

Accountable to Whom? Public Opinion of Aid Conditionality in Recipient Countries*

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Abstract

When donors extend foreign aid, they often attach requirements on how funds can be spent. These requirements can be intended to increase the effectiveness of aid, to incentivize beneficial reforms, or to generate additional benefits for the donor. For recipient governments, these requirements can be perceived as an infringement on their sovereignty, introducing external considerations into their policy choices. How does the public in recipient countries view requirements attached to development finance? Since aid requirements introduce a potential tension between a government's accountability to its citizens and external actors, it is important to understand how the public perceives them. We argue that individuals' assessment of aid requirements is a function of their trust in their own government. When citizens trust their government, they are likely to have a negative view of aid requirements, given sovereignty concerns. However, when individuals have a negative perception of their government, they are likely to support development finance requirements, seeing it as a source of external accountability. Moreover, citizens' views of aid requirements are likely to be shaped by their attitudes toward the foreign donor. External accountability will be welcome only if the donor is trusted. We test our argument using new Afrobarometer data on the public opinion on aid conditionality and plan an original survey fielded in Kenya in which we randomly manipulate the identity of the donor attaching aid conditions.

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Introduction

There are numerous challenges involved in creating accountability in a global system (Grant and Keohane, 2005).¹ Governments, and especially democracies, are beholden to the governed (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999). Yet, governments are responsive to an array of other actors in modern international politics, including international organizations (IOs), other states, and multinational corporations. If they fail to enact desired reforms, provide diplomatic support to their benefactors, or create attractive investment environments, they can face extensive repercussions. These repercussions can even amount to regime change, on par with (or worse than) the punishment political leaders can face by disappointing their domestic supporters. Globalization, which strengthens supranational ties, could weaken domestic ones, making it harder for domestic publics to hold their leaders accountable. Such accountability gaps exacerbate concerns about a democratic deficit in global governance (Dahl, 1999).

At the same time, citizens might actually prefer this state of affairs. Individuals may feel that an international actor has a better chance of holding their political leader to high standards than they do. In this case, they may be tolerant of encroachments on their country’s sovereignty, even though these encroachments represent limitations of the domestic public’s authority over national policy. But as long as an international authority roughly shares the public’s preferences, individuals may prefer that their political leaders be held to international rather than domestic account. Despite the importance of these dynamics, we know little about how citizens feel about the outsourcing of their accountability to foreign actors.

Foreign aid is an important example of this problem. Aid donors often attach requirements to funds. These can include *conditionality* often applied by international organizations (IOs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as well as other requirements such as *tied aid* offered by emerging donors like China. In the former case, governments undertake economic reforms and are constrained in how they can spend aid (Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King, 2016; Clark and Dolan, 2021). In the latter case, aid favors companies from the donor country and can allow the donor to access critical resources (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al., 2017; Zeitz, 2020; Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange and Tierney, 2022). In sum, donors often hold significant leverage over recipients, which enables them to attach and enforce stringent requirements to aid — these requirements must often be met for aid to be disbursed.

We use the context of aid to understand how individuals think about accountability in a globalized world. Even if citizens do not necessarily think about aid requirements in their daily lives, it is important to understand when citizens are willing to tolerate external sources of accountability. Indeed, from a normative standpoint, if citizens are accepting of foreign constraints, concerns

¹We follow Grant and Keohane (2005, 29) in defining accountability as implying that “some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met.”

about democratic deficits in global governance may be overblown (Moravcsik, 2004). Conversely, if citizens are concerned about foreign encroachments on their ability to hold their governments accountable, it suggests that easing aid requirements may be one way to improve accountability in developing country settings.

We argue that whether citizens approve or disapprove of aid requirements is primarily a function of (a) citizens' perceptions of their government and (b) citizens' perceptions of the donor. When individuals are supportive of their government, donor requirements raise sovereignty concerns. Citizens worry that their government will be unable to implement its preferred policies. Therefore, these individuals oppose aid requirements. Conversely, when individuals oppose the government, they should welcome aid requirements as a check on the government.

We also highlight the importance of public attitudes toward the foreign donor. When individuals approve of the donor, they should be more willing to accept requirements on aid, and especially intrusive ones. In this case, individuals likely believe requirements will improve the situation in the home country. In contrast, when individuals disapprove of the donor, they will likely oppose aid requirements, especially when they severely constrain the government.

To test these claims, we leverage both observational and experimental evidence. First, we make use of the Afrobarometer survey series, which collects data on public opinion of aid requirements, support for the government, and perceptions of key donors. Second, we plan to field a survey experiment on a diverse sample of citizens in Kenya in which we randomly manipulate the identity of the foreign donor attaching aid conditions.

We contribute to several important literatures. First, we extend and revise the large body of work interested in the relationship between aid, perceptions of government legitimacy, and government autonomy. While existing work suggests that aid may undermine government legitimacy (Sacks, 2012), and that aid requirements may limit government autonomy (Shah, 2017), we disentangle the conditions under which citizens in recipient countries may desire these incursions on legitimacy and autonomy. In doing so, we speak to broader debates about accountability gaps and democratic deficits in international relations (Dahl, 1999; Grant and Keohane, 2005).

Second, we build on extant work interested in the politics of conditionality and tied aid, though we shift the focus from powerful donor states (Andersen, Hansen and Markussen, 2006; Kilby, 2006; Copelovitch, 2010; Stone, 2011; Clark and Dolan, 2021; Zeitz, 2020) and horse trading between donors and recipients (Dreher, 2009; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2015; Clark, 2022) to the oft-overlooked public in recipient states.² Existing work has only examined public opinion of aid requirements in the context of highly politicized IMF programs (Kaya, Handlin and Gunaydin, 2020).³ Moreover, empirical evidence on public opinion of major donors like the World

²Though see Vreeland (2005); Caraway, Rickard and Anner (2012) on the domestic politics of IMF lending.

³The conditions attached to IMF loans often incite public unrest given their harshness. For more on the content of IMF loan conditions, see Li, Sy and McMurray (2015); Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King (2016). Conditions attached to development aid, such as that from the World Bank, tend to be softer (Clark and Dolan, 2021).

