Choosing not to conclude: mapping Canadian and American efforts to negotiate preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (1980-2020)[*]

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Abstract

How often do attempts to negotiate preferential trade agreements (PTAs) collapse? What explains these bargaining failures, and how has tolerance for negotiation failure changed over time? Using process tracing and archival research methods, I construct an original dataset of all negotiations towards a PTA initiated by the United States and Canada between 1980 and 2020. While both countries have collective signed and ratified 35 PTAs since 1980, they have also attempted to negotiate another 31 separate agreements that ultimately yielded no treaty of any kind. Surprisingly, negotiation failure happens often: since 1980, 46% of initiated PTA negotiations by Canada and the United States have failed; however, these negotiation failures are disproportionately concentrated after the mid 2000s. Logistic regression and survival analysis demonstrate a correlation between the likelihood of negotiation failure and the cumulative number of ratified PTAs. A case study of the attempted Canada-India PTA demonstrates that the policy priorities of specific leaders, and the cumulative number of successful agreements making the overall costs of no agreement lower over time, matters a great deal. As PTAs become more ambitious, the prerogatives of specific leaders in developed democracies may easily frustrate and prolong efforts to liberalize international trade. This data also invites future research to revisit the causes and factors determining which countries sign PTAs as existing research has largely ignored the negotiation process.

Introduction

With over 1000 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) known to exist as of September 2020, existing research in the field of international political economy (IPE) has largely focused on understanding the determinants of PTAs (Baccini, 2019) and the politics behind their ratification (Putnam, 1988; Mo, 1995; Milner, 1997; Carnegie, 2014). With these studies has come a growing consensus that PTAs have had consequential effects on, amongst many things, economic growth (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), peace (McDonald, 2004; Dorussen and Ward, 2010; Mavroidis and Sapir, 2015), human rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Kim, 2012), and domestic policy reforms (Baccini and Urpelainen, 2014; Bastiaens and Postnikov, 2017; Brandi et al., 2020). However, existing studies have only evaluated successful agreements. While it is recognized that not all treaties are negotiated in isolation (Meunier and Morin, 2015), the field of IPE has not recognized that not all negotiation attempts succeed, and ratified agreements are the results of sometimes a decades long bargaining process. This paper asks three questions as a result: how often do negotiations towards PTAs breakdown; why do negotiations fail to come to an agreement of any kind; and, what are the consequences of these negotiation attempts for future negotiation efforts?

I contribute to existing studies evaluating the formation of PTAs by presenting an original dataset of all PTA negotiation attempts by the United States and Canada between 1980 and 2020. While the United States has formally signed and ratified 19 PTAs, and Canada 16, collectively both countries have attempted to negotiate another 33 separate PTAs.[1] 50% of initiated PTA negotiations have failed in Canada, and 42% have failed in the United States. Collectively, these failed agreements account for at least 161 years (1942 months) of talks that have ultimately amounted to no agreement.[2] By paying closer attention to the process of negotiating PTAs, we can better evaluate the causes of negotiation success and breakdown. In doing do,

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[1] These counts do not include negotiations within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or World Trade Organization (WTO) towards multilateral, plurilateral, or universal trade agreements. The count would be higher still if one included those agreements.

[2] This count is a sum of all months spent negotiating agreements consecutively when specific start and end dates can be established. In reality, many treaties are negotiated simultaneously.

scholars of IPE can develop a deeper understanding of why successfully ratified PTAs result between specific trade partners.

While recent scholarship has emphasized how populism and growing global power imbalances have led to the American withdrawal from trade treaties like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), I find that PTA negotiation breakdown by the United States and Cnada largely stems from a changing perception of the costs of negotiation failure amongst leaders, as well as the atrophying of political agendas following leadership turnover either country. While in the 1980s the global trade regime was dominated by concerns of poor market access, or missed opportunities for economic growth, today the status quo of generally low tariff rates is much more tolerable. With so many established PTAs in place, and general success in trade liberalization within the World Trade Organization (WTO), a failed attempt to negotiate a PTA in 2020 carries different costs than a failed attempt in 1980 or 1990. Turnover from administration to administration, as opposed to political party or general electoral cycles, also appears central.

In the American case, negotiation failures have largely stemmed from the ambitious PTA negotiation efforts initiated by former Republican President George W. Bush following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. In the Canadian case, efforts towards trade liberalization after 2003 were doubled down by former Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper in the wake of the 2008 Great Recession. In both cases, electoral turnover saw changing levels of support for continued negotiations that did conclude before either W. Bush or Harper lost power. Alongside irreconcilable preferences towards thorny key issues, such as the liberalization of agricultural products in PTAs, and the inclusion of investor state dispute settlement provisions (ISDS) in many investment chapters, trade negotiations today are difficult in part because what remains to be liberalized are historically protected industries, sectors with limited intra-industry trade, and politically powerful firms capable of lobbying for continued protection (Baccini, Dür and Elsig, 2018; Kim and Osgood, 2019).

Lastly, existing research stresses that developed democracies are far more likely to sign PTAs with one another, and to trade more with one another (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff,

2000, 2002). However, I find that the vast majority of PTA negotiation attempts that breakdown are between developed democratic states and autocratic developing partners. What matters most for success is the ideal point distance between two negotiating partners. While democracies are more successful at negotiating with one another, it is not for lack of trying to negotiate with their developing or autocratic counterparts.

In what follows, this paper documents the history of PTA negotiation attempts, providing a descriptive overview of the original data for the United States and Canada from 1980 to 2020. Quantitative analyses, using logistic regression and survival models, indicate that some traditional drivers of successful cooperation, such as the number of negotiating parties, are determinants of negotiation success. However, more important is the cumulative number of successfully negotiated treaties, and whether electoral turnover occurred during a negotiation. Given the small-n nature of the dataset, the paper then dives deeper into a case study of attempts by the Canadian government to negotiate a PTA with India between 2009 and 2017, documenting the changing priorities and perceptions of the costs of negotiating failure across four Canadian Prime Ministers. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for our understanding of the negotiation of PTAs in the 21st century, and existing research on who signs trade agreements. Existing work has largely censored the negotiation process from the study of PTAs, ignoring an important selection effect in what agreements are ultimately signed and ratified.

Re-evaluating bargaining success (and breakdown) in IPE

With the rising importance and number of PTAs signed by states since 1980, many scholars have examined why states sign them. Existing research argues that states enter into PTAs given they increase international trade (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Büthe and Milner, 2008; Neumayer and Spess, 2005). PTAs can also signal a host governments' commitment to economic liberalization, locking in preferences amongst democratic states (Mansfield, Milner and

Rosendorff, 2000, 2002; Milner and Kubota, 2005; Baccini and Urpelainen, 2014) and establishing credible dispute settlement mechanisms to adjudicate treaty violations (Allee and Elsig, 2016).[3] PTAs can also be signed to meet the demands of domestic interest groups such as multinational corporations (MNCs) (Manger and Peinhardt, 2017; Allee and Peinhardt, 2014) and export oriented industries (Kucik, 2012; Kim, 2017; Kim and Osgood, 2019).

When evaluating why states have signed so many PTAs, scholars have argued that normative consensus (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006), coercion (Berge and Stiansen, 2016), competition (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons, 2006; Baldwin and Jaimovich, 2012), emulation (Dür, Baccini and Haftel, 2015), and learning (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013; Manger and Peinhardt, 2017), have contributed to the diffusion of PTAs after the 1990s. Scholars have also noted that states often carry over the contents of one agreement into the next, leading to a cluster of "model" PTAs defined by the United States and the European Union (Gagné and Morin, 2006; Kim and Manger, 2017; Allee and Elsig, 2019; Peacock, Milewicz and Snidal, 2019). However, these studies are exclusively based on agreements that have been ratified, and implemented. While many studies were initially based on ad hoc datasets of PTAs, more recent studies have been based on more comprehensive datasets such as the design of trade agreements (DESTA) database, which now includes over 900 documented PTAs in force globally (Dür, Baccini and Elsig, 2014).[4] Studies of PTA ratification have also neglected to include agreements that were not ultimately implemented, focusing instead on the causes of ratification delay (Lechner and Wüthrich, 2018; Wüthrich, 2020).

More generally, researchers in the field of international political economy (IPE) have paid

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[3] The non-triviality of investor state dispute settlement procedures in some PTAs cannot be stated enough. Following politicized rulings in ISDS proceedings, such as Swedish energy company Vattenfall's disputes against Germany in 2009 or American cigarette and tobacco producer Philip Morris against Uruguay in 2010 and Australia in 2015, have led a number of developing and developed countries to seek revisions to existing PTAs, including CETA, removing ISDS provisions or withdrawing from elements of existing ISDS measures all together (Poulsen and Aisbett, 2013; Peinhardt and Wellhausen, 2016; Haftel and Thompson, 2018).

