Bridging the Gulf: Overseas Migration to the Middle East Fosters Tolerance and Cosmopolitanism

Nikhar Gaikwad,[1][*] Kolby Hanson,[2] Aliz Tóth[3]

[1]Department of Political Science, Columbia University;
420 W 118 St, MC 3320, New York, NY, 10027;
E-mail: nikhar.gaikwad@columbia.edu.
[2] Department of Political Science, US Naval War College;
686 Cushing Rd, Newport, RI 02841;
E-mail: kolby.hanson@usnwc.edu.
[3] Department of Political Science, Stanford University;
450 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305;
E-mail: aliztoth@stanford.edu.

[*]Corresponding author; E-mail: nikhar.gaikwad@columbia.edu.

Abstract: Can migration foster tolerance and inclusion? Policy-makers often raise concerns that migrants maintain their ethnic identities, exacerbating anti-migrant and anti-globalization sentiments among native-born populations. Yet scientific evidence about how migration shapes migrants' attitudes and identities remains scarce. In the first randomized controlled trial resulting in overseas migration, we connected individuals in India with job opportunities in the Persian Gulf region's hospitality sector. Two years after the program began, individuals in the treatment group were significantly more tolerant toward ethnic, cultural, and national outgroups. Migration also bolstered migrants' support for globalization and cultivated cosmopolitan identities. This

study provides the first set of experimental evidence that migration, when it facilitates inter-group contact, can promote tolerance and improve migrants' sense of belonging.

One Sentence Summary: An RCT demonstrates that moving abroad makes labor migrants more tolerant, cosmopolitan, and supportive of globalization.

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Introduction

International migration transforms how migrants see and relate to the world. For example, the experience of living and working in South Africa was foundational for Mahatma Gandhi, who upon return to India led its struggle for independence, emphasizing the unity of all Indians regardless of caste or creed. Migrants often play pivotal roles in society, culture, and politics, both overseas and in their countries of origin. Yet whether and how migration transforms the attitudes and identities of cross-border migrants, who numbered 272 million in 2019, is not well understood (*1, 2*). Policy-makers, media, and the public often claim that migrants remain committed to their prior cultures and identities, in turn stoking intercultural conflict and anti-immigrant backlash (*3, 4*). However, we lack rigorous evidence to adjudicate these assertions because most existing studies focus on how natives—not migrants—respond to migration. Investigating how cross-border mobility impacts migrants themselves is necessary for understanding the drivers of migrant integration, immigration policy, and globalization more broadly.

How does migration shape the social attitudes, worldviews, and identities of people who cross national borders? Scholars raise concerns that competition between natives and migrants gives rise to intercultural conflict and a retreat into parochialism (*5–7*). Migrants who confront ethnically, religiously, and culturally distinct host societies—especially ones in which they encounter discrimination—may grow less tolerant of out-groups and reject more inclusive identities (*8*). This mirrors effects often documented among native-born individuals; migration has been shown to drive anti-immigrant prejudice and a broader backlash to globalization among natives (*9, 10*).

We instead argue that moving to a new country can foster intercultural tolerance and cosmopolitanism for migrants. The day-to-day experience of migration typically involves living and working around people from different national, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, and dispelling negative beliefs while increasing familiarity of others. Such exposure, we posit, leads

migrants to become more tolerant of other nationalities and cultures (*11–14*).

Heightened tolerance resulting from migration in turn spurs migrants to support international cooperation and adopt less parochial identities. Outgroup hostility and ethnocentrism are driving forces behind isolationist preferences toward trade and immigration (*15, 16*). Correspondingly, individuals with more tolerant attitudes toward cultural outgroups are also more supportive of cooperative foreign security policy (*17, 18*). We therefore argue that exposure to diverse international communities should lead migrants to embrace cosmopolitan identities over competing national, regional, or ethnic ones.

Evaluating whether and how migration shifts norms and beliefs among migrants is fraught with methodological challenges because individuals self-select into the migration process (*19, 20*). People who decide to leave their home countries and embark on overseas migration are almost certainly systematically different from those who do not; for example, they likely *already* hold egalitarian views of outsiders. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether migration and contact with host societies causes meaningful changes in migrants' attitudes.

Overcoming these methodological concerns, we bring to bear clear, causal evidence on the impact of cross-border migration on inter-group attitudes, policy preferences and identities from the first randomized controlled trial to have resulted in international migration (*19, 21*). Our study connected individuals from Mizoram, India who sought overseas employment with hospitality sector jobs in the Persian Gulf. The intervention succeeded in enabling individuals to find international employment, increasing overseas migration from just 3 percent in the control group to 23 percent in the treatment group. The experiment provides a valuable, causally-identified setting to evaluate the impact of labor migration on migrants' social attitudes and worldviews.

Two years after the program began, individuals in the treatment group reported significantly higher levels of intercultural contact with members of different religions, ethnicities, and nation-

alities. In turn, migration led individuals to become significantly more tolerant toward ethnic, cultural, and national outgroups. This change in intergroup tolerance accompanied increases in individuals' support for globalization: subjects in the treatment group were more supportive of international trade and security cooperation. They were also more likely to adopt cosmopolitan identities over national or ethnic ones.

Research Design

Methodologically, it is difficult to ascertain whether and how migration shifts migrants' identities, levels of tolerance, and support for intergroup cooperation. Most studies examine natives' attitudes and reactions, which are generally easier to measure and compare. To date, the only causally-identified study on the effect of crossing borders focuses on the attitudes of pilgrims to Mecca (*12*). It remains unclear whether the findings from such transient experiences travel to longer-term migration. Our focus here is on the largest cross-border migrant flows in the global economy: labor migration. We conducted a randomized controlled trial connecting individuals in the Indian state of Mizoram seeking overseas jobs with lucrative employment opportunities in the hospitality industry in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region.

This study evaluates a training and recruitment program set up in collaboration with the Mizoram government to help Mizos join a large and growing population of overseas workers. India is the world's largest source of emigrants (16 million per year), and the India-UAE corridor represents the world's second-largest bilateral passageway, after Mexico-USA. Mizoram is a geographically-isolated state in Northeast India with few local economic opportunities. The vast majority of Mizoram's population are members of the Mizo community, one of India's historically-marginalized Scheduled Tribes (ST). Mizos frequently face discrimination in mainland India as conspicuous racial and religious minorities (*22*). By contrast, the Gulf region is remarkably diverse. Foreign workers constitute majorities of the populations in GCC countries

such as the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar. Indian labor migrants typically live and work alongside others from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and other countries from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. For additional information on our study setting, see *SM S2.1*.

In July–August 2018, in collaboration with the state government and local NGOs, we recruited a group of prospective applicants interested in overseas employment from around Mizoram's capital city, Aizawl (*23*). We selected candidates from applicants that met basic requirements for hospitality sector jobs in the GCC countries: English language skills and educational attainment.[1] Following selection, a survey firm surveyed subjects at baseline to collect basic demographics and pre-treatment outcome measures (23).

Table 1 reports the baseline characteristics of subjects in our sample. These individuals were relatively young, educated, and unemployed at the start of the program. Notably, these characteristics are similar to other South Asian migrant populations abroad (*SM S2.2*). After the baseline survey, half of our subjects were randomly selected to attend the training and recruitment program (T=196, C=196). Prior to assignment to experimental groups, we used a matching algorithm to generate blocked pairs to ensure balance along key covariates which might predict economic prospects (specifically gender, education, and English proficiency). Demographics and balance tests are reported in *SM S2.3* and *Table S1*.

Our treatment comprised a two-part program to facilitate migration to the GCC countries for hospitality sector employment. First, all selected individuals were offered a fully-funded, five-week hospitality training program in October-November 2018. The training was designed and administered by a local NGO and an Indian training firm, with the support of the Mizoram government. Participants received both classroom instruction and basic practical training for service jobs in restaurants and hotels in the Gulf. This training was not exhaustive; it was primarily designed to enable candidates to interview and demonstrate eligibility for overseas

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[1]English is the medium of instruction, apart from Mizo, in Mizoram schools; thus a large proportion of candidates had the required skills.

hospitality jobs. See additional details in *SM S2.4*.

In the second phase of the treatment, candidates in the treatment group were invited for interviews with hospitality-sector GCC employers. Our recruitment partner firm connected subjects with a vetted set of potential Gulf employers, ranging from hotels such as Mandarin Oriental to food-and-beverage outlets such as Pizza Hut and Costa Coffee. Employers, in turn, conducted several rounds of interviews with candidates. Every individual in the treatment group was eligible to interview, typically multiple times, and employers offered jobs to the vast majority of interviewees.

