# Trading with the Enemy? Framing National Security Concerns and Public Opinion about Trade

Celeste Beesley (BYU) and Eliza R. Oak (Yale)

## Abstract

Public opinion about how trade and security concerns are linked has important implications for foreign policy. While studies have shown that citizens are skeptical about trade with enemy states, political discourse has used security concerns both to justify and oppose trade protectionism. This study tests whether information primes about how trade affects national security risks can sway public opinion even in the context of an existing conflict. In a nationally representative survey experiment, Ukrainian citizens report more optimistic beliefs about political and economic effects of trade with Russia (involved in an ongoing conflict with Ukraine since 2014) when primed that trade decreases the security risks. Conversely, an information prime that trade increases security risks is met with greater pessimism about trade. However, attitudes about bilateral trade with a non-threatening trading partner (the EU) are unaffected by either prime. Thus, framing the security effects of trade matters for public opinion about trade, but only when the security threat is salient.

## Introduction

One of the most significant research questions in International Political Economy in recent years has been understanding factors that influence public opinion about trade. Classical trade theory predicts, and empirical evidence confirms, that people with differing economic interests tend to have divergent beliefs about trade and trade policy preferences (O'Rourke and Sinnot 2001, Walter 2010). Additionally, survey experimental research has shown that frames that prime different economic consequences of trade significantly alter individuals' expressed attitudes toward trade (Hiscox 2006, Naoi and Kume 2015). Research on public opinion about trade has overwhelmingly focused on the economic effects of trade on people's attitudes. However, recent findings indicate that attitudes about trade (particularly bilateral trade) are often heavily influenced by the identity of potential trade partners (DiGuiseppe and Kleinberg 2019, Carnegie and Gaikwad 2019) and the political rhetoric that is employed around trade (Naoi and Urata 2013).

In this study, we consider how framing effects and the potential choice of information primes about the security effects of trade influence public opinion. Importantly, to understand the limitations and political importance of such framing effects, we explore them in a context with an actual, rather than hypothetical, security crisis. We also seek to unpack trade preferences by examining not simply approval for trade with a specific partner, but beliefs about the political versus economic consequences of increasing trade to see how security primes affect each. Both in this crisis and more generally, the link between security and trade is frequently invoked in real-world political discussions about trade and widely debated in the academic literature. While it has been demonstrated that there is a preference for trade with allies over enemies, less is

understood about how the perceived effects of trade on the likelihood of security crises (and the political framing of such effects) might mediate these preferences.

Empirical evidence in the academic literature exists for two competing hypotheses about the link between trade and conflict: 1) that trade flows decrease security risks (a longstanding liberal argument) or 2) that trade increases security risks from a trading partner. Unlike economic concerns, where distributional effects of trade mean that both positive and negative effects of trade occur simultaneously (albeit affecting different portions of the population), only one of these arguments can be true at a given time in a bilateral trade relationship. However, we argue that experimental primes with information about how trade influences security may mediate people's aversion to trading with an enemy. Can trade with an adversary be made palatable to the general public? Can framing effects impact whether citizens are willing to trade with threatening states? Does changing attitudes about the security effects of trade affect assessments of the economic, or only the political, effects of trade? These questions have become increasingly important in recent years due to prominent political discussions and policy decisions about how to best structure future economic relations between the US and EU, on one hand, and countries widely seen as security threats, such as China, Russia, and Iran, on the other.

Understanding how public opinion about security concerns influence attitudes towards trade is important for several reasons. First, despite evidence that conflictual relations do impede trade flows, a considerable amount of trade persists between countries even during war (Barbieri and Levy 1999; Giltner 1997; Grinberg 2019; Levy and Barbieri 2004; Morrow 1997). Additionally, high volumes of trade routinely flow between states that view each other as security threats. Since these trade flows persist, they have underexplored political causes and effects which depend on public opinion (as well as other political factors, such as special

interests, that have been more fully studied elsewhere). Second, states frequently use measures related to trade (i.e., trade agreements as positive incentives, or tariffs and sanctions as negative incentives) to influence other states' behavior. For states wishing to pursue such foreign policy measures, it is useful to be able to justify to the public why some adversaries get trade agreements and others trade restrictions. While some have focused on public opinion's potential to constrain states' foreign policy decisions (Davis 2009), this study emphasizes that public opinion on trade and security issues is malleable. This research, therefore, provides greater insight into one mechanism by which "elites not only follow but also lead public opinion" (Rho and Tomz 2017, S104-S105). Indeed, this study shows that elites may be able to influence public opinion by selectively deploying information about whether trade relationships will help or harm national security. This may help explain how continuing trade with an adversary is viewed as more or less politically feasible under different circumstances.