[4] The exception here are studies that include agreements, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in their analyses, which were fully drafted and signed, but ultimately not implemented. Given complete drafts are available to scholars and the general public, analysis is easy and accessible. Yet the TPP was ultimately renegotiated by remaining members following the 2016 withdrawal of the United States, an implemented as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018. Many more agreements are never fully drafted.

little attention to the negotiation process, and its various stages before ratification. What studies exist have prioritized case specific evaluations of failed agreements, such as the OECD's failed multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) in 1998 (Neumayer, 1999; Batlu, 2000), or the stalling of negotiations toward the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and European Union (EU) in 2017 (Henckels, 2016; De Ville and Siles-Brügge, 2017). Parallel examples beyond the negotiation of PTAs abound, including work on the the failed United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) forest negotiations (Davenport, 2005) or the failures of the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (Dimitrov, 2010). Case specific studies are valuable, particularly for their insight into the details of a given agreement, the countries involved, and key individuals working for or against cooperation. However, more systematic evaluations of negotiation attempts in a specific issue area are possible, especially with modern information processing and record keeping. While existing datasets of successful PTAs can allow us to observe the details contributing to their eventual signing, or later revocation, they do not provide information on the full universe of negotiation attempts, making it difficult to draw lessons from negotiations leaders consciously decided to terminate. Inconclusive PTA negotiations are important political events that happen frequently. Not only is failure a prevalent phenomenon, it is a costly effort both in terms of time and money, often occurring after years of negotiation efforts. Beyond the actual costs of conducting negotiations, diplomatic ties between countries can also be impacted when negotiations breakdown or fail to yield an agreement that meets participant expectations.

Methods and Data Collection Process

Existing data sets of successful PTAs have relied on compiling lists of signed and ratified agreements to produce an exhaustive universe of cases. I began by stepping back to consider the negotiation process itself, and to develop a dataset consisting of a universe of PTA negotiation attempts. Every observation is a concrete effort to negotiate a PTA by Canada or the United

Figure 1: Stages of Negotiation.

States with one or more partner countries. As such, each data entry is a *negotiation attempt*, as opposed to a list of country-dyads that are hypothetically potential treaty partners. Prior to the signature and ratification of a given agreement, governments must first initiate negotiations, and subsequently engage in rounds of talks and treaty drafting. While it is conceivable that countries purposely select into negotiations that are less likely to fail, the data show that countries often fail to anticipate negotiation roadblocks, perhaps because many of the hurdles are exogenous. For example, negotiations between Canada and Thailand towards a PTA were terminated in 2015 because of a military coup in the latter country.

For an attempted PTA negotiation to be considered in my dataset, a given pair of states must publicly announce that they intend to negotiate an agreement and subsequently formally engage in a negotiation round at least once. The negotiation process itself can be broken down into five definitive steps, visualized in Figure 1.[5] First, at least two states engage in exploratory discussions. This period is punctuated and defined by public consultations with industries interested in an agreement, as well as formal meetings between governments evaluating their interests and negotiating the set of issues that could be covered in a treaty. When states seek to draft an agreement, they then proceed to structured negotiations, engaging in formal meetings often in a series of "negotiation rounds." In the third stage, negotiations conclude and a treaty draft is produced and subject to a legal scrub and, if necessary, translation. When the final text is ready, this period is followed by a formal signature, which in turn is followed by a period of domestic ratification and implementation.

Notably, this 5 stage process is idealized as a linear progression from one stage to the next.

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[5]This process is recognized by Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and is subsequently used to classify negotiation efforts in their own database.

At each stage, negotiators must consciously decide to continue negotiating, proceeding to the next round of bargaining. Rarely have negotiations regressed from formal negotiations to exploratory discussions, though occasionally initial drafts are re-visited during the legal scrub, or are renegotiated before a treaty is finally signed. Likewise, a signed treaty may be subject to review, or revision, following electoral turnover. Notably, this 5 stage process does not include a treaty proposal process, wherein officials might discuss potential PTAs but not explore potential agreements beyond thought experiments or casual conversations. The full universe of potential agreement proposals is, in effect, unknowable. Such thought experiments by leaders also don't amount to the expenditure of many state resources, whereas a defined period of exploratory discussions at a minimum requires public consultations and diplomatic exchanges. As such, the data collection process starts at the stage of *observable* exploratory talks publicly launched by a pair of governments, followed by the launching of formal negotiations towards a PTA.

The dataset includes negotiation attempts towards PTAs for two countries: Canada, and the United States. These countries were chosen first for their data availability, as well as their consequential role in PTA negotiations since the 1980s. The United States has successfully negotiated and ratified 20 PTAs. It remains the world's largest economy, and thus one of the most consequential negotiators of such agreements. Existing research has further demonstrated that American trade agreements are model agreements adopted by many other states (Dür, Baccini and Haftel, 2015). Yet the United States, because of its particular position as the hegemonic power in the global economy and status as the largest economy for the majority fo the period under study, may not be representative of all negotiating efforts. In order to engage in a comparison, I chose to study Canadian PTA negotiations both because of data availability, as well as key similarities to the United States. Canada has signed 16 PTAs and is a middle-income country part of the Group of 8 (G8). It offers a point of comparison to the United States as a country with similar model PTAs. However, it differs in terms of its electoral cycle and structure, as well as its importance in the global economy. These differences offer less predictable electoral turnover in Canada than the United States, given Canada's federal parliamentary structure, as

well as different economic and political interests in signing PTAs due to significant differences in industry composition and population.

Alongside collecting a quantitative database of failed negotiations, I compliment the general descriptive data with a Large-N case analysis, evaluating all cases of successful and failed PTAs in Canada and the United States over time in terms of which political leader and political party was in power throughout the negotiation process. I prioritize a methodological approach that displays both the nuance of the data, as well as evaluating the theorized causal mechanisms against the historical record. Process tracing is well suited to do this given the case-centric approach, and evaluation of two primary causal processes: electoral turnover, and changing perceptions of the costs of negotiation failure. Each negotiation in my data set represents an instance of the posited causal relationship (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, 2019). Doing so allows me to recover a stronger understanding of what links our posited mechanisms with the causal outcome of interest, in this case negotiation success or failure (Collier, 2011; Bennett and Checkel, 2015). In both cases, Canada and the United States experienced both leadership and political party turnover, while the scope negotiations varied between extremely shallow (in the successful US-Japan PTA) to incredibly broad (the proposed Canada-India PTA).

Tracing failed PTA negotiations and Defining Failure

To collect an exhaustive list of all attempted PTA negotiations by the United States and Canada, I first collected public press releases by the bureaucratic agencies concerned with negotiating PTAs. In the case of Canada, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) maintains a publicly available database of all active investment agreement negotiations, noting information about when talks were first initiated, the number of negotiation rounds, and dates of signature and ratification when applicable.[6] American PTA negotiations were traced using press releases by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), public media reports, leaked diplo-

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[6]This database can be accessed here: https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/index.aspx?lang=eng. Notably, each entry also indicates the "stage" of negotiation according to our five point scale, as well as when the page was last updated.

matic cables posted on WikiLeaks, and WaybackMachine internet archives of the US Trade Representative website for additional cases of failed talks.[7] Lists of attempted PTA negotiations were then compared to existing databases of known Canadian and American PTAs reported in DESTA, and to the Organization of American States (OAS) Foreign Trade Information System (SICE). This subsequently generated a final data set of negotiations coded according to the five stage process outlined previously. Importantly, a negotiation was coded as failed if negotiating parties had not met for at least 18 months, and there was not statement or record they intended to meet again within the next 12 months.[8] The 18 month cutoff was chosen as it is the median time to negotiate a PTA in the data, as well as the longest noted gap between negotiation rounds for almost all known successful treaties.[9]

Overview of the Data

The dataset includes 68 PTAs negotiated by the United States and Canada, of which 35 were negotiated successfully and 33 failed to yield an agreement off any kind.[10] Table 1 provides summary statistics. PTAs negotiated by the United States and Canada are overwhelmingly bilateral: only 22 multilateral PTAs have been negotiated by the United States and Canada, of which they are mutually apart of 4 (the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the revised United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), the initial Trans-Pacific

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[7]I adopted this approach because electoral turnover has often resulted in the archiving of older versions of the USTR or State Department websites, including the removal of older negotiations by outgoing administrations that were discontinued without formal public notice.

[8]By this definition, I code stalled negotiations, or "zombie" negotiations as failed given they did not produce an agreement of *any* kind. In future research, I hope to decompose terminated negotiations from "zombie" talks that are on the books as "in progress" but haven't met in a number of years. I am open to comments or suggestions on how to differentiate between these two categories, as well as questions of interest about such cases.