The study by necessity bundled both elements of the treatment: the training program and recruitment opportunities for overseas placement. That said, potential effects of the treatment on tolerance, support for globalization, and group identification likely stem from subjects migrating rather than simply attending the training program. There are many hospitality job training programs available in Mizoram; many treatment group subjects had previously enrolled in similar programs and over 40 percent of control group subjects enrolled in alternate local programs. Placement opportunities with foreign employers, however, are virtually non-existent. Additionally, contact between subjects and the training instructors was relatively shallow and short. We provide more evidence on this point when discussing our results.

Careful consideration was given to the ethics of this study. We worked closely with our partners to minimize the potential risks that participants might face, to ensure that the benefits of the program flowed to participants, and to protect participants' informed consent (*24*). We situated the study in Mizoram because of the existing demand from the Mizoram government and local NGOs for connecting local unemployed individuals with international employment opportunities. In particular, the program's goal was to find best practices to improve the recruitment and migration experience for prospective migrants relative to those who migrated on their own accord. An extended discussion of ethical considerations is provided in *SM S2.5*.

Our main outcomes come from the endline survey that was conducted in January–March 2021. Of the 392 pre-treatment subjects, 248 responded to the endline survey (63%). In a host of statistical tests, we find no evidence of systematic bias resulting from attrition. We also do not find that pre-treatment covariates systematically predict response rates (see *SM S2.6, Tables S2-S4*).

We evaluated the effect of migration on several major outcomes regarding intercultural tolerance, preferences for globalization, and group identification. For each outcome, we asked 1-6 survey questions. For multi-question outcomes, we combined various responses with a z-score index of the main outcome in order to reduce the number of comparisons (and therefore the chance of false positives) and to reduce noise.[2] The specific wording and answer choices for these questions are listed in the *Tables S5-S9*. We configured all outcome variables such that the hypothesized direction of the effect is positive and that all effect sizes are in units of standard deviations of the dependent variable.

The main results show the estimated average treatment effect (ATE) based on Ordinary Least Squares for each hypothesis, controlling for the baseline measure of each variable. We include both parametric (OLS-based) p-values and standard errors and randomization inference (RI)-based p-values—which were nearly identical (23). All of our hypotheses and analyses were pre-registered at the Experiments in Governance and Politics online registry (Study #20210608AE). For our primary hypotheses, we use one-tailed p-values reflecting the pre-registered effect directions.

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[2]Given the multiple main hypotheses, we also provide a Benjamini-Hochberg false discovery rate analysis in *Table S15*, as specified in the pre-analysis plan. This analysis validates our central findings, even by conservative statistical standards.

Experimental Results

Migration and Contact. The treatment helped dozens of job-searching Mizos find work in the GCC. The left panel of *Figure 1* plots overseas migration in the treatment and control group over the duration of our study (see also *Table S10*). 23 percent of the treatment group migrated in the two years following the intervention, versus just 3 percent of the control group (a 667 percent proportional increase). Migrants took hospitality jobs in countries such as Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

The overseas migrants in our program encountered a wide variety of peoples and cultures, as the right panel of *Figure 1* and *Table S11* demonstrate. Those in our treatment group were significantly more likely to work and socialize with non-Christians, non-Mizos, and non-Indians. Nearly every overseas migrant in our study reported spending most of their time with coworkers and neighbors from diverse nationalities and ethnic backgrounds, such as Filipinos, Nepalis, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, and mainland Indians (*SM S2.8*).

Tolerance. We find that these diverse experiences abroad led migrants to become significantly more tolerant of other cultural groups (*Figure 2, Table S12*). Treatment group individuals reported more favorable impressions of a wide variety of outgroups and expressed greater support for marriage outside of their ethnic community. In total, the treatment group scored more than a third of a standard deviation higher on our index of intercultural tolerance compared to the control group. Considering that the treatment effects were driven primarily by individuals who migrated, the effect among these compliers may be substantially higher. An instrumental variables (2SLS) approach suggests that migration had an effect of 1.79 standard deviations of the tolerance index (*Table S12*).

The prejudice-reducing effects on migrants in our study applied to a wide variety of cultural outgroups. Many scholars have argued that intergroup contact only reduces prejudice if it takes

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place in a context that is cooperative, egalitarian, and endorsed by authorities (*25, 26*). We do find that migrants in our study became more tolerant toward outgroups alongside whom they were likely to work and live: non-Mizos, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis. However, they also became more tolerant toward Middle Easterners and Europeans, whom they were only likely to encounter in more hierarchical settings as servers or employees. The treatment group's most improved views, in fact, were of Middle Easterners, even though migrant workers are excluded from government benefits in the Gulf, depend on Gulf employers to sponsor visas, and have no avenue for citizenship in their host nations. These results suggest that contact with other cultures or individuals can reduce prejudice even in highly unequal settings.

Support for Globalization. Conflict between migrants and natives has long been linked to decreased support for international trade, security cooperation, and migration. By contrast, we do not find that migration creates a backlash to globalization. In fact, individuals in the treatment group were more likely than those in the control group to support international trade and cooperation; they were also marginally more likely to express interest in international affairs (*Figure 3, Table S13*). We do not find conclusive evidence that treatment group subjects were more supportive of migration. These measures represent a fairly hard test for support for globalization given that we probed support for policies issues, such as migration from neighboring Bangladesh into Mizoram, on which Mizos typically hold deep nationalist attitudes.

Cosmopolitan Identification. Many argue that after migrating to hostile host societies, migrants retreat into their national or parochial identities (*8, 27*). We find instead that migrating and living overseas instilled in our subjects broad cosmopolitan identities. We asked respondents to pick how they most identify: as an individual, as a member of their local community, as a Mizo, as an Indian, or as a "citizen of the world" (*Figure 4*, *Table S13*). The last category captures cosmopolitanism, first articulated by Diogenes the Cynic in fourth century BCE when

he asserted, "I am a citizen of the world [*kosmopolitēs*]." Treatment group subjects were nearly twice as likely to identify as global citizens than those in the control group. We do not find that the treatment had any effect on individuals' identification with their nation or region. Although treatment group individuals expressed more tolerance toward mainland Indians than those in the control group, they did not become more likely to identify as Indians over Mizos, and they did not become more supportive of national integration or internal migration of mainland Indians to Mizoram (*Table S14*). Together, these findings provide strong evidence that the experience of migration shifts not only cultural tolerance and support for globalization, but also the ways in which individuals construct their core political and social identities.

Mechanisms Mechanisms tests indicate that the effects documented above were driven by migration and intercultural contact rather than alternate channels. First, we find strong evidence that the treatment effects were much greater among those treatment group individuals who migrated overseas than among those who were selected into treatment but chose not to migrate. Observationally, individuals who migrated overseas scored much higher on measures of tolerance on the endline survey than on the baseline survey two years earlier. Individuals who remained in India, however, showed virtually no change over time, even those who attended a job training program or moved elsewhere in India for work (*Figure S3*). Additionally, employing a pre-registered analysis, we identified pre-treatment characteristics that best predicted subjects' decision to migrate in the treatment group (*SM S1.3.3*). Then we identified subjects in both the treatment and control groups who most resembled "likely migrants" in the treatment group. The treatment effects were 2-5 times larger among "likely migrants" than "non-likely migrants" (see *SM S2.7*, and *Table S16*). These tests imply that our findings are driven by the impact of migration and not other components of the intervention.

Second, in a separate survey of program participants' immediate family members back

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home, we find no evidence of similar changes in their attitudes or identities. Migrants experienced large economic gains from migration, which are sometimes linked to increased tolerance and internationalism. Yet while family members of treatment group individuals reported significant economic gains from remittances (*21*), they showed no accompanying increase in intercultural tolerance or internationalism (*Table S18*).

Lastly, migrants consistently attributed the change in their perspectives to intercultural experiences and contact in detailed qualitative interviews we conducted after the endline survey with study subjects whom our algorithm identified as "likely migrants" (*SM S2.8*). *Figure S4* denotes that treatment group individuals described "co-workers" and "roommates" from other outgroups as the people with whom they spent the most time, whereas control group individuals described "family" and "neighbors" from home as their regular contacts. In addition, *SM S2.8* provides quotes from participants in each group that paint a nuanced story of how contact with outside cultures triggered a shift toward egalitarian attitudes in the treatment group, with no such changes emerging in the control group.

Discussion

Recent migration crises in Europe and North America have renewed long-standing debates on migrant and refugee integration amongst scholars and policy makers; the projected effects on migration of population decline in higher-income countries and climate change in lower-income countries point to the critical importance of these questions for future generations. Despite the ubiquity of labor migration in today's interconnected world, rigorous causal evidence is scarce on how migration shapes migrants' tolerance, attitudes, and identities. Our research is the first to provide such evidence. We find that individuals who had access to overseas job opportunities become more tolerant of outgroups and more supportive of globalization. We do not find that migrants became more nationalistic or more likely to identify with their ethnicities,

as prior literature on migrant integration suggests (*8*). Indeed, migrants were more likely to adopt cosmopolitan identities and envision themselves as citizens of the world.

