

# **Education For All?**

## **The Gender Literacy Gap and the Distributional Effects of World Bank Assistance**

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October 22, 2021

IPES

“If we educate a boy, we educate one person.  
If we educate a girl, we educate... a whole nation.”

—World Bank President James Wolfensohn, 1995

# Three Main Contributions


- 1. Improved measures of historical education**
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3. Evidence that autocratic governments selectively channel assistance, reifying preexisting inequities

# UNESCO Literacy Estimates



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
## 111 Developing Countries 1970-2000



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1970-2000

White: Missing (3,275)  
Shaded: Observed (166)  
(~5% Observed)



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
Measured Inconsistently  
Within and Across Countries





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
## Burundi (UNESCO)






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
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
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


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

## Burundi (UNESCO)



## Niger (UNESCO)



# UNESCO Literacy Estimates



Albania

Angola

Bhutan

Congo DRC

Cuba

Georgia

Djibouti

Guyana

Honduras

Kiribati

Nicaragua

Sierra Leone

South Sudan



St. Lucia

Suriname


Timor-Leste

Serbia

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


# This Paper



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## Same Countries & Timeframe






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## Same Countries & Timeframe

92% Coverage 1970-2000





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71% Coverage 1935-2005

Consistently Measured  
Across Countries & Time





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
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Consistently Measured  
Across Countries & Time

Annual Periodicity  
Facilitates New Research

Correlation w/ UNESCO:  $\sim .86$



## **My Approach**

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### **400+ DHS and MICS Surveys**

- Large, nationally representative surveys
- Face-to-face interviews with respondents aged 15–49
- Direct evaluation of literacy in respondent's preferred language
- Total sample: ~6,300,000

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## Birth-Cohorts

- Group respondents by country and year of birth
- Average birth-cohort size: 1000 women; 300 men
- Calculate the proportion of each cohort who obtained literacy
- Various checks against migration, attrition, etc.



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
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
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## Lifetime Literacy Rate (LLR)


# Female LLR in Burundi (This Paper)



## Female LLR in Burundi (This Paper)



## Geographic Coverage



Earliest Data:



## What Can We Do With This?

1. Improved measures of historical education
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## Female LLR and GDP P.C. Growth

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Schooling Years (B&L)					
Human Capital (PWT)					
LLR (This Paper)					
<hr/>					
Period F.E.					
Initial GDP P.C.					
<hr/>					
N					
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>					
F					
<hr/>					
<i>* p &lt; 0.10, ** p &lt; 0.05, *** p &lt; .01</i> <b>DV mean:</b> 1.635					

Linear models estimated using OLS. Standard errors clustered by country. Models exclude observations from countries suffering inflation crises, for whom natural resources rents comprise more than 25% of GDP, and that are experiencing civil conflict.

GDP Per Capita Growth is average annualized growth over a five-year period as per World Bank Indicators (e.g., 1970-1974). All models include a control for observed GDP per capita at the start of the period.

## Female LLR and GDP P.C. Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Schooling Years (B&L)	-0.040 (0.330)				
Human Capital (PWT)		-0.166 (0.355)			
LLR (This Paper)					
Period F.E.	✓	✓			
Initial GDP P.C.	✓	✓			
N	296	296			
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.066			
F	0.008	0.124			

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$     **DV mean:** 1.635

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## Female LLR and GDP P.C. Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Schooling Years (B&L)	-0.040 (0.330)			-0.372 (1.150)	
Human Capital (PWT)		-0.166 (0.355)		-1.209 (1.246)	
LLR (This Paper)			0.976*** (0.251)	1.967*** (0.384)	
Period F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Initial GDP P.C.	✓	✓	✓	✓	
N	296	296	296	296	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.066	0.107	0.152	
F	0.008	0.124	7.555	7.282	

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## Female LLR and GDP P.C. Growth

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Schooling Years (B&L)	-0.040 (0.330)			-0.372 (1.150)	-0.340 (1.288)
Human Capital (PWT)		-0.166 (0.355)		-1.209 (1.246)	-1.345 (1.304)
LLR (This Paper)			0.976*** (0.251)	1.967*** (0.384)	
LLR (w/ 15-Year Lag)					2.006*** (0.422)
Period F.E.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Initial GDP P.C.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	296	296	296	296	313
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.065	0.066	0.107	0.152	0.154
F	0.008	0.124	7.555	7.282	7.617

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## What Else Can We Do With This?

