Animosity, Amnesia, or Admiration?
Mass Opinion around the World toward the Former Colonizer

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Abstract. Nearly all contemporary countries were colonized by a foreign power, but do citizens resent their former metropoles for past colonial abuses? We exploit survey questions in which respondents were asked for their opinion of a named foreign country. Our analyses of responses from over 90 countries yields the surprising finding that today's citizens are *more* favorable toward their country's former colonizer—by two-fifths of a standard deviation—than they are toward other countries. Colonial history and experiences do not correlate with citizens' evaluations of their former metropoles. Instead, contemporary monadic traits that make former metropoles liked around the world—especially their tendency to be democracies—as well as their relatively high volumes of trade with former colonies explain their popularity among citizens of their former colonies. Our findings have important implications for understanding international soft power, an asset about which today's states care deeply.

Word count. ~4,000

Colonization by European and other world powers was one of the most transformational and nefarious institutions of the previous millennium, yet scholars of mass opinion and collective memory know little about where colonialism stands in the contemporary public mind. Do individuals in today's post-colonial world resent the country that colonized and brutalized their ancestors? Or have they forgotten the colonial abuses of the past and perhaps even respect former metropoles because they tend to be wealthy democracies? In this paper, we discern whether today's citizens hold animosity, amnesia, or admiration toward their former colonizer.

To do so, we compile and aggregate responses to thousands of cross-nationally comparable survey questions asked in over 90 countries. Each question queries respondents' evaluations of a named foreign country, including on many occasions the former colonizer of the respondent's country. We find a surprising former-colonizer premium in global mass opinion: today's citizens are *more* favorable toward their former metropole—by about two-fifths of a standard deviation—than they are toward other countries. Similarly, the amount of abuse and violence that occurred under colonialism does not correlate with how favorably an erstwhile metropole is evaluated. The former-colonizer premium exists, we show, mostly because of democracy and trade. Former metropoles today tend to be more democratic than other countries, a monadic trait that makes them relatively popular in world opinion and thus more popular in former colonies. They also tend to be relatively important trading partners with their former colonies, a dyadic trait that helps to explain the former-colonizer premium.

As the large literatures on soft power, international status, and public diplomacy show, states invest heavily in and care deeply about their images abroad (Nye 2004; Renshon 2017; Wang 2008), so our findings speak to an important topic. A country's image among foreign mass publics affects that state's material interests in a variety of ways—its risk from terrorism, its

ability to form international alliances, its inflows of foreign tourists, and so on (Datta 2014; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2012; Krueger and Malečková 2009). We add to a nascent literature that empirically demonstrates how valuable democracy is in improving a country's image abroad (Tomz and Weeks 2020). In addition, we contribution to a literature on the long-term psychological consequences of political violence. Whereas recent findings demonstrate the intergenerational transmission of trauma from ethnically-targeted violence (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017), ours show collective memory of colonial affronts to have a short half-life.

Mass Resentment toward the Former Colonizer?

Formal colonialism is largely an institution of the past, but its scope, brutality, and legacy mean that the residents of the 150-plus independent nation-states that were once colonies of European and other powers still have good reason to resent their former metropoles. Most of the territory of Africa, Asia, East Europe, and the Western Hemisphere was colonized or annexed by at least one global power—Belgium, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Soviet Union, Spain, Turkey, United States—for some stretch between 1299 (the founding of the Ottoman Empire) and 1991 (the collapse of the Soviet Union). Across these territories, colonization occurred at different times and in a variety of ways, but colonial residents were subjected to at least several abusive practices from a very long list: forced labor and migration, ethnoracial cleansing, decimation by disease, violent repression, land expropriation, theft of mineral and agricultural resources, massacres, paternalistic and racist ideological projects, excessive taxation, and so on (Rodney 1972). Moreover, the process of decolonizing was often a bloody one.

In other words, metropoles did much to foment permanent resentment, and a bevy of recent research suggests that various agents of socialization can propagate and thus sustain the

painful memories of oppression for a long time: "political attitudes associated with certain institutional practices persist long after the institutions themselves have disappeared" (Lupu and Peisakhin 2017, 838). Families and identity groups, in particular, can transmit victimization narratives and grudges across multiple generations (Balcells 2012; Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov 2017). In addition, political elites sometimes seek to promote victimization narratives in collective memory. In 2019, for example, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called on Spain to apologize for the conquest and colonization of Mexico, and former President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe often attributed his country's ills to British colonialism (Mangena 2020; see also Tharoor 2016). Because elite rhetoric is a leading source of mass attitudes toward foreign countries, efforts such as these may reproduce anti-colonizer sentiment among contemporary mass publics (Blaydes and Linzer 2012).

Further, many pernicious consequences of colonialism persist and are visible in today's independent states, as documented in a booming literature. For instance, many civil and ethnic conflicts in Africa (e.g., Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire) and the Middle East (e.g., Iraq and Lebanon) exist partly because of the artificiality of national borders—borders that are legacies of superpower rivalries and other European prerogatives, not organic nation-building efforts (Englebert 2009). Similarly, many former colonies still struggle to break from the corrupt, regressive, and growth-retarding institutions and practices, such as neopatrimonialism and the maldistribution of land, that are clear legacies of colonial governance (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Dell 2010). To summarize, some previous theories and findings suggest that today's citizens are much less favorable toward their former colonizer than toward other foreign countries.