The positive effects of migration on tolerance and support for international cooperation run counter to a large literature on the association between immigration, ethnic conflict, and globalization backlash. We make several points. First, our focus is on migrants, whereas most existing work analyzes native populations. Even if migration generates backlash among natives, it appears to promote tolerance among migrants themselves. Second, the migrants in our study reported frequent and meaningful interactions with members of other groups. While a lack of contact or superficial proximity between migrants and native-born individuals may spark prejudice and backlash, meaningful and frequent contact helps foster greater tolerance and openness, as our findings demonstrate (*28*). This pattern is present in other settings: studies show that contact between different groups improves inter-group attitudes in residential, educational, and workplace environments (*29–31*). This suggests that the association between migration and hostility is driven not by contact, but the lack thereof.

Contrary to concerns that migrants and refugees retreat into enclaves and double down on their national and ethnic identities, we find that migration causes migrants to prioritize global, rather than local, identities. Prior work suggests that migrants are more likely to invest in their ethnic identities—for example, by choosing ethnic names for their children or speaking their home languages—when they face exclusion in the host country (*8, 32*). Such discrimination is more likely to take place in competitive settings featuring a few polarized groups (*33*). By contrast, in our study migrants reported facing very little discrimination because they lived in multi-cultural settings, which foster tolerance, and settings characterized by labor scarcity not competition (*34*). Migration context, therefore, matters for how migrants conceptualize their relationship to others in host societies.

Hundreds of millions of people cross international borders every year for work, study, and

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family reunification, and many more are projected to do so in years to come. Concerns among policy-makers and the public abound about how immigration may flare up intergroup hostilities. Results from this study indicate that policies that encourage migrants' residential and employment integration in already diverse places are well-positioned to foster tolerance and increase migrants' sense of belonging. Future work could explore the extent to which these findings generalize to non-labor migrant populations and whether our results hold in alternate settings, such as in more homogeneous host societies. Answering these questions with rigorous causal evidence can inform immigration and refugee integration policy on which countries like the U.S. and members of the European Union already spend more than a billion dollars annually (*35*).

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Acknowledgements:

List of Supplementary Materials:

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Tables

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects

	Baseline	*Endline*
N	389	248
Mean Age (Baseline)	22.9	22.9
Pct Male	56	54
Pct Completed Grade 12	72	75
Pct Employed	14	12
Pct Married	2	1
Pct Scheduled Tribe	95	96

Figures

Figure 1: International Migration and Contact Over Time

The left panel shows the percentage of the treatment and control groups that migrated overseas throughout the study period. The right panel shows the percentage of each group that reported working or sharing a meal with someone from a different ethnic, religious or national group at least once a week in the endline survey.

Figure 2: Effect on Intercultural Tolerance

Treatment effects are based on OLS, controlling for baseline measures of each outcome. Top row is an index of five components below. All treatment effects are standardized, with the standard deviation of the control group equal to 1. 90% confidence intervals are shown, which translates to $p < .05$ on these one-directional tests. All specifications and hypotheses were pre-registered.

Figure 3: Effect on Support for Globalization

Treatment effects are based on OLS, controlling for baseline measures of each outcome. All treatment effects are standardized, with the standard deviation of the control group equal to 1. 90% confidence intervals are shown, which translates to $p < .05$ on these one-directional tests. All specifications and hypotheses were pre-registered.

Figure 4: Effect on Identity

Respondents were asked the identity with which they most identified. The top figure shows the percent of individuals in the treatment and control groups that selected a particular identity as the one with which they most identified in the endline survey. The bottom figure shows the impact of being in the treatment group on the likelihood that a respondent chose "citizen of the world" as the identity with which they most identified. 90% confidence intervals are shown, which translates to $p \leq 0.05$ on these one-directional tests.

Supplementary Materials

Bridging the Gulf: Experimental Evidence on Migration's Impact on Tolerance and Cosmopolitanism

Nikhar Gaikwad,[1*] Kolby Hanson,[2] Aliz Tóth[3]

[1]Department of Political Science, Columbia University;
533 W. 218th St. New York, NY, USA.
[2] Department of Political Science, US Naval War College;
686 Cushing Rd, Newport, RI 02841
[3] Department of Political Science, Stanford University;
450 Jane Stanford Way Stanford, CA 94305, USA
[*]Corresponding author; E-mail: nikhar.gaikwad@columbia.edu.

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S1   Materials and Methods

Note: Some of the material in these appendices, particularly in the Materials and Methods and Supplemental Text sections, also appears in the appendices of (21), which examines a different set of results from the same field experiment.

S1.1   Subject Recruitment Strategy

We identified and recruited a group of prospective candidates interested in migrating to GCC countries for employment, but lacking the know-how and connections to do so. We relied on a variety of different media to advertise the job training and placement opportunity. We posted advertisements in leading Mizo newspapers as well as on local Mizo television networks (specifically, Zonet and LPS). We sent recruitment materials and application forms to regional offices of local skills training organizations and visited job fairs organized by the government. One of the job fairs took place in a suburb of Aizawl, while the other one in a neighboring district's headquarter. Additionally, we placed banners around Aizawl advertising the program. Finally, we reached out to the largest Mizo community organization, Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) to advertise on their social media platforms. Advertisement materials were translated to Mizo to reach a wide audience. The advertisement period lasted for two months over the summer of 2018. While we targeted the entire state of Mizoram with our advertising strategy, the majority of applicants came from Aizawl, which was unsurprising given the higher educational attainment and English skills in the capital city.

All our advertising materials asked applicants to be above the age of 18 and have at least Grade 10 standard education. We also required English competency. Once registration for the program took place, our team in Aizawl called back all registered applicants and screened them for their English skills over the phone.

We randomly assigned treatment status using the final list of applicants who passed the English language screening. We matched these applicants into blocked pairs based on age, gender, education level, and English proficiency (judged in the English screening). We then randomized between each pair, assigning one to treatment and the other to control.

S1.2 Survey Methodology

For this paper, we interviewed subjects (both treatment and control) in two survey rounds: a baseline survey before participants were selected for the treatment, and an endline survey approximately two years after treatment subjects began moving overseas.

Both surveys were administered by a New Delhi-based survey company (CVoter Inc.), that hired twenty local, Mizo-speaking enumerators of both genders to conduct the surveys. This ensured that participants had access to enumerators of the same gender. Both surveys were written in English and then translated and back translated by CVoter's team into Mizo. We offered subjects the choice of Mizo and English versions of the survey. The topics that formed the basis of our surveys are socio-political topics that are routinely discussed in Indian society and that are identical or similar to questions that are commonly asked in many types of preexisting surveys, including government surveys (notably National Family and Health Surveys) carried out across India on a regular basis.

The baseline survey was a face-to-face survey that took place in Aizawl in September 2018. Survey subjects were invited to the research team's offices in central Aizawl, where they were asked to fill out a survey by enumerators using handheld tablets. In order to facilitate re-contacting, we collected the phone numbers and addresses of each respondent as well as a back-up family member. Shortly after the baseline survey, we contacted our respondents via phone to ensure that appropriate contact information had been given and to verify respondents' willingness to participate in future surveys.

Approximately two years after our training and placement program (Jan-Mar 2021), we fielded our second survey round. The survey was administered as a 30-minute computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI) by CVoter enumerators. To boost participation, we offered phone credits worth a month of free calls, text messages, and 1 GB data to participants for taking the survey.[3] At this time, we also conducted contacted one family member per individual, based on the listed contact information given in the initial survey. This survey was conducted with the same basic structure and incentives as the endline survey, with similar questions. See the questions for our main outcomes summarized in Tables S5-S9.

S1.3 Estimation

S1.3.1 Baseline Specification

We analyzed all data with an *intention-to-treat* framework, substituting the endogenous treatment (decision to migrate) with the exogenous assignment to treatment (invitation to attend the training session). As an additional analysis, we assessed the *complier average causal effect* of treatment using two stage least squares to assess the likely effect of migration.

All of our major hypotheses posit an effect of treatment assignment on some attitude or behavior. For every primary outcomes, we have a measure of the same outcome from the baseline

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[3]Depending on the telephone operator, this cost around INR 169-199 (USD 2.36-2.78).

survey. We therefore test these hypotheses with an OLS model of outcome y on treatment τ, with the baseline outcome measure X:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \tau_i + \alpha X_i + \epsilon \tag{1}$$

We did not preregister any additional covariates in the model because we matched treatment and control respondents prior to treatment selection (that is, we created pre-treatment blocks of two) based on several key covariates. Indeed, we found that including additional covariates did not improve the predictiveness of the model. Due to the limited number of observations, small size of blocks, and the possibility of attrition, will did not include block (pair) fixed effects.