Bank comes mostly from developed donor countries, and especially the U.S., rather than recipient states.⁴ This is despite the fact that recipient countries and their citizens play a major role in shaping the performance of aid programs (Mallaby, 2004; Woods, 2007; Malik and Stone, 2018). Additionally, citizens’ feelings about aid requirements should feed into the types of requirements their governments are willing to tolerate in negotiations with donor states and IOs. This paper therefore highlights the importance of examining public opinion in aid recipient countries when studying aid requirements, and we anticipate future research in this vein.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. To start, we offer a typology of the requirements that donors attach to aid. Specifying the expectations that donors have of recipient governments when they extend development finance allows us to more precisely measure public attitudes toward these requirements. We then move to explication of our theoretical framework before proceeding with our observational tests and experimental evidence. We conclude with discussion of policy implications, including how donors can design requirements in ways that minimize incursions on government accountability to the people, as well as areas for future research.

A Typology of Aid Requirements

Aid requirements vary widely in their content and stringency. We suggest that requirements generally correspond to three broad categories, which are summarized in Table 1.

Category	Areas	Donors
Development requirements	Government spending; taxation	World Bank; IMF
Governance requirements	Human rights; democratization	USAID; EU
Business requirements	Donor firm contracts; exports	China

Table 1: **A Typology of Aid Requirements.**

The first category, which encompasses most aid requirements used by multilateral donors and OECD bilateral donors, we call *development requirements*. Many aid requirements affect a government’s development plans, and therefore how the government collects and spends public money. For example, the World Bank may mandate reductions in government subsidies for energy, changes to public spending, and alterations to the structure of state-owned companies. Development requirements may also restrict how the recipient can spend donor funds — for instance, earmarking financing for specific infrastructure projects or public goods provision. The literature often refers to these requirements as *conditionality* since aid disbursement can be conditional on the completion of these conditions (as in the case of prior actions). However, development requirements can also present as benchmarks, or softer targets.

Historically, the most expansive conditionality was associated with structural adjustment lend-

⁴See e.g., Brutger and Clark (2021).

ing in the 1980s and 1990s, when the requirements attached to World Bank policy lending often required substantial changes to government policy at the core of government competencies, including trade policy, regulation, or privatization (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991). Such conditions were (and remain) common in IMF programs as well (Li, Sy and McMurray, 2015; Kentikelenis, Stubbs and King, 2016). Critiques of the effectiveness and appropriateness of conditionality led to a change in the norms and practices of development policy in the 2000s. Affirmed by all OECD donor countries, the 2005 Paris Declaration introduced the principles of “ownership” and “alignment,” which suggest that development policies should be initiated and “owned” by developing countries, and donors should “align” their aid with these policies (OECD, 2005). Multilateral bodies like the World Bank have created new lending instruments like Program-for-Results to this end, emphasizing the importance of buy-in from recipients.⁵ This shift in norms has led to a reduction in the number of requirements that donors attach to their aid,⁶ but has not eliminated the practice of conditionality. Donors continue to attach requirements to their development assistance — at the World Bank, about a quarter of financing is conditional as of 2021. Development requirements can be divisive domestically (Caraway, Rickard and Anner, 2012), and they can provoke significant short-term economic costs for publics. In extreme cases, this can drive unrest and protests, and even thwart leaders’ reelection bids (Vreeland, 2005).

The second category consists of *governance requirements*. These include requirements that pertain to democratization, domestic institutions, human rights, and transparency — foundational issues where opposing groups are likely to have different views of the merits of granting the government discretion. In other words, these requirements may be highly divisive domestically and are often costly for governments to implement. This may be especially true in authoritarian or weakly democratic contexts, since regime opponents may hope that external democratization conditionality can expand the space for them to participate in political life.

Governance conditionality was initially integrated into Western donors’ foreign aid programs in the early 1990s alongside the third wave of democratization (Carothers, 2020). Donors explicitly conditioned their aid on recipient countries’ democratic credentials and even supported regime opponents in their efforts to push for free and fair elections. Though democracy promotion has softened over time, becoming more conciliatory toward autocratic regimes (Bush, 2016), many bilateral donors and the European Union continue to attach governance requirements to their aid and there is empirical evidence that this can improve performance on certain governance criteria, at least in the short term (Carnegie and Marinov, 2017). Governance requirements played an increasing role in the loan programs of the World Bank and the IMF from the mid-2000s with the emergence of the “good governance” agenda that sought to improve the performance of development

⁵See “Program-for-Results Financing (PforR).” *World Bank* <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/program-for-results-financing>

⁶For instance, a series of reforms in 2012 led to a reduction in the average number of conditions applied to Development Policy Financing loans at the World Bank (Clark and Dolan, 2021).

policy by reforming governance institutions in recipient countries (Rodrik, 2006). Today, the United States and the EU are most commonly associated with governance requirements, as are the World Bank and, to a lesser extent, the IMF.

The final category — often utilized by emerging donors such as China — we refer to as *business requirements*. These include requirements that aid funds be used to purchase goods and services from donor companies (i.e. tied aid) or that aid projects are connected to donors' access to key resources and exports. Tied aid has historically been a widespread practice among bilateral donors, since it responds to pressure from domestic interests that aid programs tangible domestic benefits in the donor country. Among OECD donors, various policy measures have sought to reduce the tying of aid, though it remains commonplace, especially in the case of food aid (Fritz and Raza, 2017). By contrast, China has been especially forceful in using overseas finance to support domestic firms (Brautigam, 2011). In some cases, these requirements even mandate that development projects use Chinese workers employed by Chinese firms. Again, these requirements can be contentious. For instance, local workers and firms may express anger at the preferential treatment given to companies from the donor country.

Donors, citizens, aid, and the state

Though extant work examines several themes tangent to public opinion of foreign accountability in recipient states, including perceptions of government legitimacy and autonomy concerns, the topic remains understudied. Here, we outline the scope of existing research before proceeding with our argument and testable predictions.

