

NEW DISPLACEMENT

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Syrians and Lebanese cross the border at the Masnaa crossing after it was bombed - October 4, 2024



Contents

Overview	5
Syrian refugees in Lebanon before the recent escalation	6
• Economic Challenges	6
• Access to Services	6
• Hostility and External Pressure	6
Conditions of return and crossing challenges:	6
• Syria – Lebanon Official Border Crossings	9
• Crossing from Government of Syria-Controlled Areas to Northeast Syria	11
• Crossings between Northeast to Northwest Syria	12
Humanitarian Needs of Syrian new IDPs in Northern Syria	12
• Humanitarian needs in Northwest Syria	13
• Humanitarian needs in Northeast Syria	14
Bahar response	15
Protection risks	17
1. Safety and Security	17
2. Access to Crossline Areas	17
3. Housing Destruction and Land Rights:	17
4. Reintegration and Social Tensions	17
5. Documentation and Legal Status	18
6. Transportation and Safety Concerns	18
Recommendations	19

Overview



Syrians and Lebanese cross the border at the Masnaa crossing after it was bombed - October 4, 2024

The humanitarian response in Syria remains one of the most complex and critical crises in the world today. With over a decade of conflict, widespread displacement, and persistent socio-political instability, millions of Syrians continue to face severe hardships. The situation is further compounded by the ongoing hostilities, economic collapse, and deteriorating infrastructure, which have left large swathes of the population in urgent need of food, shelter, healthcare, and protection.

In recent days, the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon has become an increasingly pressing issue due to the deteriorating security situation in Lebanon, exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in Lebanon and the region. As Syrian refugees flee Lebanon, they face immense challenges upon crossing back into Syria. According to UNHCR, those returning under these circumstances are doing so in highly adverse conditions, and their journey is fraught with legal, security, and protection risks.

One of the most significant factors complicating the return of Syrian refugees is the “crossline” dynamic. Syria is fragmented into areas controlled by various actors, including the government of Syria, and local authorities in northwest and northeast Syria. These fragmented territories create substantial obstacles for refugees attempting to return, as they navigate complex control zones and bureaucratic hurdles. The safety and security concerns for new Syrian IDPs are particularly acute. In government-controlled areas, new Syrian IDPs face risks such as arbitrary detention, conscription, and harassment, particularly men of military age. Women and children, while facing challenges of their own, are more likely to attempt the return journey. In addition to these concerns, new IDPs must pass through areas controlled by different actors, each with its own rules and checkpoints. This crossline nature of the return presents logistical and safety challenges, as new IDPs face potential interrogation, detention, or worse when crossing from government-controlled to opposition-held areas.

Furthermore, many new IDPs find their homes destroyed or illegally occupied, while land and property laws issued by the government of

Syria like Decree 66 (2012) and Law 10 (2018) complicate the reclaiming of property, particularly in areas previously under opposition control. The reintegration process is also fraught with social tensions, especially in communities divided by the war along political, ethnic, or social lines. Bearing in mind that all of de facto authorities in Syria are politicizing the returnee file and leverage it for their interests locally and internationally.

This complex situation is compounded by the recent reduction in humanitarian assistance in northwest Syria, where 91.18% of the population lives below the poverty line, 41% face hunger, and the unemployment rate has reached 89%. Inflation, at 77.13% as of September 2024, has further eroded purchasing power, while the funding deficit for the Syria response, at 73.5%, threatens to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis. With 65% of the population in northwest Syria being IDPs reliant on aid, the reduced assistance will have a severe impact.

Given these challenges, it is critical that donors and civil society focus on both immediate humanitarian assistance and long-term solutions that address protection risks, housing and land rights, freedom of movement, and reintegration into Syrian society. These issues must be addressed to ensure the safe and dignified return of Syrian refugees, especially in the context of worsening conditions in Lebanon.

Syrian refugees in Lebanon before the recent escalation

According to UNHCR, Lebanon already hosts the largest number of refugees per capita in the world, with an estimated 1.25 million Syrian refugees and 11,000 refugees from other nations living there¹. The situation for Syrian refugees in Lebanon is critical even before the recent escalation due to the country's economic collapse and political instability. Lebanon, has been grappling with its worst financial crisis in decades, marked by hyperinflation, soaring poverty rates, and a crumbling public infrastructure. Refugees, like the broader Lebanese population, are suffering the consequences of this collapse, but their circumstances are compounded by their vulnerable status as non-citizens.

