Policy Preferences in Tough Times: Experimental Evidence

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24th October 2022

Abstract

We assess which policies citizens prefer in the case of negative economic shocks: 1) social spending and redistribution via taxation; 2) closure to both foreign products and people. We design three sets of original survey experiments to estimate the causal effect of different policies on political support. Our key tests involve vignette experiments and split-ballot experiments conducted in France, Germany, and Italy. We find that politicians who increase welfare expenditure and implement redistribution policies are significantly more likely to be supported by voters when confronted with mass layoffs. Follow-up conjoint experiments, which dig into specific attributes of social spending and redistribution, indicate strong support for social investment over consumption investment and for very progressive taxation. We find evidence of welfare chauvinism among right-wing voters. Surveying more than 11,000 citizens in the three largest EU economies, our micro-foundational evidence suggests a pronounced political advantage for politicians who advocate redistribution in tough times.

Keywords: Social spending, redistribution, protectionism, mass layoffs, Europe.

1 Introduction

Which policies do citizens favour in tough times? While there is a general consensus that economic efficiency is fostered by globalization, there is also ample evidence that its distributional consequences are starkly uneven. Losers from globalization represent a pressing political problem for politicians in advanced democracies as the recent surge of anti-system parties and candidates testifies. Faced with negative economic shocks, politicians' position on policies that tackle economic vulnerability affects individual preferences, and ultimately voting behaviour. Typically, two different approaches to address economic vulnerability have emerged: 1) embedded liberalism (EL), advocating redistribution policies that compensate the losers from negative economic shock; 2) economic nationalism (EN), advocating anti-globalization policies in the form of markets' closure, which allegedly removes the roots of negative economic shocks.

The political formula underpinning the EL paradigm is quite straightforward: promoting redistribution via higher taxation in order to make sure that the individuals that are most exposed to market opening are shielded from its negative consequences and, hence, keep supporting it. Many empirical works have provided evidence consistent with the micro-level mechanisms postulated by this paradigm: exposure to globalization-related economic insecurity tends to increase citizens' support for redistribution (Alt & Iversen, 2017; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 2009, 2011; Thewissen & Rueda, 2019; Baccini *et al.*, 2022) and for parties advocating an expansion of the welfare state (Walter, 2010).

In recent years, however, this paradigm has been challenged by an alternative paradigm, which has acquired increasing electoral strength: the economic nationalism paradigm. Political parties adhering to the EN paradigm propose to cope with potential negative economic shocks induced by globalization by implementing policies of closure to both foreign products and people, accompanied by a promise of lower taxation (Colantone & Stanig, 2018a,b). Again, there is ample micro-level evidence supporting the logic that underpins the EL paradigm. For one, individuals bearing the negative economic consequences of market opening tend to favour protectionism (Hays *et al.*, 2005; Mayda & Rodrik, 2005; Owen, 2017; Owen & Johnston, 2017; Schaffer & Spilker, 2019; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001) and strict migration policies (Ballard-Rosa *et al.*, 2021, 2022; Cramer, 2016; Gamez-Djokic & Waytz, 2020; Gennaioli & Tabellini, 2018; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Margalit, 2019). Moreover, recent works have produced a rich set of empirical results showing that individuals' exposure to globalization-related shocks, such as trade, offshoring, and technological change, may have indeed triggered support

for political parties, mostly right-wing ones, embracing the EN paradigm across Western democracies (Anelli *et al.*, 2019; Baccini & Weymouth, 2021; Broz *et al.*, 2021; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a,b; Flaherty & Rogowski, 2021; Milner, 2021).

Despite the abundance of empirical works investigating the individual-level consequences of exposure to globalization-related economic shocks, the existing evidence is far from conclusive with respect to the question of which policy positions, or combinations of policy positions, are likely to be electorally rewarding in times of economic crises. First, the results of existing empirical works are mixed. For instance, exposure to globalization simultaneously increases individual-level support for redistribution, protectionism, and anti-immigration policies, making it difficult to derive clear ex-ante expectations as to which policy paradigm is better positioned to capitalize on citizens' concerns in times of economic crisis. The observation that in recent years vulnerable individuals have largely supported radical right populist parties has led scholars to suggest that voters may have come to trust political leaders proposing a bargain involving closure to trade and migration (and lower taxes) more than politicians promising redistribution and insurance in exchange for support for globalization (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b).. At the same time, some research shows that these parties have sometimes come to embrace pro-redistribution policy platforms, albeit often with a selective logic aiming to exclude immigrants from welfare state benefits, suggesting that redistribution may remain a politically rewarding policy proposal (de Koster *et al.*, 2013; Van Der Waal *et al.*, 2013).

Second, policies are interdependent. The effects of politicians' positions on some of these policy dimensions are often correlated and/or conditional on their positions on other policy dimensions. For instance, the so-called embedded liberalism paradigm posits that individuals support market opening provided that politicians put in place compensation mechanisms for those exposed to the risks associated with increased international competition and volatility (Cameron, 1978; Ruggie, 1982; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1998). Relatedly, since anti-immigration and anti-trade policy stances usually go hand in hand in these parties' policy platforms, it remains difficult to disentangle their relative weight in driving support for these parties. Similarly, the "welfare chauvinism" perspective suggests that vulnerable individuals favour redistribution only insofar as immigrants are excluded from it (Alesina *et al.*, 2022; Magni, 2021).

In order to shed new empirical light on this important question we adopt an experimental approach, which allows us to isolate the causal effect of each policy. In particular, we develop original experimental designs to evaluate which leaders are better positioned to gain the support of voters in the case of negative economic shocks, which we present to

respondents in the form of a large plant closure and related mass layoffs. We carry out our test through vignette experiments and split-ballot experiments conducted in France, Germany, and Italy, surveying about 8,000 voters.

This first wave of survey experiments suggests a pronounced political advantage for politicians who advocate redistribution: Politicians who implemented redistribution policies and increased welfare expenditure are significantly more likely to be supported by voters after an economic shock. Interestingly, the support for political leaders who implement redistribution holds *regardless* of their ability to effectively tackle mass layoffs. The support for redistribution holds for both left- and right-wing political leaders. Only in the case of Italy do we find that support for political leaders who implement redistribution is larger if combined with trade openness rather than if combined with protectionist policies. In France and Germany, the support for a leader who implement redistribution is *unconditional* on other policies.

To better understand which type of redistribution policies voters favour, we run a second wave of survey experiments, which focus specifically on social expenditure and taxation. We design conjoint experiments in which respondents have to decide what is their preferred proposal to raise social expenditure in the case of mass layoffs. More specifically, we present respondents with five attributes: 1) type of social expenditure; 2) nationality of the beneficiaries; 3) work history of the beneficiaries; 4) reason for layoffs; 5) taxation. We conducted the conjoint experiment in France, Germany, and Italy, surveying more than 3,000 voters.

The results of the conjoint experiments indicate a strong preference in favour of social investment (e.g. re-training) over consumption investment (e.g. unemployment benefits and universal income). We also find a strong support for progressive taxation: The large majority of respondents ask for high-income people to pay for an increase in social spending. Moreover, we find no evidence that respondents have preferences for discriminating between natives and foreigners with respect to social spending. However, among right-wing voters, there is evidence of welfare chauvinism. Furthermore, respondents are *less* likely to favour social spending when layoffs are caused by globalization (proxied by offshoring) rather than layoffs in general, i.e. regardless of their causes. This last result is partially at odds with the EL paradigm.

Our findings have major implications. First, our research shows that redistribution policies are alive and well. Claims that anti-immigration and protectionist policies have trumped redistribution as means to provide protection against the vagaries of globaliza-

tion in the eyes of citizens are not supported by our empirical findings. On the contrary, our micro-foundational evidence suggests a pronounced political advantage for politicians who advocate social spending and redistribution in tough times. Second, our results indicate that there is a limited political market for parties that rely exclusively on protectionist policies (from both foreign goods and people) to shelter the losers from globalization. Redistribution rather than closure is still the preferred tool for addressing inequality. Third, the strong version of our argument is that the recent electoral success of extreme right-wing parties may be better understood by their position on social spending rather than their position on trade and migration. While they have always been against free trade and migration, extreme right-wing parties, which were originally fiscally conservative, have become in favour of welfare expansion over the past 20 years.[1] This change of policy position has a simple explanation: Redistribution is a winner among voters.