Aid and government legitimacy

Extant research examines the effect of foreign aid on the *legitimacy* of governments in aid recipient countries. This literature is grounded in the notion of a fiscal contract between citizens and the state, in which the state secures citizens' willingness to comply with taxation by providing services in return. Foreign aid and service provision by NGOs and foreign donors raises concerns the fiscal contract may be broken (Sacks, 2012), not unlike countries that rely on natural resource rents (Morrison, 2010). If foreign actors pay for or even directly provide public services, this may undermine the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the public.

However, there is little empirical evidence that foreign aid damages the legitimacy of recipient governments. Using observational survey data (Sacks, 2012) and experimental data (Dietrich and Winters, 2015; Blair and Roessler, 2021; Dolan, 2020), scholars consistently find that aid does not undermine the legitimacy of recipient governments. In fact, aid inflows appear in some cases to improve the legitimacy of the state, as measured by individuals' willingness to pay taxes (Sacks, 2012). Even when it is clear that donors are providing public services, citizens likely do not expect

the government to be self-sufficient (Dolan, 2020), and may even see the government as fulfilling its responsibilities to citizens by attracting foreign aid.

Aid and policy autonomy

While the fiscal contract arguments about aid and the legitimacy of the government focus on the potentially disruptive effect of *inflows* of aid, a separate strand of literature considers how the *conditions* attached to aid affect the policy autonomy or sovereignty of recipient governments. The specific conditions attached to aid are the product of negotiations between donor and recipient. The leverage possessed by each party depends on a variety of factors, including geopolitical alignment (Stone, 2011; Clark and Dolan, 2021; Malis, Rosendorff and Smith, 2021), the availability of outside options (Bunte, 2019; Zeitz, 2020; Clark, 2022), the ability to engage in horse-trading (Dreher, 2009; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland, 2015; Dreher, Lang, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2022), and domestic politics in the recipient (Caraway, Rickard and Anner, 2012) and donor (Broz, 2008; Daugirdas, 2013) state.

There is also important variation by issue area and donor type. Emergency lending, such as that administered by the IMF, tends to have the most stringent conditions attached since countries accept reform requirements under the duress of an acute crisis (Henning, 2011). Development aid conditions, in contrast, are softer (Clark and Dolan, 2021) and are negotiated as part of the regular routine relationship between donors and recipients (Whitfield, 2009; Swedlund, 2017). Nevertheless, developing countries' dependence on foreign aid can mean that they are effectively reliant on funds that come with policy strings attached.

The reliance of developing countries on aid accompanied by policy requirements has led critics to claim that conditions constitute an incursion into the policy autonomy, or even sovereignty, of recipient countries (Plank, 1993; Williams, 2008). For donors, requirements are a means of ensuring accountability, while for recipient governments they can involve a compromise of policy autonomy. This tension is at the heart of Mkandawire's (2010) critique that "Accountability in the context of aid dependence is problematic because it addresses two different constituencies: those of the donor country and those of the recipient country" (Mkandawire, 2010, 1168). The policy requirements of foreign donors may reduce governments' autonomy full control over their own policies.

Aid and public opinion in recipient countries

Despite this, there has been little empirical research into public opinion in developing countries on the requirements attached to foreign aid. Recent research on public opinion in recipient countries has focused either on the fiscal contract, as discussed above, or on the effect of aid on the opinions that citizens in the recipient country have of donors. If aid improves attitudes toward the donor country, donors may be motivated to provide aid to improve their image abroad (Lancaster, 2007). Empirical research finds that aid has a positive effect on opinions of the donor in recipient countries

(Goldsmith, 2014), and this holds for both traditional and emerging donors (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021).⁷ Relatedly, there is a recurrent argument that IOs are perceived as more legitimate than other international actors (Hurd, 1999). Indeed, empirical work finds that public approval of policies tends to be higher when these are proposed or endorsed by IOs (Voeten, 2005; Milner and Tingley, 2012; Brutger, 2021). Explanations for this phenomenon suggest that the collaborative nature of decisionmaking in IOs confers greater legitimacy on their policy proposals than those of single states. Moreover, IOs can claim both expertise and impartiality in a way that individual states cannot.

Simply extended to the context of foreign aid, this would suggest that the public in recipient countries might be more willing to accept requirements from multilateral donors than individual donor countries. And yet, it might not be so straightforward. For one, multilateral donors appear to be heavily influenced by their major shareholders (Copelovitch, 2010; Stone, 2011; Clark and Dolan, 2021). If multilateral donors are widely seen as representing the interests of major shareholders, then the multilateral nature of the institution may do little to help publics overcome the aversion to foreign influence and public rejection of accountability to foreign actors. Moreover, most of the evidence on the legitimacy and approval of IOs comes from advanced industrialized countries (Kaya, Handlin and Gunaydin, 2020; Brutger and Clark, 2021). In developing countries, since leading multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are historically associated with the most extensive and intrusive requirements, the public may regard even multilateral conditions with suspicion.

A theory of recipient opinion on aid requirements

The existing literature thus sheds light on how foreign aid affects core relationships of legitimacy and accountability between a state and its citizens. On balance, the empirical literature finds that inflows of foreign aid do not undermine citizens' perceptions of the legitimacy of their government. Yet, there is a gap in the existing research, which has yet to consider how citizens in aid recipient countries respond to the requirements attached to foreign aid.⁸ Since research finds that foreign aid often improves individuals' perception of donor countries and, in general, individuals tend to have positive perceptions of IOs, individuals in recipient countries may appreciate if donors generally, and especially multilateral ones, hold their governments accountable. On the other hand, individuals may disapprove of incursions on policy autonomy and discretion that requirements imply for their

⁷When choosing among donors, both the public and elites in recipient countries appear not to have a preference between bilateral and multilateral aid (Findley, Milner and Nielson, 2017).

⁸One notable exception is Milner, Nielson and Findley (2016), who, as an extension of their main study, ask Ugandan survey respondents if they believe that aid conditions "help Uganda to reform and become a better country" or "are unfair and hurt Uganda." They find that approximately 50% of respondents support conditionality, with those supporting conditionality more likely to approve of aid overall, but they do not investigate what explains respondents' level of support for conditionality.

government. Below, we develop our framework for the conditions under which individuals in aid recipient countries will approve or disapprove of aid requirements.