Economic Challenges

Syrian refugees in Lebanon face extreme economic hardship. As Lebanon's currency continues to devalue², basic necessities such as food, housing, and healthcare have become increasingly unaffordable. Over 90% of Syrian refugee families are now living in extreme poverty, unable to meet their most basic needs. Many have resorted to negative coping mechanisms such as child labor or reducing food consumption to survive. The economic collapse has also led to a significant reduction in employment opportunities for refugees. Given that many refugees rely on informal, low-wage jobs, the collapse of Lebanon's economy has disproportionately affected them, leaving many without any source of income.

Access to Services

Access to essential services like healthcare and education has also deteriorated. Lebanon's healthcare system, already weakened by years of underfunding, has been overwhelmed by the crisis. Hospitals are understaffed and undersupplied, making it difficult for refugees to receive necessary medical treatment³. Only a small fraction of Syrian refugee children are enrolled in formal education, with many unable to attend school due to the high cost of transportation or the need to contribute to family income.

Hostility and External Pressure

As the Lebanese public struggles with their own economic crisis, tensions between host communities and refugees have increased. Syrian refugees are often blamed for exacerbating Lebanon's problems, leading to discriminatory practices and violence against them⁴. Local authorities have implemented stricter residency requirements, and many refugees face eviction from informal settlements. The Lebanese government has been pushing for the repatriation of Syrian refugees, citing the strain on public resources, though returns to Syria remain fraught with risks. It's important to note that pressure and hostilities against Syrian refugees in Lebanon are fueled by Lebanese allies of the Syrian government, who promote the narrative that Syria is safe for return. This contrasts with international reports, which consistently highlight ongoing risks and unsafe conditions in Syria.

Conditions of return and crossing challenges

The recent escalation in the conflict in the region has led to significant displacement, both within Lebanon and across the Lebanon-Syria border. Hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, already living in precarious conditions, are now attempting to return to Syria to escape the intensifying airstrikes that have destroyed key border crossings. However, this mass return presents numerous challenges as new IDPs face dangerous journeys through formal and informal crossings, compounded by the complex and volatile situation within Syria itself.

As of the 14th of October, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that more than 294,000 people (both Lebanese and Syrian) have crossed into Syria since the escalation of the conflict in Lebanon began two weeks ago, 70% of them are Syrians who had sought safety in Lebanon⁵. Movements into Syria are primarily to Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, and Tartous Gover-

1 UNHCR scales up support as people flee Lebanon for Syria. <https://www.unhcr.org/uk/node/27214>.

2 World Bank- [Lebanon: Normalization of Crisis is No Road to Stabilization](#).


3 Health Economics Review: The fragile healthcare system in Lebanon: sounding the alarm about its possible collapse

4 CSIC- [Lebanon's Dangerous Campaign against Refugees](#)

5 UNHCR: [Lebanon crisis deepens as Israeli airstrikes intensify](#)

norates, with some also moving to non-government-controlled areas in the north-east and in the north-west and beyond. Many people are arriving


in Syria in dire conditions, with some having sustained injuries either during the difficult journey or as a result of the hostilities in Lebanon. More than half of the new arrivals are women and girls, and over 60% are children under the age of 18. People are arriving at border points either by car or on foot, carrying only what they could manage.





A

294,000+




Conflict in Lebanon forces 294,000+ people into Syria (70% are Syrian refugees).



B

MAIN DESTINATIONS



Damascus, Rural Damascus, Homs, Tartous, and to non-government-controlled areas .



C


MEDICAL CONDITIONS

Dangerous journeys and injuries, with Syria facing complex, volatile conditions.



D

DEMOGRAPHICS



Over 50% are women and girls; 60%+ are children under 18. Many travel by car or on foot with few belongings.


Syria – Lebanon Official Border Crossings

The formal crossings between Lebanon and Syria—such as the Jadeidet Yabous - Masnaa crossing—have historically been essential routes for refugees, humanitarian aid, and commerce. These official crossings are typically better regulated, with infrastructure that allows for smoother travel. However, the ongoing airstrikes have severely disrupted this border crossing point.