The Theoretical Case for Amnesia and Admiration

Despite this, theoretical reasons to doubt that today's citizens resent their former colonizer are, we argue, stronger. Research confirming the intergenerational transmission of political trauma focuses on specific victimized groups—families and ethnoracial groups—and their direct descendants. By contrast, ours is a question about a much larger and more diffuse type of collective: descendants of entire colonized populations. To be sure, some groups (e.g., indigenous peoples of Spanish America) were more victimized by colonial rule than others (e.g., *criollos*), yet, because colonialism was also an affront to entire societies, it is worth considering whether today's societal aggregates single out their former colonial master for resentment (Lloyd 2000). On this front, we are skeptical that they do because mass publics are notoriously myopic and fickle about political and economic events (Healy and Lenz 2014). Li, Wang, and Chen (2016), for example, found that the Nanjing Massacre (1927) played little role in how Chinese citizens viewed Japan in 2010. More broadly, many scholars bemoan a purported "postcolonial amnesia" in today's nation-states (Diop 2020; Kennedy 2016).

Because of citizen myopia, sustaining a sense of grievance in collective memory requires ongoing nurturance from elites and other agents of socialization, a practice that is rare, notwithstanding the López Obrador and Mugabe examples. Instead, most political elites *avoid* vehement and open animosity toward their former metropoles. As relatively wealthy countries, former metropoles often have diplomatic leverage over their former colonies and, for that matter, all less developed countries (Casetti 2003). Shortly after Mugabe lost power, for example, his successor Emmerson Mnangagwa declared that "our quarrel with Britain is over," and Mnangagwa sought British foreign investment and technical expertise as well as readmission to the British Commonwealth (Mushanawani 2018). If contemporary elites are not persistently

unified in vocal criticism of their former colonizers, citizens are unlikely to absorb and maintain anticolonial narratives (Zaller 1992).

Although the average citizen is myopic and not deeply knowledgeable about foreign countries, previous research does suggest that individuals develop impressions—sometimes complex, multidimensional impressions—about foreign countries called "national stereotypes" or "country images" (Chattalas, Kramer, and Takada 2008; Chiozza 2010; Han 1989). A person's image of country x emerges from ongoing information gathered about that country. With this in mind, we propose two sets of reasons—both related to *contemporary* politico-economic features—for why today's individuals should extend *more* goodwill to their former colonizers than they do to other countries.

A first set of reasons invokes former metropoles' contemporary monadic traits, meaning country-level attributes that they broadcast to all countries. Former colonizers are more democratic (e.g., Spain, UK), larger in brute economic size (e.g., Russia, Turkey), and richer on a per capita basis (e.g., France) than the average country. According to research on international soft power, these are attractive monadic traits to have (Nye 2004). For example, a growing body of experimental evidence shows that individuals evaluate autocratic and rights-violating countries more harshly than they do democracies (Chu 2021; Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2021; Putnam and Shapiro 2017; Tomz and Weeks 2013, 2020). Similarly, wealth promotes a country's brand, conveying status and competence while also affording it economic outflows and the tools of public diplomacy (Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth 2014; Verlegh and Steenkamp 1999).

A second set of reasons speaks to unique elements of modern dyadic relationships between former metropoles and their former colonies. Former colonies sometimes share important cultural similarities—most notably in language and religion—with their erstwhile

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metropoles. Cultural similarities tend to boost mutual understanding, casting residents of former metropoles as in-group members to individuals in the former colonies (Khalid, Okafor, and Sanusi 2021). In addition, linguistic similarity boosts investment and trade flows between country dyads (Egger and Lassmann 2012), which can promote positive mutual feelings (Baker and Cupery 2013). Furthermore, some European countries make active diplomatic efforts— exemplified by the British Commonwealth, the Organization of Ibero-American States (Spain and Portugal), the Commonwealth of Independent States (Russia), and the concept of *Françafrique*—to foster ties with former colonies, and donor countries tend to favor former colonies with their foreign aid outflows (Alesina and Dollar 2000).

Overall, we hypothesize that citizens will be more supportive, on average, of their former colonizer than they are of other countries. We expect to find that this is explained by contemporary monadic traits of former metropoles and contemporary aspects of the relationships between former metropoles and their erstwhile colonies.

Data

We capitalize on the fact that, in recent decades, several cross-national survey projects have been measuring mass attitudes toward foreign countries. Specifically, five major survey ventures—Americas and the World, Asiabarometer, BBC Globescan, Latinobarometer, Pew Global Attitudes Project—have repeatedly measured respondents' attitudes toward named foreign countries. For example, Latinobarometer typically includes a battery of questions asking its Latin American respondents for their opinions about Spain, about the US, and more. We use these surveys to create $Opinion_{ijt}$, a measure of what the average citizen in the "home" country i thinks about "target" country j in year t (e.g., what the average Mexican(i) thinks about Spain(j) in 2015). $Opinion_{ijt}$ thus aggregates opinions to the level of the directed-dyad-year, and it is then

standardized. We refer to the "outgoing favorability" of home toward target and the "incoming favorability" to target from home. Online appendix (OA) parts A and B contain details about why we are confident in merging answers from the five survey projects into the single $Opinion_{ijt}$ variable plus information about how we do so with a factor analysis.