Government support and attitudes toward aid requirements

Our argument for the determinants of attitudes toward aid requirements is rooted in the extent of trust that individuals have in their government's use of policy discretion. Requirements introduce external constraints into the government's policymaking process. To have a discernible effect, such requirements must necessarily cause the government to deviate from the policies it would otherwise have chosen, thereby at least partly limiting the government's autonomy to set its own policies. We argue that individuals in aid recipient countries are likely to respond to requirements in light of their trust in the government's use of its policy autonomy. When an individual believes the government sets policy in the country's interest or even in their particular interest, the individual will likely disapprove of constraints on the government's autonomy. By contrast, where an individual disapproves of a government's policy choices or doubts the integrity of the government, they may appreciate the external check provided by aid requirements.

We therefore expect that individuals who support the government are more likely to reject and disapprove of foreign-imposed requirements. This is likely to be true regardless of the substantive content of the requirements that donors attach to their aid. Even if the requirements do not require the government to diverge considerably from its preferred policy, a government supporter is likely to disagree in principle with constraints that limit the government's room to maneuver. Opponents of the governing regime, by contrast, will be more likely to approve of requirements as a means of constraining the government. This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: *Individuals that express **higher** levels of government support will be **less** likely to approve of aid requirements.*

In countries where political cleavages fall primarily along ethnic lines, an individual's attitude toward the government may be a function of their ethnicity or identity. In political systems characterized by ethnic politics, being a co-ethnic with the governing regime is likely to be associated with a positive view of the government (Wilkinson, 2004; Corstange, 2016), especially since patterns of clientelist distribution are more likely to benefit co-ethnics (Chandra, 2007). In these contexts, those who are of the same ethnicity as the ruler are more likely to disapprove of aid requirements, while excluded or marginalized ethnicities may be more likely to see them as a valuable source of accountability.

As an extension of the role of trust in the government, we consider the effect of perceptions of corruption on individuals' approval of aid requirements. Since donor requirements involve a trade-off between external accountability and government discretion, an individual who is concerned about government corruption is more likely to approve of donors imposing constraints on the government.

This may be especially likely when the donor is a Western IO, since these organizations often encourage greater government transparency (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2011).

Opinions of donors and attitudes toward aid requirements

So far, we have framed the trade-off that individuals consider when evaluating aid requirements as the choice between external accountability and government discretion. However, the identity of the donor likely plays a role in whether individuals — even government opponents — approve of requirements that constrain the government’s policy autonomy. When individuals have a more critical view of a donor country or donor institution, they are less likely to approve of aid requirements, even if they are government opponents. After all, requirements introduce the donor’s preferences into the policymaking process. If citizens distrust the donor, then they are less likely to approve of such requirements. Notably, this does not necessarily require citizens to link specific donors to specific types of requirements, though the donor’s identity may serve as a helpful heuristic for citizens as they evaluate aid requirements. On the other hand, individuals that have a positive perception of the donor will likely see the donor as a positive influence on government policymaking, especially if they are opponents of the government. This leads to our second hypothesis:

H2: *Individuals that **approve** of a donor will be **more** likely to approve of aid requirements from that donor.*

Variation in attitudes toward donors may be a function of views about the donor’s role in global politics, colonial history, past experience with aid projects from that donor, or media coverage of the donor’s influence. For instance, in countries that have experienced contentious IMF programs, individuals may hold negative views of the Bretton Woods institutions, especially if they were employed in sectors affected by IMF-mandated reforms, such as the public sector. Or, if an individual was forced to relocate their home as a result of World Bank-funded infrastructure development, they may be disdainful of the Bank. Alternatively, individuals who live in close proximity to a donor-funded project and have benefited from its effects may hold a positive view of that donor. Last, individuals may have more positive attitudes toward multilateral donors insofar as they are perceived to be neutral and legitimate actors in global governance (Voeten, 2005; Tallberg and Zürn, 2019; Brutger, 2021), though some may simply perceive them to be instruments of powerful states (Stone, 2008).

Evidence from the Afrobarometer

To test these patterns, we require extensive public opinion data on the topic of aid requirements from the countries who benefit from aid the most. We employ data from round 8 of the Afrobarometer, which was fielded between 2019 and 2021 in 34 African countries. At the time of our analysis, data had been made available for 27 of these countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Cote

d'Ivoire, Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Guinea, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, and Uganda. We will incorporate data from the remaining seven countries when they are released.

Our main dependent variables measure support for two types of requirements, as theorized above. The first question we use measures support for development requirements. The question reads: "Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: When other countries give loans or development assistance to [COUNTRY], they should enforce strict requirements on how the funds are spent. Statement 2: When other countries give [COUNTRY] loans or development assistance, they should allow our government to make its own decisions about how to use the resources." We view this question as measuring support for development requirements because it focuses on the donor's ability to require the government to spend public funds in a particular way. A second question measures the concept we call governance requirements. It reads: "Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: When other countries give loans or development assistance to [COUNTRY], they should enforce strict requirements to make sure our government promotes democracy and respects human rights. Statement 2: Even if other countries give [COUNTRY] loans or development assistance, our government should make its own decisions about democracy and human rights." To capture the direction of an individual's attitude, we operationalize both variables as dummies, where 1 indicates support for conditionality (agrees or strongly agrees with statement 1) and 0 indicates aversion to conditionality (agrees or strongly agrees with statement 2). We omit responses of don't know, agreed with neither, refused, and missing.

The distribution of both variables appears in Figure 1. On the whole, the sample tends to oppose requirements attached to aid. The modal response for both questions is to strongly agree that the country should get to make its own decisions. This sentiment is stronger for development requirements than for governance requirements: people are slightly more open to requirements concerning democracy and human rights than they are to requirements concerning financial decisions. However, for both types of requirements, a substantial number of people (about 40 percent) are supportive. This indicates significant variation in attitudes toward donor practices, which we hope to explain. Summary statistics for these and for all variables appear in Table 2.