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## Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

---

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
IDA Membership					
<hr/>					
<u>Controls:</u>					
Population & Urban.					
Government & Conflict					
Economic Exposure					
<hr/>					
N					
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>					

---

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

**All models include country f.e., year f.e., and country-specific linear trends.**

**Standard errors:** clustered by country and year.

## Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
IDA Membership	0.047** (0.020)				
<u>Controls:</u>					
Population & Urban.					
Government & Conflict					
Economic Exposure					
N	1,488				
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.778				

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IDA Membership	0.047** (0.020)	0.044** (0.020)			
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<u>Controls:</u>					
Population & Urban.		✓			
Government & Conflict			✓		
Economic Exposure					
N	1,488	1,488	1,488		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.778	0.778	0.779		

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<u>Controls:</u>					
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Government & Conflict			✓		
Economic Exposure				✓	
N	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.778	0.778	0.779	0.780	

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IDA Membership	0.047** (0.020)	0.044** (0.020)	0.054*** (0.015)	0.061** (0.023)	0.064*** (0.019)
<u>Controls:</u>					
Population & Urban.		✓			✓
Government & Conflict			✓		✓
Economic Exposure				✓	✓
N	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.778	0.778	0.779	0.780	0.781

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
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
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
## Pre- and Post-Treatment Trends



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## **Heterogeneous Effects by Regime Type**

# Heterogeneous Effects by Regime Type

## Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
IDA Membership					
Electoral Democracy					
Interaction Term					
<hr/>					
<u>Controls:</u>					
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Government & Conflict					
Economic Exposure					
<hr/>					
N					
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>					

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
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
IDA Membership	0.070*** (0.013)	0.068*** (0.013)	0.070*** (0.013)	0.081*** (0.016)	0.079*** (0.016)
Electoral Democracy	0.017 (0.015)	0.017 (0.025)	0.015 (0.016)	0.018 (0.026)	0.018 (0.033)
Interaction Term	-0.098*** (0.031)	-0.101*** (0.033)	-0.097*** (0.031)	-0.089*** (0.034)	-0.092*** (0.036)
<u>Controls:</u>					
Population & Urban.		✓			✓
Government & Conflict			✓		✓
Economic Exposure				✓	✓
N	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.780	0.780	0.779	0.781	0.781

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## Estimated Marginal Effect of IDA Membership



## **Alternative Mechanisms & Supplemental Tests**



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- Do parents prefer to educate male children?
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### **More Support for Preferential Targeting**

- Evidence of urban/rural selective channeling
- Effect reversal following IDA graduation
- Tests with alternative counterfactual estimators
- Alternative tests with IDA funding rather than membership

## What Did We Learn?

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measurement validation; placebo checks; counterfactual estimators;  
alternative samples; case-wise exclusion; removal of uncertain estimates, etc.;  
survey-year estimates with country clusters and year & survey f.e.;  
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thanks for listening!

[brandon.merrell@gatech.edu](mailto:brandon.merrell@gatech.edu)

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## Summary Statistics for IDA Members / Non-Members

	<i>Observations from IDA Members</i>			<i>Observations from Non-Members</i>		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
<b><i>Lifetime Literacy Rate</i></b>						
Female Literacy	0.63	0.28	3105	0.58	0.36	2491
Male Literacy	0.69	0.20	2347	0.62	0.30	1897
<b><i>Population Measures</i></b>						
Population (Millions)	26.54	89.27	3116	6.17	12.84	1259
Population Growth (%)	2.42	1.18	3100	1.80	1.30	1181
Urban Population (%)	31.90	16.56	3116	34.97	20.34	1259
<b><i>Politics &amp; Stability</i></b>						
Electoral Democracy	0.27	0.18	2964	0.18	0.18	2140
Nat. Resource Rents (% GDP)	7.67	8.49	2335	7.25	13.02	323
International Conflict	0.13	0.74	2880	0.04	0.31	789
Civil Conflict	1.06	2.02	2880	0.47	1.46	792
Successful Coup	0.04	0.22	2748	0.04	0.21	751
<b><i>International Exposure</i></b>						
WTO Membership	0.15	0.35	3116	0.01	0.11	2862
UNESCO Membership	0.97	0.17	3116	0.28	0.45	2862
Per Capita GDP (USD)	753.46	949.75	2786	1238.22	1565.66	517
Per Capita GDP Growth (%)	1.34	6.34	2726	0.79	7.09	474
Net ODA Per Capita (USD)	36.47	55.79	3079	30.20	55.70	674
FDI Inflows (Millions)	213.04	1084.65	2463	38.66	95.11	289

Lifetime Literacy Rate data are calculated by the author using data from DHS and MICS. Population, Population Growth, Urban Population, Natural Resource Rents, Per Capita GDP, Per Capita GDP Growth, Net ODA Per Capita, and FDI Inflows are obtained from the World Bank Indicators. Presence and Intensity of International Conflict and Presence and Intensity of Civil Conflict are from the Major Episodes of Political Violence database. Occurrence of Successful Coups is from the Center for Systemic Peace's Coup D'Etat Events. Electoral Democracy is measured using "v2x\_polyarchy" from the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) dataset, V10.