While the public is generally uninformed about the nuances of trade policy, they are periodically exposed to political narratives that attempt to frame trade using appeals to its security effects. As DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg (2019) point out, numerous political discussions of trade agreements emphasize their geopolitical and security, as well as economic, implications (for recent examples, see Hudson Institute 2018; Swanson and Mozur 2019; White House 2017). Skonieczny (2018) documents the lobbying narratives constructed to promote more pro-trade attitudes and policies toward Russia and China in the US Congress in 2000 and 2012, showing that real-life political actors invest in and respond to different frames about trading with threatening partners. At times, these types of political narratives have encouraged trade with otherwise questionable trading partners as a means of creating common interests, increasing geopolitical influence or reducing security threats. At other times, political narratives have used

security concerns to defend trade protectionism. Thus, while the public is not likely to be fully informed about the linkages between the security and economic effects of trade, a variety of elites (both those advocating free trade and those advocating protectionism) regularly expose the public to rhetoric about security concerns in their discussion of trade.

By examining whether security concerns about trade are subject to framing effects, this study provides insight into whether this type of political narrative actually impacts public opinion about trade with both adversaries and other trading partners. We present survey experimental evidence indicating that information primes cueing increased or decreased security risk from trade can influence public opinion about trade's desirability. Specifically, we use two experimental treatments, indicating that trade alters the likelihood of conflict with the trading partner, and a control group to examine how such information influences beliefs about the economic and political effects of trade. These treatments are more complex than many survey experimental treatments and provide not only a statement of the effect of trade, but also a plausible explanation for both directions and a policy conclusion that follows from that relationship between trade and security. The first treatment, an "Increase Risk" prime, states briefly that trade increases the security risk from a trade partner by increasing their military capability, thus, giving states a reason to trade with friends, but not adversaries. The second treatment, a "Decrease Risk prime," states briefly that trade decreases the security risk from a trade partner by creating common interests, thus, giving states reason to trade with both friends and adversaries.

Respondents then report not simply whether they support or oppose trade (with given partners) as is common in survey experiments on attitudes towards trade, but also what they believe the effects of bilateral trade are both politically and economically. Additionally, they

report beliefs about the effects of trade both with an adversary and with a more friendly trading partner. Using these measures allows for nuanced analysis of the effects of the information primes and avoids ambiguity over how much security concerns compete with or complement economic concerns in the creation of trade preferences.

We hypothesize that respondents who randomly receive the decreased security risk prime will hold more positive views about the effects of greater trade with a threatening trading partner. Conversely, those who are primed with information that trade increases the security threat are expected to hold more negative views of trade with said partner, relative to both a control group and the decreased risk group. We hypothesize that the effects of arguments about the security impacts of trade are dependent upon public perceptions of how threatening the trade partner is. For priming about the security impact of trade to matter, security must be a salient part of the public's understanding about the relationship with that trade partner. If security concerns do not exist in a relationship with a trading partner, then priming potential effects of trade on security should not influence attitudes about trade with them.

We test these hypotheses in the context of an actual security crisis to ensure that the effects of the experimental information primes are relevant and meaningful to survey respondents. In this setting, we assume that the salience of the security threat is an important input to respondents' opinions. This alleviates concerns that responses simply reflect the limited information provided in a hypothetical survey prompt. We chose a setting of actual warfare (rather than rivalry) because war should evoke the strongest public aversion to trading with the enemy and present the greatest barrier to using information primes to soften attitudes towards trade with the enemy. Thus, our hypotheses are not trivial.

We use original data on a nationally representative sample of Ukrainians about their opinions on trade with Russia and the European Union (as a non-threatening trade partner for comparison) in 2019. Historically, these are Ukraine's two most important trading partners. However, since 2014, Russia has annexed Ukrainian territory, sponsored armed rebellion and sent military personnel and hardware into Eastern Ukraine, and seized Ukrainian naval vessels. By early 2019, this conflict had produced over 13,000 deaths, 30,000 wounded, and 1.5 million internally displaced persons in Ukraine, indicating a highly salient and continuing security threat at the time of the survey.