Because of the nature of the randomization (blocked to reduce imbalance between treatment and control groups), we used randomization inference to calculate our primary p-values. This involves simulating the treatment assignment and estimation process 100,000 additional times, calculating the expected distribution of estimated effects under the (strict) null hypothesis. We report the one-sided p-value for one-sided hypotheses and two-sided p-value for two-sided hypotheses. Given that this analysis does not yield meaningful confidence intervals, the figures in the paper show the equivalent confidence intervals from a parametric OLS analysis – which was preregistered as a robustness check. The p-values from the two analyses are nearly identical.

S1.3.2 Indexing and Multiple Comparisons

To reduce issues of multiple comparisons, we created a single z-score index of the outcome questions for each hypothesis. For example, we ask respondents about their attitudes towards a number of different national and ethnic groups, then we combine these into a single, normalized index variable of tolerance. Therefore, there should be a single simple outcome measure for each hypothesis to be used in the regression model.

We report each of our primary hypotheses as findings, so they are not subject to multiple comparisons corrections.

For the secondary hypotheses, we account for multiple comparisons within each set of hypotheses. We report both nominal p-values and p-values corrected using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) method. Some of these secondary hypotheses also include several questions, which we have combined into a z-score index and treat them the same as the primary hypotheses. Table S15 shows the p-values for our main tests corrected by the Benjamini-Hochberg method.

S1.3.3 Additional Analyses

In order to test that our findings are driven by the impact of migration and not other factors, we conduct two tests. First, we study the impact of migration in a group of likely and unlikely migrants. Second, we use a separate household survey that we conducted with the household members of both the treatment and control groups.

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Subset Analysis among Likely Migrants   We expect that any changes in tolerance in the treatment group are the consequence of migration. Therefore, as a secondary analysis included in our pre-analysis plan, we test all of the main hypotheses among the subset of likely migrants (that is, individuals who are likely to migrate abroad at a high rate conditional on being in the treatment group).

We identify likely migrants using the following pre-registered process. First, we determine the individuals who migrated in the treatment group using the endline survey. Second, we implement BART, a non-linear Bayesian machine-learning algorithm, to identify likely movers among the treatment group using all available pre-treatment covariates (specifically, age, education, sex, marriage status, employment status, Scheduled Tribe status, religion, personal & household income, ethnic identification, contacts abroad, interest in migration, political interest and participation, knowledge of foreign affairs, support for migration and diversity, views on Muslims and the Middle East, and economic confidence). Third, we use this model to predict the likely migrants in both the treatment and control groups. That is, the model identifies the individuals in both the treatment and control groups who are most similar to the migrants in the treatment group. The code is in our pre-analysis plan. Lastly, we then repeat the analysis on the subset of likely migrants and likely non-migrants.

Household Survey   In addition to our main endline survey, we also conducted a survey with one household member of each participant in both treatment and control groups. Most of the same questions were asked to household members as to program participants. Table S18 shows the impact of being a treatment household member on our main outcomes.

S2 Supplemental Text

S2.1 Intervention Location and Study Context

Mizoram is situated in northeastern India, bordering Bangladesh from the east and Myanmar from the west. The state is sparsely populated, with around one million residents. Aizawl, the capital city, hosts a third of this population with 300,000 residents. Mizoram has a highly educated population: the literacy rate is 91.33 percent according to the 2011 Census. Female literacy is 89.27 percent, which puts Mizoram amongst the highest literacy and female literacy rates in India (Census 2011). Mizoram also has one of the highest female-to-male demographic ratios as well as one of the lowest literacy gender gaps in the country (Census 2011). While most people in Mizoram speak the local language, Mizo, English is also widely spoken and used as the other official language of the state. The vast majority of the state's population belong to various tribes that are collectively known as Mizos. These tribes have been classified under the Indian Constitution as Scheduled Tribes, a category indicating groups that have been historically marginalized and discriminated against. Today, the Indian Constitution guarantees Scheduled Tribes quotas in government jobs, educational institutions, as well as elected positions. The majority of Mizos identify as Christians and only a small minority identifies as Hindus or Buddhists.

Mizos migrated to current Mizoram from upper Burma sometime between the 15th and 18th centuries. British colonization was formalized in 1895 after the Lushai Hills were declared to be part of British India. Mizoram administratively became a district of the province of Assam. This was also the time when Christian missionaries arrived to the area and set up schools. Missionaries achieved wide-reaching changes in Mizo society by converting the majority of the population to Christianity, opening schools, and educating the masses. After India's independence, Mizoram remained a part of Assam state, but centralized control from Assam frustrated Mizos and in the 1960s the Mizo National Front (MNF) started an armed insurgency. Mizoram became the 23rd state of India in 1986, following a peace accord between the Government of India and the MNF.

Subsequently, the MNF reformed itself as a political party and contested elections in 1987. The Indian National Congress (INC)—established in 1961—is the other major political party in the state. The INC and the MNF have regularly alternated in power in the state's legislative assembly. At the local level, after the abolition of chieftainship, village councils were established in 1957. Mizoram, as a Sixth Schedule state, is excluded from quotas instituted for women, Scheduled Castes, and Other Backward Classes (OBCs), in village councils under the 73rd amendment of the Indian constitution.

Despite its high human capital, Mizoram lacks employment opportunities. The relative geographic isolation and mountainous topography have constrained industrial growth and produced high unemployment rates. Mizoram's GDP per capita is around US$1,600, which puts it at 19th amongst 27 Indian states. The majority of the population remains employed in agriculture, even though the contribution of agriculture to GDP has been declining. Industrial output is

only 19.39 percent of the state's GDP, whereas the tertiary sector makes up 66.29 percent of the GDP. The largest employer within the services sector, however, remains the government. Taken together, Mizoram has struggled to create employment opportunities outside of small-scale agriculture and the public sector, which leaves its educated population without adequate avenues for economic advancement.

Why focus on the India - GCC migration corridor? Much of prior research on migration has analyzed population flows from the Global South to the North, but migration across countries in the Global South has increased exponentially in the past twenty years. According to the 2017 United Nations Migration Report, migrants around the world are most likely to originate from Asia, which sends 41 percent of the world's migrant population (*36*). India alone sends 16.6 million migrants abroad making it the country with the largest number of emigrants in absolute terms. Furthermore, there are around 600,000 - 800,000 annual migrants from India, whereas annually India adds 7 - 8 million new workers to the labor force (*37*). This makes out-migration one of the major sources of new employment for Indian workers.

Due to the role of economic incentives, social networks and immigration policy regimes, migrants often end up in a small set of countries. Around 60 percent of Asian migrants, for instance, migrate to another Asian country, and only a much smaller subset, 16 and 19 percent migrate to Europe and North America, respectively.[4] Moreover, the 2017 United Nations Migration Report estimates that more than 67 percent of the world's migrant population live in only twenty countries. Out of these twenty, Saudi Arabia has the second largest migrant population, the United Arab Emirates the eighth and Kuwait the twentieth. This has not always been the case. Countries outside of a small group of Western industrialized countries have been registering rapid growth in migrant populations only in the past twenty years (*36*). GCC countries are amongst the world's most significant migrant destinations today both in terms of volume and growth in migration.

When looking at migration flows between countries, Indian migration to the UAE is second only to the Mexico-US migration corridor. However, migration between India and the Gulf is growing much more rapidly. Migration between India and the UAE registered almost a three-fold increase and migration from India to Saudi Arabia doubled in the past twenty years.

It is not only the size of migration within the Global South that warrants scholarly and policy attention, but also its economic impact. India is the largest recipient of overseas migrants' remittances, with US$78.6 billion received in 2018 (*38*). For comparison, India received US$44.37 billion in foreign direct investment. Over half of these remittances are sent from GCC countries by Indian migrants. For low or middle income countries the size of these remittances often make up a significant portion of the economy. For India's northeastern neighbor, Nepal, remittances equal 28 percent of its gross domestic product (*38*). Unlike development assistance, remittances flow directly to recipient households making it an important source for consumption and investment.

An important difference between South-South migration and South-North migration is that

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[4]In absolute terms this means that out of 105 million Asian migrants in 2017, 63 million migrated within Asia, 20 million migrated to Europe and 17 million to North America.

many Western industrialized countries offer a route to citizenship, although they restrict labor migration flows tightly and often privilege educated and skilled migrants in the case of employment-based immigration. By contrast, countries in the Global South usually welcome labor migrants of varying skill levels, but make it very difficult for newcomers to obtain citizenship and permanent residency status.

S2.2   Mizoram Sample and Other Migrant Populations

To see how representative our sample is, we compared it to migrants in the Kerala Migration Study (KMS), one of the few studies that systematically tracks labor migrants from entire sending communities in the Global South. Figure S2 shows descriptive characteristics of both samples.

Kerala migrants share two important similarities with the Mizos in our study. First Kerala migrants are significantly more likely to have completed secondary education than comparable cohorts of non-migrants in South Asia (50 percent in Kerala and 75 percent in our sample). Second, a disproportionate share of Kerala migrants come from underrepresented groups; more than 65 percent of the KMS migrants are Muslim or Christian, much higher than would be expected from the Kerala population. This mirrors the ST subjects in our study, who are also likely to face higher barriers to success in the domestic economy and therefore may have more to gain from migration. Our sample, therefore, matches the broad characteristics of other important migrant samples in South Asia.

