



**HUMANITY FOR FREEDOM
FOUNDATION**

Russian Disinformation in the Balkans: Geopolitics, History, and the Impact of the Ukraine War



A joint report from

**Humanity for Freedom Foundation and
Humanity for Freedom Foundation Balkans**

Part of the HFF FREEDOM LIGHT SERIES

Shining a light on authoritarian disinformation and propaganda efforts

VOLUME ONE

Forward

This report was commissioned by Humanity for Freedom Foundation and Humanity for Freedom Foundation Balkans as part of the HFF FREEDOM LIGHT series. HFF FREEDOM LIGHT is a series of investigative papers that shine a light on authoritarian disinformation and propaganda efforts.

Both organisations share a central goal: to help fight against authoritarianism and help protect against the erosion of freedom and a malevolent new world order. Using detailed research as well as connections to the affected areas, the report highlights the dangers Russia poses in the Balkans and suggestions on how the region should respond.

The world faces unprecedented threats from authoritarianism, with eastern Europe on the front line of this battle.

The Balkans is a collective term for disparate regions, nations, and peoples. What is identical is the desire from these people to be free.

East of the Balkans, on the very front line of this battle against authoritarianism, lies Ukraine. The Balkans will share Ukraine's fate if its leaders and the world continue to downplay the threat Russia poses to them.

As this report suggests, the Balkans is already at war. This war is currently a disinformation war, a war to sow doubts and confusion, and a war to make the inevitable physical conflict easier for the Russians to win.

The region and the world must act.

Sincerely,

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Introduction

In recent years, the Balkans have become a focal point for Russian disinformation campaigns, aimed at destabilizing the region, undermining democratic institutions, and advancing Moscow's strategic objectives.

This report will provide an in-depth analysis of the various tactics employed by Russia to manipulate public opinion and exert influence in the Balkan countries, highlighting the significant challenges these campaigns pose to regional stability and democracy.

In this work, we will explore the geopolitical and historical context of the Balkans, which makes the region particularly susceptible to foreign interference. We will examine the state of play, discussing specific tactics used by Russia, including the deployment of troll farms, paid advertising, and support for pro-Russian groups in the region. Additionally, we will provide concrete examples of Russian disinformation efforts, illustrating their impact on the Balkan countries and their populations.

Finally, we offer five recommendations on how the Balkan states can counter Russian influence and disinformation effectively.

These recommendations will focus on strengthening media literacy, enhancing cybersecurity, supporting independent journalism, promoting regional cooperation, and engaging with international partners.

Through this comprehensive examination, we aim to shed light on the extent and impact of Russian disinformation campaigns on the Balkan countries, while providing viable and workable solutions to ensure the protection of democratic institutions, national security, and regional stability.

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Executive Summary

The Balkans, a region with a complex history of ethnic, religious, and political rivalries, has become a target for Russian disinformation campaigns. Russia's strategic interests in the region are to undermine the unity of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while bolstering its influence in the Balkans. These campaigns exploit existing divisions, promote anti-Western narratives, and spread fake news to destabilize the region and weaken its ties to the West.

Russian disinformation campaigns in the Balkans employ various tactics to achieve their objectives. These tactics include:

- Establishing and funding troll farms to create and disseminate fake news, conspiracy theories, and divisive content on social media platforms
- Paying public figures to promote Russian propaganda and anti-Western narratives
- Supporting pro-Russian groups and individuals in the region to create a network of influence
- Utilizing hackers and other cyber capabilities to manipulate online discourse and amplify divisive messages
- Establishing and funding media outlets that disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation



Examples of Russian disinformation can be found in various countries, such as Bulgaria, Kosovo, Serbia, and North Macedonia.

In Bulgaria, Russian trolls have been successful in shaping public opinion, with numerous websites and social media accounts spreading disinformation. In Serbia, Russia has been promoting disinformation campaigns aimed at reinforcing traditional ties between the two countries, positioning Russia as the protector of the Orthodox Christian faith and discrediting the EU and NATO.