[9] One extreme exception to this cutoff exists: a ten year gap in negotiations between Canada and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Negotiations were launched in 1998, but paused for 6 years between 2000 and 2006 over "sensitive issues" such as access to Canada's ship-building market. The agreement concluded in 2007. For more information see the press release announcing the conclusion fo the agreement by the Canadian government: http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/can_efta/Negotiations/conclusion_e.pdf. While the agreement came into force in 2009 for all members, discussions to modernize the agreement were held in 2016 and 2018. To my knowledge, no other agreement has been revived after such a delay, relying on previous negotiations to do so. In all other cases with multiple attempts, negotiators began new drafts.

[10] Where agreements are signed by both the United States and Canada, they are double counted. I use the phrase "unique" PTAs here to note this overlap in future counts.

Partnership (TPP), and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). Figure 3 reports the distribution

of cases across the 5 stage negotiation process by agreement type and country. Collectively,

9 PTAs are currently in the exploratory discussions stage, amounting to formal public consulta-

tions towards potential agreements and meetings to launch formal negotiations. There are 23

PTAs coded at the negotiation stage, of which only 2 are actively ongoing with future negoti-

ation rounds scheduled. footnote Only negotiations by the Trump administration towards the

US-Kenya Free Trade Agreement and the US-UK Free Trade Agreement remain active within the

last 2 years, with the last formal meeting of parties occurring in February of 2020. Additionally

the United States has met with the United Kingdom 3 times to begin negotiations towards a

standalone PTA, but such drafting efforts have been slow given the UK has not yet fully exited

the EU. The Trump administration also terminated the BIT negotiations program. It remains

unclear what Biden's priorities are towards BITs and PTAs, but evidence should become clearer

after the senate confirmation of Katherine Thai as the next USTR. At the time of writing, Cana-

dian efforts to negotiate new PTAs are on hold. Just 1 PTA has been signed but not ratified in

the dataset - the TPP which Canada and the United States both signed. While the United States

withdrew, Canada would go on to renegotiate the draft treaty and implement the successful

Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2018.

Table 1: Summary Statistics For Complete Dataset (1980-2020)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	68	2006	8.25	1984	2020
Number Negotiating Parties	68	6.26	10.31	2	51
Negotiation Failed	68	0.46	0.50	0	1
Number of Negotiation Months	68	28.56	26.62	1	113
Canada/USA RILE Manifesto Score	68	15.93	17.57	−20.68	33.60
Partner Polyarchy Score	46	0.57	0.27	0.02	0.90
Partner GDP Per Capita ($USD)	44	12,055.32	13,324.94	276.81	48,603.48
Trade Balance with Partner ($USD Millions)	43	−11,274.45	68,711.81	−443,000.00	70,773.91

Note: Partner refers to countries in negotiation with either thee United States or Canada towards a PTA. Polyarchy scores are collected from the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) project, and range between 0 and 1, where 1 is the ideal electoral democracy. Trade balance calculations represent the total value of exports less imports by the United States or Canada and their negotiating partner in millions of US dollars, as reported by UNCOMTRADE. Because of data availability, trade balance values are missing for negotiations before 1990. Partner values are only calculated for bilateral negotiations in this version of the dataset.

Figure 2: Cumulative PTAs, successful vs. negotiation attempts (1980-2020)

While previous work in the field of international political economy has highlighted the difficulties of the approval process for PTAs (Putnam, 1988; Milner, 1997), the data on PTA negotiation attempts highlights that ratification difficulties on the floor of the house of commons or congress in either the United States or Canada are not the real issue. Where efforts to conclude new trade agreements stumble is at the negotiations stage. This is likely due to two running issues: first, negotiating parties recognize that they cannot agree to terms that would ultimately be domestically ratifiable so they don't even try; or, second, negotiating parties possess truly irreconcilable preferences can cannot come to an agreement. As a result, ratification failure rarely has the chance to occur, if at all, because politicians are unwilling to risk a failed floor vote at all. Many scholars argue that the TPP suffered from this exact problem in the United States, regardless of whether Trump had been elected and pursued an anti-globalist foreign policy.[11] Yet not all treaties get to such a stage. Regardless, this highlights that governments

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[11] See, Alan Yuhas evaluation of Barack Obama's final push to ratify the TPP and recognition that the agreement would not pass a vote as late as November 12th 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/nov/12/tpp-trade-deal-congress-obama.

Figure 3: PTAs by negotiation stage, USA v. Canada (1980-2020)

Note: PTAs that Canada and the United States are jointly apart of are double counted, adding 4 additional observations to the Canadian tally: the TISA to under negotiation, TPP to signed for both countries, and the CUSFTA, NAFTA and USMCA agreements to the ratified count.

may cut their losses earlier in the negotiation stage if they anticipate their local governments won't approve of the final treaty.

Table 2 describes the breakdown of success and failure rates of negotiations between the United States and Canada. In both the United States and Canada, PTA negotiations fail roughly half the time they are initiated, with 16 successful and 16 failed PTA negotiations in Canada (50/50%), and 19 successful and 15 failed PTA negotiations in the United States (56/44%).[12] These differences are broken down further in Table 3 and Table 4. Successful PTA negotiations

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[12] The CUSFTA, NAFTA, TISA and USMCA trade agreements are counted in both Canadian and American lists of agreements, as they constitute individual successes for both countries.

Table 2: PTA Negotiation Success Rates, USA v. Canada (1980-2020)

Country	Treaty Type	Successful	Success (%)	Failed Nego.	Failed Rat.	Failure (%)
Canada	PTA	16	50%	16	0	50%
United States	PTA	20	56%	15	0	44%

Note: Failed.Nego refers to negotiations that failed to produce a final agreement. Failed.Rat refers to agreements that were fully drafted, but subsequently were not ratified by the US or Canada, and thus remain not in force. The count of successful negotiations includes all agreements that reached the "concluded negotiations", "signed" and "ratified" stages. The count of failed negotiations included all agreements that were not ultimately ratified and implemented. This leads to double counting of treaties in the "concluded negotiations" and "signed categories." The CUSFTA, NAFTA and USMCA preferential trade agreements are also all double counted here, as they are considered successful by both the governments of the United States and Canada. The failed TISA agreement is also double counted, as the US and Canada were both apart of those multilateral negotiations

are concentrated around 2004, whereas the average year of negotiation failure in the dataset is 2008. The average number of negotiating parties in successful cases is 3 but for failed negotiations is 10. This corroborates that negotiating with more trade partners at once is difficult, and rarely successful beyond the NAFTA/USMCA agreements. More generally, Canada and the United States seek PTAs with largely undemocratic states, with average polyarchy scores of 0.57 (where 0 is absolutely not an electoral democracy, and 1 is a true electoral democracy). Partner countries are also ones with which Canada and United States run significant trade deficits (i.e. countries they import more products from than export to). Failed negotiations also tend to run longer – 36.5 months vs. 21 months - than those that are successful.

Table 3: Summary Statistics For Successful and Ongoing PTA Negotiations

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	37	2004	9.52	1984	2,020
Number Negotiating Parties	37	3.35	4.74	2	29
Number of Negotiation Months	37	21.84	24.51	3	103
Canada/USA RILE Manifesto Score	37	17.84	16.29	−20.68	33.60
Partner Polyarchy Score	29	0.60	0.28	0.08	0.90
Partner GDP Per Capita	27	10,770.90	11,172.36	276.81	40,284.64
Trade Balance with Partner ($USD Millions)	26	−14,931.96	88,485.11	−443,000.00	70,773.91

Note: The count of cases is 37, higher than the discussed 35 as the counts include 2 ongoing negotiations by the US at the time of writing: the US-UK PTA, and the US-Kenya PTA. Partner refers to countries in negotiation with either thee United States or Canada towards a PTA. Canada/USA RILE manifesto score indicates the right-left orientation of the sitting Canadian or American government, as calculated by the comparative manifesto project. Polyarchy scores are collected from the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) project, and range between 0 and 1, where 1 is the ideal electoral democracy. Trade balance calculations represent the total value of exports less imports by the United States or Canada and their negotiating partner in millions of US dollars, as reported by UNCOMTRADE. Because of data availability, trade balance values are missing for negotiations before 1990. Partner values are only calculated for bilateral negotiations in this version of the dataset.

Table 4: Summary Statistics For Failed PTA Negotiations

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	31	2008	5.61	1998	2019
Number Negotiating Parties	31	9.74	13.69	2	51
Number of Negotiation Months	31	36.58	27.19	1	113
Canada/USA RILE Manifesto Score	31	13.65	19.00	−20.68	33.31
Partner Polyarchy Score	17	0.52	0.26	0.02	0.90
Partner GDP Per Capita	17	14,095.27	16,344.28	1,263.29	48,603.48
Trade Balance with Partner ($USD Millions)	17	−5,680.61	10,231.78	−32,750.84	6,579.67

 Note: The total number of failed cases is 31, as 2 American PTAs are still under active negotiations at the time of writing: the US-Kenya PTA, and the US-UK PTA. Partner refers to countries in negotiation with either thee United States or Canada towards a PTA. Canada/USA RILE manifesto score indicates the right-left orientation of the sitting Canadian or American government, as calculated by the comparative manifesto project. Polyarchy scores are collected from the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) project, and range between 0 and 1, where 1 is the ideal electoral democracy. Trade balance calculations represent the total value of exports less imports by the United States or Canada and their negotiating partner in millions of US dollars, as reported by UNCOMTRADE. Because of data availability, trade balance values are missing for negotiations before 1990. Partner values are only calculated for bilateral negotiations in this version of the dataset.