2 Theoretical Framework

Every economic transformation increases efficiency through an increase in competition. However, as George Orwell in his review of Hayek notes, "the trouble with competitions is that somebody wins them" (Orwell, 1944). Losers become not only an economic problem, but also a political one. Advanced economies, which are very globalized and have been facing increasing competition, have been repeatedly and routinely hit by negative economic shocks, which generate (more or less) concentrated losses for a part of the population. For one, there is a large literature documenting the economic and political costs of the China trade shock. Anxious from an increasing incidence of negative economic shocks, the public in advanced (globalized) economies demand political solutions. Typically, two different approaches to address economic vulnerability have emerged: *embedded liberalism* and *economic nationalism*.

The EL paradigm gained prominence when political economists started hypothesizing the existence of a systematic relationship between globalization and government spending for redistribution. For many, the consistent trend towards welfare state expansion across Western countries in the post-WWII period was the by-product of these countries' growing integration into global markets: As these countries deepened their ties with

[1] Figure A.1 shows that support for welfare state expansion has increased significantly more for right-wing populist parties than left-wing populist parties over the past 30 years. On the contrary, Figure A.2 shows that the position of right-wing populist parties on free trade has not changed over the past 30 years and it has remained quite low.

global markets, governments started striving to compensate globalization losers for the risks associated with increased international competition and volatility (Cameron, 1978; Ruggie, 1982; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1998). Hence, globalization led to greater welfare state spending (Hicks & Swank, 1992; Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998; Bernauer & Achini, 2000; Burgoon, 2001; Garrett & Mitchell, 2001).

In a nutshell, the EL paradigm advocates government intervention to tame the socially disruptive effects of markets without, however, eliminating its efficiency gains. As aptly noted by Walter (2010, p. 404), this argument has two components: a demand-side component and a supply-side component. On the demand side, it holds that globalization increases voters' demand for social protection, while on the supply side, it posits that governments satisfy this demand by supplying a more generous welfare state. The demand-side component of the argument helps us highlight the micro-level causal mechanisms postulated by the EL paradigm.

Such micro-level mechanisms are three. First, individuals in countries exposed to globalization should feel more economically insecure than those in countries less globalized. This is true in general and it should be even truer in cases where individuals are exposed to globalization-induced economic shocks. Second, individuals' economic insecurity should translate into support for welfare state expansion, i.e. for government-sponsored mechanisms of insurance against such economic distress. Third, individual-level preferences for redistribution should translate into votes for parties advocating the expansion of the welfare state. A number of empirical works have lent plausibility to the micro-level mechanisms postulated by the EL paradigm. For instance, many works in the comparative political economy literature show that exposure to globalization-related economic insecurity tends to increase citizens' support for redistribution (Alt & Iversen, 2017; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 2009, 2011; Thewissen & Rueda, 2019). Moreover, Walter (2010) carried out a comprehensive empirical assessment of the three causal chains, showing that individuals more exposed to globalization are more insecure, have stronger preferences for redistribution, and, consequently, tend to vote for parties advocating an expansion of the welfare state.

However, more recent works in the political economy literature cast doubt on this view. One of the most consistent findings of numerous empirical studies is that individuals exposed to the vagaries of globalization tend to turn to parties advocating the EN paradigm, i.e. proposing policies of closure for both products and people, accompanied by a promise of lower taxation (Colantone & Stanig, 2018b,a). Rising import competition from China, off-shoring, and automation have all been found to correlate with growing

popular support for parties promising to provide protection through higher tariffs and stricter immigration policies, rather than through redistribution (Anelli *et al.*, 2019; Autor *et al.*, 2013; Baccini & Weymouth, 2021; Broz *et al.*, 2021; Colantone & Stanig, 2018b,a; Flaherty & Rogowski, 2021; Milner, 2021). Similarly to the EL paradigm, proponents of the EN paradigm seek to gain citizens' trust by promising protection against the insecurity generated by globalization-related economic shocks. However, this policy formula turns things around: protection comes not from redistribution but in the form of market closure for both goods and people.

In the current stage of globalization, a number of factors may have contributed to making individuals prefer closure to trade and migration over redistribution as a protection from the (potential) risks they face. For one, the higher taxes required to finance a renewed welfare state might not be particularly appealing to middle-class constituencies, which are nowadays less likely to trust that they will benefit from redistribution in hard times. The deepening of economic globalization implies stronger globalization shocks demanding higher compensation, while at the same time constraining the financing capacity of governments. Since globalization, particularly capital mobility, constrains the ability of national governments to raise the necessary tax revenues (Burgoon, 2001; Garrett & Mitchell, 2001), governments tend to provide insufficient compensation for losers, leading to an overall loss of credibility of the embedded liberalism paradigm (see Hays, 2009; Hellwig, 2014).

Moreover, economic distress tends to increase authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and anti-minority sentiments (Ballard-Rosa *et al.*, 2021, 2022; Margalit, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Indeed, as individuals exposed to the vulnerabilities generated by globalization perceive that their socio-economic status worsens, they are more likely to change the social groups with which they identify and switch from a class-based to a cultural and national social identification (Bonomi *et al.*, 2021; Baccini & Weymouth, 2021). Overall, when it comes to dealing with large economic shocks, these arguments suggest that individuals should be more likely to ask for limited foreign competition of both products and people and, at the same time, should be less likely to care about redistribution.

This discussion suggests that politicians' positions on three key policy issues should be crucial in determining whether they are trusted by citizens in the case of a negative economic shock: 1) social spending via redistribution, 2) trade policy, and 3) migration policy. For instance, the EL paradigm suggests that citizens are inclined to trust leaders who favour social spending and redistribution. Symmetrically, the EN paradigm suggests that citizens are likely to trust leaders who implement protectionism, strict immigration

policies, and cut taxes.

More formally, this discussion suggests two competing hypotheses about the relationship between parties' platforms and citizens' support in advanced (globalized) economies hit by negative economic shocks:

> **H1a** *(EL paradigm)*: In the case of negative economic shocks, citizens are more likely to support a politician who increases social spending and redistribution via taxation rather than one who implements protectionist policies from both foreign goods and foreign people.
>
> **H1b** *(EN paradigm)*: In the case of negative economic shocks, citizens are more likely to support a politician who implements protectionist policies from both foreign good and foreign people than one who increases social spending and redistribution via taxation.

Moreover, in order to further assess the relative merits of the embedded liberalism and economic nationalism paradigms, we also test three conditional hypotheses. More specifically, we explore whether support for politicians who implement trade liberalization changes once redistribution is granted. Similarly, we analyze whether support for politicians who implement redistribution changes once trade liberalization is implemented. Finally, we assess whether trust in politicians who implement redistribution and protectionism changes once strict migration policies are implemented.

Furthermore, we are also interested in assessing how these perceptions are affected by a successful (or unsuccessful) management of economic shocks. In short, we want to gauge whether, in the case of a successful handling of an economic shock, politicians who embrace the EL paradigm are more likely to gain electorally compared to politicians who adhere to the EN paradigm. More formally, we test the following competing hypotheses:

> **H2a** *(EL paradigm)*: In the case of successfully handling negative economic shocks, voters are more likely to remunerate electorally a politician who increases social spending and redistribution via taxation.
>
> **H2b** *(EN's paradigm)*: In the case of successfully handling negative economic shocks, voters are more likely to remunerate electorally a politician who implements protectionist policies from both foreign good and foreign people.

3 Data and Case Selection

We test the hypotheses above with three survey experiments conducted in Italy (from 2 to 24 September 2021), France, and Germany (both from 13 December 2021 to 8 January 2022). The Italian data were collected by *GFK Italy* in the fourth wave of the DISPOC-GFK panel survey, on a sample of the Italian population aged 14 years or older ($N \approx 3,000$).[2] The French and German data were collected in two opt-in surveys conducted by *respondi*, on a sample of the French and German populations aged 18-75 years ($N \approx 2,500$ in each survey). All surveys are representative of the population by age, gender, education, and region in which respondents live. For the empirical analysis, we included only respondents who successfully passed two attention checks.

