in the DRC by persons under its jurisdiction or control, and by failing to punish persons under its jurisdiction or control for having committed the above acts. The Court found that, among other things, the failure of the Ugandan forces to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants during the course of the armed conflict constituted a breach of the Geneva Conventions and of international humanitarian law. The Court also found that Uganda’s shelling of medical facilities, religious buildings, educational buildings, and civilian escape routes constituted a breach of the Geneva Conventions and of international humanitarian law.

The Geneva Conventions were also integral to the Eritrea v. Ethiopia arbitration, in which both parties to the arbitration were found to have breached the Conventions and international humanitarian law. The Commission found multiple breaches on each side of the conflict, including breaches for conduct involving both civilians and prisoners of war. Ethiopia was found in violation of multiple articles of Geneva Convention IV for unlawfully expelling Ethiopian nationals of Eritrean descent who did not hold dual citizenship, and for the inhuman conditions of deportation on some of these convoys to Eritrea. Eritrea was found in breach of Article 35 of Geneva Convention IV for failing to ensure that some Ethiopian nationals who were lawfully expelled were allowed the opportunity to collect their personal property. Among other things, Eritrea was also found in breach of multiple articles of Geneva Convention IV regarding both its unlawful detainment of Ethiopian nationals as well as the insanitary conditions, denial of due process, and frequent abuse to which the Ethiopian nationals were subjected.

C. Overview and Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was established in 1998 by the Rome Statute, and acts as a permanent international criminal tribunal under which individuals who commit or attempt to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression may be prosecuted and held accountable for their conduct. Per the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction when one of these four core international crimes was committed and the crimes were committed by a State party national, in the territory of a State party, or in a State that has accepted jurisdiction of the Court. Alternatively, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction where the crimes were referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the UN Security Council pursuant to the resolution adopted in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The Prosecutor may begin an investigation before issuing a warrant if the crimes were referred by the UN Security Council or if a State Party requests an investigation for crimes that appear to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the Court. Otherwise, the Prosecutor must seek authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber to begin an investigation proprio motu (on its

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186 *Id.* at ¶ 76.
187 *Id.*
189 *Id.*
190 *Id.*
191 Rome Statute art. 5.
192 Rome Statute art. 12.
193 Rome Statute art. 13.
own initiative) based on information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.\textsuperscript{195} If the Pre-Trial Chamber considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court based on the criteria listed above, it shall authorize the investigation.\textsuperscript{196}

\textbf{D. Crimes Against Humanity}

Article 7 of the Rome Statute details the scope of the potential crimes against humanity that may be charged by the Prosecutor. A crime against humanity is defined as any of the listed acts as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”\textsuperscript{197} This statute has a mens rea of knowledge to find someone guilty of a crime against humanity, but this element does not require that the perpetrator had actual knowledge of the attack, details of the plan, or policy of the state organization.\textsuperscript{198} In order for the Prosecutor to successfully charge an individual with a crime against humanity under Article 7, the Prosecutor must be able to establish that the conduct was committed as part of a “widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population” pursuant to a State policy, and that the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.\textsuperscript{199}

Crimes against humanity that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC include murder, extermination, enslavement, forced deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape and other sex crimes, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid, and other inhuman acts “of a similar character.”\textsuperscript{200} Article 7 of the Rome Statute, as well as the Rome Statute Elements of Crimes supplement, provide further clarification on what types of conduct fall within the scope of crimes against humanity. For example, a charge of enslavement under Article 7(1)(c) must include the exercise of “the right of ownership” over a person, which includes human trafficking.\textsuperscript{201} Likewise, in order for the Prosecutor to successfully charge an individual with enforced disappearance under Article 7(1)(i), the Prosecutor must establish that the individual intended to remove the disappeared persons from “the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”\textsuperscript{202}

Since its establishment, the Prosecutor has charged and tried multiple individuals for violations of Article 7 of the Rome Statute. In \textit{The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga}, the Prosecutor charged Germain Katanga, the Commander of the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and Brigadier-General of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) with crimes against humanity in relation to an attack on Bogoro, a village in the Ituri district of the DRC, that took place in February 2003.\textsuperscript{203} The Prosecutor alleged that Katanga and his co-perpetrators directed this attack against civilians to raze Bogoro and its predominantly Hema civilian population, and implemented this plan by engaging in widespread killing and imprisonment, destroyed civilian homes, raped civilian women and girls, and prevented civilians

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{195} Rome Statute art. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Rome Statute art. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Rome Statute art. 7(1)
\item \textsuperscript{198} ICC Elements Art. 8(2)
\item \textsuperscript{199} See Rome Statute art. 7(2)(a).
\item \textsuperscript{200} Rome Statute arts. 7(1)(a)-(k).
\item \textsuperscript{201} Rome Statute art. 7(2)(9c) (However, this crime must also satisfy the element regarding the existence of a widespread attack on a population, and therefore a non-State organization conducting human trafficking for financial reasons would likely not fall under the scope of art. 7(1)(c)).
\item \textsuperscript{202} Rome Statute art. 7(2)(h).
\item \textsuperscript{203} \textit{Prosecutor v. Katanga}, ICC-01/04-01/07- Warrant of Arrest, Judge Kuenyehia, 7 (July 2, 2007).
\end{itemize}
from fleeing. The FRPI also pillaged the property mainly of Hema civilians of Bogoro after the attack, and abducted women and girls from Bogoro and used them as “wives” of FRPI combatants. Among other things, Katanga was charged as an accessory to murder under Article 7(1)(a) and was found guilty. He was sentenced to twelve years in prison for his crimes.

The Appellate Court’s acquittal of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo illustrates the level of direct control an individual must have in order to be liable for the conduct of those under his or her command. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo was President and Commander-in-chief of the Mouvement de libération du Congo (“MLC”), and was originally convicted by the Trial Court for the murders and rapes of all the soldiers under his direction, even though the Prosecutor did not establish that Bemba had control of the conduct of these soldiers. The Appeals Chamber found that Bemba could not be held criminally liable for the acts of all MLC troops during the CAR operation for multiple reasons. Among other issues, Appeals Court found the trial court failed to recognize the limitations Bemba faced in investigating and prosecuting these crimes given his role as a remote commander of troops in a foreign country and that MLC relied heavily on the cooperation of CAR authorities during the time in question.

E. War Crimes

As with Article 7 and crimes against humanity, Article 8 defines the scope of what conduct constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. In order for any of the conduct listed under Article 8, it must be committed during a time of either international or non-international armed conflict. The first section of Article 8 establishes that any “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions constitute a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, including wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering, extensive destruction of property, depriving prisoners of war various rights, unlawful deportation or transfer of individuals, and the taking of hostages. The second section of Article 8 outlines various other violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including but not limited to launching intentional or indiscriminate attacks against civilian populations, targeting civilian infrastructure or religious, cultural, medical, or educational institutions, subjecting individuals to unnecessary medical experimentation, and the use of various types of inhuman weapons or projectiles. In order to convict an individual of a war crime, the Prosecutor must establish that the individual directed or participated in the conduct.

War crimes are some of the most common charges brought by the Prosecutor. In The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Al Mahdi was convicted under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.

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204 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-Pre-Trial Chamber I, Judge Kuenyehia, ¶ 17 (Sept. 30, 2008).
205 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-Pre-Trial Chamber II, Judge Cotte, ¶ 7 (Mar. 7, 2014).
207 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08- Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, ¶ 30 (June 8, 2018).
208 Id. at ¶33
209 Id. at ¶25
210 Id.
211 See Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a-e) (This differs from Article 7 crimes against humanity, which can be committed during peacetime so long as the conduct is still part of a widespread State policy).
212 Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(a)(i-vii).
213 See Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(b)(i-xxvi).
214 ICC Elements, art. 8.
Statute. Al Mahdi was an alleged member of Ansar Eddine, which was a movement associated with the terrorist group Al Qaeda. Al Mahdi was charged under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome Statute with intentionally directing attacks toward multiple religious and cultural institutions, including nine mausoleums and one mosque. These attacks had no military objective, and the destruction of the religious and historical buildings was considered as a serious matter by the people in the community. In order to convict Al Mahdi of this crime, the Prosecutor needed to establish that he had directed the attack, that the attacks targeted on or more buildings dedicated to one of the purposes enumerated in the statute, that he intended these buildings to be the target of the attack, and that the conduct took place within the context of an armed conflict.

There are five elements for Article 8 (2) (e) (iv), war crime of attacking protected objects: (1) The perpetrator directed an attack; (2) The object of the attack was one or more buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives; (3) The perpetrator intended such building or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals or places where the sick and wounded are collected, which were not military objectives, to be the object of the attack; (4) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict, and that he was aware of the existence of the armed conflict. The Trial Court determined that these elements were met, and Al Mahdi was found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison for his involvement in these war crimes.

V. MOST RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS

This section will identify the individuals most responsible for the war crimes being committed in Ukraine by Russia. It will provide a brief overview of the role the individual holds in the Russian senior leadership and a biography. Figure 9 at the end of this section contains a full list of the command and control of Russian senior leadership, and more can be read regarding the senior leadership in Appendix D.

This section is not an exhaustive list, but merely an introduction to those responsible at the highest levels. Notably, this section will begin with the individual most responsible for the current perpetration of crimes against humanity in Ukraine — Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.

Figure 9 on next page.

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216 Id.
217 Id. (Al Mahdi’s sentence was reduced by the Appellate Court by two years and will be complete on Sep. 18, 2022).
Figure 9: Original document cread by the Global Accountability Report.
A. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is the President of the Russian Federation, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Chairman of the Russian Security Council. Moreover, Putin is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 336 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland. While Putin is not the official leader of the United Russia party, he is the de facto leader of it and the party fully supports his policies.

On February 24, 2022, Putin announced that Russian armed forces were launching a “special military operation” in eastern Ukraine. In his speech announcing such an operation, Putin claimed that Russia sought the demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine. Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government was a Nazi government and that it was committing genocide against Russians speaking Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine. Within minutes of Putin’s speech, explosions were reported across Ukraine, including in locations such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region.

Notably, on March 18, 2022, Putin attended a concert at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow to commemorate the eighth anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. At that rally, Putin reiterated his false claims that Ukraine was committing genocide against Russian-speaking individuals in the Donbas and stated that it was the main reason for the invasion. He also stated that “[f]or a world without Nazism,” Russia “will definitely implement all [of its] plans” in Ukraine.

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221 See Andrey Pertsev, A New Role for United Russia, CARNEGIE MOSCOW CTR. (Dec. 2, 2018) (discussing how Putin is not directly affiliated with the United Russia Party, nor holds an official role. Instead, he utilizes United Russia for his own political gain.).
227 Id.
228 Id.
B. Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov

As the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov is the highest-ranking officer of the Russian Armed Forces and the senior-most uniformed military officer.229 This position is comparable to the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.230 Gerasimov was born on September 8, 1955, in Kazan, Tatar ASSR, Soviet Union.231 From 1971 to 1973, Gerasimov attended the Kazan Suvorov Military School.232 From 1973 to 1977, he attended the Kazan Higher Tank Command School.233 Following his studies at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, Gerasimov was assigned to the post of commander of a Mechanized Infantry platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District.234 From 1993 to 1995, Gerasimov was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District.235

From 1984 to 1987, Gerasimov studied at the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy. Finally, from 1995 to 1997, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.236 Following his graduation from the General Staff academy, Gerasimov served as the First Deputy Army Commander within the Moscow Military District as well as the commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War.237

In 2006, Gerasimov became the commander of the Leningrad Military District before being moved to command the Moscow Military District in 2009.238 On December 23, 2010, Gerasimov became the deputy Chief of the General Staff.239 In 2012, he was assigned to command the Central Military District. On November 6, 2012, Gerasimov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.240

In February 2013, Gerasimov published an article titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” in the Russian trade-paper Military-Industrial Kurier.241 In this article, Gerasimov laid out a new theory of modern warfare.242 According to Politico, this new theory, known as the Gerasimov Doctrine, “took tactics developed by the Soviets, blended them with strategic military thinking about total war, and laid our a new theory of modern warfare—one that looks more like hacking an enemy’s society than attacking it head-on.”243 Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has

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231 Due to Russian-sponsored websites crashing or becoming inoperable during the construction of this paper, this information cannot be cited. For further reading, see infra Appendix D.

232 Id.

233 Id.

234 Id.

235 Id.

236 Id.

237 Id.

238 Id.

239 Id.

240 Id.


242 Id.

243 Id.
grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness . . . [a]ll this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.”

C. Nikolay Vasilyevich Bogdanovsky

Nikolay Vasilyevich Bogdanovsky is a member of the General Staff, responsible for disseminating the Commander-in-Chief’s policies, transmits his orders, and oversees the execution of such orders. Bogdanovsky was born on January 17, 1957, in Predgorny, Russia, Soviet Union. Bogdanovsky attended the Yekaterinburg Suvorov Military School from 1972 to 1974, and then the Moscow Higher Military Command school between 1974 and 1978. From 1984 to 1987, he attended the Frunze Military Academy. From 1994 to 1996, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

In 1978, Bogdanovsky joined the Soviet Army, where he served as a reconnaissance platoon commander, company commander, chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion, commander of a motorized rifle battalion in the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary from 1978 to 1984. From 1987 to 1994, Bogdanovsky was the chief of staff of fortified areas, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, and chief of staff of a motorized rifle division. From 1996 to 2006, he was the Chief of the 392nd Pacific Center for Training Junior Specialists of Motorized Rifle Forces. He also served, during this time, as the Chief of Staff and Commander of the 35th Army.

Between June 2006 and January 2008, Bogdanovsky was the Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern Military District. Following this post, from January 2008 to March 2009, he was the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. Between March 24, 2009, and January 9, 2011, Bogdanovsky was the Commander of the Leningrad Military District. On January 9, 2011, Putin issued a decree that appointed Bogdanovsky to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training.

On December 13, 2012, Bogdanovsky was promoted to the rank of Colonel General. Following this promotion, he became the commander of the Central Military District; a position he held until June 12, 2014. On June 12, 2014, Putin once again promoted Bogdanovsky by Decree of the President, this time to the position of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

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244 McKew, supra note 241.
246 Supra, note 233.
247 Supra, note 233.
248 Supra, note 233.
249 Supra, note 233.
250 Supra, note 233.
251 Supra, note 233.
252 Supra, note 233.
253 Supra, note 233.
254 Supra, note 233.
255 Supra, note 233.
256 Supra, note 233.
Forces of Russia. Between September 29, 2015, and October 1, 2015, Bogdanovsky took part in negotiations on coordination of actions with the Israel Defense Forces during Russia’s military intervention in Syria. For his involvement in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Bogdanovsky was included in a Canadian sanctions list.

D. Igor Olegovich Kostyukov

Igor Olegovich Kostyukov is the Director of Russian Military Intelligence, heading the main intelligence department of the Russian General Staff and providing the military with intelligence. Kostyukov was a member of both the Soviet and Russian Navies and is currently an Admiral in the Russian Navy.

Kostyukov was born on February 21, 1961, in Amur Oblast, RSFSR, USSR. On Nov 22, 2018, he was appointed the acting Director of the Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Department (GBU) following the death of Igor Korobov, who had held the role prior. In 2019, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral. Kostyukov is the first naval officer to hold the office of the Director of the GBU. While not much information is available on Kostyukov, it has been noted that he is a hardliner. He has been awarded the “Hero of Russian Federation” award. In addition, he was a high-ranking participant of the Syrian military operation and was praised by President Vladimir Putin, emphasizing his outstanding merits in Syria.

E. Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov

Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov is the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, commanding the entirety of the Russian ground forces during the invasion of Ukraine. Salyukov was born on May 21, 1955, in Saratov, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1977, Salyukov graduated from the Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School with a gold medal. In 1985, he graduated from the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy with high honors. In 1996,
Salyukov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.  

From 1977 to 1982, Salyukov held the positions of (i) platoon officer, (ii) company officer, and (iii) Chief of the staff for the Battalion Commander in the Kyiv Military District. From 1985 to 1994, he held the positions of (i) Deputy Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, (ii) Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, and (iii) Deputy Commander of a Guards tank division in the Moscow Military District. From 1994 to 1997, he held the positions of (i) Commander of the 81st Guards Motor Rifle Division, (ii) Chief of the staff and Army Commander (35th Army), and (iii) Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District.

From 2005 to 2008, he served as the Chief of the Staff-First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District. From 2008 to 2010, he held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District. From 2010 to 2014, he was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. From May 2014 to the present, Salyukov holds the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.

On February 23, 2022, the E.U. added Salyukov to its sanction list for being “responsible for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

VI. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

This section will detail egregious crimes committed on behalf of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The section will focus on the Russian Federation’s targeting of medical facilities, indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, willful causing of great suffering of civilians, murder, abduction and detainment of government officials and the taking of hostages, targeting of journalists and members of the press, bombing of evacuation and humanitarian routes, forced deportation of Ukrainian citizens, and genocide.

Similar to the previous section, this will not be an exhaustive list of crimes committed in Ukraine by the Russian federation. Instead, this section aims to highlight certain representative crimes that indicate an intentional pattern of destruction, aggression, and murder. Further reading and analysis of war crimes committed in Ukraine can be found in Appendices B and C. Furthermore, an example indictment of Vladimir Putin for perpetration of these crimes can be found in Appendix A.

271 Supra, note 233.
272 Supra, note 233.
273 Supra, note 233.
274 Supra, note 233.
275 Supra, note 233.
276 Supra, note 233.
277 Supra, note 233.
A. Unlawful Targeting of Medical Facilities

Intentional destruction of medical facilities\textsuperscript{279} and murder\textsuperscript{280} are violations of the Rome Statute. Further, unlawful targeting of civilian medical facilities\textsuperscript{281} and the unlawful killing of civilians\textsuperscript{282} are violations of the Geneva Conventions. The Russian military, led by Vladimir Putin, targeted and bombed multiple protected hospital units in Mariupol, Zhtomyr, and Kharkiv.

- In Mariupol on March 9, 2022, the Russian military bombed a maternity hospital in Mariupol, unlawfully killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 17 civilians.\textsuperscript{283}
- In Zhtomyr on March 2, 2022, the Russian military bombed a children’s hospital in Zhotomyr, injuring an unknown number of civilians.\textsuperscript{284}
- In Kharkiv on March 11, 2022, the Russian military bombed a psychiatric hospital.\textsuperscript{285}

In addition, between February 24 and March 21, 2022, the Russian military targeted, bombed, or otherwise compromised a total of 64 protected medical facilities, unlawfully killing at least fifteen civilians and injuring an unknown number of civilians.\textsuperscript{286}

B. Use of Indiscriminate Cluster Munitions

Willful killing\textsuperscript{287} and extensive destruction of property carried out unlawfully and wantonly\textsuperscript{288} are violations of the Rome Statute. Further, attacks on a civilian population are a violation of the Geneva Convention.\textsuperscript{289} The Russian military has frequently used indiscriminate cluster munitions\textsuperscript{290} that killed and injured civilians in Okhtyrka, Vuhledar, and Kharkiv.

\textsuperscript{279} Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(i); 8(2)(b)(ix).
\textsuperscript{280} Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a).
\textsuperscript{281} Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
\textsuperscript{282} Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
\textsuperscript{287} Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(i).
\textsuperscript{288} Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
\textsuperscript{289} Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
• In Okhtyrka on February 25, 2022, Russian military forces struck a nursery and elementary school with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least one civilian and injuring at least three civilians.291

• In Vuhledar on February 24, 2022, Russian military forces struck a hospital with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least four civilians, injuring 10 civilians, and damaging the hospital and one ambulance.292

• In Kharkiv on or around February 28, 2022, Russian military forces struck multiple civilian residences with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing an unknown number of civilians, injuring an unknown number of civilians, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.293 In addition, on February 28, 2022, Russian military forces struck multiple civilian residences with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing four civilians, burning alive a family of two adults and three children, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.294

C. Willfully Causing Great Suffering and Murder of Civilians

Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health295 and murder296 are both violations of the Rome Statute. In addition, unlawful killing of civilians297 and indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas298 are violations of the Geneva Conventions.

• In Mariupol, on March 16, 2022, the Russian military bombed a theatre being used to shelter civilians, unlawfully killing at least 300 civilians and injuring an unknown number of civilians.299

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295 Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(iii).
296 Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(i).
297 Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
298 Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
D. Abduction and Detainment of Government Officials and the Taking of Hostages

Taking of Hostages\textsuperscript{300} and detention and severe deprivation of liberty\textsuperscript{301} are violations of the Rome Statute and the Geneva Conventions. Notably, Pripyat, Melitopol, Dniprorудne, Velykобуrlutskа, and Beryslav have endured such violations on a large scale.

- In Pripyat on February 24, 2022, Russian military forces seized the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant and held at least 100 civilians hostage.\textsuperscript{302} These civilian hostages were not provided basic amenities, including soap or water, and were not provided adequate food, water, or medicine.\textsuperscript{303} The civilian hostages were forced to perform labor related to the upkeep of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.\textsuperscript{304}

- In Melitopol on March 11, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Ivan Federov and held him hostage for five days.\textsuperscript{305} Mr. Federov was released in a prisoner exchange on March 16, 2022.\textsuperscript{306}

- In Dniprorудne on March 13, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Yevhen Matveyev.\textsuperscript{307} As of March 31, 2022, Mr. Matveyev has not been released from Russian custody.

- In Velykобуrlutskа on March 17, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Viktor Tereshchenko from his office.\textsuperscript{308} Mr. Tereshchenko was released on March 18, 2022, and went to the hospital for injuries sustained as a result of the Russian military.\textsuperscript{309}

\textsuperscript{300} Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(viii); Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
\textsuperscript{301} Rome Statute art. 7(1)(e); Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
\textsuperscript{303} Id.: see also James Callery, *Chernobyl technicians held 'like prisoners in a Russian concentration camp'*, THE TIMES (Mar. 17, 2022), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chernobyl-technicians-held-like-prisoners-in-a-russian-concentration-camp-5zz6cxd5#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThey%20can%20take%20a%20shower,is%20no%20supply%20of%20medicines.
\textsuperscript{306} Id.
• In Beryslav on March 19, 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Oleksandr Shapovalov. Mr. Shapovalov remains in Russian custody as of March 31, 2022.

E. Targeting of Journalists and Members of the Press

Targeting and killing of civilian journalists a violation of Articles 2 Common to the Geneva Conventions and Article 71 of the Additional Protocol I. In addition, intentionally launching indiscriminate attacks against civilians is a violation of the Rome Statute. Kyiv has witnessed numerous such violations.

• In Kyiv, on March 13, 2022, Russian military forces shot at and unlawfully killed journalist Brent Renaud and injured journalist Juan Arrendondo.

• In addition, on March 14, 2022, the Russian military shelled and unlawfully killed journalists Oleksandra “Sasha” Kuvshynova and Pierre Zakrzewski and seriously injured journalist Benjamin Hall.

• Including the above crimes, Russian military forces have unlawfully killed at least five journalists, injured seven journalists, and abducted six journalists since February 24, 2022.

F. Bombing of Evacuation and Humanitarian Routes

Targeting civilian escape routes and interfering with the delivery of humanitarian aid are violations of the Geneva Convention. Further, intentionally directing attacks toward the civilian population and murder are violations of the Rome Statute. Thus far in the conflict, Mariupol, Irpin, and Lyman have suffered numerous such violations.

• In Mariupol, on March 7, 2022, Russian military forces planted butterfly mines in a proposed civilian evacuation route in an attempt to seriously injure civilian evacuees. In addition, on March 8, 2022, Russian military forces shelled a civilian

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311 Geneva Conventions common art. 2, Oct. 21, 1950.; Art. 71 of the Additional Protocol I.
312 Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
314 Two journalists killed near Kyiv, EUR. FED’N OF JOURNALISTS (Mar. 15, 2022), https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2022/03/15/two-journalists-killed-near-kyiv/.
315 Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
316 Geneva Conventions common art. 2.
317 Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
318 Rome Statute art. 7(1)(a).
evacuation route from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Mariupol and preventing civilians from evacuation Zaporizhzhia.\textsuperscript{320}

- In Irpin, on March 6, 2022, Russian military forces fired indiscriminately at a civilian evacuation route, unlawfully killing four civilians.\textsuperscript{321}

- In Lyman, on March 13, 2022, Russian military forces performed an airstrike which indiscriminately struck a civilian evacuation train, killing one civilian and injuring one civilian.\textsuperscript{322}

G. \textit{Forced Deportation of Ukrainian Citizens}

Deportation of a population,\textsuperscript{323} enforced disappearance of persons,\textsuperscript{324} and unlawful deportation\textsuperscript{325} are each a violation of the Rome Statute. Mariupol, Donetsk, and Luhansk have had frequent occurrences of open and forcible deportation of Ukrainian citizens on behalf of the Russian Federation.

- In Mariupol, beginning on March 20, 2022, Russian military forces forcibly deported at least 15,000 Ukrainian citizens to the Taranog region of Russia while depriving them of all official Ukrainian documentation, including passports.\textsuperscript{326} At least some of these Ukrainian citizens are being transferred to other locations in southwestern Russia to perform forced labor.\textsuperscript{327}

- In Donetsk and Luhansk, beginning on March 21, 2022, Russian military forces forcibly deported at least 2,389 Ukrainian citizen children to various locations within the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{328}

H. \textit{Crimes of Aggression}

Crimes of aggression, enumerated in article 8 \textit{bis} of the Rome Statute, were added to the statute in 2010 and generally prohibit State conduct that is intended to position an individual to


\textsuperscript{323} Rome Statute art. 7(1)(d).

\textsuperscript{324} Rome Statute art. 7(1)(i).

\textsuperscript{325} Rome Statute art. 8(2)(a)(vii).


\textsuperscript{327} Claims Mariupol residents taken to Russia for forced labour, Associated Press (hereinafter AP) (Mar. 20, 2022), https://www.1news.co.nz/2022/03/20/claims-mariupol-residents-taken-to-russia-for-forced-labour/.

“exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.” At the time of this publication, the ICC has not convicted an individual of the charge.

Currently, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes of aggression over the situation because neither Ukraine nor Russia are a party to the ICC. The ICC would have jurisdiction over crime of aggression if the United Nations Security Council asked the ICC to investigate. However, Russia has a veto power on the UNSC and has since exercised it already by vetoing a resolution that denounces its invasion of Ukraine.

Another avenue, through Article 14 of the Rome Statute, provides jurisdiction over crime of aggression when a State Party refers the situation to the Prosecutor of crimes happening within the jurisdiction of the court and the Prosecutor acts. However, this method also does not apply to the case at hand because neither Ukraine nor Russia is party to the ICC.

A more viable avenue is through the United Nations General Assembly, authorized under Article 9. Through Article 9, the General Assembly members need to meet the required two-thirds majority vote in order to pass resolutions or answers to “important questions” regarding international peace and security.

To convict based on crimes of aggression, the Prosecutor must prove three elements: (1) the perpetrator is either a political or military leader, “the perpetrator was involved in the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of such a State act of aggression,” and (3) the crime of aggression must be in violation of the definition from General Assembly (“G.A.”) Resolution 3314 and the UN Charter. Moreover, the G.A. Resolution 3314 defines the act of aggression as an “invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State...however temporary.”

Here, as also discussed in Section V, Vladimir Putin, and other top military and political leaders are the perpetrators. Putin, under the guise of “special military operations,” sent Russian military into Ukraine on three different fronts. Such an act shows the plan and execution of the invasion. The invasion is by the Russian Federation in the borders of Ukraine, a State by its own

329 Rome Statute art. 8.
331 Id.
335 Id.
337 Id.
339 Definition of the crime of aggression, supra note 225.
340 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 227, at 143.
341 See infra Section V.
342 See infra Section II.
right. Thus, the crime of aggression charge is warranted, and is most likely to be charged under Article 9 of the U.N. Charter.

VII. CONCLUSION

Since the invasion, Ukrainian citizens have been forced to endure kidnappings, property destruction, starvation, terror, shillings, and murder at the hands of the Russian Federation. As is consistent with the complex and intricate history of Ukraine, Russia once again seeks to assert its dominance and control of the territory in wanton violation of international law and Ukrainian sovereignty. As of the writing of this document, President Zelenskyy continues to lead his country and seek peace for its citizens, while the Russian Federation continues its campaign of atrocities meant to terrorize Ukraine and strip it of its national identity.

There is no clearer violation of the laws of humanity. At its most basic elements, international law and the laws of humanity establish self-determination and self-expression of a people as fundamental rights free from infringement by foreign powers. President Putin, and the rest of his Russian Federation political and military command seek to upend these values and establish a new world order with authoritarianism, terror, and oppression at its center. The international community cannot remain silent, and the road does not end at sanctions — it begins.

Justice and accountability must take center stage as a response to this new Age of the Strongman. The international bodies of justice have remained silent in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Burma, China, Venezuela, and so many other countries and conflicts for far too long. It cannot remain silent in Ukraine. The international legal mechanisms are there and have worked in the past to hold perpetrators of crimes against humanity accountable. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone have shown that countering injustice and enforcing accountability is possible. However, the international criminal accountability system cannot remain a tool to wield against only African nations or areas lying in the remnants of a dissolved state.

The time to act is now. Further investigative inquiries over a consistent period with proper access and funding will be required to fully capture the criminal activity of the Russian Federation’s terror campaign in Ukraine. This document, and the accompanying appendices, merely provides a snapshot of the crimes that have taken place in Ukraine.

Innocent civilians and non-combatants have suffered for too long in the face of international silence and acquiescence. Those civilians and non-combatants have shouted out in anguish, while the international community remains with folded arms, depressingly silent. However, February 24, 2022, marks an opportunity to change the tides and bring accountability, peace, and justice at the center of the new world order. It is an opportunity that cannot be missed.

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343 See infra Section II.
APPENDIX CONTENTS

A. EXAMPLE INDICTMENT

B. UKRAINE CRIME NARRATIVE

C. UKRAINE CRIME MATRIX

D. RUSSIAN MOST RESPONSIBLE PARTY DOSSIER
THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR UKRAINE

THE PROSECUTOR

Against

VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN
PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

INDICTMENT

The Prosecutor, Special Court for Ukraine, charges:

VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN

with THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, VIOLATIONS
OF ARTICLE 3 COMMON TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS WITH REGARD TO
THE PRE-24 FEBRUARY 2022 NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE
DONBAS, AND OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 1, AND OTHER SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, AND WAR CRIMES, IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5, 6, and 7 OF THE ROME STATUTE as set forth below:

THE ACCUSED

1. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN (“the ACCUSED”) was born on 7 October
1952 in Leningrad, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, now known as Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation.

Prepared by the Global Accountability Network
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2. At all times relevant to this Indictment, a state of armed conflict existed within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine, as established on November 4, 1991, by the “Law of Ukraine”. The armed conflict has characteristics of both an international armed conflict between the states of Ukraine and the Russian Federation and a non-international armed conflict between Ukraine and its regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively referred to as “the Donbas”.

3. At all times relevant to this indictment, a nexus existed between the armed conflict within the territorial boundaries of Ukraine and all acts or omissions charged herein as violations of the various sources of international humanitarian law and/or the law of armed conflict, including treaties, conventions, and those international norms and precedents constituting customary international law for the purpose of this Tribunal.

4. For the purposes of this Indictment, organized armed factions involved in this conflict include the Armed Forces of Ukraine (“AFU”), the State Border Guard Services of Ukraine (“SBGSU”), the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (“AFRF”), and elements of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (“AFB”).

5. For purposes of this Indictment, irregular and/or non-state combatants include the Donetsk People’s Militia (“DPM”), the Lugansk People’s Militia (“LPM”), and various mercenary groups (collectively “Russian backed mercenaries”), including, but not limited to the Wagner Group (“WG”).

6. The AFRF is the official state military of the Russian Federation.

7. The AFU is the official state military of Ukraine.

8. The SBGSU is, while not under the control of the military, effectively the equivalent of a state military force and/or organized state militia and coast guard of Ukraine, and is organized as such.

9. The AFB is the official state military of the Republic of Belarus.

10. The AFU consists of ground forces, an air force, a navy including sea, air, and infantry components, an air assault force, and special operations forces. The AFU also includes a national guard component called the Territorial Defense Forces (“TDF”) which includes, since February 2022, a Foreign Legion, the International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine (“ILTDU”), which permits foreign nationals to formally enlist in the TDF of
Ukraine as regular troops. The Russian Federation has refused to recognize members of the ILTDU as lawful combatants and members of the organized military of Ukraine, despite their status as such under Ukrainian law.

11. The AFRF is comprised of the Russian Ground Forces, Russian Navy, Russian Aerospace Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Airborne Forces, and Special Operations Forces.

12. The AFRF is under the direct control of the Security Council of Russia. Every decision made by the Security Council of Russia is approved by the President of the Russian Federation, who then issues decrees or orders implementing these decisions.

13. The AFB is under the command and control of the President of the Republic of Belarus via the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, over which the President has de facto complete control. The AFB consists of ground forces, an air force, and air defense forces.

THE INCEPTION AND EXPANSION OF THE ARMED CONFLICT

14. In 1991, Ukraine and the Russian Federation gained full independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Much of the geographical territories of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation have periodically been incorporated into larger entities including the Russian Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Ukraine, a state with a population of roughly 44 million before the conflict at issue in the Indictment has a large Russian-speaking population and ethnic Russian population.

15. Since the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ukraine and its people have developed close ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and its members and the European Union (“EU”) and its members. Ukraine has expressed interest in joining both NATO and the EU.

16. After the election of Viktor Yanukovych to the Presidency of Ukraine in 2010 however, he began to move Ukraine away from the EU and NATO and took steps to develop closer ties with the Russian Federation. The result was substantial civil unrest in Ukraine. Protests began in 2013 and by early 2014, the conditions in Ukraine were close to that of an internal armed conflict between those supporting the turn back towards the Russian Federation and those in favor of joining the EU and NATO.