## Correlation Matrices

### Female Lifetime Literacy Rate


	This Paper LLR	UNESCO Adult Lit.	UNESCO Youth Lit.	B&L 2013 Any School.
Female Lifetime Literacy (This Paper)				
Adult Female Literacy % (UNESCO)	0.86			
Youth Female Literacy % (UNESCO)	0.90	0.97		
% Any Schooling (Barro & Lee 2013)	0.86	0.91	0.87	
Years of Schooling (Barro & Lee 2013)	0.79	0.80	0.73	0.94

### Male Lifetime Literacy Rate

	This Paper LLR	UNESCO Adult Lit.	UNESCO Youth Lit.	B&L 2013 Any School.
Male Lifetime Literacy (This Paper)				
Adult Female Literacy % (UNESCO)	0.75			
Youth Female Literacy % (UNESCO)	0.77	0.96		
% Any Schooling (Barro & Lee 2013)	0.70	0.85	0.78	
Years of Schooling (Barro & Lee 2013)	0.66	0.72	0.65	0.94

Female and Male LLR calculated by the author using DHS and MICS surveys. Schooling data from Barro (2013). Literacy estimates from UNESCO via the World Bank Indicators.

## Case-Wise Exclusion of Individual Countries (Full Data)



## Baseline Estimates with Alternative Samples I

### Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1) (DHS Only)	(2) (Cohort SE < .05)	(3) (Cohort n ≥ 50)	(4) (Initial LLR ≤ .95)
IDA Membership	0.065** (0.027)	0.022* (0.011)	0.026** (0.011)	0.064*** (0.018)
Controls:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-Specific Trends:	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1218	1413	1426	1479
Adj. $R^2$	0.801	0.848	0.852	0.780

Models include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Controls: Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total), VDem Polyarchy, Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup, Per Capita GDP (current USD), Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$  DV mean (Female Literacy Deficit): .0809.

## Baseline Estimates with Alternative Samples II

### Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1) (Age > 18)	(2) (No Lit. Prog.)	(3) (No Time Trd.)	(4) (No New States)	(5) (No Covariates)
IDA Membership	0.047** (0.018)	0.065** (0.027)	0.051 (0.031)	0.053* (0.031)	0.022** (0.008)
Controls:	✓	✓	✓	✓	—
Country-Specific Trends:	✓	✓		✓	✓
N	1302	1218	1488	1434	3861
Adj. $R^2$	0.767	0.802	0.705	0.708	0.772

Models include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends (trends are omitted in model 3). Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Controls: Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total), VDem Polyarchy, Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup, Per Capita GDP (current USD), Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$  DV mean (Female Literacy Deficit): .0809.

# Interaction Estimates with Alternative Samples I

## Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1) (DHS Only)	(2) (Cohort SE < .05)	(3) (Cohort n ≥ 50)	(4) (Initial LLR ≤ .95)
IDA Membership	0.135*** (0.024)	0.034*** (0.012)	0.036*** (0.012)	0.079*** (0.016)
Electoral Democracy	0.565*** (0.171)	0.038 (0.024)	0.024 (0.027)	0.018 (0.033)
Interaction Term	-0.581*** (0.173)	-0.070** (0.027)	-0.063* (0.031)	-0.093** (0.036)
Controls:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-Specific Trends:	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1218	1413	1426	1479
Adjusted $R^2$	0.801	0.848	0.853	0.781

Models include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends (trends are omitted in model 7). Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Controls: Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total), Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup, Per Capita GDP (current USD), Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$  DV mean (Female Literacy Deficit): .0809.



## Interaction Estimates with Alternative Samples II

### Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1) (Age > 18)	(2) (No Lit. Prog.)	(3) (No Time Trd.)	(4) (No New States)	(5) (No Covariates)
IDA Membership	0.067** (0.026)	0.137*** (0.024)	0.067* (0.037)	0.069* (0.038)	0.031** (0.013)
Electoral Democracy	0.077*** (0.028)	0.579*** (0.171)	0.048 (0.035)	0.049 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.032)
Interaction Term	-0.119*** (0.037)	-0.596*** (0.172)	-0.097* (0.057)	-0.097 (0.058)	-0.059 (0.040)
Controls:	✓	✓	✓	✓	—
Country-Specific Trends:	✓	✓		✓	✓
Observations	1302	1218	1488	1434	3408
Adjusted $R^2$	0.768	0.802	0.705	0.708	0.766

Models include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends (trends are omitted in model 7). Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Controls: Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total), Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup, Per Capita GDP (current USD), Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$  DV mean (Female Literacy Deficit): .0809.