S2.3   Balance Table

We attempt to predict treatment status by pre-treatment covariates, among each of the three sample stages (the job candidates both pre-treatment and post-treatment, and the household members post-treatment). The covariates include both demographic characteristics and pre-treatment measures of key outcome variables. We find little evidence of significant differences between treatment and control group in any of the two survey stages, even after attrition (Table S1). In fact, the treatment groups were remarkably balanced. Just one of the ten pre-treatment covariates predicted treatment status, and only on the endline survey. This 1/30 is lower than the expected false-positive rate of .05, and any pre-treatment imbalances should be accounted for in the statistical analysis. Overall, the omnibus F-test (p-values at the bottom) shows that even the combination of all ten variables provides no predictive value on treatment group on any of the three surveys. This balance is partly because the subjects were grouped into demographically similar pairs for treatment assignment – when this is considered (in the RI-based F-test), the p-values become less strikingly high.

S2.4 Training and Recruitment Program

In this section, we provide further details regarding the treatment component related to the intensive training program geared toward employment opportunities abroad. The training program was designed to equip individuals with the skills required to access employment opportunities overseas and overcome logistical barriers to migration. Individuals selected for the program had the opportunity to attend a five-week job training program designed to impart skills that would be useful in hospitality sector employment in GCC countries. Individuals were also informed that upon completion of the program, they would be contacted for employment opportunities by a recruitment firm partnering with the training program.

During the first half of the program, participants attended classroom training sessions, administered by a Bangalore-based training firm, Free Climb. This component of the program included modules on restaurant food service, beverage and counter service, and housekeeping. Specifically, the training sessions included instructions on food production (e.g., food safety, knife skills, cooking methods, kitchen equipment handling and maintenance), beverage production (e.g., beverage equipment handling, inventory and storage principles, cleaning schedules, safety and accident prevention), counter services (e.g., customer interaction, communication, order-taking principles, cash register control, cleanliness and hygiene), casual dining service (e.g., table set-up, communication, billing standards and cash control, handling of complaints, food handling principles), and housekeeping (e.g., making of beds, cleaning of guest rooms and baths, re-stocking of guest amenities, handling special requests, managing household equipment), among others. Students attended class five days a week for six hours a day.

In the second half of the program, participants conducted on-the-job training in hotels, restaurants, and fast food chains in Aizawl. Overall, this part of the intervention was designed to upgrade candidates' skills, equipping them with basic knowledge required to demonstrate eligibility for hospitality-sector job opportunities in international destinations at the interview stage. Concurrently, instructors also helped participants prepare resumés and work on interview skills. Resumé formats and interview preparations were designed with the input of our Mumbai-based recruitment firm, Vira International, to ensure that participants' job application materials were consistent with GCC hiring standards. To prepare participants for integration into the GCC countries, instructors also provided them with information on regulations and resources abroad. The focus on preparing students for jobs abroad distinguished the training program from other skills training initiatives that were geared toward domestic employment opportunities. Upon completion of the training session, participants were given a course completion certificate. Figure S1 shows photos of the training program in Mizoram.

Following this program, program participants were invited for interviews with several employers. These interviews were organized by our recruitment partner, Vira International. Every program participant was invited to interview, and most were offered multiple opportunities to do so. The vast majority of those who chose to attend interviews received job offers. Following job offers, Vira and our project manager assisted program participants in obtaining passports and medical certifications. The employers were responsible for providing everything else: work

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visas, airline tickets, and room and board.

S2.5 Ethical Considerations

While international employment offers otherwise unattainable economic opportunities for many immigrants, it potentially poses certain costs and risks to their physical or psychological wellbeing. Labor migrants sometimes struggle to integrate into new political and social environments. Relocating for work, especially overseas, requires navigating a complex, often uncertain set of costs and benefits. International employment can be lucrative but it also requires migration-specific knowledge that is difficult to obtain. This explains why individuals who could gain the most from migration often do not migrate (*39*). Specifically, in the context of GCC countries, there have been documented instances of migrants facing extortion by recruitment agencies that charge illegal recruitment fees (*37*). Furthermore, Gulf countries have also faced criticism for overlooking employer exploitation, such as the withholding of workers' passports or employers' reneging on promised salaries (*40*). Reports of labor code violations have been concentrated in the construction sector; domestic household workers have also experienced exploitation (*40*).

This study was conceptualized and embedded within the Research & Empirical Analysis of Labor Migration Program (REALM): "REALM aims to shed light on the processes that sustain unfair migrant labor by improving our empirical understanding of the structures and dynamics implicated in recruitment for temporary work in the Gulf region (and, where relevant, elsewhere)." REALM was founded in order to generate scientific knowledge regarding labor migration as a way to remedy labor recruitment practices in the Persian Gulf that are often private, unsupervised, and opaque, and to help develop and promote fairer migrant labor processes that can lead to better outcomes for migrants and their communities.[5]

Within REALM, the goal of our project was to design and evaluate a blueprint for ethical and safe cross-border labor migration, to be used by governments and NGOs in the future. While designing our project, we paid significant consideration to the ethics of the study. We were mindful of the general obligation of researchers "to anticipate and protect participants from trauma stemming from participation in research" (*41*). We worked closely with our partners to minimize the potential risks and costs that participants might face, to ensure that the benefits of this program flow to participants and their communities, and to protect participants' informed consent (*24*).

We situated the study in Mizoram because of the demand for international employment opportunities, both from individuals and from the state government, in this region. The Government of Mizoram's earlier attempts at training and recruitment had drawn large numbers of youth looking for lucrative international work, given the scarcity of employment opportunities within Mizoram. The Government's Mizoram Youth Commission (MYC), the Chief Minister of Mizoram, and several leading Mizo community organizations sought to create recruitment opportunities for Mizo workers in GCC countries, and called upon researchers to assist in evaluating scientifically processes of skills training and overseas placement that were already underway. By helping connect government and community organizations with reputable partners

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[5]Research & Empirical Analysis of Labor Migration; https://www.incite.columbia.edu/realm, accessed November 28, 2019.

both inside and outside of India, the program enabled local stakeholders to better screen potential employers, protect citizens during their employment tenures abroad, and facilitate migrant integration. Although we (and the government) could not possibly facilitate supervised employment opportunities for *all* individuals seeking employment abroad, our goal was to help the government and NGOs build an ethical template for future skills development and employment placement programs in the region.

One of the major obstacles to fair labor migration is the high costs of migration, often due to illegal recruitment fees (*37*). Prospective migrants may also be subject to the possibility of exploitation overseas. We strived to minimize both of these costs and risks for participants. We designed our skills training and placement program for employment within the hospitality sector, which is relatively reputable, remunerative, and desirable compared to sectors where labor violations had previously been reported (e.g., construction or household work). We worked closely with New York University Abu Dhabi's Office for Compliance & Risk Management to carefully vet project partners and employers. We scrutinized our recruitment partner (Vira International) closely and worked alongside Vira International to screen and assess specific employers that entered the placement program for fair recruitment practices, working conditions, and migrant worker treatment. Employers agreed to charge no recruitment fees, sponsor and guide prospective employees through the work visa authorization process for the receiving country, cover expenses for round-trip flights, visas, and other immigration costs, help recruits relocate and find housing abroad, provide competitive salaries and benefits, and enter into labor contracts that permitted workers to switch employers or leave their jobs at any time. All labor contracts were registered with governmental agencies in both home and host countries. To minimize participants' financial obligations, training (including tuition, course materials, and on-the-job training) was provided free of charge. While not all participants may eventually obtain employment in the GCC, their training was deemed broadly useful for jobs in the hospitality sector.

Cognizant of potential power differentials between employees and employers, we strived to fortify participants by informing them of their rights and resources in destination countries. The GCC states have passed several decrees in recent years that require employers to cover recruitment expenses (including visas and costs of travel), provide competitive salaries and benefits, and furnish housing and health fees for foreign workers. New reforms allow workers to leave their jobs at any time (subject to contractual obligations) and make it easier for workers to switch employers. Under the new policies in the U.A.E., for instance, prospective migrants sign a standard employment offer in their home country that is registered at the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation (MoHRE) before a work permit is issued. Once the worker arrives in the country, the agreement becomes registered as the contract and no changes are allowed unless the employer extends further benefits to the worker. Our project provided subjects with detailed information regarding the locations and helpline numbers of MoHRE offices. Additionally, the Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India has established Indian Workers Resource Centres in GCC countries that provide helplines and conduct awareness classes and counseling programs on legal, financial, and social issues. Our project ensured that subjects

were aware of these resources and had access to them. In addition, in order to assist with integration and reintegration, our project provided participants with access to comprehensive information regarding legal and counseling services both in the GCC states and in Mizoram.