We selected this diverse set of countries to enhance the external validity of our analysis. The criteria for selecting these countries are threefold. First, they are the three largest economies in the EU. Second, they have had different economic performances over the past three decades. Germany has been growing steadily since the reunification, whereas Italy and, to a lesser extent, France, have experienced sluggish economic growth. Third, the three countries have different political systems, which leads to a significant variation of socio-economic policies, allowing us to examine to what extent our results depend on country-specific circumstances.

For the three survey experiments, we chose a fictitious name for the politician in question. We opted for giving respondents a real name because this makes the description of the experimental scenarios more vivid and realistic. We made sure the politician had a common name and surname, avoiding any surname that could remind respondents of real (past or present) politicians. The experimental scenario was set in a rather distant future, so as to detach respondents as much as possible from current political considerations. The official role of the politician was adapted to each political system: in Italy and Germany, he is the head of government ("president of the council" in Italy, "chancellor" in Germany), while in France he is the head of state ("president"). For the Italian survey, we named the president of the council "Francesco Ferrari"; for the French survey, the president's name was "Jean Dubois"; the fictitious German chancellor was named "Andreas Müller".

[2] Individuals taking part in the survey were selected within a probability-based panel managed by GFK Italy.

4 Experimental Design

In each survey, we conducted two experiments. The first is a vignette experiment, with four politician's attributes that were randomly ordered to form a description of his past political choices regarding taxation and welfare, migration, and trade policy, as well as his ideological position (left or right). The second experiment is a split-ballot experiment.

4.1 Design of Experiment #1

The first experiment is a vignette experiment in which we set a future scenario and then describe the politician's profile. For our portrait, we did not want to describe the politician's stances as pledges or promises, but as actual policies that he had already implemented – for this reason, we informed respondents that he has already been in power for two years. This setting allows us to avoid a potential bias in the form of an unobserved independent variable – the extent to which respondents believed the politician would carry out what he had promised.

Respondents first visualized the following text:

> We now describe a scenario that [Italy / France / Germany] could face in the future. It's 2031. [Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has been [president of the council / president / chancellor] for two years. A well-known company has announced the closure of its biggest plant in [Italy / France / Germany]. 10,000 workers are at risk of losing their job. The issue is highly salient in the country.[3]

After that, each respondent visualized a paragraph of text in which the attributes in Table 1 were randomly ordered, and the formulations (A or B) randomly assigned.

An example of such a paragraph is the following:

> "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has opposed the new trade agreements that the European Union is negotiating, arguing that they are a threat for the interests of [Italian / French / German] firms and workers [Attribute 3, Formulation A]; [he] is a right-wing politician [Attribute 4, Formulation B]; [he] has pushed back migrants and has reduced the funding for

[3]The experiment focused on mass layoffs, a salient political issue in the three countries. This should increase the likelihood that respondents will consider the topic plausible and relevant, an important precondition to satisfy the assumption that decision-makers in experimental analyses use the information provided (Yegoryan *et al.*, 2020).

Table 1: Attributes and formulations of the vignette experiment

Attribute	**Formulations**	
1. Taxation, redistribution, and social expenditure	(A) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has raised taxes for the rich and reduced them for the poor, increasing social expenditure"	(B) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has lowered taxes for both the rich and the poor, reducing social expenditure"
2. Migration and inclusion of migrants	(A) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has avoided pushing back migrants and has increased the funding for integration policies"	(B) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has pushed back migrants and has reduced the funding for integration policies"
3. Trade policy	(A) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has supported the new trade agreements that the European Union is negotiating, arguing that they represent a big opportunity for [Italian / French / German] firms and workers"	(B) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] has opposed the new trade agreements that the European Union is negotiating, arguing that they are a threat for the interests of [Italian / French / German] firms and workers"
4. Political affiliation	(A) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] is a left-wing politician"	(B) "[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] is a right-wing politician"

integration policies [Attribute 2, Formulation B]; [he] has raised taxes for the rich and reduced them for the poor, increasing social expenditure [Attribute 1, Formulation A]."

After this treatment, the following three questions were shown to each respondent in random order. Before each question was asked, the description of the politician was repeated.

1. Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement, indicating a value between 1 and 7, where 1 means "completely disagree" and 7 means "completely agree".

   [Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully.

2. Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement, indicating a value between 1 and 7, where 1 means "completely disagree" and 7

means "completely agree".

[Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] defends the rights of the [Italians / French / Germans].

3. Please tell us to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement, indicating a value between 1 and 7, where 1 means "completely disagree" and 7 means "completely agree".

   [Francesco Ferrari / Jean Dubois / Andreas Müller] defends the rights of the workers.

The reason for having three separate outcomes is that it allows us to test the main effect of different policies on support for the politician, and two potential mechanisms. The first outcome captures the level of trust in the ability of a political leader to deal with a severe economic shock. The other two outcomes unpack political support in two dimensions: national identity and class identity. Our goal is to explore whether different policies have a differential effect on these two dimensions.

4.2 Design of Experiment #2

The second experiment was a split-ballot one in which half of the sample was shown Introduction A and half of the sample was shown Introduction B (see Table 2).

Table 2: Alternative formulations of the split-ballot experiment

Introduction A	**Introduction B**
Six months have passed. The firm has eventually decided to not close the plant and to not dismiss any employees.	Six months have passed. The firm has eventually decided to close the plant and to dismiss all employees.

After this introduction, all respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "I would not vote for [the politician / the politician's party] at the next election" and 7 means "I would vote for [the politician / the politician's party] at the next election". The formulation referred to the politician directly in the French case (where the president is directly elected) and to his party in the Italian and German cases (where voters elect MPs and the head of government is appointed after the election).

5 Statistical analysis

In its baseline form, our model specification is the following:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Tax_i + \beta_2 Migration_i + \beta_3 Trade_i + \beta_4 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where Y_i are all the outcome variables listed above; Tax_i, $Migration_i$, $Trade_i$, and $Ideology_i$ are the randomized treatments; α is the constant; $\beta_1 \ldots \beta_4$ are the coefficients of interest; ϵ_i are the residuals. Note that i refers to respondents. The equation above allows us to test hypotheses H1a and H1b.

To test the conditional hypotheses, we rely on the following model specifications:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i|(Tax_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Migration_i + \beta_2 Trade_i + \beta_3 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \\ Y_i|(Tax_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Migration_i + \beta_2 Trade_i + \beta_3 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i|(Migration_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Tax_i + \beta_2 Trade_i + \beta_3 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \\ Y_i|(Migration_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Tax_i + \beta_2 Trade_i + \beta_3 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i|(Trade_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Tax_i + \beta_2 Migration_i + \beta_3 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \\ Y_i|(Trade_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Tax_i + \beta_2 Migration_i + \beta_3 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Furthermore, to test H2a and H2b, we run our main model conditional on the politician being successful or unsuccessful in handling the negative economic shock. More formally, we run the following model:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i|(Success_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Tax_i + \beta_2 Migration_i + \beta_3 Trade_i + \beta_4 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \\ Y_i|(Success_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 Tax_i + \beta_2 Migration_i + \beta_3 Trade_i + \beta_4 Ideology_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Our models are also weighted by age, gender, education, and region in which respondents live to compensate for (mostly minor) deviations from the aforementioned quotas. In all model specifications, we include the following control variables: age, gender, socio-

economic class,[4] employment status,[5] ideology,[6] and education level. As expected, the correlation between each control and each treatment is very low, given the randomization implemented in the vignette experiment.

6 Results

6.1 Results of Experiment #1

We begin by showing the results for the first experiment, considering our baseline model (Figure 1).[7] For each country, the three dots' colours refer to the results for the three questions asked after the description of the politician's characteristics (see Section 4.1). The coefficients refer to the effect of the formulation A of each treatment. Therefore, a positive coefficient means that formulation A boosts support for the politician, and a negative coefficient means that formulation B boosts support for the politician.