17. The ACCUSED admits to having held a lengthy meeting with his security and defense officials regarding the occupation and annexation of Crimea, a region of Ukraine on or
about 22-23 February 2014, when former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, fled Ukraine for Russia in the wake of protests and democratic movement colloquially known as the “Euromaidan” movement later transforming into the pro-democracy uprising called the “Revolution of Dignity” in Ukraine. The **ACCUSED** has publicly admitted that he gave the order to “…bring Crimea back into Russia” at the conclusion of the meeting.

18. The Crimean Peninsula has been a part of both Ukraine and the Russian Empire, and even after the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its port of Sevastopol has remained, with Ukrainian approval, the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

19. On 27 February 2014, members of the AFRF without insignia, under the direction of the **ACCUSED** began to occupy the Crimean Peninsula, commencing the international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

20. On 16 March 2014, with the support of the Russian Federation, Crimea declared independence from Ukraine.


22. On or about 6 April 2014, with the backing of the Russian Federation, pro-Russian Federation separatist groups staged protests in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, collectively referred to as the Donbas.

23. On 7 April 2014, the self-proclaimed Donetsk People Republic (“DPR”) and on 27 April 2014, the Lugansk People’s Republic (“LPR”) was declared. Thereafter, referendums were held and both the DPR and LPR declared independence from Ukraine in May 2014.

24. An armed conflict ensued between Russian-backed irregular forces of the DPR and LPR and both regular and irregular forces of Ukraine. The conflict persisted for eight years and Ukraine suffered casualties in excess of 14,000. It remains unclear how many civilians and irregular forces were killed in the conflict between February 2014 and 23 February 2022.

25. Between February 2014 and 23 February 2022, the armed conflict in the Donbas was primarily a non-international armed conflict by virtue of the widespread use of pro-government and anti-government irregular forces and militias in opposition to the AFU and pro-Ukrainian irregular forces. There was both direct and indirect involvement of the AFU and AFRF.
26. Commencing in the autumn of 2021, the AFRF began a substantial buildup of troops, equipment, and supplies along the Russian and Belarusian borders with Ukraine, as well as in the occupied Crimea. During the buildup, the ACCUSED and his administration repeatedly assured the world that the Russian Federation “had no plans” to invade Ukraine.

27. On 21 February 2022, the ACCUSED stated, in a public address to the Russian People, that the Russian Federation would recognize the DPR and LPR as independent from Ukraine, which it did on 22 February 2022.

28. On 24 February 2022, during a meeting of the United Nations Security Council, chaired by the delegation of the Russian Federation that had recently assumed the rotating Presidency of the Council, to address tensions between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the AFRF, at the direction of ACCUSED, escalated the eight-year armed conflict between Ukraine the Russian Federation drastically by expanding the war across Ukraine.

29. Wider hostilities commenced at the direction of the ACCUSED when the AFRF commenced an armed attack on the territory of Ukraine, with the aerial and naval bombardment of multiple targets in Ukraine and a ground offensive along multiple fronts, including from occupied Crimea and the territory of the Republic of Belarus into Ukraine.

30. The attack spanned most of the Ukrainian territory, but was focused in the Kyiv region, Northeastern Ukraine centered around Kharkiv and Sumy, Eastern Ukraine including the Donbas region, and Southern Ukraine from Mykolaiv to Mariupol, as well as on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

31. The ACCUSED and all members of the AFRF engaged in fighting within Ukraine were required to abide by international humanitarian law and the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts and to the United Nations Charter, to which the Russian Federation bound itself by virtue of the Alma-Ata Protocol signed 21 December 1991 by 11 former member states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the Russian Federation and Ukraine, by which Protocol, the Russian Federation became a successor state at the United Nations to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

32. All offenses alleged herein were committed within the territory of Ukraine on or after 22 February 2014.

33. All acts and omissions charged herein as Crimes Against Humanity were committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population of Ukraine.
34. All acts and omissions charged herein as War Crimes were committed as part of a non-
international armed conflict (Donbas 2014-2022) and an international armed conflict in
Crimea (2014-Present).
35. The words civilian or civilian population used in this Indictment refer to persons who took
no part in the hostilities, or who were no longer taking an active part in the hostilities.

**INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSED**

36. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 35,
which are associated by reference.
37. **VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN, the ACCUSED** last assumed the Office of
the President of the Russian Federation on 7 May 2012. He had previously served in the
role from 7 May 2000 through 7 May 2008. From 7 May 2008 through 7 May 2012, the
ACCUSED served as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.
38. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the ACCUSED has been the President of the
Russian Federation and the Chairman of the Security Council of Russia.
39. In order to destabilize Ukraine, which the ACCUSED has claimed to be a fiction, to
eliminate, in whole or in part, the Ukrainian national group by erasing the Ukrainian culture
and national identity, and to expand the territory of the Russian Federation, the
ACCUSED, with the assistance and complicity of, and acting in concert with, the Security
Council of Russia, the Republic of Belarus and its armed forces and President, and the
AFRF, directed the AFRF, non-state combatants, including the militias of the DPR and
LPR, and mercenaries such as the WG, to conduct organized armed attacks on the territory
of Ukraine, the AFU, the SBGSU, and Ukrainian civilian population.
40. Throughout the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine, the AFRF, under the authority,
command and control of the ACCUSED, engaged in widespread or systematic attacks
against the civilian population of Ukraine.
41. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the ACCUSED supported and encouraged all
actions of the Security Council of Russia, the AFRF, and other combatants under his
direction, acting in concert with the Security Council of Russia, the command staff of the
AFRF, the non-state combatants of the DPR, LPR, and mercenary groups.
42. The ACCUSED and the Security Council of Russia shared a common plan, purpose, and/or
design (joint criminal enterprise) that was to use the AFRF and non-state combatants to
gain and exercise political power and control over the territory of Ukraine, as evidenced
by the “Russian Donbas Doctrine” first announced by DPR President Denis Pushilin and
adopted by DPR and LPR, which called for a union state with the Russian Federation, in
clear violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, guaranteed by international law, the
Minsk Agreements, and the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 5
December 1994.

43. The crimes alleged in this Indictment, including but not limited to aggression, unlawful
killings, abductions, forced deportation, targeting of journalists and civilians, and
prevention of humanitarian aid, were either actions within the joint criminal enterprise or
were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise.

44. VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN, the ACCUSED, by his acts or omissions, is
individually criminally responsible for each of the crimes alleged in this Indictment, which
crimes the ACCUSED planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or in whose planning,
preparation or execution the ACCUSED otherwise aided and abetted, or which crimes
were within a joint criminal enterprise in which the ACCUSED participated or were a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise in which the
ACCUSED participated.

45. In addition, or alternatively, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN, the
ACCUSED, while holding positions of superior responsibility and exercising command
and control over his subordinates, is criminally responsible for the crimes alleged. The
ACCUSED is individually vicariously responsible for the criminal acts of his subordinates,
including all members of the AFRF, in that he knew or had reason to know that the
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the ACCUSED failed to
take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.

CHARGES

46. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 47,
which are associated by reference.
47. At all times relevant to this Indictment, members of the AFRF and non-state combatants, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to the Security Council of Russia and VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN, the ACCUSED, conducted armed attacks throughout the territory of Ukraine, including but not limited to Kyiv, Northeastern Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine including the Donbas, and Southern Ukraine. Targets of the armed attacks included civilians and humanitarian assistance personnel.

48. The attacks included, but were not limited to, widespread and systematic unlawful killings of civilians and journalists, the intentional and/or reckless destruction of numerous medical facilities and cultural institutions, the taking of civilian hostages, the forced deportation of Ukrainian citizens, and the targeting of humanitarian assistance efforts.

49. The Prosecutor alleges, in the following Counts, numerous representative actions constituting violations of international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict, however, it should be noted that these offenses are not the sole instances of unlawful conduct and that the full breadth and scope of the joint criminal enterprise and conspiracy shall be the subject of the trial of the ACCUSED, and the ACCUSED is hereby placed on notice that the Prosecutor intends to and shall present evidence of further conduct in support of its case against the accused as to each Count stated in this Indictment.

COUNT 1: THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

50. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 49, which are associated by reference.

51. The ACCUSED, at all times relevant to this Indictment, was a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political and/or military action of the Russian Federation.

52. The ACCUSED, by his own public statements, engaged in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity, and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to wit: the ACCUSED through his own actions and omissions between 22 February 2014 and 31 March 2022, engaged in a course of conduct that directly caused aggressive actions to be taken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
53. The **ACCUSED** was directly involved in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the use of armed force by the State of the Russian Federation against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and/or political independence of Ukraine.

54. The **ACCUSED** directly precipitated the use of armed force by the Russian Federation in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, to which the Russian Federation is bound by virtue of the Alma-Ata Protocol.

55. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which defines aggression, the **ACCUSED** participated in numerous acts of aggression against Ukraine constituting collectively, and individually, the Crime of Aggression.

56. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the invasion or attack by the AFRF upon the territory of Ukraine and the military occupation of wide swaths of the territory of Ukraine, including, but not limited to the unlawful occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the occupation of the cities of Kherson and Mariupol in 2022.

57. The **ACCUSED**, and his subordinates, provided material support to armed irregular groups and mercenaries within the territorial bounds of Ukraine commencing in February 2014, most notably by providing arms, equipment, and other support to irregular armed groups of the DPR and LPR during the non-international armed conflict in the Donbas between Ukraine, the DPR, and the LPR.

58. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the AFRF bombardment of the territory of Ukraine and/or the use of weapons by the Russian Federation against the territory of Ukraine.

59. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the blockade of the ports and/or coasts of Ukraine by the AFRF, including the blockade, and in some cases the occupation of several ports of Ukraine on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

60. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the attack by the AFRF on the land, sea, or air forces, or marine and air fleets of Ukraine.

61. The **ACCUSED** participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the use of AFRF forces, which at the commencement of hostilities between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine in 2014, were within the territory of Ukraine with the agreement of Ukraine pursuant the Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet, signed by the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 28 May 1997. The treaty, among other things, provided for the leasing of the Port of Sevastopol and basing of the AFRF’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Ukraine, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement. A further such offense was committed by the extension of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s presence in Ukraine beyond 2017, the termination of the agreement.

62. The ACCUSED participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of an act of aggression by the Republic of Belarus against Ukraine, when, acting in concert with his co-conspirators, the Republic of Belarus and its President, Alexander Lukashenko, the ACCUSED encouraged the Republic of Belarus to allow its territory, to be placed at the disposal of the Russian Federation in furtherance of the aforementioned joint criminal enterprise, to be used by the Russian Federation for perpetrating one or more acts of aggression against Ukraine.

63. The ACCUSED participated in the planning, preparation, initiation, and/or execution of the sending by or on behalf of the Russian Federation, of armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries into Ukrainian territory, which have carried out acts of armed force against Ukraine of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.

64. Each of the foregoing offenses in and of themselves constitutes a separate Crime of Aggression and are charged in the alternative.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN, is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 1:** The Crime of Aggression, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 5 of UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 and customary international law.

**COUNTS 2 – 3: UNLAWFUL TARGETING OF MEDICAL FACILITIES**
65. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 64, which are associated by reference.

66. The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN targeted and bombed multiple protected hospital units. Hospital units included, but were not limited to, the following:

**Mariupol**

67. On 9 March 2022, the AFRF bombed a maternity hospital in Mariupol, unlawfully killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 17 civilians.

**Zhytomyr**

68. In March 2022, the AFRF bombed a children’s hospital in Zhytomyr, injuring civilians.

**Kharkiv**

69. On 11 March 2022, the AFRF bombed a psychiatric hospital in Kharkiv.

70. Between 24 February 2022 and 21 March 2022, the Russian military targeted, bombed, or otherwise compromised a total of 64 protected medical facilities, unlawfully killing at least fifteen civilians and injuring an unknown number of civilians.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN, is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 2:** Intentional destruction of medical facilities, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8(2)(a)(i) and 8(2)(b)(ix) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

**Count 3:** Murder, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(a) OF THE ROME STATUTE

**COUNTS 4-5:** USE OF INDISCRIMINATE FORCE AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS, INCLUDING THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS
71. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 70, which are associated by reference.

72. The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN engaged in the widespread and systematic use of indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas and targets, including, but not limited to, the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions that killed and injured civilians. Instances of the indiscriminate targeting of civilians included, but were not limited to, the following:

**Okhtyrka:**

73. On 25 February 2022, AFRF forces struck a nursery and elementary school in Okhtyrka with indiscriminate cluster munitions, unlawfully killing at least one civilian and injuring at least three civilians.

**Vuhledar**

74. On 24 February 2022, the AFRF struck a hospital in Vuhledar indiscriminately with cluster munitions, thereby unlawfully killing at least four civilians, injuring 10 civilians, and damaging the hospital and one ambulance.

**Kharkiv**

75. On or around 28 February 2022, the AFRF struck multiple civilian residences in the Kharkiv region indiscriminately with cluster munitions, thereby unlawfully killing at least nine civilians, injuring at least 37 civilians, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.

76. On 3 March 2022, the AFRF struck multiple civilian residences in the Kharkiv region indiscriminately with cluster munitions, thereby unlawfully killing at least four civilians, injuring at least 16 civilians, and unlawfully damaging civilian property.

**Mariupol**

77. Starting on or around 12 March 2022, the AFRF began a barrage of constant shelling in the town of Mariupol. The shelling has interrupted humanitarian aid and civilian access to basic necessities and has killed at least 1,500 civilians.

**Irpin**

78. Starting on or around 6 March 2022, the ARF began a barrage of constant shelling in the town of Irpin, killing at least five civilians and injuring civilians.
SAMPLE DRAFT INDICTMENT

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 4:** Willful killing, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute

**Count 5:** Extensive destruction of property carried out unlawfully and wantonly, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute;

**COUNTS 6 – 7: WILLFULLY CAUSING GREAT SUFFERING AND MURDER OF CIVILIANS**

79. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 78, which are associated by reference.

80. The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN bombed a theatre being used to shelter civilians in Mariupol, Ukraine, that at the time of such targeting, was clearly marked in the Russian language with the word “Children”, thereby intentionally and unlawfully killing at least 300 civilians and injuring numerous other civilians.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 6:** Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(iii) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

**Count 7:** Murder, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(i) OF THE ROME STATUTE

**COUNT 8 – 9: ABDUCTION AND DETAINMENT OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS**

81. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 80, which are associated by reference.
The AFRF, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN abducted and detained multiple public officials, including but not limited to:

**Melitopol:**

83. On 11 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Ivan Federov and held him hostage for five days. Mr. Federov was released in a prisoner exchange on 16 March 2022.

**Dniprorudne**

84. On 13 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Yevhen Matveyev. As of 25 March 2022, Mr. Matveyev has not been released from Russian custody.

**Velykoburlutska**

85. On 17 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Viktor Tereshchenko from his office. Mr. Tereshchenko was released on 18 March 2022 and went to the hospital for injuries sustained because of the Russian military.

**Beryslav**

86. On 19 March 2022, the Russian military abducted mayor Oleksandr Shapovalov. Mr. Shapovalov remains in Russian custody as of 25 March 2022.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 8:** Taking of Hostages, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(viii) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

**Count 9:** Detention and Severe Deprivation of Liberty, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(e) OF THE ROME STATUTE

**COUNTS 10 – 11: TAKING OF HOSTAGES**
87. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 86, which are associated by reference.

88. On 24 February 2022, Russian military forces seized the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant near Pripyat, Ukraine, and held at least 200 civilians hostage until 21 March 2022. These civilian hostages were not provided basic amenities, including soap or water, and were not provided adequate food, water, or medicine. The civilian hostages were forced to perform labor related to the upkeep of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 10:** Taking of Hostages, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(viii)

**Count 11:** Detention and Severe Deprivation of Liberty, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(e) OF THE ROME STATUTE

**COUNTS 12 – 13: TARGETING OF JOURNALISTS AND MEMBERS OF THE PRESS**

89. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 88, which are associated by reference.

90. The Russian military, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN targeted and killed multiple civilian journalists and other members of the press, including but not limited to:

**Kiev:**

91. On 13 March 2022, Russian military forces shot at and unlawfully killed journalist Brent Renaud and injured journalist Juan Arrendondo.

92. On 14 March 2022, the Russian military shelled and unlawfully killed journalists Oleksandra “Sasha” Kuvshynova and Pierre Zakrzewski and seriously injured journalist Benjamin Hall.

93. Including the above crimes, Russian military forces have unlawfully killed at least five journalists, injured seven journalists, and abducted six journalists since 24 February 2022.
By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 12:** Murder, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(a) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

**Count 13:** Intentionally launching indiscriminate attacks against civilians, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(iv) OF THE ROME STATUTE

**COUNTS 14 – 15: BOMBING OF EVACUATION AND HUMANITARIAN ROUTES**

94. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 93, which are associated by reference.

95. The Russian military, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN targeted civilian evacuation routes and killed multiple civilians, including but not limited to:

**Mariupol:**

96. On 7 March 2022, Russian military forces planted butterfly mines in a proposed civilian evacuation route in an attempt to seriously injure civilian evacuees.

97. On 8 March 2022, Russian military forces shelled a civilian evacuation route from Zaporizhzhia to Mariupol, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Mariupol and preventing civilians from evacuating Zaporizhzhia.

**Irpin:**

98. On 6 March 2022, Russian military forces fired indiscriminately at a civilian evacuation route, unlawfully killing four civilians.

**Lyman:**

99. On 13 March 2022, Russian military forces performed an airstrike that indiscriminately struck a civilian evacuation train, unlawfully killing one civilian and injuring one civilian.
By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

Count 14: Intentionally directing attacks toward the civilian population, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(ii) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

Count 15: Murder, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(a) OF THE ROME STATUTE

COUNTS 16 – 18: FORCED DEPORTATION OF UKRAINIAN CITIZENS

100. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 99, which are associated by reference.

101. The Russian military, supported and encouraged by, acting in concert with and/or subordinate to VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN began forcibly deporting Ukrainian citizens to Russia, including but not limited to:

Mariupol:

102. Starting on 20 March 2022, Russian military forces have forcibly deported at least 15,000 Ukrainian citizens to the Taranog region of Russia while depriving them of all official Ukrainian documentation, including passports. At least some of these Ukrainian citizens are being transferred to other locations in southwestern Russia to perform forced labor.

Donbas

103. Starting on 21 March 2022, Russian military forces have forcibly deported at least 2,389 Ukrainian citizen children to various locations within the Russian Federation.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:
Count 16: Deportation of population, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(d) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

Count 17: Enforced disappearance of persons, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1)(i) OF THE ROME STATUTE

And:

Count 18: Unlawful deportation, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(vii) OF THE ROME STATUTE

COUNTS 19: ATTACKS UPON NUCLEAR POWER FACILITIES

104. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 103, which are associated by reference.

Chernobyl:

105. On 24 February 2022, the AFRF seized the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant near Pripyat, Ukraine, and held at least 200 civilians hostage until 21 March 2022. These civilian hostages were not provided basic amenities, including soap or water, and were not provided adequate food, water, or medicine. The civilian hostages were forced to perform labor related to the upkeep of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Zaporizhzhia

106. On or about 4 March 2022, the AFRF under the command and control of the ACCUSED, attacked the largest nuclear electrical power station in Europe, the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant causing a large fire at an adjacent building, before seizing the plant. The fire posed a substantial risk to the nuclear power plant and could have resulted in radiological disaster impacting the surrounding area as well as non-combatant states across Europe.
By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:

**Count 30:** Attacks upon works and installations containing dangerous forces, to wit: nuclear electrical generating stations, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 56 OF THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I) and ARTICLE 15 OF THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL II).

**COUNTS 20: RECRUITMENT, USE, AND FINANCING OF MERCENARIES**

107. The Prosecutor repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 106, which are associated by reference.

108. Beginning with the invasion of Crimea in 2014, the ACCUSED and his co-conspirators, recruited, used, and financed mercenaries engaged in offensive operations within the territorial boundaries of Ukraine.

109. At some point between 24 February 2022 and 31 March 2022, the AFRF began recruiting, enlisting, and transporting mercenary soldiers from the Syrian Arab Republic to act as mercenaries in the conflict in Ukraine. As of 31 March 2022, the AFRF has enlisted at least 300 soldiers to work as mercenaries.

110. The Russian Federation has offered each mercenary approximately $7,000 per month to travel to Ukraine and participate in the conflict.

By his acts or omissions in relation, but not limited to these events, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVITCH PUTIN is individually criminally responsible for the crimes alleged below:
Count 20: Recruitment, Use, and Financing of Mercenaries, a VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST THE RECRUITMENT, USE, FINANCING, AND TRAINING OF MERCENARIES.

Dated this 6 day of April 2022

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The Prosecutor
THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY NETWORK
24 February 2022

Between February 24-25, 2022, at least sixty Ukrainians and fifty Russians were killed and an additional fifty-two Ukrainians were injured in the first two days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The attacks began in the early morning hours of 24 February after Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the beginning of a “special military operation.”

Crimean Peninsula

The Ukraine Border Guard service reported the death of one serviceman who was killed in a shelling attack that occurred on the border of the Crimean Peninsula. The Border Guard service stated that the serviceman’s death was the first officially confirmed military death of the Russian invasion.

Kharkiv

One civilian man was killed and two civilian women were injured after a single large missile or rock struck a residential block in Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast. The projectile caused extensive fire damage to the residential block area and left a single large crater in the ground between two apartment buildings. The Chuhuiv military airport was also struck, the projectile

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5 Id.
believe to be a missile. The attack on the military airport caused damage to fuel storage areas and other airport infrastructure. Maxar Technologies, a space technology company, released satellite photos of the damage to the Chuhuiv Airfield.

The Ukrainian military reported it destroyed four Russian tanks on a road near Kharkiv. The General Staff of the Armed Forces stated the four tanks were burned on a bypass road of Kharkiv. The military also reported killing 50 Russian occupier troop members in the town of Shchastia in the Luhansk District. Russia denied the reports of any aircrafts or armored vehicles having been destroyed.

In addition, an apartment building complex was bombed in a Russian airstrike near Kharkiv. One civilian, possibly a young boy per Ukrainian emergency services, was killed and twelve other civilians sustained injuries. The deceased civilian is reported to be one of the first civilian casualties of the Russian invasion.

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7 *Id.*
11 *Id.*
Kyiv

The Mayor of Brovary, Ihor Sapozhko, reported that at approximately 2:30p.m. local time, the military area northeast of the capital, Kyiv, was struck by a missile attack. The attack occurred in Brovary, which has a Ukrainian Special Forces Base. Ukrainian authorities report that seven people were killed and seventeen people were wounded in the missile attack.

A Ukrainian military plane was shot down, killing five of the fourteen people on board. The plane crashed after being hit, striking down approximately 20 kilometers south of Kyiv. The Ukrainian Police and the State Emergency Service stated the attack occurred as the country’s armed forces attempted to defend against “a massive Russian military operation.”

Mariupol

Mayor Vadym Boychenko reported that three people were killed and six people were injured, one of the wounded including a child, when a Russian shelling attack occurred in a suburb of the city Mariupol. Boychenko stated the Russian forces also attacked the nearby airport and village. The mayor further stated that attacks continued approximately every thirty minutes.

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18 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
24 Id.
minutes, preventing humanitarian aid from reaching the city, as well as creating a blockade that prevented citizens from being able to evacuate the city.25

**Odessa**

Eighteen people, eight men and ten women, were killed in a Russian airstrike of a military base in the city of Odessa, a port city connected to the Black Sea.26 The attack was reported to be the “deadliest single attack” of the Russian invasion to that point.27

**Uman**

At approximately 7:00 am local time, a Russian strike occurred in Uman in the Cherkasy Oblast.28 The shelling attack killed one civilian man.29 A nearby restaurant was also damaged as a result of the strike.30

**Vorzel**

The Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Iryna Venediktova, reported that an orphanage in Vorzel with fifty children still inside.31 Venediktova stated that Russian forces allowed

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shrapnel\textsuperscript{32} and other wreckage to strike the building with children and staff inside.\textsuperscript{33} No children or staff members were reported to have been injured from the shelling attack.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Vuhledar}

Four people were killed and ten people were injured, with six of the injured individuals being health care workers, after a Russian ballistic missile carrying cluster munitions struck a hospital in Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast.\textsuperscript{35} The hospital building, an ambulance, and some civilian vehicles were also damaged in the strike.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{25 February 2022}

\textbf{Black Sea, Coast of Ukraine}

A Russian missile struck a Japanese-owned cargo ship off the coast of the Ukraine in the Black Sea while it was en route to Odessa, Ukraine.\textsuperscript{37} The marine transportation firm from western Japan reported that one crewmember\textsuperscript{38} of the \textit{Nemura Queen} was injured after a Russian missile hit the stern of the ship, causing it to catch fire.\textsuperscript{39} The nineteen remaining crewmembers of the ship were reported to be unharmed.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{33} Supra note 31.
\textsuperscript{34} Supra note 31.
\textsuperscript{35} Ukraine: Russian Cluster Munition Hits Hospital, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 25, 2022, 5:30 PM EST), https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/02/25/ukraine-russian-cluster-munition-hits-hospital#.
\textsuperscript{36} Supra note 31.
\textsuperscript{39} Cakmak, \textit{supra} note 37.
\textsuperscript{40} Cakmak, \textit{supra} note 37.
Gorlovka

School No. 50 in the town of Gorlovka, Donetsk Oblast, was struck by a missile, resulting in the death of two teachers. The school building also sustained damage in the strike, the missile causing broken windows and partially collapsing a wall.

Kyiv

On the morning of 25 February 2022, a building in a residential neighborhood was struck during a Russian missile or rocket strike. A multi-story apartment building was hit by a projectile and missile or rocket fragments, injuring three civilians. The building subsequently caught fire after being struck. Following the attack, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that the Russian military’s claim that it was not targeting civilian areas was “a lie.”

A civilian man in his vehicle was run over by a Russian tank. Video recordings have been posted on the internet, the footage depicting a tank swerving to drive over the man’s car before reversing direction to drive back over it once again. Witnesses to the incident claimed that the tank stopped and perched atop the car for a moment before reversing back over it. The civilian man was rescued and sustained injuries, but was not killed.

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45 Id.
46 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
Mariupol

School No. 48 in Mariupol was stuck by a missile believed to be fired by Russian forces.\(^{51}\) The school building was damaged, the missile destroying and blowing out windows and pockmarking the walls with metal fragments.\(^{52}\) No deaths or injuries were reported as a result of the strike.\(^{53}\)

Okhtyrka, Sumy Oblast

Three civilians, including one child, were killed and one other child was injured while they were hiding in a preschool in Okhtyrka.\(^{54}\) Russian forces deployed cluster munitions in the area,\(^{55}\) striking and damaging the kindergarten building and an orphanage.\(^{56}\) Amnesty International confirmed that the cluster munitions were dropped on the Sonechko nursery and kindergarten while civilians were seeking shelter from nearby fighting.\(^{57}\)

Pripyat

Ukrainian Ambassador Oksana Markarova announced in a press conference that ninety-two members of the Chernobyl power plant operational personnel had been taken hostage by Russian forces.\(^{58}\) The Advisor to the Commander of Ukraine’s Ground Forces stated that the staff had been taken hostage when Russian troops seized control of the power plant facility.\(^{59}\)

\(^{51}\) Supra note 42.
\(^{53}\) Supra note 51
\(^{54}\) Supra note 52.
\(^{55}\) Supra note 52.
\(^{56}\) Supra note 41.
\(^{57}\) Supra note 52.
injuries or deaths of the power plant personnel were reported, but Ukrainian officials noted that radiations levels in the area were beginning to rise after Russian forces seized control of the facility.\textsuperscript{60} Vsevolod Chentsov, the head of Ukraine’s mission to both the European Union and Europe’s atomic energy authority, stated that the gamma radiation level in the Pripyat area was rising, but did not confirm if the levels had risen high enough to be considered dangerous.\textsuperscript{61}

**Zmiinyi Island**

Thirteen border guards stationed on Zmiinyi Island were killed while defending the island located in the Black Sea near the Ukraine.\textsuperscript{62} Ukrainian officials reported that a Russian ship approached the island and ordered the guards to surrender.\textsuperscript{63} The border guards were reported to have responded with an expletive to the Russian warship, after which Russia commenced its attack on the island, as reported by Anton Herashchenko, the Advisor to the Interior Minister.\textsuperscript{64} Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the thirteen guards would posthumously earn the title of “Hero of Ukraine” for standing up to Russia’s threats.\textsuperscript{65}

**26 February 2022**

At 9:48 a.m. on February 26, Minister Viktor Liashko reported that 198 Ukrainians, including 3 children, had died, and 1115 Ukrainians were wounded, including 33 children.\textsuperscript{66} The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Kaufman, \textit{supra} note 59.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Kaufman, \textit{supra} note 59.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Olena Goncharova, \textit{Border guards were killed defending Ukraine’s Zmiinyi Island (Snake Island) in the Black Sea}, KYIV INDEPENDENT (Feb. 25, 2022), https://kyivindependent.com/uncategorized/13-border-guards-were-killed-defending-ukraines-zmiinyi-island-snake-island-in-the-black-sea/.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Kyiv to honor troops killed defending ‘Snake Island’}, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/russian-warship-go-f-yourself-kyiv-to-honour-slain-troops.
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Supra} note 63.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Viktor Liashko, \textit{The face of war}, FACEBOOK (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.facebook.com/viktor.liashko/posts/256922076543414.
\end{itemize}
by 5 p.m. on February 26, there were at least 240 civilian casualties, including 64 dead and 176 injured across the country due to aerial and ground attacks.\(^{67}\) While Russia remained silent on their losses, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine estimated that more than 3,000 Russian soldiers had died\(^ {68}\).

**Chernihiv**

Explosions continue around the city. Russian Grad rocket launchers reportedly caused damage to a regional hospital.\(^ {69}\) An explosive weapon, likely an artillery shell, hits the second story of a kindergarten which likely caused a fire to spread.\(^ {70}\)

**Donetska Oblast, Volnovakha**

Volnovakha remained occupied by Russian forces and without electricity. According to chief of the Donetsk military-civil regional administration, Pavlo Kyrylenko, 15 civilians were killed from Russian firings of Grads and artillery. Multiple households, including two apartment blocks, were damaged.\(^ {71}\)

**Kharkiv**

The Russian invasion of Kharkiv continued with Russian forces allegedly using cluster bombs.\(^ {72}\) Additionally, Russians continued to fire missiles, resulting in the destruction of

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\(^{70}\) *Supra* note 52.


\(^{72}\) *In Kharkiv region, the Russian invaders are using internationally banned butterfly mines*, PRAVDA (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326201/.
residential buildings. The State Special Communications Service of Ukraine stated that the Russian military blew up a gasline and advised citizens of Kharkiv to protect themselves from the environmental dangers from the explosion. Russian soldiers opened fire on a public bus traveling down the Kharkiv-Izium route, killing 5 people and wounding 6.

**Kherson**

Russian troops attacked a civilian ambulance transporting Ukrainian soldiers. One soldier was injured, and the 64-year-old civilian ambulance driver as well as the wounded soldier he was transporting burned to death from the fire. A civilian journalist, Dilerbek Shukurovych, was shot dead in his car with an automatic weapon by a Russian soldier near the village of Zelenivka.

**Kyiv**

Mayor Vitali Klitschko reported that Russian forces attacked Kyiv both through street fights and missile attacks through the night and morning of February 26. He reported that by 6 a.m., 35 people, including 2 children, were injured, though it is unclear whether there were only civilian deaths. In the southwest region, Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated that one of the missiles hit an apartment building in Solomyans'kyi district near Zhuliany airport.