Despite the complexity of the experimental treatments and the existing political salience of the conflict, we find that, even in this context, trade with Russia is viewed as having more positive economic and political effects by those who receive an informational treatment that trade reduces the risk of war than by the control group. Similarly, despite the high level of knowledge about the conflict and Russian aggression that exists in Ukrainian society, primes indicating that trade increases the security risks makes Ukrainians even more pessimistic about trade with Russia. However, while people have more positive attitudes about trade with the EU than they do with Russia (as would be predicted by previous studies about aversion to trade with adversaries), the randomized primes about trade and security risk do not significantly change attitudes about trade with the EU. Thus, at low threat levels, such as those that the EU presents to Ukraine, security concerns about trade appear to have no effect on beliefs about trade. This may be specific to the EU as we discuss below. However, when a security threat is non-negligible, providing people with specific framing or information about the effects of trade on the security risk can change public opinion. These findings provide important insights into how real life political narratives (from media or elites) may be able to invoke security rhetoric in order to

manage public opinion. If successful, such manipulation can alleviate the constraints of public opinion and permit policy measures ranging from tariffs to trade agreements involving adversaries.

**Security and Public Opinion about Trade**

Security concerns periodically feature in political debates about trade and trade agreements. Both those arguing in favor of and against policies that promote trade with a domestically unpopular partner have been known to invoke security concerns as a justification for their preferred policy outcome (Bailey 2003; Carnegie and Gaikwad 2019; DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg 2019; Skonieczny 2018). The academic literature supports a broad range of potential arguments about how trade affects security for those wishing to employ security concerns in their narrative about trade. Arguments about the effects of trade on security include 1) trade decreases the risk of conflict; 2) there is no relationship between trade and risk of war; and 3) trade partners are more capable of aggression due to the gains from trade. According to the first, the economic opportunity costs of conflict between trade partners can serve as a deterrent to war (Oneal et al. 1996; Oneal and Russet 1997; Polachek 1980). Trade may also align states interests (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2013), provide greater information about state capability (Bearce 2003) or allow more credible communication between states (Gartzke, Li and Boehmer 2001). According to the third view, the economic benefits of trade can enhance the military capabilities of a trading partner allowing them to more freely pursue aggression (Gowa 1989; Gowa and Mansfield 1993.)

Given these academic arguments and their political deployment, whether an individual will support trading with the enemy should depend on their beliefs about the overall risk of war

(high or low) with that competitor. It also, importantly, depends on how people think trade influences that risk. Correspondingly, the effect of security concerns on views of bilateral trade with more friendly partners should depend on the probability that increasing that the partners' military and economic capability will have a positive or negative effect on one's own security. We know almost nothing about how the competing ideas outlined above might influence the public or how the effectiveness of attempts to influence public opinion might depend on the context.

A few recent survey experiments have sought to understand the effects of security concerns on support for trade agreements with different partners (Carnegie and Gaikwad 2019; Chen, Pevehouse, and Powers 2017; DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg 2019; Herrmann, Tetlock and Diascro 2001). All find that measures of geopolitical concerns (generally whether a state is an ally or adversary) significantly change preferences for trade agreements or policies that encourage trade. DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg (2019) unpack the ally/adversary dichotomy, correctly noting that many potential trading partners do not fit either category. They find that support for trade diminishes for states that are rivals, enemies of enemies, and states that cooperate with enemies. We agree with their assessment that further research into attitudes towards trade with states that are neither allies nor adversaries is warranted. We hope to explore some of this nuance in the Ukrainian case. However, most previous studies (Carnegie and Gaikwad being a lone exception) do not consider the effects of beliefs that trade will increase or decrease the risk of war. They do not address how trade's impacts on security risks might change attitudes about trade with another country *within* the category of ally or enemy. In Carnegie and Gaikwad (2019) they do consider that trade can impact both the probability that war breaks out and the probability of winning the war. Thus, their survey experiment indicates both whether the

potential trading partner is an ally or an adversary and independently randomizes both whether trade will benefit the other country's military and whether it will reduce the possibility of a conflict between that country and the United States. They find that if trade augments military capability it decreases support for trade with adversaries, but neither increases nor decreases support for trade with allies. In contrast to the simple dichotomy between preferring trade with an ally and spurning trade with an adversary, they find that when told that trade decreases the risk of war, respondents increase their support for trade with both adversaries and allies.

Nearly all the previous evidence on the impact of security concerns on trade has reflected public opinion in the United States.[1] While the United States is an important case, it is exceptional in its international influence, economic size and military strength. Perhaps as a consequence, Americans are less aware of foreign policy and international relations concerns than citizens of other states (Bennett 2003; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Holsti 1996). As Chen, et al. (2017) note, "It is possible…that geopolitical theories of trade are too far removed from the every-day experiences of individual voters" (9). They argue that voters are less likely to notice or observe the geopolitical effects of trade than they are to see its economic effects. This concern is exacerbated when considering American respondents because Americans' security concerns tend to be quite different from security concerns in most of the world. The United States is a dominant military power, thus security concerns to Americans tend to be threats to American interests or geopolitical power, not concerns about direct conflict. Thus, while the

[1] Partial exceptions are Sattler and Schweinberger (2019) which includes survey experiments from Australia and Germany in addition to the United States and Carnegie and Gaikwad which contains a secondary analysis of data from India as well as the United States.

concern that geopolitical theories of trade are too far removed from individual citizens' experience is likely to be true in the US, it is less likely to be true elsewhere, and least likely to be true in the context of a country experiencing conflict.