We took a number of steps to guarantee that participants were provided extensive information regarding the potential risks associated with international employment before agreeing to participate in the training and recruitment program. Individuals attended information sessions detailing opportunities and challenges associated with overseas employment. During these presentations, subjects were informed about the potential risks associated with the process of international employment, including the risk of labor law violations by employers. Additionally, we designed the project such that our field research team would follow up regularly with all participants who undertook employment abroad to check on their wellbeing and safety.

Subjects were required to provide informed consent prior to participating in the study and had the right to withdraw from the project at any point. Additionally, participants had distinct decision points (from participating in surveys and attending the training program to sitting for placement interviews and deciding to accept employment contracts) where they were able to reaffirm or withdraw consent. The informed consent process is central to the study design (*24, 41*): the participants themselves were the parties most affected by the intervention, and they had clearly marked opportunities throughout the process in which to provide and withdraw consent.

Overall, the program was designed to significantly improve and safeguard recruitment and employment processes for prospective migrants as compared to individuals who decided to migrate on their own accord or through unsupervised private channels. It was anticipated that future government initiatives in the region would be able to benefit from the knowledge generated and the connections created by the program.

S2.6   Tests for Attrition Bias

In addition to the balance tests before and after treatment (and attrition), we also conducted two tests for attrition bias in the endline and household surveys.

First, we tested whether attrition was greatly affected by treatment assignment itself – i.e. whether the differences in response rates between the treatment and control groups are larger than what might be expected based purely on chance. There is no significant evidence that treatment is affecting response rate in the main survey, but there is evidence that the treatment may have decreased response rates in the household survey (Table S2). In the main candidate survey, the treatment group had a slightly higher response rate (76% vs. 72%), but this is fully within the normal range of variation. The p-values suggest that under the null hypothesis we would expect a larger difference between the treatment and control groups in approximately 30% of cases. In the household survey, however, the control group households responded at a significantly higher rate (84% vs. 70%), which is statistically significant at a $p < .01$ level. This suggests that there may be some attrition bias resulting from differential response rates.

We also tested whether response rates for the endline and household surveys were affected by any pre-treatment covariates. For each survey, we ran three regressions predicting survey response based on pre-treatment covariates (Tables S3-S4). The first column predicts response rates based on the seven key demographic covariates. The second column adds in the pre-treatment measures of the key outcome variables: economic status, economic confidence, and economic policy attitudes. The third column adds in interaction terms to test whether each of these covariates differentially affects response in treatment and control groups.

Here, again, there is no evidence that attrition in the endline survey was systematic, but some suggestive evidence that household survey responses may have been. In the endline survey, there were just three predictive covariates out of all the models (which is consistent with a .05 false-positive rate), and the omnibus f-test suggests that the model as a whole is no more predictive of response rates than randomly-generated covariates would be (with p-values between .2 and .5). In the household survey, there was slight evidence that respondents were different from non-respondents, though it was statistically marginal (with p-values between .04 and .08). In particular, there may be a reasonable concern that respondents for the household survey were significantly less likely to be from households where the candidate had a job in the first place – though this was not substantially different in the treatment and control groups.

S2.7 Exploratory tests

We conduct several exploratory tests. First, we scrutinize whether the changes in tolerance and policy views were registered among our entire treatment group or just among those who migrated abroad. It is possible, for example, that the experience of a job training program conducted by non-Mizos, or even the gratitude for being selected, might influence the attitudes of respondents even if they decided not to migrate.

In order to distinguish between these effects, we compared the main attitudinal effects of the treatment among individuals who had a high chance of moving abroad to the same effects among those who were unlikely to emigrate. To identify these two groups, we conducted two steps prior to the endline survey, using a machine-learning algorithm called Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART) as described in the Materials and Methods section. This procedure is similar to matching compliers in the treatment group to observably similar individuals in the control group, except that it also includes other similar-looking individuals in the treatment group, sidestepping concerns about comparing realized compliers in the treatment group to predicted compliers in the control group. The lists of likely movers and likely non-movers were created before the endline survey and the code was pre-registered. By testing the heterogeneous effects of the treatment among likely movers and likely non-movers, we can help distinguish which effects are due to moving abroad (which the likely movers experienced) versus due to merely joining the job training program (which most of the likely non-movers experienced as well).

Table S16 compares the main effects among likely movers and likely non-movers and tests the null hypothesis that the two groups' effects are identical. The most important takeaway from this exercise is that the key effects are much larger among those who were likely to migrate as a result of the treatment than among those who were unlikely to migrate. The index of intergroup tolerance, for example, moved nearly a full standard deviation for the likely migrants, five times as much as it moved for the likely non-migrants. This is consistent with the increase in tolerance being driven by intergroup contact, which increased markedly among the likely migrants and barely at all among the likely non-migrants. The evidence is less clear on how the treatment shaped policy preferences: the differences are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is primarily due to the low statistical power in the tests: smaller treatment effects are harder to distinguish from one another.

These differences are further corroborated by observationally comparing changes over time among different groups in the study. Individuals who moved overseas saw a significant increase in measures of tolerance, while those who migrated within India and those who remained in Mizoram saw no significant change (Figure S3).

We also find little evidence that attendance of the training program was associated with a significant increase in tolerance, internationalism, or cosmopolitan identity. A significant portion of the control group (43%) attended a hospitality job training program run by one of our project partners. Controlling for covariates, we find that those who attended this job training program showed no significant differences on our main outcomes (Table S17).

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Next, we ask whether migrants' views changed because of the economic benefits of living and working abroad rather than the actual experiences of interacting with outgroup communities. Many studies have shown that individuals with higher incomes and more wealth— particularly those who stand to benefit from globalization—are more tolerant toward out-groups and more supportive of international cooperation. The jobs offered by our program, therefore, may have made individuals in the treatment group more tolerant merely through economic channels. If this were the case, we should expect migrants' immediate family members, who were interviewed in a separate survey, to shift their views as well. Like the migrants themselves, these parents and siblings benefited economically from international employment. On average, migrants each sent their families more than 130,000 INR, or 1,700 USD, in remittances during their first year overseas – more than one quarter of their wages. Unlike the migrants, however, these family members did not experience life abroad.

Overall, the results are generally close to zero and statistically insignificant: individuals whose children or siblings were selected for the program were no more tolerant or supportive of migration than those whose children or siblings were not.

S2.8 Qualitative Evidence

Evidence from qualitative interviews in both the treatment and control groups demonstrates how overseas migrants' increased contact with a diverse set of ethnic, religious and cultural groups shifted their attitudes. Moreover, migrants reported limited or no experience with nationality-, race-, or ethnicity-based discrimination abroad which helps illuminate why they did not increase identification with their own nationality or ethnic community.

Interviewees who lived abroad described having co-workers from "the Philippines, Indonesia and Nepal," "a roommate from Odisha, and [another who] was Manipuri," and "being close with people from other parts of India and Nepal and Bhutan."[6] These were not superficial relationships. One respondent described making friends with his colleagues from the Philippines because of their similarity to Mizos in culture and appearance:

> "I was comfortable with people from the Philippines because of our similarity in our looks, our physical appearance and they were broad-minded as compared to the others. And also as they were Christian and our lifestyle are somehow similar as compared to people from other places. Initially I was not very close with them but as I get to know them more and spend more time with them, I feel comfortable and I was close to them more than the other employees who were Indian. There were new comers from Arabia and Africa who joined after us, I am also close to these people and we are still in contact."[7]

Another respondent described that "[she has] made a best friend who is from Bhutan and [their] friendship is very good and strong,"[8] while someone else said that "[there was] one girl from [the] Philippines who was like an elder sister to [her]."[9] Participants who have migrated abroad, therefore, not only met individuals from different cultures, but also forged strong relationships with them as they lived and worked alongside them.

Increased interactions with people outside of their own ethnic and religious groups was a salient feature of the migration experience. This is illustrated in Figure S4, which charts the word clouds of terms used by the treatment and control groups when responding to the question: "Who are the people you interact with regularly? How would you describe your relationship with them?" While many in the treatment group reflected on relationships with "workers" and "roommates" who tended to be "Filipino," "Indian," and "Nepali" (alongside stressing concepts related to "teamwork," "manager," and "contact"), most of the control group respondents discussed their relationships with their "family," "friends," and "neighbours" that were perpetuated "nearby" in the "locality."