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76 Supra note 73.
77 Supra note 73.
79 Dmytro Kuleba, [Kiev, our beautiful, peaceful city], TWITTER (Feb. 26, 2022), https://twitter.com/DmytroKuleba/status/1497465107961499649?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1497465107961499649%7Ctwgr%5Ehb_1_8%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnbc.com%2F2022%2F02%2F25%2Frussia-ukraine-news-us-europe-impose-sanctions-as-attack-continues.html.
A journalist reported that it was one of many buildings damaged by Russian missiles.\textsuperscript{80}

At 1:38, Fire Brigade 31 received a report that a private home in Borodianka, a northwestern region, was hit by a projectile. When firemen arrived, they found the house destroyed and 3 dead civilians.\textsuperscript{81} Around 8:35 p.m., 5 explosions happened close to TPP-6, a thermal powerplant, though it is unclear who was responsible.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{Luhanska Oblast}

Luhansk Regional State Administration head Serhiy Haidai posted that Ukrainian soldiers broke the column, destroying 2 Russian tanks, an infantry fighting vehicle. He said that they defeated a Russian platoon, seizing their 3 MT-12 anti-tank guns and leaving behind many corpses. In the afternoon, Russian troops shelled Luhansk, damaging a house, a boiler room, and a café. Additionally, they caused damage to a gas line, though no casualties were reported from this incident.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{Mariupol}

Airstrikes continued in Mariupil, destroying at least 40 homes and causing extensive property damage.\textsuperscript{84} Among the homes destroyed was the home of Stepan Mahsma, the Mariupol district chairman.\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{figure}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{82} \textit{5 explosions happened in Kyiv close to TPP-6 (thermal power plant)}, LB (Feb. 26, 2022), https://en.lb.ua/news/2022/02/26/9247_5_explosions_happened_kyiv_close.html.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Serhiy Haidai, ‘Luhask region is Ukraine!, FACEBOOK (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=132143279325064&set=a.118901720649220.
\item \textsuperscript{84} \textit{Airstrike near Mariupil: more victims, nine wounded, among them children}, PRAVDA (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326237.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Invaders carried out an air raid in the suburbs of Mariupol: at least three people died, PRAVDA (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326173/.
\end{itemize}
\end{figure}
Airstrikes in Sartanav resulted in at least 7 civilian deaths and at least 15 civilian injuries.\textsuperscript{86} The Prime Minister of Greece reported that 10 Greek civilians died from these airstrikes.\textsuperscript{87}

**Okhtyrka**

Missile strikes continued in the Sumy region. Three missile strikes on a military unit together with the shelling of residential neighborhoods injured at least 70 people and causing extensive civilian property damage. One woman was killed, and a child wounded from the previous day’s shelling passed away.\textsuperscript{88} Two Danish journalists, Stefan Weichert and Emil Filtenborg Mikkelsen, were shot by unidentified attackers on their way to the kindergarten which had been shelled on the previous day.\textsuperscript{89}

**Pripyat**

A spokesperson of the State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management stated that Russian forces continued to hold civilian workers at Chernobyl powerplant hostage, and the plant remained operational. However, background radiation was increasing due to military movements in the area.\textsuperscript{90}

**Zmiinyi Island**

A civilian rescue ship on a humanitarian mission was seized and detained by the Russian Navy off the coast of Zmiinyi Island, which was occupied by Russian forces.\(^9\)  

**27 February 2022**

By February 27, Ukraine's health ministry said 352 civilians, including 14 children, had been killed and 1,684 people, including 116 children, had been wounded since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.\(^2\) Ukrainian officials estimated at least 4,500 Russian casualties.\(^3\)

**Black Sea**

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine announced that Russia seized control of two civilian ships. The Ukrainian government lost communication with the tanker “Athena” and the cargo ship “Princess Nicole,” and believe up to 50 civilian crew members are being held hostage.\(^4\)

**Kharkiv**

The Mayor of Kupyansk, Gennadiy Matsehora, announced that Russian occupiers have taken control of the city. In a video shared over social media, he stated that he negotiated with Russian authorities to give control of the city after believing that this was the best way to avoid civilian casualties. The Ukrainian government denounced this action, stating that they will

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\(^1\) *Russia has seized a civilian rescue ship near Zmiinyi Island*, PRAVDA (Feb. 26, 2022), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326261/.


pursue criminal proceedings against Matsehora. Reporters stated that a gas pipeline had caught
fire due to an attack from the Russians. While no casualties were reported from this incident, the
government stated that citizens ought to protect themselves from the environmental hazard. 96

**Kherson**

Video emerged of a civilian car what was attacked with gunfire. A civilian was killed and
his wife and two daughters were injured. Witnesses said that Russian soldiers shot at the car to
prevent it from leaving Kherson. 97

**Kyiv**

According to the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, Russian
forces continued to attack Kyiv. In Bucha, civilian buildings were destroyed, 98 including what in
photos appeared to be a children’s clinic.99 Private homes caught fire, including 3 in Irpin on
Ozernaya St.100 Russian attacks caused a gas line in Vasylkiv to catch fire, prompting
government officials to warn locals of the environmental hazards. 101

**Luhansk**

Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Administrator, stated that the villages of Luhansk
and Happiness were in a humanitarian crisis. Civilian apartments and buildings were damaged by

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95 Mayor of Kypyan in Kharkiv Region handed city over to Russians, LB (Feb. 27, 2022),
96 Samantha Lock et al., Pipeline in Kharkiv and oil terminal in Vasylkiv believed hit as US, UK and EU move to
exclude ‘selected’ banks from global payments system, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2022),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/feb/26/russia-ukraine-latest-news-fighting-kyiv-zelenskiy-assault-
97 Four days since the invasion, Russian forces have begun looting property in occupied territories, INT’L
98 Russian shell hits apartment building in Bucha, Kyiv region, UKRINFORM (Feb. 27, 2022), https://www.ukrinform
99 Bucha after shelling by Russian occupiers: civilian buildings and private houses are on fire, CENSOR.NET (Feb.
buildings_and_private_houses_are_on_fire_photo.
100 February 27 at 12:21 Irpin as a result of shelling on the street, SES OF UKRAINE (Feb. 27, 2022),
https://t.me/dsns_telegram/3988.
101 Lock, supra note 96.
shelling, and as communication channels broke down, government officials were unable to provide humanitarian relief to citizens.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{Mariupol}

Russians continued to bomb Mariupol, resulting in extensive property damage. While it is unclear how many casualties resulted from these strikes, the Greek Prime Minister reported that 10 Greek civilians were killed.\textsuperscript{103}

\textbf{Sumy Oblast}

Russian forces shot at a public bus carrying civilians.\textsuperscript{104} Though it is unclear how many casualties resulted from the incident, Dmytro Zhyvytskyy, Head of the Sumy regional military-civil administration stated on Telegram that the Russian servicemen prevented access to medical care for the civilians by blocking ambulances.\textsuperscript{105}

\textbf{Volnovakha}

The Donetsk Regional Administrator Pavlo Kyrylenko declared a humanitarian crisis in Volnovakha as Russian forces continue to bomb the city for a second day. Apartment buildings, infrastructure facilities, and a hospital were damaged by the shelling. The residents of the city do not have access to running water or electricity.\textsuperscript{106}

\textsuperscript{102} Serhiy Haidai, \textit{Luhansa on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe}, FACEBOOK (Feb. 27, 2022), https://www.facebook.com/sergey.gaidai.loga/posts/132382285967830.\textsuperscript{103} 

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Ukraine conflict: The civilian lives lost to Russia’s war}, BBC (Feb. 27, 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60547807.\textsuperscript{104} 

\textsuperscript{104} In the Sumy region, invaders shot bus with civilian people, didn’t allow ambulance to pass, PRAVDA (Feb. 27, 2022), https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/27/7326450/.\textsuperscript{105} 

\textsuperscript{105} Dmytro Zhyvytskyy, \textit{Between Chupakhivka and Dovzhik Okhtyrka district}, TELEGRAM (Feb. 27, 2022), https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/457.\textsuperscript{106} 

Zhytomyr

Ukrainian officials stated that missiles launched from Belarus hit Zhytomyr Airport. Video evidence shows that the missiles hit at around 5:09 p.m. At least 2 people, including 41-year-old police major Volodymyr Solodchuk and a 40-year-old police major Ivan Geraimchuk died, and at least 3 people were injured by this attack.

28 February 2022

Chernihiv

A Russian missile injured one woman after it struck a residential building. The strike caused a fire on two of the lower floors of the building. In addition, Russian shelling set fire to a large Epicentr K, a home improvement store.

Ivankiv

A fire at a museum destroyed roughly 25 paintings by Ukrainian artist Maria Pryimachenko. It is unclear exactly how the fire started, but intense fighting occurred at a nearby traffic circle days earlier. It is reported that “Russian troops set fire to [the] museum of local lore.”

113 Supra note 110.
115 Supra note 110.
Kharkiv

Areas across Kharkiv were subjected to indirect fires and a general assault by Russian forces. Russian multi-launch rocket systems killed six adults and three children when they hit residential areas in Kharkiv.\textsuperscript{116} A further 34 adults and three children were injured by the rockets.\textsuperscript{117} Video from the Industrialnyi district shows cluster munitions striking a residential parking lot, damaging cars and a building, and causing civilians walking near the lot to run for cover.\textsuperscript{118} At 1129, a video shows what appear to be cluster munitions raining on the buildings of the Moskovskyi district of Kharkiv.\textsuperscript{119}

Two more videos uploaded at 1255 and 1423 show similar cluster-style munitions striking the Shevchenkivskyi district.\textsuperscript{120} Between 1400 and 1500, artillery fire killed 15 military personnel, and at least one civilian, while also injuring 16 other civilians.\textsuperscript{121} As a result of indirect fires, a family of two adults and three children was burned in their car.\textsuperscript{122} During the broader assault by Russian forces, “an estimated 87 houses” were damaged or destroyed.\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[117] Id.
  \item[120] Id.
  \item[121] Supra note 110.
  \item[123] Supra note 110.
\end{itemize}
Makariv

Two elderly persons were killed in a civilian vehicle after a Russian BMP variant opened fire on them. As both vehicles approached an intersection, the BMP fired on the car multiple times.124

Mariupol

A six-year-old girl was killed by shelling while at the supermarket with her family. Doctors were unable to resuscitate her at the hospital.125

Severodonetsk

Russian artillery killed one civilian and seriously injured three others, along with residential vehicles and buildings.126

01 March 2022

Kharkiv

Kharkiv again suffered intense indirect fire. An Indian fourth-year medical student, Naveen Shekharappa Gyanagoudar, was killed by shelling after he left a bunker to get food.127 A missile also struck a government administrative building in the heart of the city.128

Kherson

In Kherson, four civilians were injured after rockets struck two nine-story buildings.129

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Kyiv

A Russian missile struck a TV tower near the Babyn Yar Holocaust memorial site in Kyiv, killing at least five people.\(^{130}\) On the Zhytomyr Highway, heading west out of Kyiv, a woman was killed by Russian sniper, and her husband and eight-year-old son were injured. The family was driving out of Kyiv when a Russian sniper shot the mother head. The father stopped their vehicle and was shot in both legs while pulling his children from the car. Their eight-year-old son was also shot in the leg.\(^{131}\)

02 March 2022

Chernihiv

The city’s chief health administrator, Serhiy Pivovar, said two cruise missiles hit a hospital in the northern city of Chernihiv.\(^{132}\) The main building of the hospital was damaged and authorities still need to determine the casualty toll.\(^{133}\)

Kharkiv

Russian air missile attack on residential areas in central Kharkiv killed at least 21 people and wounded 112 over the past 24 hours.\(^{134}\) Kharkiv National University building was destroyed by shelling.\(^{135}\) Russian strike hit the regional police and intelligence headquarters.\(^{136}\) Later, four more people died and nine more people were wounded air and rocket strikes on residential

\(^{132}\) Russia-Ukraine War: What to know on Day 7 of Russian assault, ABC (Mar. 2, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-general-assembly-state-of-the-union-address-kyiv-business-1fc732f01985f1b57e8dc5e7e411805f
\(^{133}\) Id.
\(^{134}\) Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: List of key events from day seven, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/2/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-list-of-key-events-from-day-seven
\(^{135}\) Id.
\(^{136}\) Id.
buildings continued. A hospital was attacked and the barracks of a flight school caught on fire after an air raid.

Kherson

Russian troops seized the first major port city on the Black Sea and the Ukrainian military was no longer in the city. After days of intense fighting, 300 Ukrainian civilians and fighters were left dead. Bodies were scattered on the city streets and survivors were trapped with no power and severe water and food shortage. Utility workers who tried to fix damaged pipes and downed lined were attacked by snipers.

Kyiv

Marina Kalabina, a pediatric anesthesiologist, was killed after Russian soldiers fired at her car as she was driving her wounded nephew to the hospital.

As thousands of civilians tried to flee, the train station was attacked by a Russian missile strike. Officials reported a powerful explosion Wednesday night between the Southern Railway Station and Ibis Hotel where Ukraine’s Defense Ministry is located near. During the time of the strike, women and children were being evacuated from the station, and the station suffered minor damage.

137 Supra note 134.
138 Supra note 134.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
Mayor of Irpin, 15 miles west of Kyiv, reported that a rocket hit a multi-story residential building. Casualties are unknown.

Mariupol

Russian forces escalated attacks on crowded urban areas killing and severely injuring civilians. Three boys, wounded by Russian shelling while playing soccer near a school, were rushed to a hospital. One of the boys died, and the other two were rushed into surgery; a woman was also brought to the hospital after suffering severe wounds to her face from the same strike.

Port of Olvia

A missile launched from a Russian Navy ship struck a Bangladeshi-owned cargo ship docked in the Ukrainian Port of Olvia. A crew member, Hadisur Rahman, was killed.

Zaporizhzhia

Russian troops fired on the surgery and sanitary departments of the Vaslyvka Multidisciplinary Intensive Care Hospital. Four civilians were seriously injured and three civilians were killed.

Zhytomyr

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147 Supra note 143.
148 Supra note 143.
150 Id.
151 Id.
153 Id.
155 Three people were killed and four others were wounded in Russian shelling of Vaslyvka city, UKRINFORM (Mar. 2, 2022), https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3419187-russian-troops-shell-hospital-in-zaporizhzhia-region-killing-three-and-wounding-four.html.
A maternity house was damaged in a Russian missile strike. Russian troops targeted health institutions and ambulance cars. Children were rescued from basements of destroyed houses. One child was killed and six children were injured after an airstrike.

**03 March 2022**

**Chernihiv**

Russian airstrikes targeted a residential district where no military facilities were in the vicinity. 47 people were killed (updated from 33 killed) and 18 were injured in airstrikes. Troops launched missiles near several apartment buildings, pharmacies, two schools, private homes, and a cardiac hospital. More than 40 residential buildings caught on fire.

**Kharkiv**

Russian military attacked three schools and a cathedral in the northeastern town of Kharkiv. Several shops near the city council building were also damaged.

**Kherson**

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157 *Id.*
159 *Id.*
161 *Id.*
164 *Id.*
Russian forces completely occupied the regional state administration building. The city fell under Russian control. Civilians suffer a severe lack of food and medicine. Local resident claims there had been a significant amount of looting by Russian troops.

**Kyiv**

Early morning, four major blasts were heard in Kyiv. It was unclear where the targets were or whether there were civilian casualties.

**Mariupol**

 Civilians were unable to escape as Russian soldiers destroyed bridges and trains and obstructed water, power, and food supply. Water towers and electricity substations were hit; damage to the infrastructure and the attacks made it impossible for civilians to leave. At least ten people were killed in the past two days and more than 150 people were injured in the city’s only functioning hospital. Officials are unable to go outside to get an accurate assessment of how many people have died and are unable to collect all the bodies due to Russian attacks. Russian soldiers looted grocery stores and banks.

**Zaporizhzhia**

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166 Id.

167 Id.

168 Id.


170 Id.

171 Loveday Morris et al., *Mariupol, key Ukrainian port, under siege and out of water: ‘We are being destroyed’*, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 3, 2022, 12:08 PM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/03/ukrainemariupol-siege-russia-invasion/.

172 Id.

173 Id.

174 Id.

175 Id.
Three Ukrainians were killed after Russian troops shelled a hospital. Russian forces captured Zaporizhzhia Nuclear power complex near Enerhodar. Russian armored vehicles passed through town and opened fire on civilians on the way to the plant. A fire ensued after Russians fired at buildings in the power plant. Fierce firefights around the nuclear power complex prevented wounded civilians from being moved to a hospital.

04 March 2022

Fastiv district, Kyiv

Russian forces shelled a residential area killed 5 people, including 3 children.

Mariupol

An unknown number of civilians were killed in the port city of Mariupol, including at least one child, when Russian forces indiscriminately shelled residential areas. Axios reported that over a period of 10 days, between March 1 and March 10 over 1300 people in the city had been killed. According to Human Rights Watch, beginning on March 2, and continuing beyond this reporting period, civilians in Mariupol were without access to running water,

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178 Id.
179 Mike Ives et al., A fire breaks out at a nuclear plant during a Russian assault, Ukraine says, NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/world/europe/nuclear-plant-fire-zaporizhzhia-video.html.
180 Id.
electricity, or heat, as Russian forces surrounded and blockaded the city, preventing evacuation of civilians and humanitarian aid.184

Markhalivka

A Russian air strike on a rural residential area in the village of Markhalivka killed at least 7 people on Friday, including 2 children.185

Zaporizhia

Lastly, in the middle of the night on March 4, Russian forces fired on the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, seizing it under Russian control and cutting ground lines of communication to plant staff.186 A training facility located just outside the plant’s perimeter caught on fire after an attack by Russian troops.187 Firefighters put out the blaze, and no radiation was released.

Zhytomyr

At 8:30 a.m. Russian airstrikes destroy city school. carried out by three Sukhoi fighter jets, that took off from Belarus airfields. No casualties reported at the time, but investigation continues.188

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05 March 2022

Borodyanka

Russian forces seized control of a psychiatric hospital in the town of Borodyanka in Ukraine's Kyiv region, with 670 people inside. They were reported to be running out of water and medications.

Chernihiv

Russian aircraft bombed several residential areas of the city of Chernihiv, a key city on the route to Kyiv. At least 17 civilians were killed, and 13 others injured in the shelling.

Mariupol

On March 05, 2022 Russian forces fired on numerous civilians attempting to evacuate from the city of Mariupol in an agreed humanitarian corridor between Mariupol and Volnovakha.

Zatoka, Odesa region

Russian forces air-dropped cluster munition (local authorities recovered RBK-500, RBK-250). Typically, submunitions do not detonate, frequently killing curious children. Munitions were dropped on residential town of Zatoka.

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190 Id.
192 Id.
06 March 2022

Donetsky

Three Ukrainian civilians were injured when a Russian Armed Forces strike took place immediately next to a hospital. Some of the injuries are very, very serious.195

Hulyaipole

A local Orthodox church was destroyed by Russian Armed Forces artillery fire.196

Irpin

Russian Armed Forces fired on fleeing Ukrainian civilians killing at least eight, including children.197 Video footage shows the killing of a family in Irpin, Ukraine, a town on the western outskirts of the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. The family killed included two small children and two adults.198

For several hours on March 6th, 2022, Russian forces bombarded an intersection on a road that hundreds of civilians were using to flee the Russian army’s advance in norther Ukraine.199 The persistent shelling harming civilians rather than hitting larger military objectives some distance away points to potential recklessness or deliberateness.200

195 Helen Regan et al., This Ukrainian maternity hospital is now treating wounded soldiers: "The numbers keep going up", CNN (Mar. 6, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-06-22/h_bd606b8e7d45d2128aa4d01a4e9ff00.
200 Id.
Kharkiv

In Pyatikhatki, Kharkiv region, on March 6, four people were killed and another 15 people were injured during the shelling of a supermarket. It is also reported that during the air bombardment of Kharkov on March 6, residential and civilian facilities located at the address Kharkov, Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred Square were damaged. As a result of these actions, a residential building was significantly damaged. In addition, the premises of the Kharkiv Court of Appeal, the Sloboda district prosecutor’s office and the zonal department of the Military Law Enforcement Service were partially destroyed.201

Russian Armed Forces during another shelling of Kharkov destroyed a kindergarten and playground in Saltovka, Kharkiv. As previously reported, Mikhail Podolyak, adviser to the head of the President’s Office, said that the Russian military intended to strike at civilian infrastructure facilities. Since the beginning of the invasion they have damaged or destroyed 202 schools, 34 hospitals, over 1500 residential buildings including apartment buildings. More than 900 Ukrainian settlements are now without electricity, water, heat.202

Kherson

A shopping mall in Kherson was gutted after being firebombed which left the entire mall destroyed and uninhabitable.203

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202 Russian strikes in northern Saltivka; Several residential buildings were damaged; Kharkiv Oblast, TWITTER (Mar. 6, 2022), https://twitter.com/no_itsmyturn/status/1500374495877644288.
Kyiv

Two Russian army tanks targeted school and residential houses in Buzova village of Kyiv region.\(^{204}\)

On March 6\(^{th}\), Voznesens'ka Tservka church was damaged by Russian Armed Forces air strike. This attack on a religious building was in line with Russian attacks on other places of worship since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine.\(^{205}\)

Ovruch

Two residential houses and an employment center were destroyed, and several other apartment blocks were damaged by air strikes on Ovruch, Zhytomyr region.\(^{206}\) "As a result of the air strike, the building of the Ovruch employment center was destroyed, two two-story residential houses were completely destroyed.\(^{207}\) Several apartment blocks were damaged (broken windows, doors)."\(^{208}\)


\(^{207}\) Id.

\(^{208}\) Multiple Homes Damaged in Northern Ukraine Strikes, YAHOO NEWS (Mar. 6, 2022), https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/multiple-homes-damaged-north-ukraine-100320613.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAAkTM3qRnPdcPizhxL_H1rZDAgtujxkzovsXBFpYtsufpE1V7lyP1ZBHQ9nkdrvdLJ3VxxWQY6K2ofLytzcx_K4D9wCsOvjenqRNDA5im0vofWOXWD7o0kflIDmVXe_F9z_j4qNbi00S3Drj3u6dQwqgyyuThNkd3L_4RVSp.
Vinnytsia

A barrage of Russian missiles destroyed a civilian airport in Vinnytsia in central Ukraine.209 Vinnytsia is in the western area of central Ukraine, far from the Russia and Belarus borders, in an area that has seen fewer such strikes.210

07 March 2022

Izyum

A hospital was destroyed by explosion, forcing patients to make their way out of the ruins.211

Russian shells hit the prayer house of the "New Life" Evangelical Church in the city of Izyum, Kharkiv region – the church building was completely destroyed.212 After the shelling, an Orthodox Church caught fire in the village of Zavorychi, Brovars'kyi district, Kyiv Oblast.213

Kharkiv

Russia has attacked Kharkiv with artillery, rockets, cluster munitions and guided missiles on at least 13 different days, a relentless barrage, lately targeting the city at night. Most Kharkiv residents are Russian speakers, and many are ethnic Russians.214 At least 500 civilians have been

213 Id.
killed, according to the city’s emergency services agency. The true number is likely higher, and rescue workers continue to dig through the rubble.\textsuperscript{215}

**Kyiv**

Drone footage of an individual dressed in civilian clothes appearing to be shot by people with white arm bands around their limbs, tank marked with white V on it.\textsuperscript{216}

**Luhasnk**

Russian artillery pounded the southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv overnight on March 7, resulting in fires at residential buildings, according to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service.\textsuperscript{217} A photo showed plumes of black smoke on the city skyline.\textsuperscript{218} An amber hue could be seen below the smoke, which was presumably from fires caused by Russian attacks.\textsuperscript{219}

As the Russia-Ukraine war entered its 12th day on Monday, March 7, an oil depot in Ukraine's Luhansk was on fire after a massive explosion in the separatist region.\textsuperscript{220} It is pertinent to note that pro-Russian separatist regions in Ukraine's Donbass - Donetsk and Luhansk - were declared independent by Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 21.\textsuperscript{221}

**Malyn**

Residential, commercial buildings damaged/destroyed by explosion in Malyn, a town of 25,000 near Zhytomyr, the bombing killed at least five people, including two children, and

\textsuperscript{215} Id.
\textsuperscript{218} Id.
\textsuperscript{219} Id.
\textsuperscript{221} Id.
destroyed a textile factory and seven homes, the agency said. Two people died, including a 7-year-old, in the bombing in Chuhuiv, near Kharkiv.

**Mykolaiv**

In the city’s Korabelnyi district, a shell from a Russian multiple-launch rocket system, which has a range of about 50 miles, landed on an apartment building, causing one whole side to catch fire. Multiple Launch Rocket System reportedly strike on residential area. Rocket motor impacted next to tram stop.

**Sumy**

An air strike was also launched on Sumy suburbs in which residential houses were destroyed. On Romenska Street, a few private residential houses were destroyed completely, killing 10 persons, including children. In Okhtyrka, Russian invaders were bombarding residential areas. Critical infrastructure facilities also came under bombardment and shelling, namely Okhtyrka Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHPP).

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223 *Id.*


225 *Id.*


227 *Id.*

228 *Id.*
Zavorychi

The St. George's Church in Ukraine's Zavorychi was on fire Monday, videos show, after an alleged Russian military strike.\(^{229}\) In the Monday videos of the church, the green roof of the blue-walled church was on fire and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church confirmed that the church was on fire, saying that parishioners reported that it had been hit by Russian military strikes.\(^{230}\) The rector of St. George Church archpriest Petro Kotyuk said in a statement posted on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church website that a shell hit the church's dome and that Russian troops shot at houses.\(^{231}\)


\(^{230}\) Id.

\(^{231}\) Id.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description of Incident</th>
<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Rome Statute</th>
<th>Geneva Convention</th>
<th>Ukrainian Penal Code</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/24/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>AP II, Article 7(1)(a)</td>
<td>1 civilian man killed, 2 civilian women injured during the invasion of Ukraine.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Article 7(1)(a)</td>
<td>Article 4(e)(v)</td>
<td>112, 113, 115, 121, 122</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/24/2022</td>
<td>Crimea Peninsula</td>
<td>AP II, Article 4(2)(d)</td>
<td>1 service member killed as a result of a Russian shelling attack on the Crimean Peninsula</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Article 8(2)(b)(xi)</td>
<td>Article 292</td>
<td>121, 122</td>
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<td>2/24/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>AP II, Article 4(2)(d)</td>
<td>1 killed, 12 injured when an apartment building outside of Kharkiv was bombed in a Russian airstrike</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Article 8(2)(b)(xi)</td>
<td>Article 292, 282</td>
<td>121, 122</td>
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<td>2/24/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ukraine</td>
<td>AP II, Article 4(2)(d)</td>
<td>8 people, 5 men and 10 women, were killed in a Russian airstrike near the Black Sea port of Odessa</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Article 8(2)(b)(xi)</td>
<td>Article 292, 282</td>
<td>121, 122</td>
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<td>2/24/2022</td>
<td>Mariupol, Ukraine</td>
<td>AP II, Article 7(1)(a)</td>
<td>5 killed, 6 injured (including a child) after a Russian shelling in a suburb of the city, as well as continued attacks have prevented humanitarian aid from reaching the city and evacuees from leaving the city, dealing with limited resources</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Article 7(1)(a)</td>
<td>Article 4(e)(v)</td>
<td>112, 113, 115, 121, 122</td>
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<td>2/24/2022</td>
<td>Odessa Sea Port</td>
<td>AP II, Article 7(1)(a)</td>
<td>8 people, 5 men and 10 women, were killed in a Russian airstrike near the Black Sea port of Odessa</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Article 4(e)(v)</td>
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2/25/2022 Black Sea


Description of Incident

13 border guards were killed in a Russian bombardment

Ukranian Penal Code

2/25/2022 Cerkovka, Ukraine


Description of Incident

2 teachers killed when a missile struck a school, which also suffered broken windows and collapsed walls

Ukranian Penal Code

2/25/2022 Kyiv, Ukraine


Description of Incident

1 injured when a building in a civilian neighborhood was hit by rocket fragments during a Russian missile strike; rocket attack into a Kyiv residential village

Ukranian Penal Code

2/25/2022 Mariupol, Ukraine


Description of Incident

School No. 48 was struck by a missile and damaged; windows having been blown in andockmarked with metal fragments

Ukranian Penal Code

2/25/2022 Obolon District, Ukraine
1 News, "Russian tank runs over Ukrainian civilian car, driver survives.", https://1news.co.nz/2022/02/26/russian-tank-runs-over-ukrainian-civilian-car-driver-survives/

NY Post, "Russian tank maliciously crushes civilian car with driver inside.", https://nypost.com/2022/02/25/russian-tank-runs-over-ukrainian-civilian-car-driver-survives/

Description of Incident

1 civilian man injured when a tank swerved to drive over his vehicle while still in it and then reversed back over it

Ukranian Penal Code

2/25/2022 Odessa, Stany Obozni, Ukraine


Description of Incident

at least 3 people killed, including 1 child, and 1 child injured while hiding in a preschool when Russian forces dropped cluster munitions on the nursery/kindergarten

Ukranian Penal Code

2/25/2022 Pripjat, Ukraine

"News, "Chernobyl power plant employees held hostage by Russian forces, radiation levels rising.", https://news.abc.net.au/news/area-chernobyl-power-plant-employees-held-hostage-by-russian-forces-radiation-levels-rising-12849488


Kyiv Independent, "Border guards were killed defending Ukraine’s Zmiiny Island (Snake Island) in the Black Sea.", https://kyivindependent.com/unategorized/13-border-guards-were-killed-defending-ukraine-s-zmiiny-island-snake-island-in-the-black-sea/

Description of Incident

92 power plant operational personnel were taken hostage by Russian forces

Ukranian Penal Code

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2/26/2022</td>
<td>Pripyat, Chernobyl 51°38′02″N, 30°09′38″E</td>
<td>U.P., &quot;Chernobyl nuclear power plant operational station hit with cluster bombs, killing child and two adults sheltering inside&quot; [3]</td>
<td>Acting General Director of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Valery Sedoi and staff who were on duty on the day of the invasion of nuclear plant are among hostages being held by Russian army.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)</td>
<td>AP II, Article 4(2)(b)</td>
<td>Art. 438</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/26/2022</td>
<td>Tokyo near Voloshky Yan in Kharkiv region, Kharkiv-Izium route</td>
<td>U.P., &quot;Russian invaders opened fire at a public bus in Kharkiv region, killed civilians&quot; [3]</td>
<td>&quot;Five persons are dead, six are wounded.&quot; Russian forces fire on public bus. Among the dead are two 42-year old women, two men aged 18 and 22, and another man whose age is currently unknown.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 7(1)(e)</td>
<td>AP II, Article 3 (a)</td>
<td>Art. 438</td>
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<td>2/26/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>Reuters &quot;Ukraine says Russian troops blow up gas pipeline in Kharkiv&quot; [3]</td>
<td>Ukrainian defenders found internationally-banned cluster bombs with butterfly mines (the so-called &quot;leperok&quot; mines)</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>AP II, Article 13</td>
<td>Art. 438</td>
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<td>2/26/2022</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>UP, &quot;Russian troops shot a journalist in Kherson and exploded an apartment building in Klaipeda&quot;</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/status/1497635178035668936">Video</a></td>
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<td>&quot;Oleksandr Shukurovych Shakirov, a civilian journalist for the &quot;Around You&quot; information weekly and a member of the &quot;House of Hope&quot; charitable foundation, was shot dead from a car with an automatic weapon near the village of Zelnitva in Kherson.&quot;</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)</td>
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<td>Solom'yans'kyi district, St. Lobanovsky, 6, Kyiv</td>
<td>UP, &quot;Russian missle hit an apartment building in Kyiv&quot;</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/i/status/1497635178035668936">Video</a></td>
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<td>Russian missiles attack residential Solom'yans'kyi district near airport. Apartment damaged by missile strike. Other buildings were reportedly damaged by the missile attack. Fires recorded on video.</td>
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<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>&quot;5 explossions happened in Kyiv close to TPP-6 (thermal power plant) with 3-5 minutes time difference (information added)&quot;</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/i/status/1497635178035668936">Video</a></td>
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<td>The explosions in Kyiv started around 20:35. In accordance with data provided by the Kyiv City State Administration there were 5 explosions that happened beside thermal powerplant, TPP-6, within 3-5 minutes from each other.</td>
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<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>&quot;A bridge was blown up on the Kyiv-Zhytomyr highway. One child dead, several people wounded&quot;</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/i/status/1497635178035668936">Video</a></td>
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<td>Two men and two women were injured and one approximately 8 year old boy died from a bridge near the village of Stoyanka being blown up on the Kyiv-Zhytomyr highway</td>
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<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>&quot;Shelling in Kyiv: one child killed, 4 people wounded&quot;</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/i/status/1497635178035668936">Video</a></td>
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<td>Oldemosti Children's Hospital says artillery shelling results in a child being killed, two adults and two children injured.</td>
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<td>2/26/2022</td>
<td>Okhtyrka, Sumy region</td>
<td>UP, &quot;Strikes on a military unit and residential neighborhood – 70 wounded&quot;, <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326159/">https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326159/</a> Three missile strikes on a military unit along with shelling of residential neighborhoods, injuring about 70 people. One woman killed. A child wounded on 2/25/22 dies.</td>
<td>Russia Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(ii); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(c)(i)</td>
<td>Art. 112;</td>
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<td>Art. 263; Art. 341</td>
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<td>Art. 126;</td>
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<td>2/26/2022</td>
<td>Volnovakha</td>
<td>Pavlo Kyrylenko post: <a href="https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donod/posts/4948279552763">https://www.facebook.com/pavlokyrylenko.donod/posts/4948279552763</a> video: <a href="https://twitter.com/i/status/1497504221742125056">https://twitter.com/i/status/1497504221742125056</a> 13 civilians were killed from Russian firings of Grads and artillery. Multiple households, including two apartment blocks, were damaged.</td>
<td>Russia Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 122;</td>
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<td>Art. 292;</td>
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<td>Art. 194;</td>
<td>Art. 433*</td>
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<td>Art. 195;</td>
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<td>Art. 433*</td>
<td>Art. 433*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/26/2022</td>
<td>Zmiinyi Island</td>
<td>UP, &quot;Russia has seized a civilian rescue ship near Zmiinyi (Snake) Island&quot; <a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326261/">https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/26/7326261/</a> a civilian rescue ship “Saphir” that was on a humanitarian mission was seized and is detained by Russian warships near Zmiinyi (Snake) Island.</td>
<td>Russia Art. 8(2)(a)(iv)</td>
<td>Art. 188;</td>
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<td>Art. 194;</td>
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<td>Art. 263; Art. 341</td>
<td>Art. 282;</td>
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<td>Art. 292;</td>
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<td>Art. 194;</td>
<td>Art. 433*</td>
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<td>Source</td>
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<td>Responsible Party</td>
<td>Rome Statute</td>
<td>Geneva Convention</td>
<td>Ukrainian Penal Code</td>
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<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine</td>
<td>Two civilian ships: tanker Athena and cargo Princess Nicole, were captured by Russians. Almost 50 civilian crew members taken prisoner.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(e)(v)</td>
<td>AP II, Article 4(2)(d)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433* Art. 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>The Guardian, “‘Luzhansk says ‘nowhere left to hide’ for Putin allies – as it happened”</td>
<td>Gas pipeline catches on fire following attack</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(e)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Kletser , 46°54′47.1″N 39°37′35.9″E</td>
<td>Social Media</td>
<td>Russians fire on civilian car, LP BT8338BX , killing one and injuring three.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(b)(i)</td>
<td>Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(a); AP II Art. 13</td>
<td>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 436 Art. 414; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv, Vasylkiv</td>
<td>Censor.net, “Bucha after shelling by Russian occupiers: civilian buildings and private houses are on fire. Source: <a href="https://censor.net/en/photo_news/3319726/bucha">https://censor.net/en/photo_news/3319726/bucha</a> after shelling by russian occupiers civilian buildings and private houses are on fire. photo”</td>
<td>Civilian buildings destroyed by bombing, including a Children’s Clinic.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv, Vasylkiv</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Geneva terminal on fire from Russian attack</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv, Ipin, Ozernaya St.</td>
<td>Video</td>
<td>Three houses caught fire as a result of the shelling.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Video</td>
<td>Russians shoot civilian man and dog</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Luhansk, Happiness and Luhansk.</td>
<td>Forbes, &quot;Kherson attack: 27 injured, 25 shelled, 1000 civilians took sheltered&quot;</td>
<td>Private and apartment buildings affected by shelling, evacuation not possible, no access to food or water.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<td>2/27/2022</td>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>BBC, &quot;Ukraine conflict. The civilian lives lost to Russia's war&quot;</td>
<td>© Greek civilians killed by snipers, civilian property damage.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v)</td>
<td>Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341 Art. 262; Art. 292Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<td>UP, &quot;In the Sumy region, invaders shot bus with civilian people, didn't allow ambulance to pass&quot;</td>
<td><a href="https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/27/7326450/">https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/27/7326450/</a></td>
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<td>Dmytro Zhyvytskyy, <a href="https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/457">https://t.me/Zhyvytskyy/457</a></td>
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<td>Bombing damages apartment buildings, infrastructure facilities, and a hospital. No water or electricity.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Video:</td>
<td><a href="https://twitter.com/status/149798356493861472/">https://twitter.com/status/149798356493861472/</a></td>
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<td>Missiles launched from Belarus and hit an airport. At least 2 dead and at least 3 injured.</td>
<td>Belarus/Russia</td>
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<td>Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(i)(ii); Art. 8(2)(i)(iii); Art. 8(2)(i)(v); Art. 8(2)(i)(v)</td>
<td>AP II, Article 4(2)(a); AP II, Article 4(2)(d); AP II, Article 13; Art. 51; Art. 51(4)(a); Art. 51; Article 57</td>
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<td>Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 168; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 282(Art.162); Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
<td>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 434; Art. 414; Art. 282; Art. 280; Art. 444; Art. 168; Art. 194; Art. 263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art. 282(Art.162); Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 433*</td>
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<td>2/28/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>OCHA, &quot;Ukraine: Civilian casualties as of 24/00-28 February 2022&quot;</td>
<td>A missile hit a residential building, which set two of the lower floors on fire and injured on woman.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(i);</td>
<td>AP I Art. 51</td>
<td>Art. 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/28/2022</td>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>OCHA, &quot;Ukraine: Civilian casualties as of 24/00-28 February 2022&quot;</td>
<td>Shelling set fire to a large Epicentr K, a home improvement store.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(i);</td>
<td>AP I Art. 52</td>
<td>Art. 121</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/28/2022</td>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>space.com, &quot;Russian attack sets Ukrainian home improvement store ablaze (satellite photo)&quot;</td>
<td>In the town of Ivankiv, north of Kyiv, Russian troops set fire to a museum of local lore. Unique paintings by Ukrainian artist Maria Pryimachenko were destroyed.&quot;</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(i);</td>
<td>AP I Art. 52</td>
<td>Art. 188</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/28/2022</td>
<td>Ivanik, north of Kyiv</td>
<td>Forbes, &quot;Monday, February 28. Russia’s War On Ukraine: News and Information From Ukraine&quot;</td>
<td>To the town of Ivanik, north of Kyiv, Russian troops set fire to a museum of local lore. Unique paintings by Ukrainian artist Maria Pryimachenko were destroyed.&quot;</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(i);</td>
<td>AP I Art. 52</td>
<td>Art. 202</td>
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<td>2/28/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>Forbes, &quot;Monday, February 28. Russia’s War On Ukraine: News and Information From Ukraine&quot;</td>
<td>Kharkiv was shelled by artillery between 1400 and 1500, Kyiv time. The shelling killed 11 military personnel, injured 16 civilians, and killed at least one civilian.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 7(1)(a);</td>
<td>AP I Art. 51</td>
<td>Art. 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/28/2022</td>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>CNN, &quot;Show this to Putin: A 6-year-old girl killed in Ukraine&quot;</td>
<td>A six year old girl was with her family at the supermarket when shelling started. She was wounded and brought to a hospital. Doctors were unable to revive her.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 7(1)(a);</td>
<td>AP I Art. 51</td>
<td>Art. 112</td>
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<td><a href="https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/28/europe/gallery/ukrain...eilled/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/28/europe/gallery/ukrain...eilled/index.html</a></td>
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<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(i);</td>
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<td>Art. 113</td>
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</table>
A BMP armored vehicle variant destroys a car, killing the two elderly occupants. Russia

Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i) AP I Art. 51 Art. 112; Art. 113

A video uploaded to Telegram at 11:29 a.m. on February 28th, 2022, shows what appear to be cluster munitions hitting the Moskovskyi district of Kharkiv. Russia

Art. 9(2)(x)(v); Art. 9(2)(b)(vi)*; Art. 9(2)(b)(xvi) AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13 Art. 188; Art. 194; Art.263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art.292

A video uploaded to Telegram at 12:55 p.m., and a video uploaded to Twitter at 2:23 p.m. show what appear to be cluster munitions hitting Shevchenkivskyi District. Russia

Art. 9(2)(x)(v); Art. 9(2)(b)(vi)*; Art. 9(2)(b)(xvi) AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13 Art. 188; Art. 194; Art.263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art.292

Cluster munitions hit a residential parking lot, causing damage to cars. People were seeking cover. No casualties were reported. Russia

Art. 9(2)(x)(v); Art. 9(2)(b)(vi)*; Art. 9(2)(b)(xvi) AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13 Art. 188; Art. 194; Art.263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art.292

A family was caught in their car and burned alive following missile attacks. Russia

Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i) AP I Art. 51 Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115

An estimated 87 houses were damaged by shelling on Kharkiv by Russian forces. Russia

Art. 9(2)(x)(v); Art. 9(2)(b)(vi)*; Art. 9(2)(b)(xvi) AP I Art. 52; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art.263; Art. 341; Art. 282; Art.292; Art.153; Art.162; Art.194; Art.195; Art.196

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A family was caught in their car and burned alive following missile attacks. Russia

Art. 7(1)(a); Art. 8(2)(a)(i) AP I Art. 51 Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115
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<tr>
<td>3/1/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>BBC, &quot;Ukraine invasion: Indian student killed as he tried to buy food&quot;</td>
<td>Naveen Shekharappa Gyanagoudar, a fourth-year medical student, was killed by shelling after he left a bunker to get food.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 7(1)(a);</td>
<td>Art. 112;</td>
<td>Art.113; Art.115</td>
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<td>Reuters, &quot;Indian student killed in Ukraine shelling, thousands of foreigners trapped&quot;</td>
<td>A missile struck an administrative building in Kharkiv.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv);</td>
<td>Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 112, Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 116;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/1/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Reuters, &quot;Russia bombards Ukraine urban areas as armed convoy stalls&quot;</td>
<td>A Russian missile hit a TV tower in Kyiv, near the Babyn Yar Holocaust memorial site. It killed at least 5 people.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(b)(ii)</td>
<td>Art. 188;</td>
<td>Art. 194; Art. 263, Art. 341</td>
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<tr>
<td>3/1/2022</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>Ukrinform, &quot;Four injured as two shells hit high-rise buildings in Kherson&quot;</td>
<td>Rockets struck two nine-story buildings, injuring four civilians.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 8(2)(a)(iii); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Art. 8(2)(b)(v); Art. 8(2)(a)(iv);</td>
<td>Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 263, Art. 341; Art. 162; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196;</td>
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<td>3/1/2022</td>
<td>Zhytomyr Highway, west out of Kyiv</td>
<td>The Kyiv Independent, &quot;Russian soldiers kill mother of two as she drives family to safety&quot;</td>
<td>A family including a father, mother, eight year old son, and 10 year old son, was escaping Kyiv when a Russian sniper shot the mother in the head through the windshield. The husband got out, and as he pulled his older son out of the car, the sniper shot him in the right leg. He went back for his younger son, and the sniper shot his younger son's leg. Then, the sniper the father in his other leg. A Russian convey gave medical aid to the survivors, and let the wife's parent's pick them up. They did not let the family take the wife's body.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Art. 7(1)(b); Art. 8(2)(a)(i); Art. 8(2)(a)(ii)</td>
<td>Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122</td>
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3/2/2022 Kherson

NY Times, "First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes More Civilian Targets" https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/russia-ukraine-russia-ukraine-russian-news.com-ukraine-russian-news-03-02-22/h_908c3139eb50f5ee8be88aa09b27c6f8

Port city on the Black Sea seized by Russian troops. After several days of fighting, 300 Ukrainian civilians and fighters left dead. Civilians trapped with no power and food shortage. Utility workers tried to fix damaged pipes and downed lines, but came under fire from snipers.

3/2/2022 Zhytomyr


Maternity house was destroyed. Russian troops continue shelling health institutions and ambulance cars. 1 child was killed and 6 children were injured.

3/2/2022 Kyiv

Carrefourers Business, "War in Ukraine: Doctor from pediatric cardiology clinic shot dead" https://www.carrefourersbusiness.com/topics/care-centric-war-ukraine-doctor-pediatric-cardiology-clinic-shot-dead-

Russian soldiers killed 8-year-old Khatun. After being at her car as she was driving her wounded nephew to the hospital. Missile strike on train station as thousands of civilians try to flee. Powerful explosion was reported between the Southern Railway Station and the Fish hotel where Ukraine's Defense Ministry is near. Senior official suffered minor damage.

3/2/2022 Kharkiv


Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HLpWwAKN


Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HLpWwAKN


First day of Russian assault" AP


Two children killed in civilian areas of Kharkiv

Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HLpWwAKN

NY Times, "First Ukraine City Falls as Russia Strikes More Civilian Targets" https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/russia-ukraine-russia-ukraine-russian-news.com-ukraine-russian-news-03-02-22/h_908c3139eb50f5ee8be88aa09b27c6f8

Fort city on the Black Sea seized by Russian troops. After several days of fighting, 300 Ukrainian civilians and fighters left dead. Civilians trapped with no power and food shortage. Utility workers tried to fix damaged pipes and downed lines, but came under fire from snipers.

Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HLpWwAKN


Crowded urban areas were attacked, killing and severely injuring civilians. 1 boy died and 2 were wounded by Russian shelling. A woman also suffered severe wounds to her face from the same strike.


Maturity house was destroyed. Russian troops continue shelling health institutions and ambulance cars. 1 child was killed and 6 children were injured.

AP, "Russia-Ukraine War: What to know on Day 7 of Russian assault" https://www.apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-general-assembly-state-of-the-union-address-kyiv-business-16c75201985f1b57e8dc5e7e411805f

Ukrainian civilians and fighters left dead. Civilians trapped with no power and food shortage. Utility workers tried to fix damaged pipes and downed lines, but came under fire from snipers.

Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HLpWwAKN


Crowded urban areas were attacked, killing and severely injuring civilians. 1 boy died and 2 were wounded by Russian shelling. A woman also suffered severe wounds to her face from the same strike.
<table>
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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Events</th>
<th>Treaty Clauses</th>
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</table>
Russia 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(e)(i); AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; AP II Art. 13; Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 294; Art. 341 |  |
| 3/2/22 | Zaporizhzhia| Ukrinform, “Three people were killed and four others were wounded in Russian shelling of Vasylivka city” | Russian troops fired on a hospital; 4 civilians were seriously injured and 3 were killed.  
Russia 7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(ix); 8(2)(e)(i); 8(2)(c)(i); AP I Art. 12; AP I Art. 51; AP II Art. 11; Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 11; Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 444 |  |
| 3/2/22 | Chernihiv  | AP, “Russia-Ukraine War: What to know on Day 7 of Russian assault” | 2 cruise missiles hit hospital and authorities work to determine number of casualties  
Russia 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(v); 8(2)(e)(i); AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; Art. 3(1)(a); AP II Art. 11; Art. 162; Art. 178; Art. 179; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 258; Art. 263; Art. 279; Art. 280; Art. 282; Art. 294; Art. 341; Art. 414; Art. 438; Art. 444 |  |
| 3/2/22 | Port of Odessa | Reuters, “Two cargo ships hit by blasts around Ukraine, one seafarer killed”  
UNB, “Bangladeshi killed in rocket attack on ship”  
FleetMon, “Bangladeshi bulk carrier hit by Russian Navy missile: 1 crew died UPDATE VIDEO” | Missile launched from Russian Navy ship struck Bangladeshi vessel docked in Ukrainian port. Killed crew member, Hadisur Rahman.  
Russia 7(1)(a); 8(2)(a)(iv); 8(2)(b)(i); 8(2)(e)(i) AP I Art. 51; AP I Art. 52; Art. 3(1)(a); Art. 112; Art. 113; Art. 115; Art. 121; Art. 122; Art. 162; Art. 188; Art. 194; Art. 195; Art. 196; Art. 263; Art. 282; Art. 294; Art. 414; Art. 444 |  |
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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Responsible Party</th>
<th>Rome Statute</th>
<th>Geneva Convention</th>
<th>Ukrainian Penal Code</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/3/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>VOA, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, March 3, 2022”</td>
<td>Three schools and a cathedral were attacked. Several shops near the city council building were also damaged.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Art. 9</td>
<td>Art. 13</td>
<td>Art. 178</td>
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<td>3/3/2022</td>
<td>Kyiv</td>
<td>Aljazeera, “Russian Troops in the Streets of Kherson, Mayor Says”</td>
<td>At least four major blasts in the capital, unclear where the targets were, or whether there were civilian casualties.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Art. 41</td>
<td>Art. 16</td>
<td>Art. 184</td>
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<td>3/3/2022</td>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>Daily Sabah, “Russian airstrike in residential area near Chernihiv”</td>
<td>Russian airstrike in a residential district. 47 people were killed. Troops launched a missile on a multi-story residential area in the city center, attacked 2 schools and private homes. More than 40 residential buildings caught fire. No military facilities were in the vicinity.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Art. 112</td>
<td>Art. 51</td>
<td>Art. 195</td>
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<td>3/3/2022</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>NY Times, “What Happened on Day 8 of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”</td>
<td>Russian troops shelled a hospital killing 3 Ukrainians. Russian forces captured Zaporizhzhia Nuclear power complex near Enerhodar. Russian armored vehicles passed through town and opened fire along the way to the plant. Fire broke out after Russians fired at buildings in the power plant. Fighting around nuclear power complexes was so fierce, wounded civilians were unable to be moved to a hospital.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Art. 12</td>
<td>Art. 51</td>
<td>Art. 196</td>
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<td>3/3/2022</td>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>Washington Post, “Mariupol, key Ukrainian port, under siege and out of water: ‘We are being destroyed’”</td>
<td>Russian soldiers destroyed bridges and trains and obstructed water, power, and food supply. Water towers and electricity substations were hit. Civilians trapped. At least 10 people killed in the past two days and more than 150 injured in the city’s only functioning hospital. Russian soldiers looted grocery stores and banks.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Art. 51</td>
<td>Art. 16</td>
<td>Art. 195</td>
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<td>3/4/2022</td>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>Russian invaders fired on village in Kyiv region, killing two adults and three children.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russia 7(1)(h); Russia 8(2)(iv); Russia 8(2)(b)(iv)</td>
<td>AP II Art. 3; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 4(2)(c); AP II Art. 3(3); Art. 31(1)(k)</td>
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<td>3/4/2022</td>
<td>Fastiv district, Kyiv region</td>
<td>Shelling of residential area killed 5 people, including 3 children.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russia 7(1)(h); Russia 8(2)(iv); Russia 8(2)(b)(ix)</td>
<td>AP II Art. 3; AP II Art. 4(1); AP II Art. 3(3); Art. 31(1)(k)</td>
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<td>3/4/2022</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>Russians fired on the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, and seized it unde their control. Training facility caught on fire. Ground line facility caught with the staff were cut.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russia 8(2)(b)(v); Russia 8(2)(e)(i)</td>
<td>AP II Art. 15; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 198; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 295; Art. 313; Art. 315; Art. 442; Art. 453</td>
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<td>3/4/2022</td>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>17 civilians killed, 13 reported when Russian aerial bombed residential areas.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russia 7(1)(h); Russia 8(2)(iv); Russia 8(2)(b)(i)</td>
<td>AP II Art. 3; Art. 31(1)(k)</td>
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<td>3/4/2022</td>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>Russians fired on a nuclear power plant, and seized it unde their control. Training facility caught on fire. Ground line facility caught with the staff were cut.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russia 8(2)(b)(v); Russia 8(2)(e)(i)</td>
<td>AP II Art. 15; Art. 194; Art. 196; Art. 198; Art. 282; Art. 292; Art. 295; Art. 313; Art. 315; Art. 442; Art. 453</td>
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<td>3/4/2022</td>
<td>Markhalivka</td>
<td>Two children, 5 adults killed in Russian air strike in Kyiv region, say Ukraine police.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Russia 7(1)(h); Russia 8(2)(iv); Russia 8(2)(b)(i)</td>
<td>AP II Art. 3; Art. 31(1)(k)</td>
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<td>3/5/2022</td>
<td>Mariupol</td>
<td>Ukrinform, &quot;Russians fire towards area of green corridor in Mariupol- Defense Ministry&quot;&lt;br&gt;<a href="https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3421331-russians-fire-towards-area-of-green-corridor-in-mariupol-defense-ministry.html">https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3421331-russians-fire-towards-area-of-green-corridor-in-mariupol-defense-ministry.html</a></td>
<td>Russian forces fired on civilians, despite agreement or a humanitarian corridor between Volnovakha and Mariupol</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7(1)(h); 8(2)(b)(i)</td>
<td>AP II Art. 11;</td>
<td>Art. 50(3)</td>
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<td>AP II Art. 13;</td>
<td>Art. 50(3)</td>
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<td>Bellingcat, &quot;These are the Cluster Munitions Documented by Ukrainian Civilians&quot;&lt;br&gt;<a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2022/03/13/these-are-the-cluster-munitions-documented-by-ukrainian-civilians/">https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-world/2022/03/13/these-are-the-cluster-munitions-documented-by-ukrainian-civilians/</a></td>
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<td>Art. 121</td>
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<td>NY Post, &quot;Russia accused of using ‘cluster bomb’ in Ukraine as civilian casualties surge&quot;&lt;br&gt;<a href="https://nypost.com/2022/03/04/russia-accused-of-using-cluster-bombs-in-ukraine-as-civilian-casualties-surge/">https://nypost.com/2022/03/04/russia-accused-of-using-cluster-bombs-in-ukraine-as-civilian-casualties-surge/</a></td>
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<td>3/6/2022</td>
<td>Irpin</td>
<td>CNN, &quot;March 6, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news&quot;</td>
<td>School damaged by explosion</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Art. 112;</td>
<td>Art. 4;</td>
<td>7(1)(a);</td>
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<td>Russian military airstrike kills family in Irpin, Ukraine, a town on the western outskirts of Kyiv</td>
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<td>Art. 113;</td>
<td>Art. 4(1);</td>
<td>8(2)(a)(i);</td>
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<td>Russian forces fire on evacuees, leaving 4 people dead outside Kyiv.</td>
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<td>Art. 153;</td>
<td>Art. 4(2)(a);</td>
<td>8(2)(a)(ii);</td>
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<td>The attack in Irpin, west of the capital, suggested either direct targeting of evacuees or disregard for the risk of civilian casualties</td>
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<td>Art. 188;</td>
<td>Art. 4(2)(b);</td>
<td>8(2)(b)(i);</td>
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<td>Art. 203;</td>
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<td>Art. 444;</td>
<td>Art. 4(2)(g);</td>
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<td>3/6/2022</td>
<td>Halyapole</td>
<td>HRW, &quot;Russian Assault Kills Fleeing Civilians&quot;</td>
<td>At least eight fleeing civilians killed as Russian forces bombarded an intersection that hundreds of civilians were using to flee</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7(1)(a);</td>
<td>8(2)(a)(i);</td>
<td>8(2)(a)(iii);</td>
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<td>8(2)(b)(i);</td>
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<td>8(2)(b)(ix);</td>
<td>9(1) Art. 162;</td>
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<td>3/6/2022</td>
<td>Donetsk City</td>
<td>CNN, &quot;March 6, 2022 Russia-Ukraine news&quot;</td>
<td>Russian artillery strike, three wounded</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7(1)(a);</td>
<td>8(2)(a)(i);</td>
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<td>3/6/2022</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>HRW, &quot;Ukraine: Deadly Attack Kill Injure Civilians, Destroy Homes&quot;</td>
<td>Strike on a line of civilians queuing outside of a supermarket. Multiple small impacts indicate cluster munitions</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>7(1)(a);</td>
<td>8(2)(a)(i);</td>
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<td>Residential, commercial buildings damaged/destroyed by explosion in Malyn, a town of 25,000 near Zhytomyr, the bombing killed at least five people, including two children, and destroyed a textile factory and seven homes, the agency said. Two people died, including a 7-year-old, in the bombing in Chuhuiv, near Kharkiv.</td>
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Most Responsible Party Dossier

Russia (Russian Federation)

Updated as of: April 01, 2022

Prepared by Ukraine Task Force – Intelligence Division
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Introduction and Scope

The purpose of this report is to provide in depth analysis of the role, capabilities, and organization of Russian Military and Senior Leadership. This report also provides an overview of key leaders associated with Russian Military and Senior Leadership as well as their roles, responsibilities, and organizational membership. The report also provides a brief overview of the most egregious incidents associated with the Russian Military activities in Ukraine.

Key Areas

Key Political Areas

Russia’s political power is distributed among its oblasti (regions), kraya (territories), okruga (autonomous district), and two Federal Cities.1

The Federal Cities are Moscow (Capital, located in Western Russia), and Saint Petersburg (often called the “Northern Capital”).2

Russia is further divided into eight Federal Districts overseen by President-appointed plenipotentiaries which monitor the consistency between federal and regional law.3 The districts are: Central, Far East, Northwest, Siberia, Southern, Urals, Volga, and Caucuses.4

There are approximately 114 Foreign Embassies and 87 Consulates in Russian territory and approximately 140 Russian Embassies and 38 Consulates around the world.5 Russia maintains one Embassy and three consulates in Ukraine, located in Kyiv and Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odessa, respectively.6

Key Military Areas

Russia contains five OSKs (military districts): Western, Southern, Northern Fleet and Arctic Command, Central, and Eastern.7

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2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
6 Id.
Each military district command center houses Ground Forces, Air Force, Air Defense, and Navy outfits. Districts fall under the command of the district headquarters, headed by the district commander, and is subordinated to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Russia maintains approximately twenty military bases outside its territory, primarily located in post-Soviet states and Syria (Center S, Khmeimim Air Base, and Tartus). Bases are also located in Belarus (including nuclear submarine sites), Egypt, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan (Baikonur Cosmodrome), Kyrgyzstan (Kant Air Base), and Armenia, and Vietnam. Russia also maintains a military presence in Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

Russian also operates the Arctic Brigade that includes outposts, air bases, and special forces units. These agreements and operations are part of a multi-step strategy that involves stationing peacekeepers in frozen conflict zones and integrating aspects of the region’s military forces through the CSTO and joint air defense agreements.

While China is a traditional Russian ally, throughout the Ukraine conflict several states have shown support and maintain positive military relationships with Russia. These include Belarus, Myanmar, Venezuela, Nicaragua.

**Relevant Areas of Operations**

Russia consistently offers conventional regime support to Syria and more covert support to Central African Republic and Venezuela. It also provides insurgent support to Libya and the rebel Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

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8 TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, supra note 7.  
9 TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff, supra note 7.  
12 Dyner, supra note 10.  
16 Hawn, supra note 11.  
17 Hawn, supra note 11.
Russian troops carry out conventional peacekeeping operations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova.\(^{18}\)

Russia maintains a deployment in the Transdniestria region of Moldova, known as the Operational Group of Russian Forces, for military exercises and trainings.\(^{19}\) This outpost has become especially active since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

More than 30,000 troops were deployed in Belarus for alleged joint military exercises as of FEB 2022.\(^{20}\)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine (official name is the Special Operation in Ukraine, sometimes referred to as an “Operation Z”) includes the use of Chechen special commando units, known as kadyrovtsy.\(^{21}\)

### Key Structures and Infrastructure

#### The Importance of Belarussian Infrastructural Support in the Ukrainian Invasion

In many ways, Belarus functions as an external organ of the Putin regime.\(^{22}\) Headed by an equally despotic and authoritarian ruler, Aleksandr Lukashenko is cut from the same post-Soviet anti-democratic cloth as Putin. Both have histories of cracking down on free speech, democratic processes, and both regimes are teeming with corruption. In recent years, Belarus has attracted negative international attention for the crackdown on the protests that sprung up in the wake of his reelection in 2020.\(^{23}\) Despite these hiccups, the Putin-Lukashenko partnership continued unabated, and the duo was seen enjoying a boat trip on the Black Sea last MAY.\(^{24}\) By late 2021, Russia was positioning troops in Belarus. Few alarm bells sounded. In mid-FEB 2022, Russia announced joint military exercises in Belarus--the longest and most extensive exercises in recent memory. By then, American intelligence knew that Russian invasion of Ukraine was imminent.

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\(^{18}\) Hawn, *supra* note 11


Several international sources have claimed that Belarus was a “staging ground” for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is partly true, but the statement can be broadened: Belarus is Russia’s partner in the Ukraine invasion. In the ensuing weeks since the invasion, the EU and their partners have sanctioned Belarus nearly as heavily as Russia. Without Belarus’ unwavering support of Russia and their ability to use Belarus as an entry point into northern Ukraine, the invasion into Ukraine would have been difficult, if not impossible.

Belarus’ support makes the difference in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the following ways:

- **Proximity to Kyiv.** From the Belorussian town Gropol, it is nearly a straight, unobstructed shot to Kyiv. Newsweek posted a video of Russian tanks coming over the Belorussian border on the early morning of 24 FEB. Belarus is essentially an extension of Russia’s border.
- **Additional troops if necessary.** Russia has sustained heavy losses in the conflict. Low estimates that 7,000 soldiers have been killed, while other sources ballpark closer to 10,000. While Minsk has been coy about stepping in to help the invasion with more soldiers, it remains an option if Russia continues to hemorrhage personnel.
- **Unobstructed supply chains.** Despite Ukraine’s valiant defense, the north of Ukraine remains firmly within Russia’s control. The Belorussian-Russian border is unobstructed, which can allow materiel and personnel to pass through unmolested.
  - In the weeks before the invasion CSIS published a paper guessing the invasion routes that Russia would take in waging war against Ukraine. The projected invasion routes and the current ones are nearly a perfect match.

**Russia’s Access to Chernobyl**

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Early in the conflict, Russia quickly surrounded and subsequently gained control of Chernobyl, the city that experienced the infamous nuclear disaster in 1986. While the radiation was too dangerous, the Russian army stationed itself in a city a safe distance away. The purpose of stationing near Chernobyl is ease of access to Kyiv, the seat of the Ukrainian government. It cannot be overstated how important it is to Russia’s military endeavors that Russia retains control of the Belorussian border and the northern cities as Russia’s army pushes toward Kyiv to bring the capital city to its knees.

Military hardware and conscription situation

Russia has thousands of military conscripts that are rapidly losing morale as the invasion continues. The troops are badly trained and have little experience in combat. Despite hefty financial incentives and an ambitious goal of attaining 100,000 conscripts, Russia is far behind in reaching its goal.

The situation is even worse on the ground than it is on paper. Many videos have appeared on social media of abandoned tanks, and there are unconfirmed reports that conscripts are being told they are going to drill when they are being sent to Ukraine. The now-famous UN speech during which a Russian soldier texts his mother moments before he was killed encapsulates the wide gulf between the soldiers' belief and reality: instead of a quick, painless military campaign during which oppressed Russians would be greeted as heroes, young inexperienced soldiers are facing the horrors of war and a determined adversary.

Military hardware and apparatuses used in Ukraine invasion

The military hardware that has been used thus far has been conventional weaponry and materiel typical of a ground invasion. These weapons have been confirmed in their use in the Ukraine invasion. This list is not exhaustive.

- TOS-1 flamethrower system
- T-72 tanks
- BM-21 “Grad” multiple launch rocket system
- Suspected use: Smerch and Urugan rocket launchers

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34 Cooper, Barnes, & Schmitt, *supra* note 28.
36 Guardian News, *Ukraine’s UN ambassador reads texts from Russian soldier to mother before he was killed*, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qhQ5P_u4g-M.
- BTR3 Tanks
- T80BVM Tanks
- Small-range and medium range ballistic missiles

### Planes

- Su-25 fighter jet
- Su-25SM fighter jet
- Su-34 fighter jet

### Helicopters

- Mi-8 helicopter
- Mi-24 helicopter

### Key Capabilities

#### Military Capabilities

On 21 FEB 2022, President Vladimir Putin ordered military units to invade Ukraine, fully equipped to assault the nation by land, air, and sea. By 25 FEB 2022, between 169,000 and 190,000 Russian personnel had been reported along the border, in Belarus, and in occupied Crimea. The personnel are composed of the Russian National Guard and other internal security units.

#### Land Forces

The Russian Ground Forces have been arriving from Russia and travelling as far as 4,000 miles from the Russian Far East. Russia has 900,000 active-duty troops with 2,000,000 reserve troops, 7,571 artilleries, 30,122 armored vehicles, 12,420 tanks including 151 surface to surface missile launchers at their disposal.

Much of the armor is being brought in by rail, passing through Kursk, approximately 80 miles from the Ukrainian border. Russian vehicles have also

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41 Id.
42 Id.
44 Brown, *supra* note 40.
been arriving by road via Karachev in the Bryansk region.\textsuperscript{45} 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile launchers, replacing the obsolete OTR-21 Tochka systems, are speculated to have been deployed as well.\textsuperscript{46} The Iskander, a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile, has a range of up to 200 miles, using a common transporter-erector launcher and support vehicles. The Iskander system can also fire the 9M728 (R-500, SSC-7) and 9M729 (SSC-8) cruise missiles.\textsuperscript{47} As troops continue to accumulate on the border of Ukraine, they are put on the highest level of readiness to invade.\textsuperscript{48}

**Air Forces**

The Russian Aerospace Forces have been deploying missile strikes, targeting key cities throughout Ukraine.\textsuperscript{49} As a result of failing to capture major cities by land, Aerospace forces have intensified its targeting of civilian areas by the air, striking residential buildings, schools, and hospitals.\textsuperscript{50} The Russian military currently has 544 attack helicopters and 1,511 fighter aircrafts in their position.\textsuperscript{51} Russian warplanes are being used to target Ukrainian military bases.\textsuperscript{52}

Russia is doing what it can to hinder Ukraine from being able to locate its missiles. Barrages of ballistic missiles being shot into Ukraine contain decoys that “trick air-defense radars and fool heat-seeking missiles.”\textsuperscript{53} The devices spanning about a foot in length are shaped like a dart are released by the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). Each device contains electronics and produces radio signals to hinder enemy radars from locating the Iskander-M.\textsuperscript{54} These decoys may cause Ukrainian air-defense weapons to have difficulty intercepting Russia’s missiles.\textsuperscript{55} As of 3 MAR 2022, Russia has fired a total of 600 missiles since it began its invasion of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{56}

**Naval Forces**

\textsuperscript{45} Brown, supra note 40.
\textsuperscript{46} Brown, supra note 40.
\textsuperscript{48} Brown, supra note 40.
\textsuperscript{49} Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, supra note 32.
\textsuperscript{50} Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, supra note 32.
\textsuperscript{51} Comparison of Ukraine and Russia Military Strengths (2022), supra note 43.
\textsuperscript{52} Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, supra note 32.
\textsuperscript{54} Id.
\textsuperscript{55} Id.
\textsuperscript{56} Oren Liebermann, Russia has fired 600 missiles: 95% of amassed combat power now in Ukraine, senior US defense official says, CNN NEWS (Mar. 6, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-putin-news-03-06-22/h_9a75a46d4bfa8041016b60472351f411.
Throughout FEB, Russia held worldwide naval drills spanning from the Atlantic to the Pacific.\textsuperscript{57} These drills involved about 140 ships and support vessels, 60 aircraft, and 10,000 personnel. The Russian Navy stationed vessels capable of landing main battle tanks, personnel, and armored vehicles in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov including six vessels that passed through the English Channel in JAN.\textsuperscript{58} Thirteen of these vessels are equipped with cruise missiles, nine of which are in the Black Sea, and the remaining four are stationed in the Caspian Sea.\textsuperscript{59}

**Special Operations Forces**

The *Spetsnaz*, or “of special purpose/special designation,” remain the primary elite forces of the Russian military.\textsuperscript{60} As part of the military intelligence, Spetsnaz is a strategic asset lent to territorial commands for operational deployment in times of war, subject to the final authority of the General Staff.\textsuperscript{61} Russia has placed the Spetsnaz at the core of Ukraine with a heavy emphasis on Kyiv.\textsuperscript{62} Within the Spetsnaz is the *Zaslon* unit, a unit considered to be the “alpha unit” used for covert missions and specializing in war against terrorism in extreme conditions that can operate far from Russia’s borders.\textsuperscript{63} The *Zaslon* are regarded as the best fighters within the Russian army, specifically selected by the high command. The *Zaslon* is assimilating into civilian populations within Ukraine with the target of penetrating any weak spots to get at Ukraine’s political and military echelon.\textsuperscript{64} These covert assailants are dressing in civilian clothing, causing alarm, and spiking fear in the community, resulting in neighbor accusing neighbor of being a part of the Spetsnaz. As terror continues, it can be predicted that more chaos will ensue.\textsuperscript{65}

**Paramilitary Forces**

The use of mercenaries is regarded as a key feature of the Kremlin’s military strategy around the world.\textsuperscript{66} Russian mercenaries have previous history of fighting in both Syria and Libya.\textsuperscript{67} These mercenary group, Wagner, covertly snuck into

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} Brown, supra note 40.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Brown, supra note 40.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Brown, supra note 40.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Mark Galeotti, *Spetsnaz: Operational Intelligence, Political Warfare, and Battlefield Role*, GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUR. CTR. FOR SEC. STUD. (Feb. 2020), https://www.marshallcenter.org/de/node/1380.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Amir Bohbot/Walla, *Putin’s elite unit’s goal: Spetsnaz seeks to eliminate Ukraine’s leaders*, THE JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.jpost.com/international/article-699165.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Id.
\end{itemize}
territories of Ukraine to lay the groundwork for the invasion. Wagner’s fighters fought in wars in the Middle East and served as security advisers to various governments, including in the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Mali. While loosely tied to the Russian military, it has allowed the Kremlin to deny the use of mercenaries, and instead refer to them as “volunteers.”