We can see that the only treatment that has a consistent effect for all the response questions in each of the three countries is the one referring to social spending and redistribution via taxation: Voters tend to support a politician who "has raised taxes for the rich and reduced them for the poor, increasing social expenditure". In Italy, this is the only attribute that increases support for the politician overall. The effect of other treatments is more context-dependent. For instance, French voters tend to trust more a president that "has pushed back migrants and has reduced the funding for integration policies", while German voters think that a pro-immigration chancellor is the right person for handling the crisis successfully and defending the rights of the workers. French voters find that a president that "has opposed the new trade agreements that the European Union is negotiating, arguing that they are a threat for the interests of French firms and workers" defends the workers' interests. German voters, instead, believe that a chancellor that has adopted a pro free-trade stance is the right person for handling the crisis successfully. Ideological orientation does not have a significant effect in Italy and France, while the German electorate looks more favourably on a left-wing politician.

[4] In the Italian sample, socio-economic class is measured with an ordinal variable taking values from 1 ("inferior") to 6 ("superior"). In the French and German surveys, respondents were asked to choose the class they belong to among the following options: "lower class or poor", "middle class", "working class", "upper class". To ensure comparability, we have treated all these variables as categorical ones.

[5] In France and Germany, this is a variable with the following categories: "working now", "unemployed", "retired", "permanently disabled", "temporarily laid off", "homemaker", "student". In the Italian sample, the categories are 18.

[6] Left-right position on a 1 to 7 scale. Recoded to a categorical variable with values "left" (1-3), "centre" (4), "right" (5-7). The Italian survey also contained the option "I don't recognize myself on this scale".

[7] In the main text, we show the results graphically. Tables are reported in Appendix B.3.

Figure 1: Results of the regression analysis (Experiment #1, baseline model)



Notes: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

Concerning the comparison between the EL and the EN paradigms, there is more evidence supporting H1a (EL paradigm) than H1b (EN paradigm). However, Germany is the only country in which the support for social spending and redistribution is coupled with support for free trade, in favour of which there is no evidence in France and Italy.

To shed more light on the mechanisms linking the different policy stances, we look at the results of the conditional models, in which we show, for all respondents that have received

Figure 2: Results of the regression analysis (Experiment #1, conditional models, Italy)



Notes: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

a particular attribute of one treatment, the effect of the other treatment on the response variable. For clarity's sake, we present separate figures for each country survey, focusing on the first question only (full results are available in Appendix B.1). As shown in Figure 2, the Italian data lend some support to the EL paradigm. For instance, if the president has a pro free-trade stance, they trust him more if he has implemented a redistributive fiscal policy. Conversely, if voters face a president that has adopted an anti-redistributive fiscal policy, they support him more if he has also opposed trade liberalization. So, redistribution and trade liberalization seem to go hand in hand in the Italian case.

In the data concerning France, though, we do not observe the same pattern (Figure 3). There is no increased preference for a pro free-trade president if he has implemented a redistributive policy. At the same time, the fact that the president is pro or against free trade does not affect citizens' attitudes towards redistribution: French voters prefer a pro-redistribution candidate anyway. If anything, they want more redistribution from an anti free-trade candidate – the opposite of what the EL paradigm would predict. The president's stance on immigration does not affect preference for redistribution either.

Furthermore, the German data (Figure 4) do not seem to support any trade-off between

Figure 3: Results of the regression analysis (Experiment #1, conditional models, France)



Notes: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

openness to trade and redistribution, as voters consistently reward a chancellor that is pro free-trade (regardless of his stance on welfare taxation policy) and pro-redistribution (regardless of his stance on trade).[8]

6.2 Results of Experiment #2

The results of the second experiment are shown in Figure 5. For most of the treatments, the propensity to vote for the incumbent politician at the next election is not affected by whether he succeeded or failed in avoiding the plant's closure. This is certainly the case for the social spending and redistribution policy: A candidate that has adopted the EL paradigm is always more rewarded electorally, *regardless* of how he managed the negative shock. This is consistent with the results of the first experiment, which showed redistribution as the only policy that was consistently supported across the three countries.

Concerning migration, the three countries show divergent patterns. Italians are indifferent to it; the French consistently reward an anti-immigration president; Germans con-

[8]Appendix B.1 shows the conditional effects for the other two outcomes.

Figure 4: Results of the regression analysis (Experiment #1, conditional models, Germany)



Notes: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

sistently reward a pro-immigration chancellor. Similar results are observed as regards trade policy. It does not matter for Italians, while it matters (in the form of support for a protectionist president) for the French. Germans reward a free-trade oriented chancellor if he has succeeded in avoiding the plant's closure, but they do not if he has failed.

Interestingly, the French and German experiments yield the same result when it comes to the ideological orientation of the politician: A left-wing politician is more likely to receive votes if he succeeded in avoiding the plant's closure, but ideology is not significant if the politician failed. Overall, however, the policy platform of the politician matters much more than the result he obtained in dealing with the plant's closure. This result may suggest that, in globalized economies, politicians are less accountable to negative economic shocks, which are perceived as largely out of the hands of the incumbent president/chancellor.

6.3 Heterogeneous Effects

We implement a large number of heterogeneous effects to shed light on which part of the population drives the results of the vignette experiments. In particular, we interact

Figure 5: Results of the regression analysis (Experiment #2, baseline model)



Notes: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the placement on a 1 to 7 scale where 1 means "I would not vote for [politician] at the next election" and 7 means "I would vote for [politician] at the next election". All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

each treatment with education, gender, ideology, and income. Moreover, we interact each treatment with attitude towards welfare, migration, and trade and with a proxy for identity. Furthermore, we interact each treatment with variables capturing economic vulnerability, which we proxy with exposure to automation and offshoring.[9] Details of

[9]These variables are only available for France and Germany.

the intervening variables and of this analysis are reported in the appendix (see Appendix B.2).

Results indicate that the support of redistribution holds across different parts of our sample, *regardless* of the demographic and socio-economic conditions of the respondents and of their political attitudes. This is true in all countries. On the contrary, support for open or restricted migration policies, and to a lesser extent support for trade openness, depends on political attitudes, especially in France and Italy.

7 Preferences over Social Spending and Redistribution

So far the analysis has showed a pronounced political advantage for politicians who advocate redistribution in tough times. Given the great deal of heterogeneity among redistribution policies, we now delve into their specific characteristics. In particular, we are interested in gaining a better understanding of the following issues: 1) which type of social expenditure is preferred by citizens in the case of negative economic shocks; 2) who should benefit from an increase in social expenditure; 3) who should pay for an increase in social expenditure. Below, we detail the conjoint experiment, which helps answer these questions.

7.1 Empirical approach

We administered original surveys in Italy (N = 1,100), in Germany (N = 1,100), and in France (N = 1,100) in 2022. The samples come from opt-in panels administered by the company *Respondi*. Each sample is representative of the population with respect to age, gender, employment status, and location of residence. We embedded conjoint experiments in each survey, which asked respondents to choose among pairs of welfare policies whose multiple attributes were randomized.

Attributes In the experiments, respondents evaluated pairs of welfare reforms, which are motivated by a major plant closure. Thus, both the vignette experiments and the conjoint experiments have a similar background scenario, i.e. the occurrence of a negative economic shock.[10] Since the proposed welfare reforms happen as a result of a mass layoff event, *all* welfare reforms involve an increase in social expenditure. We randomly varied five characteristics of the welfare reforms: 1) type of social expenditure to protect displaced

[10]The specific text of the background scenario is reported in Appendix C.1. As said, mass layoffs are a salient political issue in the three countries, which increases the probability that respondents rely on the information provided, a crucial assumption in conjoint experiments.

workers; 2) nationality of the beneficiaries; 3) work history; 4) cause of layoffs; 5) taxation. Table 3 summarizes the attributes.[11]

Table 3: Attributes and formulations of the conjoint experiment

Attribute	**Formulations**
	The plan increases social expenditure
Type of social expenditure	– to finance a universal basic income* – to finance unemployment benefits – to provide training for those who lost their jobs – to finance early retirement
Nationality of beneficiaries	– for both [Italian / French / German] and foreign citizens* – only for [Italian / French / German] citizens
Work history	– for all people, regardless of their work history* – for people who have worked at least 3 years – for people who have worked at least 10 years
Reason for layoffs	– for all layoffs, regardless of their reason* – for layoffs due to offshoring (companies moving their production abroad) – for layoffs due to automation
	To finance this increase in social expenditure, the plan raises taxes
Taxation	– for all people, regardless of their income* – for all people progressively (the higher the income, the higher the increase in taxation) – for high-income people – for high-income people, reducing taxation on low-income people

Note: Formulations with an asterisk represent the reference category. The order of the attributes is randomized.