Russian Examples of Disinformation

- In Bulgaria, Russian propaganda has been used to question the legitimacy of the Bulgarian government and cast doubt on the benefits of EU membership
- In Serbia, Russia has disseminated disinformation that portrays the EU and NATO as threats to Serbian sovereignty and security
- In North Macedonia, Russian disinformation has contributed to political instability and social unrest by exploiting ethnic tensions and promoting anti-Western sentiments

The State of Play in the Balkans

The Balkans have witnessed an increase in Russian disinformation campaigns, which utilize a range of tactics to advance their goals. These tactics include troll farms, paid advertising, and support for pro-Russian groups in each region.

The mechanics of Russian propaganda in the Balkans are relatively simple. Information originates from official Russian sources, including representatives of the Kremlin and state media outlets like TASS, Russia Today, and Sputnik.



Bulgarian news websites then translate and reprint the content, often without conducting any journalistic investigation. This information is then disseminated through posts on social networks, including groups specifically created for this purpose.

The main goal of this propaganda is to justify Putin's aggression in Ukraine, sow division in society, and undermine trust in democracy, the European Union, and NATO. The start of Russia's war against Ukraine saw a drastic rise in Russian propaganda pieces in Bulgarian online media, with the number of texts per day increasing by ten times at the outset of the conflict.

Propaganda subjects generally follow a conspiratorial geopolitical logic, presenting Russia as a victim under siege by the collective West (including the United States, NATO, and the EU) through its puppets and sell-out liberal elites. This narrative, which portrays Russia as the saviour of Europe and Ukraine, is disseminated without adaptation to the local cultural context, only taking on a local flavour when intersecting with specific political events.

While fake news is a component of Russian propaganda, it constitutes a relatively small percentage. Nevertheless, false stories, such as the presence of Polish mercenaries in Donbass before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, can still spread widely through Russian and Bulgarian media outlets, even after being officially debunked.

Examples

Fabricated News Stories

One notorious example of a fabricated news story was the 2016 "Lisa case", in which Russian media claimed that a 13-year-old Russian-German girl had been abducted and raped by migrants in Germany.

This story was later debunked, but not before it had caused significant tensions between Germany and Russia, as well as inciting anti-immigrant sentiment in the Balkans.



In 2017, a fake news article claimed that Swedish authorities had decided to ban the traditional Christmas holiday and replace it with a Muslim celebration called "Kandil". This story was widely circulated in the Balkans and served to fuel anti-Muslim sentiment and mistrust toward Western countries.

Another example of a fabricated news story occurred in 2017 when a fake article claimed that then- French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron was being secretly funded by Saudi Arabia. This disinformation campaign aimed to discredit Macron and created distrust in Western democracies among the Balkan population.

Social Media Manipulation

During the 2018 Macedonian name referendum, Russian trolls were found to have created and promoted hundreds of Facebook pages supporting the "Boycott" campaign.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian-backed social media campaigns have sought to exacerbate ethnic divisions and promote anti-Western sentiment.



In Bulgaria, Russian disinformation efforts have targeted the country's energy sector, particularly its reliance on Russian gas supplies. Social media campaigns have been used to spread false information about the supposed dangers of diversifying energy sources, promoting the narrative that Bulgaria should remain dependent on Russian gas.

State-sponsored Media Outlets

In 2016, Sputnik published an article claiming that the European Union was considering deploying military forces to quell protests in the Serbian city of Belgrade.

The article falsely stated that the EU was preparing to send a special military unit to Serbia due to concerns about the stability of the country during the protests.

This disinformation was not only reported by Sputnik but also picked up by other pro-Russian media outlets, leading to widespread circulation of the false claims. The article reached an audience of more than 1 million people on social media platforms, including Twitter, and caused a significant public reaction, further fuelling anti-Western sentiment in Serbia. The protests in question, organized by the opposition movement "Enough is Enough," attracted thousands of people, and the false claims about EU intervention added further tension to an already volatile situation.

Support for Fringe Political Groups

Russia has been known to support fringe political groups in the Balkans that align with its interests. In Montenegro, for example, Russia has been accused of backing the Democratic Front, an opposition party that opposes the country's NATO membership. Russian support has included providing financial assistance, helping to organize protests, and offering media support to amplify the party's message.