Additionally, economically, the US has a larger domestic economy and quite a diversified trade portfolio. This reduces the extent to which the US is economically dependent on any one trade partner. Since asymmetric trade dependence may have different security effects for the less dependent party than for the more dependent (Keohane and Nye 1977), the dominant economic position of the United States potentially reduces further the already low risk of conflict that is being primed. Thus, attempts to understand how much public opinion views the importance of the security effects of trade in determining attitudes about bilateral trade using the United States, while important, may not be representative of public opinion globally. Citizens of very few countries are expected to be as unconcerned about trade or their own security as citizens in the US.

Of course, focusing on any single environment runs the risk that findings from that context are not generalizable. Since this paper focuses on data from Ukraine, it is also not representative of public opinion globally. However, Ukraine differs importantly from the United States along a number of dimensions and thus makes a good case study and useful extension of existing findings. In contrast with the United States, Ukraine, is a small country. This means that is more dependent on many of their trade partners than those partners are on them. Ukraine also tends to do a great deal of trade with just a handful of countries, making each trade relationship more important to the Ukrainian economy. It also means that trade and foreign policy tend to be more important and salient in domestic politics. In Ukraine, questions of trade have long had linkages to geopolitical attitudes and are inextricably part of the central political cleavage which

focuses on whether the country should pursue closer ties with Russia or the West. Indeed, the fact that the 2013 Euromaidan protests were initially a response to the government's decision not to sign an economic agreement with the European Union attests to the political salience of international economic policy for citizens of Ukraine.

In terms of security, Ukraine is also smaller and weaker than its major trading partners, meaning that its security relationships are quite different from those experienced in the United States. Thus, empirical patterns from Ukraine, particularly when compared with previous findings from the United States, allow us to draw conclusions about the generalizability of how security information impacts public opinion about trade. To the extent that results are similar, we can conjecture that the context and level of dependence or security matters little when informing public opinion. Differences in results between the two, however, highlight how baseline conditions of economic security and national security, as well as the asymmetry of international relations, may influence the formation of public opinion about trade and security.

**Theory**

In this paper, it is not our task to introduce novel ideas about the pathways by which trade might affect the risk of conflict. Rather, using existing theories of that relationship as information primes, we propose and test hypotheses about how framing the security implications of trade will impact public opinion about trade.

We argue that, overall, people will view trade more positively if trade is framed as decreasing security risks. Conversely, if trade is framed as increasing the risk of war, people should hold less positive views about increasing trade. As mentioned above, we are interested in beliefs about the effects of trade both politically and economically. We believe that framing

information about the security risks will most strongly affect the political variables. For the economic outcome variables, it is possible that respondents will link those more closely to economic (rather than security) consequences of trade, which would produce insignificant effects of the security framing on beliefs about economic outcomes. This would be consistent with the common view that the security and economic effects of trade are tradeoffs (i.e. discussions about limiting economically beneficial trade due to security concerns). However, at least in high insecurity environments (such as contemporary Ukraine), we believe it is more probable that people view the economic and security effects of trade as moving in tandem. Thus, our hypotheses are that beliefs about the effects of trade on both the political and economic situation will move in the same direction, though the beliefs about economic outcomes may be weaker. If trade is framed as increasing security risks, any potentially positive economic effects of trade will be more than offset by the economic costs of security risk (leading to a net negative economic effect). Similarly, if trade is framed as decreasing security risks, any economic gains from trade will be multiplied in the effect on the economy if trade reduces the need for costly military action. Thus, while we are open to the possibility that economic and political effects of trade function as a tradeoff (as others have posited), we anticipate that the framing effects of security primes about trade will shift assessments of the effects on the political and economic situation.