As of 23 FEB 2022, there were about 300 in Wagner that arrived in the separatist enclaves of Donetsk and Luhansk. Like the special forces group Zaslon, Wagner arrived in these territories dressed in civilian clothing to remain discreet. The purpose of mercenaries is debated. One official claimed that mercenaries were placed in rebel territories to engage in the conflict to make it appear as if Ukrainian forces were attacking civilian targets. Another official with the Ukrainian military stated that mercenaries arrived two months prior and were used to fill out the ranks of the separatist forces to make it seem like local fighters were leading the charge.

Political Capabilities

President Putin warned that those who interfered with his plans to invade Ukraine would face never-before consequences. So far, Russia’s government is making sure that these words become true. On 3 MAR 2022, the Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption Action approved a draft law that would imprison anyone for spreading false information regarding Russian military operations for up to 15 years. This is an effort to control the narrative of the war and to promote a Soviet-style national unanimity.

The international community has been taking matters into its own hands. Both the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken steps to urge Russia to cease their operations. The UN had three emergency sessions of the Security Council and a meeting of the 193-member General Assembly, all of which calling for the de-escalation of the conflict. The General Assembly voted on a resolution that would command Russia to cease its invasion of Ukraine. The resolution had widespread support.

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68 Schwirtz & Schmitt, supra note 66.
69 Schwirtz & Schmitt, supra note 66.
70 Schwirtz & Schmitt, supra note 66.
71 Schwirtz & Schmitt, supra note 66.
72 Schwirtz & Schmitt, supra note 66.
73 Russia attacks Ukraine as Putin warns countries who interfere will face ‘consequences you have never seen,’ PBS (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-launches-attacks-ukraine-as-putin-warns-countries-who-interfere-consequences-you-have-never-seen.
75 Id.
with only five oppositions coming from Russia, Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and Eritrea. Following Russia’s veto of the resolution, Secretary General, António Guterres, stated to press that “we must never give up” and assured that the UN is scaling up on life-saving support on both sides of the line of contact.

President Putin has already reached out to a few countries asking for additional support including Syria, China, and the Central African Republic.

Additionally, NATO allies have engaged in restrictive measures including sanctions against Russia. (NATO). NATO urged Russia to stop its invasion and asked to “respect international humanitarian law and to allow for the safe and unhindered humanitarian access and assistance to all persons in need.”

NATO held regular consultations with Ukraine in the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) and has enhances existing programs and is developing substantial new programs that are targeted at developing practical support to Ukraine. (NATO). This includes NATO’s assistance of coordinating the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid. Individual member countries are sending weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and other vital military equipment to Ukraine. (NATO). In addition to sending physical resources, many ally countries are opening their borders to Ukrainian refugees seeking refuge from the turmoil.

Economic Capabilities

Russia’s economy has been impacted from almost the start of the formal invasion at the end of FEB. In the response to severe economic sanctions, the Russian ruble’s value has taken a drastic hit. The Russian Bank initially spiked interest rates from 9.5% to 30% and then slowly decreased to 20%. With the currency’s value diminishing, this could lead to ordinary Russian citizens having their entire savings account wiped out. President Putin’s response to the sanctions and the long lines at banks prohibited Russian citizens from transferring any of their funds to outside of Russia in order to ride out the consequences of the sanctions. Russia’s stock market took a heavy loss and officially closed on 25 FEB.

78 Russia blocks Security Council action on Ukraine, supra note 76.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
Russia has about $630bn in reserves built up from soaring oil and gas prices. But due to the money being stored in foreign currencies, the Western ban on dealing with Russia’s central bank restricts access to the cash.

Russian citizens are not only lining up at the ATMs to take out their cash, but also lining up at grocery stores, fearful that some items may become scarce due to trade limitations or price increases. These sanctions are causing a lot more apprehension than previous ones. While citizens are stockpiling supplies, companies started to reduce their working hours or halt production all together because of their inability to access the West.

**Media/Information Capabilities**

Russian authorities have been taking strides to shut down any anti-nationalist sentiments and the spread of “false information” of the invasion in Ukraine. Ekho Moskvya radio station liquidated its channel and website after receiving pressure from the government over its coverage of the invasion. Roskomnadzor, the state media and communications regulator, issued threats and warnings to put pressure on stations such as Ekho Moskvya to take down their reports on Ukraine claiming the information that refers to the events as “an attack,” “invasion,” or “declaration of war” instead of a “special operation” are spreading “false information.” Ekho Moskvya and similar stations considered to report liberal opinions were taken off the air and blocked from being accessed.

People in Russia have been blocked from accessing Facebook while authorities are looking to restrict the use of Instagram as well. The apps’ parent company, Meta, is being accused of being an “extremist organization” by Roskomnadzor and other Russian authorities. This accusation followed Meta temporarily allowing some calls for violence against Russian soldiers. Twitter is becoming more difficult to use, and TikTok is not allowing people in Russia to upload new material. These bans and restrictions are a result of the country passing a law that criminalizes the spread of “false information” regarding the invasion. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other platforms blocked RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik in Europe in compliance with EU sanctions and at the request of other countries supporting Ukraine. The EU’s sanction also extends to traditional broadcast

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89 Hotten, supra note 84.
90 Hotten, supra note 84.
91 Hotten, supra note 84.
92 Coalson, supra note 74.
93 Coalson, supra note 74.
95 Coalson, supra note 74.
96 Shannon Bond & Bobby Allyn, Russia is restricting social media. Here’s what we know, NPR (updated Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/03/07/1085025672/russia-social-media-ban.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
media organizations in Europe. Roskomnadzor stated these restrictions are discriminatory and moved to block these platforms as a response. The ban on Twitter falls under a federal law regulating calls for riots, extremism, protests, and the spread of “false information.”

Russia’s Education Ministry also became involved online and held an “online lesson” for schoolchildren and educators on “why the liberation mission in Ukraine was necessary.” The department, also referred to as the Ministry of Enlightenment, hosted the “All-Russian Open Lesson” that would teach the “danger NATO represents to [Russia]” and “why Russia stood up for the protection of the civilians of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.” The lesson also aims at teaching children how to “distinguish the truth from lies in the huge stream of information, photos, and videos” flooding the internet.

Russian citizens are attempting to outwit the authorities by purchasing virtual private networks (VPNs) to access the blocked platforms and other news sites. The demand for VPNs rose 668% on 3 MAR 2022 from the week prior to the invasion.

Key Organizations

Political Organizations

United Russia

United Russia is the dominant political party in the Russian Federation. United Russia holds 466 of the 620 in Russia’s Federal Assembly. Specifically, 142 of the 170 seats in the Assembly’s upper house, and 324 of the 450 seats in the Assembly’s lower house. United Russia is described as conservative and nationalist. The party strongly supports the policies of President Putin. The Current Chairman is former president Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev also serves as deputy chairman of the security council under chairman and current president Vladimir Putin.

Military Organizations

Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

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100 Bond & Allyn, supra note 96.
101 Bond & Allyn, supra note 96.
102 Bond & Allyn, supra note 96.
103 Coalson, supra note 74.
105 Id.
106 Bond & Allyn, supra note 96.
107 Bond & Allyn, supra note 96.
The military forces of the Russian Federation. Branches include the Russian
Ground Forces, Russian Aerospace Forces, Russian Navy, Russian Airborne
Forces, Russian Strategic Missile Forces, and the Russian Special Operations
Forces.

Economic Organizations

Bank of Russia

The Bank of Russia is the central bank of the Russian Federation. It serves as the
primary regulator of financial markets in Russia and the Russian Ruble. The Bank
of Russia has served as a financial source for the Russian Federation during the
Invasion. The Bank of Russia has been the target of numerous sanctions by the
United States and other countries in efforts to disrupt the funding of the invasion.
The Bank of Russia has been responsible for stabilizing the Russian economy
during the sanctions targeted at the bank and other Russian financial markets.

Gazprom

Gazprom is a Russian energy corporation and one of the largest natural gas
companies in the world. The Russian Federation owns a majority stake in Gazprom.
Gazprom is a primary partner in the Nord Stream gas pipeline that runs from Russia
through Europe.

Key Leaders and Individuals

Key Leader and Individual

I. Vladimir Putin, President of Russia/Supreme Commander-in-Chief/Chairman
of Security Council

Key Military Leaders

I. Sergey Shoigu, Minister of Defense (also a Key Political Leader)
   a. First Deputy Ministers of Defense
      i. Ruslan Tsalikov
      ii. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed
          Forces
   b. Deputy Ministers of Defense
      i. Dmitry Bulgakov
      ii. Pavel Popov
      iii. Gennady Zhidko
      iv. Tatiana Shevtsova
      v. Yuri Sadovenko
      vi. Alexander Fomin
      vii. Timur Ivanov
viii. Yunus-Bek Yevkurov
ix. Nikolay Pankov
x. Aleksey Krivoruchko

II. Col. Gen. Nikolai Bogdanovsky First Deputy Chief of General Staff

III. Admiral Igor Kostyukov, GRU Director
   a. Ground Forces
      i. Oleg Salyukov, Commander in Chief
      ii. Vasily Tonkoshkurov, First Deputy Commander
      iii. Aleksandr Matovnikov, Deputy Commander
   b. Aerospace Forces
      i. Sergey Surovikin, Commander in Chief
      ii. Viktor Afzalov, First Deputy Commander
      iii. Andrey Yudin, Deputy Commander
      iv. Sergey Dronov, Commander/Deputy Commander
   c. Naval Forces
      i. Nikolai Yevmenov, Commander in Chief
      ii. Aleksandr Nosatov, First Deputy Commander
      iii. Vladimir Kasatonov, Deputy Commander in Chief
      iv. Igor Osipov, Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet
   d. National Guard
      i. Victor Zolotov, Commander in Chief

IV. Dmitry Shugaev, Director of Federal Service of Military-Technical Cooperation

V. Alexander Mikheev Director General of Rosoboronexport

Key Political Leaders

I. Security Council of Russia (Permenant, Non-Permanent Members, and those they direct)
   a. Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council
   b. Anton Vaino, Manager of the Presidential Administration
   c. Sergei Ivanov, Special Representative of the President on Issues of Environmental Activities, Ecology and Transport
   d. Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council
      i. Rashid Nurgaliyev, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council
   e. Igor Krasnov, Prosecutor/Attorney General
   f. Mikhail Mishustin, Prime Minister
      i. Andrey Belousov, First Deputy Prime Minister
      ii. Dmitry Grigorenko, Deputy Prime Minister/Chief of Staff of the Government
      iii. Deputy Prime Ministers
         1. Yury Trutnev (also Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to Far Eastern District)
         2. Viktoria Abramchenko
         3. Yury Borisov
4. Dmitry Chernyshenko
5. Tatyana Golikova
6. Marat Khusnullin
7. Alexander Novak
8. Alexey Overchuk

g. Legislature
   i. Valentina Matviyenko, Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly
   ii. Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly
   iii. 351 lawmakers voted in favor of recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk.

h. Intelligence Command
   i. Aleksandr Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service
      1. Sergei Korolev, First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service
      2. Vladimir Kulishov, First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service
   ii. Sergei Naryshkin, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service
   iii. Dmitry Kochnev, Director of the Federal Protective Service

i. Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoys
   i. Yury Trutnev, Far Eastern (also Deputy Prime Minister)
   ii. Igor Shchygolev, Central
   iii. Valdimir Ustinov, Southern
   iv. Aleksandr Gutsan, Northwestern
   v. Anatoly Seryshev, Siberian
   vi. Nikolay Tsukanov, Ural
   vii. Igor Komarov, Volga
   viii. Yury Chaika, North Caucasian

II. Council of Ministers (Most relevant)
   a. Sergey Shoygu, Minister of Defense (also a Key Military Leader)
   b. Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Minister of Internal Affairs
   c. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs
      i. Maria Zakharova, Director of Information and Press Department
   d. Aleksandr Chupriyan, Acting Minister of Emergency Situations
   e. Maxim Reshetnikov, Minister of Economic Development

Key Events and Most Egregious Incidents
Key Leader Biographies

Key Leader and Individual

Name:
VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN

Titles:
President of the Russian Federation
Supreme Commander-in-Chief
Chairman of the Security Council of Russia

Role:
Commanded Russian armed forces to assemble along the Ukrainian-Russian border and gave the order to launch a war of aggression upon the State of Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (“Putin”) was born on 07 OCT 1952, in Leningrad, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union (now Saint Petersburg, Russia). Putin studied law at Leningrad State University and graduated in 1975. In 1975, Putin began his service as a foreign intelligence officer for the Committee for State Security (“KGB”). In total, Putin served as a foreign intelligence officer for the KGB for a period of fifteen years. Putin retired from the KGB in 1990 as a lieutenant colonel.

Following his KGB service, Putin returned to Russia and became the prorector of Leningrad State University. This role required Putin to represent the institution in all external affairs. While at Leningrad State in the role of prorector, Putin reunited with his old tutor, Sobchak, who was, at the time, the first democratically elected mayor of Saint Petersburg. While serving as an advisor to Sobchak, Putin earned the trust and confidence of his boss, earning a reputation for getting things done. Due to this reputation, in 1994, Putin became first deputy mayor.

Two years later, in 1996, Putin moved to Moscow and became a deputy to Pavel Borodin, who was the Kremlin’s chief administrator. Putin was able to make sturdy connections with fellow Leningrad State alumnus, such as Anatoly Chubais, which resulted in Putin being promoted through the administrative ranks. In JUL 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin to the post
of director of the Federal Security Service (“FSB”) (the domestic successor of the KGB). Soon thereafter, Putin became the secretary of the Security Council. At this time, President Yeltsin was looking for someone to assume his duties. Yeltsin had undergone emergency quintuple heart bypass surgery in 1996 followed by the government’s default on its debts which caused the 1998 Russian financial crisis. As a result of Yeltsin’s failures, and Putin’s quick rise, Yeltsin appointed Putin prime minister in 1999.

When he was appointed Prime Minister, Putin was virtually unknown amongst Russian society. However, this quickly changed after he launched a military operation against secessionist groups in Chechnya. The Chechnya operation catapulted Putin’s public-approval ratings and ensured his electoral bloc, Unity, a victory in parliamentary elections.

Yeltsin announced his resignation on 31 DEC 1999 and named Putin the acting president. Putin won the MAR 2000 elections with about fifty-three percent of the vote. The MAR 2000 elections marked the first time that the electoral process was utilized to determine who sat in the Kremlin. Following his electoral victory, Putin suggested unity with political foes when he contemplated adding members of opposition political parties to posts in his government. Among his priorities, Putin sought to end corruption and found a regulated market economy.

Upon his election, Putin divided Russia’s eighty-nine regions and republics into seven federal districts, with each district headed by a representative appointed by the president. Contemporaneously, Putin removed the right of regional governors to sit on the Federation Council, which is the upper house of Russian parliament. Putin also closed several media outlets and initiated criminal proceedings against large figures in the media industry, to reduce the power of financiers and media tycoons.

Putin had a rocky relationship with U.S. President George W. Bush. In 2001, he strongly objected to Bush’s decision to discard the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. However, in response to the attacks of 11 SEPT 2001, Putin pledged Russia’s assistance to the U.S.-led campaign against terrorist organizations. In this assistance, Russia allowed allied forces to utilize Russian airspace for humanitarian deliveries and aided in search-and-rescue operations. However, Putin opposed the U.S. and U.K. use of force to oust the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.

In 2004, Putin was reelected. However, the Russian constitution, at that time, limited the president to serving two consecutive terms. So, from 2008 to 2012, Putin served as prime minister under Dmitry Medvedev. As prime minister under Medvedev, Putin oversaw large-scale military and police reform, as well as the Russo-Georgian War.

Putin was reelected to the presidency in 2012, and again in 2018. In APR 2021, Putin signed a constitutional amendment into law that allowed him to run for reelection two more times.

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Summary of Role:

On 24 FEB 2022, Putin announced that Russian armed forces were launching a “special military operation” in eastern Ukraine. In his speech announcing such an operation, Putin claimed that Russia sought the demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine. Putin falsely claimed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government was a Nazi government and that it was committing genocide against Russian speaking Ukrainians in eastern Ukraine. Within minutes of Putin’s speech, explosions were reported across Ukraine, including in locations such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region.

On 21 FEB 2022, Putin announced that Russia recognized the independence of two-regions, Donetsk and Luhansk.

On 25 JAN 2022, the Russian military conducted exercises that involved 6,000 troops and sixty jets near Ukraine and Crimea. Later, on 10 FEB 2022, Russia and Belarus both began to conduct military maneuvers that lasted for ten-days.

On 10 NOV 2021, the United States reported that Russian troops were moving in an unusual fashion near the Ukrainian border. Ukraine reported 92,000 Russian troops had assembled by 28 NOV 2021.

The situation in Ukraine is complex and Putin’s involvement in such is widespread. In 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine after “little green men,” later identified as Russian actors, seized key facilities and checkpoints in Crimea.

Organizational Membership:

Putin is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland. While Putin is not the official leader of the United Russia party, he is the de facto leader of it and the party fully supports his policies.

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 18 MAR 2022, Putin attended a concert at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow to commemorate the eighth anniversary of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. At that rally, Putin reiterated his false claims that Ukraine was committing genocide against Russian speaking individuals in the Donbas and stated that it was the main reason for the invasion. He also stated that “For a world without Nazism,” Russia “will definitely implement all [of its] plans” in Ukraine.

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Putin in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
During the early hours of 24 FEB 2022, Putin addressed Russia and announced a special military operation against Ukraine. In that speech, Putin stated that NATO expansion into eastern Europe was one catalyst for his invasion of Ukraine.

On 21 FEB 2022, Putin gave a speech in which he recognized the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, two break away regions of Ukraine, as sovereign and independent states.

On 30 SEPT 2015, Putin authorized Russian military intervention in Syria after a formal request from the Syrian regime.

In 2014, under the leadership of Putin, Russia officially annexed Crimea and Sevastopol.
Key Military Leaders

Name: SERGEY SHOYGU (SHOIGU)
Title: Minister of Defense
Role: Under Shoygu’s command and orders Russian troops have held military drills in the illegally annexed Crimea and have been positioned at the border with Ukraine. Shoygu is ultimately responsible for any military action against Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:

Sergey Shoygu (“Shoygu”) was born 21 MAY 1955 in Chadan, Tuva Autonomous Oblast. Shoygu graduated with a civil engineering degree from Krasnoyarsk Polytechnic Institute in 1977. In his younger years, Shoygu worked as an engineer improving emergency and rescue systems for Russia. He also served as a representative in one of the major regional factories. In 1990, he made his way to Moscow and undertook a position with the Government under construction/architecture.

As the collapse of the USSR, there was a need to restructure internal disasters and emergencies. In 1991, he was appointed chief of the Russian Rescue Corps, where he built a team to improve emergency systems within Russia. In 1994, he rose to ministerial-level position, as Minister, he found himself at the front-lines of disasters that consisted of improper infrastructure.

Shoygu held the Ministry of Emergency Services position for roughly 20 years, during this time he garnered the reputation as Russia’s “savior.” In MAY 2012, President Putin appointed Shoygu as Governor of Moscow. Months later in NOV of 2012, Shoygu was appointed as Russia’s Minister of Defense, working to improve military morale and prestige. Shoygu replaced a discredited minister, Anatoliy Serdukov. During his time as Minister of Defense, Shoygu had the challenge of organizational reform. Shoygu has served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States since 2012.

Summary of Role:
The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation is the minister responsible for the Russian Armed Forces.

**Organizational Membership:**

Shoygu is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

28 FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by U.S.

23 FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by E.U. “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

Shoygu’s military has been successful; the capture of Crimea in 2014 and the intervention in Syria a year later.
Name: RUSLAN TSALIKOV
Title: First Deputy Minister of Defense
Role: Deputy to the Minister of Defense, who is responsible for the Russian Armed Forces.

Biographical Summary:

Ruslan Tsalikov (“Tsalikov”) was born on 31 JUL 1956 in Ordzhonikidze (now Vladikavkaz), North Ossetian ASSR. He graduated from North Ossetian State University of K.L. Khetagurov in 1978. From 1978 until 1983, Tsalikov was an intern researcher at the Moscow Institute of National Economy of G.V. Plekhanov. In 1983 he received a degree from the Moscow Institute of National Economy.

From 1983 to 1987, Tsalikov was a lecturer on labour economics and later became a subdean of the Economics Faculty at North Ossetian State University. From 1987 to 1989 he was Economic Affairs General Director, and from 1989 to 1990 Tsalikov worked as Chief Controller of Control-and-Auditing Directorate in the Ministry of Finance of (RSFSR).

From 1990 until 1994, Tsalikov worked as Minister of Finance of North Ossetia. From 1994 to 2000, Tsalikov was the Chief of the Main Financial and Economic Administration under Boris Yeltsin. From 2000 to 2005 he worked for Ministry of Emergency Situations. He was promoted to the State Secretary by Vladimir Putin, a position which he held from 2005 to 2007. In 2010, Tsalikov became a head of Ministry of Emergency Situations.

From MAY to NOV 2012 Tsalikov was the Vice Governor of the Moscow Region. He was made Acting Governor of Moscow Region on 6 NOV 2012 and served until 8 NOV 2012, when he was replaced by current Governor Andrei Vorobyov. On 15 NOV 2012, Tsalikov was promoted to Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.
In DEC 2015, by decree of the Russian President, Tsalikov was appointed the First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation.

**Summary of Role:**

Deputy to the Minister of Defense, who is responsible for the Russian Armed Forces.

**Organizational Membership:**

Unknown

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Name:
VALERY VASILYEVICH GERASIMOV
Title:
First Deputy Minister of Defense
Chief of the General Staff
Role:
Top uniformed member of the Russian military and commands the entirety of Russia’s armed forces.

Biographical Summary:
Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov (“Gerasimov”) was born on 8 SEPT 1955, in Kazan, Tatar ASSR, Soviet Union. From 1971 to 1973, Gerasimov attended the Kazan Suvorov Military School. From 1973 to 1977, he attended the Kazan Higher Tank Command School. Following his studies at the Kazan Higher Tank Command School, Gerasimov was assigned to the post of commander of a Mechanized Infantry platoon, company, and battalion of the Far Eastern Military District. From 1993 to 1995, Gerasimov was the commander of the 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division in the Baltic Military District.

From 1984 to 1987, Gerasimov studied at the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy. Finally, from 1995 to 1997, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. Following his graduation from the General Staff academy, Gerasimov served as the First Deputy Army Commander within the Moscow Military District as well as the commander of the 58th Army in the North Caucasus Military District during the Second Chechen War.

In 2006, Gerasimov became the commander of the Leningrad Military District before being moved to command the Moscow Military District in 2009. On 23 DEC 2010, Gerasimov became the deputy Chief of the General Staff. In 2012, he was assigned to command the Central Military District. On 6 NOV 2012, Gerasimov was appointed Chief of the General Staff.
In FEB 2013, Gerasimov published an article titled “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight” in the Russian trade-paper *Military-Industrial Kurier*. In this article, Gerasimov laid out a new theory of modern warfare. According to *Politico*, this new theory, known as the Gerasimov Doctrine, “took tactics developed by the Soviets, blended them with strategic military thinking about total war, and laid out a new theory of modern warfare—one that looks more like hacking an enemy’s society than attacking it head-on.” Gerasimov wrote: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness . . . [a]ll this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character.”

Gerasimov has been awarded the “Hero of the Russian Federation” award, which is given to individuals who provide extraordinary service to the state.

**Summary of Role:**

As the Chief of the General Staff, Gerasimov is the highest-ranking officer of the Russian Armed Forces and the senior-most uniformed military officer. This position is comparable to the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Organizational Membership:**

Head of the General Staff.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 25 FEB 2022, the United States added Gerasimov to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Gerasimov.

On 23 DEC 2021, Gerasimov held a meeting with Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the British Chief of the Defense Staff to discuss regional security issues.

On 9 DEC 2021, Gerasimov issued a warning to the government of Ukraine against trying to settle the war in the Donbas through the utilization of force. He said that “information about Russia’s alleged impending invasion of Ukraine is a lie.” Gerasimov went on to say “Kyiv is not fulfilling the Minsk Agreements. The Ukrainian armed forces are touting that they have started to employ US-supplied Javelin anti-tank missile systems in [Donbas] and are also using Turkish reconnaissance/strike drones. As a result, the already tense situation in the east of that country is further deteriorating.”

In MAY 2014, Canada, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland levied sanctions against Gerasimov for interference in Ukraine and for his responsibility for the deployment of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border. In SEPT 2014, Australia added Gerasimov to their sanctions list as well.

In APR 2014, the European Union levied sanctions against Gerasimov for “actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”
Biographical Summary:

Dmitry Bulgakov ("Bulgakov"), born 20 OCT 1954. He joined the army in 1972 and studied at the Volsk Higher Military School of Logistics. Between 1982-1984 he graduated from the Military Academy of Logistics and Transport. In 1992, he became a Major General. From 1994-1996, he also studied from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, after in 1996 he was promoted to lieutenant general.

From 1996-1997, Bulgakov served in many roles such as, Deputy Commander for logistics, Deputy Chief of logistics of Trans-Baikal Military District and Chief of logistics staff of the Moscow Military District. From 1997-2008, he served as Chief of Staff of Logistics of the Armed Forces of Russia, in 2008 he became Colonel General. From 2 DEC 2008 to 27 JUL 2010, he was promoted to the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense. In FEB 2011, he was given the rank of Army General.

From 2015-17, Bulgakov oversaw issues relating to a railway that would bypass Ukraine and since 2015 he was in charge of supplying Russian troops in Syria. In 2019 he led the Operational Group of the Russian Ministry of Defense for multiple forest fires.

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Name: 
PAVEL ANATOLYEVICH POPOV
Title: 
Deputy Minister of Defense
Role: 

Biographical Summary:

Pavel Anatolyevich Popov ("Popov") was born 1 JAN 1957, in Krasnoyarsk. In 1978 graduated from Alma-Ata Higher Combined Arms Command School. After he served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany of the Soviet Army. In 1986, he transferred to the Far Eastern Military District as a commander. In 1990, he graduated from Frunze Military Academy. After his graduation from 1990-93, he served as Chief of Staff, deputy commander of the civil defense regiment of the Central Asian Military District. From 1993-96, he served as First Deputy Head of the East Siberian Regional Center of the EMERCOM of Russia. Years later in 1999, he became Head of the Siberian Regional center of the EMERCOM of Russia. During his time as Head, he supervised rescue operations, delivering humanitarian cargo and construction materials, extinguishing fires and other emergencies.

12 JUN 2004, Popov was awarded the military rank of Colonel General. That same year, he was appointed head of the Civil Protection Academy of the Russian Emergencies Ministry, until 2008. From 2008-2013, he was Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations. In 2013, he was appointed Deputy Minister and he oversaw the creation of the National Center for Defense Management of Russia.

13 NOV 2013 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense and became a member of the Russian Ministry Defense. In DEC 2015, he was promoted to General of the Army. OCT 2020, Popov was sanctioned by the EU for connections of poisoning Alexei Navalny.

Summary of Role:
Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
Biographical Summary:

Gennady Zhidko (“Zhidko”) was born on 12 SEPT 1965 in Yangiabad, Uzbekistan. In 1987, he graduated from the Tashkent Higher Tank Command School. Zhidko served in the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga and Volga-Ural Military Districts (Totskoye, Totsky District, Orenburg Oblast). Zhidko rose from platoon commander to division commander, was promoted to captain, and then to colonel. He received awards for organizing fire training from the commander of the Ural Military District, Colonel-General Alexander Baranov. Zhiko was also the commander of the 92nd motorized rifle regiment (Dushanbe, Tajikistan).

In 1997, Zhidko graduated from the Military Academy of Armored Forces. In 2007, he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

From AUG 2007 to JUL 2009, Zhidko was the Commander of the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the North Caucasian Military District, based in Volgograd. During his tenure, he continued the work of Major General Aleskandr Lapin to establish trusting relationships with military groups, improve combat and technical training.

From JUL 2009 to JAN 2011, Zhidko was the Deputy Commander of the 20th Guards Army of Moscow, then Western Military Districts with headquarters in Voronezh. From JAN 2011 to JAN 2012 he was Chief of Staff First Deputy Commander of the 6th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District, based in Saint Petersburg. Zhidko participated in the formation of this unit.
From JAN 2015 to SEPT 2016, Zhidko was Chief of Staff First Deputy Commander of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army. From SEPT 2016 to NOV 2017 he was Commander of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District with headquarters in Samara. The army under his tenure repeatedly took part in surprise exercises and checks. During the Zapad 2017 Exercise, the army units were deployed from Samara to the Kola Peninsula.


Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

Unknown

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Name:
TATIANA SHEVTSOVA
Title:
Deputy Minister of Defense
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Tatiana Shevtsova (“Shevtsova”) was born on 22 JUL 1969 in Kozelsk, USSR. Shevtsova attended and later graduated from Leningrad Institute of Finance and Economics in 1991. From that year on Shevtsova worked as a tax collector for the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation. Shevtsova was appointed deputy manager of the Federal Tax Service in 2004. In MAY 2010, Shevtsova was appointed adviser to the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation. On 4 AUG 2010, she was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, with responsibility for finances, under a Presidential Decree. Shevtsova is entrusted with supervising the military-economic bloc and the financing of armed forces. Forbes Russia included Shevtsova on a list of the top richest siloviki (state and military administration officials) of Russia (13th place in 2013).

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership: Unknown

Incidents and Events of Note:
Biographical Summary:

Yuri Sadovenko (“Sadovenko”) was born on 11 SEP 1969, in Zhytomyr, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Sadovenko graduated from Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School in 1990 and the same year began serving in the Russian Armed Forces where he was a participant in combat operations. Four years later Sadovenko served at the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM). There, Sadovenko rescued and provided humanitarian aid until 2002. From 2002 to 2007 he was the Assistant to the Minister at EMERCOM. In 2007, he became the Head of the Office of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. In 2012 he became the Head of the Executive Office of Moscow Oblast. On JAN 2013 Sadovenko was appointed a Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Supervisor of the Apparatus of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Sadovenko is a Colonel General.

Summary of Role:

Deputy Defense Ministers are a part of the principal staff and advisory board of the Minister of Defense.

Organizational Membership:


Incidents and Events of Note:
On 18 MAR 2022, Sadovenko was sanctioned by Japan as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Name: ALEXANDER FOMIN  
Title: Deputy Minister of Defense  
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Alexander Fomin (“Fomin”) was born on 25 May 1959 in Leninogorsk, Russia. In 1984 Fomin graduated from the Military Institute of the Red Banner of the Ministry of Defense. Fomin’s awards include the Order of Honour, Order of Friendship, and the Jubilee Medal 50 Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. He has been serving as Deputy Minister of Defense since 2017.

Summary of Role:

Deputy Defense Ministers are a part of the principal staff and advisory board of the Minister of Defense.

Organizational Membership:

Russian Federation

Incidents and Events of Note:

Unknown
Name: TIMUR IVANOV
Title: Deputy Minister of Defense
Role:

Biographical Summary:
Timur Ivanov (“Ivanov”) was born on 15 August 1975 in Moscow. His father is Vadim Gennadyevich, the general director of Crystal Development LLC since 2004. In 1997, Ivanov graduated from the Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics of the Moscow State University. From 1997 to 1999, he worked in various commercial organizations. From 1999 to 2012, he worked at enterprises of the fuel and energy complex of Russia. He holds his academic degree: a candidate of economic sciences (dissertation “Financial and organizational models of NPP construction projects” which he defended in 2011. In 2012, he served as Deputy Prime Minister of the Moscow Oblast, under Governor Sergey Shoygu. From 2013 to 2016, he was the General Director of Oboronstroy JSC, a subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defense. On 23 May 2016, by decree of the President of Russia, Ivanov was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia. During the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia in 2020, he supervised the construction of 16 multifunctional medical centers of the Ministry of Defense for the treatment of patients with COVID-19.

Summary of Role:
In his position in the Ministry of Defense, Ivanov oversees issues related to property management and quartering of troops, housing, and medical support of the Russian Armed Forces, and is responsible for the construction, reconstruction and overhaul of facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defense and military mortgages.