After merging, we have 7,221 directed dyad years (from 1995 to 2020), though our effective N is 1,478—the number of distinct directed dyads. Temporal variation in $Opinion_{ijt}$ is largely irrelevant because our main independent variable—$Former.colony_{ij}$ (=1 if i is a former colony of j; =0 if not)—is time invariant (Hensel 2018). About 5% (398) of the observations and 4% (64) of the directed dyads consist of respondents evaluating their former colonizer. These 64 directed dyads, which we label "former colonizer dyads," include evaluations of nine different colonizers by 60 different former colonies, yielding nice variation in targets and homes. (OA part C shows the full set of these dyads and discusses its sampling properties. Part D describes all independent variables, some of which required new data collection.) The entire dataset contains 94 home and 52 target countries—most of them either major powers (e.g., US, China) or nearby countries, thereby lowering the rate of nonattitudes.

Findings

Our first important finding is that, far from resenting it, individuals tend to hold their former colonizer in relatively high esteem. $Opinion_{ijt}$ averages .553 [.476, .629] in former colonizer dyads and -.032 [-.056, -.008] in all other directed dyads. This is a difference in means of nearly three-fifths of a standard deviation, roughly equivalent to a 13 percentage point difference in outgoing favorability.

The gap remains, moreover, when controlling for important confounds. Table 1 reports between-effects (BE) OLS regressions, meaning regressions of the directed-dyad means of

Opinion$_{ijt}$ on the directed-dyad means of the covariates. We estimate BE regressions because our independent variable of interest is time invariant and because the BE model is not sensitive to arbitrary differences in the number of observations per directed dyad. Model 1.1 estimates the difference in means after conditioning on survey-project fixed effects (FE), home-country FEs, and year FEs. Based on this model's results, we estimate that citizens around the world evaluate their former colonizer 0.39 standard deviations (about 9 percentage points) more favorably than they do other countries. We label this counterintuitive quantity the "former-colonizer premium."[1]

Table 1: Aspects of the Colonial Experience as Explanations of the Former-Colonizer Premium

Model:	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.5
Former.colony$_{ij}$	0.386* (0.116)	0.485* (0.168)	0.321* (0.159)	0.402* (0.157)	0.272* (0.132)
Centuries.since.sovereignty$_{ijt}$ × Former.colony$_{ij}$		0.146 (0.149)			
Indigenous.mortality$_i$ × Former.colony$_{ij}$			0.371 (0.268)		
Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$ × Former.colony$_{ij}$				-0.063 (0.228)	
Settler.share$_{ij}$ × Former.colony$_{ij}$					0.902 (0.578)
Other additive term		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Home-country FE	Yes	No	No	No	No
Observations	7,221	7,221	5,645	7,177	6,031
Directed dyads	1,478	1,478	1,094	1,457	1,280

Note: Dependent variable is *Opinion$_{ijt}$*. Entries are BE OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include survey-project and year FEs. * $p < 0.05$

Despite the presence of this premium, perhaps resentment lurks in some former colonies, particularly those with more brutal or more recent colonial experiences. Colonialism was almost as varied as the nation-states it left behind, so models 1.2 through 1.5 test whether these

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[1] Also, respondents in 20 African countries were more likely—by 0.55 standard deviations—to say their former colonizer helps their country than they were to say the same about other countries (Afrobarometer 2008). Despite querying a slightly different concept, in other words, this question shows a similarly sized former-colonizer premium.

differences in aspects of j's colonial governance of i are associated with public opinion. (OA part E gives the reasons for missing data when present.) Our key tests are four interaction coefficients shaded in gray.

Variation in colonial institutions does not correlate with support for the former colonizer. With *Centuries.since.sovereignty$_{ijt}$* (interacted with *Former.colony$_{ij}$*), model 1.2 tests and rejects the hypothesis that collective memories about colonialism's sins existed but fade through time (Hensel 2018). Recent colonizers are not less liked than historically distant ones. The next two models test hypotheses that violence during the colonial era—namely, whether colonialization decimated indigenous populations or ended after violent opposition—sour today's citizens on their former metropoles. Neither *Indigenous.mortality$_i$* (model 1.3) nor *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$* (1.4) have significant interaction coefficients (Easterly and Levine 2016; Hensel 2018). Again, Zimbabwe, which freed itself from minority rule by white settlers of British descent only in 1980 after a war of liberation, illustrates. Despite this violence, racism, and recency, Zimbabwe's favorability toward the UK in 2006 was 0.72, compared to its average outgoing favorability of 0.64 toward seven other countries. Finally, model 1.5 interacts *Former.colony$_{ij}$* with *Settler.share$_{ij,}$* (Easterly and Levine 2016; Karpat 1985). *Settler.share$_{ij,}$* is the proportion of the country's colonial population that was settler or settler-descended people. Today, former settler colonies tend to have more prosperous economies and more racial and linguistic similarities with their metropoles than former non-settler colonies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), but we find that citizens in settler colonies do not evaluate their former colonizers more favorably than do citizens in non-settler colonies. In summary, our second main finding confirms a necessary condition underlying the existence of the former colonizer premium: the historical colonial experience does not seem to inform citizens' evaluations of their former metropoles.