The attribute 'type of social expenditure' allows us to understand which welfare policy voters prefer to finance. We selected four policies that can be seen as responses to the event leading to mass layoffs, which we describe in our background scenario. The policies differ in their scope (whether they are universal or more targeted), in the profile of beneficiaries (workers, old-age workers, everybody), in the time frame of the increase in social expenditure (more limited in time or permanent), and in the ambition of the policy (purely compensatory or investing in displaced workers' future employability). Including

[11]Recent work shows that respondents' stated choices remain fairly stable regardless of the number of attributes and profiles in the conjoint table (Jenke *et al.*, 2021).

this attribute allows us to estimate which type of expenditure policy is preferred.

The attribute 'nationality of beneficiaries' allows us to test whether voters' preferences are characterized by "welfare chauvinists", i.e. whether they prefer to spend money only on beneficiaries who belong to the (perceived) national community. In short, we are interested in exploring whether respondents prefer to restrict the pool of beneficiaries from the increase in social expenditure on the basis of their nationality.We are aware that excluding (some or all) foreign citizens could be legally problematic, but we choose to ignore the technical and legal feasibility of the options we present, given that we present to respondents a future hypothetical scenario.

The attribute 'work history' allows us to explore the deserving dimension. Indeed, this attribute allows us to understand if, and to what extent, voters see social expenditure as something linked to social contributions. That is, the more time people have worked and contributed (through taxation and social contributions, for instance), the more they should benefit from the increase in social expenditure. By interacting this attribute with the attribute 'nationality of beneficiaries', we can also test whether national workers are perceived to deserve social expenditure more than foreign workers, since the former category is perceived to contribute more than the latter category.

The attribute 'reasons for layoff' helps us to discriminate between respondents who would like to spend public money on workers who lost their jobs for a particular reason and voters who are happy to give the proposed social benefit to all workers that have lost their jobs. The two specific reasons that we list are offshoring, which is specifically linked to globalization, and automation, which has to do with technological progress. In particular, a respondent's preference for linking social expenditure to a globalization-related shock would hint that people internalize an "embedded liberalism" logic, i.e. protection in exchange for economic openness.

The attribute 'taxation' lists several combinations of tax increases that could be chosen to finance the increase in social expenditure. In particular, the reference category is a non-progressive increase in taxation (i.e. the same increase for every taxpayer), while the other three formulations are all progressive, but in different ways: one proposes to increases taxes on everybody progressively (the higher the income, the higher the increase); one proposes to increase taxes for high-income people only; the last one not only increases taxes for high-income people, it also reduces taxes on low-income people – it readjusts the tax burden more progressively. The four formulations, therefore, cover the whole range of policy options, from no progressivity at all to full progressivity.We do not allow

a free-meal option in this attribute.

Outcomes After each pair of plans is shown to respondents, they are first asked if they like Proposal 1 and then asked if they like Proposal 2. These two questions give respondents the opportunity to like one of the two proposals, both of them, or neither of them. The "abstention category" (i.e. respondents who do not like either proposal, see Miller & Ziegler, 2022) is particularly important, since some respondents may be generally against an increase in social expenditure.

We then ask a forced choice question: If you had to choose, which proposal would you prefer, Proposal 1 or Proposal 2? A comparison between the results of the first two question and the results of the forced choice allows us to understand how much bias is introduced by not giving people the option of "abstain" or liking both proposals.

To get a better understanding of *how much* respondents like the proposals, we also ask them to give each proposal a score from 1 to 7. More specifically, we ask the following question:

> On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "I don't like Proposal 1 at all" and 7 means "I like Proposal 1 a lot", how would you assess Proposal 1?

This question is repeated for Proposal 2. Finally, we ask the following question:

> On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "very unlikely" and 7 means "very likely", how likely are you to sign a petition in favour of Proposal 1?

This question is repeated for Proposal 2. These last two questions seek to measure if the preference for the proposals (one proposal or both of them) translates into some kind of mobilization. The rationale for including these questions is that a proposal for which a voter is likely to mobilize is particularly relevant for her or him.

Estimation We then analyze the data using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with cluster-robust standard errors because each respondent evaluated four pairs of policy proposals. In the regressions, the dependent variables are the "like/don't like" choice indicator, the intensity of the preference, and the behavioural outcome. The independent variables are the set of dummy variables for the attribute levels. No other covariate is present in the models.

Since attribute levels are independently randomized from one another, recent studies have shown that OLS produces unbiased and consistent estimates of the average marginal

component effects (AMCEs) (Hainmueller *et al.*, 2014; Horiuchi *et al.*, 2018). Because coefficient sizes in conjoint analysis are directly comparable, the results also reveal the relative importance of each attribute as a determinant of welfare preferences.

Finally, to evaluate interactions, we calculate the average marginal interaction effects (AMIEs). Egami & Imai (2019) show that the relative size of the AMIEs is not conditional on the attribute level adopted as the baseline in the conjoint analysis.

7.2 Results

Figure 6: Results of the conjoint experiment (Italy)



Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy that scores 1 if respondents like the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

Figures 6-8 present the results of the conjoint experiment based on the "like/don't like" outcome, including all respondents in the three countries. AMCEs in these figures reveal the following main findings.[12] First, respondents show a strong preference in favour of social investment (e.g. re-training) over consumption investment (e.g. unemployment

[12]Roughly 20% of respondents like neither proposal in each country. Disliking both proposals correlates highly with having negative attitudes towards social spending and redistribution via taxation, which we measure with pre-treatment questions.

Figure 7: Results of the conjoint experiment (France)



Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy that scores 1 if respondents like the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

benefits and universal income). The effect is slightly weaker in Germany than in the other countries, though it is significant when the outcome is the rating (see Figure C.6).

Second, we find a strong support for progressive taxation: The large majority of respondents ask high-income people to bear the burden of an increase in social spending. These effects are particularly large in France and Italy.

Third, our findings indicate that respondents have preference for extending social spending to both natives and foreigners. We find no evidence of welfare chauvinism, at least its most extreme form.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that respondents are more likely to favour social spending when layoffs are caused by globalization (proxied by offshoring) rather than when layoffs are caused by other reasons. If anything, there is larger support for expanding social spending when layoffs are *not* caused by offshoring and automation than when they are. This last result is partially at odds with the EL paradigm, but it may be explained by the fact that respondents' beliefs that globalization, which is a complex and pervasive

Figure 8: Results of the conjoint experiment (Germany)



Notes: The outcome variable is a dummy that scores 1 if respondents like the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

phenomenon, is ultimately responsible for every plant closure.[13]

Additional evidence. We perform some additional tests to corroborate our findings. First, our results are similar if we use marginal means rather than AMCEs (see Appendix C.2).

Second, our main findings are similar if we use the rating outcome rather than the "like/don't like" outcome and if we use the petition outcome rather than the "like/don't like" outcome (see Appendices C.3 and C.4). In sum, results are *not* sensitive to the way that we measure preferences in the conjoint.

Third, Appendix C.5 reports other heterogeneous effects. Many of these conditional effects leave our results unchanged. Importantly, we find evidence of welfare chauvinism among right-wing respondents, which may explain the success of radical right parties advocating a nativist identity-based form of social spending.

[13]Our tests indicate that the order of the choice tasks and the profile order do not affect the results. Our results are similar if we include or exclude respondents who fail the attention check.

