

# Populist Right Success and Mainstream Party Adaptation: The Case of Economic Globalization

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## Abstract

Are populist right parties (PRPs) making mainstream parties more economically protectionist? From West to East, European parties of the populist right have experienced increasing electoral success by running on platforms stressing cultural and economic protectionism. While previous studies have found a causal link between populist right success and mainstream parties (MSPs)' accommodation on immigration, the degree to which PRP success leads to MSP accommodation on economic protectionism remains unexplored. In this study I argue that, while MSPs are unlikely to accommodate PRPs' economic protectionism, they are likely to respond to the PRP electoral threat by de-emphasizing trade and globalization in their campaign messages. I test this de-emphasis hypothesis by conducting a quantitative text analysis of the Twitter campaign rhetoric of 36 MSPs in 17 European democracies. The findings from statistical analyses and a regression discontinuity design indicate that, unlike immigration, MSPs do not accommodate the protectionist positioning of successful PRPs. However, when it comes to salience, successful PRPs cause MSPs to de-emphasize economic globalization in their messaging. The findings call for a deeper exploration of MSP responses to populist challenges on economic issues.

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## 1. Introduction

Are populist right parties making mainstream parties more economically protectionist? From Sweden to Germany to Italy, several European countries have seen increasing electoral success for radical, populist right parties (PRPs) stressing protectionist, isolationist, and nationalist stances. Previous studies have shown that electorally successful PRPs can cause mainstream parties (MSPs) to move in a more protectionist direction on cultural issues, particularly on immigration and multiculturalism (Han, 2015; Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018). However, a less explored topic is the degree to which accommodation of MSPs to the populist right position also takes place on issues other than immigration. Specifically, it remains unexplored whether PRPs' electoral success pushes mainstream right and left parties to change their position on (or deemphasize their support for) free trade and economic globalization, as a result of the populist right emphasizing a message of economic protectionism (opposition to free trade agreements, economic integration, and support for national sovereignty on economic policy decisions) along with cultural protectionism.

The accommodation thesis posits that, when responding to niche parties' electoral challenges, MSPs will tend to accommodate niche parties' salient issue positions in order to reduce the latter's electoral appeal to voters (Meguid, 2005). When it comes to PRP-MSP competition, most studies to date have focused on PRPs' effect on MSPs' positions (Han, 2015; Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018) and the effect of accommodation on MSPs' electoral fortunes (Spoon and Klüver, 2020; Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2020), mostly on immigration and other cultural issues. However, the degree to which accommodation works on other issues of increasing salience such as economic globalization has been neglected.

In the last decade—particularly post-2008 financial crisis—, many PRPs have expanded their issue portfolio by bundling their traditional criticism of cultural forms of globalization

(immigration, multiculturalism, and loss of national identity) with opposition to the economic facets of globalization, from free trade to foreign capital and multinational firms to economic policy harmonization. This form of “issue expansion” (Spoon and Williams, 2020) is noticeable in parties such as France’s *Rassemblement National*—which campaigns against both “financial” and “Islamist” globalization<sup>1</sup>—and Germany’s *Alternative für Deutschland*—which has denounced free-trade agreements such as TTIP and EU-Mercosur<sup>2</sup>—, among others.

On the other hand, mainstream parties from left and right have tended to converge on pro-globalization positions since the 1990s (Fligstein, 2009; Glyn, 2001; Ladrech and Marliere, 1999), supporting economic integration, free trade agreements, and policy harmonization across borders. This mainstream convergence has opened the policy space to political entrepreneurs (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015) and challenger parties like PRPs (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020) to incorporate globalization to the issue package offered to voters. Moreover, issues related to economic globalization can be easily incorporated to PRPs’ nationalist, ethnocentric, and isolationist message, since they can be advanced from the prism of an “us-vs-them” defense of national sovereignty and the nation-state, in a similar fashion to immigration and the national culture.

How do then MSPs respond to the politicization of economic globalization by PRPs? While accommodation can be successful when it comes to immigration (Spoon and Klüver, 2020), previous studies on the party politics literature suggest that accommodation may not be the most effective strategy for MSPs when dealing with economic issues such as trade and economic integration. First, as natural parties of government, mainstream parties of left and right are more constrained in the extent to which they can shift positions to respond to changes in the salience of issues (Klüver and Spoon, 2014). Moreover, government parties

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<sup>1</sup>Melander (2017)

<sup>2</sup>*Alternative für Deutschland* (2016, 2019)

tend to have less “room to manoeuvre” when it comes to issues related to global markets, having to respond to both voters and global market actors to maintain financial stability and economic growth (Berger, 2000; Mosley, 2003; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014). Accommodating PRPs’ protectionism, therefore, may risk a country’s economic performance by shifting the expectations of global market actors in a negative way, particularly in open economies such as those of European democracies. Finally, as the issue owners (Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch, 2012) of pro-globalization stances, shifting positions on these issues may not be credible for voters and it may involve reputational costs for MSPs (Somer-Topcu, 2009; Tavits, 2007).

I argue that, unlike in the case of immigration and multiculturalism, accommodation is not the most rational strategy for a governing MSP to follow when it comes to economic globalization. Instead of accommodating PRPs’ protectionism, I argue that MSPs will tend to de-emphasize globalization from their campaign statements in order to avoid losing voters to the PRP challenger, while maintaining their pro-globalization positioning and minimizing any negative economic effect resulting from increased protectionism (whether in action or in rhetoric).

The findings from statistical analyses and a regression discontinuity design indicate that, while MSPs do not seem to accommodate to populists’ economic protectionism, they do tend to de-emphasize free trade and other issues related to economic globalization as PRPs become more electorally successful. Moreover, both mainstream right and mainstream left parties seem to adopt a de-emphasis strategy following PRP success. The results from this study call into question the accommodation thesis when it comes to economic issues.


## 2. Theory and Hypotheses

### 2.1. Populist Right: Electoral Success and Increasing Protectionism


From West to East, European PRPs have experienced increasing electoral success in the last two decades (see Figure 1), with many participating in coalition governments (for instance, in Austria, Italy, and Greece) or providing tacit support to minority governments in confidence-and-supply arrangements (e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands). Yet, many have remained sidelined by mainstream parties under a *cordon sanitaire* (e.g. France, Sweden, Germany).