To measure an individual's support for their government, we look at their trust and perceptions of corruption in their governments. Specifically, we focus on trust in the president and the ruling party, as these are the political officials with the greatest authority to determine how public funds should be spent, and are also those officials who are democratically elected. We focus on beliefs about the corruption of the president and the civil servants, as these are the places where development funds are most likely to disappear. We also conduct a Principal Components Analysis on several other questions measuring views of other parts of government in order to generate an index

Table 2: Summary statistics

Characteristic	N	N = 38,175 ¹
Supports development requirements (1-4)	36,882	
Mean (SD)		2.31 (1.18)
Supports development requirements (0-1)	36,882	15,624 (42%)
Supports governance requirements (1-4)	36,794	
Mean (SD)		2.41 (1.16)
Supports governance requirements (0-1)	36,794	16,926 (46%)
Trusts president (1-4)	37,174	
Mean (SD)		2.64 (1.16)
Trusts ruling party (1-4)	34,338	
Mean (SD)		2.38 (1.15)
Trust index	30,680	
Mean (SD)		0.00 (2.36)
Corruption of president (1-4)	33,590	
Mean (SD)		2.36 (0.92)
Corruption of civil servants (1-4)	35,280	
Mean (SD)		2.39 (0.79)
Corruption index	28,701	
Mean (SD)		0.00 (1.76)
Approves of UN influence (1-5)	29,229	
Mean (SD)		3.92 (1.16)
Approves of U.S. influence (1-5)	30,836	
Mean (SD)		3.84 (1.19)
Approves of British influence (1-5)	26,973	
Mean (SD)		3.36 (1.44)
Support for domestic accountability (0-1)	35,783	
Mean (SD)		0.71 (0.45)
Age	38,164	
Mean (SD)		37 (15)
Female	38,175	
Mean (SD)		0.50 (0.50)
Rural	38,175	
Mean (SD)		0.56 (0.50)

¹n (%)

Figure 1: Histogram of support for conditionality



measuring trust or corruption beliefs about the government more generally.

Consistent with hypothesis 1, we find that attitudes toward the domestic government strongly predict an individual’s support for attaching requirements to lending. The results appear in Table 4. The more an individual trusts their government — whether that is the president, the ruling party, or the government more generally — the less willing they are to support the requirements a donor might impose on their government. This is true whether those requirements are development (models 1-3) or related to governance (models 4-6). Individuals do not wish a government they like to be constrained in its activities.

Conversely, people who view the government as highly corrupt are much more likely to support a donor’s use of requirements (Table 5). When they perceive the president to be corrupt, individuals prefer donors to attach both development (model 1) and governance (model 4) requirements to their development finance. The same is true for civil servants; when individuals perceive them to be corrupt, they would prefer both development (model 2) and governance (model 5) requirements. Our corruption index displays similar patterns, and therefore has an understandably stronger relationship with support for development than for governance requirements. In sum, individuals like donors to tie the hands of a government they distrust in ways that address the issue at hand, but they prefer donors to lay off imposing requirements on a government they like.

Table 4: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Supports development requirements (0-1)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.080*** (0.010)			-0.101*** (0.011)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.086*** (0.011)			-0.095*** (0.010)	
Trust index			-0.048*** (0.006)			-0.055*** (0.006)
Observations	31,278	28,546	25,454	31,184	28,470	25,420

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Regressions use binary probit models to estimate the relationship between support for government and support for requirements. Controls include age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Cases are weighted using Afrobarometer's withinwt (household) variable. The trust question reads: "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Not at all / Just a little / Somewhat / A lot) The trust index consists of questions measuring trust in: the president, parliament, electoral commission, ruling party, police, army, courts, and tax authorities. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8.

Table 5: Perceptions of government corruption associated with higher support for requirements

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Supports development requirements (0-1) Supports governance requirements (0-1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Corruption of president (1-4)	0.081*** (0.013)			0.094*** (0.015)		
Corruption of civil servants (1-4)		0.067*** (0.014)			0.044*** (0.015)	
Corruption index			0.043*** (0.007)			0.038*** (0.008)
Observations	28,224	29,732	23,758	28,192	29,684	23,760

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Regressions use binary probit models to estimate the relationship between support for government and support for requirements. Controls include age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Cases are weighted using Afrobarometer's withinwt (household) variable. The corruption question reads: "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" (None / Some of them / Most of them / All of them) The corruption index consists of questions gauging the corruption prevalent in: the presidency, parliament, civil servants, local government, police, judges, and tax authorities. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8.

Of course, we also believe that attitudes toward the donor, and not just the recipient government, matter for an individual's opinion about requirements. To measure an individual's opinion of a donor, we look to an individual's views of whether their influence on the country is positive or negative. Among the actors the Afrobarometer inquires about are the United Nations, the United States, and Britain. Ideally, we would like to see whether an individual's opinion of each donor is related to their attitudes toward requirements *from that donor*, but unfortunately the Afrobarometer lacks data fine-grained enough to do this. Instead, we select these donors as the ones that individuals would be most likely to associate with the type of politicized lending described in our main outcome measures, and so we expect that positive attitudes toward these actors would correlate with greater openness to requirements in general.

We find some support for hypothesis 2 in Table 6. Essentially, we find some relationships we expect with respect to U.S. influence, but not with respect to UN or British influence. Individuals with more positive views of the U.S.'s influence on their country are more likely to support any donor's use of development requirements, but they are not especially more favorable toward governance requirements (models 2 and 4). We find null relationships mostly for UN and British influence, although we find that supporters of the UN are less likely to favor governance requirements. What does it mean that we do not observe the same relationships for UN influence or British influence? This could be evidence against hypothesis 2, suggesting that individuals' views of requirements are not related to their opinions about the donor imposing those requirements. Alternatively, and we think more likely, individuals think the U.S. engages in conditional lending much more so than the UN or than Britain, and so the relationship between attitudes toward requirements and views of the donor is stronger for the U.S. than for others. Since the U.S. does in fact engage in conditional lending much more so than Britain, and especially more so than the UN which is not a donor per se, we tend to feel this is the correct interpretation. However, we require further survey data to test it more precisely.