Perhaps surprisingly, support for progressive taxation also persists among high-income respondents. Furthermore, pre-treatment attitudes towards social spending do not appear to affect our findings in any defining way. This is evidence that our treatment moves respondents' preferences and does not only capture and reinforce pre-existing attitudes.

8 Conclusions

Our analysis sought to shed new empirical light on the mechanisms that drive citizens' support for politicians dealing with globalization-induced economic distress. To do so, we relied on an original experimental design to evaluate whether leaders embracing the embedded liberalism paradigm or the economic nationalism paradigm are better positioned to gain the support of voters in the case of negative economic shocks. While not providing straightforward support for either of the two paradigms, the vignette experiments we conducted in Italy, France, and Germany highlight a number of important issues.

First, they show that the only feature having a consistent positive effect for all the response questions across the three countries is more redistribution and more welfare: Voters tend to give higher support to politicians that increase social expenditure via welfare state policies, and that shift the tax burden from the poor to the rich. This is an important finding which suggests that, contrary to what is posited by the economic nationalism paradigm, citizens continue to perceive redistribution as a key tool to provide social protection against the vagaries of globalization. While full support for the embedded liberalism paradigm would have called for evidence showing that support for redistribution and free trade go hand in hand, our results show that the current phase of globalization has not made the embedded liberalism paradigm obsolete. Moreover, we cannot neglect that the citizens of Italy, France, and Germany live in countries with an all-time high degree of trade liberalization. The fact that they do not support (politicians advocating for) more trade liberalization does not necessarily mean that they are against open trade.

If the embedded liberalism paradigm is not fully validated by our test, the economic nationalism one probably fares even worse: With the exception of France, voters do not seem to care much about leaders taking a tough stance against immigration. This is a surprising finding too, which highlights a potentially huge mismatch between the supply and demand sides of politics: While the question of how to regulate migration flows has acquired prominence in parties' policy platforms across the board, citizens do not

seem to place much emphasis on this policy issue when it comes to judging politicians dealing with negative economic shocks. Having said that, we cannot rule out that what we observe is also a by-product of the covid-19 pandemic, which made economic issues more relevant, possibly at the expense of migration.

Our results also highlight context-dependent dynamics, which is not surprising given the different political and economic profiles of the three countries considered. Our findings regarding Italy are the ones that more straightforwardly provide support for the embedded liberalism paradigm: Support for redistribution is stronger in the case of the politician's support for free trade and vice-versa. The findings concerning France provide more support for the economic nationalism paradigm, but with an important *caveat*: Voters do not see closure for goods and people as a substitute for redistribution, which they still want alongside protectionism and strict migration policy. Finally, in Germany citizens consistently support redistribution irrespective of the politician's choices concerning other policy issues.

When we look at the types of redistribution that citizens prefer, we find the following: 1) a strong preference in favour of social investment (e.g. re-training) over consumption investment (e.g. unemployment benefits and universal income); 2) a strong support for progressive taxation; 3) evidence of welfare chauvinism among right-wing voters; 4) no evidence that respondents are more likely to favour social spending when caused by globalization; if anything, we find the opposite.

After surveying more than 11,000 respondents in the three largest EU economies and running three sets of original survey experiments, the take-home message of our research is clear-cut: Social spending and redistribution are still the preferred policies in tough times.

Acknowledgements

Previous versions of this paper were presented at Science Po (Paris), IBEI (Barcelona), McGill University, Sapienza University of Rome (SISP annual conference), and APSA 2022. We thank Francesco Amodio, Alicia Cooperman, Aaron Erlich, Yannis Karagiannis, Krzysztof Pelc, and Thomas Sattler for comments on this project. Costin Ciobanu provided outstanding research assistance. Funding for this research was provided by the SSHRC Insight Development Grant, Canada (grant agreement 430-2021-00079) and by the Research Fund of the University of Trento. REB approval was obtained from McGill University (REB #21-09-001, 1st September 2021). The Italian data of the vign-

ette and split-ballot experiments were collected by the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences at the University of Siena thanks to the financial support of the Italian Ministry of University and Research, under the "Department of Excellence 2018-2022" project (2272-2018-IA-PROFCMIUR-001). The pre-analysis plans are available at https://osf.io/cbgtf/, https://osf.io/4krjv, and https://osf.io/dgvqb/.

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Appendix

A Descriptive evidence

Figure A.1: Support for Welfare State Expansion

Note: CMP (2022), Parlgov (2022), and PopuList (2022).

Figure A.2: Right Populist Support for Free Trade



Note: CMP (2022), Parlgov (2022), and PopuList (2022).

B Vignette Experiments

B.1 Conditional models for Questions 2 and 3 of the vignette experiment

Figure B.1: Results of the regression analysis (Vignette experiment, conditional models, **Italy**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statements "Francesco Ferrari defends the rights of the Italians" (a) and "Francesco Ferrari defends the rights of the workers" (b). All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

Figure B.2: Results of the regression analysis (Vignette experiment, conditional models, **France**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statements "Jean Dubois defends the rights of the French" (a) and "Jean Dubois defends the rights of the workers" (b). All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

Figure B.3: Results of the regression analysis (Vignette experiment, conditional models, **Germany**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statements "Andreas Müller defends the rights of the Germans" (a) and "Andreas Müller defends the rights of the workers" (b). All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education.

B.2 Heterogeneous effects

Figure B.4: Heterogeneous effects: Education, gender, ideology and national identity (**Italy**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". 'High education' scores 1 if the respondent holds at least an undergraduate degree. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 mean "left" and 7 means "right") are considered as right-wing. National identity' scores 1 if the respondent, when asked if she feels more Italian or European, answers "only Italian". All models are weighted.

Figure B.5: Heterogeneous effects: Income, and attitudes towards immigration, trade and welfare (**Italy**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". Income is "middle" for respondents who earn between 20,000 and 99,000 euros per year. Income is "high" is for respondents who earn more than 100,000 euros per year. Respondents are considered 'pro-immigration' if they agree with the statement "In general, immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and habits". Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means "International trade is an opportunity for economic growth thanks to the increase in our exports" and 7 means "International trade is a threat to economic growth due to increased imports") are considered are considered 'pro-trade'. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means "Public spending must be increased by raising taxes" and 7 means "Public spending needs to be cut in order to reduce taxes") are considered are considered 'pro-welfare'. All models are weighted.

Figure B.6: Heterogeneous effects: Education, gender, ideology and national identity (**France**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". 'High education' scores 1 if the respondent holds at least an undergraduate degree. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 mean "left" and 7 means "right") are considered as right-wing. National identity' scores 1 if the respondent, when asked if she feels more French or European, answers "only French". All models are weighted.

Figure B.7: Heterogeneous effects: Income, and attitudes towards immigration, trade and welfare (**France**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". Income is "middle" for respondents who earn between 20,000 and 99,000 euros per year. Income is "high" is for respondents who earn more than 100,000 euros per year. Respondents are considered 'pro-immigration' if they agree with the statement "In general, immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and habits". Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means "International trade is an opportunity for economic growth thanks to the increase in our exports" and 7 means "International trade is a threat to economic growth due to increased imports") are considered are considered 'pro-trade'. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means "Public spending must be increased by raising taxes" and 7 means "Public spending needs to be cut in order to reduce taxes") are considered are considered 'pro-welfare'. All models are weighted.

Figure B.8: Heterogeneous effects: Education, gender, ideology and national identity (**Germany**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". 'High education' scores 1 if the respondent holds at least an undergraduate degree. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 mean "left" and 7 means "right") are considered as right-wing. National identity' scores 1 if the respondent, when asked if she feels more German or European, answers "only German". All models are weighted.

Figure B.9: Heterogeneous effects: Income, and attitudes towards immigration, trade and welfare (**Germany**)



Note: Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully". Income is "middle" for respondents who earn between 20,000 and 99,000 euros per year. Income is "high" is for respondents who earn more than 100,000 euros per year. Respondents are considered 'pro-immigration' if they agree with the statement "In general, immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and habits". Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means "International trade is an opportunity for economic growth thanks to the increase in our exports" and 7 means "International trade is a threat to economic growth due to increased imports") are considered are considered 'pro-trade'. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means "Public spending must be increased by raising taxes" and 7 means "Public spending needs to be cut in order to reduce taxes") are considered are considered 'pro-welfare'. All models are weighted.