**Figure 1:** Evolution in European PRPs' Vote Share

**a.** Individual Parties (2002-2019)



**b.** 10-Year Moving Average (1980-2019)




Sources: Parliaments and Governments Database (Döring and Manow, 2018) and electionresources.org.

Originally espousing a combination of nationalism, nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde, 2007), many PRPs have expanded their issue portfolio to include topics which can be easily bundled into their core ethno-nationalist and populist message: Euroskepticism (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002; De Vries and Hobolt, 2020), welfare chauvinism (de Lange, 2007; Otjes et al., 2018), and economic protectionism (Colantone and Stanig, 2019). The latter issue lends itself particularly well to a combination with anti-immigrant politics. Previous studies on the sources of protectionist sentiment identify xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and in-group favoritism as major predictors of anti-trade attitudes (Hurwitz and

Peffley, 1987; Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Margalit, 2012; Sabet, 2013; Honeker, 2022), along with individuals’ skill level, industry of employment, and job tasks (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Thus, a message centered on anti-immigrant and protectionist policies is likely to resonate well among voters concerned with the status of the national in-group in opposition to a foreign outgroup.

Evidence from both party manifestos and expert surveys seem to confirm PRPs’ protectionist positioning (see Figures 2 and 3). Moreover, protectionism seems to go hand in hand with PRPs’ nationalism, as evidenced by the positioning of the PRP (or “radical right”) party family in expert surveys, where it is the sole occupant of the nationalist-protectionist quadrant and the most protectionist party family, surpassing the populist left.


**Figure 2:** Net Protectionism in PRPs’ Manifestos (1980-2020)



*Notes:* Figure shows the 10-year moving average in percentage of PRP manifestos mentioning net protectionist positions (*per406-per407*). Negative numbers indicate pro-trade positioning. *Source:* Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2019).

The adoption of protectionist stances by PRPs in the last two decades coincides with their increasing electoral appeal among working-class segments of the electorate (Harteveld, 2016; Ivaldi, 2015) and voters from regions negatively impacted by import shocks (Colantone and Stanig, 2018). Moreover, this new positioning also allows PRPs to expand their competition

**Figure 3:** Nationalism and Protectionism by Party Family.



*Notes:* Figure plots the mean nationalism score by party family where 10 indicates most nationalist and 0 least nationalist against the mean protectionism score where 10 indicates most protectionist and 0 least protectionist. *Source:* Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), 1999-2019 (Bakker et al., 2015).

for votes beyond the political right, entering into a direct competition with mainstream left parties for traditionally left-leaning segments of the electorate critical of global capitalism (Arzheimer, 2013).

## 2.2. Mainstream Convergence and Populist Entrepreneurship on Globalization

Originally an issue associated with free markets and the political right—whether liberal or conservative—, economic globalization has been mostly embraced by mainstream left parties. Whereas free trade and economic integration—including the European single market—were mostly a project of mainstream right parties in the 1970s and 1980s, since the 1990s with the advent of Third-Way social democracy (Giddens, 1998) governing mainstream left parties have adopted pro-globalization positions (Burgoon, 2012; Fligstein, 2009; Glyn, 2001; Ladrech and Marliere, 1999). On the one hand, mainstream right parties see globalization as a process to open world markets and liberalize national economies. On the other hand,

mainstream left parties see globalization’s push for policy harmonization as an opportunity to implement transnational regulations on labor and environmental standards in “deep integration” trade agreements (Lawrence, 1996), in what some authors have called “social democratic multilateralism” (Held and McGrew, 2002). Moreover, global economic integration also tends to go hand in hand with support for internationalism and global cooperation, positions supported by mainstream European parties from left, right, and center.

From an issue ownership perspective, voters are likely to see mainstream parties as the issue owners of pro-globalization stances in the associative dimension (Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch, 2012), that is, issues such as free trade and economic integration are identified with MSPs in the minds of most voters, irrespective of whether these parties are seen as competent or not in dealing with these issues.

While the convergence of MSPs towards a pro-globalization positioning is likely to lower the salience of this issue from these parties’ campaign messaging—redirecting MSPs’ attention to issues in which they are in competition with each other—, PRPs can take advantage of the association of MSPs with globalization by turning this issue ownership against them. First, niche parties such as PRPs are defined by their identification with issues which are outside the main dimension of conflict (Meguid, 2005). Second, niche (or challenger) parties can act as issue entrepreneurs, that is, they can politicize issues previously ignored by the mainstream status quo due to a convergence of mainstream parties’ positions (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; De Vries and Hobolt, 2020). Moreover, we should expect PRPs—and niche parties in general—to emphasize issues that do not antagonize current supporters and where they enjoy a potential majority position (or that can attract new voters), what De Sio and Weber (2014) call “bridge policies.”

Economic protectionism—that is, opposition to free trade agreements, foreign capital, multinational firms, policy harmonization across borders, and offshoring, among others—is likely to be such a “bridging” issue. First, protectionism is likely to appeal to PRPs’ core




voter base due to the commonality between the sources of anti-immigrant and protectionist sentiment, namely in-group favoritism and ethno-nationalism. Second, expanding PRP's issue portfolio to include economic protectionism can expand the voter base by including segments that have been negatively affected by import shocks, offshoring, and other side effects of economic integration. Finally, opposition to globalization is consistent with other key PRP messages: the isolationist appeal to national sovereignty or "sovereignism" (Ivaldi and Mazzoleni, 2020) and the populist appeal of "the people vs. the elites" (Mudde, 2007, 2010; Golder, 2016).

The notion that protectionism can be a bridging issue for PRPs to expand their electoral appeal beyond the core nativist base is further supported by looking at the mirror image of Figure 3, but at the voter level. Figure 4 plots European voters' level of nationalism against their protectionism by the party family they support. It is clear that European voters are more protectionist than mainstream party elites. Even liberal voters are on the protectionist side (although close to the center along with green voters). Both mainstream left (social democrats) and mainstream right (conservatives and Christian democrats) voters are closer to populist right voters on their protectionism score (along with populist left voters) than to liberal voters, while also being relatively close to populist right voters on their nationalism.