Canadian PTA Negotiations

Table 5 and Table 6 break down BIT and PTA negotiation success rates by the political party and Prime Minister in power respectively, while Figure 4 provides a graphical overview of negotiation success and failure rates over time. The earliest year a Canadian PTA negotiation is reported by the OAS SICE or the GAC database is 1984, with the initiation of negotiation efforts towards the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. In Canada, two major political parties have held power between 1980 and 2020: the Progressive Conservative party (which, following developments in party agenda and composition, since 2003 is known as the Conservative Party) and the Liberal party. Both parties have sought to negotiate many PTAs over time, though most efforts have been concentrated in the post-2000 era by Conservative governments.

Failed PTA negotiations have only occurred since 2001, when the Canadian government sought to sign many more agreements in the wake of the dot-com bubble and even more so after the 2008 global financial crisis. On average, PTA negotiations have taken as little as 2 months and as long as 113, with an average negotiation time of 36.5 months, or 3 years, to complete. The average number of negotiation rounds for PTAs is 7, though agreements have been concluded in as few as 1, and as many as 21 rounds of meetings for those with formal

**Table 5:** Failure rates by agreement type for Canadian political parties

Political Party	Successful	Success (%)	Failed	Failure (%)
Conservative	9	47%	10	53%
Liberal	7	54%	6	46%

Table 6: PTA Negotiation Attempts by Canadian Prime Ministers

Prime Minister	Successful	Success (%)	Failed	Failure (%)
Mulroney (C)	2	100%	0	0%
Chrétien (L)	4	67%	2	33%
Martin (L)	1	100%	0	0%
Harper (C)	7	41%	10	59%
Trudeau (L)	2	33%	4	67%

reports available. On three occasions, PTA talks have taken over 100 months, or just over 8 years to conclude, including a 10 year negotiation effort for a multilateral PTA between Canada and the Central American 4: Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador. After 113 months of talks and 12 formal rounds of negotiations, Canada terminated the negotiation effort, instead prioritizing the negotiation of a PTA with Honduras alone. Likewise, negotiations for a PTA between Canada and South Korea concluded after 103 months of talks and 11 negotiation rounds.

The data hints that electoral turnover in Canada is consequential for PTA negotiations, but what process evidence demonstrates that what matters more is the particular Prime Minister in power. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties have sought international economic agreements, with more agreements signed and ratified by Conservative Prime Ministers than Liberal Prime Ministers. Yet, specific political agenda of a sitting Prime Minister has mattered greatly for negotiations that were not completed by outgoing administrations. Progressive Conservative leader Brian Mulroney (PM 1984-1993) was the first Prime Minister to successfully negotiate a PTA on behalf of Canada. Mulroney's successes began with the 1988 Canada-United States

Figure 4: PTA negotiation success rates, Canada (1985-2020)

Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), signed opposite then Republican President Ronald Reagan.

While the United States and Canada had formally attempted to negotiate PTAs three times, first in 1855, then 1911, and lastly in 1945, electoral turnover in each instance had killed any agreement from being put to a ratification vote. The early prioritization of efforts towards a multilateral organization, initially the International Trade Organization (ITO) and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), also squeezed out efforts towards a bilateral arrangement between the two countries. Mulroney's success with the CUSFTA is notable, particularly in that, like prior US-Canada PTAs in 1855 and 1911, the ratification of CUSFTA triggered a federal election in 1988 (Brodie, 1989). A rare single-issue election, Mulroney's victory in 1988 stemmed from the Progressive Conservative party's successes in the first past the post system (LeDuc, 1989). The Canadian popular vote, on the other hand, was firmly against the agreement. Subsequently, the success of CUSFTA saw the United States seek a standalone bilateral trade agreement with Mexico in 1991. Fearing the CUSFTA would be overshadowed, the Mulroney government joined those negotiations, ultimately resulting in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000). NAFTA was signed

in 1993 shortly before Mulroney lost power to Liberal opposition leader, Jean Chrétien (PM 1993-2003). A core component of Chrétien's 1993 election campaign was his opposition to the version of NAFTA Mulroney had negotiated. Following his victory, Chrétien would negotiate two additional chapters with Republican George H.W. Bush prior to the 1994 American election of Democratic leader Bill Clinton.

Following NAFTA re-negotiations, Chrétien's government prioritized the negotiation of much shallower bilateral investment treaties. Known to the Canadian government as Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPAs), Chrétien's government signed 14 BITs while in office, mostly with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Hungary, Ukraine, the Philippines, Egypt, Armenia, Croatia, Lebanon and Thailand.[13] Yet, Chrétien did pursue three bilateral trade agreements with Chile, Israel and Costa Rica. The agreements were largely shallow, prioritizing tariff reductions on specific sectors such as automobile parts. When Chrétien lost the support of the Liberal party as leader in 2003, he stepped down from power, leading the party to nominate Paul Martin (PM 2003-2006) as his successor. Martin secured his position as Prime Minister in a formal election in 2004. While he remained with the Liberal party as prime minister, all PTA negotiations were put on hold during his leadership, and no new talks were initiated while he was office.

The negotiation of PTAs by Canada was renewed with the victory of Conservative leader Stephen Harper (PM 2006-2015), and the subsequent 2008 financial crisis, which had the Canadian government double down on making commitments to trade and investment liberalization. Harper would sign 7 PTAs during his 9 years in office; yet he would also see 9 failed PTA negotiations. These trends would in part be continued, but on a lesser scale, when newly nominated Liberal leader Justin Trudeau (PM 2016-present) assumed the Prime Minister's office in the fall of 2016. During his first electoral campaigns, Trudeau was questioned about his support for prospective trade agreements like the TPP and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU. He was agnostic, adopting the perspective of Chré-

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[13] BITs with countries in the LAC region included Argentina, Barbados, Ecuador, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Uruguay and Costa Rica.

tien: the Liberal party supported free trade, but would seek to preserve Canadian interests in both agreements even if doing so required re-negotiations. Yet, upon assuming office, Trudeau halted negotiations towards PTAs with Japan and India despite 7 and 10 rounds of negotiations respectively under the Harper government.

Since taking power in 2015, Trudeau's Liberal overnment has seen 4 PTA negotiations fail, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). While the initial TPP agreement was successfully negotiated and signed by the Harper government, the subsequent election of Trudeau in 2015 and American withdrawal from the TPP in 2017 complicated the ratification process. Following the withdrawal of the United States, the Trudeau government was tasked with participating in additional negotiation rounds with the other remaining 10 signatories, adding nearly 100 pages of additional content in the process.[14] The Canadian government would subsequently double down on revisions to the TPP treaty following the withdrawal of the United States in 2017, leading to the significant editing and expansion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) amongst the 11 remaining TPP signatories. Negotiations towards the CETA, on the other hand, would be reopened following demands by both Canadian and European Union members to revisit the agreement's investment chapter, and investor state dispute settlement provisions in particular.

Collectively, the Canadian experience demonstrates that electoral turnover has frustrated negotiations in several periods, leading the incoming administration to abandon the priorities of outgoing administrations particularly towards new PTAs. However, the political agendas of a specific Prime Minister appears to matter more than a particular political party affiliation. Periods when leadership turnover occurred, but political parties have stayed the same, face similar negotiation failure rates as those period where leadership and political party turnover occurred. While the vast majority of PTA negotiations are bilateral, agreements with more than three countries have faced immense difficulties. Almost all cases of PTA negotiation failure in-

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[14] Notably, within the GAC database the TPP is listed as a separate PTA from the ultimate CPTPP agreement. Within the OAS SICE database, information on the negotiation of the TPP and CPTPP have been consolidated into one page, though they note the separation of the negotiations process after 2017.

cluded more than two countries. More comprehensive negotiating agendas have also been frustrated in the negotiations process. As the rational design literature suggests, the more parties to a negotiation and the more up for negotiation, the harder it is to come to an agreement (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001).

American PTA Negotiations

**Table 7:** Failure rates by agreement type for American political parties

Political Party	Successful	Success (%)	Failed Nego.	Failure (%)
Democratic	4	44%	5	56%
Republican	15	56%	10	37%

Note: The total count of agreements here is 34, while the dataset contains 36 total PTA negotiation attempts for the United States. The two missing cases are ongoing negotiations towards the US-UK PTA and US-Kenya PTAs announced by the Trump administration.