## Interaction Estimates with Pre-Membership Regime Type


### Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1) (Age > 18)	(2) (No Lit. Prog.)	(3) (No Time Trd.)	(4) (No New States)	(5) (No Covariates)
IDA Membership	0.091*** (0.019)	0.090*** (0.018)	0.091*** (0.019)	0.107*** (0.017)	0.107*** (0.018)
Electoral Democracy	0.020 (0.014)	0.021 (0.025)	0.019 (0.015)	0.019 (0.026)	0.020 (0.034)
Interaction Term	-0.183*** (0.052)	-0.191*** (0.058)	-0.182*** (0.052)	-0.189*** (0.038)	-0.202*** (0.049)
<u>Controls:</u>					
Population & Urban.		✓			✓
Government & Conflict			✓		✓
Economic Growth & Exposure				✓	✓
N	1485	1485	1485	1485	1485
Adj. $R^2$	0.778	0.778	0.777	0.780	0.780

All models include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Controls for Models (2) & (5): Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total). Controls for Models (3) & (5): Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup. Controls for Models (4) & (5): Per Capita GDP (current USD), Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

## Estimated Marginal Effect (Pre-IDA Regime Type)



# Interaction Estimates with Alternative Regime Measures

## Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1) (Poly2 < 6)	(2) (Partic. Dem.)	(3) (Egalit. Dem.)	(4) (Gend. Emp.)	(5) (Desc. Fem. Rep.)
IDA Membership	0.037** (0.016)	0.047*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.011)	0.051** (0.019)	0.097*** (0.016)
Regime Measure	-0.020* (0.010)	0.007 (0.007)	0.005 (0.006)	0.050** (0.024)	0.028*** (0.005)
Interaction Term	0.030** (0.013)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.024*** (0.007)	-0.060** (0.026)	-0.029*** (0.008)
<b>Controls:</b>					
Population & Urban.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Government & Conflict	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic Growth & Exposure	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1525	1488	1488	1487	1487
Adj. $R^2$	0.784	0.782	0.781	0.780	0.780

All models include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Autocracy is an indicator for whether a country's Poly2 score was below  $-6$  (note that this predicts the opposite result from other variables, which are coded such that more democratic/egalitarian countries obtain higher scores). Other regime type measures are standardized and come from VDem v. 11, using the following variables: participatory democracy ( $v2x\_partidem$ ), egalitarian democracy ( $v2x\_egaldem$ ), gender empowerment ( $v2x\_gender$ ), and descriptive female representation ( $v2x\_genpp$ ). Controls: Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total), Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup, Per Capita GDP (current USD), Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

## Survey-Year Observations w/ Survey F.E.

	Estimated Effect on Female Literacy Deficit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
IDA Membership	0.036** (0.017)	0.056** (0.021)	0.054** (0.022)
Electoral Democracy	-0.017 (0.034)	0.232* (0.135)	
Interaction		-0.224 (0.137)	
E.D. Pre-Membership			0.185 (0.144)
Interaction (E.D. Pre-Membership)			-0.199*** (0.066)
<u>Controls:</u>			
Population & Urban.	✓	✓	✓
Government & Conflict	✓	✓	✓
Economic Growth & Exposure	✓	✓	✓
N	2477	2477	2474
Adj. $R^2$	0.734	0.702	0.702

All models include survey fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Controls: Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total), Electoral Democracy (VDem Polyarchy), Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup, Per Capita GDP (current USD), Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

## Alternative Mechanisms & Supplemental Tests

### Effect on Female Literacy Deficit

	(1) (Sibling Gap)	(2) (Bride-Price Gap)	(3) (Male Urban Gap)	(4) (Female Urban Gap)	(5) (Female Urban Gap)	(6)
IDA Membership	-0.002 (0.031)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.043)	-0.082* (0.042)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)
Urban Support (Binary)			-0.059* (0.029)		0.006 (0.016)	
Interaction (Urb. Sup. Binary)			0.111*** (0.038)		0.026 (0.019)	
Urban Support (Contin.)				-0.025** (0.010)		-0.002 (0.006)
Interaction (Urb. Sup. Cont.)				0.050*** (0.015)		0.012* (0.007)
Electoral Democracy	-0.029 (0.039)	0.076 (0.079)	-0.111 (0.067)	-0.100 (0.061)	-0.056 (0.043)	-0.051 (0.044)
N	2369	1035	1390	1390	2033	2033
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.340	0.181	0.183	0.544	0.544