Organizational Membership:
The Ministry of Defense.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 18 MAR 2022, Japan placed sanctions on Ivanov as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Biographical Summary:

Yunus-Bek Bamatgireyevich Yevkurov (“Yevkurov”), an ethnic Ingush, was born on 23 JUL 1963 in Tarskoye village, Prigorodny District, North Ossetian ASSR, Soviet Union, into a peasant family of 12 children. He has five sisters and six brothers. He graduated from School Number One (SNO) in the town of Beslan, North Ossetia, an autonomous republic in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. Yevkurov married Mareta Yevkurova on 23 DEC 2007. The couple have five children; their first son was born on 1 NOV 2008. He is a career soldier, paratrooper, and Hero of the Russian Federation who was involved in numerous conflicts where Russia played a key role, including Kosovo (1999) and Chechnya.

Yevkurov was conscripted into the Soviet Army in 1982, serving in the Naval Infantry of the Pacific Fleet. In 1989, he graduated from the Ryazan School of Airborne Troops. Yevkurov continued his military education, graduating from the Frunze Military Academy in 1997 and from the General Staff Academy in 2004.

In JUN 1999, Yevkurov was stationed in the Bosnian town of Ugljevik with the Russian peacekeepers under the auspices of SFOR. On 12 JUN, he led a task force on a swift 500-km-long march, which aimed to secure the Pristina International Airport ahead of the NATO troops, thus ensuring a Russian presence in Kosovo after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. This led to a standoff with NATO troops.

Yevkurov has had various positions of command within the Russian Airborne Troops and has participated in counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus. During the course of the Second
Chechen War in 2000, he was in command of the 217th Guards Airborne Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division). While on a reconnaissance mission, Yevkurov’s team discovered a house where a group of captured Russian soldiers was held. Having neutralized the guards and infiltrated the building, the team was surrounded by Chechen reinforcements, resulting in armed combat. The Russian troops were able to break through the encirclement while Yevkurov was providing cover for the evacuation of the wounded. He personally carried a soldier to safety despite sustaining an injury himself. Twelve imprisoned soldiers were rescued. On 13 APR 2000, Yevkurov was presented with the Hero of Russia award for his courage, the country’s highest title of honor.

In 2004, Yevkurov was appointed to be the Intelligence Division Deputy Commander of the Volga-Urals Military District.

On 30 OCT 2008, Yevkurov replaced the highly unpopular Murat Zyazikov when President Dmitry Medvadev appointed him as the head of Ingushetia. The following day, the People’s Assembly of the Republic of Ingushetia, the republic’s regional unicameral parliament voted in favor of Yevkurov’s appointment, making him the third Head of Ingushetia. Zyazikov’s dismissal and Yevkurov’s appointment were received with much enthusiasm from the Ingush population. As head of Ingushetia, he was reportedly able to stabilize the crime situation and bring about positive social changes within the Russian republic.

On 22 JUN 2009, Yevkurov was seriously injured following a car-bomb attack on his motorcade in the city of Nazran. In the incident, a Toyota Camry filled with explosives rammed Yevkurov’s convoy in what was believed to be a suicide bomb attack. One escorting policeman died on the spot; Yevkurov’s driver and cousin Ramzan died a few days later in a hospital. Yevkurov’s brother Uvais was among the injured. Yevkurov suffered a ruptured liver, a severe concussion, and several cracked ribs, but was expected to survive following surgery. Yevkurov was then airlifted to a hospital in Moscow and was sent to intensive care with damage to his skull and internal organs. He regained consciousness from a coma two weeks after the attack. Yevkurov was released from the hospital in Moscow on 12 AUG 2009, more than seven weeks after the attack, but continued to receive rehabilitation. Speaking to reporters upon leaving the hospital, Yevkurov warned that "those who refuse to lay down their arms and surrender will be killed." In a radio interview on 17 AUG 2009, Yevkurov accused the United States, Great Britain and Israel of being behind the destabilization of the North Caucasus in order to "prevent Russia from reviving the former Soviet might."

Though no group claimed responsibility, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev accused Islamist militants of carrying out the attack, condemning the "terrorist attack". Speaking on Russian television, Medvedev claimed that Yevkurov "did a lot to restore order ... and the bandits obviously didn’t like that kind of activity". Russian news agency RIAN, quoting an unnamed Kremlin source, reported that executive authority in Ingushetia was temporarily transferred to the prime minister, Rashid Gaisanov, who became acting Head by Russian presidential decree. Gaisanov remained the acting head of Ingushetia until Yevkurov returned to office in SEP 2009.

After the attack, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed the Kremlin had ordered him to fight insurgents in Ingushetia, and during his subsequent visit to Ingushetia on 24 JUN pledged to revenge ruthlessly. On 4 JUL, a convoy of Chechen troops sent by Kadyrov into Ingushetia in
response to the suicide bombing was ambushed by militants. The attack caused nine Chechen deaths, with 10 others severely wounded. On 9 JUL, Ingushetia’s Interior Ministry announced the arrest of several suspects, including the Chechen rebel commander Rustaman Makhauri, allegedly involved in the attack on Yevkurov.

In SEP 2018, Yevkurov and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov signed a border agreement following secret negotiations, prompting activists in Ingushetia to claim the pact was invalid because it represented an illegal transfer of territory to Chechnya. Because of the deal, Yevkurov’s popularity in the region plunged dramatically. Several mass protests in Ingushetia against the deal were violently dispersed by police and dozens of people were detained and later fined or jailed. Some protesters faced criminal charges. Ingush opponents of the deal claimed that Ingush land was being unjustly handed over to Chechnya, whose strongman leader Kadyrov had been accused of interfering in the affairs of neighboring Ingushetia and Daghestan.

Yevkurov resigned on 24 JUN 2019 after months of controversy and amid ongoing tensions in Ingushetia sparked by the controversial border deal/land swap agreement with Chechnya.

Yevkurov was appointed a deputy defense minister of Russia by President Vladimir Putin on 8 JUL 2019. In this decree, Putin also promoted Yevkurov from major general to lieutenant general.

On 8 DEC 2021, he was further promoted to colonel general.

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

United Russia

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Biographical Summary:

Nikolay Aleksandrovich Pankov (‘Pankov’) was born on 2 DEC 1954 in the village of Maryino, Kady district of the Kostroma Oblast region, RSFSR, USSR, and has been the Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of the Defense of the Russian Federation since 13 SEP 2005. He is the General of the Reserve Army and has received several military awards. He was educated at the FSB Academy, has a PhD in Law, and is an Associate Professor. He is married and has a son and a daughter.

In 1974 Pankov enlisted for military service in the Armed Forces. He served in the border troops of the USSR, in the North-Western border district. After being transferred to the reserve in 1976, he served on the USSR State Security Committee. He graduated from the Higher School of the KGB of the USSR named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky in 1980, and in 1989 he completed postgraduate studies.

In 1994 Pankov became the Academic Secretary of the Academy of the FSB of Russia. In 1997-1998 he was Head of the Department of Affairs of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation. In 1998 he was also appointed as Chief of Staff of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

In APR 2001, along with Sergei Ivanov, Pankov was transferred to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation where he assumed the post of head of the Department of Affairs of the

By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 12 JUN 2004, Pankov was awarded the military rank of General of the Army. In OCT 2004, he was appointed head of the Personnel and Educational Work Service of the Ministry of Defense, and in SEP 2005 he became Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defense - Deputy Minister of Defense. He was in charge of the Main Directorate of Personnel, the Main Directorate of Educational Work, and the Main Directorate of the Civil Service of the Ministry of Defense of Russia. In this position, Pankov carries out general management of the Military University, the Military Institute of Physical Culture and a number of pre-university educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Under the leadership of Pankov, 40 higher military universities were reduced, and the main blow was dealt to those of them that trained the most high-tech personnel for the Russian army. At the same time, the teaching staff of military universities was reduced seven times. The main motive for such a reorganization of military education is the release and subsequent sale of buildings belonging to military universities. During Pankov’s tenure, 200,000 officers were also dismissed from the army. This reduction in the personnel of the Russian Armed Forces reportedly cost the state 1.65 trillion rubles.

On 30 MAR 2009, Pankov was dismissed from reserve military service and transferred to the category of federal civil servant, while retaining the position of Secretary of State - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. On 17 JUN 2011, he was awarded the highest class rank of a state federal employee - Active State Councilor of the Russian Federation, 1st class, a promotion from Acting State Councilor of the Russian Federation, 2nd class which he received 30 APR 2010.

In DEC 2010, the Ministry of Defense entered into an agreement with Neviss-Komplekt LLC for the transfer of funds and expositions of the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg from the Stock Exchange building on the Spit of Vasilyevsky Island to the Kryukov barracks on Labor Square. The museum’s move to the new building was supervised by State Secretary Pankov. In DEC 2012, the Main Military Investigation Department found out that a majority of the payment was made on the basis of fictitious reporting documents. Pankov signed the work acceptance certificate for the building, although the work was barely half completed. Without Pankov’s signature the criminals could not have access to the money. At that stage of the investigation, it was revealed that those actions caused damage to the state in the amount of more than 400 million rubles. Many involved in the scam received real prison terms, yet Pankov was not convicted, despite the fact that the defendants called him a key participant in the scam. Pankov was however obliged to reimburse about 600 million rubles through court proceedings.

Nikolai Pankov is one of the few who has retained the post of Deputy Minister of Defense after the dismissal of Anatoly Serdyukov and the appointment of Sergei Shoigu to the post of Russian Defense Minister in NOV 2012. Pankov also played a key role in Defense Minister Anatoly
Serdyukov’s dacha scandal near Anapa. Pankov went to Anapa and convinced city deputies to transfer a site within the Krasnodar Territory to the Ministry of Defense, allegedly for the construction of a radar station, claiming without which "the country’s defense will fall." The deputies allocated the land, but instead of the radar station, a 600m² residential building with a swimming pool and a boathouse for yachts was built. Retired Russian military Col. Viktor Baranets claimed “A whole railway troops battalion or two were used to build the road to that dacha. Hundreds of spruce and fir trees and thousands of lawn rolls were flown there from Moscow as hundreds of ordinary conscript soldiers were used as slave labor to plant all that. A whole defense ministry plane full of Spanish-made furniture was flown from Spain to equip that dacha.”

Since 15 APR 2015 Pankov has been the head of the Supervisory Board of the Central Sports Club of the Army. From 2015 to 2018, he oversaw the All-Russian Military Patriotic Public Movement.

After the creation in 2018 of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which was headed by the Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov, part of the military command and control bodies for which Pankov was responsible, passed to him, while the Main Directorate of Personnel and the Directorate of Physical training and sports remained with Pankov.

On 1 JUL 2021, President Vladimir Putin appointed State Secretary - Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Nikolai Pankov as his official representative at the ratification by the State Duma and the Federation Council of the agreement on the establishment of a logistics point for the Russian Navy in Sudan. On 1 JUN 2021, Sudan announced the revision of the agreement with the Russian Federation on the establishment of a base on the Red Sea.

**Summary of Role:**

**Organizational Membership:**

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Biographical Summary:

Aleksey Yurievich Krivoruchko (“Krivoruchko”) was born on 17 JUL 1975 in Stavropol. He is the Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation with the overall responsibility for armaments. This includes the oversight of the Ministry’s stocks of weapons and military equipment. He is also responsible for their elimination within the framework of the implementation of international treaties assigned to the Ministry of Defense. The Russian Ministry of Defense took on the responsibility for the chemical weapons stocks inherited from the Soviet Union and their safe storage until their destruction could be completed.

In DEC 2019, in an exclusive conversation with Olga Belova, host of the TV program “The Main”, Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Alexei Krivoruchko spoke of the Russian army’s modernization and future challenges. Krivoruchko stressed that in 2020 the Russian Army must reach a more than 70% level of modernity. The most important field of development is the nuclear triad. “We will continue to rearm our army with ‘RS-24 Yars’,” he said. The Navy’s development would continue and “the Navy will probably receive the biggest impetus, precisely in the part of the ships of the long-range maritime zone,” Krivoruchko stated. “Of course there were difficulties [in 2019], they remain and will always be. One can also say that the 2019 state defense orders were fulfilled by more than 99%. All the main tasks that awaited the Ministry of Defense and industry are fully completed. And this allowed us to bring the level of modernity in the Armed Forces to ... more than 68%. Therefore, we can say with confidence that the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces have been completed.”

When asked about the sphere of the defense industry in the coming year, Krivoruchko said, “The challenges of 2020 are also difficult. We must reach the
level of modernity surpassing 70%. This goal was reflected in the President’s May decrees. I have no doubt that we will achieve these indicators. As for some of the most important areas, it is hard to highlight something. ... I would like to note first everything that concerns our nuclear triad. We will also continue rearmament. We have the highest rate of modernity here. ... We will continue to rearm our army with ‘RS-24 Yars’. ... One of the most significant news, which will await us in the year 2020 is the development of the Navy. We will continue to build, and we will lay [the keel] for eight additional ships. Also, additional contracts will be signed at the ‘Army of Russia’ forum. Therefore, probably, the Navy will receive the biggest impetus, precisely in the part of the ships of the long-range maritime zone.”

When asked about hypersonic and laser weapons, and if it was correct to to say the one who has these weapons will control the world, Krivoruchko said, “Indeed, these are the areas of the highest priority in all the armies of the modern world. If we start with laser weapons, we already (as the president and the defense minister said) have such weapons in service. I’m talking about the ‘Peresvet’ complexes. But this is not the only system that we are developing, which will soon go into service. I must say that this is one of the highest priority areas. And all the works are in a full swing. And, I think, in the near future we will show something.”

When asked about the nuclear triad, Krivoruchko said, “All this is important and requires efforts, one might say the same amount of it. As for nuclear weapons, this is certainly a priority. Here, everything goes smoothly. Laser weapons are also an important area. Hypersound - as you already know, we are here at the forefront. Complexes such as the ‘Dagger’ are already in service. ‘Zircon’ is already in service with the Armed Forces then, in the near future, the tests will all be completed...”

When asked about Russia’s foreign policy situation and its effect on defense, Krivoruchko said, “Of course, we are following this issue closely. And there were attempts, including sanctions, to influence it [state defense order]. That is no secret, literally 5-7 years ago a lot of foreign equipment and components were used in our armament (engines, component base). Today there are no such problems. The import substitution process has been fully completed. We do not have a single supply disruption due to import substitution, therefore, they [sanctions] have no effect on [state defense order] today. But, of course, there were such attempts. Precisely for that sanctions were imposed against the military-industrial complex. Our industry dealt with them, and in the process was able to gain new expertise, new areas [of competency]. …” “You can definitely say ... that all the equipment that goes to the Armed Forces is modern technology. This is true for all types of troops: the technology of the REP troops, aviation, the navy, land equipment. All weapons are not only at the level of the analogs of other countries, but are well superior to them. And this is also not a secret: the operation in Syria showed it. It is therefore quite clear: We have modern, complex and efficient systems. [They are] significantly cheaper than other countries’ models. …”
Given his senior leadership role in the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, an EU Journal claimed Aleksei Yurievich Krivoruchko was responsible for assisting the persons who carried out or were involved in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with the Novichok nerve agent, which constitutes a use of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. On 20 AUG 2020, Navalny was taken seriously ill and admitted to a hospital in Omsk, Russian Federation. On 22 AUG 2020, he was transported to a hospital in Berlin, Germany. A specialized laboratory in Germany subsequently found clear evidence, also corroborated by laboratories in France and Sweden, that Alexei Navalny had been poisoned with a toxic nerve agent of the Novichok group. This toxic agent is accessible only to State authorities in the Russian Federation. As a consequence of the overall responsibility of the Ministry of Defense for the safe storage and destruction of chemical weapons, the use of such chemical weapons in the territory of the Russian Federation could only be as a result of intent or negligence by the Ministry of Defense and its political leadership.

On 4 SEPT 2021 Vietnamese Defense Minister General Phan Van Giang received Russian Deputy Defense Minister Aleksey Yurievich Krivoruchko in Hanoi on the occasion of his attending the closing ceremony of the “Sniper Frontier” and “Emergency Area” contests of the Army Games 2021 in Vietnam. At the reception, General Giang highlighted the time-honored friendship between the two countries and emphasized that Vietnam always attaches much importance to strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia and considers it a top priority in the country’s foreign policy. The Vietnamese defense minister said that over the past time, leaders of the two countries have paid attention to fostering defense cooperation, thus creating a momentum to expand the bilateral cooperation in other fields. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the two defense ministries have actively supported each other in their pandemic fight.

General Phan Van Giang also took the occasion to thank Russia for assisting Vietnam in combating the COVID-19 pandemic. He also highlighted the outcomes of bilateral defense ties over the past time, especially in delegation exchanges, training, cooperation among units and support at regional mechanisms and forums. General Giang reaffirmed that Vietnam will support Russia’s hosting of the Army Games and actively participate in the event to strengthen friendship and defense cooperation with participating countries.

For his part, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Aleksey Yurievich Krivoruchko congratulated the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) on successfully hosting the “Sniper Frontier” and “Emergency Area” contests within the Army Games 2021 and hoped that the VPA will continue supporting and participating in the Army Games 2022.

After the reception, the Vietnamese defense minister and Russian deputy defense minister toured the Cultural Space, the Weaponry and Military Equipment Exhibition Area, and sidelines activities of the Army Games, before attending the closing ceremony.

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Name: NIKOLAI VASILYEVICH BOGDANOVSKY
Title: First Deputy of the General Staff
Role:

Biographical Summary:


In 1978, Bogdanovsky joined the Soviet Army, where he served as a reconnaissance platoon commander, company commander, chief of staff of a motorized rifle battalion, commander of a motorized rifle battalion in the Southern Group of Forces in Hungary from 1978 to 1984. From 1987 to 1994, Bogdanovsky was the chief of staff of fortified areas, commander of a motorized rifle regiment, and chief of staff of a motorized rifle division.

From 1996 to 2006, he was the Chief of the 392nd Pacific Center for Training Junior Specialists of Motorized Rifle Forces. He also served, during this time, as the Chief of Staff and Commander of the 35th Army.

Between JUN 2006 and JAN 2008, Bogdanovsky was the Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern Military District. Following this post, from JAN 2008 to MAR 2009, he was the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.
Between 24 MAR 2009 and 9 JAN 2011, Bogdanovsky was the Commander of the Leningrad Military District. On 9 JAN 2011, Putin issued a decree that appointed Bogdanovsky to the post of Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training.

On 13 DEC 2012, Bogdanovsky was promoted to the rank of Colonel General. Following this promotion, he became the commander of the Central Military District; a position he held until 12 JUN 2014. On 12 JUN 2014, Putin once again promoted Bogdanovsky by Decree of the President, this time to the position of First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. Between 29 SEPT 2015 and 1 OCT 2015, Bogdanovsky took part in negotiations on coordination of actions with the Israel Defense Forces during Russia’s military intervention in Syria.

**Summary of Role:**

Disseminates the Commander-in-Chief’s policies, transmits his orders, and oversees the execution of such orders.

**Organizational Membership:**

Bogdanovsky is a member of the General Staff.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

For his involvement in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Bogdanovsky was included in a Canadian sanctions list.
Name:
IGOR OLEGOVICH KOSTYUKOV
Title:
Director of Russian Military Intelligence
Role:
Heads the main intelligence department of the Russian General Staff and provides the military with intelligence.

Biographical Summary:
Igor Olegovich Kostyukov ("Kostyukov") was born on 21 FEB 1961 in Amur Oblast, RSFSR, USSR. On 22 NOV 2018, he was appointed the acting Director of the Russian General Staff’s Main Intelligence Department (GBU) following the death of Igor Korobov, who had held the role prior. In 2019, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral. Kostyukov is the first naval officer to hold the office of the Director of the GBU. While not much information is available on Kostyukov, it has been noted that he is a hardliner. He has been awarded the “Hero of Russian Federation” award.

Summary of Role:
Unknown.

Organizational Membership:
Kostyukov was a member of both the Soviet and Russian Navies. He currently is an Admiral in the Russian Navy. Additionally, he is the Director of Russian Military Intelligence.

Incidents and Events of Note:
In MAR 2022, the European Union placed him on its “blacklist.”
Following the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, Kostyukov was placed on the U.S.’s “blacklist” for allegedly interfering in the elections.
Name:
OLEG LEONIDOVICH SALYUKOV
Title:
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces
Role:
Heads and commands the entirety of the Russian ground forces

Biographical Summary:

Oleg Leonidovich Salyukov ("Salyukov") was born on 21 MAY 1955 in Saratov, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1977, Salyukov graduated from the Ulyanovsk Guards Higher Tank Command School with a gold medal. In 1985, he graduated from the Malinovsky Military Armored Forces Academy with high honors. In 1996, Salyukov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

In MAY 2014, Salyukov was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces. In 2019, he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army.

Summary of Role:

Commanded the entirety of Russia’s ground forces during the invasion of Ukraine.

Organizational Membership:

From 1977 to 1982, Salyukov held the positions of (i) platoon officer, (ii) company officer, and (iii) Chief of the staff for the Battalion Commander in the Kyiv Military District.

From 1985 to 1994, he held the positions of (i) Deputy Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, (ii) Commander of a Training Tank Regiment, and (iii) Deputy Commander of a Guards tank division in the Moscow Military District.
From 1994 to 1997, he held the positions of (i) Commander of the 81st Guards Motor Rifle Division, (ii) Chief of the staff and Army Commander (35th Army), and (iii) Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District.

From 2005 to 2008, he served as the Chief of the Staff-First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District.

From 2008 to 2010, he held the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Military District.

From 2010 to 2014, he was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

From MAY 2014 to the present, Salyukov holds the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 23 FEB 2022, the E.U. added Salyukov to its sanction list for being “responsible for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”
Name:
VASILY PETROVICH TONKOSHKUROV
Title:
First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces
Role:
Advises and assists Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, in military decisions and tactics.

Biographical Summary:

Vasily Petrovich Tonkoshkurov (“Tonkoshkurov”) was born on 27 JAN 1960 in Karaganda, Kazakh SSR, USSR. He joined the Soviet Armed Forces in 1977. In 1981, he graduated from the General VI Lenin Higher Military School in Tashkent. From OCT 1983 to DEC 1985, Tonkoshkurov was in the 371st motorized battalion. He was injured while involved in the Soviet-Afghan War.

In 1990, he graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Between FEB 2000 and JUL 2000, he was involved in the Second Chechen War.

In 2004, Tonkoshkurov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff with a gold medal. Beginning in JUL 2004, he commanded the 19th motorized division of the North Caucasus region. In JUN 2008, Tonkoshkurov was assigned to the post of first deputy commander of the 42st army of the Siberian region. On 11 JUN 2009, he was assigned as commander of the 42st Siberian army.

Between OCT 2013 and MAY 2018, Tonkoshkurov was the deputy commander of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In MAY 2018, Tonkoshkurov was appointed to the post of deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces.

Summary of Role:

Advises and assists the commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics.
Organizational Membership:

Tonkoshkurov has been in the military since 1977. He has served both the Soviet Union and Russian Federation.

Incidents and Events of Note:

In MAR 2019, Tonkoshkurov accompanied and led 100 Russian soldiers in an envoy to Venezuela to discuss equipment maintenance, training, and strategy with the Maduro regime.
Name:
ALEKSANDR (ALEXANDER) ANATOLYEVICH MATOVNIKOV
Title:
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces
Role:
Advises and assists Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces, and Vasily Tonkoshkurov, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, in military decisions and tactics.

Biographical Summary:

Aleksandr Anatolyevich Matovnikov (“Matovnikov”) was born on 19 SEPT 1965 in Moscow. In 1982, he began attending the Higher Border Military-Political School of the KGB and graduated in 1986. Upon graduation, he began his service in KGB group “A.”

During his KGB service, Matovnikov was a member of a motorized group operating under the cover of operational units of border troops during the Soviet-Afghan war. Additionally, he held the positions of the head of the 2nd department of the 1st department of Department “A” and the first deputy head of Department “A.” In 1987, he was a member of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s security detail during a state visit to the U.S. In 1988, he was a member of the security detail for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher when she visited areas of Armenia affected by an earthquake.

In 1992, Matovnikov graduated from the Higher School of the Ministry of Security of Russia. Afterwards, he took part in both the First and Second Chechen Wars, including several special operations. Such operations included the storming of a hospital in Budyonnovsk, an anti-terrorist operation in the “Nord-Ost” on Dubrovka, and an investigation into the circumstances of the storming of a school in Beslan.

In 2013, Matovnikov was transferred to the Ministry of Defense and then appointed to the post of Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Main (Intelligence) Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. In 2015, he became Commander of the MTR and Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.
It has been reported that Matovnikov was a special assignment officer under Putin and led secret military operations abroad. Such operations included coordinating the actions of personnel in Ukraine during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He was also reported to be in command posts during Russia’s military intervention in Syria’s civil war. In 2017, Matovnikov was awarded the title of “Hero of the Russian Federation” by Putin for his actions in Syria. On 22 FEB 2018, he was promoted to Lieutenant General. On 26 JUN 2018, he was appointed Plenipotentiary Representative in the North Caucasus Federal District. On 3 JUL 2018, he was included in the Russian Security Council.

On 22 JAN 2020, he was transferred to the post of Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces. On 3 FEB 2020, he was removed from the Security Council.

**Summary of Role:**

Advises and assists the commander-in-chief and first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces in military decisions and tactics.

**Organizational Membership:**

Matovnikov is a member of the Association of Veterans of the Anti-Terror Unit “Alpha.”

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

Unknown.
Name:
SERGEY VLADIMIROVICH SUROVIKIN
Title:
General of the Army
Commander of the Aerospace Forces
Role:
Responsible for air operations in or to Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:

Sergey Vladimirovich Surovikin ("Surovikin") was born on 11 OCT 1966 in Novosibirsk, RSFSR, USSR. In 1987, Surovikin graduated from Omsk Higher Military Command School. Following his education, he was sent to a Spetsnaz unit and served in the Soviet-Afghan War.

In AUG 1991, during the August Coup, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on Garden Ring, which resulted in three demonstrators being killed. After the coup was defeated, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. On 10 DEC 1991, Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders and dropped the charges. Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major shortly afterwards.

He also attended the Frunze Military Academy. In SEPT 1995, Surovikin was sentenced to a year of probation by the Moscow garrison’s military court for the illegal sale of weapons. The conviction was later overturned when the investigation concluded that Surovikin gave a fellow student a pistol for a competition, but was unaware of its intended purpose. Surovikin graduated from Frunze in 1995.

Upon graduation from Frunze, Surovikin was sent to Tajikistan to command a motor rifle (tank) battalion. Shortly after, he became the chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division.
In 2002, Surovikin graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Upon graduation, Surovikin was sent to Yekaterinburg, where he became the commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division.

In MAR 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of assaulting him for voting for the wrong candidate. In APR 2004, division deputy commander for armaments Colonel Andrei Shtakal shot himself in the presence of Surovikin after being criticized by Surovikin. Military prosecutors found no evidence of guilt in either instance.

Beginning in JUN 2004, Surovikin led the 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division which was stationed in Chechnya.

In 2005, he became the chief of staff of the 20th Guards Army. In APR 2008, he became the army commander. In NOV 2008, Surovikin became the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff. In JAN 2010, he became the chief of staff of the Volga-Urals Military District (which became the Central Military District shortly thereafter).

Beginning in NOV 2011, Surovikin headed a working group that was established to create a Military Police. In OCT 2012, he became the chief of staff of the Eastern Military District. In OCT 2013, he was appointed commander of the Eastern Military District. On 13 DEC 2013, he was promoted to the rank of colonel general.

On 9 JUN 2017, Surovikin was introduced to media representatives as the Commander of the Russian armed forces deployed to Syria. On 22 NOV 2017, Surovikin was appointed to the post of Commander of the Aerospace Forces by presidential decree. On 28 DEC 2017, Surovikin was awarded the Hero of the Russian Federation award for his involvement in Syria.

Surovikin once again commanded the contingent of Russian military forces in Syria from JAN 2019 to APR 2019. In 2021, Surovikin was promoted to General of the Army.

Summary of Role:

The Russian Aerospace Forces were established on 1 AUG 2015, after the Russian Air Force and Russian Aerospace Defense Forces merged.

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 14 MAR 2022, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova announced that she filed a criminal case against Surovikin and other Russian officials.

On 23 FEB 2022, the European Union added Surovikin to its sanctions list for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies
that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”
Name:
VIKTOR AFZALOV
Title:
First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces
Role:
Unknown.
Name:
ANDREI (ANDREY) YUDIN

Title:
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces

Role:
The role of Andrei Yudin is currently unknown. It is possible that Yudin is not involved as he may no longer by in the Russian armed forces.

Unknown.

It is possible that Yudin no longer holds a Deputy Commander-in-Chief position within the Aerospace Forces of Russia. Our research has shown that on 1 SEPT 2015, Yudin was named the Commander of the Russian Air Force. He held this role until JULY 2019, when Sergei Dronov was appointed Commander of the Air Force. However, it is unclear from our research whether Yudin continues to play a role in the Aerospace Forces or not. It is possible that Yudin is no longer a member of the Aerospace Forces.
Name:
SERGEY (SERGEI) VLADIMIROVICH DRONOV
Title:
Commander of the Air Force
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces
Role:
Responsible for air operations in or to Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:

Sergei Vladimirovich Dronov (“Dronov”) was born on 11 AUG 1962 in Almazovka, Voroshilovograd region, Ukraine. In 1983, Dronov graduated from the Yeisk Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots. Upon graduation, Dronov was referred for further service in the Belarusian Military District, where he served in a fighter-bomber regiment. In 1990, Dronov attended the Yuri Hagarin Air Force Academy. Upon graduation, he was appointed commander of a fighter regiment in the North Caucasus Military District. He then commanded the air force and air defense units in the Far Eastern Military District, though the period of time of such service is unknown to us. In 2013, Dronov was appointed deputy commander of the Russian air force. In SEPT 2015, Dronov was appointed head of the aviation group for the Russian air force base in Syria. During this post, Dronov planned and conducted military operations on the orders of the Supreme Commander. He returned to Russia in 2017. In JUL 2019, Dronov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Air Force of the Russian Federation and the deputy commander of the Air Force.

Summary of Role:

Commands the entirety of the Russian Air Force and assists the commander-in-chief of the Aerospace Forces in the commandment of that military branch.

Organizational Membership:
Drovnov has served in both the Soviet and Russian Air Forces.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 23 FEB 2022, Drovnov was sanctioned by the European Union “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”
Name:
NIKOLAI/NIKOLAY ANATOLYEVICH YEVMENOV
Title:
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy
Role:
Commands the entirety of Russian naval forces. Responsible for any maritime operation of the Russian navy, including in or to Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:
Nikolai Anatolyevich Yevmenov ("Yevmenov") was born on 2 APR 1962 in Moscow. He studied at the Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation from 1982 to 1987. Upon graduation, he was appointed to the post of commander of the electronic navigation department of the navigation unit (BCh-1) of a nuclear submarine in the Pacific Fleet from 1987 to 1991.

From 1995 to 1997, he studied at the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy. From 1997 to 1999, he commanded ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific Fleet. From 1999 to 2006 he was chief of staff, deputy commander, and then commander of the 25th submarine division of the Pacific Fleet. During this time, from 2001 to 2003, he studied at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia.

In 2012, Yevmenov was named deputy commander of the Northern Fleet. In 2016, he became commander of the Northern Fleet. In 2017, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral. On 3 MAY 2019, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy.

Summary of Role:
Heads and commands the entirety of Russia’s naval forces.

Organizational Membership:
Yevmenov has served in both the Soviet and Russian navies.

Incidents and Events of Note:
In FEB 2022, Yevmenov was included on the E.U.’s sanctions list for his involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In NOV 2019, Yevmenov made an official visit to Japan to meet with Hiroshi Yamamura, the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Self Defense Force. During this visit, Yevmenov took a photo with a portrait of Togo Heihachiro (the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet who defeated the Russian fleet during the Battle of Tsushima), which sparked a controversy in Russia.
Name:
ALEKSANDR MIKHAILOVICH NOSATOV
Title:
First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy
Role:
Assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy with naval activities.

Biographical Summary:

Aleksandr Mikhailovich Nosatov (“Nosatov”) was born on 27 MAR 1963 in Sevastopol, Ukrainian SSR, USSR. He studied at the P. S. Nakhimov Black Sea Higher Naval School and graduated in 1985. Early in his career, Nosatov was a lieutenant engineer in the laboratory of the coastal base maintenance workshop within the Pacific Fleet. Between 1986 and 1989, he commanded an anti-aircraft missile battery aboard the Stoykiy. Nosatov was then the commander of missile and artillery combat aboard the destroyer Bezboyazenny. Beginning in 1991, he was assistant to the flagship missile specialist of the 35th missile ship division.

Beginning in 1993, Nosatov was the commander of the Bezboyazenny’s missile weapons. In 1994, he became the flagship specialist in missile weapons for the 35th division of missile ships. Between 1997 and 1998, Nosatov was the senior officer to the commander of the Slava-class cruiser Varyag.

In 2000, Nosatov graduated from the N. G. Kuznetsov Naval Academy. Upon graduation, he took over his own command of the Pacific Fleet destroyer Bystryy. Between 2002 and 2007, Nosatov was chief of staff and commander of the 36th division of surface ships. In 2006, he was promoted to rear-admiral by presidential decree. Nosatov undertook further studies at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, leaving in 2009.

In 2009, Nosatov was appointed commander of the naval base at Baltiysk. On 27 JAN 2012, he was appointed deputy commander of the Black Sea Fleet. In 2013, he became the chief of staff of
the Black Sea Fleet. On 5 MAY 2014, Nosatov was promoted to vice admiral by presidential decree. Beginning on 17 MAY 2016, he was the head of the Naval Academy, but did not hold the position for long. On 30 JUN 2016, he was appointed acting commander of the Baltic Fleet. On 18 OCT 2016, Nosatov was presented with the ceremonial standard of the fleet. On 12 DEC 2018, he was promoted to Admiral. He has been awarded the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Naval Merit.