The qualitative interviews provide evidence that respondents experienced diversity as a positive feature of life in the Gulf and they attributed the lack of racism in these countries directly

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[6]Respondents # 179, 144, 44.
[7]Respondent # 156.
[8]Respondent #360.
[9]Respondent # 144.

to diversity. First, when asked what they liked or disliked about living in the Gulf, several of the migrants remarked on the cultural diversity they encountered: "I like every part of staying in that country because I was able to meet people from different countries."[10] Another respondent told us that diversity was one of the most exciting aspects of living abroad: "The fact that I am in a country I never thought I will get the chance to visit is memorable and meeting people from different cultures and religions is also memorable."[11] Second, 10 out of the 19 treatment group members who were interviewed attributed more tolerant attitudes in the Gulf toward people of different races and ethnicities to the existing diversity there. This was summarized by one of the respondents: "here the local people are not racist towards any group of people and also because so many of us here are from different countries, we are more accepting."[12] That is, migrants did not only interact more with out-groups, but they also considered these interactions to be one of the most positive aspects of their experiences abroad.

Increased contact with different groups abroad contributed to changing perceptions of out-groups, in line with our theory. Many respondents focused on their changed perceptions of people in the Gulf. One respondent explained to us how she had changed: "I was actually a bit scared because I used to wonder if it is safe to say that I am a Christian because most of them are Muslims, but it is totally opposite of that, no one is bothered that I'm a Christian so no one here is really bothered about religion. And the fact that there is no alcohol and drugs makes it very safe to live."[13] Together, migrants' reflections on forging new relationships with people from abroad and developing an appreciation for diversity illuminate why our experimental results uncovered such strong positive shifts in migrants' levels of tolerance for outgroups.

The qualitative evidence also provides some clues about why we find a limited effect of migration on increased ethnic identification or nationalism. Prior literature on immigrant identity has highlighted experiences with discrimination in the host country as one of the main reasons for increased identification with immigrants' own national, ethnic, or religious groups. When asked about discrimination based on race or ethnicity, most migrants told us that "[they] haven't faced any racism here and [they] don't think there is favouritism between races."[14] Others concurred by stating that "because in Dubai we are a mix of people from different countries and people are exposed to that difference in culture so no one is racist here."[15] Migrants' perceptions of limited discrimination based on race did not mean that the Gulf was free of all kinds of discrimination, in respondents' views. Indeed, our interviewees compared the relatively class-based egalitarian society of Mizoram with the stark differences between the rich and poor in the Gulf. When asked which aspects of living in the Middle East they disliked, some of the migrants cited inequality: "Yes, there is a lot of difference between the rich and the poor and even among themselves, the difference was very visible and the rich people mostly look down

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[10]Respondent # 156.
[11]Respondent # 261.
[12]Respondent # 59.
[13]Respondent # 40.
[14]Respondent # 60.
[15]Respondent #261

on the poor ones so I do not like that."[16] In spite of the negative experience with inequality, almost all migrants considered the Gulf to be less discriminatory than mainland India. Migrants' lack of experience with racial discrimination therefore explains why they did not retreat to more parochial identities and instead became more internationalist and cosmopolitan in their worldviews.

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[16]Respondent #140.

S3 Figures

Figure S1: Photos of Training Program and Participants

Figure S2: Comparison to the Keralan Migrants

The figure shows the proportion of each sample who that a particular characteristic.

Figure S3: Change over Time in Tolerance, Migrants vs. Non-Migrants

The figure shows the average value of the tolerance index in the pre and post treatment periods for three subgroups: those who migrated overseas, those who migrated within India, or those who stayed in Mizoram.

Figure S4: Description of With Whom Interviewees Spent Time

(a) Treatment Group

(b) Control Group

The word clouds in the figures show the most commonly used expressions of respondents when they were asked with whom they spend time. Figure S4 (a) shows the results for the treatment group and (b) shows those for the control group.

S4 Tables

Table S1: Balance Test for Three Surveys

| | *Dependent variable: Treatment Group* | | |
	Baseline	Endline	Household
Age	−0.008	−0.004	−0.010
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Male	0.001	−0.041	−0.040
	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Education	0.027	0.064	0.016
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Employed	−0.030	−0.067	−0.054
	(0.077)	(0.102)	(0.091)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.029	−0.073	−0.053
	(0.123)	(0.165)	(0.133)
Married	0.122	0.312	0.122
	(0.200)	(0.310)	(0.262)
English Ability	−0.004	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Pre: Income	0.001	0.013	0.013
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Pre: Tolerance	0.034	0.063**	0.018
	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Pre: Migration Support	0.016	0.015	0.017
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.032)
Observations	389	248	303
F-Test P-Value	.940	.517	.955
F-Test P-Value (RI)	.773	.335	.884

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S2: Response Rates: Treatment vs. Control Group

	Endline	*Household*
Response Rate: Treatment Group	76.0 %	70.4%
Response Rate: Control Group	71.9 %	84.2%
Difference in Response Rate	4.1 %	13.8%
P-Value: Two-Sample T-Test	.296	.001
P-Value: RI-based Test	.268	.002

Table S3: Predictors of Response Rate: Endline

	Dependent variable: Response		
Age	0.001	−0.001	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)
Education	0.018	0.014	−0.018
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.042)
Scheduled Tribe	0.123	0.108	0.154
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.180)
Employed	−0.098	−0.110	0.042
	(0.072)	(0.104)	(0.150)
Married	−0.137	−0.140	−0.072
	(0.190)	(0.193)	(0.324)
Male	−0.031	−0.042	0.014
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.072)
English Ability	0.043*	0.036	0.040
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.034)
Economic Status		0.008	−0.069
		(0.039)	(0.052)
Economic Confidence		0.047	0.024
		(0.038)	(0.052)
Economic Attitudes		−0.004	−0.048
		(0.024)	(0.032)
Treatment			−0.714
			(0.604)
Treat x Age			0.011
			(0.017)
Treat x Education			0.066
			(0.062)
Treat x ST			−0.064
			(0.242)
Treat x Employed			−0.317
			(0.209)
Treat x Married			−0.093
			(0.410)
Treat x Male			−0.135
			(0.102)
Treat x English			−0.014
			(0.049)
Treat x Econ. Status			0.175**
			(0.078)
Treat x Econ. Confidence			0.061
			(0.075)
Treat x Econ. Attitudes			0.087*
			(0.048)
Observations	389	384	384
F-Stat P-Value	.314	.461	.220

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table S4: Predictors of Response Rate: Household Survey

	Dependent variable: Response		
Age	0.010	0.011	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Education	0.023	0.026	0.047
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.036)
Scheduled Tribe	−0.057	−0.035	−0.020
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.154)
Employed	−0.128**	−0.133**	−0.101
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.088)
Married	−0.191	−0.184	−0.214
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.275)
Male	−0.019	−0.014	0.045
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.061)
English Ability	0.031	0.027	0.026
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.029)
Pre: Income		0.013	0.002
		(0.012)	(0.017)
Pre: Tolerance		0.022	0.044
		(0.021)	(0.030)
Pre: Migration		0.031	0.031
		(0.023)	(0.031)
Treatment			0.173
			(0.427)
Treat x Age			−0.010
			(0.015)
Treat x Education			−0.034
			(0.054)
Treat x ST			−0.022
			(0.207)
Treat x Employed			−0.055
			(0.127)
Treat x Married			0.058
			(0.347)
Treat x Male			−0.117
			(0.086)
Treat x English			0.0002
			(0.041)
Treat x Income			0.024
			(0.024)
Treat x Tolerance			−0.035
			(0.042)
Treat x Migration			−0.0004
			(0.045)
Observations	389	389	389
F Stat P-value	.080*	.044**	.058*

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table S5: Questions: Intercultural Contact

Question	Options
How often have you shared a meal with someone of a different *religion or church — ethnicity (non-Mizo) — country (non-Indian)*?	Almost daily A few times a week A few times a month A few times a year Never
How often have you worked alongside someone of a different *religion or church — ethnicity (non-Mizo) — country (non-Indian)*?	Almost daily A few times a week A few times a month A few times a year Never

Table S6: Questions: Intercultural Tolerance

Question	Options
Could you tell me whether your general feeling about each group of people is positive or negative?: Indians from Mizoram European people Bangladeshi people Pakistani people Middle Eastern people	Very positive Somewhat positive Neither positive nor negative Somewhat negative Very negative
Would it be acceptable to you if someone in your family married someone of a different ethnic group (e.g. non-Mizo)?	Yes No

Table S7: Questions: Internationalism

Question	Options
On balance, how do you think international trade affects people's lives around the world?	Improves them a lot Improves them a little Does not affect them much Hurts them a little Hurts them a lot
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Peace with Pakistan is important for India's future.	Agree strongly Agree somewhat Neither agree nor disagree Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly
On balance, how do you think people migrating from one country to another affects people's lives around the world	Improves them a lot Improves them a little Does not affect them much Hurts them a little Hurts them a lot
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Government of Mizoram should work to prevent people from migrating from Bangladesh into Mizoram?	Agree strongly Agree somewhat Neither agree nor disagree Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly

Table S8: Questions: Nationalism

Question	Options
Do you see yourself more as a Mizo or as an Indian?	Much more as a Mizo
	Somewhat more as a Mizo
	Both about the same
	Somewhat more as an Indian
	Much more as an Indian
Could you tell me whether your general feeling about each group of people is positive or negative?: Indians from mainland India	Very Positive
	Positive
	Neutral
	Negative
	Very Negative
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Mizoram should be much more autonomous and independent from other parts of India.	Agree strongly
	Agree somewhat
	Neither agree nor disagree
	Disagree somewhat
	Disagree strongly
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Government of Mizoram should work to prevent people from migrating from mainland India into Mizoram?	Strongly agree
	Somewhat agree
	Neither agree nor disagree
	Somewhat disagree
	Strongly disagree
In general, how interested are you in the following types of events?: National Politics	Very Interested
	Somewhat Interested
	Not At All Interested

Table S9: Questions: Identity

Question	Options
People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Which of the following statements do you agree with most?	I see myself as a citizen of the world
	I see myself as part of the Indian nation
	I see myself as a Mizo.
	I see myself as part of my local community
	I see myself as an individual.