In Serbia, pro-Russian far-right groups such as the Serbian Radical Party, have received support and funding from Russian sources. This support has come in various forms, including financing party activities, organizing events, providing training for party members, and sharing Russian propaganda materials to be disseminated through the party's social media channels.



In North Macedonia, Russia has provided support to the far-right political party "United Macedonia", which actively opposes the Prespa Agreement between North Macedonia and Greece. This support has included financing campaigns, coordinating with party officials, and offering guidance on political strategies. By backing this party, Russia seeks to undermine the process of North Macedonia's integration into NATO and the European Union.

In Bulgaria, Russia has supported fringe political groups such as the far-right Ataka party, which promotes anti-Western and pro-Russian sentiments. This support has come in various forms, including financial assistance, providing Russian propaganda materials to be disseminated through the party's media channels, and offering media exposure through Russian state-controlled media outlets like RT and Sputnik. Ataka has been known to use these resources to amplify its message, fostering anti-EU and anti-NATO sentiments within Bulgaria.



Another Bulgarian political group that has received Russian support is the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Although not a fringe party, the BSP has a pro-Russian stance and has opposed Bulgaria's Western orientation. Russian support for the BSP has included sharing intelligence and providing guidance on political strategies, aiming to increase the party's influence in Bulgarian politics.

Finally, Nikolai Malinov, the chairman of the International Movement of Russophiles (MDR), a group that has been suspected of Russian influence. Malinov, a former BSP deputy, was accused

of spying for two Russian organizations and his movement was added to the US sanctions list under the global Magnitsky Act.

Despite this, he was awarded a state award by Vladimir Putin in 2019. This illustrates how Russian entities and individuals support fringe political groups in the Balkans, thereby shaping the political landscape in their favour.

Moreover, the connection between Reshetnikov and Malinov can be highlighted to demonstrate the links between Russian disinformation campaigns and political influence operations in the Balkans.

Reshetnikov's RISI commissioned a sociological study for the 2016 presidential elections in Bulgaria that showed rising support for Russia.

Malinov was the one who commissioned the study on behalf of RISI. This connection points to a concerted effort to manipulate public opinion in favour of Russia, demonstrating the interplay between disinformation and political influence.

Cyberattacks and Hacking

Russian cyberattacks often involve the use of sophisticated techniques to infiltrate networks and systems, steal sensitive information, disrupt operations, or spread disinformation. These attacks are often carried out by state-sponsored hacking groups, such as APT28 (also known as Fancy Bear) and APT29 (also known as Cozy Bear).

Some examples of Russian cyberattacks on institutions include:

Businesses: In 2017, a major ransomware attack known as NotPetya targeted businesses worldwide, causing billions of dollars in damage. The attack was attributed to the Russian military, and it mainly affected businesses in Ukraine, but also hit companies in the Balkans and other countries.

Schools: In 2019, the Bulgarian National Revenue Agency (NRA) was hacked, resulting in a massive data breach that exposed the personal and financial information of millions of Bulgarian citizens. This attack was suspected to be the work of Russian hackers, and it disrupted the country's tax collection system and eroded public trust in government institutions.

ATMs: In 2018, several banks in Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, were targeted by a series of ATM "jackpotting" attacks, in which hackers infected ATMs with malware that allowed them to steal cash. Russian cybercriminal groups were believed to be behind these attacks, causing significant financial losses for the targeted banks.

Hospitals: In 2020, a wave of ransomware attacks targeted hospitals and healthcare facilities across Europe, including the Balkans. These attacks, believed to be the work of Russian cybercriminal groups, disrupted healthcare services and put patients' lives at risk by locking medical staff out of critical systems and demanding ransoms for the release of encrypted data.

In focus: Russian spokespeople in Bulgarian media.

Historically, Russia has had no qualms with having public facing media figures across Bulgarian media. This has decreased, as the amount of faceless propaganda, increased.

This decrease is likely due to two factors: a reduction in direct Russian investment in Bulgaria and an increasing number of individuals distancing themselves from Putin's war.

Although some media and political figures continue to spread the Kremlin's narrative, they are not the most prominent sources quoted. Instead, Russian authorities and lesser-known foreign experts with Russian and English names, such as Scott Ritter, Nick Parker, and Valery Korovin, take precedence.