Table 8: PTA Negotiation Attempts by American Presidents

President	Successful	Success (%)	Failed Nego.	Failed Rat.	Failure (%)
Reagan (R)	2	100%	0	0	0%
H.W. Bush (R)	1	100%	0	0	0%
Clinton (D)	4	80%	1	0	20%
W. Bush (R)	9	47%	10	0	53%
Obama (D)	0	0%	4	1	100%
Trump (R)	3	100%	0	0	0%

Table 7 and Table 8 provide an overview of PTA negotiation rates by political party and President in power in the United States respectively, while Figure 5 depicts rates of PTA negotiation success and failure over time. The earliest year an PTA negotiation is reported by the OAS SICE or USTR records is 1984 with the CUSFTA with Canada. Between 1980 and 2020, there have been six Presidents, of which 2 represented the Democratic Party, and 4 represented the Republican Party. Taking a closer look at the data again reveals that American rates of negotiation

Figure 5: PTA negotiation success rates, USA (1980-2020)

success and failure are not dramatically different from Canada. However, again the capacity

of Presidents to negotiate PTAs has been heavily influenced by whether the administration has

possessed trade promotion authority (Hiscox, 1999). Signed into legislation in 1934, The Re-

ciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) granted the President the capacity to negotiate trade

agreements independently from the Congress, with final agreements subject only to a final a

yay or nay vote in the House and Senate. However, the authority has been subject to constant

congressional renewal, often only covering the length of a single electoral period (3-4 years).

The spirit of the RTAA was extended with the Trade Promotion Authority Act (TPA) in 1974, and

its subsequent extensions up to and including 2021, playing a role in the lapsing of negotiations

for many presidents over time.

Diving into the data, the period of PTA negotiations under study captures a clear realign-

ment of political party preferences for protectionism vs. free trade in the United States. Whereas

Ronald Reagan's Republican Party (Pres. 1981-1989) championed free trade in the 1980s, it

is now the Democratic Party that fully supports pursuing more liberalized economic relations

(Schonfeld, 2019). Overall, Republicans have been slightly more successful than Democrats at negotiating PTAs (56% success rate vs. 44%), though this stems in part from a higher success rate amongst fewer overall attempts. However, many PTA negotiations have spanned multiple administrations, and subsequently been subject to the whims of party turnover, such as efforts to negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership, as well as NAFTA. Party attribution to negotiation efforts, however, is determined by the original initiator of a negotiation.

The average length of a PTA negotiation by the United States is 19 months, or just just over a year and a half. The shortest PTA negotiation was 3 months, for the shallow Trade Promotion Agreement signed between the US and China in 2020, while the longest was 67 months towards the Free Trade Area of the Americas between 1998 and 2005 over 8 rounds of talks. The average number of negotiation rounds for PTAs, however, is 7, though officials have concluded agreements in as few as 2 meetings (the 2020 US-China TPA) and as many as 21 (the 2006 United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement). This highlights the immense disparity of diplomatic capacity between the US and Canada, as well as a higher tolerance to bear the costs of negotiating failure amongst American negotiators. It was Reagan who was first successful at signing a PTA, first in 1985 with Israel and secondly in 1988 with Canada. The orientation towards signing PTAs would continue with Republican George H.W. Bush (Pres. 1989-1993).

Overall, the Democratic Party has initiated 9 PTA negotiations while the Republican party has initiated 25 PTAs. Of the Democratic Party's 9 PTA negotiations, only 5 treaties were successful, while the Republican Party has ratified 10. Democratic successes also technically include the successful ratification of NAFTA in 1994, though the agreement was fully negotiated and signed while Republican H.W. Bush was President. More generally, the vast majority of American PTA and BIT negotiations were instead initiated by George W. Bush (Pres. 2001-2009). Of the 25 overall attempted PTA negotiations, 19 were initiated by W. Bush. These trends were driven in large part by W. Bush's efforts to promote economic exchange and "export democracy" following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks (Monten, 2005).

The W. Bush administration prioritized PTAs based on clusters of potential trading partners

in every region of the globe. Notably, W. Bush launched the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) in October of 2002, the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) in May of 2003, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in November of 2003. Likewise, parallel negotiations were initiated with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the South African Customs Union (SACU), the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). Only the proposed MEFTA and FTAA agreements were truly multilateral, with invitations to negotiate extended to specific groups of countries, as opposed to specific regional organizations. In particular, the MEFTA was to be a regional free trading area among twenty entities in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. W. Bush marketed the PTA as an anti-terrorism initiative and as a way to promote democracy through trade [15]. The USTR was tasked with signing multiple bilateral agreements between the United States and MENA countries as building blocks towards a larger multilateral agreement by 2013, starting first with promoting WTO membership and the extension Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) access, followed by the signing of individual trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs), then BITs, and ultimately PTAs.[16]

Not only were regional initiatives like MEFTA pertinent for the *selection* of negotiating partners, since they were chosen for largely political rather than economic reasons, they subsequently became central in the choice of what kind of economic agreement was pursued. W. Bush's democracy promotion efforts culminated in the successful negotiation of 2 BITs and 8 PTAs, though his TPA authority also lapsed in 2007, limiting his executive authority to fast track PTA negotiations during his final year in office. Furthermore, efforts to progress from TIFAs to BITs, and likewise from BITs to PTAs did not occur amongst any of the agreements signed with the exception of Bahrain. While Clinton had signed a BIT with Bahrain in 1999, W. Bush successfully negotiated a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the country in 2002, and subsequently a PTA in 2004.

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[15] See Bolle, (2005) *Middle East Free Trade Area: Progress Report*. Accessible online at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32638.pdf

[16] See a June 23, 2003 statement by W. Bush, found in https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32638.pdf

Outside of regional initiatives with an openly acknowledged political component, such as MEFTA, the initial US governmental priority was in negotiating BITs, dating back to 1978. In addition to the CUSFTA and NAFTA agreements, BITs were Reagan and H.W. Bush's priorities, which then continued under Clinton. TIFAs began to become more prevalent under Clinton, and then dramatically so under W. Bush as a result of his administration's efforts to promote democracy via economic relations. The Obama administration continued to primarily sign TIFAs, and his diplomatic Pacific pivot saw the EAI shift focus from negotiating with ASEAN to American allies Japan and Australia, and ultimately the TPP. 3 of the PTAs Obama ratified early in his administration were formally negotiated and signed during the Bush era. In totality, Obama was only able to negotiate one successful BIT, with Rwanda, which may be a result of the expiration of his Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) in 2015.

The inauguration of Republic President Donald Trump in 2017 saw another pivot in support for negotiating PTAs. Campaigning on a platform that sought to renegotiate NAFTA and KO-RUS, and withdraw from the TPP, Trump largely delivered on his promises during his first term. While his right-wing populist position would suggest an aversion to any PTA negotiation, Trump would begin 5 new negotiations. Within days of taking office, Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP and within months triggered talks towards a revised NAFTA. His signature of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUSMA) in 2018 was complimented by the successful negotiation of a Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) with China in early 2020. His administration has sought to negotiate two other PTAs, one with Japan and another with Kenya, though the former resulted in a shallow agreement not formally requiring congressional ratification, and the latter was announced in March of 2020. These 4 agreements stand apart from the Trump administration's complete rejection of TIFAs, BITs and PTAs as foreign economic policy tools. Yet the Trump administration's negotiation successes have stemmed from the hangover of Obama's 2015 renewal of TPA via the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act, currently set to expire in 2021.

The causes of negotiation success and failure

Given the changing prevalence of negotiation failure between 1980 and 2020, why then does it happen? What are the consequences of negotiation failure for future negotiating efforts? In evaluating the data collected, two key factors appear important. First, the policy agenda of a sitting leader matters greatly for which countries the United States and Canada seeks to negotiate with, as well as how deep a complicated a trade agreement they seek to sign. Secondly, leaders appear to evaluate the costs of negotiation failure differently over time. With increased negotiation failure towards new PTAs arising after 2008, leaders appear more willing to bear the costs of failure. This may stem from the perception that the costs of negotiation failure after 2008, in a period where many agreements have already been successful and the global trading regime is generally open thanks to the World Trade Organization, are lower than in previous periods.