Table 2 shows how monadic traits account for much of the former-colonizer premium, attenuating the coefficient on *Former.colony$_{ij}$*. As a first check of this proposition, Model 2.1 adds target-country FEs to model 1.1. The target-country FEs reduce the coefficient on *Former.colony$_{ij}$* by a whopping 83 percent (from .386 to .064). Stated differently, a huge part of the premium is created by traits that make former colonizers more liked by all countries. Model 2.2 helps to discern what these traits are by controlling for target country's *Polity$_{jt}$* score (Center for Systemic Peace 2018), its overall *GDP$_{jt}$*, and its *GDP.per.capita$_{jt}$*. Collectively, former colonizers' propensities to be democratic and to have large economies account for more than 50 percent of the former colonizer premium. (Further regressions reported in OA part F suggest that democracy does most of this work.) To illustrate the impact of regime type, Figure 1 depicts the strong bivariate relationship between a target's level of democracy and its overall average incoming favorability.

Table 2: Contemporary Monadic and Dyadic Features as Explanations of the Former-Colonizer Premium

	Model:	2.1	2.2	2.3
Former.colony$_{ij}$		0.064	0.192	-0.047
		(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.099)
Polity$_{jt}$			0.031*	0.030*
			(0.004)	(0.004)
GDP$_{jt}$			0.299*	0.138*
			(0.021)	(0.031)
GDP.per.capita$_{jt}$			0.014	0.026
			(0.021)	(0.021)
Trade$_{ijt}$ (instrumented)				0.165*
				(0.025)
Target-country FE		Yes	No	No
Observations		7,221	6,841	6,699
Directed dyads		1,478	1,416	1,355

Note: Dependent variable is *Opinion$_{ijt}$*. Entries are BE OLS coefficients (2.1, 2.2) or BE IV regression coefficients (2.3) with standard errors in parentheses. All models include survey-project, home-country, and year FEs. * $p < 0.05$

Figure 1: Target Country's Incoming Favorability by its Level of Democracy

Note: To purge incoming favorability of the confounds captured by the survey-project, home-country, and year FEs, we plot on the *y*-axis each target country's FE from model 2.1. Points are 3-letter ISO codes.

Model 2.3 accounts for the remainder of the former colonizer premium by including a dyadic trait. *Trade$_{ijt}$* is an instrumental variable measured in the following units: *i*'s trade with *j* as a share of *i*'s GDP (Frankel and Romer 1999). This variable is statistically significant, and its inclusion lowers the coefficient on *GDP$_{jt}$*, suggesting that the positive effect of targets' economic size partly works through their large volumes of trade flows. (OA part G shows regressions with other dyadic variables, none of which return statistically significant results. Part H describes the instrumental variable and its potential shortcomings.) All told, our third and final finding is as follows: their monadic traits—and especially their propensity to be democratic—and their higher trade flows with former colonies make former metropoles popular around the world and explain most of the former-colonizer premium.

Conclusion

We find that colonial abuses are mostly missing from the global public mind: former colonizers are not resented as colonizers in global mass opinion. On average, individuals see their country's former colonial master in a favorable light because former metropoles tend to be democracies, large economies, and commercial powerhouses. To the benefit of history's colonizers, collective memories about past colonial crimes are short.

One interpretation of our findings is that we are providing a justification for past and even future imperial abuses, but such an interpretation would be highly misguided. Whether today's citizens resent their former colonizer is but one criterion of many to use when judging the consequences and morality of colonialism, and we admit that it is surely one of the less important ones. Our findings provide no reason whatsoever to question the moral repugnance of colonialism, yet our topic remains important because of the ink spilt and money spent on the construction of soft power.

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A. Survey Data Information

Table A.1 includes the precise wordings (in English) for each survey.

Table A1: Information about Measurement and Observations for the Five Survey Projects

Americas and the World (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE). 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014. The Americas and the World. Mexico City, Mexico. Available at https://www.lasamericasyelmundo.cide.edu/)

Question Wording: "Now I am going to ask that you measure your opinion of some countries, with zero expressing a very unfavorable opinion, 100 expressing a very favorable opinion and 50 expressing an opinion that is neither favorable or unfavorable. You can use any number between 0 and 100, and the higher the number the more favorable your opinion of that country .If you don't have an opinion or don't know the country, please tell me."

Coding: "51" to "100" (positive); "0" to "49" (negative); "50" and "Don't know" and "Don't have an opinion" (neutral)

Years: 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014

Number of directed-dyad-year observations: 403

AsiaBarometer (Inoguchi, Takashi. 2003-2007. AsiaBarometer. Tokyo, Japan. Available at https://www.asiabarometer.org)

Question Wording: "Do you think the following countries have a good influence or bad influence on your country? Please select the response closest to your opinion for each country listed."