This shift has resulted in fewer original pieces on Bulgarian websites recycling Russian propaganda clichés and a higher number of articles that report on Russian sources or translate verbatim propaganda articles.

The Human and Social Studies Foundation (HSSF) report also highlights Bulgarian President Rumen Radev as a mouthpiece and disseminator of Russian propaganda, although he does not strictly parrot the Russian government's words.



The researchers argue that Radev periodically voices opinions that serve the Kremlin's interests, such as commenting on the halt of natural gas flows from Russia or opposing the supply of arms to Ukraine, claiming that it would draw Bulgaria into the war.

This decline in Bulgarian spokespeople, sympathetic to Russia, suggests a subtle change in the landscape of Russian disinformation in the Balkans.

As fewer Bulgarian voices actively promote the Kremlin's narratives, the focus has shifted towards Russian sources and foreign experts to maintain the flow of propaganda in the region.

How disinformation spreads

Russian disinformation in Bulgaria is primarily spread through local media outlets, digital platforms such as Facebook, fringe websites, blogs, and tabloids linked to oligarchs.

Bulgaria's low levels of media literacy, its communist past, and high levels of political corruption contribute to the country's vulnerability to pro-Russian disinformation.

Fringe websites and blogs that reprint disinformation from Russian sources lend a sense of credibility to pro-Kremlin opinions, which are then amplified on social media platforms such as Facebook. Certain media outlets are owned by businessmen with economic ties to Russia, who have a vested interest in maintaining a positive perception of Russian-funded projects in Bulgaria. Public media outlets, while providing overall objective coverage of the war, have also inadvertently contributed to the spread of disinformation, either through poor judgment or by airing debates that are mere pretences for disseminating pro-Kremlin propaganda.

Social media platforms, such as Facebook, are convenient tools for propagandists, who can fine-tune their messaging and optimize the content's reach by analysing user interactions.

Pages that initially spread conspiracy theories can gradually transition into publishing pro-Russian content, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic when misinformation about vaccines was rampant.

Countering such propaganda is challenging, but Hristo Milchev, founder of the Citizens Platform for Opposition to Discrimination, has found that people are more likely to change their mind when the debunking comes from someone close to them or perceived to be "on their team."

What disinformation aims to achieve?

The research conducted by the Human and Social Studies Foundation (HSSF) reveals that Russian propaganda in Bulgaria primarily aims to justify Putin's aggression in Ukraine, sow division in society, and undermine trust in democracy, the European Union, and NATO.



The onset of Russia's war against Ukraine coincided with a drastic rise in Russian propaganda pieces in Bulgarian online media. These propaganda pieces mainly focus on Kremlin's "talking points" that follow a conspiratorial geopolitical logic.

The study also notes that the main sources for "news" serving Kremlin's interests have shifted to official Kremlin authorities, such as Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov, Dmitry Peskov, and others. A significant portion of the top 25 media that spread Russian propaganda are aggregator websites that copy texts from other sources, while the rest publish content that gets reprinted by "bot"

pages. Some of these websites are interconnected, such as BLITZ and its eight aggregator websites.

The distribution of propaganda on social media, particularly Facebook, relies on republishing content released on specific websites, promoted by public profiles, pages, and groups. The super-spreaders of the Kremlin's theses on Facebook include the leader of the political party "Vazrazhdane" Kostadin Kostadinov and journalist Martin Karbovski. The analysis of public Facebook groups that spread propaganda content shows that Russian propaganda targets users dissatisfied with political parties, the government, and those nostalgic about socialism.

In conclusion, Russian propaganda in Bulgaria aims to manipulate public opinion, exploit dissatisfaction, and undermine trust in democratic institutions. Its rapid spread on social media, fuelled by algorithms that promote engagement, presents a significant challenge for countering its influence.

Recommendations

Ending Russian influence over media: As we have seen above, fabricated news stories and social media manipulation are major components of Russian disinformation campaigns. By investing in education programs that promote media literacy, the Balkan states can empower their citizens to identify and resist false information, thereby reducing its impact on public opinion. Law makers must be prepared to directly tackle disinformation propagated by broadcasters. If necessary, they should follow western countries and ban the likes of Russia Today.

Implementing Strict Regulatory Measures: Balkan states should introduce and enforce strict regulatory measures to curb the influence of Russian actors within their political systems and media landscapes. This may include banning payments originating from Russia to political parties, prohibiting payments to journalists from Russian sources, and restricting Facebook advertising from Russia sympathizers.

Implementing strict regulatory measures, such as banning payments from Russian sources to political parties and journalists and restricting advertising from Russia sympathizers on platforms like Facebook, is crucial. The influence of figures like Reshetnikov and Malinov, and their links to Russian disinformation and political interference, underline the urgent need for these measures.

By implementing these hard-hitting measures, the Balkan countries can significantly limit the opportunities for Russian entities to exploit their political and media environments, thereby protecting their democratic institutions from undue foreign influence.

Enhancing Cybersecurity Measures: As mentioned in the report, cyberattacks and hacking have been used by Russia to target various institutions in the Balkans. The Balkan states should prioritize improving their cybersecurity infrastructure, including training specialized personnel, implementing advanced security technologies, and sharing best practices with their regional partners. This will help to protect sensitive information and critical systems from potential attacks.

Ending Russian influence over media: As we have seen above, fabricated news stories and social media manipulation are major components of Russian disinformation campaigns.

Supporting Independent Journalism: State-sponsored media outlets like Sputnik and RT have been used to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and disinformation. Encouraging and supporting independent journalism in the Balkans can provide an alternative to state-controlled media and contribute to a more diverse and accurate information landscape. This can be achieved through funding, capacity-building programs, and legal protections for journalists.

Promoting Regional Cooperation: As mentioned in the report, Russia has supported fringe political groups in several Balkan countries. By fostering regional cooperation and dialogue, Balkan states can work together to counteract these efforts, share information on disinformation campaigns, and develop joint strategies to counteract Russian influence. This could be facilitated through existing regional organizations and initiatives or the creation of new mechanisms for collaboration.

Engaging with International Partners: Working closely with international partners, such as the European Union and NATO can help the Balkan states to access resources, expertise, and

support in countering Russian influence. These partnerships can offer strategic guidance, technical assistance, and financial support for initiatives aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, enhancing cybersecurity, and promoting media freedom.

By implementing these recommendations, the Balkan states can build resilience against Russian disinformation campaigns and work to protect their democratic institutions, national security, and regional stability.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Balkan region faces a multifaceted challenge from various forms of Russian influence.

From the significant presence of Russian propaganda in Bulgaria to the potential impact of Russian disinformation campaigns in Montenegro's political landscape, and the influence of the Wagner Group in countries like North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania, the Kremlin's reach extends across multiple aspects of Balkan society and politics.

Efforts to counter Russian influence in the region have been met with mixed success. While some progress has been made in addressing certain aspects, such as Montenegro's accession to NATO and the European Union's cyber defence initiatives, more needs to be done to comprehensively address the problem. The lack of proper investigation into the Wagner Group's activities and the prevalence of Russian propaganda in local media outlets underscore the need for increased vigilance and cooperation among Balkan nations and their Western allies.

Ultimately, the Balkans' stability and Euro-Atlantic integration are at stake. To effectively counter Russian influence in the region, a combination of stronger political will, enhanced cooperation between local authorities and international partners, and increased public awareness of disinformation and propaganda campaigns is essential.

By addressing these challenges in a cohesive and strategic manner, the Balkan countries can better safeguard their political, economic, and social landscapes from external interference and foster a future more aligned with their Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

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About Humanity for Freedom Foundation

A global non-profit organization based in the United States, Humanity for Freedom Foundation seeks to educate all people about the increasing threats to our freedom from authoritarian governments and movements across the world, with the purpose of pushing back those threats and helping secure freedom's future.

About Humanity for Freedom Foundation - Balkans

Humanity for Freedom Foundation Balkans is an affiliate of Humanity for Freedom Foundation and seeks to educate all people about the increasing threats to freedom in the Balkans.

We must stop the erosion of freedom and maintain a critically important global balance.

**TO ENSURE FREEDOM AND PROTECT GLOBAL INTERESTS, WE MUST
STOP AUTHORITARIANISM**

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