In a world where two countries seeking an agreement can walk away, the costs of failure must be high in order to compel them to continue negotiating, and furthermore accept less than their preferred outcome. The perception of what these costs entail, as well as the perceived costs of future enforcement and noncompliance, can be manipulated in the present to generate agreement (Fearon, 1998). The costs of negotiation failure include limited market access or first mover's advantage when establishing a treaty in issue areas not covered by existing agreements. In the wake of World War I the erosion of global economic cooperation following the Great Depression in the 1930s was high: in effect, almost all pre-existing agreements on trade and tariffs were revoked following the incursion of steep tariffs. In this instance, the perceived costs of negotiation failure were quite high: market access could only be gained by new agreements; the status quo was one of relatively closed foreign markets. In the context of conflict, and the sheer expense of war or military ventures, the costs of negotiation failure are generally much more significant. Continuing with the previous example, the UK could not stand to lose out of the financial and military support guaranteed in the Atlantic Charter, and subsequent Lend Lease Agreements. In my other research, I argue that because falling back

on status quo is unacceptable, a compromise on treaty terms must be tolerated, which can be achieved by relying on ambiguous treaty language. These claims generate two observable implications, and testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *Country leaders will be more willing to accept negotiation failure if the perceived costs of walking away with no agreement are low.*

Hypothesis 2: *The policy priorities of new political leaders can lead to the termination of negotiations by prior administrations.*

While the data descriptively offers support for these hypotheses, I provide correlational quantitative evidence using a logistic regression model on the cross-sectional data, as well as a survival analysis of a cross-sectional time series version of the data. Given the limited case counts, however, these analyses are paired with a case study of efforts by the Canadian government to negotiate a PTA with India between 2009 and 2017. This case was chosen as an instance where a negotiation spanned 4 administrations, with changes in the political party in power, as well as changing levels of domestic support for international trade. By evaluating this case, it is possible to evaluate these hypotheses against intuitive alternative explanations. First, it may be that political party agendas for and against international trade driven demands for agreements, given domestic levels of support. As a result, we might anticipate that leaders are more willing to terminate negotiation efforts because their party agenda is opposed signing additional agreements, and/or their domestic supporters are against additional treaties. Second, it may be that as global enthusiasm for PTAs has waned in the second decade of the 21st century more broadly has generated a cooling off of efforts towards new trade agreements in all countries. The case serves as a productive way to dive into the mechanics of the decision making process where quantitative analysis is not well positioned to evaluate how these mechanisms may have alone, or in combination, led to the outcome of negotiations failing in 2017.

Quantitative Analyses

The panel nature of the data makes possible two sets of basic quantitative analyses: the first is a basic cross-sectional logistic regression of all 68 PTA negotiation attempts by the United States and Canada. The second is a cross-sectional time series dataset evaluating changes in key variables over the period a treaty is under negotiation. In both cases the dependent variable is binary, coded 1 for if a negotiation fails and 0 if it's successful. The first independent variable of interest is the cumulative number of successful PTAs, meaning agreements that are negotiated, signed, and ratified, by either Canada or the United States over time. If Hypothesis 1 is correct, then this coefficient should be positive and statistically significant, meaning that as Canada or the United States have successfully negotiated PTAs, each successive negotiation is *more* likely to fail. This measure captures decreasing costs of negotiation failure as market access over the period improves, and the status quo generally favours free trade. It also captures the fact that successive treaties tend to address more difficult industries and issues to negotiate. The second independent variable of interest is whether there was administration turnover during a negotiation attempt, evaluating whether turnover itself is more likely to see negotiations fail. An additional measure is a factor variable coding the leader in power in the United States and Canada that initiated a given PTA negotiation attempt. If Hypothesis 2 is correct, then the binary measure of whether leadership turnover occurred during a PTA negotiation attempt should be positive and statistically significant, meaning turnover during a negotiation is more likely to lead a negotiation to fail. Control variables include measures for whether there was leadership turnover in the partner country or countries negotiating with Canada or the United States, a binary measure fo whether the partner country or countries were democratic, the number of negotiating parties, and the number of months a treaty was under negotiation. An additional control includes the comparative manifesto project's measure of right/left orientation (RILE) for Canada or the United States to capture the general orientation

Table 9: Logistic Regression on Cross-Sectional Data

|	PTA Negotiation Failed (1)	
	(1)	(2)
Canada/USA cumulative PTAs	0.10*	0.12*
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Canada/USA leader turnover	0.31	0.21
	(0.52)	(0.64)
Canada/USA Election Year		−1.65**
		(0.76)
Negotiation partner(s) leader turnover		0.11
		(1.08)
Canada/USA RILE Manifesto		−0.004
		(0.02)
Negotiation partner(s) democracy		−0.60
		(0.70)
Negotiation partner(s): Mixed		1.65
		(1.35)
Negotiation partner(s): Developing		1.94**
		(0.94)
Multilateral		1.16
		(0.79)
Constant	−1.14**	−2.36
	(0.55)	(1.44)
N	68	68
Log Likelihood	−44.71	−35.72
AIC	95.43	91.45

$^*p < .1;\ ^{**}p < .05;\ ^{***}p < .01$

Note: The leadership turnover variables are a dummy variable for whether a new administration took power during a negotiation. The developing country party and mixed developing/developed country partner variables are part of the same factor variable where the baseline category is a negotiation between two developed countries, as classified by the World Bank.

of the government in power towards international trade and business.[17]

Table 9 presents the results of two logistic regression models. In the first, a simple model regressing the number of cumulative PTAs and whether there was leadership turnover in Canada or the United States during a negotiation on negotiation failure yields a positive and statistically significant result: the more PTAs a country has successfully negotiated before a given negoti-

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[17] Because of the limited sample size, additional control variables had limited impact. Additional models were run controlling for whether a political leader had control of their domestic political institutions. In the United States, this was a variable measuring whether the President had control of both the the house and senate, and in Canada whether a government had a majority or minority share of seats in Parliament. Other controls evaluating whether turnover in political parties in power happened in the partner country, whether the treaty was bilateral or multilateral, the political party of the government in power, the pre-existing trade volume between countries were also included. All measures were statistically insignificant and are not reported here.

Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Negotiation Breakdown (Cross-sectional Results)

ation attempt, the more likely a PTA negotiation is to fail. Importantly, the coefficient on leadership turnover is in the correct direction, but not statistically significant in model 1 or 2. What is more important is whether a negotiation has a national election occur during negotiations. If this happens, negotiations are less likely to fail. Yet, even when controlling for this and other factors, Increasing from 1 successful PTA to 15 sees an increase in the predicted probability of negotiation failure from 34% to 74%. The change in predicted probability of negotiation failure as the cumulative number of successful PTAs increases, holding all else constant for developed democracies negotiating partners that have experienced electoral turnover, is graphically depicted in Figure 6.

Importantly, the number of months a treaty is under negotiation is statistically significant and positive, meaning the longer a negotiation drags on for, the more likely it is to fail. Likewise, the more negotiating parties the more likely a negotiation is to fail. Interestingly, a mea-

sure for whether a negotiating partner is a developing country, or if the agreement is multilateral whether parties are mixed in their developing status, indicates that negotiations between Canada and the US with developing countries are more likely to fail. While the number of North-South PTAs is few, it's not for lack of trying. They are, however, more likely to see negotiations fail.

As the cross-sectional dataset does not capture important time trends in the variables of interest, I run a second set of analyses on an expanded version fo the dataset. Turning the data into a cross-sectional time series panel, the unit of analysis becomes the PTA negotiation attempt-year, for all years a negotiation is under . Doing so expands the dataset to 228 observations. To model negotiation failure on this panel, I run a survival analysis to evaluate the likelihood a given negotiation is likely to fail as the number of negotiating months increases. Using a Cox proportional hazards regression, where the outcome event is whether a negotiation fails, the key independent variables are risk factors making the likelihood of negotiation failure more likely. I include the same set of variables as the cross-sectional models, including the two central variables: the cumulative count of PTAs signed by the United States or Canada by the year a negotiation for a new PTA is initiated, and whether leadership turnover happened in the specific year a negotiation was ongoing. For interpretation, all continuous variables are make into dummy variables for whether a given measure was above or below the mean. For cumulative PTAs signed by the USA or Canada, the measure is whether the country was above 9 ratified PTAs in a given negotiation year, and whether a negotiation had extended past 47 months. Controls include whether leadership turnover also happened in the negotiating partner or partners, whether it was an election year in Canada or the USA, whether a negotiation is bilateral or multilateral, and whether the negotiating partner is a developing country, developed country, or mixed set of countries. Table 10 reports the results while Figure 7 graphically depicts the hazard ratios for each coefficient.