Table 6: Positive opinions of U.S. influence associated with greater support for requirements

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Supports development requirements (0-1) Supports governance requirements (0-1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Approves of UN influence (1-5)	-0.005 (0.012)			-0.023* (0.014)		
Approves of U.S. influence (1-5)		0.022* (0.011)			0.011 (0.012)	
Approves of British influence (1-5)			-0.004 (0.011)			-0.009 (0.011)
Observations	24,540	25,787	23,005	24,526	25,753	22,995

Note: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Regressions use binary probit models to estimate the relationship between opinions of Western influence and support for requirements. The influence question reads: "In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of the following organizations on [COUNTRY] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough to say?" (Very negative / Somewhat negative / Somewhat positive / Very positive / Somewhat positive / Very positive) Controls include age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Cases are weighted using Afrobarometer's withinwt (household) variable. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8.

We present supplementary analysis in the Appendix. First, we examine whether there is an interaction between support of the government and support of a donor. There is not (Table 7), and we report this in the Appendix because we had no theoretical reason to expect one. Opinion of the foreign donor plays no greater or less of a role depending on whether a person supports or opposes their government. Second, we split our sample by regime type. We code a country as democratic if it is Free or Partly Free in 2022 according to Freedom House, and autocratic if it is Not Free. The results are similar (negative and significant) for each sample (Tables 8 and 9). We further split results by country. Figure 2 illustrates that the relationship between trust and support for requirements is strongest for Mauritius, Uganda, and Liberia, and weakest for Tanzania, Senegal, and Botswana. Third, we consider how an individual’s attitudes toward accountability factor into these issues. We use a question in the Afrobarometer inquiring about individuals’ preference for using Parliament to hold the President accountable. We find that individuals who agree with this are more likely to support donors’ requirements (Table 10). We do find that the relationship between trust and support for donor requirements is stronger for these individuals, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on an interaction between our trust index and this accountability question.

Evidence from Kenya

While the Afrobarometer evidence allows us to explore attitudes toward conditionality across a variety of countries, there are some limitations in terms of the questions fielded. We therefore supplement the Afrobarometer analysis with an original survey we field in Kenya. We plan to field this survey in fall 2022.

Case selection

We choose to field our survey in Kenya for three reasons: (1) Kenya has received and continues to receive large volumes of development finance from donors associated with each of the three forms of aid requirements; (2) Kenya has a vibrant and open media landscape, meaning that citizens are well informed about both domestic politics and Kenya’s foreign affairs, including relationship with donors; (3) Kenya has widespread cellphone usage, which allows us to field a mobile-based survey.

The most important criterion for selecting Kenya as location for our survey is that Kenya has been a major recipient of development finance from a variety of lenders. In the period 1990-2018, Kenya was the second highest recipient of development finance from the US among sub-Saharan African countries, the fourth highest recipient of funds from the World Bank, and the third highest recipient of loans from China.⁹ Since US aid is closely associated with governance requirements, the World Bank with development requirements, and China with business requirements, Kenya has had

⁹Data from the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics and the the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System.

meaningful exposure to each of these forms of requirements. Kenya is a rapidly growing economy that transitioned to lower middle income country status in 2012 and is not highly dependent on foreign aid (ODA averaged 4.15% of GNI 2011-2020). However, Kenya still has substantial development needs and donors have been willing to continue to fund development projects in the country despite the country's economic growth. For bilateral donors, including the US, this is partly due to strategic interests in Kenya, which has been seen as an anchor for stability in the Horn of Africa region and an important ally in regional counter-terrorism efforts. Relations with donors are thus an important part of Kenya's foreign policy and fairly widely covered in the national press.

Protocol

Our survey will be conducted using GeoPoll. GeoPoll will recruit 1,000 Kenyans through SMS and invite them to participate in a mobile web survey in exchange for data top up. Because the survey platform requires a data plan, we expect the sample to skew somewhat young, urban, and male. However, since the point of the survey is to ask more detailed questions than those included in the Afrobarometer, this platform is essential to communicating our questions clearly and minimizing cognitive load. We will use age and gender quotas to improve the representativeness of the survey. It will be fielded in English and Swahili.

Survey design

First, our survey better allows us to test whether attitudes toward specific donors influence attitudes toward conditions from those specific donors (H2). The Afrobarometer measures of support for conditionality are very general; an individual might support conditions from the World Bank but not the U.S., for example. We address this by providing an experimental vignette that describes a hypothetical project and which randomly manipulates the donor. The vignette reads:

[**The United States / The World Bank / China**] would like to finance a large project in Kenya's energy grid. This will help people and businesses in Kenya get access to electricity to make their lives easier and their businesses more productive. For this to happen, [**the United States / the World Bank / China**] will provide money to Kenya, and then the government of Kenya will oversee the project. Do you agree or disagree that [**the United States / the World Bank / China**] should...

We then solicit individuals' attitudes toward a variety of different requirements (see below).

We select the U.S., the World Bank, and China to provide a variety of types of donors, all of which are important for aid in Kenya. The U.S. is a bilateral traditional donor, the World Bank is a multilateral traditional donor, and China is a bilateral new donor. We selected the energy grid as a hypothetical sector. We selected this sector because it was an equally plausible investment

for all three donors; it can simultaneously promote development, impact governance, and benefit businesses; and it is often linked to various requirements.

We randomize the donor primarily because we lack the survey space to interview each individual about all three donors. Ideally, we would like to repeat this vignette for two of the three donors, though, in order to examine within-respondent heterogeneity. We welcome ideas on whether to change features of the vignette (e.g. the sector) for the repeated measure.

Second, our survey enables us to more precisely measure support for different types of requirements. This is important for two reasons: (A) A contribution of our project is to typologize the various aid requirements that old and new donors use. While the Afrobarometer asks generally about concepts we view as governance requirements and development requirements, it does not ask about business requirements, nor does it offer specific examples of any of these categories. (B) We imagine individuals associate different donors with different types of requirements. This makes it difficult to tell whether an individual's support for a general description of governance requirements, for example, calls to mind specific donors, and the opinion they express is capturing primarily their attitude toward those donors.

Following our experimental vignette, we ask whether the donor should:

1. Require Kenya to show that its elections are free and fair
2. Require Kenya to pass laws that protect the rights of minorities
3. Require Kenya to show how it spends its money
4. Require Kenya to pass laws to sell state-owned companies to private investors
5. Require Kenya to cut government programs it can't pay for
6. Require Kenya to show that the project doesn't hurt the environment
7. Require Kenya to hire certain kinds of companies (such as the donor's) for this project
8. Require Kenya to sell goods to them at discounted prices

While we will present this list in a randomized order, items 1-3 measure governance requirements, 4-6 measure development requirements, and 7-8 measure business requirements. We plan to use Principal Components Analysis to generate three different indices for the three different types of requirements.

We will also ask questions identical to the main outcome measures we use in the Afrobarometer analysis. This will allow us to assess the relationship between the Afrobarometer measure and ours in the sample of Kenyans. In addition to validating the Afrobarometer measure, we can use this relationship to predict responses to our original questions for the entire Afrobarometer sample.

Finally, we ask individuals directly their impressions of which donors use which conditions.

There are many different international donors and lenders. For example, the United States, the European Union, Japan, China, and the World Bank. Some of these donors require our government to do a lot in order to receive a loan. Others don't require much at all. Which of these donors you think would make the following requirements of the Kenyan government?

We provide the list of nine possible requirements as a grid and ask individuals to select which requirements they believe each donor makes use of. We provide the following donors: the U.S., the EU, Japan, China, and the World Bank. We add the EU and Japan as another Western and Eastern bilateral donor with a potentially different reputation in Kenya. This question will yield novel data on which donors are perceived as encroaching on the government's authority, and in what ways.

As for independent variables, we measure trust in government and trust in donors as similarly as possible to the Afrobarometer survey. We ask:

1. How much do you trust the President, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
2. How much do you trust the ruling party, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
3. In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of the following on Kenya is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?
 - The U.S.
 - The European Union
 - Japan
 - China
 - The World Bank

Conclusion

Accountability is an core tenet of representative government (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin, 1999), and scholars have identified a number of variables that may limit the public's ability to hold its government to account (e.g, regime type, resource rents, and foreign aid receipts).¹⁰ Yet, relatively little work examines the link between accountability and the requirements attached to aid. Rarely does foreign aid come without strings, since large bilateral donors like the U.S. and China as well as multilateral entities like the World Bank often make demands of borrowers.

We show with new Afrobarometer data that although such conditionality may restrict the public's ability to directly hold its leaders accountable, this is not always undesirable for the public.

¹⁰See Fearon (1999); Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008); Morrison (2010); Chen, Pan and Xu (2016).

Instead, when citizens dislike the government, and they have positive feelings about the foreign donor, they may prefer that the donor hold the government to account. Conversely, when they approve of the government and disapprove of the donor, they perceive aid requirements as unwanted incursions on state sovereignty. Our survey will enable us to examine which specific conditions publics (a) associate with different donors and (b) find most intrusive — the first such evidence of its kind.

To that end, this research offers several paths for future research. First, scholars might probe the extent to which elites and publics diverge on the issue of aid requirements. In most contexts related to the technical design of international agreements, especially in developing country and non-democratic settings, elites hold greater sway than publics, and so it is important to determine whether and when they tolerate or even embrace accountability to foreign donors. Second, we encourage additional work probing how publics come to form opinions of aid donors, including when they perceive specific types of conditions to be more or less problematic, and whether these public attitudes shape governments' decisions over who they take funding from in world politics.

Our findings also carry normative implications. International organizations and bilateral donors alike often discuss a need for aid recipients to be accountable to their citizens and take ownership of development projects. And yet, the requirements that donors attach to aid are often thought to undermine these goals. However, when the public is on board with the requirements attached to aid, such requirements may actually indirectly *improve* government accountability — promoting outcomes that the public desires. Therefore, we believe donors should be attuned to the public mood in recipient countries. If they can concentrate conditions in governance areas that the public desires or perceives to be less intrusive, donors can help to close rather than exacerbate accountability gaps in the developing world.

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Appendix of Supporting Information

Table 7: No interaction between trust in government and opinion of foreign donor

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Supports development requirements (0-1) Supports governance requirements (0-1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.137*** (0.032)			-0.066* (0.034)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.102*** (0.032)			-0.078** (0.035)	
Trust index			-0.067*** (0.016)			-0.053*** (0.018)
Approves of U.S. influence (1-5)	-0.007 (0.022)	0.024 (0.022)	0.036*** (0.012)	0.043* (0.024)	0.026 (0.024)	0.017 (0.013)
Trust Pres. X U.S.	0.014* (0.008)			-0.010 (0.008)		
Trust Ruling X U.S.		0.004 (0.008)			-0.004 (0.008)	
Trust Index X U.S.			0.004 (0.004)			-0.001 (0.004)
Observations	25,291	23,190	21,423	25,261	23,170	21,411

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Regressions use binary probit models to estimate the relationship between trust in government, opinions of Western influence, and support for requirements. The trust question reads: "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Not at all / Just a little / Somewhat / A lot) The trust index consists of questions measuring trust in: the president, parliament, electoral commission, ruling party, police, army, courts, and tax authorities. The influence question reads: "In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of the following organizations on [COUNTRY] is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven't you heard enough to say?" (Very negative / Somewhat negative / Neither negative nor positive / Somewhat positive / Very positive) Controls include age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Cases are weighted using Afrobarometer's withinwt (household) variable. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8.

Table 8: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (democratic countries)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Supports development requirements (0-1)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.078*** (0.011)			-0.091*** (0.012)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.072*** (0.012)			-0.071*** (0.011)	
Trust index			-0.041*** (0.007)			-0.043*** (0.007)
Observations	20,383	20,490	17,997	20,304	20,428	17,960

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Regressions use binary probit models to estimate the relationship between opinions of Western influence and support for requirements. The trust question reads: "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Not at all / Just a little / Somewhat / A lot) The trust index consists of questions measuring trust in: the president, parliament, electoral commission, ruling party, police, army, courts, and tax authorities. Controls include age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Cases are weighted using Afrobarometer's withinwt (household) variable. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8.