B.3 Regression tables (main analysis)

Table B.4: Regression analysis (Vignette experiment)

	Dependent variable:									
	Right person to deal with closure			Defends people's interests			Defends workers' interests			
	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)
Redistribution	0.152**	0.341***	0.418***	0.209***	0.272***	0.339***	0.186**	0.452***	0.578***
	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.073)
Migration	0.088	−0.291***	0.211***	−0.007	−0.476***	−0.039	0.068	−0.253***	0.244***
	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.074)
Trade	−0.046	−0.082	0.213***	−0.075	−0.138	0.021	−0.041	−0.190**	0.071
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.074)
Left-wing	0.036	0.104	0.265***	−0.010	0.016	0.177**	−0.025	0.061	0.311***
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.074)
Constant	2.913***	3.972***	3.750***	3.884***	4.008***	4.246***	3.387***	3.811***	3.854***
	(0.720)	(0.614)	(0.500)	(0.672)	(0.678)	(0.510)	(0.723)	(0.650)	(0.440)
Observations	2,222	1,918	2,301	2,263	1,927	2,296	2,274	1,926	2,302
R^2	0.025	0.032	0.042	0.031	0.036	0.026	0.032	0.043	0.056
F Statistic	1.803***	2.940***	4.725***	2.334***	3.367***	2.860***	2.364***	4.050***	6.382***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.5: Regression analysis (Split-ballot experiment)

	Dependent variable:					
	Propensity to vote for the politician					
	Avoided the plant's closure			Did not avoid the plant's closure		
	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)
Redistribution	0.262**	0.218*	0.253**	0.240**	0.426***	0.286***
	(0.116)	(0.131)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.110)
Migration	0.094	−0.340***	0.180	−0.021	−0.456***	0.357***
	(0.116)	(0.131)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.112)
Trade	−0.056	−0.217*	0.268**	0.033	−0.234**	−0.008
	(0.115)	(0.129)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.110)
Left-wing	0.026	0.179	0.237**	0.130	0.115	0.144
	(0.118)	(0.129)	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.119)	(0.112)
Constant	4.027***	4.256***	3.253***	4.171***	3.393***	3.764***
	(1.044)	(1.028)	(0.709)	(0.640)	(0.653)	(0.696)
Observations	1,143	944	1,154	1,087	970	1,148
R^2	0.051	0.034	0.049	0.056	0.057	0.045
F Statistic	1.943***	1.525*	2.794***	2.008***	2.719***	2.506***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.6: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, first dependent variable, Italy)

	Dependent variable:							
	Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.194*	0.085	0.009	0.291***	0.189*	0.127
			(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.106)
Migration	0.135	0.029			0.107	0.075	0.149	0.102
	(0.106)	(0.105)			(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.108)
Trade	−0.186*	0.071	0.020	−0.087			−0.085	−0.054
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.103)			(0.101)	(0.106)
Left-wing	0.053	0.008	0.082	0.019	−0.007	0.072		
	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.103)		
Constant	2.512***	3.502***	2.553**	3.547***	2.478**	3.548***	2.780***	2.980***
	(0.731)	(1.119)	(1.189)	(0.738)	(0.973)	(0.695)	(0.830)	(1.146)
Observations	1,132	1,090	1,097	1,125	1,093	1,129	1,141	1,081
R^2	0.050	0.022	0.071	0.041	0.057	0.029	0.090	0.026
F Statistic	1.917***	0.800	2.696***	1.540**	2.153***	1.088	3.643***	0.917

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.7: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, second dependent variable, Italy)

	Dependent variable:							
	Francesco Ferrari defends the interests of the Italians							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.237**	0.141	0.184*	0.209**	0.216**	0.213**
			(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.108)
Migration	0.035	−0.077			0.150	−0.131	0.062	−0.007
	(0.108)	(0.107)			(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.110)
Trade	−0.089	−0.109	0.100	−0.241**			−0.085	−0.096
	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.104)			(0.105)	(0.108)
Left-wing	−0.004	−0.016	0.043	−0.017	−0.033	−0.006		
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.105)		
Constant	3.690***	4.589***	4.025***	4.010***	3.580***	4.237***	4.245***	3.459***
	(0.918)	(0.870)	(0.967)	(0.982)	(0.877)	(0.948)	(1.000)	(0.879)
Observations	1,164	1,099	1,117	1,146	1,126	1,137	1,160	1,103
R^2	0.067	0.023	0.100	0.034	0.062	0.045	0.079	0.029
F Statistic	2.733***	0.840	4.014***	1.298	2.418***	1.730***	3.244***	1.085

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.8: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, third dependent variable, Italy)

	Dependent variable:							
	Francesco Ferrari defends the rights of the workers							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.219**	0.139	0.103	0.255**	0.180*	0.203*
			(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.107)
Migration	0.103	0.021			0.235**	−0.076	0.052	0.164
	(0.109)	(0.107)			(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.109)
Trade	−0.099	0.003	0.163	−0.223**			−0.102	0.002
	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.104)			(0.104)	(0.108)
Left-wing	−0.049	0.008	−0.057	0.036	−0.091	0.020		
	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.107)		
Constant	3.432***	3.624***	2.651**	4.398***	2.636**	4.529***	3.464***	3.149***
	(0.824)	(1.087)	(1.244)	(0.463)	(1.028)	(0.499)	(0.980)	(1.026)
Observations	1,165	1,109	1,121	1,153	1,127	1,147	1,170	1,104
R^2	0.059	0.022	0.066	0.045	0.062	0.045	0.078	0.042
F Statistic	2.358***	0.825	2.567***	1.759***	2.419***	1.753***	3.205***	1.579**

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.9: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, first dependent variable, France)

	Dependent variable:							
	Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.286**	0.413***	0.486***	0.198*	0.127	0.552***
			(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.120)	(0.105)	(0.114)	(0.113)
Migration	−0.377***	−0.263**			−0.295**	−0.258**	−0.224**	−0.383***
	(0.114)	(0.113)			(0.120)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.115)
Trade	0.065	−0.228**	−0.069	−0.051			−0.084	−0.108
	(0.113)	(0.109)	(0.110)	(0.111)			(0.112)	(0.112)
Left-wing	−0.090	0.300***	0.163	0.0003	0.117	0.069		
	(0.114)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.106)		
Constant	3.258***	5.070***	4.361***	3.321***	4.604***	3.156***	3.960***	4.197***
	(0.894)	(0.747)	(0.933)	(0.715)	(0.763)	(0.771)	(0.708)	(0.923)
Observations	974	944	966	952	953	965	949	969
R^2	0.037	0.050	0.093	0.067	0.050	0.036	0.040	0.079
F Statistic	1.854**	2.421***	4.833***	3.344***	2.472***	1.751**	1.924***	4.039***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.10: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, second dependent variable, France)

	Dependent variable:							
	Jean Dubois defends the interests of the French							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.186	0.376***	0.335***	0.218**	0.115	0.430***
			(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.117)
Migration	−0.592***	−0.410***			−0.516***	−0.425***	−0.485***	−0.526***
	(0.120)	(0.117)			(0.125)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.119)
Trade	−0.084	−0.189*	−0.155	−0.061			−0.069	−0.229*
	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.118)			(0.119)	(0.119)
Left-wing	−0.151	0.151	0.028	−0.027	0.089	−0.078		
	(0.120)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.124)	(0.113)		
Constant	3.681***	4.910***	3.880***	3.973***	4.504***	3.304***	3.901***	4.185***
	(1.205)	(0.791)	(1.014)	(0.715)	(0.818)	(1.006)	(0.840)	(0.932)
Observations	979	948	970	957	954	973	954	973
R^2	0.056	0.046	0.100	0.076	0.042	0.043	0.059	0.069
F Statistic	2.848***	2.260***	5.293***	3.865***	2.041***	2.163***	2.926***	3.501***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.11: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, third dependent variable, France)

	Dependent variable:							
	Jean Dubois defends the rights of the workers							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.357***	0.577***	0.512***	0.396***	0.349***	0.561***
			(0.110)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.107)	(0.117)	(0.110)
Migration	−0.388***	−0.158			−0.255**	−0.232**	−0.179	−0.347***
	(0.115)	(0.114)			(0.119)	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.110)
Trade	−0.122	−0.263**	−0.180	−0.169			−0.163	−0.244**
	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.114)			(0.116)	(0.110)
Left-wing	−0.050	0.149	0.122	−0.046	0.097	0.010		
	(0.114)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.109)		
Constant	3.785***	4.554***	3.851***	3.705***	4.354***	3.028***	3.966***	3.759***
	(1.168)	(0.748)	(0.953)	(0.746)	(0.808)	(0.976)	(0.791)	(0.930)
Observations	979	947	969	957	955	971	952	974
R^2	0.051	0.036	0.091	0.083	0.044	0.048	0.073	0.072
F Statistic	2.572***	1.745**	4.730***	4.239***	2.135***	2.383***	3.643***	3.694***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.12: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, first dependent variable, Germany)

	Dependent variable:							
	Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.422***	0.367***	0.394***	0.436***	0.343***	0.496***
			(0.110)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.100)
Migration	0.264**	0.147			0.176*	0.259**	0.322***	0.135
	(0.106)	(0.108)			(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.103)
Trade	0.182*	0.233**	0.159	0.226**			0.359***	0.088
	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.101)			(0.110)	(0.102)
Left-wing	0.194*	0.352***	0.373***	0.166	0.406***	0.126		
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.105)		
Constant	2.365***	5.381***	3.608***	3.888***	2.170***	4.922***	2.604***	5.073***
	(0.764)	(0.597)	(0.769)	(0.548)	(0.702)	(0.623)	(0.744)	(0.556)
Observations	1,135	1,166	1,139	1,162	1,136	1,165	1,152	1,149
R^2	0.035	0.048	0.080	0.065	0.069	0.039	0.059	0.050
F Statistic	2.029***	2.862***	4.859***	3.964***	4.138***	2.345***	3.537***	3.159***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.13: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, second dependent variable, Germany)

	Dependent variable:							
	Andreas Müller defends the interests of the Germans							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.278***	0.383***	0.416***	0.258**	0.219**	0.458***
			(0.107)	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.100)
Migration	−0.054	−0.015			0.071	−0.138	0.003	−0.065
	(0.103)	(0.105)			(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.108)	(0.101)
Trade	0.088	−0.036	0.095	−0.110			0.068	−0.007
	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.109)	(0.096)			(0.108)	(0.101)
Left-wing	0.060	0.312***	0.249**	0.121	0.203*	0.130		
	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.107)	(0.101)		
Constant	3.962***	4.954***	4.846***	4.082***	3.087***	4.989***	3.465***	5.153***
	(0.722)	(0.688)	(0.795)	(0.620)	(0.557)	(0.727)	(0.791)	(0.572)
Observations	1,133	1,163	1,135	1,161	1,133	1,163	1,145	1,151
R^2	0.025	0.034	0.085	0.061	0.046	0.038	0.031	0.036
F Statistic	1.401	2.023***	5.152***	3.680***	2.696***	2.246***	1.797**	2.202***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.14: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, third dependent variable, Germany)

	Dependent variable:							
	Andreas Müller defends the rights of the workers							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.581***	0.528***	0.499***	0.661***	0.404***	0.755***
			(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.100)
Migration	0.291***	0.189*			0.189*	0.302***	0.235**	0.257**
	(0.106)	(0.103)			(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.103)
Trade	−0.026	0.164	−0.001	0.113			0.236**	−0.088
	(0.107)	(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.099)			(0.105)	(0.101)
Left-wing	0.123	0.513***	0.338***	0.322***	0.481***	0.137		
	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.102)		
Constant	4.013***	4.377***	3.621***	4.239***	3.008***	4.317***	4.120***	3.926***
	(0.587)	(0.646)	(0.568)	(0.583)	(0.535)	(0.609)	(0.658)	(0.580)
Observations	1,137	1,165	1,139	1,163	1,138	1,164	1,150	1,152
R^2	0.031	0.057	0.089	0.075	0.069	0.064	0.060	0.077
F Statistic	1.814**	3.439***	5.438***	4.620***	4.138***	3.897***	3.593***	4.959***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

C Conjoint experiment

C.1 Text of the conjoint experiment's background scenario

We will now describe a hypothetical scenario that Italy could face in the future. It's 2031. A well-known company has announced the closure of its biggest plant in Italy. 10,000 workers are at risk of losing their job. The government is discussing a plan to increase social expenditure to deal with plant closures. There are several proposals on the government's table. Proposals differ as to which type of social expenditure will be increased, which category of people will benefit from it, and who will pay for it. We ask you to compare three pairs of proposals and let us know your opinion.

C.2 Marginal means

Figure C.1: Marginal means for the conjoint experiment (**Italy**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

Figure C.2: Marginal means for the conjoint experiment (**France**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

Figure C.3: Marginal means for the conjoint experiment (**Germany**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

C.3 Rating as outcome

Figure C.4: Results of the conjoint experiment (Rating proposals, **Italy**)



Note: The outcome variable is a [1,7] score of each proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

Figure C.5: Results of the conjoint experiment (Rating proposals, **France**)



Note: The outcome variable is a [1,7] score of each proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

Figure C.6: Results of the conjoint experiment (Rating proposals, **Germany**)



Note: The outcome variable is a [1,7] score of each proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

C.4 Petition as outcome

Figure C.7: Results of the conjoint experiment (Signing a petition, **Italy**)



Note: The outcome variable captures the probability of signing a petition for each proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

Figure C.8: Results of the conjoint experiment (Signing a petition, **France**)



Note: The outcome variable captures the probability of signing a petition for each proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

Figure C.9: Results of the conjoint experiment (Signing a petition, **Germany**)



Note: The outcome variable captures the probability of signing a petition for each proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents.

C.5 Heterogeneous effects

Figure C.10: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of education (**Italy**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Education is "high" for respondents with a high school diploma.

Figure C.11: Results of the conjoint experiment for different political ideology (**Italy**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means "right") are considered as right-wing.

Figure C.12: Results of the conjoint experiment for different income levels (**Italy**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Household income is considered "Middle and high" if greater than 30,000€ per year.

Figure C.13: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of support for increasing social spending (**Italy**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means "social spending should be increased") are considered in favour of public spending.

Figure C.14: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of economic vulnerability (**Italy**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on values greater than 0 on a 0-to-10 scale (where 0 means "very unlikely" and 10 means "very likely") measuring the likelihood that the respondent's job could be off-shored in the next future are considered vulnerable.

Figure C.15: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of education (**France**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Education is "high" for respondents with a university degree.

Figure C.16: Results of the conjoint experiment for different political ideology (**France**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means "right") are considered as right-wing.

Figure C.17: Results of the conjoint experiment for different income levels (**France**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Household income is considered "Middle and high" if greater than 30,000€ per year.

Figure C.18: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of support for increasing social spending (**France**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means "social spending should be increased") are considered in favour of public spending.

Figure C.19: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of economic vulnerability (**France**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on values greater than 0 on a 0-to-10 scale (where 0 means "very unlikely" and 10 means "very likely") measuring the likelihood that the respondent's job could be off-shored in the next future are considered vulnerable.

Figure C.20: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of education (**Germany**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Education is "high" for respondents with a university degree.

Figure C.21: Results of the conjoint experiment for different political ideology (**Germany**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means "right") are considered as right-wing.

Figure C.22: Results of the conjoint experiment for different income levels (**Germany**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Household income is considered "Middle and high" if greater than 30,000€ per year.

Figure C.23: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of support for increasing social spending (**Germany**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means "social spending should be increased") are considered in favour of public spending.

Figure C.24: Results of the conjoint experiment for different levels of economic vulnerability (**Germany**)



Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Confidence intervals clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on values greater than 0 on a 0-to-10 scale (where 0 means "very unlikely" and 10 means "very likely") measuring the likelihood that the respondent's job could be off-shored in the next future are considered vulnerable.