Thus, an anti-globalization message bundling nationalist and protectionist stances can be an electorally successful strategy for PRPs. First, it has ideological consistency with the core PRP issue of immigration and therefore does not alienate current supporters. Second, it can appeal to protectionist voters from MSPs and, to some extent, to populist left voters. The increasing salience of protectionist rhetoric among PRPs and their electoral success in the last two decades seem to validate the adoption of an anti-globalization issue bundle.

**Figure 4:** European Voters’ Mean Nationalism and Protectionism Scores by Party Family.



*Notes:* Figure plots European voters’ mean nationalism score by party family where 5 indicates most nationalist and 1 least nationalist against voters’ mean protectionism score where 5 indicates most protectionist and 1 least protectionist. *Source:* International Social Survey Program, 2003 and 2013 waves. (ISSP, 2015).

### 2.3. Accommodation or De-emphasis? Immigration vs. Globalization

How can MSPs respond to PRPs’ issue entrepreneurship on globalization? While previous studies have shown MSPs accommodate the positions of PRPs on immigration and multiculturalism—issues which are also outside the primary dimension of conflict—(Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018; Han, 2015; Spoon and Klüver, 2020), no study has, to my knowledge, explored whether accommodation also takes place when it comes to economic globalization. The “accommodative strategy” posits that, faced with a niche competitor stressing an issue outside the main dimension of conflict, MSPs will tend to accommodate the rival niche party’s position in order to avoid losing voters to it (Meguid, 2005). By doing so, MSPs increase the salience of the issue and converge towards the niche

party's position, leaving the niche party without a distinctive edge and, thus, decreasing its electoral appeal.

It is unlikely, however, that MSPs would attempt to accommodate PRPs' economic protectionism as they have accommodated the immigration-skeptic positions of PRPs. While immigration policy is under the control of national governments<sup>3</sup>, both *de jure* and *de facto*, policies that deal with economic globalization present a challenge for national governments. First, trade policy is an exclusive EU competence, so trade negotiations are handled at the EU level (however, the Council of the European Union, which represents national governments, can still veto an agreement<sup>4</sup>). Foreign direct investment (FDI) is also covered by EU trade policy, although national governments retain competencies on certain areas such as dispute settlement.<sup>5</sup> Second, and more importantly, despite the *de jure* regulations and EU competencies, the interconnectedness of national economies brought about by globalization has reduced national governments' *de facto* room to manoeuvre, even on areas where they retain *de jure* jurisdiction to define national policy (Berger, 2000; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014).

In a world of increased capital mobility, in addition to responding to the concerns of voters, national governments need to manage the expectations of global market actors such as multinational firms or corporations (MNCs), investors, and credit rating agencies. Previous studies show how global market actors such as investors pay attention to certain government policies like public deficits (Mosley, 2003). Moreover, a rich literature in economics finds evidence on the negative effects of economic policy uncertainty on firms' investment decisions (Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016; Bloom, 2014) and macroeconomic performance (Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016; Davis, 2020). The uncertainty generated by trade wars and economic protectionism, in particular, has a negative effect on firm-level equity returns (Huang et al.,

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<sup>3</sup>In Schengen Area countries, EU citizens are not considered "immigrants," so here I refer mostly to non-EU citizens. Moreover, regulation of migration from non-EU countries remains a prerogative of nation-states. See <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/152/immigration-policy>.

<sup>4</sup>See <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/>.

<sup>5</sup>See <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/160/the-european-union-and-its-trade-partners>.

2018), corporate investment and hiring decisions (Bloom, 2014; Caldara et al., 2019; Gulen and Ion, 2015), and overall equity market volatility (Baker et al., 2019). On the other hand, lower uncertainty about trade policy stimulates investment, for instance, in export capacity (Handley and Limão, 2015).

The policy decisions—and policy-related campaign rhetoric—of governing parties, thus, can have an effect on the expectations of market actors. The adoption of protectionist messaging by governing MSPs to counteract PRPs’ protectionism may lead to increased policy uncertainty and, therefore, negative economic outcomes. Thus, while government parties are, overall, more constrained in the extent to which they can shift positions or respond to the salience of issues (Klüver and Spoon, 2014), this is particularly likely to be the case when it comes to making changes to their pro-globalization consensus (Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014), since that could destabilize the national economy. Furthermore, Ezrow and Hellwig (2014) show that, in the case of European countries, the constraining effect of globalization on national governments is not a mere effect of “Europeanization”—that is, being a member of the EU—, but globalization has an effect on its own. Finally, as the owners of pro-globalization issue stances, there is a potential reputational cost for MSPs in adopting a policy completely opposite to their governing record, making such a policy shift not believable for voters who would welcome such a change and, at the same time, displeasing the more liberal members of MSPs’ coalitions. The latter, in multiparty systems, can lead to a defection of more liberal voters of both mainstream right and left parties to other centrist liberal parties (for instance, a Moderate or Social Democratic liberal-leaning Swedish voter could defect to the market-liberal Center Party or the Liberal Party). The constraints imposed by global market forces, the status of MSPs as natural parties of government, and the potential costs to their reputation lead me to expect that accommodation will not be the rational strategy adopted when it comes to economic globalization issues.

Finally, while most PRPs seem to have adopted anti-globalization and protectionist eco-



since MSPs cannot modify their position on globalization, they are likely to try to reduce the salience of the issue by *de-emphasizing* it from their campaign messages.<sup>6</sup> By doing so, they can prevent any backlash from global market actors and more liberal voters within their coalitions while, at the same time, avoiding entering the issue of protectionism into the national discussion, which could potentially favor the populist right by legitimizing the new dimension of conflict. Issue de-emphasis also allows MSPs to keep their implicit support for economic globalization while not being openly antagonistic towards voters who may have jumped ship to the populist right but may be recoverable (or those who may be attracted to PRPs' protectionist messages). I, thus, expect that:

- **H2 - De-emphasis Hypothesis:** As a PRP's vote (seat) share and protectionism increase at  $t-1$ , an MSP's globalization salience decreases at  $t$ .