The results confirm such of what was found using the cross-sectional data alone. The number of cumulative PTAs is again positive and statistically significant. Holding all other variables

Table 10: Survival Analysis Results

	Negotiation Failed (1)
Canada/USA cumulative PTAs >9	1.40**
	(0.68)
Canada/USA leadership turnover	1.08*
	(0.64)
Negotiation months >= 47	-3.31***
	(0.69)
Developing Developed: Developing	2.31***
	(0.79)
Controls	✓
N	218
R^2	0.334
Log Likelihood	-81.536
LR Test	91.495*** (df = 19)

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Note: The leadership turnover variable is a dummy variable for whether a new administration took power during a negotiation. The developing country party and developing country partner variables are part of the same factor variable where the baseline category is a negotiation between mixed (developing and developed) countries, as classified by the World Bank. Note that 2 observations are missing as negotiations are ongoing for the US-Kenya and US-UK PTAs at the time of writing. Control variables include whether a negotiating partner is a democracy, whether electoral turnover happened in the negotiating partner(s), whether the government in Canada or the USA had a RILE manifesto score above 15.7 (the mean), a dummy for whether negotiations were multilateral and a dummy variable for whether it was an election year in the USA or Canada.

constant, a one unit increase in the number of cumulative PTAs signed by Canadas or the United States increase the hazard ratio by a factor of 1.25, or 25%. However, the leadership turnover variable in the panel setting does not produce a statistically significant result. This is likely due to the fact that leadership turnover often does not immediately translate into the termination of negotiations in the same year a new administration takes office. Again, however, the length of a time a treaty is under negotiation and whether a negotiating partner is a developing or developed country has a significant effect on the likelihood of negotiation success. Figure 8 graphically depicts the survival probability for a given PTA negotiation where the number of cumulative successful agreements increases from 0 to 5 to 10 to 19 (the maximum possible in the data). Holding all variables at their mean, for developing democracies, the survival probability of a negotiation declines from almost 98% at three years with only 1 pre-existing agreement to 75% with 15. The survival probability drops further when hitting the status quo, with 19 cumu-

Figure 7: Hazard ratios produced in survival analysis

Hazard ratios from survival analysis

cumulative_PTAs_dummy	(N=221)	4.069 (1.0734 − 15.42)		0.039 *
country1_leadership_turnover	(N=221)	2.935 (0.8346 − 10.32)		0.093
country2_leader_turnover	(N=221)	2.487 (0.4534 − 13.64)		0.294
Country1_Election_Year	(N=221)	0.568 (0.1599 − 2.02)		0.382
country2_democracy	(N=221)	1.338 (0.4721 − 3.79)		0.584
Nego_Months_dummy	(N=221)	0.036 (0.0095 − 0.14)		<0.001 ***
Country1_RILE_Manifesto_dummy	(N=221)	0.773 (0.2350 − 2.54)		0.671
Type	Bilateral (N=124)	reference		
	Multilateral (N=97)	0.781 (0.2466 − 2.48)		0.675
Developing_Developed	Developed (N=64)	reference		
	Developing (N=136)	10.047 (2.1505 − 46.94)		0.003 **
	Mixed (N=21)	1.184 (0.0799 − 17.54)		0.902

 # Events: 27; Global p−value (Log−Rank): 2.2216e−10
AIC: 188.92; Concordance Index: 0.91

0.005   0.01   0.05   0.1   0.5   1   5   10   50

lative successful agreements in the United States, especially for negotiations that run longer than average (2.5 years in the data).

While these quantitative analyses offer correlational evidence in favour of both hypotheses, they lack statistical power to rule out two important alternative explanations. First, it remains unclear if the individual agenda of a sitting leader is driving the change in orientation towards PTA negotiations, or if the change in priorities comes from a change in political party preferences for new trade agreements. Likewise, these models are not multi-level and are unable to capture changes in domestic political preferences, and the general climate towards international trade and investment globally. As such, I turn to a case study now to evaluate these two hypotheses in closer detail.

A deeper look: the failed Canada-India PTA (2009-2017)

When Conservative leader Stephen Harper assumed the Prime Minister's office in 2006, re-establishing economic ties between Canada and India was a top priority for his administration.

Figure 8: Survival Analysis of PTA Negotiations by Cumulative Number of Ratified PTAs

The task, however, was far from simple. Since the late 1950s, diplomatic relations between the two countries had been turbulent, defined by Canada's alignment with the United States during the Cold War and India's with the Soviet Union; an increasingly large Sikh diaspora in Canada; and India's efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities using Canadian technology in 1974 and 1998 (Touhey, 2009; Singh, 2016; Mehta, 2019).

Harper's efforts marked a revival of those by Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to normalize relations between the two countries. After assuming office in 1993, Chrétien sent 3 diplomatic missions to India, and in 1996 visited New Delhi himself with a delegation of 300 business leaders, provincial premiers and trade staff to further economic ties. Collectively referred to as *Team Canada* by external affairs, the contingent secured 75 trade contracts worth approximately CAD$3.4 billion over a matter of days (Touhey, 2009; Mehta, 2019). Yet the Chrétien government did not follow up on the effort. India's nuclear testing in May of 1998 saw

the Canadian government impose harsh sanctions against India (Touhey, 2009, 917). It was only at the end of Chrétien's time in office, in October of 2003, that his government reached out once more, establishing an open ended joint statement with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. In time, Chrétien's successor Paul Martin only verbalized support for normalizing relations with India (Singh, 2016, 58).

Surmounting the legacies of Canada's condemnations of India's nuclear program was central to Harper initiating talks of a BIT or PTA with India. In January of 2009, Harper visited New Delhi, proposing an ambitious comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA) with India. Harper sought to eliminate not only tariffs between both countries, but also the establishment of common rules on investment and non-tariff barriers.[18] Public consultations towards a PTA with India were initiated in March and April of that year, while the administration opened 4 trade offices in Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Kolkata, bringing the total to 8 (Singh, 2016, 59).

On November 17th 2009, Harper returned to India. During the visit, the Canadian and Indian governments jointly commissioned a feasibility study of a PTA between the two countries and initiated negotiations towards a BIT.[19] Collectively, the efforts culminated in the G20 summit in September of 2009, when Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was the first Indian leader to visit Canada in 44 years. On September 24th both governments announced a Canada-India Nuclear Trade deal.[20] With the stage set, Minister of International Trade Peter Van Loan visited New Delhi in November of 2010, officially launching formal negotiations towards a PTA. Both countries subsequently labelled 2011 the "Year of India in Canada" (Singh, 2016, 59)

Between 2011 and 2015, the Canadian and Indian governments held 8 rounds of negotiations, alternating between meetings in Ottawa and New Delhi. Negotiation efforts were supplemented by Harper's Global Markets Action Plan (GMAP) in 2013 which prioritized reducing Canadian economic dependence on the United States. Harper also prioritized staffing

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[18] See http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAN_IND/Negotiations/CAN_IND_EPA_e.pdf.
[19] See http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAN_IND/Negotiations/CAN_IND_EPA_e.pdf.
[20] See http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAN_IND/Negotiations/JointStatement_e.pdf.

Canada's High Commission in India over other countries with high quality bureaucrats (Mehta, 2019, 10). Parallel efforts sought to engage the Indian diaspora in Canada, as well as in-creased efforts by major Canadian universities to recruit Indian students for post-secondary degrees.(Singh, 2016, 64). Yet electoral turnover would derail negotiations with the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India in 2014, and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Canada in 2015.

Modi's government would visit Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver in April of 2015, signing multiple MOUs on issues ranging from space, rail, and aviation technology to research and development partnerships (Mehta, 2019). When Trudeau's government formally took power in 2016, economic relations with India became much less of a priority. While a 10th round of trade negotiations was held in New Delhi in August of 2017, Trudeau himself would not visit India until 2018 - and the visit itself amounted to a public relations disaster. Public media in Canada and India commented that Trudeau prioritized the visit of cultural landmarks like the Taj Mahal and Golden Temple over state meetings, as well as engaged in cultural appropriation and PR stunts for social media. The trip was further punctuated by Modi's refusal to meet Trudeau upon landing, sending instead Union Minister for Agriculture, Gajendra Shekhawat and many district level officials to greet the Canadian delegation.

The primary source of tension stemmed from Canadian refusals to meet with Punjab Chief Minister, Captain Amrinder Singh, an active critic of the Sikh Khalistan Movement in Punjab. The tensions harked back to the creation of the movement in the 1970s, which sought the creation of a separate, predominantly Sikh, state from India (Singh, 2016, 16). During that period, a large number of Sikhs and Khalistan sympathizers had sought asylum in Canada, creating tensions in state relations when Canadian leaders refused to police or condone local Khalistan Move-ment meetings. In 1984, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh body-guards, just months after Khalistan Movement activists high-jacked Air India flight 182 from Vancouver (Mehta, 2019, 7). In 1984, the Golden Temple became a symbol for the movement when Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale took control of the monument while advocating

for the creation of Khalistan.

When Trudeau rejected the meeting offer with Minister Singh in favour of visiting the Golden Temple, while in the company of Sikh Canadian Defence Minister Harjit Singh Sajjan, the Modi government was deeply offended.[21] While Modi and Trudeau ultimately met face to face at the end of his official state visit in 2018, talks deteriorated quickly. While extenuating political legacies rendered relations difficult, the political agendas of the two leaders created a sharp change in priorities. While Harper's government had successfully negotiated a BIT with India in 2007, engaged in 9 rounds of talks, signed numerous MOUs, and prioritized 19 high level missions, his administration's efforts were largely undone within 2 years of Trudeau assuming office. The prospect of a Canada-India PTA likely will not be revisited until political leadership in both countries favours a PTA, and or seek a much less ambitious agreement.