With the border crossing disruption, thousands of people, including Syrian new IDPs, find themselves trapped in Lebanon, forced to search for alternative—and often more dangerous—routes. The risk of further air strikes adds another layer of danger to new IDPs. It's noteworthy that there are six formal border crossing points connecting Syria with Lebanon. These crossings, including Jadeidet Yabous-Masana, Mutriba, Al-Arida, Telkelakh, Debussiya, and Jousiya, serve as critical routes as well. Informal crossings, once essential for evading conflict, are similarly threatened, leaving many trapped in perilous conditions.

In areas controlled by the Syrian government, new IDPs face the greatest risks. Since the start of the civil war in 2011, the Assad regime has viewed those who fled the country with suspicion. The regime perceives many new IDPs, especially men of fighting age, as potential traitors, or deserters. Consequently, new IDPs' risk being arrested at checkpoints or detained upon reaching their home regions. There are widespread reports of new IDPs being arbitrarily detained, tortured, or forcibly conscripted into the Syrian army. The risk is particularly acute for individuals who were politically active or critical of the regime before they fled.

Additionally, the regime controls key checkpoints and requires bribes for safe passage. At each checkpoint, new IDPs may be subjected to questioning, harassment, or even arrest. The constant fear of conscription or detention significantly discourages Syrians from returning through government-controlled areas, despite the pressure to escape the deteriorating situation in Lebanon.





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Crossing from Government of Syria-Controlled Areas to Northeast Syria

As of October 14, 2024, the NES NGOs Forum in northeast Syria has reported 19,502 people displaced from Lebanon have entered through formal crossline entry points⁶. Currently, four formal crossline entry points have been reported as used by displaced people from Lebanon into Syria. From GoS to NES areas, four formal crossline entry points were identified: Asi entry point in Tabqa Sub-District in Raqqqa Governorate; Ekershi entry point in Sabka Sub-District, in Raqqqa Governorate; Tayha (Abu Kahf) entry point in Menbij Sub-District, in Aleppo Governorate; and Dadat entry point in Menbij Sub-District, in Aleppo Governorate has been identified.

The Local Authorities at the formal crossline entry point between GoS and NES have implemented various processes depending on the place of origin of the displaced from Lebanon arriving or passing through NES. There has been a long-standing practice in NES to limit freedom of movement for people displaced by the war who are not originally from NES or who don't have first- or -degree related family members from NES. This practice is being applied to the arrival of newly or further displaced people arriving at or passing through NES.

The humanitarian community in NES has condemned this practice of limiting freedom of movement for people displaced by war, as it infringes on Internally Displaced People (IDP) and Refugee Law and protection mechanisms. However, to accurately report on the differences in situation faced by displaced people from Lebanon, two categories, each with two sub-categories, are used below to highlight the multiple challenges and constraints faced by each. This categorisation by NES also leads to those displaced people from NES being located in some camps, while those displaced and not ascertained as not originally from NES are in other camps, i.e., informal open camps or formal closed camps.

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6 NES NGO Forum's flash update





Figure 1 - Map representing the different cross-line entry points into and out of Northeast Syria.

Crossings between Northeast to Northwest Syria

The Aoun al-Dadat crossing, located between NWS and NES, has become a pivotal point in the lives of civilians, where blatant exploitation occurs. As of October 14, 2024, it was reported that 2,900 persons have crossed from NES to NWS. Crossing individuals endure harsh treatment, facing delays by controlling party. Numerous testimonies reveal weeks of waiting in harsh conditions. The crossing is not merely a passage for individuals; it has transformed into a hub for informal trade. Passengers are compelled to pay amounts ranging from \$160 to \$572, encompassing transportation costs. Smuggling routes are also available, further increasing financial exploitation. Interestingly, both parties in NES and NWS prefer the continuation of this unofficial network, which serves their economic interests without requiring direct involvement. These unspoken alliances illustrate the scale of corruption amongst the conflicting parties. The Aoun al-Dadat crossing has become a manifestation of the ongoing struggle between opposing forces, where civilians are exploited daily symbolizing a network that intertwines power and corruption, reflecting a significant lack of oversight and division of interests in conflict-affected areas. The dire conditions underscore an urgent need for genuine intervention to uphold civilian rights and halt this ongoing exploitation.





People waiting at Aoun al-Dadat crossing point

To date, there are no news about Syrians crossing from GoS controlled areas from to NWS through Abu Zandin in Albab sub-District and Trenba at the vicinity of Saraqeb.

Humanitarian Needs of Syrian new IDPs in Northern Syria

Humanitarian needs in Northwest Syria

Since the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon on September 23, the number of Syrians fleeing to northwest Syria has remained relatively low, according to UNHCR. However, the influx has gradually increased. Most of these households originate from northwest Syria and are currently staying with relatives. Over 80% of the households consist of women and children, with more than half headed by women. Nearly 50% of the families have members, primarily men, still in Lebanon, as many Syrian men of military age are withholding from returning to Syria to avoid conscription or potential legal consequences, particularly those wanted by the Syrian regime. This absence of male family members has left returning households, primarily composed of vulnerable groups such as women, children, and the elderly, in an even more precarious situation. A number of Syrian families who have crossed the border have relocated to specific areas.

Additionally, it is estimated that approximately 900 individuals are currently stranded at the Aoun al-Dadat crossing point. These individuals, many of whom are vulnerable families, are awaiting mandatory security screenings by the relevant authorities before they can be permitted entry into northwest Syria. This delay is creating a bottleneck at the crossing, adding to the pressure on the already limited resources available in the area. The families on hold are reportedly facing growing uncertainty and frustration as they await clearance, with the process of security checks being crucial for ensuring the safety and stability of the region. As of October 14, there have been no reported arrivals of Lebanese nationals or non-Syrians in northwest Syria.

It is worth mentioning that the humanitarian situation in northwest Syria has deteriorated significantly due to a recent reduction in assistance, exacerbating the already dire conditions in the region. With 91.18% of the population living below the poverty line, 41% facing hunger, and an unemployment rate of 89%, the population is grappling with extreme vulnerability and protection threats. Compounding these challenges is a staggering inflation rate of 77.13% as of September 2024, severely reducing purchasing power⁷. The funding deficit for the Syria response, currently at 73.5%, threatens to further worsen the situation, especially for the 5 million residents of northwest Syria, 65% of whom are internally displaced persons (IDPs) reliant on humanitarian aid⁸. Without adequate support, the region faces a deepening humanitarian crisis.

Humanitarian needs in Northeast Syria

Based on the priority needs identified through interviews conducted by REACH, below a summary of the key findings regarding the urgent needs of households arriving in the assessed locations:

- **Food:** The most frequently identified first priority, with the majority of households indicating an urgent need for food assistance. Food security remains a critical issue across all assessed locations.
- **Shelter:** Shelter was frequently cited as a top or second priority need, with many households requiring immediate shelter solutions, especially with the approaching winter
- **Non-Food Items (NFIs):** NFIs such as blankets, mattresses, and other essential household items were highlighted as a crucial need, particularly as families prepare for the winter months.
- **Winterization:** A recurring third priority need, winterization support (such as heaters, warm clothing, and insulation materials) is essential as colder temperatures approach.
- **Livelihoods:** Several households also listed livelihoods as a priority, indicating the need for income generation opportunities to support their long-term stability.
- **Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH):** WASH needs, including access to clean water and sanitation facilities, were also mentioned as an important area, though typically listed as a third priority need.
- **Health and nutrition:** The arrival of new IDPs from Lebanon in northwest Syria has intensified the demand for healthcare and nutrition services. The displaced population is facing critical shortages of health infrastructure and medical supplies, further exacerbated by the region's pre-existing needs. Key health needs include primary and secondary care, maternal and child health services, disease surveillance, and mental health support. Nutrition interventions are also urgent, focusing on screening and treating acute malnutrition in children and pregnant/lactating women, as well as micronutrient supplementation and infant feeding counseling
- **Protection:** access to legal documentation, protection from arbitrary arrest and detention, prevention of gender-based violence (GBV), and child protection services. They also require secure shelter, mental health and psychosocial support, and protection from exploitation by armed groups. Addressing these needs is critical to ensuring safety, dignity, and access to basic services, as new IDPs face heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and displacement upon arrival

The needs vary by location, but overall, the immediate requirements focus on food, shelter, NFIs, and winterization support. Livelihoods and WASH services are also of significant importance, highlighting the need for a multisectoral response to address the diverse and pressing needs of the displaced population. The most common type of shelter for people who arrived is mud brick houses, with some also residing in tents.