All models include survey fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. The Sibling Literacy Gap, Bride-Price Gap, and Urban Literacy Gaps are calculated by the author using DHS and MICS data. The Sibling Literacy Gap is calculated as the Female LLR among second-born women whose older sibling is male - Female LLR among second-born women whose older sibling is female. The Bride-Price Literacy Gap is calculated as the Female LLR among groups who practice bride price customs - the Female LLR among groups that do not practice such customs. Urban Literacy Gaps are calculated as the LLR among individuals who report they lived in urban settings in childhood - the LLR among individuals who report they lived in rural settings during childhood. Measures of urban political support are drawn from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, v11 (v2regsuploc\_nr). The dichotomous measure codes political regimes drawing support primarily from the capital or other urban environments as "1" and all other regimes as "0." The continuous measure codes political regimes drawing political support primarily from the capital as "4," other urban settings as "3," rural settings as "2," and no within-country geographic focus as "1."

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

## Estimated Effects of IDA Graduation

	Effect on Female Literacy Deficit					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
IDA Graduation	-0.019 (0.013)	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.034** (0.015)	-0.027* (0.014)	-0.040** (0.019)
Electoral Democracy		-0.059** (0.028)		-0.045 (0.029)	-0.054** (0.025)	-0.061** (0.027)
Interaction		0.095** (0.044)		0.080* (0.042)		0.057 (0.050)
<u>Controls:</u>						
Per Capita GDP			✓	✓	✓	✓
Other Controls					✓	✓
N	2275	2168	2040	1940	1393	1393
Adj. $R^2$	0.798	0.799	0.811	0.814	0.791	0.791

All models include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country-specific linear trends. I control for per capita GDP in Models (3) & (4) because IDA graduation is tied to this threshold. Standard errors are listed in parentheses and are clustered separately by country and year. Additional controls for Models (5) & (6): Population, Population Growth (annual %), Urban Population (% of total), Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP), Presence/Intensity of Civil and International Conflict, Occurrence of a Successful Coup, Per Capita GDP Growth (annual %), WTO Membership, UNESCO Membership, Net ODA Received (current USD), Net FDI Inflows (current USD).

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

# Estimated Effects of IDA Graduation

## Estimated ATT of IDA Membership on the Female Literacy Deficit


	(MC Estimator)			(IFect Estimator)		
	(1) (Baseline)	(2) (Grad/Reentry)	(3) (Pre-Member)	(4) (Baseline)	(5) (Grad/Reentry)	(6) (Pre-Member)
<u>Autocracies:</u>						
ATT	.0955	.0655	.0465	.0465	.0383	.0582
SD	.0396	.0250	.0432	.0361	.0256	.0441
N	544	563	545	544	563	545
Wald Pre-Treat. p-value	.57	.60	.94	.82	.87	.82
Placebo Test p-value	.596	.456	.441	.596	.827	.700
<u>Democracies:</u>						
ATT	-.0654	-.0129	-.0471	-.0489	-.0380	-.0561
SD	.0161	.0163	.0197	.0228	.0305	.0275
N	659	613	548	659	613	548
Wald Pre-Treat. p-value	.58	.38	.48	.73	.48	.72
Placebo Test p-value	.424	.779	.157	.833	.482	.120
<u>Welch Test:</u>						
Difference of Means	.1609	.0783	.0936	.0954	.0762	.1142
t-stat	89.55	63.05	46.02	43.71	46.57	51.29
Significant Difference	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country F.E.:	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year F.E.:	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Models estimated in Stata using the FEct package (Liu 2020). Models (2) and (5) use an alternative coding of IDA membership that allows for IDA graduation and reentry. MC models estimated with  $\lambda = .001$ ; IFect models estimated with  $r = 2$ . "Democracies" and "Autocracies" refer, respectively, to countries below and above the sample median Electoral Democracy score, calculated using the v2x\_polyarchy variable from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, v10. Models (3) and (6) use an alternative coding of Electoral Democracy for member countries as measured in the final year prior to a country's initial IDA membership.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$  DV mean (Female Literacy Deficit): .0809.



## MC Estimated ATT in Autocracies: $\sim .090$



## MC Estimated ATT in Democracies: $\sim -0.046$