In this instance, Liberal and Conservative governments favoured an agreement. Domestic support for a PTA in both countries was positive amongst existing industries with ties to one another. The general public in Canada, however, was largely uninformed of efforts towards a PTA at all - general media coverage of talks under the Harper government were limited, while Trudeau's personal antagonism with Modi took priority over discussions of negotiations themselves. Governments also viewed the costs sunk into negotiations as limited and tolerable. Market access to the country was already, generally, quite good. Earlier concerns related to India's nuclear capacity and strategic position in Asia were also abated.

Conclusion and Implications

This paper makes an important contribution to the study of PTAs in the field IPE. First, I highlight the importance of studying bargaining failure in IPE by broadening the study of PTAs to all negotiation attempts. Negotiation failures happen almost 50% of the time, and the full

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[21] Concerns also rose within the Modi government with the nomination of Sikh Canadian Jagmeet Singh Dhaliwal to leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP) in Canada in 2017. While Singh was an unlikely future Prime Minister due to the NDP's 3rd party status in Canada, Singh remained an outspoken critic of Modi's government in public speeches and on twitter.

universe of negotiation attempts needs to be studied in order to better understand treaty formation. Existing scholarship in IPE has been averse to discussions of "non-events", in part due to the view that obtaining a near universal data set of all negotiating failures is impossible or hypothetical. This paper works to correct this view, demonstrating that a systematic empirical tracing of failed negotiations is possible. As such, this paper presents an original data-set of 68 PTA negotiations initiated by the United States and Canada between 1980 and 2020. A coding of negotiation attempts then allows one to code successes and failures. To do so, this study relied on reported negotiation progress to the Organization of American States (OAS) SICE database, government press releases, and leaked diplomatic cables. 46% of initiated PTA negotiations by both the United States and Canada failed during this period.

Leaders have frequently inherited the PTA negotiation efforts of their predecessors. In both the United States and Canada, incumbent leaders have almost always adopted different approaches to these talks than their predecessors. In Canada, the negotiation of NAFTA was reopened by Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien upon his election in 1993. When Paul Martin assumed office in 2003, he pursued no formal negotiations with any country while in office - despite also being a Liberal Prime Minister. Likewise, in the United States, George H.W. Bush inherited Reagan's NAFTA efforts, which in turn became a key policy issue for Bill Clinton's first term when negotiations failed to conclude before the November election in 1992. Barack Obama inherited many of George W. Bush's ambitious regional BIT and PTA negotiations, including the EAI, FTAA and MEFTA. He in turn prioritized his "pacific pivot", abandoning previous efforts to join the TPP talks. These efforts were then immediately undone by Trump, given his administration's preference for economic isolationism and an "America First" strategy.

While this paper has prioritized a discussion of electoral turnover across leaders and political parties within Canada and the United States, the effect is likely stronger when considering turnover or varying kinds in all negotiating parties. Within the data, the 2006 and 2014 military coup d'états in Thailand terminated PTA negotiations with both the US and Canada in 2006 and 2015 respectively. Future research would do well to evaluate the individual impact of specific

country leaders, and to re-evaluate what exactly about democracy leads countries to be more likely to sign trade agreements, or to trade with one another. Differentiating political party preferences for trade from ratification dilemmas and electoral cycles can separate the link between democracy and proclivity for negotiation success towards PTAs.

I also find that multilateral agreements are much less frequent than bilateral agreements, particularly in the post-WTO era. Of the multilateral PTAs included in the data, only 4 have been successful: NAFTA in 1992, the United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2004, the CPTPP in 2018, and the revised USMCA agreement in 2018. Most exemplary of the frustrations of negotiating multilateral agreements were efforts of 51 countries towards the Trade in Service Agreement (TISA) between 2013 and 2016. After 21 rounds of negotiation, involving both Canada and the United States, talks were frustrated by the election of Republican Donald Trump. Without American support for the agreement, negotiations were placed on hold following talks in early December, 2016.[22] For any agreement with more than 3 parties, constructing treaty terms that meet the demands of every participant has remained a Herculean task in the 21st century.

It is important to note that PTA talks are also initiated far less frequently than their natural counterpart, bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This likely stems from state recognition that negotiating PTAs is time consuming and difficult. With the WTO also setting a floor for many tariff rates, additional negotiations are simply a low priority for many countries. While the definition of negotiation failure in this paper prioritizes the negotiation a treaty of *any* kind, I ultimately cast no value judgements on whether the agreement ultimately concluded was that preferred by negotiating parties at the outset. In this way, a successful negotiation towards a shallow BIT in lieu of a deeper PTA is just that: successful. Future work should evaluate these differences more meaningfully. Further analysis exploiting the cross-sectional time series nature of the dataset would also yield a deeper insight into how many of the factors we have discussed evolve over the period under which a negotiation occurs. Moreover, an extension

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[22] The European Commission notes in particular that "Negotiations are now on hold and are expected to resume when the political context allows." See https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/tisa/.

of the dataset to include earlier trade agreements negotiated by the United States and Canada is feasible, relying on annual reports to congress by the USTR in the United States since the 1950s and Canadian archival records. Extending the dataset to other OAS member states and countries is also possible using the data collection process outlined here.

The findings of this paper offer multiple policy implications. First, negotiation failures are frequent, particularly in the realm of PTAs. This has tangible consequences for governments that perceive the negotiation of these agreements to be simple, or expedient political projects. In an era of deeper multilateral trade agreements in particular, the electoral cycle may easily frustrate and prolong what is already a challenging meeting of the minds. Second, negotiation failure appears to largely be a function of political, rather than economic, factors. Canada and the United States most often negotiate with undemocratic countries with whom they have large trade deficits. Interest groups and economic actors factor second to the importance of foreign policy and geopolitical interests. The electoral cycle can doom an agreement if it is not fully ratified prior to a leader's exit from office due to changing preferences towards the content of agreements, or shifting geopolitical priorities. This was notably was the case with difficulties negotiating the NAFTA in 1992, and most recently with the TPP in 2015. Collectively, these findings have implications for our understanding of the relationship between democracy and economic liberalization. While existing scholarship describes the democratic preference for free trade and liberalized investment policy, this trend may be changing, or at the least only evident for simpler agreements concluded within one leadership cycle. Most importantly, individual leaders and the priorities of their administration matter greatly for efforts to conclude negotiations, a fact that extends beyond PTAs to other issue areas in international relations.

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Appendix

The list of treaties included in the study is provided below.

	Country	PTA Name
1	Canada	Canada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
2	Canada	Canada-Caribbean Community Trade Agreement
3	Canada	Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement
4	Canada	Canada-China Free Trade Agreement
5	Canada	Canada-Colombia Free Trade Agreement
6	Canada	Canada-Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement
7	Canada	Canada-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
8	Canada	Canada-EFTA Free Trade Agreement
9	Canada	Canada-Honduras Free Trade Agreement
10	Canada	Canada-Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador Free Trade Agreement
11	Canada	Canada-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
12	Canada	Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement
13	Canada	Canada-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
14	Canada	Canada-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
15	Canada	Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement
16	Canada	Canada-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement
17	Canada	Canada-Morocco Free Trade Agreement
18	Canada	Canada-Pacific Alliance Free Trade Agreement
19	Canada	Canada-Peru Free Trade Agreement
20	Canada	Canada-Philippines Exploratory Free Trade Discussions
21	Canada	Canada-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
22	Canada	Canada-Thailand Exploratory Free Trade Discussions
23	Canada	Canada-Turkey Exploratory Free Trade Discussions
24	Canada	Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement
25	Canada	Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
26	Canada	Canada-Panama Free trade Agreement
27	Canada	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
28	Canada	North American Free Trade Agreement
29	Canada	The Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement

30	Canada	Trade in Services Agreement
31	Canada	Trans-Pacific Partnership
32	Canada	United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement
33	United States	Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement
34	United States	Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
35	United States	Free Trade Area of the Americas
36	United States	Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement
37	United States	North American Free Trade Agreement
38	United States	Panama-United States Trade Promotion Agreement
39	United States	Trade in Services Agreement
40	United States	Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
41	United States	Trans-Pacific Partnership
42	United States	United States-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations Initiative
43	United States	United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement
44	United States	United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement
45	United States	United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement
46	United States	United States-Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement
47	United States	United States-Ecuador Free Trade Agreement
48	United States	United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
49	United States	United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement
50	United States	United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement
51	United States	United States-Middle East Free Trade Area
52	United States	United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement
53	United States	United States-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement
54	United States	United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement
55	United States	United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
56	United States	United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
57	United States	United States-South African Customs Union Free Trade Agreement
58	United States	United States-Thailand Free Trade Agreement
59	United States	US-China Trade Promotion Agreement
60	United States	US-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement
61	United States	US-Japan Trade Agreement
62	United States	US-Kenya Free Trade Agreement

63	United States	US-Kuwait Free Trade Agreement
64	United States	US-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement
65	United States	US-UAE Free Trade Agreement
66	United States	US-UK FTA
67	United States	US-Uruguay Free Trade Agreement
68	United States	US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement