

Can International Interventions Build States? Evidence from the United Nations Development Programme

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Abstract

Are international interventions successful at state-building? Existing research is inconclusive and presents contradictory arguments about the effectiveness of state-building projects. I take a fresh look at this debate by focusing on one of the largest but understudied state-building organization in the world: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP provides a crucial test for the power of international interventions: its work with long time horizons, deep financial resources, and broad global presence better situates its projects for success than any organization. Using a new dataset of geolocated UNDP state-building projects and expenditures, I find that UNDP's state-building work is associated with a statistically significant decrease in violence – overall, by state actors, and by non-state actors. This is consistent with the most optimistic arguments in support of state-building, suggesting that with the right approach international organizations can successfully build states.

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Introduction

In 1991, after years of civil war, the Somali government collapsed. In response to the state's failure, the international community – including the United Nations and the United States – rallied together to stop the violence and build the state. But after the disastrous Black Hawk Down incident in 1993, the international community withdrew. The Somali state never rebuilt, and out of the continued chaos rose the terrorist group Al-Shabaab. Today, Al-Shabaab is one of the most active and lethal groups in Africa committing thousands of acts of violence and killing tens of thousands of people (ACLED, 2021). The relatively short lived intervention had failed with deadly consequences, and Somalia became an archetype of state failure and the ineffectiveness of international state-building efforts.

State-building is defined as both the mitigation of violence and the building of legitimate institutions (Lee, 2022). Whether international interventions successfully build states is a well studied question, but there is no consensus on the answer. Some scholars argue that such international interventions are doomed: not only do they fail to mitigate violence, they may actually increase violence (Hoffman, 2004; Spaniel, 2018; Weintraub, 2016), and they do not have the domestic legitimacy to build institutions (Duursma, 2020; Russell and Sambanis, 2021). Others argue that under specific circumstances, such as sufficient funding, interactions between interventionists and citizens, and long time horizons, international interventions can be successful both at mitigating violence (Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2020; Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 2019; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014) and building institutions (Blair, 2019; Blair, Karim and Morse, 2019; Bratton and Chang, 2006; Choi, 2010).

Missing from these previous studies is a specific examination of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP is one of the largest state-building organizations in the world in every sense: the dollars spent, the projects implemented, and the countries that host them (Campbell, 2018; Ponzio, 2004). UNDP as an organization also exhibits many of the characteristics that the existing literature argues should make it more likely to succeed:

financial resources, opportunities to interact with local citizens, and long time horizons. This profile makes UNDP a crucial case for the debate on international interventions.

I address this omission with a new geocoded dataset to examine UNDP’s state-building projects in failed and fragile states between 2012 and 2020. To my knowledge, this is the first cross-national study of UNDP’s state-building work. Using a matching identification strategy to address the non-random geographic placement of projects, I performed a cross-national analysis of 13 failed and fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa. I find that UNDP’s work, defined by both the number of projects per year and annual project expenditures, supports successful state-building. UNDP’s work is significantly associated with a decrease in violence perpetrated by state actors, non-state actors, and overall violence. This success is especially notable given that the case selection focuses on the “most difficult” cases, setting the bar for success quite high. These findings are an important contribution for arbitrating the debate on whether international interventions can successfully build states.

Are International Interventions Successful?

International interventions intended to mitigate violence are well studied. However, the literature does not present a consensus on whether they are successful in their efforts to bring peace and build institutions (Findley, 2018). This scholarship can be divided into three factions: those who argue that international interventions usually fail by nature, those who argue that international interventions often fail because they are poorly implemented, and those who argue that international interventions are sometimes successful. In the next three sections, I give an overview of these arguments.

International Interventions Usually Fail

One side of the debate posits that international interventions are ineffective. The most pessimistic scholars argue that international interventions fail to establish peace base their

arguments on the logic that the “outsider” nature of the international intervention itself dooms the endeavor (Di Salvatore, 2019; Hoffman, 2004; Narang, 2014, 2015; Weintraub, 2016; Ziemke, 2012). This argument hypothesizes that the international intervention changes the dynamics on the ground, incentivizing violence against civilians, aid organizations, and even other warring parties. For example, providing aid to civilians can make civilians valuable military targets for warring parties to re-stock their supplies, meaning that the international intervention’s successful delivery of humanitarian aid is correlated with increased violence against civilians (Hoffman, 2004; Ziemke, 2012). In a similar vein, aid can be used to buy the hearts and minds of civilians, an information stream that can be cut off by attacking civilians and aid organizations but also exploited for greater territorial control, which itself requires more fighting (Weintraub, 2016). Aid can also serve to reinvigorate the losing side, prolonging the conflict (Narang, 2014, 2015). In a more nuanced view, perhaps aid can stop fighting related to the war, but will inadvertently lead to increased violence from other sources, such as violent crime (Di Salvatore, 2019).

Other work questions the ability of international interventions to build institutions for effective states and governance, arguing that, as international entities, they lack the necessary legitimacy to build trustworthy institutions by and for the domestic citizenry (Barma, 2016; Duursma, 2020; Russell and Sambanis, 2021). For example, post-conflict interventions in Africa led by African states have a greater success rate and are associated with longer periods of peace than those by the broader international community because other African states are perceived to have more domestic legitimacy (Duursma, 2020). Other scholars have highlighted the contradictory need to engage local leaders for post-conflict state-building, but that very engagement can undermine the institution-building process (Barma, 2016; Russell and Sambanis, 2021). Local leaders have, by definition, earned their standing under the status quo, and therefore likely have little interest in changes that could diminish their power (Barma, 2016). However, without local leader engagement, the imposed institutions lack domestic legitimacy. Even if an international intervention’s initial institution-building

efforts are successful, they can become a victim of their own success, where their continued presence threatens the growing legitimacy of the institution and the sovereignty of the state (Russell and Sambanis, 2021).

A third set of results is more tempered with mixed findings, arguing that international interventions do not have either a positive or negative impact on violence, and consequently on the institution-building that would follow. While peacekeeping missions seem to be successful at establishing peace at the macro level, those findings cannot be replicated at the micro level (Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2021). Scholars have also found that international interventions fail to stop violence in the short term while possibly protecting civilians in the long term (Kathman and Wood, 2011). In contrast, other scholars have found that peacekeeping missions might initially appear successful but those successes are fleeting (Beardsley, 2013). A general sense pervading this branch of literature is that international interventions are still worth trying, since they are the best known option for trying to help failed states and their citizens (Kathman and Wood, 2011).

International Interventions Do Not Have to Fail

A less pessimistic strain of scholarship offers a middle ground: international interventions have historically been ineffective, but this is because they have been poorly implemented and not because of the nature of international interventions. One crucial question regards funding, and most fundamentally the total amount of funding. While some scholars have argued that the massive amounts of funds can encourage rent-seeking behavior instead of peace and institution-building (Haass, 2021), others argue that international interventions are plagued by inadequate resources (Autesserre, 2010; Campbell, 2018). Another aspect is how that funding is distributed across conflict-ridden states. International interventions and their localized funding mechanisms guarantee a certain cost to fighting, which might be higher or lower than the cost of fighting in the absence of the intervention. In cases where the intervention raises the cost of fighting, it can lower the probability of fighting, but if it

lowers the cost it can prolong a conflict (Spaniel, 2018).

Other critiques of international interventions have focused on the logistics of the implementation. For example, interventions are often led by professional peace-builders who are too disconnected from the citizens they are trying to help (Autesserre, 2014). Without these relationships, interventions cannot ensure the new institutions fit local needs, as well as undercut the trust necessary for legitimacy. The objectives of the interventions can also be distorted: to make donor-imposed metrics and have demonstrable progress over short time horizons, interventions often focus on shallow institutions that, by definition, will not make meaningful changes in society (Buntaine, Parks and Buch, 2017).

Ostensibly, per these arguments, if an intervention addressed these shortcomings – that is, ensuring that the intervention is adequately resourced with appropriate dispersal, interacting with civilians, and working in longer time horizons that allow for deeper institutional change – then international interventions might be successful. This specific argument is examined in the next section.

International Interventions (Sometimes) Succeed

The optimistic side of the debate on international interventions argues that they offer real opportunities for peace and institution-building. This work agrees that some international interventions have had shortcomings and finds that yes, with these shortcomings addressed, international interventions can be successful.

One consistent finding is that international interventions which are adequately resourced – in terms of funding and personnel – can deter and mitigate violence (Bove, Salvatore and Elia, 2021; Carnegie and Mikulaschek, 2020; Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 2019; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014; Kathman and Benson, 2019; Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen, 2013). While most of these studies specifically study UN Peacekeeping interventions, it still suggests that adequate financial resources are a key to success. A second finding is the need to meaningfully interact with the local population in an effort to build the domestic legit-

imacy required for both peace and institution-building (Blair, 2019; Karim, 2020). These meaningful interactions can include civilians seeing patrols policing the areas in which they live or civilians being included in the peace and institution-building processes. These interactions ensure that the international interventionists establish credibility with the people they are attempting to assist, give the international interventionists a better understanding of the specific needs at hand, and in turn breed legitimacy for the new peace and institutions.

A third important finding from this body of work is that international interventions should work on long time horizons, establishing the stability and trust necessary for building institutions and having the time to make meaningful change (Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014). With long time horizons, successful international interventions can also serve as a consistent neutral third party, facilitating institution-building in a post-conflict state (Blair, 2021). Humanitarian aid that focuses on good governance and re-building societies can positively change the political dynamics within a state, reducing participation in and support for political violence (Savun and Tirone, 2018). Furthermore, states with democratic institutions, such as a strong rule of law, have alternative mechanisms for civilians to express discontent, reducing the need for political violence (Choi, 2010). As these institutions grow stronger, more civilians will participate in the conventional political process instead of resorting to violence, which in turn strengthens the nascent institutions (Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi, 2011). This virtuous cycle does not necessarily require an international intervention, but international interventions can expedite the transition to democracy and establish post-conflict state legitimacy, helping to ensure the longevity of the new regime (Avdeenko and Gilligan, 2015; Bratton and Chang, 2006; Steinert and Grimm, 2015).

The contours of the debate show that the matter of whether or not international interventions are successful is far from settled. But the debate thus far, especially in regards to the potential keys for successful international interventions, has largely focused on UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). UNPKO is undoubtedly an important actor in the international interventions space, but it is also somewhat unique compared to many international

organizations. For example, peacekeeping missions often have weapons for self defense and are actively focused on conflict prevention, whereas other actors in the international intervention space are less directly involved in the conflict itself. Furthermore, this focus on UN Peacekeeping has overshadowed another important UN organization: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In the next section, I introduce UNDP's state-building work and argue that UNDP presents a crucial case for the larger debate on international interventions.

UNDP and State-building

As is clear from the scholarly debate, most of the international interventions literature has focused on UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), an agency that is fundamentally different from UNDP. UNDP was founded in 1965, and today is the UN's largest development agency with work in 170 of the 193 UN member countries (UNDP, 2021). While the agency is perhaps best known for its humanitarian aid, promoting peace and good governance is a top objective of the organization. Consistent with that objective, UNDP has implemented good governance projects around the world since the early 1990s. In 2020, UNDP had 1,440 state-building projects across 132 countries with a combined budget of 158 million USD. This represented about 27% of UNDP's total budget, and was about equal to the budget allocated for humanitarian work (United Nations, 2021).

In 2000, UNPKO underwent an extensive review as summarized in a document referred to as the Brahimi Report, which identified UNDP as the key state-building organization within the UN and advised UNPKO to work with UNDP for all institution-building aspects of their missions (Brahimi, 2000; Campbell, 2018). Together, the mitigation of violence and the building of institutions would build effective states.

This logic strongly resonates with the theoretical concept of a Weberian state, which posits that states are entities that have a monopolization on the legitimate use of violence

(Weber, 2019). This requires that not only is violence mitigated, but that there be effective legal institutions that can define when violence is legitimate (Geuss et al., 2001). While UNDP clearly has a broader focus than violence mitigation, this close conceptual relationship between violence and statehood means that controlling violence must be a fundamental component of UNDP’s state-building work (Barma, 2016; Howard, 2019; Lake, 2016; Lee, 2022).

Since the Brahimi Report, scholars have studied in-depth the efficacy of UNPKO for saving lives, protecting civilians, and shortening the duration of conflict. However, little attention has been paid to the efficacy of UNDP’s own work. Today, UNDP follows the guidelines of the Brahimi Report by promoting its “Peace, Justice, and Institutions” sustainable development goal. These projects cover a broad set of objectives, from establishing a new tribunal system to a training a new elections ministry to writing a new constitution, as well as a variety of activities including workshops and purchasing new equipment for state administration.

To my knowledge, all existing studies of UNDP are brief and qualitative, and in all cases UNDP is not seen as a success story (Autesserre, 2014; Campbell, 2018; Howard, 2019). This is surprising since, at least on paper, UNDP is theoretically posed for success. As an organization, it has access to one of the largest state-building funds in the world (Campbell, 2018), ostensibly securing the adequate resources scholars have identified as crucial to success. Its intensive presence around the world through humanitarian work enables long time horizons and the opportunity to focus on deep institution building – UNDP often claims that it is there to help before, during, and after a crisis – which is another key element for success identified by the literature (Campbell, 2018). Its aid focuses on supporting society and good governance. Moreover, UNDP must be invited to do a project by the host government, potentially avoiding some of the questions on legitimacy as well as creating the opportunity to do projects that most benefit the host state (Campbell, 2018).

What this gap between case studies and the paper profile does not show is whether UNDP's state-building efforts are systematically ineffective or, if under the right circumstances, UNDP can succeed even in these difficult environments. Until 2015, UNDP did not systematically share data about its projects, making it difficult to answer this question. I have collected UNDP's data into a new dataset, allowing for the first systematic analysis of the organization's work. Based on existing literature and the expectations presented from existing case studies, it is possible that UNDP has no effect or actually increases violence. UNDP could also have partial success, where perhaps they establish enough state capacity for government forces to suppress non-state violence (either forcefully or peacefully) but not the institutions needed to restrain state perpetrated violence. However, UNDP has organizational attributes that literature has identified as key to decreasing violence: deep financial resources, a broad presence that enables interactions with local citizens, and long time horizons. Based on past literature, successful interventions exhibited at least one of these characteristics, suggesting that UNDP might empirically prove successful where other organizations have failed. This leads to my following expectations for the cross-national analysis:

***Breadth:** A broader presence of UNDP's work (measured as a count variable) will be associated with decreased overall violence, violence by state actors, and violence by non-state actors.*

***Depth:** A deeper presence of UNDP's work (measured as total expenditures) will be associated with decreased overall violence, violence by state actors, and violence by non-state actors.*

I test these expectations in a cross-national analysis of UNDP's state-building work and violence in 13 failed and fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since, based on UNDP's materials, these projects are placed in the areas of greatest need as defined by higher historical levels of violence, I utilized a matching identification strategy with two-way fixed effects to

address non-random project placement. My findings indicate that UNDP's work, both in terms of *Breadth* and *Depth*, is associated with the successful mitigation of violence by both state and non-state actors. These findings are possible with a new dataset, which I present in the next section.

Research Design


For my analysis, I use spatially and temporally disaggregated data on the location and timing of UNDP's state-building work and conflict. To measure UNDP's work, I collected a new dataset on UNDP state-building projects in failed and fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa, as defined by the top quartile of the Fund for Peace Failed and Fragile State Index in 2012. This yields a sample of 13 states: Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. I focused on Sub-Saharan Africa because, despite the region's geographic, demographic, and historical diversity, the experiences of this group of states is more similar to each other than they are to other states in the top quartile, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Haiti. The Fund for Peace is a well respected think tank in Washington, D.C. that releases an annual report scoring all states in the international system on their institutional stability and security, ultimately ranking states from most to least fragile. Unlike other indices such as Polity or Freedom House, the Failed and Fragile State Index explicitly addresses the intersection of state capacity and state failure, making it a more accurate identification tool for the universe of cases. The geographic unit of analysis is a grid cell of 1 degree by 1 degrees, which, given Sub-Saharan Africa's position around the equator, translates to about 200 km by 200 km on the earth's surface, and the temporal unit of analysis is year. This results in 10,926 observations in the unmatched sample.

I decided to use the grid cell data structure, summing measures of state-building and violence across time and grid cell, following the example set by existing literature and other


datasets (e.g. UCDP-PRIO, Nomikos, Sener and Williams (2021); Ruggeri, Dorussen and Gizelis (2017)). The benefit of this data structure is that it allows for a consistent unit of analysis across many countries, which might have different sized geographic administrative units. Furthermore, the grid-cell structure provides a template for a geographic relationship between the projects and violence that is at a smaller, and more practical, level than an entire state or administrative unit might allow. For example, South Sudan’s capital city Juba headquarters several projects, and one can reasonably assume that those projects have an association with violence around the capital Juba. However, Juba is only a small part of the larger administrative area of Central Equatoria State, and, given South Sudan’s rudimentary infrastructure and other impediments to travel, it is not plausible that the projects would have an effect in the farther reaches of the state. The grid-cell data structure allows for these moderate spill-over effects.

The structure of the data vis-a-vis counts of projects and violent events by different actors across space and time in the unmatched sample are visually shown in Figure 1. The countries with a white background are those included in the dataset. In all nine images, the blue points indicate the location of a UNDP state-building project office in a given year, and the gold points indicate a violent event as recorded by ACLED the following year. The leftmost column of images shows violence by non-state actors, the middle column shows violence by state actors, and the rightmost column shows violence by all actors (including some events not categorized as a state or non-state actor). Panel 1a shows projects from 2012, the first year in which project data is available, and violent events from 2013; Panel 1b shows projects from 2016 and violent events from 2017; and Panel 1c shows projects from 2020 and violent events from 2021. Close examination of the figures shows that while the patterns of violence by different actors is similar, there are some distinct differences. For example, Somalia has noticeably more violence perpetrated by non-state actors, while Sudan appears to have more violence by state actors. It is also clear that project locations are highly persistent over time, with only minor variations between the three years shown.


Figure 1: UNDP state-building projects lagged one year, shown in blue, and present year violence, shown in gold, by non-state actors (left), state actors (middle), and all actors (right) in 2012 (top), 2016 (middle), and 2020 (bottom) across the 13 states included in the dataset.



(a) 2012 projects and 2013 violence



(b) 2016 projects and 2017 violence



(c) 2020 projects and 2021 violence

My key independent variables are derived from the new dataset on UNDP’s state-building work. All UNDP project data is posted weekly to the UNDP Transparency Portal. The data includes the location of UNDP field offices implementing specific UNDP projects, the dates projects were implemented, annualized expenditures, the targeted development goals, and key project documents describing the project plans and evaluations. Historic project data is available from 2012 through present. Using customized Python scripts I collected the project data, parsing them so that the data is organized in a format appropriate for analysis. UNDP has at least one state-building project in all 13 states. Projects are defined as a state-building project if they target the “Peace, Justice, and Institutions” sustainable development goal. Since the expenditure data is annualized, I collapsed the data to be at the year-level, focusing on the period from 2012 through 2020 (and including data from 2012 through one year lags). Overall, the dataset includes information on 1,209 state-building projects, which are spread across 111 grid cells. I analyzed two different measures of UNDP’s work: a count variable, *Breadth*, which is a count of the UNDP state-building projects in the grid-cell; and *Depth*, which is the total expenditures for UNDP state-building projects in the grid-cell. More information about the project structure and coding decisions can be found in the Supplementary Materials.

These measurements are derived from existing academic literature (Blair, 2019; Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 2019; Howard, 2019; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014; Karim, 2020; Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen, 2013). There is some evidence that the results of analyses using different measures of international interventions are not robust to each other, suggesting they might be conceptually capturing different dynamics (see Ruggeri, Gizelis and Dorussen (2013) and Howard (2019) for a discussion). Furthermore, recall that some scholars argued that when international interventions interacted more with the civilians they were trying to help, they were more successful at establishing institutions (Blair, 2019; Karim, 2020). While I do not have information on specific logistical activities or survey data asking civilians if they have seen UNDP personnel, theoretically countries with more projects

would have more personnel who could interact with civilians. However, more projects does not necessarily translate to adequate funding for all projects – for example, if funding is stretched thinly over several projects – so the count of projects is an approximate measure of the breadth of UNDP’s work in the state. In contrast, other scholars highlighted the need for adequate resources, especially financial resources for international interventions to be successful (Hegre, Hultman and Nygård, 2019; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon, 2014). To address this argument, I include analyses on expenditures, or the *Depth* of UNDP’s work. I am assuming that projects with higher expenditures have more financial resources at their disposal.

My dependent variables are counts of violent events from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), which records the latitude and longitude of several types of violent events at the day level (Raleigh et al., 2010). Unlike other sources of data for violent events, ACLED records all relevant events regardless of casualty counts or whether the violence is tied to an ongoing conflict, and therefore should be a more comprehensive measure of violence and corresponding state capacity. In addition to considering all violent events, I delineate between state and non-state actors to probe if UNDP is successful in building state capacity – which should correspond to a decrease in violence by non-state actors – and establishing rule of law institutions – which, theoretically, should correspond to a decrease in violence by state actors. These categorizations are derived from ACLED’s event coding, which I describe in more detail in the Supplementary Material. All violent events, regardless of actors involved, are included in the variable *All*; any event that included a state actor is included in the variable *State*; and any event that included an organized but non-state actor is included in the variable *Non-state*. Since ACLED data is at the event level, I summed the event counts to the year-grid-cell level.

An unfortunate challenge when studying fragile states with recent or ongoing conflict is the presence of consistent data to be used as control variables, especially at the sub-national level. For example, South Sudan’s last census was in 2008, before its independence from

Sudan, and the counts are thought to be inaccurate due to corruption and malignant political motivations. Even so, with an estimated 60% of the population under the age of 25 and frequent migrations fleeing conflict and seeking economic opportunities, those demographic statistics most likely do not appropriately reflect modern South Sudan. Therefore, I resorted to using high level approximations. In the matching procedure, I use two controls. First is the distance from the centroid of each grid cell to the capital city, which can be thought of as measuring both access to resources as well as population density. Major highways, railways, and airports, to the extent that they exist, would facilitate access to international resources and are often located at or connected to the capital city, with geographic areas closer to the capital often having easier access. Furthermore, the capital city is often the population center of the country, with the population becoming sparser as you move farther away. More people living in a concentrated area might also make the probability of a violent event more likely, but without precise numbers it is not possible to normalize the counts. Second, I include a control for the relative size of the grid area to account for some border grids only being partially included, and therefore having less potential area to have either a project or specific violent events. In the regression analysis, I use grid-cell fixed effects and year fixed effects to account for unobserved geographic and temporal heterogeneity, as well as lagged measures of the corresponding dependent variables (i.e. counts of violent events by non-state actors, state actors, and all actors) to account for the persistence of violence over time.

Another issue with analyzing UNDP's project data is that the projects are not randomly assigned. In fact, UNDP's materials purport to target projects and resources to the places that need the most assistance, which, in this case, can theoretically be captured by analyzing historical experiences of violence. Since ACLED data in Sub-Saharan Africa dates back to 1997, I summed the counts of violent events for all actors, state actors, and non-state actors by grid-cell and year from 1997 to 2011. To address the non-random placement of UNDP's resources, I then did one-to-one propensity score matching using Mahalanobis distance on

the proportion of the grid cell included in the country, the distance to the capital, annual fatalities, and annual violence totals for the “treated” grid-cells – meaning they had at least one UNDP project between 2012 and 2020 – and the “control” grid-cells. Since there were many more control grid-cells, this identification strategy also addressed analytical challenges with the relative rareness of the treatment. This approach found a match for all 111 treated grid-cells. While matching alone should be a credible causal inference identification strategy, I also include grid-cell and year fixed effects, rendering the final regression a two-way fixed effects model. I analyzed the matched panel data using ordinary least squares with country-level clustered standard errors, year fixed effects, and grid cell fixed effects.

Findings

The results of the cross-national regression analyses showing the relationship between state-building projects and violence mitigation with grid-cells matched on historical violence are shown in Tables 1 and 2. In all cases the grid-cells and year fixed effects are included in the model but omitted from the table for brevity.

Table 1 shows the results for project *Breadth*, where UNDP’s work is measured as a count of projects. The first column shows *Non-state* violence, the count of violent events specifically perpetrated by non-state actors; the second column shows *State* violence, the count of violent events specifically perpetrated by state actors; and the third column shows *All* violence, a count of all violent events by state, non-state, and any other actors tracked by ACLED. In all cases, a greater breadth of projects is associated with a decrease in violent events. In the case of *All* violence, on average every additional state-building project in the previous year is associated with a decrease of 0.4 violent events in that grid-cell that year, all else equal. The effect size is almost half that for violence by non-state violence, where every additional project in the previous year is associated with 0.22 fewer violent events, and less than half that for violence by state actors, where every additional project in the

previous year is associated with 0.14 fewer violent events. However, the effects themselves are still highly statistically significant. These results are all consistent with my expectation on UNDP's *Breadth* of work, i.e. that more UNDP state-building projects would be associated with a decrease in all forms of violence.

Table 2 shows the results for project *Depth*, where UNDP's work is measured as annual project expenditures in millions USD. The dependent variables are the same as for the *Breadth* analysis, with the first column showing *Non-state* violence, the second column showing *State* violence, and the third column showing *All* violence. Again, in all cases greater depth of projects is associated with a decrease in violent events. In the case of *All* violence, on average every additional one million USD of state-building project expenditures in the previous year is associated with a decrease of 0.8 violent events in that grid-cell that year, all else equal. The effect size is again much smaller for violence by specific actors relative to overall violence, where every one million USD in expenditures from the previous year is associated with 0.5 fewer violent events by non-state actors and 0.3 fewer violent events by state actors. All effect sizes are highly statistically significant, and are consistent with my expectation on UNDP's *Depth* of work, i.e. that greater UNDP state-building project expenditures would be associated with a decrease in all forms of violence.

Across all analyses – measuring the effect of UNDP's breadth and depth of work on violence perpetrated by non-state, state, and all actors – a pattern emerges that suggests UNDP's state-building work effectively mitigates violence. As a robustness check, I removed grid cells that contain the capital city or are very close to the capital city, and repeated the matching procedure and regression analysis. Capital cities are potentially more turbulent locations in terms of violence, but also might be more likely to have a state-building project and might have easier access to international resources. These results are shown in Tables 3 and 4. The significance of the results for *Depth* dissipates but the sign remains, while the results for *Breadth* decreases slightly in significance and effect size but otherwise hold. The original findings are also robust when omitting any single country (see Supplementary

Table 1: Project breadth and violence: regression on matched data

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Count	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.05)	-0.40*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.45*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.29*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.43*** (0.02)
Grid FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.14 (4.10)	-0.84 (4.18)	-2.09 (7.25)
Observations	1,890	1,890	1,890
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1670)	12.07	12.31	21.32
F Statistic (df = 219; 1670)	33.23***	77.29***	69.03***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 2: Project depth and violence: regression on matched data

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.8*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.02)
Grid FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.1 (4.1)	-0.9 (4.2)	-2.1 (7.3)
Observations	1,890	1,890	1,890
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1670)	12.1	12.3	21.4
F Statistic (df = 219; 1670)	33.1***	77.3***	68.7***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 3: Project breadth and violence: regression on matched data, omitting capital cities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	-0.17** (0.08)	-0.14** (0.06)	-0.28** (0.13)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.63*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.53*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.68*** (0.03)
Grid FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.80 (3.59)	-0.10 (3.02)	-0.68 (5.95)
Observations	1,485	1,485	1,485
R ²	0.66	0.67	0.71
Adjusted R ²	0.62	0.63	0.67
Residual Std. Error (df = 1310)	10.53	8.85	17.43
F Statistic (df = 174; 1310)	14.69***	15.37***	18.36***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 4: Project depth and violence: regression on matched data, omitting capital cities

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	Violence (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.02 (0.3)	-0.2 (0.2)	-0.2 (0.5)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.6*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.5*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.7*** (0.03)
Grid FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.7 (3.6)	-0.1 (3.0)	-0.6 (6.0)
Observations	1,485	1,485	1,485
R ²	0.7	0.7	0.7
Adjusted R ²	0.6	0.6	0.7
Residual Std. Error (df = 1310)	10.6	8.9	17.5
F Statistic (df = 174; 1310)	14.6***	15.3***	18.3***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Material). Importantly, to the extent that one finds matching and two-way fixed effects a credible causal identification strategy, these relationships can be interpreted to mean that UNDP's work caused these decreases in violence, even with the high bar for success by focusing on the most fragile states in the international system. The selection of UNDP as an organization is based on its paper profile where the keys to success – financial resources, opportunities to interact with citizens, and long time horizons – should be present. While the analysis does not directly test the importance of these characteristics or compare the effect of UNDP's work to that of another organization where such traits might be less obvious, the established mixed track record of international interventions by other organizations indirectly support the theory that these organizational attributes are important.

A key limitation to the economic meaning of these findings is that, while they are highly statistically significant, they are substantively quite small. To approximately prevent one violent event by any actor in a 200km by 200km area in a given year costs more than 1 million USD. That same reduction for non-state actors costs 2 million USD, and more than three 3 million USD for state actors. Similarly, it requires more than two additional projects to reduce violent events perpetrated by any actor the following year, and almost seven additional projects to reduce violent events specifically perpetrated by the government. Given the high levels of violence in these countries, arguably these are too small a reduction to be meaningful and the price tags are too high.

Conclusion

Scholars of international interventions have long debated whether international interventions can effectively promote peace and build states. One faction has argued that international interventions can mitigate violence, provided that projects have sufficient funding, opportunities to interact with citizens, and long time horizons. This paper sought to arbitrate this debate with a new dataset on UNDP's state-building projects in failed and fragile states in

Sub-Saharan Africa, since UNDP’s organizational profile and state-building approach is designed to maximize these theorized keys for success. Using a matching identification strategy with a two-way fixed effects model to account for non-random placement of state-building projects and the strong temporal persistence of key variables, I found that UNDP is indeed effective at mitigating violence by all actors. This is true for both when measuring UNDP’s work by breadth, i.e. the number of projects in a geographic area, and by depth, i.e. annual project expenditures. The results are robust to several subsets of the data. These findings suggest that UNDP state-building builds the state capacity needed to curb violence by non-state actors against its citizens, as well as the state institutions needed to restrain the state from using that violence illegitimately.

These findings have important implications for the role of the international community in domestic state-building processes. However, the study has several limitations that should be taken into consideration. First, it has a limited scope by studying only the United Nations Development Programme’s state-building projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. The UNDP dataset presented in this paper offers a richer context for these projects, including information on projects that target sustainable development goals other than state-building (e.g. education, public health, and protecting the environment) as well as project donors. It is also possible to examine states outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as other states that are within the region but not ranked as highly on an index for state fragility. Future research should leverage this information to better understand international interventions, the flows of foreign aid, and under what circumstances they can be successful. In particular, as mentioned previously, the mitigation effects are potentially too small to be substantively meaningful for very high price tags. Perhaps the dataset could yield insights into more economically efficient or more substantively meaningful state-building approaches.

Second, it conceptualizes “state-building” as an absence of violence by specific actors. While the absence of violence is certainly a prerequisite for fuller definitions of peace and a potential downstream indicator of institutional capacity, it is still an indirect measure of

the key concept of interest. Furthermore, there is growing acknowledgement by academics and practitioners that thriving modern states provide more than security guarantees to their citizens. While this paper found that UNDP's state-building projects mitigated violence by both state and non-state actors, this should be seen as a minimum threshold of achievement that does not guarantee an establishment of fuller peace or broader state provision of goods and services. Now that we have established UNDP's capacity to mitigate violence, future research might consider possible alternative measures of statehood that capture how well international interventions perform along these nuances.

Third, while this is the most detailed view yet of UNDP's work, the data still lacks some precise information needed to better evaluate the mechanisms for UNDP's success. More specifically, while UNDP's general organizational profile might theoretically enable adequate funding, opportunity for interactions with citizens, and long time horizons, the project data here does not provide information on which, if any, of those characteristics might be coming into play and if so to what extent. For example, while this data provides information on individual project expenditures each year, there is no information to indicate whether those funds are spent efficiently and whether some expenditures are more effective than others. As another example, there is no guarantee that simply having a project office in a location translates to UNDP personnel interacting with local citizens. Without information on how many UNDP personnel are deployed and UNDP policies for individual projects, it is impossible to assess the impact of interacting with local citizens on state-building success. To my knowledge, such detailed data is not publicly available, but could be a fruitful avenue for future research.

A final caveat is, as already mentioned, the potentially substantively small year-to-year effect sizes, despite their statistical significance. Preventing a single violent event should not be discounted – every act of violence has the potential for leaving people injured or killed and property destroyed. It is clear that state-building is time consuming and expensive, and to make a measurable impact it cannot be pursued half-heartedly. Regardless, in my view,

demonstrating that international interventions can successfully mitigate violence in the most difficult state environments is an important contribution: with the right approach, the time and expense can help the most frail and fragile states stabilize and build into more peaceful societies.

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A ACLED Events and Coding

A.1 Included ACLED Events

The objective was to only include violent events from the ACLED dataset. To do this, I included all ACLED events except:

- Those ACLED coded as “strategic developments” since these are not usually violent events; and
- “protests” with the sub-event type of “peaceful protest.”

Therefore, the included events are coded with one of the following:

- “Protests” without the “peaceful protest” sub-event type;
- “battles”;
- “explosions/remote violence”; and
- “violence against civilians.”

More information about the types of violence is available in ACLED’s code book (ACLED, 2019).

A.2 ACLED Actor Coding

As described in the main text, I also analyzed subsets of violent events depending on the actors involved using ACLED’s “Interaction” coding. Those specific codes are as follows:

- State Violence: Sole military action (10), Military versus military (11), Military versus rebels (12), Military versus political militia (13), Military versus communal militia (14), Military versus rioters (15), Military versus protesters (16), Military versus civilians (17), Military versus other (18)

- Non-State (Organized) Violence: Sole rebel action (20), Rebels versus rebels (22), Rebels versus political militia (23), Rebels versus communal militia (24), Rebels versus rioters (25), Rebels versus protesters (26), Rebels versus civilians (27), Rebels versus others (28), Sole political militia action (30), Political militia versus political militia (33), Political militia versus communal militia (34), Political militia versus rioters (35), Political militia versus protesters (36), Political militia versus civilians (37), Political militia versus others (38), Sole communal militia action (40), Communal militia versus communal militia (44), Communal militia versus rioters (45), Communal militia versus protesters (46), Communal militia versus civilians (47), Communal militia versus other (48)

Note that there are some events with a non-organized actor or other type of actor, so the *All* violence variable is greater than the sum of *Non-state* and *State* violence. Summary statistics for the dependent variables in the matched panel across all grids and time are shown below:

Measure	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Total
<i>Non-state</i>	3.1	13.7	0	395	33798
<i>State</i>	3	18	0	755	33084
<i>All</i>	6.5	30.8	0	1091	71878

More information about actors' interactions is available in ACLED's code book (ACLED, 2019).

B UNDP Project Coding

Within the UNDP system, a “project” or “program” is an umbrella program for a set of “outputs.” For the purposes of the cross-national analysis, I am calling the outputs “projects” for conceptual clarity. Programs do not have specific sustainable development goals (SDGs) and are not assigned a specific geocoding. However, outputs are assigned this level of detail, allowing me to distinguish between UNDP’s state-building and non-state-building work as well as allowing for the geospatial aspect of the cross-national analysis. In the case that an output has multiple geolocations, that observation is repeated in the dataset so that there is only one city per row. An output is considered to be part of UNDP’s state-building work if at least one of the assigned SDGs was in the “Peace, Justice, and Institutions” category (SDG ID 16). Some of the projects that started before 2012 (but had an active year of 2012 or beyond) do not have an assigned SDG, but instead have a “Focus Area.” To include those projects, I counted it as a state-building project if the Focus Area was Democratic Governance. Note that UNDP’s data includes expenditures and budgets both at the project level and the output level.

Because of the distinction between projects and outputs in the UNDP system, there are instances when the timeline for the output is shorter than the timeline for the project as a whole (e.g. the output is part of an earlier phase in the project). However, the years in which an output is considered “active” are inherited from the project. To avoid inflating output activity, if an output has 0 USD in expenditures and 0 USD in budgets for a given year, then I do not consider it to be an active output for that year and do not include that output for that time period in the analysis.

C Robustness Check: Leave One Country Out Results

For the key results on violence and UNDP state-building expenditures and project counts, there is a concern the results are driven by individual countries (especially Kenya and Zimbabwe). Below is a series of 26 regression tables showing the analyses run sequentially, leaving out a different country each time. Note that all but four of the regression results across two states hold in sign and significance. All results that do not hold are have a negative sign and are insignificant. The first set of results that do not hold are when leaving out the Central African Republic. The specific models are when state-building expenditures is the independent variable and the *Non-state* and *All* violence variables are the dependent variables. The second set of results that do not hold is when leaving out Sudan. The specific models are when the state-building project count is the independent variable and *State* violence is the dependent variable; and when state-building project expenditure is the independent variable and *State* violence is the dependent variable. All models include grid and year fixed effects (omitted for brevity) and with country level clustered standard errors.