Table 9: Trust in government associated with lower support for requirements (autocratic countries)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
Supports development requirements (0-1) Supports governance requirements (0-1)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.087*** (0.018)			-0.112*** (0.024)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.133*** (0.023)			-0.162*** (0.020)	
Trust index			-0.066*** (0.012)			-0.085*** (0.011)
Observations	9,726	6,874	6,305	9,714	6,862	6,311

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Regressions use binary probit models to estimate the relationship between opinions of Western influence and support for requirements. The trust question reads: "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Not at all / Just a little / Somewhat / A lot) The trust index consists of questions measuring trust in: the president, parliament, electoral commission, ruling party, police, army, courts, and tax authorities. Controls include age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Cases are weighted using Afrobarometer's withinwt (household) variable. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8.

Figure 2: Trust most strongly predicts support for requirements in Uganda and Ghana



Note: Points represent coefficients taken from Models 1 and 4 in Table 4. Countries are ordered according to their Freedom House score, ranging from the least to most free. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8, Freedom House.

Table 10: Results somewhat driven by individuals with stronger beliefs in domestic accountability

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	Supports development requirements (0-1) Supports governance requirements (0-1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Trusts president (1-4)	-0.066*** (0.018)			-0.100*** (0.017)		
Trusts ruling party (1-4)		-0.078*** (0.018)			-0.082*** (0.016)	
Trust index			-0.028*** (0.010)			-0.043*** (0.009)
Support for domestic accountability (0-1)	0.214*** (0.060)	0.171*** (0.062)	0.148*** (0.034)	0.185*** (0.057)	0.190*** (0.052)	0.147*** (0.028)
Trust pres X Accountability	-0.021 (0.019)			-0.008 (0.018)		
Trust ruling X Accountability		-0.011 (0.021)			-0.017 (0.018)	
Trust index X Accountability			-0.029*** (0.011)			-0.017* (0.010)
Observations	29,193	28,174	25,189	29,109	28,099	25,158

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Regressions use binary probit models to estimate the relationship between trust in government, accountability attitudes, and support for requirements. The trust question reads: "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (Not at all / Just a little / Somewhat / A lot) The trust index consists of questions measuring trust in: the president, parliament, electoral commission, ruling party, police, army, courts, and tax authorities. The accountability question reads: "Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: Parliament should ensure that the president explains to it on a regular basis how his government spends taxpayers' money. Statement 2: The president should be able to devote his full attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying his actions." Controls include age, gender, rural, and country fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. Cases are weighted using Afrobarometer's withinwt (household) variable. *Source:* Afrobarometer Round 8.

Draft Survey Questionnaire for “Public Opinion of Aid Conditionality in Aid Recipient Countries”
Richard Clark, Lindsay Dolan, Alexandra Zeitz

This Draft: 2022-08-25

Trust in government

1. How much do you trust the President, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?
2. How much do you trust the ruling party, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?

(Not at all / just a little / neutral / somewhat / a lot)

Corruption of government

3. How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Civil servants?

(None / some of them / most of them / all of them)

Influence of donors

4. In general, do you think that the economic and political influence of each of the following on Kenya is mostly positive, mostly negative, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?

The U.S.

The European Union

Japan

China

The World Bank

(Very negative / somewhat negative / neither positive nor negative / somewhat positive / positive)

5. Support for development requirements [Note- this question is the same as Q64A in the Afrobarometer opinion poll, see an example of the Ghana survey [here](#)]

When other countries or international organizations give loans or development assistance to Kenya, they should enforce strict requirements on how the funds are spent.		When other countries or international organizations give loans or development assistance to Kenya, they should allow our government to make its own decisions about how to use the resources.	
Agree very strongly with Statement 1	Agree with Statement 1	Agree with Statement 2	Agree very strongly with Statement 2

6. **Support for governance requirements** [Note- this question is the same as Q64B in the Afrobarometer opinion poll, see an example of the Ghana survey [here](#)]

When other countries or international organizations give loans or development	Even if other countries give Kenya loans or development assistance, our government
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assistance to Kenya, they should enforce strict requirements to make sure our government promotes democracy and respects human rights.		should make its own decisions about democracy and human rights.	
Agree very strongly with Statement 1	Agree with Statement 1	Agree with Statement 2	Agree very strongly with Statement 2

7. Support for business requirements

When other countries or international organizations give loans or development assistance to Kenya, they should be allowed to require our government to hire or buy from their businesses.		Even if other countries give Kenya loans or development assistance, our government should make its own decisions about which businesses to hire or buy from.	
Agree very strongly with Statement 1	Agree with Statement 1	Agree with Statement 2	Agree very strongly with Statement 2

8. Experimental vignette (repeated 3x per respondent)

[The United States / The World Bank / China] would like to finance a large project in Kenya’s energy grid. This will help people and businesses in Kenya get access to electricity to make their lives easier and their businesses more productive. For this to happen, **[the United States / the World Bank / China]** will provide money to Kenya, and then the government of Kenya will oversee the project.

Do you agree or disagree that **[the United States / the World Bank / China]** should...

Governance	
-Democracy	Require Kenya to show that its elections are free and fair
-Human Rights	Require Kenya to pass laws that protect the rights of minority ethnicities
-Transparency	Require Kenya to show how it spends its money
Development	
-Privatization	Require Kenya to pass laws to sell state-owned companies to private investors
-Public spending	Require Kenya to cut government programs it can’t pay for
-Safeguards	Require Kenya to show that the project doesn’t hurt the environment
Business	
-Tied aid/procurement	Require Kenya to hire certain kinds of companies ([such as U.S. companies / NULL / such as Chinese companies]) for this project
-Exports	Require Kenya to sell goods to them at discounted prices

(strongly disagree / disagree / neither agree nor disagree / agree / strongly agree)

9. Expectations about which donors use which conditions

There are many different international donors and lenders. For example, the United States, the European Union, Japan, China, and the World Bank. Some of these donors require our government to do a lot in order to receive a loan. Others don't require much at all. Which of these donors you think would make the following requirements of the Kenyan government?

(same grid as above, for: the U.S. / EU / Japan / China / World Bank)