Coding: "Good influence" and "Rather good influence" (positive); "Bad influence" and "Rather bad influence" (negative); "Neither good nor bad influence" and "Don't know" (neutral)

Years: 2003-2007

Number of directed-dyad-year observations: 524

BBC/Globescan (BBC World Service, Globescan, Program for Public Consultation. 2005-2014, 2017. The Country Ratings Poll. Toronto, Canada. More information on the most recent survey is available at https://globescan.com/sharp-drop-in-world-views-of-us-uk-global-poll/#)

Question Wording: "Please tell me if you think each of the following country is having a mainly positive or mainly negative influence in the world."

Coding: "Mainly positive" (positive); "Mainly negative" (negative); "Depends" and "Neither, neutral" and "Do not know/No answer" (neutral).

Years: 2005-2014, 2017

Number of directed-dyad-year observations: 3,436

Latinobarometer (Corporación Latinobarómetro. 1995-2011, 2013, 2015-2018. Latinobarómetro. Santiago, Chile. Available at https://www.latinobarometro.org/)
Question Wording: "I would like to know your opinion about the following countries and powers. Do you have a very good, good, bad or very bad opinion about…"
Coding: "Very good" and "good" (positive); "Very bad" and "bad" (negative); "Do not know" and "No answer" (neutral)
****Note that from 1995 respondents were also given the option to answer "Neither positive nor negative". In 1996, 1997 and 1998, the option "About average" was provided. These responses have been coded as neutral.
Years: 1995-2011, 2013, 2015-2017
Number of directed-dyad-year observations: 1,630

Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew Research Center. 2002-2020. Pew Global Attitudes Project. Washington, D.C. Available at https://www.pewresearch.org/global/datasets/)
Question Wording: "Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of…"
Coding: "Very favorable" and "favorable" (positive); "Very unfavorable" and "unfavorable" (negative); "Don't know" and "Refused" (neutral)
Years: 2002-2020
Number of directed-dyad-year observations: 2,498

We also reference Afrobarometer in a footnote. We do not merge the Afrobarometer directed dyads into the dependent variable because the project's question wording is *so* different, which is surely responsible for its low convergent validity. (See next section).

Table A2: Information about Measurement and Observations for Afrobarometer

Afrobarometer (Afrobarometer Data, [Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malai, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabe], [Round 4], [2008-2009], available at http://www.afrobarometer.org)
Question Wording: "In your opinion, how much do each of the following do to help your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?"
Coding: "Do nothing, no help" and "Help a little bit" (negative); "Help somewhat" and "Help a lot" (positive); "Don't know" and "Refused" (neutral)
Years: 2008-2009
Number of directed-dyad-year observations: 97

Evaluations of the European Union are also widely available across these datasets (701 directed dyad year observations). We drop these from all analyses, however, since the EU is not a nation-state.

B. Creating the Dependent Variable

For each of the five different survey projects, we recoded the relevant question into a three-point variable of positive responses, neutrality, and negative responses. We then aggregated responses to the directed-dyad-year level using the following formula:

$$Opinion^*_{ijt} = \frac{p_{ijt}}{p_{ijt}+n_{ijt}}, \tag{1}$$

where p is the number of positive responses and n the number of negative responses. $Opinion^*_{ijt}$ is thus the proportion of valenced responses in year t by citizens in i that are positive toward j, and the variable we ultimately use, $Opinion_{ijt}$, is the standardized version of $Opinion^*_{ijt}$.

The presence of different question wordings and response options is the biggest challenge to merging data from the different projects into a single dependent variable, but once we aggregate responses to the directed dyad level, the variables from the different survey projects have strong convergent validity. In many years multiple survey projects polled the same home country about the same target country, which allows us to calculate correlation coefficients for most of the pairwise combinations of survey projects. Table A3 reports this correlation matrix. For the five main projects, six of the eight observed coefficients (shaded in grey) exceed +.80, and seven of the eight exceed +.70. Most reassuringly, the correlation between the BBC Globescan and Pew GAP variables is high, which is important because these two projects provide the bulk of cases. Overall, the correlations for these five projects are sufficiently high to justify collapsing them into a single measure. The variable from Afrobarometer, however, does not correlate very highly with two other projects, which is not surprising since it induces evaluation of a very different and specific aspect of target countries. For this reason, we do not include these Afrobarometer cases in $Opinion_{ijt}$.

Table A3: Convergent Validity Analysis:
Inter-item Correlations at the Directed-Dyad-Year Level

	Pew GAP	Latin-barometer	Americas & the World	Asian-Barometer	BBC Globescan
Latin-barometer	+0.81 (175)				
Americas & the World	+0.85 (39)	+0.72 (64)			
Asian-Barometer	+0.88 (29)	Ø (0)	Ø (0)		
BBC Globescan	+0.81 (975)	+0.81 (183)	+0.46 (81)	+0.86 (25)	
Afro-barometer	+.48 (6)	Ø (0)	Ø (0)	Ø (0)	+.25 (9)
Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients with number of observations in parentheses.					