Table 5: Omitting Central African Republic: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-0.4 (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.03)
Constant	0.4 (3.9)	-1.0 (4.7)	-0.4 (7.6)
Observations	1,539	1,539	1,539
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1358)	11.6	13.6	22.3
F Statistic (df = 180; 1358)	42.3***	76.0***	75.4***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Omitting Central African Republic: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.15*** (0.05)	−0.16*** (0.06)	−0.30*** (0.09)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.51*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.29*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.44*** (0.03)
Constant	0.10 (3.94)	−1.05 (4.65)	−0.86 (7.59)
Observations	1,539	1,539	1,539
R ²	0.85	0.91	0.91
Adjusted R ²	0.83	0.90	0.90
Residual Std. Error (df = 1358)	11.54	13.62	22.23
F Statistic (df = 180; 1358)	42.63***	75.97***	75.92***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Omitting Chad: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.9*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.5 (4.2)	-1.0 (4.3)	-2.6 (7.4)
Observations	1,800	1,800	1,800
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1590)	12.4	12.6	21.9
F Statistic (df = 209; 1590)	32.9***	77.2***	68.6***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Omitting Chad: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.14*** (0.05)	−0.40*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.45*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.29*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.43*** (0.03)
Constant	−1.69 (4.21)	−1.07 (4.28)	−2.91 (7.42)
Observations	1,800	1,800	1,800
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1590)	12.37	12.59	21.81
F Statistic (df = 209; 1590)	33.04***	77.28***	68.93***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9: Omitting Cote Ivoire: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.9*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.5*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.2 (4.3)	-1.0 (4.3)	-2.0 (7.6)
Observations	1,827	1,827	1,827
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1614)	12.6	12.8	22.3
F Statistic (df = 212; 1614)	32.4***	74.8***	66.4***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: Omitting Cote Ivoire: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.15*** (0.05)	−0.42*** (0.09)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.50*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.34*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.49*** (0.03)
Constant	−1.16 (4.28)	−0.94 (4.34)	−1.96 (7.57)
Observations	1,827	1,827	1,827
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.88
Residual Std. Error (df = 1614)	12.60	12.77	22.26
F Statistic (df = 212; 1614)	32.55***	74.96***	66.75***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: Omitting Democratic Republic of Congo: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.0*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.3*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.2*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.2*** (0.02)
Constant	-1.9 (3.5)	-1.0 (4.0)	-3.4 (6.2)
Observations	1,584	1,584	1,584
R ²	0.9	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1398)	10.3	11.6	18.1
F Statistic (df = 185; 1398)	45.6***	97.4***	103.2***
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 12: Omitting Democratic Republic of Congo: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	-0.24*** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.39*** (0.07)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.24*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.18*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.22*** (0.02)
Constant	-2.07 (3.50)	-0.94 (3.97)	-3.46 (6.19)
Observations	1,584	1,584	1,584
R ²	0.86	0.93	0.93
Adjusted R ²	0.84	0.92	0.92
Residual Std. Error (df = 1398)	10.27	11.65	18.13
F Statistic (df = 185; 1398)	45.99***	97.00***	103.14***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 13: Omitting Ethiopia: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.8*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.2 (4.2)	-0.9 (4.2)	-2.3 (7.4)
Observations	1,800	1,800	1,800
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1590)	12.4	12.5	21.8
F Statistic (df = 209; 1590)	32.8***	78.9***	69.1***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: Omitting Ethiopia: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.14*** (0.05)	−0.40*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.45*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.30*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.43*** (0.03)
Constant	−1.24 (4.21)	−0.85 (4.24)	−2.21 (7.39)
Observations	1,800	1,800	1,800
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1590)	12.37	12.46	21.74
F Statistic (df = 209; 1590)	33.01***	78.91***	69.42***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Omitting Guinea: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.8*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.2 (4.2)	-0.9 (4.2)	-2.2 (7.4)
Observations	1,800	1,800	1,800
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1590)	12.4	12.5	21.8
F Statistic (df = 209; 1590)	33.0***	78.7***	69.2***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: Omitting Guinea: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.15*** (0.05)	−0.41*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.45*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.29*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.43*** (0.03)
Constant	−1.24 (4.20)	−0.80 (4.23)	−2.12 (7.38)
Observations	1,800	1,800	1,800
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1590)	12.35	12.45	21.70
F Statistic (df = 209; 1590)	33.16***	78.85***	69.59***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Omitting Guinea-Bissau: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.9*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.02)
Constant	-1.2 (4.2)	-0.9 (4.2)	-2.2 (7.3)
Observations	1,845	1,845	1,845
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1630)	12.2	12.4	21.6
F Statistic (df = 214; 1630)	33.0***	77.3***	68.7***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 18: Omitting Guinea-Bissau: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.22*** (0.05)	−0.14*** (0.05)	−0.40*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.45*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.29*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.43*** (0.02)
Constant	−1.19 (4.15)	−0.87 (4.23)	−2.18 (7.33)
Observations	1,845	1,845	1,845
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1630)	12.21	12.44	21.56
F Statistic (df = 214; 1630)	33.18***	77.36***	69.01***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 19: Omitting Kenya: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3** (0.1)	-0.9*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.5 (4.2)	-1.0 (4.3)	-2.6 (7.4)
Observations	1,773	1,773	1,773
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1566)	12.5	12.6	21.8
F Statistic (df = 206; 1566)	33.0***	78.6***	70.0***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 20: Omitting Kenya: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.15*** (0.05)	−0.41*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.44*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.30*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.44*** (0.03)
Constant	−1.47 (4.23)	−1.00 (4.27)	−2.60 (7.40)
Observations	1,773	1,773	1,773
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1566)	12.43	12.55	21.74
F Statistic (df = 206; 1566)	33.20***	78.79***	70.39***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 21: Omitting Nigeria: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.0*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.5*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.4 (4.2)	-1.1 (4.4)	-2.4 (7.5)
Observations	1,809	1,809	1,809
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1598)	12.3	12.8	22.1
F Statistic (df = 210; 1598)	33.9***	75.2***	67.9***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 22: Omitting Nigeria: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.16*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.09)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.51*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.33*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.49*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.37 (4.19)	-1.03 (4.35)	-2.37 (7.51)
Observations	1,809	1,809	1,809
R ²	0.82	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1598)	12.32	12.79	22.08
F Statistic (df = 210; 1598)	34.03***	75.30***	68.19***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 23: Omitting Somalia: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.9*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.6*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.5*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.6*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.4 (3.9)	-0.7 (3.4)	-2.0 (6.6)
Observations	1,773	1,773	1,773
R ²	0.6	0.7	0.7
Adjusted R ²	0.6	0.6	0.7
Residual Std. Error (df = 1566)	11.5	9.9	19.4
F Statistic (df = 206; 1566)	13.2***	15.2***	17.2***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 24: Omitting Somalia: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.16*** (0.05)	−0.13*** (0.04)	−0.32*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.58*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.49*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.62*** (0.03)
Constant	−1.28 (3.92)	−0.65 (3.37)	−1.86 (6.59)
Observations	1,773	1,773	1,773
R ²	0.63	0.67	0.69
Adjusted R ²	0.59	0.62	0.65
Residual Std. Error (df = 1566)	11.53	9.91	19.37
F Statistic (df = 206; 1566)	13.20***	15.21***	17.15***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 25: Omitting South Sudan: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.4*** (0.1)	-1.0*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.03)
Constant	-0.8 (4.3)	-0.6 (4.2)	-1.6 (7.4)
Observations	1,674	1,674	1,674
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1478)	12.5	12.3	21.9
F Statistic (df = 195; 1478)	34.0***	86.2***	73.1***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 26: Omitting South Sudan: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.15*** (0.05)	−0.41*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.45*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.30*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.44*** (0.03)
Constant	−0.70 (4.26)	−0.49 (4.19)	−1.39 (7.44)
Observations	1,674	1,674	1,674
R ²	0.82	0.92	0.91
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.91	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1478)	12.52	12.31	21.83
F Statistic (df = 195; 1478)	34.16***	86.06***	73.28***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 27: Omitting Sudan: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.6*** (0.1)	-0.1 (0.1)	-0.7*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.4*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.3 (4.3)	-1.2 (4.2)	-2.7 (7.5)
Observations	1,620	1,620	1,620
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1430)	12.5	12.3	21.9
F Statistic (df = 189; 1430)	34.2***	88.1***	74.2***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 28: Omitting Sudan: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state (1)	State (2)	All (3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	-0.48*** (0.09)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.62*** (0.15)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.44*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.32*** (0.03)	
Lagged All Violence			0.43*** (0.03)
Constant	-1.36 (4.24)	-1.20 (4.19)	-2.79 (7.44)
Observations	1,620	1,620	1,620
R ²	0.82	0.92	0.91
Adjusted R ²	0.80	0.91	0.90
Residual Std. Error (df = 1430)	12.43	12.30	21.83
F Statistic (df = 189; 1430)	34.69***	88.16***	74.67***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 29: Omitting Zimbabwe: UNDP State-building Expenditures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Expenditure	-0.5*** (0.1)	-0.3*** (0.1)	-0.9*** (0.2)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.5*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.3*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.4*** (0.02)
Constant	-1.2 (4.1)	-0.9 (4.2)	-2.2 (7.3)
Observations	1,863	1,863	1,863
R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Adjusted R ²	0.8	0.9	0.9
Residual Std. Error (df = 1646)	12.1	12.3	21.4
F Statistic (df = 216; 1646)	33.4***	77.9***	69.3***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 30: Omitting Zimbabwe: UNDP State-building Project Count

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Non-state	State	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged State-building Project Count	−0.23*** (0.05)	−0.14*** (0.05)	−0.40*** (0.08)
Lagged Non-state Violence	0.45*** (0.03)		
Lagged State Violence		0.29*** (0.02)	
Lagged All Violence			0.43*** (0.02)
Constant	−1.16 (4.11)	−0.85 (4.19)	−2.13 (7.25)
Observations	1,863	1,863	1,863
R ²	0.81	0.91	0.90
Adjusted R ²	0.79	0.90	0.89
Residual Std. Error (df = 1646)	12.08	12.33	21.34
F Statistic (df = 216; 1646)	33.56***	77.89***	69.60***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01