### 3. Data and Method

In order to test the extent to which the electoral success of protectionist populist right parties affects mainstream parties' direction (position) and emphasis (salience) on economic globalization, I conducted a quantitative text analysis of mainstream and populist right parties' Twitter messages, where my unit of analysis is mainstream party-year observations. The use of Twitter relates to two reasons. First, while previous studies on niche-mainstream party issue competition has traditionally relied on manifesto data (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Han, 2015; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014), the CMP data (Volkens et al., 2019) only contains one measure of globalization positioning (positive and negative mentions of trade protectionism) and misses observations for several parties. Second, the extent to which manifestos reflect parties' strategic messaging to voters rather than party activists has been debated by the

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<sup>6</sup>This is similar to what Meguid (2005) calls a "dismissive strategy," since the objective is to decrease the salience of the issue politicized by the niche party, while, at the same time, having no change in the mainstream party's issue position.

literature (Han, 2015; Dinas and Gemenis, 2010), with manifestos having significant inertia from one election to the next. On the other hand, Twitter has become an important platform through which politicians and parties campaign and communicate with voters (Russell, 2020; Tromble, 2018; van Kessel and Castelein, 2016). Thus, Twitter data lends itself well to both the topic under study and as a more realistic proxy for parties’ strategic campaign messages.

My analysis spans 17 European democracies, 36 mainstream parties (from both the center-right and the center-left), 18 populist radical right parties, and 17 populist radical left parties (see Tables A1-A3 in the Appendix). I consider as populist right parties (PRPs) those categorized as “nationalist” by the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2019) or as “radical right” by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). Similarly, populist left parties are those categorized as “Communist” or “Radical Left” by the same sources. For the sample of mainstream parties, I include the main mainstream right and mainstream left party in each country analyzed as determined by its vote share. In other words, I include any mainstream political party with chances of forming a government as the leading party (for instance, in Finland, I include as mainstream right parties both *Kokoomus* and *Keskusta*, which occupy the role of main party of the mainstream right depending on the election). Depending on the country, the main mainstream right party can come from different party families (conservative, liberal, Christian democrat, or agrarian), whereas all mainstream left parties belong to the social-democratic party family.

### 3.1. Dependent Variables

My two dependent variables *MSP Globalization Position* and *MSP Globalization Salience* were obtained by conducting a text analysis of mainstream parties’ tweets. The entire historical tweet archive from each mainstream party was scraped via Twitter’s Academic API using *Twarc2*, a Python library allowing a full Twitter archive search. In total 1,269,670

tweets were scraped from the official mainstream parties' Twitter accounts. Tweets were then preprocessed<sup>7</sup> in R (Welbers, Atteveldt and Benoit, 2017) and translated into English via Google Translate (Erik, Schoonvelde and Schumacher, 2018). I then identified all tweets per party account mentioning globalization. In order to identify these tweets, I searched for a list of keywords and root words related to economic globalization, excluding immigration-related topics which are not the focus of this study (see the full list in Table A4 in the Appendix). Overall, 0.68% of tweets from MSPs are globalization-related. While this number may seem small, it should be noted that this is just one of several topics political parties focus on in their day-to-day messaging. Moreover, this figure mirrors the salience of the protectionism/trade item in mainstream party manifestos (0.67%).<sup>8</sup>

The first dependent variable, *MSP Globalization Position*, was obtained by conducting a sentiment analysis of all tweets identified as mentioning globalization keywords using a dictionary-based approach. The sentiment analysis was conducted using the *Quanteda* package in R (Welbers, Atteveldt and Benoit, 2017). Each tweet was classified as having a continuous valence score between -1 and 1, where -1 represents most negative valence or tone, 1 represents most positive valence, and 0 neutral valence. To accomplish this, I used the *Lexicoder Sentiment Dictionary* (LSD) (Young and Soroka, 2012), a freely available pre-defined sentiment dictionary which has been validated in different contexts (Proksch et al., 2019). Each tweet's valence was determined based on equation 1:

$$Tweet\ Valence = \frac{Positive\ Words}{Total\ Words} - \frac{Negative\ Words}{Total\ Words} \quad (1)$$

A mean valence score per year, my unit of analysis, was then obtained. A negative score indicates that the tone or valence in a mainstream party's globalization messages at year  $t$  is

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<sup>7</sup>Preprocessing refers to the cleaning of Tweets' text, removing non-text characters such as URLs, emojis, and other special characters which is necessary to conduct text analysis.

<sup>8</sup>This figure results from adding the items *per406* and *per407* in the CMP data for the social democrat, liberal, conservative, and Christian democrat party families.



net protectionist, whereas a positive score indicates a net pro-globalization position. This is similar to measures previously used in the literature based on manifesto data (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2016).

The second dependent variable, *MSP Globalization Salience*, is the percentage of globalization related tweets among all mainstream party’s tweets at year  $t$ . In equation form:

$$Globalization\ Salience_t = \left( \frac{Globalization\ Tweets_t}{Total\ Tweets_t} \right) * 100 \quad (2)$$

### 3.2. Independent Variables

My main independent variable is an interaction term between a populist right party’s vote share in the previous election (I use seat share as an alternative measure) and its level of protectionism as measured by a yearly tweet valence score obtained as shown in equation 3:

$$Tweet\ Protectionist\ Valence = \frac{Negative\ Words}{Total\ Words} - \frac{Positive\ Words}{Total\ Words} \quad (3)$$

In total, 606,965 tweets were scraped from the official populist right parties’ and leaders’ Twitter accounts, 0.73% of which were globalization-related tweets. Data on vote and seat shares was obtained from the Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov) (Döring and Manow, 2018).

I include a series of control variables based on the previous literature and theoretical expectations. I control for the electoral success of populist radical left parties at the previous election (vote and seat share), since these parties have been the main exponents of anti-capitalist and anti-globalization politics for several decades (Fagerholm, 2017) and their success may affect the positioning and salience of this issue among MSPs.

Following previous studies on the effects of niche parties on mainstream parties (Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries, 2014; Abou-Chadi, 2016; Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2020), I include

controls for the mainstream party's size and whether it was in government in a given year. Larger parties have been shown to be more responsive to salient issues, whereas parties in government are more constrained to respond to changes in the salience of issues (Klüver and Spoon, 2014), especially when the issue with increasing salience may affect the economic performance of the country, as is the case with economic integration. I use ParlGov data to operationalize *Party Size* as the vote share of mainstream parties at the previous election and *Government Party* as a dummy variable indicating the presence of the mainstream party in government at year  $t$ .

*Trade/GDP Ratio* is a macro-level variable controlling for the extent to which a national economy is dependent on trade and economic openness, obtained from World Bank data. I expect that in countries with higher trade to GDP ratios, mainstream parties will be less likely to deemphasize trade in their messages and move in a protectionist direction, as the country's economic performance highly depends on openness.

Finally, I include a dummy for whether the MSP is a mainstream right or mainstream left party, since mainstream right parties have been the main representatives of economic liberalism in Europe, and a dummy for Eastern Europe, since post-Communist systems may differ with Western European countries in the extent to which parties compete on the issue of globalization.

### 3.3. Statistical Model

I estimate OLS regressions with a lagged dependent variable, since party messages at the current year are likely to build on previous years introducing serial correlation, following previous studies (Abou-Chadi, 2016; Han, 2015). Since observations may not be independent, I cluster the standard errors by party and country in all models.

## 4. Results

Table 1 shows the results for the two dependent variables, *MSP Globalization Position* and *MSP Globalization Salience*, and the two alternative measures of PRP (and populist left) electoral success, vote and seat share. For the position models, positive coefficients indicate MSPs move in a pro-globalization direction and negative coefficients indicate they become more protectionist. In the salience models, positive coefficients indicate increased salience for globalization in MSPs' messages, while negative coefficients indicate decreased salience or de-emphasis on globalization. As expected, the lagged dependent variable—that is, the position or salience of globalization in MSPs' messages in the previous year—is related to their messages in the current year.

As we can see in Models 1 and 2, as the vote or seat share of PRPs increases in the previous election and their yearly protectionism increases, MSPs do not seem to change their position on globalization, as hypothesized by H1. Successful populist left parties also do not appear to affect the positioning of MSPs on globalization. As expected, MSPs in government are more pro-globalization than those in opposition, since government parties are more constrained (Klüver and Spoon, 2014) and have less room to manoeuvre on globalization issues (Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014) than those in opposition. Finally, mainstream right parties are more pro-globalization than mainstream left parties as we would expect based on their more economically liberal ideology.

In terms of salience (Models 3 and 4), the more electorally successful PRPs are in the previous election and the more protectionist they are in the previous year, the more MSPs de-emphasize globalization from their Twitter messages, as H2 expected. This is the case whether we measure electoral success in terms of vote or seat share. In terms of the controls, electoral success for populist left parties in the previous election also seems to lead to MSP de-emphasis on globalization, although to a lesser extent than the effect of successful pro-

**Table 1:** Models of MSP Globalization Position and Salience

	(1) MSP Position	(2) MSP Position	(3) MSP Salience	(4) MSP Salience
Lagged DV	0.204** (0.0767)	0.202** (0.0785)	0.314** (0.114)	0.320** (0.117)
PRP Vote t-1	0.000141 (0.000422)		0.0111 (0.00701)	
PRP Protectionism t-1	-0.00574 (0.0669)	-0.00831 (0.0702)	1.759** (0.754)	1.528* (0.721)
<b>PRP Vote t-1 × PRP Protectionism t-1</b>	<b>0.00532 (0.00365)</b>		<b>-0.109** (0.0489)</b>	
Pop Left Vote t-1	0.0000820 (0.000454)		-0.0199* (0.0100)	
PRP Seats t-1		0.000549 (0.000415)		0.00670 (0.00671)
<b>PRP Seats t-1 × PRP Protectionism t-1</b>		<b>0.00547 (0.00354)</b>		<b>-0.102** (0.0409)</b>
Pop Left Seats t-1		0.000327 (0.000402)		-0.0137** (0.00599)
Party Size	0.000241 (0.000513)	0.000315 (0.000499)	-0.00115 (0.00678)	-0.000535 (0.00696)
Government Party	0.0267*** (0.00825)	0.0268*** (0.00877)	0.0434 (0.128)	0.0497 (0.128)
Mainstream Right	0.0234*** (0.00562)	0.0226*** (0.00577)	-0.152 (0.121)	-0.154 (0.121)
Eastern Europe	-0.00934 (0.0121)	-0.0114 (0.0130)	-0.357* (0.180)	-0.316* (0.174)
Trade/GDP Ratio	0.000127 (0.000147)	0.000129 (0.000124)	0.00297 (0.00190)	0.00254 (0.00179)
Constant	-0.00282 (0.0258)	-0.00997 (0.0215)	0.270 (0.309)	0.326 (0.278)
Observations	196	196	236	236
$R^2$	0.209	0.215	0.260	0.251

OLS regressions with clustered standard errors by party and country in parentheses.

\*  $p < .1$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

tectionist PRPs. Finally, globalization seems to be less salient in Eastern European party systems (although this is statistically significant at the 10% level).

## 5. A Causal Effect? Evidence with a Regression Discontinuity Design

Since MSPs could also be responding to changes in public opinion rather than changes in rival parties' strategies and this is not controlled for in the previous models, I use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to explore the effect of PRPs' electoral success on MSPs' globalization Twitter messages. Following [Abou-Chadi and Krause \(2018\)](#), I use PRPs' presence in national parliaments as an indicator of their threat to MSPs. The RD design allows me to quasi-experimentally identify the causal effect of PRPs' presence in parliament on MSPs' globalization salience. I use a country's electoral threshold as the cut-off point that assigns treatment. Comparing scenarios with similar PRP vote shares—below and above the cut-off—allows me to rule out public opinion as a potential confounder. As in [Abou-Chadi and Krause \(2018\)](#), in countries with no legal electoral threshold, I use the effective nationwide threshold following [Taagepera \(2002\)](#)<sup>9</sup>.

I use the following standard discontinuity regression equation:

$$Y_{m,i} = \alpha + \tau D_m + \beta_1(x_i - c_i) + \beta_2(x_i - c_i) * D_m + \epsilon_m \quad (4)$$

where  $Y_{m,i}$  refers to the salience of globalization in a mainstream party's Twitter messages at year  $t$ ;  $\tau$  (the main parameter of interest) indicates the treatment effect;  $D_m$  indicates the treatment status;  $x_i$  indicates the assignment or running variable (in this case, PRPs' vote share at  $t-1$ ); and  $c_i$  denotes the cut-off point (in this case, a country's electoral threshold). That is,  $D=0$  if  $x < c$  and  $D=1$  if  $x \geq c$ . An interaction between the running variable and treatment status is included to allow for different slopes on both sides of the cut-off point.

The parameter of interest identified by the RD design is the local average treatment

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<sup>9</sup>The effective threshold is used for only four countries in the sample. Following [Abou-Chadi and Krause \(2018\)](#), majoritarian systems like the UK are excluded from the analysis since the validity of the effective threshold in these cases has been questioned ([Bischoff, 2009](#)).

effect (LATE), since the causal effect of the running variable (PRP vote share) is identified near the cut-off point (electoral threshold). Moreover, since countries have different electoral thresholds, the PRP vote share variable has been centered around the respective national threshold in order to identify the causal effect across countries.


Following the literature on RD designs (Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001; Thoemmes, Liao and Jin, 2017), I estimate both nonparametric and parametric models. Nonparametric models only consider the data points close to the cut-off within a certain bandwidth (the so-called local approach). Parametric models consider the entire sample (thus, called the global approach). For nonparametric specifications, the bandwidth is chosen by the algorithms proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009, 2012). Finally, all models include robust standard errors clustered by party.

### 5.1. RDD Results

Figure 6 shows graphically the discontinuity around the cut-off and plots MSPs' globalization salience at time  $t$  as a function of PRPs' vote share at time  $t-1$ . We can observe a discontinuity or "jump" around the cut-off of 0, which denotes the electoral threshold in each given country. Close to the cut-off, MSPs below 0 have a higher globalization salience than those above 0. Table 3 presents the estimated causal effect of PRP vote share at  $t-1$  on MSP globalization salience at  $t$  in the form of the LATE. As we can see, and across different specifications, there is a statistically significant and negative effect of PRP success on MSPs' globalization messages. That is, for parties in otherwise similar circumstances around the cut-off, the electoral threat generated by having a PRP represented in parliament causes MSPs to de-emphasize globalization from their Twitter messages, as hypothesized in H2.

This confirms the initial results presented in Table 1 and shows that those results are not driven by public opinion or other unmeasured confounders. Moreover, the effect of PRP success on MSP salience can be given a causal interpretation.

**Figure 6:** MSP Change in Globalization Salience



Note: LOESS fit with 95% confidence intervals.

**Table 3:** Effect of PRP Success on MSP Globalization Salience

LATE	St. Err.	95% CI	Bandwidth	Approach	N
-1.769***	0.134	[-2.032, -1.507]	2.486 <sup>a</sup>	Non-Parametric	56
-1.549***	0.119	[-1.782, -1.316]	3.079 <sup>b</sup>	Non-Parametric	76
-0.702*	0.292	[-1.275, -0.130]	Global	Parametric (Linear)	356
-1.552***	0.172	[-1.890, -1.215]	Global	Parametric (Quadratic)	356
-1.866***	0.275	[-2.404, -1.328]	Global	Parametric (Cubic)	356

Robust standard errors clustered by party; \* $p < 0.05$  \*\* $p < 0.01$  \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

<sup>a</sup>Based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009).


<sup>b</sup>Based on Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).

## 5.2. Robustness Checks

I checked the robustness of these findings by conducting several sensitivity analyses. Figure 7 shows the sensitivity of the RDD results to alternative bandwidth specifications. As we can see results are robust to different bandwidth selections except in the location close to the cut-off value of 0 (below 1), due to fewer observations as we would expect. Moreover, I checked whether the LATE is sensitive to the selection of the cut-off point. Figure A1 in the

Appendix shows that the LATE remains statistically significant only in the 0 cut-off value across all model specifications (see also placebo tests in Table A6).

**Figure 7:** Sensitivity to Bandwidth Selection



Finally, I checked for the possibility that the results are driven by either mainstream right or mainstream left parties alone. Following the spatial logic of party competition, previous studies argue that PRPs are a greater electoral threat to mainstream right parties, since they are both located on the right of the political spectrum and are closer on cultural issues (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995). On the other hand, it could be argued that PRPs are closer to mainstream left voters on economic protectionism and, thus, they could be a bigger threat to mainstream left parties on this issue. At the same time, previous studies find an increasing competition for voters between PRPs and social democratic parties (Arzheimer, 2013).

Tables 4-5 show the LATE for the subsamples of mainstream right and mainstream left parties. As we can see, the effect of PRPs on MSPs' globalization salience does not seem to be driven by mainstream left or right. In other words, both center-left and center-right parties



appear to de-emphasize free trade and globalization as a consequence of PRPs' electoral success.

**Table 4:** Effect of PRP Success on Mainstream Right Globalization Salience

LATE	St. Err.	95% CI	Bandwidth	Approach	N
-1.488***	0.095	[-1.674, -1.302]	2.827 <sup>a</sup>	Non-Parametric	35
-1.287***	0.088	[-1.460, -1.114]	3.437 <sup>b</sup>	Non-Parametric	40
-0.786**	0.276	[-1.328, -0.244]	Global	Parametric (Linear)	206
-1.5783***	0.106	[-1.786, -1.371]	Global	Parametric (Quadratic)	206
-1.423***	0.122	[-1.663, -1.184]	Global	Parametric (Cubic)	206

Robust standard errors clustered by party; \*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001.

<sup>a</sup>Based on [Imbens and Kalyanaraman \(2009\)](#).

<sup>b</sup>Based on [Imbens and Kalyanaraman \(2012\)](#).

**Table 5:** Effect of PRP Success on Mainstream Left Globalization Salience

LATE	St. Err.	95% CI	Bandwidth	Approach	N
-1.672***	0.288	[-2.236, -1.107]	3.095 <sup>a</sup>	Non-Parametric	36
-1.388***	0.395	[-2.163, -0.613]	3.716 <sup>b</sup>	Non-Parametric	36
-0.682	0.525	[-1.710, 0.347]	Global	Parametric (Linear)	150
-1.477***	0.377	[-2.217, -0.737]	Global	Parametric (Quadratic)	150
-2.336***	0.139	[-2.608, -2.063]	Global	Parametric (Cubic)	150

Robust standard errors clustered by party; \*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001.

<sup>a</sup>Based on [Imbens and Kalyanaraman \(2009\)](#).

<sup>b</sup>Based on [Imbens and Kalyanaraman \(2012\)](#).

## 6. Discussion and Conclusion

Previous studies have found that electoral success for populist right parties causes mainstream parties of left and right to become more culturally protectionist ([Han, 2015](#); [Abou-Chadi, 2016](#); [Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018](#)). That is, MSPs appear to accommodate the nativist positions of PRPs by adopting more restrictionist stances on immigration and multiculturalism. However, no study to my knowledge has measured the extent to which radical right-wing nationalist and populist parties, which espouse an increasingly protectionist and

isolationist message on economic globalization, may be influencing the way mainstream parties emphasize and position themselves on issues related to economic globalization in their campaign messaging. In other words, the accommodation thesis remains untested when it comes to economic globalization.

In this study, I argued that, unlike with the case of immigration and cultural protectionism, MSPs are unlikely to accommodate the economic protectionism of PRPs and make the issue more salient due to the constraints they face as natural parties of government and the reduced room to manoeuvre on global economic integration relative to immigration policy. I argued, however, that MSPs are likely to respond to PRPs' electoral threat by de-emphasizing trade and globalization from their campaign messages.

The results from statistical analyses of MSPs' tweets seem to indicate that MSPs do not accommodate the globalization positions of protectionist right-wing populists as their vote (or seat) share increases. However, when it comes to issue salience, there is some evidence that protectionist PRPs' electoral success does seem to lead to a de-emphasis of globalization by MSPs as expected. The lack of accommodation on position along with issue de-emphasis also seems to take place among MSPs as a response to electorally successful left-wing populists. Furthermore, by using a regression discontinuity design I isolate the causal effect of PRPs' success on MSPs' globalization salience free of the potential confounding effect of public opinion.

Moreover, the effect of PRP success on MSP salience does not seem to be driven by the responses of mainstream right parties alone. Both mainstream left and right parties appear to de-emphasize globalization from their Twitter messages as a response to PRPs' electoral threat. This finding goes hand in hand with recent studies that show the emergence of an electoral competition for working class and "globalization loser" voters between center-left and far-right parties ([Arzheimer, 2013](#); [Ivaldi, 2015](#)).

The results from this study call into question the application of the accommodation thesis

on economic issues. While mainstream parties may accommodate the populist right on issues under more national control (like immigration), issues where national governments have less room to manoeuvre due to a globalized world economy may lead mainstream parties to respond in a different way to the populist challenge.

Future studies should explore whether this is also the case on domestic economic issues. Previous studies have identified a move of PRPs to the economic left not only on trade and globalization but also on more domestic issues such as welfare and government spending (de Lange, 2007; *The Economist*, 2018). While governments may have more *de facto* control over taxes and spending than over trade and capital mobility, they are still constrained in the extent that they can adopt policies which may be negatively perceived by global market actors. Thus, they may also choose a de-emphasis strategy for more domestic economic issues rather than accommodation.

From a normative perspective, the results from this study provide a mixed picture on the future of the liberal international economic order. On the one hand, a lack of accommodation by mainstream parties to PRPs' protectionism may indicate the resilience of globalization and the post-WWII free-trade regime to the populist backlash of the last decade. On the other hand, the de-emphasis of these issues in mainstream parties' messages may prevent the public from hearing the argument in favor of free trade and the liberal world order, leaving the voices of populist elites as the only ones resonating in the public sphere. Defenders of the liberal international order may thus find that de-emphasis may not be a sustainable strategy in the long term.

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## Appendix

### A. Tables

**Table A1:** Populist Right Parties included in Analysis

Country	Populist Right Party	Acronym	Twitter Accounts
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria	FPÖ	@FPOE_TV
Belgium	Flemish Block / Flemish Interest	VB	@vlbelang / @tomvangrieken
Czech Republic	Freedom and Direct Democracy	SPD	@hnutiusvit_cz / @tomio_cz
Denmark	Danish People's Party	DF	@DanskDf1995 / @JThulesen
Finland	True Finns / Finns Party	PS	@persut / @Halla_aho
France	National Rally / National Front	RN	@RNational_off / @MLP_officiel
Germany	Alternative for Germany	AfD	@AfD / @Alice_Weidel
Greece	Independent Greeks	ANEL	@anexartitoi
Hungary	Jobbik	Jobbik	@JobbikMM / @PeterJakab1
Italy	Northern League	LN	@LegaSalvini / @matteosalvinimi
Latvia	National Alliance	NA/TB	@VL_TBLNNK
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	PVV	@geertwilderspvv
	Forum for Democracy	FvD	@fvdemocratie / @thierrybaudet
Norway	Progress Party	FrP	@frp_no / @Siv_Jensen_FrP
Poland	Law and Justice	PiS	@pisorgpl
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	SD	@sdriks / @jimmieakesson
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party	SVP	@SVPch
United Kingdom	UK Independence Party	UKIP	@UKIP / @Nigel_Farage