**Summary of Role:**

Advises and assists the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian navy in the implementation of naval policies.

**Organizational Membership:**

Nosatov has served in both the Soviet and Russian navies.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

In DEC 2020, Nosatov gave a statement to the Russian army’s *Red Star* newspaper that Russia would beef up its forces in the Kaliningrad exclave. He cited the need to respond to a so-called buildup of NATO forces nearby.

On 21 MAR 2014, Nosatov was added to the EU sanctions list in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Name: VLADIMIR LVOVICH KASATONOV
Title: Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy
Role: Responsible for assisting the commander-in-chief of the navy in naval operations in or to Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:

Vladimir Lvovich Kasatonov (“Kasatonov”) was born on 17 JUN 1962 in Moscow, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1977, Kasatonov entered the Nakhimov Naval School in Leningrad. In 1979, he began studying at the P. S. Nakhimov Black Sea Higher Naval School, and graduated in 1984 with a gold medal. Upon graduation, he began his active service with the Northern Fleet in the missile division of the armament section of the heavy nuclear missile cruiser Kirov. In SEPT 1987, he was appointed commander of the Kirov’s missile division. In FEB 1988, he was promoted to the rank of captain-lieutenant. In SEPT 1988, he was appointed assistant commander of the Kirov.

From 1990 to 1991, Kasatonov served in the Mediterranean Sea with the 5th Operational Squadron. In JUL 1991, he graduated from the Higher Special Officer Classes and was subsequently appointed to the post of senior assistant commander of the Sovremenny-class destroyer Gremyashchy. Beginning in APR 1994, Kasatonov was the senior assistant to the commander of the destroyer Rastoropnyy. In DEC 1994, he became the commander of the Rastoropnyy. In SEPT 1997, he entered the Naval academy and graduated with honors in JUN 1999. After graduation, he was appointed head of the department of mobilization at the Northern Fleet headquarters.

From MAR 2000 to JUL 2005, Kasatonov served as the captain of the battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy. From 2005 to 2006, he served as Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet’s 43rd missile ship division. Beginning in SEPT 2006, he attended the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. In AUG 2008, Kasatonov was appointed commander of the Northern Fleet’s 43rd missile ship division. In OCT 2008, Kasatonov was the leader of a detachment of Northern Fleet warships
on a cruise from the Arctic Ocean into the Atlantic. Such detachments made port calls in Venezuela before going through the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea.

In APR 2010, Kasatonov was appointed the commander of the Kola Flotilla. In the SUMMER of 2012, Kasatonov was the commander of a detachment of ships from the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets in the Mediterranean Sea. On 14 SEPT 2012, he was appointed the chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet. On 12 JUN 2013, Kasatonov was promoted to vice-admiral. On 3 OCT 2016, he was appointed the head of the Naval Academy.

On 20 DEC 2018, Kasatonov defended his thesis and was awarded a doctorate of military science. In DEC 2019, he was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the navy.

**Summary of Role:**

Responsible for assisting the commander-in-chief of the navy in naval operations in or to Ukraine.

**Organizational Membership:**

Kasatonov has served in both the Soviet and Russian navies.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 23 FEB 2022, Kasatonov was sanctioned by the European Union “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”
Name:
IGOR VLADIMIROVICH OSIPOV
Title:
Admiral and Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet
Role:
Commands the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, the fleet positioned in the Black Sea within the territorial waters of Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:

Igor Vladimirovich Osipov ("Osipov") was born on 6 MAR 1973 in Novoshumnoye, Fyodorov District, Kostanay Region, Kasazkh SSR, USSR. He attended the Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation in Saint Petersburg and graduated in 1995 with a speciality in navigation. In AUG 1995, he began his naval service with the Pacific Fleet as the weapons commander of the Grisha-class corvette MPK-221, which was part of the 11th division of anti-submarine ships of the Primorsky Flotilla’s 47th brigade. This brigade was tasked with patrolling an area covering Russky Island and Paris Bay.

Between JUL 1998 and JUL 2000, Osipov commanded the MPK-61, which was part of the 11th division of the 165th brigade of surface ships covering the sea area around Vladivostok and Maly Ulyss Bay. From JUL 2000 to DEC 2001, he served as the chief of staff for the 11th division. Osipov then commanded the 11th division from DEC 2001 to SEPT 2002. Following this post, Osipov undertook additional studies at the Naval Academy and graduated in 2004. Between JUN 2004 and JAN 2007, he served as the chief of staff for the 165th brigade. From JAN 2007 to AUG 2011, he served as the commander of the 165th brigade.

In 2012, Osipov graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia. In JUN 2012, he was appointed chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Baltic Naval Base, Baltiysk, of the Baltic Fleet. From OCT 2012 to MAY 2015, he served as the base commander for the same base. In MAY 2015, he was appointed to the post of commander of the Caspian Flotilla.
Between SEPT 2016 and AUG 2018, he served as the chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet. Between AUG 2018 and MAY 2019, Osipov was the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. During this post, he was promoted to vice-admiral in 2018. On 8 MAY 2019, Osipov was appointed commander of the Black Sea Fleet (this appointment was backdated to 3 MAY 2019). On 11 JUN 2021, Osipov was promoted to the rank of admiral.

**Summary of Role:**

Commands the entirety of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, the fleet positioned within the territorial waters of Ukraine.

**Organizational Membership:**

Osipov has served in both the Soviet and Russian navies.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 15 MAR 2022, satellite imagery showed at least fourteen Russian Navy vessels approaching the Ukrainian coast from the Black Sea. The imagery showed the following groupings of vessels: (i) northern group: line-astern formation led by a tug boat or minesweeper appearing to tow a mine clearing device, followed by two Ropucha-class landing ships, another tug boat, and a trailing Ropucha; (ii) second group in a square formation made up of smaller warships, including missile corvettes; (iii) a southern group led by the Slava-class cruiser Moskva, two Alligator-class landing ships, the Ivan Gren-class landing ship Pyotr Morgunov, and a smaller warship, possibly identified as a Buyan-M-class missile corvette. The PM-138 vessel was observed in Lake Donuzlav, which has immediate access to the sea and is viewed as a safe harbor to perform emergency battle repairs. Another vessel, the PM-56, was positioned similarly near Feodosia, which is to the east of Crimea. Since its initial placement near Feodosia, the PM-56 has subsequently been moved further east, possibly to support vessels stationed in the Sea of Azov.

On 14 MAR 2022, a Russian convoy landed at Berdyansk within the Sea of Azov.

In FEB 2022, the European Union added Osipov to its sanctions list for being “responsible for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

In FEB 2022, six amphibious landing ships, that are normally based in the Arctic and Baltic Seas, were moved to the Black Sea to bolster the Black Sea Fleet. These were further bolstered by amphibious landing ships and combatants from the Arctic, Baltic, Pacific, and Caspian. Further units, including missile corvettes, were moved to the Sea of Azov (a restricted and shallow body of water), placing them adjacent to the city of Mariupol in Donets. On 17 FEB 2022, reports showed that Russia appeared to have pre-positioned two repair ships on either side of the Crimean peninsula. The vessels appeared to be Project 304 Amur Class repair and depot ships that are used to perform urgent repairs on the high seas.
Name:  
VIKTOR VASILYEVICH ZOLOTOV  
Title:  
Director of the National Guard of Russia  
Role:  
Commands the National Guard of Russia which has been utilized within Russia to quell anti-war protests and demonstrations. Zolotov has also been accused of arbitrary detention, so it is possible that his role is more expansive than is discussed herein.

Biographical Summary:

Viktor Vasilyevich Zolotov (“Zolotov”) was born on 27 JAN 1954 in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1975, Zolotov began his career with the KGB Border Troops. In 1991, Zolotov served as a bodyguard for the President of the Russian SFSR Boris Yeltsin during his famous “Tank Speech” during the 1991 Soviet coup d’etat attempt. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he became part of the newly-created Federal Protective Service, which is the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Secret Service.

In the later 1990s, Zolotov was hired as a bodyguard for the Mayor of Saint Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak. During this position, Zolotov became acquainted with then-Vice Mayor, Vladimir Putin. His friendship with Putin blossomed as Zolotov became Putin’s sparring partner in boxing and judo. Additionally, Zolotov walked directly behind Putin anytime Putin appeared in public. Zolotov also served in Roman Tsepov’s private guard Baltik-Eskort, before Tsepov was poisoned by an unknown radioactive substance.

According to Yuri Felshtinsky and Vladimir Pribylovsky, in 1992, based on Zolotov’s advice, the agency was created, with Zolotov allegedly overseeing it later as a member of the active reserve. Baltik-Eskort provided protection to high ranking Saint Petersburg officials, including Sobchak and Putin. The agency also served as a mechanism for the collection of tribute and chorniu nal (“black cash”) for Putin’s purposes.

From 2000 to 2013, Zolotov was the Chief of the Security of the Prime Minister of Russia and President of Russia Vladimir Putin. During this time, he commanded security officers, known in
Russia as “Men in Black,” as they wore black sunglasses and dressed in all-black suits. It has been reported that Zolotov has friendly relations with Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov.

On 12 MAY 2014, Zolotov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia and Commander of the Internal Troops of Russia. On 5 APR 2016, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the National Guard of Russia and, by separate presidential decree, was also named a member of the Security Council.

In AUG 2018, Zolotov became a target of an Anti-Corruption Foundation investigation. Alexei Navalny alleged a theft of > $29 million in procurement contacts for the National Guard of Russia. Navalny was soon thereafter imprisoned. On 11 SEPT 2018, Zolotov published a video message where he challenged Navalny to a duel and promised to make “good, juicy mincemeat” out of Navalny.

**Summary of Role:**

Commands and controls the entirety of the Russian National Guard, which has been utilized to quash anti-war protests and demonstrations within Russia.

**Organizational Membership:**

Zolotov has been a career government officer. During the era of the Soviet Union, he served in the KBG Border Guard. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he served the Russian Federation in the (i) Federal Protective Service, (ii) Internal Troops, and (iii) National Guard.

Non-permanent Member of the Security Council of Russia.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 15 MAR 2022, Zolotov was sanctioned by the United States, pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy. On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Zolotov in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 2 MAR 2021, the Council of the European Union imposed restrictive measures on Zolotov saying he was “responsible for serious human rights violations in Russia, including arbitrary arrests and detentions and systematic and widespread violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, in particular by violently repressing protests and demonstrations,” as it relates to the quashing of pro-Navalny protests in 2021.

On 6 APR 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on Zolotov and twenty-three other Russian nationals for being an official of the Russian Federation government, pursuant to E.O. 13661.
Biographical Summary:

Dmitry Schugaev (“Schugaev”) graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987. He has a PhD in economics.

He has served as an Executive Director of CJSC “Legal Profile.” He also worked as Consultant to the Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport; Assistant to the First Deputy Director General of Rosoboronexport; and the Chief of Staff to the Director General of Rosoboronexport. Schugaev was also the Head of the Office of the General Director of the State Corporation “Rostekhnologii” (Rostec).

Schugaev was the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Transport and Exhibition Complex “Russia” and the company “Marketing Investment Projects”. He was also the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Inter RAO UES (a diversified energy holding company) and Ramport Aero OJSC (an international aviation holding company).

Summary of Role:

The Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS) is a federal executive body responsible for control and oversight in the field of military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign countries. The service reports to the President and is in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The Director of the FSVTS is under direct authority of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Organizational Membership:
Member of the Board of Directors of Russian Corporation for Instrumentation and Information Systems (RKS OJSC), Ramenskoye International Airport OJSC and Rosoboronexport JSC. Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board of “National Center for Aircraft Construction.”

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 18 MAR 2022 Japan sanctioned Shugaev as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Biographical Summary:

Alexander Mikheev (“Mikheev”) was born on 18 Nov 1961 in Moscow, Russia. In 1985, Mikheev graduated from the Moscow Institute of Civil Aviation Engineering with a degree in aeronautical design. Alexander acquired a graduate degree from the Military Academy of the Russian Armed Forces in 2004 and a degree in money and credit from the Russian Government Financial Academy in 2006.

He was formerly filling in as the administrator of the Russian Helicopter Federation. Afterward, he moved to Rosoboronexport organization as a CEO who exports weapons. As of 2022, many reports guarantee that Mikheev’s complete and total assets are assessed at 5,000,000 dollars.

Summary of Role:

Alexander Mikheev serves as the Chief Executive Officer of Rosoboronexport and assists in the exportation of weapons worldwide.

Organizational Membership:

Rosoboronexport Organization

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.
Key Political Leaders

Name: DMITRY MEDVEDEV
Title: Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia
Role: Has threatened the use of nuclear weapons in the Ukrainian invasion.¹⁰⁹

Biographical Summary:

Dmitry Medvedev (“Medvedev”) was born on 14 SEPT 1965 in Leningrad. He is married to Svetlana Medvedeva, and has one son, Ilya, who was born in 1995. Medvedev holds a PhD in law and the title of associate professor. He graduated from the Faculty of Law of Leningrad State University in 1987, and completed post-graduate studies there in 1990. From 1990-1999 he taught at St Petersburg State University, and from 1990-1995 he also served as Adviser to Chairman of the Leningrad City Council, expert consultant with St Petersburg City Hall’s Committee for External Affairs.

In 1999 he became Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government Executive Office, and from 1999-2000 he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. In 2000, he was appointed First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. He served as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom from 2000-2001, Deputy Chairman of this board later in 2001, and then in JUN 2002 was re-appointed Chairman of the Board. In OCT 2003, Medvedev was again appointed Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office. In NOV 2005 he was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister.

On 7 MAY 2008, Medvedev assumed the office of President of the Russian Federation while Putin became the Russian Prime Minister due to term limits. On 8 MAY 2012, Medvedev was appointed by Putin as the prime minister, while Putin ascended back to the presidency. On 15 JAN 2020 Medvedev resigned from his role as Prime Minister – along with the rest of the government – to allow Putin to make sweeping constitutional changes. On 16 JAN 2020, Putin appointed Medvedev to the new office of deputy chairman of the Security Council.

**Summary of Role:**

**Organizational Membership:**

United Russia since 2011.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 11 October 2021 Medvedev published an inflammatory and vulgar piece in the Russian daily Kommersant outlining 5 reasons why he believes it is “meaningless” to engage in talks with Ukrainian authorities.\(^{110}\)

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\(^{110}\) Peter Dickinson, *Medvedev echoes Putin’s dangerous Ukraine obsession*, ATLANTIC COUNCIL (Oct. 12, 2021)  
Name: ANTON VAINO
Title: Manager of the Presidential Administration
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Anton Vaino (“Vaino”) was born on 17 FEB 1972 in Tallinn. He graduated from the MGIMO, Faculty of International Relations, in 1996. From 1996 to 2001, he was an employee of the Russian Embassy in Japan, the Second Asia Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

In 2002-2004, Vaino worked in the Office of the Protocol of the President of the Russian Federation. Between 2004 and 2007, he was Deputy Head of the Protocol and Organizational Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation. In 2007, Vaino was appointed First Deputy Head of Protocol of the President of the Russian Federation. In 2007-2008, he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Between APR 2008 and DEC 2011, Vaino served as a Deputy Chief of Staff of the Government. From DEC 2011 to MAY 2012, he was the Chief of Staff of the Government. Between MAY 2012 and AUG 2016, he served as a Deputy Head of the Presidential Executive Office. On 12 AUG 2016, he was appointed head of the Presidential Administration.

Summary of Role:

As the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office, Vaino plays an active role in Kremlin decision-making process by taking part in the Russian ‘Security Council’ and influencing the elaboration of decisions by the President in the field of Russia’s defense and national security. Vaino also attends meetings on socio-economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol.
Organizational Membership:
United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note:

15 MAR 2022 - U.K. sanctioned Vaino by freezing his assets and imposing a travel ban on him.

23 FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by E.U. “for actively supporting and implementing actions and policies that undermine and threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine as well as the stability or security in Ukraine.”

FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by Canada.
Name: SERGEI IVANOV
Title: Special Representative of the President on Issues of Environmental Activities, Ecology and Transport
Role: 

Biographical Summary:

Sergei Ivanov (“Ivanov”) was born 31 JAN 1953 in Leningrad. In 1975 he graduated from Leningrad State University from the English branch of the Department of Philology. Starting in the late 1970’s he worked on staff for the external intelligence services. In 1976 he graduated from Higher Courses of the KGB with a postgraduate degree in counterintelligence. After this he served in the Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast KGB Directorate. In 1981, he studied at the Red Banner Institute of KGB.

In the 1980s, Ivanov served as Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, working for the KGB. In NOV 1999, he was appointed as secretary of the Security Council of Russia. In this position he was to coordinate daily work of the council, but role was unclear because at the time it was a relatively new position. In DEC 1999, Ivanon was appointed as Russia’s Minister of Defense where his responsibility for overseeing military reform was emphasized. Then in MAY 2001, he was elected chairman of the Council of Commonwealth of Independent States Defense Ministers.

In NOV 2005, Ivanov was then appointed to the post of Deputy Prime Minister in Mikhail Fradkov’s Second Cabinet, focusing on the manufacturing industry and export of arms. In FEB 2007, President Putin then promoted him to First Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility over defense industry, aerospace industry, nanotechnology and transport. In JUN 2007, he was then appointed chairman of the Government Council for Nanotechnology. In DEC 2011, he was then appointed Chief of Staff of Presidential Administration of Russia.
In 2016, he was then given the role of special envoy for transportation and the environment.

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Ivanov in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Name:  
NIKOLAI PATRUSHEV  
Title:  
Secretary of the Security Council  
Role:  

Biographical Summary:

Nikolai Patrushev (“Patrushev”) was born on 11 JUL 1951 in Leningrad. He was a general in Russia’s Army and has a PhD in law. Patrushev is a Russian politician, security officer and intelligence officer who served as Director of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which is the main successor organization to the Soviet KGB (excluding foreign intelligence), from 1999 to 2008, and he has been Secretary of the Security Council of Russia since 2008.

He graduated from Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute in 1974, where he worked as an engineer until joining the KGB in 1975. From 1974-1975 he attended the Higher Courses of the KGB with the USSR Council of Ministers in Minsk. In 1975 he began to work at the counter-intelligence section of the KGB regional directorate for the Leningrad region where he later ended up being chief of the service for combatting contraband and corruption. Upon finishing year-long refresher courses at the Higher School of the KGB (now the FSB Academy), in JUN 1992, he was appointed Minister of State Security of Karelia, a post he held until 1994.

In 1994 Patrushev was appointed chief of the FSK Directorate of Internal Security, under Director Sergei Stepashin. After Stepashin’s resignation on 30 JUN 1995, Patrushev received the senior post of Deputy Chief of the FSB’s Organisation and Inspection Department. In 1998 he was chief of the Control Directorate of the Presidential Staff from MAY-AUG, and from AUG-OCT he was Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff. In OCT 1998 he was appointed Deputy Director of the FSB and chief of the Directorate for Economic Security. In APR 1999, he became FSB First Deputy Director - and on 9 AUG the same year a decree by President Boris Yeltsin promoted him to Director, replacing Vladimir Putin.
Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Patrushev in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.


In DEC 2000, Patrushev said on the anniversary of the founding of the Bolshevik secret police, the Cheka, that his FSB colleagues did not “work for the money...They are, if you like, our new ‘nobility’.”

Patrushev has received several national awards, including Hero of the Russian Federation.
Biographical Summary:

Rashid Nurgaliyev (“Nurgaliyev”) was born in Zhetikara, Kazakh SSR, on 8 OCT 1956 and is of Volga Tatar ethnicity. He graduated from Kuusinen State University in Petrozavodsk in 1979. He later received a doctoral degree in economics. His thesis was on the “economic aspects of the formation of business undertakings in modern Russia”.


In 1995 he moved to Moscow and was appointed chief inspector of the Inspectorial Directorate of Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), which became the Federal Security Service (FSB) by 23 JUN 1995, and head of a section of FSB Internal Security Department led by Nikolai Patrushev.

In 2002 he became the first deputy minister of interior of Russia. Nurgaliyev became minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2003. He was removed from office on 21 MAY 2012 and Vladimir Kolokoltsev replaced him in the post. Two days after his dismissal, on 23 MAY 2012, he was made Deputy Secretary of the Security Council.

Nurgaliyev holds the rank of Army General.

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
The E.U. sanctioned Nurgaliyev on 25 JUL 2014 as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that started in late FEB 2014.
Name: IGOR KRASNOV
Title: Prosecutor/Attorney General
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Igor Krasnov ("Krasnov") was born on 24 DEC 1975 in Arkhangelsk. Krasnov was a member of the Lenin Komsomol, a communist youth organization.

Krasnov began his service as an investigator in the Kholmogorsky district of the Arkhangelsk region. He graduated from the Law Faculty of Pomor State University.

He started serving in the prosecutor’s office in 1997. From 2006 to 2007, Krasnov was an investigator of the central office of the General Prosecutor’s Office. In 2007, he joined the Investigative Committee at the prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation. In 2011, he was appointed senior investigator for important cases of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation.

On APR 30 2016, Krasnov was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation by Alexander Bastrykin. On January 20, 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed that the Federation Council approve Krasnov as the Prosecutor General of Russia.

Krasnov has the rank of Lieutenant General of Justice as well as the rank of Actual State Counselor of Justice, which is the highest-class rank in the prosecutor’s office. Krasnov is also a member of the Security Council of Russia.

Summary of Role:
The Prosecutor General of Russia heads the system of official prosecution in known courts and heads the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The Prosecutor General is the most powerful component of the Russian judicial system.

The Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia prosecutes in court on behalf of the State and represents the interests of a citizen or of the State in court in cases determined by law. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia also supervises the observance of laws by bodies that conduct detective and search activity, inquiry, and pretrial investigation. Furthermore, the Office of the Prosecutor General supervises the observance of laws in the execution of judicial decisions in criminal cases and is also entrusted in the application of other measures of coercion related to the restraint of personal liberty of citizens.

Organizational Membership:

The Office of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Krasnov in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 02 MAR 2021, the E.U. imposed sanctions on Krasnov for the sentencing of the Russian opposition figure, Alexey Navalny.

On 02 MAR 2021 the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce imposed sanctions on Krasnov in response to Russia’s poisoning and subsequent imprisonment of the Russian opposition figure, Aleksey Navalny.
Biographical Summary:


Summary of Role:

As Prime Minister, Mishustin is the head of the Russian government, the chief executive of the Russian Cabinet, and the second-most powerful figure in the Russian Federation. In general, the prime minister serves more of an administrative role, nominating members of the Cabinet and taking the lead in fully implementing domestic and foreign policy as formulated by the president. In case of the president’s death, resignation or impeachment, the prime minister becomes a temporary president until new presidential elections which must take place within three months.

Organizational Membership:
Mishustin is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 18 MAR 2022, Mishustin had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko, to follow up on the 14 MAR event.

On 25 FEB and 15 MAR 2022, the EU, Switzerland, and other countries adopted economic sanctions against Mishustin.

On 14 MAR 2022, Mishustin met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko. Two agreements were signed by the Finance Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Yury Seliverstov and Deputy Finance Minister of the Russian Federation, Timur Maksimov after the talks: (1) Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on amending provisions of certain Russian-Belarusian intergovernmental agreements; (2) Protocol No.2 on amendments to the 6 OCTr 2021 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on providing a state financial loan to the Government of the Republic of Belarus.

On 25 FEB 2022, the day after Russia invaded Ukraine, Mishustin met with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Belarus, Roman Golovchenko.
Name:
ANDREI/ANDREY BELOUSOV

Title:
First Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (“First Deputy Prime Minister”)

Role:

Biographical Summary:

Andre Belousov (“Belousov”) was born on 17 MAR 1959. In 1981, Belousov graduated, with honors, from the Lomonosov Moscow State University, Department of Economics achieving a DSc in Economics.

From 1981 to 1986, Belousov began his career as an intern researcher and a junior researcher at the Central Economic Mathematical Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences. From 1986 through 2006, he progressed through the positions of junior researcher, researcher, senior researcher, and laboratory head at the Institute of Economics and Scientific and Technical Progress Forecasts at the USSR Academy of Sciences (later the Institute of National Economy Prognostication at the Russian Academy of Sciences). From 2000 through 2006 he held the position of General Director at the Center for Macroeconomic Analyses and Short-Term Prognostication.

Belousov shifted into politics in 2000, when he became an External Advisor to the Prime Minister, a position he held until 2006. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade, Deputy Minister of Economic Development. From 2008 until MAY 2012, he was a Director at the Government Department of Economy and Finance.

On 21 MAY 2012, Belousov took office as First Deputy Prime Minister and was appointed Minister of Economic Development by Presidential Executive Order. From 24 JUN 2013, he became a Presidential Aide, appointed again by Presidential Executive Order.
Summary of Role:

Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
Name:
DMITRY YURYEVICH GRIGORENKO

Title:
Deputy Prime Minister, Chief of the Government Staff

Role:

Biographical Summary:

Dmitry Grigorenko (“Grigorenko”) was born in 1978 in the Tyumen Region. He graduated from Kuban Agricultural Institute and the Institute of International entrepreneurship and management in the specialty specialized in finance.

In 2000 he worked as a Tax specialist, Chief of State Tax Inspector of Interregional inspectorate for large taxpayers. Later in 2003 he was transferred to the Ministry of Tax and Collection and the Federal Tax Service Deputy Chief of the analysis program, head of taxation of commercial organizations and tax accounting of management. In 2008 he was made head of the Department of Administration income Tax of Commercial Organizations and Tax accounting of the Management of administration tax income.

In 2012 he became Head of Department of Income Tax and Special Tax Modes. In 2014 he became Head of Department of Taxation in the Federal Tax Service and later in the same year became Deputy Manager of Federal Tax Service. Grigorenko was responsible for setting up new local tax legislation for the territory of Crimea following its annexation in 2014.

Grigorenko was elected as deputy Prime Minister and Chief of Government staff in JAN 2020. In MAY 2020, he joined the supervisory board of VTB Bank, the second biggest Russian bank, replacing Anton Siluanov.

Summary of Role:

Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates the activities of some federal organizations.
Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 15 MAR 2022, sanctioned by the U.S., pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as a person who operates or has operated in the defense and related material sector of the Russian economy.

23 FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by E.U. “for actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine” and “for providing financial and material support, and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine.”
Biographical Summary:

Yury Petrovich Trutnev (“Trutnev”) was born 1956 in Perm. In 1978 he graduated from the Perm Polytechnic Institute with a degree in Mining Engineering. During his time in university he interned with Oil Companies, Polaznanef and Komineft, as a drill operator. He also was junior research associate at PermNIPInef, developing oil and gas production equipment. From 1981-88, Trutnev worked at Perm City and Regional Young Communist League committees. In 1988 he founded the Kontakt physical fitness and recreation association.

In 1990, Trutnev, was CEO of EKS Limited Co. Then in 1996, CEO of shareholding company E.K.S. International Compromising EKS Group Enterprises.

In 1996, Trutnev began his political career, being elected mayor of Perm and Governor of the Perm Region in 2000. In 2004, he was appointed Natural Resources Minister. In 2013 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District in the First Medvedev Cabinet. He was again re-appointed in 2018 with the Second Medvedev Cabinet and once again in 2020 with the Mishutin Cabinet.

Summary of Role:

Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates the work of the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic.
Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
Name:
VIKTORIA ABRAMCHENKO
Title:
Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (“Deputy Prime Minister”)
Role:

Biographical Summary:

From 1998 to 2000, Abramchenko worked at the Committee for Land Resources and Land Management (Roskomzem) of the Russian Federation. For one year, from 2000 to 2001, she worked at the Land Cadastre Chamber. From 2001 through 2005, she held various positions including Deputy Department Head at the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography and the Federal Agency for Real Estate Cadastre.

From 2005 through 2011, Abramchenko worked at the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and was the Deputy Director of the Ministry’s Department of Real Estate. From 2011 to 2012, she was the Deputy Head of the Federal Service for State Registration. From 2012 through 2015, she held the position of Director, Department of Land Policy, Property Relations and State Property at the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. Then from 2015 to 2016, she held the position of State Secretary, Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation. From 2016 until 2020, she again held the position of Deputy Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Head of the Federal Service for State Registration, Cadastre and Cartography.
On 21 JAN 2020, she Abramchenko appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation by a Presidential Executive Order.

**Summary of Role:**

Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

**Organizational Membership:**

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

Abramchenko was awarded the Medal of the Order for Services to the Fatherland, 2nd Class.
Name: YURY BORISOV
Title: Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (‘‘Deputy Prime Minister’’)
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Yury Borisov (‘‘Borisov’’) was born on 31 DEC 1956 in Vyshny Volochek, Tver Region. In 1974, Borisov graduated from the Kalinin Suvorov Military School. In 1974, he then graduated from the Pushkin Higher Command School of Air Defense Radio Electronics. In 1985 Borisov graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University. He obtained his PhD in engineering.

From 1978 through 1998, Borisov served as an officer in the Soviet Armed forces and the Russian Armed Forces. From 1998 to 2004, he held the position of Director General of the Modul Research and Technical Center. From 2004 to 2008, he became the head of the radio electronics industry and control system department at the Federal Agency for Industries as well as becoming the deputy head of the agency. From JUL of 2008 until MAR 2011, he served as Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation.

In MAR 2011, he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation. On 15 NOV 2012 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation by Presidential Executive Order. On 18 MA 2018 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

Summary of Role:
Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

**Organizational Membership:**

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

Awarded the Order for Services to the Fatherland, 4th Class; the Order of Honor; the Order for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd Class.

Recipient of the Marshal Georgy Zhukov State Award.
Biographical Summary:

Dmitry Nikolaevich Chernyshenko (“Chernyshenko”) was born on 20 SEPT 1968 in Saratov.

Chernyshenko graduated from Stankin Moscow State Technological University with a degree in Computer Aided Design, with a Systems Engineer major.

In 1989 he founded InformatiKa Marketing Service, one of the country’s first computer graphics studios. In 1993 he co-founded MediaArts, one of Russia’s largest communication holdings. He managed MediaArts, which specialized in advertising and sports marketing, for 12 years.

From 2005 to 2007, Chernyshenko held the position of General Director of the Sochi 2014 Bid Committee. From 2007 to 2014 he was the President of the Sochi 2014 Olympic Organizing Committee and the Sochi 2014 Paralympic Organizing Committee. Chernyshenko served as the President and Executive Board Chairman of the Kontinental Hockey League from 2014 until 2020. During this time he was also the Chief Executive Officer of Gazprom-Media Holdings.

On 1 JAN 2020, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Presidential Executive Order.

Summary of Role:

Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.
Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:

Awarded the Order for Services to the Fatherland, 2nd Class; the Order of Friendship; the Order of Honor; the Order of St Sergius of Radonezh, 2nd and 3rd Class; and the Golden Olympic Order
Biographical Summary:

Tatyana Golikova (“Golikova”) was born on 9 FEB 1966, in Mytishchi, Moscow Region. In 1987 she graduated from Moscow’s Plekhanov Institute of Economics, with a degree in Labor Economics. Upon graduation, she began working as a junior researcher at the State Labor Committee’s Labor Research Institute, wages department until 1990 where she became the leading economist, chief economist, Head of the Budget Policy and Analysis section of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Department. In 1995, Golikova obtained the position of Deputy Head of the Budget Department, Head of the General Department of the Finance Ministry’s Consolidated Budget Division. From 1996 until 1998, she was the Deputy Head of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Department. From APR 1998 through AUG 1998, Golikova was the Head of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Department and member of the Finance Ministry’s board. From AUG 1998 through JUN 1999, she was the Head of the Finance Ministry’s Budget Policy Department and a member of the Finance Ministry’s board.

From JUN 1999 through JUN 2002, Golikova held the position of Deputy Finance Minister and held the position of First Deputy Finance Minister from AUG 2002 until APR 2004. In APR 2004, Golikova was against in the role of Deputy Finance Minister. On SEPT 24, 2007, she was appointed Healthcare and Social Development Minister. On MAY 18, 2018, she took office as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.

Summary of Role:
Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies.

**Organizational Membership:**

**Incidents and Events of Note:**
Name:
MARAT KHUSNULLIN
Title:
Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (“Deputy Prime Minister”)
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Marat Khusnullin (“Khusnullin”), born 9 AUG 1966, in Kazan. In 1990, he graduated from Kazan State Finance and Economics Institute with a degree in economics. Continuing his postgraduate education at Open University, taking a degree in Professional Management. In 2006, he also received a Candidate of Science in economics.

Between the years 2001-2010, Khusnullin served as Minister of Construction Architecture, Housing and Utilities of the Republic of Tatarstan. The program at the time was focused on development of large cities, bringing in a large number of federal investments.

21 JAN 2020, Khusnullin was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for construction and regional development under the Mishustin cabinet. In FEB 2022, he was placed under the EU sanctions list for being responsible for actions and policies that threaten independence, stability, and security of Ukraine.

Summary of Role:

Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions. Coordinates activities of some federal agencies. As Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Construction and Regional Development, Khusnullin is responsible for Russian governmental policies about occupied Crimea, including providing water to Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
23 FEB 2022 – Sanctioned by E.U. “for actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.”
Name:
ALEXANDER NOVAK
Title:
Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation ("Deputy Prime Minister")
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Alexander Novak ("Novak") was born on 23 AUG 1971 in the town of Avdeyevka, Ukraine. In 1993, Novak graduated from the Norilsk Industrial Institute with a degree in Economics and Management for the Steel Industry. Then, in 2009, he graduated from the Lomonosov Moscow State University earning a degree in management.