Even with these high inter-item correlations, we still face the challenges of (1) mapping five variables (from the five survey projects) with different underlying wordings/scales onto a single scale and (2) an incomplete correlation matrix (i.e., the two empty cells in the "Asianbarometer" row of Table A3). We could solve the first challenge with scoring coefficients from a factor analysis, but a factor solution is elusive without a fully observed covariance matrix. To proceed, we generate an estimate of the full covariance matrix. Multiple imputation (MI) techniques first compute a full covariance matrix, so we estimate ours using the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm from an MI procedure (Graham 2009; Truxillo 2005; UCLA 2021; Weaver and Maxwell 2014). With this in hand, we can generate imputations for missing values on all five variables (which we average over) and scoring coefficients to convert the five variables into $Opinion^*_{ijt}$. As mentioned in the paper, to absorb any remaining differences across the five variables, we include survey-project fixed effects in all regression analyses.

C. The Former-Colony Independent Variable

Our *Former.colony$_{ij}$* variable is based on "IndFrom: Entity from Which Independence Was Gained" and "ColRuler: Primary Colonial Ruler" in Hensel (2018). *Former.colony$_{ij}$* equals one if, according to Hensel, *i* gained independence from *j* or *j* was the primary colonial ruler of *i*. From there, we adjust about a dozen of Hensel's codings according to the following rules. First, for a few directed dyads, the pre-independence relationship was not colonial in nature and independence occurred through secession rather than decolonization. These directed dyads (recoded by us to *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=0) are (1) *i*=Ecuador and *j*=Colombia, (2) *i*=Peru and *j*=Bolivia, (3) *i*=Uruguay and *j*=Brazil, and (4) *i*=Bangladesh and *j*=Pakistan. Second, because Hensel tends to code only the primary colonizer, we recoded *Former.colony$_{ij}$* for some directed dyads to reflect multiple former colonizers or, in a few cases, to fix oversights. The codings we changed, along with what we changed them to, are as follows: (1) *i*=Palestine and *j*=Turkey, *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=1; (2) *i*=Hong Kong and *j*=Great Britain, *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=1; (3) *i*=Egypt and *j*=Great Britain, *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=1; (4) *i*=Tunisia and *j*=France, *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=1; (5) *i*=Bhutan and *j*=India, *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=0; (6) *i*=Bhutan and *j*=Great Britain, *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=0. Third, we dropped a few cases (i.e., recoded by us to *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=missing) in which sovereignty from the target does not currently exist: (1) *i*=Palestine and *j*=Israel, (2) *i*=Taiwan and *j*=China, and (3) *i*=Hong Kong and *j*=China. Notes and citations justifying these decisions are available in the computer code, which will be posted along with this Online Appendix.

Figure A1 shows the directed dyads—along with their frequency (i.e., years observed)—for which *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=1. (This figure excludes the Afrobarometer dyads, referring strictly to the data used for the tables in the main text.) Note that four countries (Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Poland) were asked about two former colonizers.

Figure A1: Directed Dyads for which the Target is a Former Colonizer of the Home Country (i.e., *Former.colony$_{ij}$*=1)

Note: Abbreviations are the two-letter ISO country codes of home countries. Abbreviations are as follows: AE=United Arab Emirates; AF=Afghanistan; AR=Argentina; AU=Australia; AZ=Azerbaijan; BD=Bangladesh; BO=Bolivia; BR=Brazil; CA=Canada; CL=Chile; CO=Colombia; CR=Costa Rica; DO=Dominican Republic; EC=Ecuador; EG=Egypt; FI=Finland; GH=Ghana; GR=Greece; GT=Guatemala; HK=Hong Kong; HN=Honduras; IL=Israel; IN=India; IQ=Iraq; JO=Jordan; KE=Kenya; KG=Kyrgyzstan; KR=Korea, Republic of; KZ=Kazakhstan; LB=Lebanon; LT=Lithuania; MA=Morocco; MN=Mongolia; MV=Maldives; MX=Mexico; MY=Malaysia; NG=Nigeria; NI=Nicaragua; PA=Panama; PE=Peru; PH=Philippines; PK=Pakistan; PL=Poland; PS=Palestine; PY=Paraguay; SG=Singapore; SN=Senegal; SV=El Salvador; TJ=Tajikistan; TM=Turkmenistan; TN=Tunisia; TZ=Tanzania, United Republic of; UA=Ukraine; UG=Uganda; US=United States of America; UY=Uruguay; UZ=Uzbekistan; VE=Venezuela; ZA=South Africa.

Because we are not working with a systematic sample of countries or directed dyads, it is worth commenting on the sampling properties of our list of observed former-colony dyads. To provide a point of reference, Table A4 gives an approximation of the universe to which our sample can be compared. Table A4 is the frequency distribution of primary colonizers for the set of modern nation-states (Hensel 2018). For example, the UK was the primary colonizer of 59 countries (e.g., Ghana, US), France was the primary colonizer of 24 countries (e.g., Mali, Vietnam), and so on. How well does our sample of former-colony dyads—the frequency distribution of which appears in the column below "# of dyads" in Figure A1—approximate this

universe? Reasonably well, with some imperfections. Among the major colonizers, the UK (22 of 64 dyads in our sample) and Turkey (7 of 64 dyads) appear in our dataset in close proportion to their share among today's formerly colonized nation-states. By contrast, Spain and Russia are over-represented as targets in our sample (17 and 10 of the 64 dyads in our sample, respectively), and this over-representation clearly comes at the cost of under-representing France (just 4 of our directed dyads) and Portugal (none of our directed dyads). (We do have better representation of former French (5 of 19 former-colony dyads) and Portuguese (2 of 19 former-colony dyads) in the Afrobarometer sample, however.) In our main sample, we also have four targets (China, Germany, Japan, US) from a longer list (in Table A4) of former metropoles who were the primary colonizers of just one to three of today's countries.