Table S10: Full Results: Migration

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	Treat	P(RI)	ATE	P(RI)	P(OLS)	N
Moved Overseas	.03	.23	.000	+ .20	.000	.000	248
Training Program	.43	.58	.011	+ .14	.009	.012	245
Job Offer	.08	.34	.000	+ .26	.000	.000	231

Results are shown for differences between treatment and control groups in moving overseas, completing the training program, and receiving a job offer. All outcomes listed are binary.

Table S11: Full Results: Intercultural Contact

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			2SLS		
	Ctrl	Treat	P(RI)	ATE	P(RI)	P	CACE	P	N
Contact Index	—	.481	.001	+ .487	.001	.001	+ 2.447	.000	248
Meal w/ Non-Christian	2.28	2.61	.032	+ .34	.031	.032	+ 1.71	.021	248
Meal w/ Non-Mizo	2.18	2.66	.003	+ .49	.002	.003	+ 2.50	.001	248
Meal w/ Non-Indian	1.49	2.13	.000	+ .64	.000	.000	+ 3.16	.000	247
Work w/ Non-Christian	2.79	2.99	.130	+ .20	.131	.141	+ .99	.128	248
Work w/ Non-Mizo	2.72	2.98	.074	+.27	.070	.068	+ 1.34	.051	248
Work w/ Non-Indian	1.59	2.26	.000	+ .67	.000	.000	+ 3.34	.000	247

All items are measured from 1 (never) to 5 (every day). Contact Index is a composite index of all other outcomes.

Table S12: Full Results: Intercultural Tolerance

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			2SLS		
	Ctrl	Treat	P(RI)	ATE	P(RI)	P	CACE	P	N
Tolerance Index	—	.371	.002	+.354	.004	.003	+ 1.79	.006	248
OK to Marry Non-Mizo	.52	.65	.022	+.13	.022	.018	+ .64	.026	248
View of Bangladeshis (1-5)	2.95	3.08	.051	+.13	.041	.043	+ .66	.047	248
View of Pakistanis (1-5)	2.90	3.01	.076	+.11	.072	.071	+ .56	.075	248
View of Middle Easterners (1-5)	3.01	3.23	.001	+.21	.002	.001	+ 1.04	.004	248
View of Europeans (1-5)	3.14	3.25	.046	+.11	.045	.051	+ .54	.050	248

All outcomes are on 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive), except for accepting family members' choice to marry a non-Mizo.

Table S13: Full Results: Support for Globalization and Cosmopolitanism

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			2SLS		
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P*	*CACE*	*P*	*N*
Intl Cooperation Index	—	.231	.038	+ .231	.038	.039	+ 1.16	.051	248
Trade Improves Lives	4.04	4.27	.023	+ .23	.023	.022	+ 1.14	.027	248
Peace w/ Pakistan	3.87	3.98	.206	+ .12	.179	.180	+ .62	.191	248
Migration Index	—	.125	.156	+ .123	.161	.164	+ .61	.164	248
Migration Improves Lives	3.39	3.47	.279	+ .08	.278	.269	+ .40	.268	248
Bangladeshi Migration	2.66	2.78	.194	+ .11	.198	.207	+ .55	.209	248
Intl News Interest	—	.212	.063	+ .211	.066	.067	+ 1.06	.072	248
Identify as World Citizen	.14	.23	.027	+ .10	.025	.025	+ .48	.028	247

First four items are measured from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).

Table S14: Full Results: National vs. Regional Identity

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			2SLS		
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P*	*CACE*	*P*	*N*
Identify as Indian vs. Mizo	2.26	2.17	.526	− .09	.532	.515	− .46	.518	247
Less Autonomy for Mizoram	2.93	3.04	.481	+ .11	.487	.498	+ .54	.502	248
Support Internal Migration	1.92	2.09	.243	+ .16	.250	.234	+ .82	.247	248
View of Mainland Indians	3.22	3.39	.021	+ .17	.017	.020	+ .86	.029	248
Natl News Interest	1.66	1.84	.020	+ .18	.015	.014	+ .90	.027	248

Items 1-4 are measured from 1 (Strongly Disagree or Very Negative) to 5 (Strongly Agree or Very Positive). Item 5 is measured from 1 (not at all interested) to 3 (very interested).

Table S15: Benjamini-Hochberg Correction, International Hypotheses

	P-Value	Target
Intercultural Contact	.001	.01
Intercultural Tolerance	.004	.02
Support for Intl Cooperation	.038	.03
Interest in Intl Politics	.063	.04
Support for Intl Migration	.156	.05

The table shows the p-values for the main hypothesis tests using the Benjamini-Hochberg Correction.

Table S16: Comparing Treatment Effects: Likely Migrants vs. Likely Non-Migrants

| | Effect Size | | |
	Likely Mig.	Likely Non-Mig.	Diff?
Moved Abroad	+ .59***	+ .06*	$p < .01$
Intergroup Contact	+ 1.36***	+ .18	$p < .01$
Intergroup Tolerance	+ .87***	+ .16	$p < .05$
Support for Intl Cooperation	+ .25	+ .21*	$p > .1$
Support for Intl Migration	+ .36*	+ .03	$p > .1$
Interest in Intl Politics	+ .50**	+ .09	$p > .1$
Identify as World Citizen	+ .03	+ .13**	$p > .1$
N	68	180	

Each row comes from an OLS regression of treatment (with an interaction term by respondent group) on the main outcome. P-values are two-sided, as there was no pre-registered hypothesis on the difference in effect.

Table S17: Effect of Training Attendance, Control Group Only

	Dependent variable:			
	Tolerance	Trade & Coop.	Migration	Ctzn. of World
Training	0.262	0.213	−0.066	0.095
	(0.171)	(0.186)	(0.190)	(0.064)
Age	−0.008	0.017	−0.043	−0.006
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.011)
Male	−0.163	0.387**	0.018	0.038
	(0.175)	(0.191)	(0.195)	(0.066)
Employed	−0.011	0.086	−0.062	0.100
	(0.259)	(0.300)	(0.288)	(0.097)
Married	−3.559***	1.090	1.775	−0.192
	(1.027)	(1.120)	(1.137)	(0.385)
Education	−0.017	0.043	−0.036	−0.045
	(0.105)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.039)
ST	0.439	1.014**	0.959*	−0.115
	(0.462)	(0.505)	(0.513)	(0.173)
Baseline Outcome	0.192**	0.021	−0.007	−0.029
	(0.088)	(0.100)	(0.093)	(0.068)
Obs.	118	118	118	117

The table shows the effect of attending a job training program for the control group. Note:
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table S18: Full Results: Household Members Survey

	Diff-in-Means			OLS			
	Ctrl	*Treat*	*P(RI)*	*ATE*	*P(RI)*	*P(OLS)*	*N*
Contact Index	—	+.076	.267	+.077	.268	.257	301
Discussed Foreign Religions?	.26	.29	.324	+.03	.326	.318	300
Discussed Foreign Discrimination?	.23	.27	.219	+.04	.224	.223	301
Tolerance Index	—	−.045	.669	−.054	.698	.692	304
OK to Marry Non-Mizo?	.36	.33	.666	−.02	.651	.661	293
View of Indians	4.15	4.07	.844	−.10	.868	.868	302
View of Bangladeshis	2.30	2.31	.475	+.01	.469	.461	302
View of Pakistanis	2.25	2.27	.444	+.02	.448	.442	297
View of Middle Easterners	2.80	2.96	.044	+.17	.042	.034	295
View of Europeans	3.95	3.77	.959	−.18	.961	.959	302
Migration Index	—	−.134	.871	−.119	.844	.852	304
Migration Improves Lives	2.59	2.51	.724	−.00	.508	.507	304
Support Migration into India	1.33	1.23	.847	−.09	.822	.837	302

The table shows the impact of belonging to the treatment group on a variety of outcomes for the household members of program participants.