Novak began his career in 1988 as a hydrometallurgy machine operator, 1st grade and worked his way up to becoming a technician, assistant engineer for labor efficiency and wages, economic expert, and finance office head of the accounts department at Zavenyagin Steel Combine, Norilsk by 1997. In 1997, he held the position of Department Head, board head, deputy director for economics at Zavenyagin Steel Combine, Norilsk. From 1999 to 2000, Novak became the deputy director for economics and deputy director for personnel at Norilsk Mining Company Transpolar Branch.

From 2000 to 2002, he served as Norilsk Deputy Mayor for economics and finance, Norilsk First Deputy Mayor. From 2002 through 2007, Novak held the position of Deputy Governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory in charge of the Central Finance Board of the territorial administration, and from 2007 through 2008, Novak was the First Deputy Governor and Prime Minister of the Krasnoyarsk territory. From 2008 until May 2012, he served as the Deputy Minister of Finance. On 21 MAY 2012, Novak was appointed Minister of Energy by Presidential Executive Order. On 10 NOV 2020, Novak was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by Presidential Executive Order and took office as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation the same day.
Name: ALEXEI OVERCHUCK
Title: Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (“Deputy Prime Minister”)
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Alexei Overchuck (“Overchuck”) was born on 9 DEC 1964 in Korostyshev, Zhitomir Region, Ukraine. In 1986, Overchuck graduated from the Moscow Timiryazev Agricultural Academy with a degree in Economic Cybernetics, and a PhD in economics. Overchuck began his career in 1986, working as a senior laboratory technician at the Economic Cybernetics Department and progressed by 1993 to have held the positions of: junior research fellow, research fellow and senior research fellow at the laboratory for economic mechanism improvement at the Moscow Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. From 1993 to 1998, Overchuck worked as chief specialist, deputy head of the International Cooperation Department of the Russian State Committee on Land Resources and Land Management. From APR to JUL 1998, Overchuck served as the Head of the Department of State Registration of Real Estate Rights at the Russian State Land Committee. From JUL to DEC of 1998, he served as the Head of the Information and Analysis Department at the Russian State Land Committee and from 1999 through 2000 he served as the Head of the Information and Analysis Department at the Russian Land Policy Committee.

In AUG of 2000, Overchuck was appointed deputy head of the Russian Federal Cadastre Service. In APR 2004, he became the acting deputy head, before becoming the official Deputy Head of the Federal Real Estate Cadastre Agency in JUL 2004. From 2007 through 2008, Overchuk held the position of deputy head of the Federal Agency on Special Economic Zones Management. From 2008 through 2010, Overchuk held senior positions at UFG Asset Management Group. In 2010, Overchuck became the advisor to the head of the Federal Taxation Service and was appointed deputy head of the Federal Taxation Service in 2011. On 21 JAN 2020, Overchuck was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia by a Presidential Executive Order.
Summary of Role:

Coordinates the work of federal executive bodies and issues instructions.

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:
**Name:**
VALENTINA MATVIYENKO

**Title:**
Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly

**Role:**
Valentina Matviyenko at the head of the Federation Council allowed Vladimir Putin to start a war in Ukraine. She must sign off on use of the army, which she did on 22 FEB.

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**Biographical Summary:**

Valentina Matviyenko ("Matviyenko") was born in APR 1949. In 1972, she graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Chemistry and Pharmaceutics. From 1984–1986, she served as First Secretary of the Krasnogvardeisky District CPSU Committee in the city of Leningrad. In 1985, she graduated from the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. Between 1986–1989 she served as Deputy Chair at the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Council. In 1989, she was Elected People’s Deputy of the USSR. In 1991, she completed a Senior Diplomatic Staff Course at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and joined the diplomatic corps, where she served until 1998, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. From 1991–1994, she served as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Greece. Between 1998–2003, she served as Deputy Prime Minister. In 2003, she was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northwestern Federal District and elected the Governor of St Petersburg.

On 31 AUG 2011, she took her seat on the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation as a representative of the executive authority of the city of St Petersburg. On 21 SEPT 2011, she was unanimously elected Speaker of the Federation Council, and re-elected to this office in 2014 and 2019. Matviyenko has served as a permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation since SEPT 2011. In NOV 2011, she was elected Chair of the
Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPA CIS).

**Summary of Role:**

As Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly, Valentina Matviyenko is the presiding officer of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament. It is the third highest position, after the President and the Prime Minister, in the government of Russia. In the case of incapacity of the President and Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Federation Council becomes Acting President of Russia.

**Organizational Membership:**

Matviyenko is a member of the United Russia political party, which is the largest party in Russia holding 326 of the 450 in the State Duma. United Russia came into existence in 2001 following a merger of the political parties Unity and Fatherland.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 17 MAR 2014, economically sanctioned by the US (asset freeze and visa ban).

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Matviyenko in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Name: VYACHESLAV VOLODIN
Title: Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly

Biographical Summary:

Vyacheslav Volodin (‘Volodin’) was born 4 FEB 1964 in the Khvalynsky District. Volodin graduated from Saratov Institute of Mechanization of Agriculture in 1986 with a degree in mechanical engineering. In 1995 he received a legal degree in the Russian State Service Academy and in 1996 a PhD in law from the Interior Ministry’s St. Petersburg Institute.

In 1990 Volodin was elected as a member of the City Council of Saratov. In 1992 Volodin was the Deputy Head of Administration of Saratov. Then in 1994, Deputy Chairman of the Saratov Regional Duma, in 1996 he became Governor of Saratov Region. In 1999 he was elected to the State Duma as Deputy Chairman and Head of the Fatherland-All Russia party.

In OCT 2010 he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and in DEC 2011, became the First Deputy Chief of State of the Presidential Executive Office. In JAN 2017, he became a member of the Supreme Council of the United Russia Party and in OCT 2019, the 10th Chairman of the State Duma.

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note:
On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Volodin in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Name: 
ALEKSANDR/ALEXANDER VASILYEVICH BORTNIKOV
Title: 
Director of the Federal Security Service
Role:

Biographical Summary:

Aleksandr Vasilyevich Bortnikov (“Bortnikov”) was born on 15 NOV 1951 in Perm, Russia. He is a Russian intelligence officer who has served as the Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) since 12 May 2008. He graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Railway Engineers in 1973 and joined the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1975 after graduating from Dzerzhinsky KGB Higher School in Moscow.

From 1975 to 2004, he worked in the secret police system in Leningrad/Saint-Petersburg. In 2004, he became Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, the Head of the Economic Security Service. In May 2008, Bortnikov was appointed Director of the FSB of Russia, chairman of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee, and a permanent member of the Security Council of Russia.

Aleksandr Bortnikov is also a member of the board of directors for Russia’s largest shipping company and hydrocarbon transporter, Sovkomflot.

Summary of Role:

The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation’s principle security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union’s KGB. As Director, Aleksandr Bortnikov oversees the entirety of the FSB and is a member of President Putin’s inner circle.

Organizational Membership:
Incidents and Events of Note:

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Bortnikov in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Summer 2014, the European Union and Canada imposed sanctions against Bortnikov for Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine.
Biographical Summary:

Sergei Borisovich Korolev ("Korolev") was born on 25 JUL 1962, in the city of Frunze (Bishkek) of the Kirghiz SSR. Korolev was from a military family - his late father was the commander of a military unit, Korolyov’s father was friends with Viktor Zubkov and went on hunting with him.


On 8 JUL 2016, Sergei Korolev was promoted to the head of the Economic Security Service of the FSB of Russia. In this position, his duties, among others, included providing Vladimir Putin with dossiers on members of the government. On 24 FEB 2021, by decree of the President of Russia, he was appointed First Deputy Director of the FSB of Russia. In early JUN 2021, Korolev was awarded the rank of General of the Army.

Summary of Role:

The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation’s principal security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union’s KGB. As First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, Korolev works directly for the agency’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov.
Organizational Membership:

FSB / Supervisory Board of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute”.

Incidents and Events of Note:
Name: VLADIMIR KULISHOV (KYLISHOV)
Title: First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service
Role: As First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, Korolev works directly for the agency’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov.

Biographical Summary:
Vladimir Kulishov (“Kulishov”) was born on 20 JUL 1957 in Russia’s southern Rostov region. In 1979, he graduated from the Kyiv Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers and after graduation worked at a Rostov-in-Don-based civil aviation plant. In 1982, he joined Russia’s state security agencies. He graduated from the USSR KGB Higher School. Since 2000, Kulishov has been working in the central administration of the Federal Security Service in Moscow. In JUL 2003, he was appointed head of the Federal Security Service department for Saratov region. In 2004, he was appointed first deputy head of the Federal Security Service anti-terrorism directorate, and later he became head of the Federal Security Service department for the Chechen Republic. Since JUN 2008, Kulishov has been deputy director of the Federal Security Service and deputy head of administration of the National Anti-terrorism Committee.

Summary of Role:
The Federal Security Service is the Russian Federation’s principal security agency and is the main successor to the Soviet Union’s KGB. As First Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, Korolev works directly for the agency’s director, Aleksandr Bortnikov.

Organizational Membership:
FSB

Incidents and Events of Note:
Biographical Summary:

Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin ("Naryshkin") is a Russian politician and businessman who has served as the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service since 2016. He was born 27 OCT 1954 in St. Petersburg. He graduated from the Leningrad Mechanical Institute with the diploma of an "engineer radio mechanic." It was there he met his future wife Tatyana Yakubchik, a fellow student, with whom he has two children - Andrey and Veronica. He likes to begin his mornings with a swim. His swim routine recently sparked a controversy when it was discovered that he frequents a pool owned by the controversial Azeri billionaire God Nisanov.

In 1982, Naryshkin was appointed Deputy Vice-Rector of the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute. Naryshkin and Putin met around that same time – when they both worked at the KGB regional headquarters in Leningrad, right after Naryshkin had graduated from one of Moscow’s most prestigious institutions – the Felix Dzerzhinsky Higher School of the KGB. Putin and Naryshkin, codenamed Comrades Platov and Naumov at the Red Banner Institute, spent a year learning the essentials of spy craft from veteran foreign intelligence officers. Putin learned German, Naryshkin learned French. Interestingly, neither was part of the powerful group of Middle East specialists (known as the Middle Eastern “mafia”) that came to dominate the higher rungs of the KGB’s foreign intelligence arm in the late 1980s and in the SVR after the collapse of the USSR.

Naryshkin and Putin had a lot of things in common, especially the traumas of losing close family members during the Nazi blockade of the city. Both also had parents who did not belong to the Communist elite. They grew up outside party ruling circles and had to confront the challenges of adulthood on their own. Driven by personal ambition to climb up the social ladder, they figured a
job in the KGB – the most powerful Soviet institution outside the Communist Party – would enable them to make their mark on the world.

Naryshkin was dispatched as a diplomat to Brussels, working in the Soviet Embassy from 1988 to 1992. By day, he worked in the embassy’s economic section, and by night Naryshkin recruited spies to steal Western science and technology secrets for the Soviet military-industrial complex. With the USSR on the verge of an economic collapse in the mid-to-late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev’s KGB had put technical secrets at the top of its espionage agenda, even higher than political intelligence. His career as a spy came to an end when a fellow Soviet intelligence officer defected to the CIA and exposed Naryshkin’s cover.


From 1996 to 2004, Naryshkin had a seat on the board of Philip Morris Izhora, the Russian affiliate of the American tobacco giant, while at the same time working for the city government. He became a rich man by mingling his government and business positions.

From 1998 until 2004, he was the Chairman of the Committee for External Economic and International Relations of the government of Leningrad Oblast. In early 2004, he was a deputy head of the economic department of the Russian presidential administration. From MAR through SEPT 2004, Naryshkin was a deputy chief of staff of the Russian government.

Since 2004, he has been a member of the board of directors of Sovkomflot and a deputy chairman of the board of directors of Rosneft. Since 31 AUG 2004, Naryshkin has also been Chairman of the Board of Directors of Channel One of the Russian television.

Since 13 SEPT 2004, he has been a Minister, Chief of Staff of the Government of Russia. On 15 FEB 2007, President Vladimir Putin announced that Naryshkin had been appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for external economic activity, focusing on collaboration with the Commonwealth of Independent States. In MAY 2008, Naryshkin was appointed chief of the Presidential Administration of Russia. In MAY 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev appointed him chairman of the Historical Truth Commission.

Naryshkin was elected to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament in DEC 2011. When the Duma began meeting for its new term on 21 DEC 2011, Naryshkin was elected as Chairman of the State Duma; he received 238 votes in favor of his candidacy, while 88 deputies opposed him. In JUN 2012, Naryshkin signed a resolution on setting up a culture council under the State Duma speaker. The council is “a standing advisory body”. The tasks of the council are “the examination and drafting of initiatives on topical problems of legislative regulations in culture and associated industries, the development of recommendations on culture for the use in lawmaking”. On 2 SEPT 2013, Naryshkin stated that there are no political prisoners in today’s Russia.
Since the rise of tensions between the European Union and Russia in 2014, Naryshkin was perceived as one of the main coordinators of contacts with European far-right and far-left parties supporting Russian foreign policy in Europe.

In SEPT 2016, Naryshkin was appointed as chief of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Naryshkin in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In JAN 2022, echoing a constant Russian theme, the SVR boss compared the government of Ukraine to the Nazis who invaded and occupied much of Russia during 1941-1945. Given that the Nazis are equated in Russian minds with absolute evil, Naryshkin’s metaphor sounded like an alarming call to all Russians to defeat another looming fascist invasion.

In DEC 2021, Naryshkin dismissed reports of a possible invasion of Ukraine asserting that it was "malicious propaganda by the US State Department". Days before Russia invaded Ukraine in FEB 2022, Naryshkin received widespread attention in the global press for visibly trembling and "stutter[ing] uncomfortably" as Putin humiliated him publicly for "fumbling" his response to the Russian President’s questioning during a Security Council meeting concerning recognizing the Russian-backed separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

As a result of the 2014 Crimean crisis, the federal government of the United States under Barack Obama blacklisted Naryshkin and other close friends of the Russian president, including Sergei Ivanov and Gennadi Timchenko. Nevertheless, he officially visited the U.S., along with other Russian top security chiefs, at the end of JAN 2018.
Biographical Summary:

Dmitry Kochnev ("Kochnev") was born on 1 MAR 1964 in Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union. From 1982 to 1984 Kochnev served in the Armed forces of the USSR. He then served in the law enforcement agencies of the USSR and Russia from 1984 to 2002. In 2002 he started working in the state security bodies of the Russian Federation. He was promoted to colonel in 2006.

Kochnev was the head of the Russian Presidential Security Service from JUN 2015 to MAY 2016, and was acting head from JUN 2015 to DEC 2015. On 26 MAY 2016 Kochnev was appointed the Director of the Federal Protective Service. In early JUN 2021 he was promoted to the rank of army general.

Summary of Role:

The Federal Protective Service (FSO) is a federal government agency that is concerned with the tasks related to the protection of several high-ranking state officials, mandated by the relevant law, including the President of Russia, as well as certain federal properties. The FSO includes the Russian Presidential Security Service and also has about 20,000 troops and controls the nuclear briefcase that can be used in the event of a nuclear war.

Organizational Membership:

Federal Protective Service (FSO)

Incidents and Events of Note:
On 14 MAR 2022 Canada imposed sanctions on Kochnev in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Name:
IGOR SHCHEGOLEV
Title:
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Central Federal District
Role:
Serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government

Biographical Summary:

Igor Shchegolev (“Shchegolev”) was born on 10 Nov 1965 in Vinnitsa, Ukraine. In 1982, he attended the Moscow State Linguistic University and graduated in 1984. He then attended Leipzig University and graduated in 1988 as a philologist. After graduating, he joined the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (now the Information Telegraph of Russia aka ITAR-TASS). From 1988 to 1993, Shchegolev served as the Editor of the European Department at the TASS/ITAR-TASS news agency. Between 1993 and 1997, he served as an ITAR-TASS correspondent in Paris. Upon his return to Russia in 1997, he served as the Editor-in-Chief of the European Department of ITAR-TASS and deputy director of the ITAR-TASS news service.

In 1998, he left ITAR-TASS to work in government. Initially, he served as deputy head of the government corps of press officer, then briefly as the press secretary for Yevgeniy Primakov, but returned to lead the press officer corps. In 2000, he was appointed to the post of press secretary for then-acting President Vladimir Putin. At the end of 2001, he became the head of Presidential Protocol, which involved coordinating presidential trips overseas and within Russia. In 2004, his duties expanded to be head of Kremlin Protocol. He remained in this role until 12 May 2008, when he was appointed Minister of Communications and Mass Media, as part of Putin’s second cabinet.

Summary of Role:

The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Shchegolev serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Central Federal District comprises the Central and Central Black Earth economic regions and eighteen
federal subjects (Oblast). As of the 2010 Census, 38,427,539 Russians live in the Central Federal District.

**Organizational Membership:**

While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Shchegolev is a member of the United Russia political party, given his relationship and proximity to the de facto leader of that party, Vladimir Putin.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Schegolev in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Name:
VLADIMIR VASILYEVICH USTINO

Title:
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Southern Federal District

Role:
Serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government

Biographical Summary:
Vladimir Vasilyevich Ustinov (“Ustinov”) was born on 25 FEB 1953 in Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, Russian SFSR, USSR. From 17 MAY 2000 to 2 JUNE 2006, he served as the Prosecutor General of Russia. He also held the post of Minister of Justice until 2008.

Summary of Role:
The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Ustinov serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Southern Federal District shares borders with Ukraine, the Azov Sea, and the Black Sea, as well as Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea. As of the 2010 Census, 16,319,253 Russians live in the Southern Federal District.

Organizational Membership:
While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Ustinov is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note:
On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Ustinov, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
On 6 APR 2018, Ustinov was sanctioned by the United States, pursuant to E.O. 13661, for being an official of the Government of the Russian Federation.
Name:
ALEKSANDR VLADIMIROVICH GUTSAN
Title:
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northwestern Federal District
Member of the Security Council
Role:
Serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government

Biographical Summary:
Aleksandr Vladimirovich Gutsan (“Gutsan”) was born on 6 JUNE 1960 in Siversky, Russian SFSR, USSR. From 13 APR 2007 to 7 NOV 2018, he served as the Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia. Since 7 NOV 2018, he has served as the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Northwestern Federal District. Additionally, since 19 NOV 2018, he has served as a member of the Security Council.

Summary of Role:
The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Gutsan serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Northwestern Federal District comprises the Northern, Northwestern, and Kaliningrad economic regions and eleven federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 13,616,057 Russians live in the Northwestern Federal District.

Organizational Membership:
While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Gutsan is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.

Incidents and Events of Note:
In late FEB 2022, New Zealand added Gutsan to its travel ban list. Australia also added Gutsan to a travel ban list and froze his assets in late FEB 2022.
Name:
ANATOLY ANATOLYEVICH SERYSHEV
Title:
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Siberian Federal District
Role:
Serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government

Biographical Summary:

Anatoly Anatolyevich Seryshev (“Seryshev”) was born on 19 JULY 1965 in Koblyakovo, Russian SFSR, USSR. In 1988, he graduated from the Irkutsk Institute of National Economy with a degree in economics. In 1990, he graduated from the Higher Courses of the KGB of the Soviet Union with a degree in officer with higher specialized education. From 1988 to 2016, he served in the security agencies, though no further information about such service is available.

From 2011 to 2016, Seryshev held the position of Head of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service in the Republic of Karelia. From 2016 to 2018, he served as deputy director of the Federal Customs Service. On 13 JUNE 2018, Seryshev was appointed Assistant to the President of Russia. On 12 OCT 2021, he was appointed as the 6th Plenipotentiary Representative in the Siberian Federal District.

Summary of Role:

The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Seryshev serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Siberian Federal District comprises the West Siberian (part) and East Siberian economic regions and ten federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 17,178,298 Russians live in the Siberian Federal District.

Organizational Membership:

While it cannot be confirmed, it is assumed that Gutsan is a member of the United Russia political party, given his close ties with Vladimir Putin.
Incidents and Events of Note:

In FEB 2022, Australia banned Gutsan from entry into its country.
Name:
NIKOLAY NIKOLAYEVICH TSUKANOV

Title:
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Ural Federal District

Role:
Serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government

Biographical Summary:

Nikolay Nikolayevich Tsukanov ("Tsukanov") was born on 22 MAR 1965 in Lipovo, Russian SFSR, USSR. Upon graduating from school in 1980, Tsukanov entered a local special professional technical college (SPTU) and obtained a specialist degree as an electrical welder. From 1983 to 1985, he served in the Soviet army in a space communications guard battalion stationed in Czechoslovakia.

After 1985, he began to gain prominence as a local Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist League) leader. In the 1990s, he became a relatively successful businessman. In 1999, he graduated from the Higher School of Privatization and Entrepreneurship with a specialization in law.

In 2005, Tsukanov was elected to the post of Mayor of Gusec. In 2009, he would become the head of the Gusec municipal area. In MAR 2009, he became chairman of the Council of municipal formations of Kaliningrad Oblast. In 2010, he was elected secretary of the local political council of the United Russia party. On 28 SEPT 2010, he became Governor of Kaliningrad Oblast. On 26 JUNE 2018, Tsukanov replaced Igor Kholmanskikh as the presidential envoy to the Ural Federal District.

Summary of Role:

The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. In this role, Tsukanov serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government. He is also primarily responsible for overseeing the compliance of the federal subjects with federal laws. The Ural
Federal District comprises the Central (part) and West Siberian economic regions and six federal subjects. As of the 2010 Census, 12,080,526 Russians live in the Ural Federal District.

**Organizational Membership:**

He is a member of the United Russia political party.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

Unknown.
Name:
IGOR KOMAROV
Title:
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District
Role:
Serves as a liaison between the federal subjects and the federal government

Biographical Summary:

Igor Komarov ("Komarov") was born on 25 May 1964 in Engels, Russia. Komarov is a Russian industrialist, financier, and manager. He graduated from the Moscow State University in 1986 with a specialty in Economics.


In March 2014, the government appointed the head of the United Rocket and Space Corporation. On 24 May 2018 by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Komarov was dismissed from office as the General Director of Roscosmos State Corporation. Since 7 Sept 2018 Komarov has been the Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District.

Summary of Role:

The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. Komarov serves as a liaison between the Russian Federation and its subjects in the Volga Federal District.
Organizational Membership:

United Russia.

Incidents and Events of Note:

Unknown
Biographical Summary:

Yury Yavoklevich Chaika (“Chaika”) was born 21 May 1951 in Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, Russian SFSR, USSR. Chaika is a Russian lawyer and politician, Presidential Envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District since 2020. Previously he served as Prosecutor General of Russia from 2006 to 2020 and Minister of Justice from 1999 to 2006.

Chaika began his career as an electrician working in a shipyard. After serving in the army, Chaika graduated from Sverdlovsk Institute of Law in 1976 and began work at Irkutsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office where he served as an investigator and a deputy district prosecutor. In 1983, he became head of the investigations at the East Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office. From 1984 to 1992, Chaika worked in various positions for the Irkutsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office, the regional Communist Party and the East Siberian Transport Prosecutor’s Office. In 1992, he was appointed Irkutsk Oblast prosecutor.

In 1995, he became the first deputy Russian prosecutor general. He was appointed by then Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov, his former classmate from Sverdlovsk Institute of Law. Chaika served as acting prosecutor general for a brief spell between April and August 1999. From August 1999 to June 2006, he served as justice minister. On 23 June 2006, Chaika became Russian prosecutor general, effectively swapping jobs with his predecessor Vladimir Ustinov who took up the post of justice minister. On 22 January 2020 he was appointed Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to North Caucasus Federal District after resigning from his previous post.

Summary of Role:
The role of a Plenipotentiary Representative is to oversee the work of federal agencies in the region. This role is viewed as extensive and of considerable consequence. Chaika serves as a liaison between the Russian Federation and its subjects in the North Caucasian Federal District.

**Organizational Membership:**

Russian Federation

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

Unknown
Name:  
VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH KOLOKOLTSEV  
Title:  
Minister of Internal Affairs  
Role:  

Biographical Summary:

Vladimir Alexandrovich Kolokoltsev (“Kolokoltsev”) was born in 1961 in the Penza region. In 1982, he began his career working with a special unit specializing in foreign diplomatic missions in Moscow. In 1984, he became platoon commander of a separate patrol battalion in the Gagarinskiy district executive committee in Moscow. In 1989, Kolokoltsev graduated from the Higher Political College of the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR. Post-grad he returned to the police force and slowly worked his way to head of the police department in the Kuntshevski district.

During the 1990’s, Kolokoltsev worked in many Organized Crime Departments in different police stations throughout Moscow. In 1997, he started working in the ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation and the Department of Organized Crime Prevention of the Ministry of Interior of Russia in Moscow. Roughly 2 years later he was appointed chief of the Regional Operational Search Bureau of the Department on Organized Crime Prevention of the Ministry of Interior of Russia. In 2010 he was given the rank of Militsiya Lieutenants-general and after re-attestation in 2011, was appointed by Presidential decree to the position of the Chief of Moscow Police as lieutenant-general. In 2012, Kolokoltsev was appointed as Minister of Interior, replacing Rashid Nurgaliyev. In 2020 he resigned for 2 days before being reinstated.

Summary of Role:

The Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation is the head of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Minister is appointed by the President of Russia upon recommendation of the Prime Minister of Russia.

Organizational Membership:
Political party is either Independent or United Russia.\textsuperscript{111}

\textbf{Incidents and Events of Note:}

17 MAR 2022 - Sanctioned by New Zealand

28 FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by Australia

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Kolokoltsev in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

On 2 AUG 2019, the Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović, wrote a letter to the Kolokoltsev, regarding the action taken by law enforcement agencies to disperse the largely peaceful protests in Moscow on 27 JUL 2019, and recommended that the Russian authorities ensure that human rights are respected in the context of policing of assemblies.\textsuperscript{112}


\textsuperscript{111} Kolokoltsev’s presence at United Russia congress was legal - Ministry of Internal Affairs, REGNUM (Dec. 9, 2018, 20:48), https://regnum-ru.translate.goog/news/2534226.html?_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp.

Name:  
SERGEY LAVROV  
Title:  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Role:  

Biographical Summary:  

Sergey Lavrov (“Lavrov”) was born in 1950 in Moscow. He graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1972 with a focus on international relations. After being admitted to university, Lavrov was sent to a student construction brigade for a month to build the Ostankino Tower. After graduating he was employed in the Soviet Embassy in Sri Lanka - at the time there was a close market and economic cooperation between both countries. Lavrov was tasked with analyzing the situation in the country, translator, and assistant to Rafiq Nishonov and eventually Lavrov gained diplomatic rank of attache.

In 1976, Lavrov returned to Moscow and served as a secretary in the Section for the International Economic Relations, analyzing and working with various international organizations, such as the United Nations. In 1981, he served as Senior Advisor at the United Nations in New York, returning in 1988 to Moscow becoming Deputy Chief of the Section of the International Economic Relations of the USSR.

Between 1990-1992 Lavrov served as Director of the International Organization of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. During this time, he was tasked to watch over activities concerning Human Rights and International Cultural Cooperation. In 1994, he returned to work with the United Nations, as Permanent Representative of Russia. The following years he served as President of the UN Security Council: DEC 1995, JUN 1997, JUL 1998, OCT 1999, APR 2002, and JUN 2003. In 1994, in his role as Permanent Representative of Russia with the UN, he signed the Budapest Memorandum - where Russia guaranteed the security of the borders of Ukraine.

In MAR 1994, President Putin appointed Lavrov as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Summary of Role:

Organizational Membership:

Incidents and Events of Note:

On 25 FEB 2022, the U.S. Treasury announced that it had imposed sanctions on Lavrov in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Name:
MARIA ZAKHAROVA
Title:
Director of the Information
Role:
Promoted the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.

Biographical Summary:

Maria Zakharova (“Zakharova”) was born on 24 DEC 1975 in Moscow. In 1981 Zakharova moved with her family to Beijing when her father, Vladimir Zakharov, was appointed to the Soviet embassy there. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, her family left Beijing in 1991 and moved back to Russia in 1993.

In 1998, Zakharova graduated from the Faculty of International Journalism at Moscow State Institute of International Relations in orientalism and journalism. Zakharova carried out her pre-diploma apprenticeship at the Russian Embassy in Beijing.

From 2003 to 2005, Zakharova worked at the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. From 2005 to 2008, she was the press secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York City. She returned to the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 2008 to 2011. On 10 AUG 2015, Zakharova was appointed Director of the Information and Press Department by order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Zakharova is the first woman to have held the position.

Summary of Role:

As Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zakharova is the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Zakharova promoted the deployment of Russian forces in Ukraine.
**Organizational Membership:**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

**Incidents and Events of Note:**

18 MAR 2022 - Japan sanctioned Zakharova as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

08 MAR 2022 - Australia imposed sanctions on Zakharova as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

23 FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by E.U. because she “supported actions and policies which undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.”
Name:
ALEKSANDR PETROVICH CHUPRIYAN
Title:
Acting Minister of Emergency Situations
Role:
The Minister of Emergency Situations bears responsibility for performance assigned to the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia.

Biographical Summary:
Aleksandr Petrovich Chupriyan (“Chupriyan”) was born 23 MAR 1958 and is a Russian statesman, and political military commander, who is serving as the interim Minister of Emergency Situations since 8 SEPT 2021. Aleksandr Chupriyan was born in Ukhta on 23 MAR 1958. He graduated from high school. From 1976 to 1978 he served in the Soviet Army. In 1979, Chupriyan was a firefighter in the service of the Fire Department of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Leningrad Regional Executive Committee of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs. He graduated from the courses of the middle commanding staff of the fire department in 1980. In 1980, he was the chief of the guard of the 14th militarized fire department of the 7th detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade. In 1982, he was the deputy head, then in 1983, he was promoted to the head of the 3rd militarized fire brigade of the 7th detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade, the Fire Department of the Central Internal Affairs Directorate of the Leningrad City Executive Committee. In 1987, he was the deputy chief of the 1st detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade.

In 1989, Chupriyan graduated from the Higher Engineering Fire-Fighting School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR with a degree in firefighting and safety engineering. The same year, Chupriyan was the head of the 1st detachment of the paramilitary fire brigade. In 1993, Chupriyan was the Deputy Head of the State Fire Service Directorate of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast. In 1996, he was the Deputy Head of the Department of the Saint-Petersburg University of the State Fire Service of the EMERCOM of Russia. In 1997, he was the acting Head of the State Fire Service Directorate of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region.
In 2003, he was the Head of the Main Directorate of the State Fire Service of the EMERCOM of Russia. Since 2005, he was the Head of the North-West Regional Center of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters. Between 2006 and 2018, Chupriyan was the Deputy Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of the Consequences of Natural Disasters. Since JUN 2018, Chupriyan has been the first First Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations.

**Summary of Role:**

The Minister of Emergency Situations, is the head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations and is one of the five “presidential” ministers along with the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and justice. The Minister of Emergency Situations bears responsibility for performance assigned to the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia.

**Organizational Membership:**

**Incidents and Events of Note:**
Name:
MAXIM GENNADYEVICH RESHETNIKOV

Title:
Minister of Economic Development

Role:
As Minister of Economic Development, Reshetnikov is responsible for infrastructure development programmes in Crimea and Sevastopol.

Biographical Summary:
Maxim Gennadyevich Reshetnikov (“Reshetnikov”) was born 11 JUL 1979. Reshetnikov graduated from the Perm State University at the Department of Economic Cybernetics in 2000 with a degree in economics and mathematics. In 2002, Reshetnikov obtained a degree in linguistics-translator. The following year, 2003, he obtained a degree in Economic Sciences.

Starting in 2000, Reshetnikov worked with the Sterlinggroup Forecast and then began working in the Administration of the Perm Region, Perm Territory at the time. Following that he worked as head of the budget revenue and expense planning department, head of the regional finance and investment department, deputy head of the Main Directorate of Economics, First Deputy Chairman of the Regional Planning Department, and Director of the Department. Between 2006-2007, Reshetnikov was First Deputy Head of the Administration of the Governor of the Perm Krai. In 2007-2008, he became Deputy Director of the Department of the Intergovernmental Relations of the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation. From JUN 2008 to OCT 2009, he was Director of the Department for Monitoring and Evaluating the Performance of Government agencies of the Subject of the Russian Federation in the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation.

From OCT 2009- DEC 2010, Reshetnikov was appointed Director of the Department of Public Administration, Regional Development and Local-Self Government of the Apparatus of the Government of the Russian Federation. From DEC 2010 to APR 2012, he was First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Mayor and the Government of Moscow. Then from APR 2012-FEB 2017, he was
Minister of the Government of Moscow, Head of the Department of Economic Policy and City Development.

In FEB 2017, Reshetnikov was temporarily appointed, by President Putin, as acting Governor of Perm Krai, winning the election by SEP 2017. In DEC. 2017 he joined the United Russia Party and in JAN 2020, he was appointed Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation in Mikhail Mishustin’s Cabinet.

Summary of Role:

As Minister of Economic Development, Reshetnikov is responsible for infrastructure development programmes in Crimea and Sevastopol, most notably under the federal target programme “Social and Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea and Sebastopol until 2022” which has been extended until 2025. Reshetnikov has made public statements outlining the plans and priorities of the government of the Russian Federation concerning the economic development of Crimea and Sevastopol.

Organizational Membership:

United Russia. Member of the Supervisory Council of the VTB Bank, a State-owned bank and associated with Dmitriy Grigorenko, member of the Supervisory Council of VTB Bank.

Incidents and Events of Note:

23 FEB 2022 - Sanctioned by E.U. “for actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine” and “for providing financial and material support, and benefitting from Russian decision-makers responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine.”