⁷ Response Coordination Team, October bulletin on economic parameters during September 2024

⁸ CCCM cluster in NWS

Bahar response

In response to the subsequent influx of Syrian families, Bahar swiftly mobilized its resources to provide essential humanitarian assistance. On October 7, Bahar's team-initiated communication with the local council in Jarabulus to explore ways to support the arriving families. The following day, Bahar deployed a team comprising doctors, nurses, a mobile clinic, a mobile kitchen, and outreach protection and community health workers to the area. The team's primary goal was to deliver medical aid and distribute hot meals, including soup, to these families. However, there have been a recent directive from the local council prohibiting NGOs provision of aid to new IDPs resulting in suspension of Bahar's response to the new IDPs.

In case of resumption of new IDPs' influx to northwest Syria, Bahar has begun monitoring the displacement movement on the ground, ready to adjust and redirect current programs, while also working on mobilizing funding by engaging with donors and partners.





Protection risks:

The return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon is fraught with numerous legal, security, and safety challenges, compounded by the complex dynamics of “crossline” issues. Crossline refers to movement across territories controlled by different actors in Syria, such as government-held areas, opposition-controlled and NES regions. This fragmentation presents significant obstacles for returning refugees, as they navigate a patchwork of control, insecurity, and bureaucratic hurdles. It is important to emphasise that according to UNHCR, Syrian refugees fleeing Lebanon back to Syria are considered to be returning under adverse circumstances as people are fleeing airstrikes in Lebanon, where many Syrian refugees, as well as Lebanese, have also been killed and injured.

1. Safety and Security

Despite the Syrian government’s assurances, large parts of the country remain insecure due to sporadic fighting, unresolved political tensions, and the presence of various armed groups, including remnants of extremist organizations. Areas outside government control, especially in Idlib and northeastern Syria, are prone to airstrikes and military operations. Even within government-controlled areas, the risk of arbitrary detention, conscription, and harassment by security forces remains high, particularly for individuals perceived to have been involved with opposition groups or who avoided military service during the war. A significant aspect of the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon is that the majority of new IDPs are women and children. This demographic imbalance stems from the serious safety and security concerns that men, particularly those of conscription age, face upon their return to Syria. Men, especially young adults, are at high risk of being conscripted into the Syrian military upon their return. The Syrian government continues to enforce mandatory military service, and new IDPs are often targeted for conscription, even if they fled the country to avoid the conflict. Those who previously avoided service or were involved with opposition groups face the additional threat of arbitrary arrest, detention, or persecution by government forces. This has created widespread fear among men, particularly those who are perceived as politically or militarily opposed to the regime.

2. Access to Crossline Areas

The crossline nature of return means that refugees may need to pass through areas controlled by different actors, each with its own set of rules, checkpoints, and security protocols. This adds to the logistical difficulties of return, as some areas may require permissions from multiple authorities, while others may be entirely inaccessible due to ongoing conflict. Crossing from opposition-held territories into government-controlled regions, for instance, can be perilous, with refugees facing interrogation or even detention by government forces.

3. Housing, Lands and Properties Rights:

One of the most pressing challenges for new IDPs is the destruction of housing and infrastructure. The war has left entire neighborhoods in ruins, and many new IDPs find their homes either destroyed or illegally occupied. Discrimination against certain groups, such as ethnic minorities and those perceived to have opposed political views, further hampers new IDPs’ efforts to reclaim their homes. Women, especially widows, face gender-based barriers when trying to access their property rights due to discriminatory inheritance laws. In addition, Syrian land and property laws have made it difficult for new IDPs to reclaim their homes. Laws such as Decree 66 (2012) and Law 10 (2018) have allowed the government to seize and redevelop land, particularly in areas formerly held by opposition forces. These legal frameworks disproportionately affect new IDPs, who often lack the documentation to prove ownership or residency. Without a home, many new IDPs are forced to live in temporary shelters or with relatives in overcrowded conditions. With limited institutional capacity and weak rule of law, the ability of local authorities to address these HLP issues is often inadequate, leaving new IDPs vulnerable to displacement, exploitation, and legal uncertainty.

4. Reintegration and Social Tensions

Upon return, many Syrians face challenges in reintegrating into communities that have been deeply divided by the conflict. New IDPs may encounter suspicion or hostility from local populations, especially if they are perceived as having fled to avoid the hardships of war. Additionally, some new IDPs re-

turn to areas now controlled by political or military factions that were hostile to their ethnic or religious group during the war. These social tensions make reintegration difficult and can contribute to a sense of isolation or insecurity.

5. Civil Documentation and Legal Status:

Many refugees face challenges related to their legal status upon return. Some may have left Syria without proper documentation or lost their identification papers during displacement. To re-enter Syria legally, they must navigate complex bureaucratic procedures to obtain new documentation, which may involve bribery or dealing with corrupt officials. Additionally, men of conscription age face the risk of being drafted into the military upon their return, unless they are able to secure an exemption, which often involves high fees or political connections.

6. Transportation and Safety Concerns:

Logistically, new IDPs face significant difficulties related to transportation and the safety of their journey. Many new IDPs are forced to travel through insecure regions, navigating multiple checkpoints and potentially hazardous routes. Public transportation infrastructure in Syria has been severely damaged by the war, meaning new IDPs often rely on private vehicles or organized convoys. In some cases, they may be forced to pay bribes at checkpoints to ensure safe passage. Furthermore, ongoing clashes in parts of Syria make certain areas too dangerous to access, restricting the flow of returns to specific “safe” zones. Some forms of protection risks relating to transportations.

- New IDPs experienced exploitation by drivers and at checkpoints in government-controlled areas during their journey from Lebanon.
- Some young men in the camp face restricted movement in the Northeast Syria NES region due to the lack of documentation proving they are new IDPs from Lebanon, making them vulnerable to forced recruitment by the local authorities.
- A significant challenge is the inability of the new IDPs to return to their original homes in Tel Abyad due to security restrictions.



Bahar's Mobile Clinic at Aoun Al-Dadat crossing

Recommendations

It is crucial to emphasize that Syria remains unsafe in many of its regions, and the current movement of people should not be misinterpreted as a “return.” Efforts must be made to counter narratives that exploit this displacement to push return agendas. A comprehensive political solution, as outlined in UN-SCR 2254, is essential to pave the way for a safe, voluntary, and dignified return to Syria, ensuring that any future repatriation is rooted in stability and respect for human rights.

1. Immediate and Long Terms Assistance:

- Ensure basic needs such as shelter, food, and medical care for new IDPs, particularly women, children, and the elderly.
- Increase funding for humanitarian actors in return areas in the short term and development assistance in the mid-long term while integrating new IDPs and host communities in both forms of assistance.
- Deploy mobile units along formal and informal crossings to assist vulnerable populations arriving in dire conditions.

2. Protection for New IDPs:

- Advocate for the enforcement of international protection standards to prevent arbitrary detention, extortion, and forced conscription in government-controlled areas.
- Support mechanisms that monitor and document human rights abuses at checkpoints and border crossings.
- Apply diplomatic pressure on Syrian authorities to ensure safe and dignified passage for new IDPs, especially young men at risk of conscription or persecution.
- Establish mobile legal aid clinics to assist with documentation and land/property claims.
- Advocate for secure, neutral corridors for new IDPs crossing between different territorial control zones.
- Provide legal assistance to secure housing and land rights and support shelter reconstruction.
- Develop reintegration programs that foster social cohesion and provide psychosocial support for new IDPs.

3. Long-Term Livelihood Support:

- Fund livelihood programs that foster small business creation, job opportunities, and skills development for new IDPs.
- Strengthen partnerships with local organizations to develop sustainable economic initiatives in host communities.
- Allocate resources to infrastructure rebuilding, such as water stations and roads, to facilitate the safe movement of people and goods.

4. Advocacy for Freedom of Movement:

- Advocate for the lifting of movement restrictions imposed by local authorities in NES and NWS on displaced people, particularly those not originally from the region.
- Push for respect of refugee and IDP protection laws, ensuring displaced individuals have access to services and freedom of mobility.

5. Support for Early Recovery durable solutions:

- Prioritize funding for the restoration and reconstruction of critical infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict, including roads, schools, hospitals, and water and sanitation systems.
- Develop comprehensive programs that go beyond immediate relief to provide long-term support for new IDPs. This should include housing reconstruction, legal assistance for property claims, livelihood opportunities, and skills training to ensure that new IDPs can rebuild their lives sustainably.









Bahar Organization was founded in 2011 as an initiative in Afrin & Aleppo, Syria.
It was officially registered as a Syrian NGO in Türkiye in 2014,
and officially registered in Erbil, Iraq in 2017.

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