Table A4: Distribution of Primary Colonizers among Modern Nation-States

Primary colonizer	Number of countries	Percentage of (formerly colonized) countries
United Kingdom	59	35.76%
France	24	14.55%
Spain	23	13.94%
Turkey	19	11.52%
Russia	12	7.27%
Portugal	7	4.24%
Austro-Hungary	4	2.42%
United States	3	1.82%
Netherlands	3	1.82%
Belgium	3	1.82%
Italy	2	1.21%
Japan	2	1.21%
Germany	1	0.61%
China	1	0.61%
Australia	1	0.61%
New Zealand	1	0.61%
Total	165	100%

D. Other Independent Variables

Centuries.since.sovereignty$_{ijt}$ is how long ago (in units of centuries to ensure coefficient readability) the home country ceased to be governed by the metropole in question. Our use of the word "sovereignty" is a (slightly inaccurate) shorthand for "no longer being governed" by the target. The fact that this variable is indexed by j means it can vary within a single home country, although it does so only for the four countries who were polled about multiple former colonizers. For example, the territory that is today Israel was under Ottoman rule until 1918, at which point it switched to British rule until 1948. We thus score *Centuries.since.sovereignty$_{ijt}$* as .90 when i=Israel, j=Turkey, and t=2008, and we score it as .60 when i=Israel, j=UK, and t=2008. (Because it is interacted with another covariate, we subsequently center *Centuries.since.sovereignty$_{ijt}$* at its median among the former-colony dyads.) Our source for this variable is "IndDate: Date of Independence" (Hensel 2018), although we make some minor adjustments to Hensel's

scorings. In particular, Hensel records this variable as the date on which the country "acquired control of its own foreign policy," but we make minor changes to the year, where necessary, so that this variable reflects the more standard date of achieving sovereignty from the relevant metropole.

Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$ equals 1 if "independence occurred through organized violence … (it occurred through armed revolt by the entity)" and 0 if not. This quote and variable come from "IndViol: Violent Independence?" (Hensel 2018). Because of the aforementioned changes we made to Hensel's coding in creating our *Former.colony$_{ij}$* variable, we had to do our own research to score this variable for a few cases—cases for which Hensel did not have a scoring. (Again, note that this variable is indexed by *j* and can thus vary within home countries by metropole.) New scorings are as follows: (1) *i*=Bangladesh and *j*=Great Britain, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=0; (2) *i*=Tunisia and *j*=France, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=1; (3) *i*=Israel and *j*=Turkey, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=1; (4) *i*=Palestine and *j*=Turkey, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=1; (5) *i*=Lebanon and *j*=Turkey, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=1; (6) *i*=Hong Kong and *j*=Great Britain, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=0; (7) *i*=Egypt and *j*=Great Britain, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=1; (8) *i*=Lithuania and *j*=Russia, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=1; (9) *i*=Morocco and *j*=France, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=1; (10) *i*=Poland and *j*=Russia, *Violence.at.sovereignty$_{ij}$*=0. Notes and citations justifying these decisions are available in the computer code, which will be posted along with this Online Appendix.

Indigenous.mortality$_i$ equals 1 if indigenous mortality was high and 0 if it was low (Easterly and Levine 2016).

Settler.share$_{ij}$ is the share of the country's population at the peak of the colonial era that was a settler (from the metropole in question) or settler-descended peoples. For most directed dyads, this is the *Euro Share* variable from Easterly and Levine (2016), which is "the European share of the population during colonization" (p. 231). In deciding which era to use in designating *Euro Share*, these authors "choose a date at least a century after initial European contact, but at least 50 years before independence" (p. 231). For directed dyads for which *Euro Share* is unavailable or irrelevant—such as Russian ethnics in the republics of the Soviet Union or Turkish ethnics in the *vilayet* (provinces) of the late Ottoman Empire—we did our own research to score *Settler Share.* Data for these cases are more sparse, so we had little choice as to dates. But we were able to find credible values for almost all former-colony dyads not scored by Easterly and Levine. Useful sources for this include Karpat (1985) and Sakwa (1998, 244). Notes and citations justifying our scorings are available in the computer code.

Polity$_{jt}$ is from the PolityV dataset (Center for Systemic Peace 2018).

GDP$_{jt}$ is reported in current US dollars (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2021b).

GDP.per.capita$_{jt}$ is reported in current US dollars (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2021b).