**Table A2:** Mainstream Parties included in Analysis


<b>Country</b>	<b>Mainstream Party</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Twitter Account</b>
Austria	Austrian People’s Party	ÖVP	@volkspartei
	Social Democratic Party of Austria	SPÖ	@SPOE_at
Belgium	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats	VLD	@openvld
	Christian Democratic and Flemish	CD&V	@cdenv
	Socialist Party	PS	@PSofficiel
Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party	ODS	@ODScz
	Czech Social Democratic Party	CSSD	@CSSD
Denmark	Liberal Party	V	@venstredk
	Social Democrats	Sd	@Spolitik
Finland	National Coalition Party	KOK	@kokoomus
	Center Party	KESK	@keskusta
	Social Democratic Party	SSDP	@Demarit
France	The Republicans / Union for a Popular Movement	LR / UMP	@lesRepublicains
	Socialist Party	PS	@partisocialiste
Germany	Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union	CDU/CSU	@cdusubt / @CDU / @CSU
	Social Democratic Party	SPD	@spdde
Greece	New Democracy	ND	@neademokratia
	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	@pasok
Hungary	Fidesz - Hungarian Civic Union	Fidesz	@Fideszmpsz / @FideszEP
	Hungarian Socialist Party	MSZP	@mszptweet
Italy	Forza Italia / People of Freedom	FI/PdL	@forza_italia
	Democratic Party	PD	@pdnetwork
Latvia	Unity	V	@Jauna_Vienotiba
Netherlands	Liberal Party	VVD	@VVD
	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	@cdavandaag
	Labour Party	PvdA	@PvdA
Norway	Conservative Party	H	@Hoyre
	Labour Party	A	@Arbeiderpartiet
Poland	Civic Platform	PO	@Platforma_org
Sweden	Moderate Party	M	@moderaterna
	Social Democrats	SAP	@socialdemokrat
Switzerland	The Liberals	FDP	@FDP_Liberalen
	Christian Democratic People’s Party	CVP	@Mitte_Centre
	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	SP	@spschweiz
United Kingdom	Conservative Party	Con	@Conservatives
	Labour Party	Lab	@UKLabour

**Table A3:** Populist Left Parties included in Analysis

Country	Populist Left Party	Acronym
Austria	Communist Party of Austria	KPÖ
	JETZT – Pilz List	JETZT
Belgium	Workers’ Party of Belgium	PVDA/PTB
Czech Republic	Communist Party of Bohemia	KSCM
Denmark	Red-Green Alliance	En-O
Finland	Left Alliance	VAS
France	Unsubmissive France	FI
	Revolutionary Communist League	LCR
Germany	Die Linke	Linke
Greece	Coalition of the Radical Left	SYRIZA
Hungary	Hungarian Workers’ Party	MMP
Italy	Partito della Rifondazione Comunista	PRC
	Left Ecology Freedom	LeU
Netherlands	Socialist Party	SP
Norway	Socialist Left Party	SV
Sweden	Left Party	Vp
Switzerland	Swiss Party of Labour	PdA

Some countries had no populist-left or far-left party at the time of the analysis.

**Figure A1:** Sensitivity to Cut-Off Selection



Note: Y axis=LATE, X axis=Cut-Off. Non-parametric model bandwidth based on I&K (2012).

**Table A4:** List of Globalization Keywords/Root Words

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globalization	free trade	capital flow*	global capitalism
globalisation	trade agreement*	foreign capital	financial market*
globalist*	global trade	offshor*	financialization
globaliz*	open market*	outsourc*	global econom*
globalis*	trade polic*	foreign investment*	
neoliberal*	global market*	corporation*	
	imports	multinational*	
	imported	transnational*	
	WTO	global corporation*	
	world trade	foreign compan*	
	foreign trade	foreign firm*	
	mercosur	foreign industr*	
	CETA	big business*	
	TTIP		
	TAFTA		
	TPP		
	freetrade		
	worldtrade		
	fair trade		
	trading		
	bilateral trade		
	multilateral trade		
	unfair competition		
	fair competition		
	foreign product*		
	chinese product*		
	tariff*		
	protectionis*		

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\* indicates a root word.

**Table A5:** Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
MSP Glob Salience	445	.63	.92	0	9.34
MSP Glob Position	344	.05	.07	-.14	.26
PRP Protectionism	242	.008	.11	-.24	.5
PRP Vote Share	448	12.69	9.19	0	43.59
PRP Seat Share	448	11.49	10.56	0	51.09
Pop Left Vote Share	448	6.22	6.78	0	36.34
Pop Left Seat Share	448	5.94	8.37	0	49.67
Government Party	448	.68	.47	0	1
Mainstream Right	448	.58	.49	0	1
Eastern Europe	448	.16	.37	0	1
Trade/GDP Ratio	448	102.25	37.11	45.42	168.24

**Table A6:** Placebo Tests

Cut-off	Non-Parametric				Parametric					
	I&K 2009		I&K 2012		Linear		Quadratic		Cubic	
	LATE	SE	LATE	SE	LATE	SE	LATE	SE	LATE	SE
-3.48	—	—	—	—	-0.090	0.147	-0.207	0.170	0.060	0.232
-1	0.745	0.579	0.661	0.559	0.202	0.282	-0.103	0.325	0.157	0.340
<b>0</b>	<b>-1.769***</b>	<b>0.134</b>	<b>-1.549***</b>	<b>0.119</b>	<b>-0.702*</b>	<b>0.292</b>	<b>-1.552***</b>	<b>0.172</b>	<b>-1.866***</b>	<b>0.275</b>
5.23	0.218*	0.104	0.221	0.135	0.142	0.171	0.187	0.209	0.466***	0.141
13.27	-0.014	0.195	0.074	0.214	0.280	0.195	0.082	0.244	-0.038	0.276

Robust standard errors clustered by MSP; \*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001.

Bandwidths calculated based on Imbens & Kalyanaraman (I&K) 2009 & 2012.

Alternative cut-offs chosen: median values below (-3.48) and above (13.27) the threshold as in Abou-Chadi & Krause (2018), as well as the 75th percentile below the threshold (-1) and the 25th percentile above the threshold (5.23). Lack of estimates for the -3.48 cut-off in the non-parametric models is due to few observations below this alternative cut-off.