Trade$_{ijt}$ is the logged sum of *Imports$_{ijt}$* and *Exports$_{ijt}$*. These are calculated as a share of country *i*'s GDP (International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2021a). Bilateral imports data, when reported, is used for both the imports of the reporting country and the exports of the partner country. Bilateral exports data is only used as a replacement when the partner country's imports are not reported.

Common.official.language$_{ij}$ indicates whether the countries in the dyad share an official language (=1) or not (=0) (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2021).

FDI$_{ijt}$ is the stock of FDI from *j* in *i* in year *t* calculated as a share of *i*'s GDP (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021).

Aid$_{ijt}$ is the inflow of official development assistance from *j* to *i* in year *t* calculated as a share of *i*'s GDP (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2021).

E. Missing Data Patterns

In model 1.3 we lose all observations for which *Indigenous.mortality$_i$* is undefined in Easterly and Levine (2016). In model 1.5 we lose all observations in which the home country is a never-colonized European country, since *Settler.share* is undefinable for these cases. Also, we lose four former-colony directed dyads that are former Ottoman colonies, namely *i*=Israel and *j*=Turkey, *i*=Palestine and *j*=Turkey, *i*=Jordan and *j*=Turkey, and *i*=Lebanon and *j*=Turkey. Data on Turkish ethnics in these territories under late Ottoman rule are unavailable (Karpat 1985).

In model 2.2 we lose 118 cases from 2019 or 2020 for which *Polity$_{jt}$* scores do not yet exist. In model 2.3 we lose these 118 cases plus 262 for which North Korea is the target (due to its lack of GDP data) plus another 80 cases for which trade data do not exist.

F. Further Regressions on Monadic Traits

Table A5: Contemporary Monadic Features as Explanations of the Former-Colonizer Premium

Model:	A5.1	A5.2	A5.3
Former.colony$_{ij}$	0.182 (0.107)	0.283* (0.099)	0.223* (0.108)
Polity$_{jt}$	0.057* (0.003)		
GDP$_{jt}$		0.355* (0.016)	
GDP.per.capita$_{jt}$			0.251* (0.018)
Observations	7,103	6,959	6,959
Directed dyads	1,477	1,417	1,417

Note: Dependent variable is *Opinion$_{ijt}$*. Entries are between-effects OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include survey-project, home-country, and year FEs. * $p < 0.05$

Each of these three measures of targets' monadic features is statistically significant when included individually. The addition of the two GDP measures (model 2.2), however, does not further attenuate the coefficient on $Former.colony_{ij}$ beyond the extent to which the $Polity_{jt}$ variable alone does so (model A5.1). Moreover, while $GDP.per.capita_{jt}$ does attenuate the coefficient rather dramatically (A5.3), it does not remain statistically significant upon controlling for $Polity_{jt}$ and GDP_{jt}. Hence, regime type appears to be the most consequential of the three.

G. Further Regressions on Dyadic Traits

Table A6: Features of Postcolonial Dyadic Relationships as Explanations of the Former-Colonizer Premium

	A6.1	A6.2	A6.3
$Former.colony_{ij}$	0.410[*] (0.119)	0.269 (0.154)	0.427[*] (0.135)
$Common.official.language_{ij}$	-0.078 (0.082)		
FDI_{ijt}		1.379 (0.964)	
Aid_{ijt}			0.709 (3.305)
Observations	7,221	2,698	2,293
Directed dyads	1,478	520	443

Note: Dependent variable is $Opinion_{ijt}$. Entries are between-effects OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. All models include survey-project, home-country, and year FEs.
[*] $p < 0.05$

Sharing a $Common.official.language_{ij}$ (model A6.1) with the former metropole does not make individuals more favorable to it (CIA 2021). Two other measures of dyadic economic flows from target to home—FDI_{ijt} and Aid_{ijt}—are insignificant, though these variables are missing for about 60 percent of our cases. FDI_{ijt} and Aid_{ijt} are only available for directed dyads in which the outflow is from an OECD nation, hence the large quantities of dropped cases in models A6.2 and A6.3.

H. Instrumental Variable for Trade Flows

Frankel and Romer (1999) develop an instrumental variable for trade flows between two countries based on the following variables: whether the two countries share a border, whether one of them is landlocked, their sizes in both area and population, and their distance from one another. As geographical measures, these are all plausibly exogenous to trade flows, and exogeneity is important for us to achieve since trade flows may be partially endogenous to the international opinions we seek to explain (Rose 2016). In the first stage equation of model 2.3, we regress $Trade_{ijt}$ on each of these variables plus the interactions between shared border and

each of the other variables (plus all the regressors in the second stage equation reported in Table 2). The instrument is a strong one, explaining 42% of the variance between directed dyads.

Still, the coefficient on $Trade_{ijt}$ in model 2.3 may be inflated because we cannot be entirely certain that this instrumental variables regression satisfies the exclusion restriction. We cannot be certain that, say, distance between home and target only affects home's opinion of target through the channel of bilateral trade flows. Indeed, this is surely a strong assumption to make, and whether truly exogenous shifts in trade flows yield changes in $Opinion_{ijt}$ requires further research that would be beyond the scope of this paper. For this reason, we are most comfortable with the cautious conclusion that trade merely helps to account for the former-colonizer premium along with the monadic trait of democracy.

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