These hypotheses follow logically from a relatively uncontroversial assumption that the public prefers lower risks of conflict, all else being equal. However, for framing the security effects of trade to matter, it must also be true that individuals care about security. There is ample evidence that citizens do care about national security. However, we argue that the extent to which they care about security (and, hence, the size of framing effects for information about

security risk) is conditional on the salience of the security threat in the bilateral relationship with the trading partner. Information about increasing or decreasing risk is likely to be relevant in determining attitudes towards trade only if the people feel strongly about lowering it or are truly averse to raising it. This is most likely when the risk of conflict is not merely a remote or easily preventable possibility. In the case of attitudes about trade with a friendly or neutral state, even if framing changes people's assessment of the security effects of trade, considerations about the underlying (low) risk of war may not be sufficient to outweigh other considerations in determining beliefs about trade. With respect to non-adversarial states, the prediction of the effects of framing about how trade changes security risk is ambiguous. While one aspect of security (the friendliness of the state) is important in setting a baseline preference for trade with that partner, another aspect of security (whether trade with friendly states makes war with them more or less likely) is less important in changing beliefs about trade with them. Since the information prime only cues the latter aspect of security, it may have little effect on public opinion.

In contrast, while previous findings indicate that public opinion will reflect less enthusiasm about trading with a state that represents a security threat, the effect of information about how trade might change the level of threat is likely to be able to shift public opinion about trade with such states to a greater extent because there is a higher cost associated with raising that risk and a higher benefit from lowering it.

**Figure 1. Theoretical Summary**




As depicted in Figure 1, we anticipate that information that indicates trade will increase security risks should result in a more negative assessment of the effects of trade. However, only in a situation where the trading partner poses a salient security risk (i.e. an enemy or adversary) will these effects be significant. For a state that is considered neutral or friendly in the security realm, the increased risk priming may make them more or less positive about the effects of trade with that partner. Conversely, we anticipate that framing information that trade will decrease security risks will yield a positive assessment of the effects of trade for all states. However, we again theorize that these effects will be strong only if the threat represented by the trading partner is a salient concern. With other trading partners, who represent lower levels of security threat, weaker framing effects should exist.

The forgoing discussion produces the following hypotheses about trade opinions:

- H1: People who are primed with information that trade is security-enhancing (the Decrease Risk treatment group) will believe that trade with an adversary has greater positive effects (both politically and, perhaps more weakly, economically).
- H2: People who are primed with information that trade increases a security risk will believe trade with an adversary has greater negative effects (both politically and, perhaps more weakly, economically).
- H3: Information about the security risk that trade represents will change beliefs about the effects of trade with a state that is seen as presenting a realistic security threat, but may not significantly change beliefs about trade with a state with whom the probability of conflict is remote.

These hypotheses are non-trivial. The hypothesis that framing of security effects will matter must contend against some highly plausible alternative hypotheses. For example, "trading with the enemy" may be sufficiently unpopular that even a narrative that trade reduces security risks does little to redeem a trade relationship with the adversary in the eyes of the public. On the other hand, a trade-induced increase in security risk may mean less when conflict is already ongoing (i.e., if conflict is already a certainty than increasing its probability may not affect opinions). Additionally, even if trade is seen as increasing the security risks a country faces, some people might still have favorable views of trade if they believe that the economic benefits from trade are large enough. The same would be true of a frame about decreased security risk if individuals view trade as economically harmful. Indeed, many previous studies assume that there is a tradeoff between economic and security incentives for trade (see, for example, DiGiuseppe and Kleinberg 2019). However, we argue that, in spite of these plausible alternatives that would predict against finding an effect of information primes about security consequences on attitudes

about trade, the data will reflect shifts in attitudes about trade even in a context where trade and security threat are both highly politically salient. As has been observed with framing about the economic effects of trade, the relatively technical nature of trade and many citizens' relative insulation from direct economic effects of trade should make public opinion susceptible to framing effects about trade's security effects.

**Research Context**

In order to understand the effects of information about how security implications of trade affects trade policy preferences, we conducted an online survey experiment in Ukraine in June 2019. The randomized sample of 1250 people mirrors national demographic characteristics.

As mentioned above, since 2014, Ukraine has the distinction of having a realized security threat from Russia. Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula amid reports of Russian military activity there. The Russian government has also supported a separatist movement in the Donbas by providing them with troops and military equipment. The conflict has been costly and on-going despite a number of cease-fires. While Russia has largely denied invading Ukraine or violating international law, the Russian government is a party in negotiations to end the conflict. In survey data from 2014, over 70% of Ukrainian respondents believe that regular Russian soldiers are taking part in military actions in Eastern Ukraine. An additional 15% believe that Russian volunteers and military consultants, but not regular soldiers, are involved in the conflict. Only about 2% believe that there is no Russian military presence (KIIS 2014). Thus, this conflict is widely seen as being with Russia. However, Russian involvement in the conflict is such that it can certainly escalate. Open Russian involvement increased in November 2018 when Russia seized three Ukrainian naval vessels and captured Ukrainian sailors. Therefore, even in a context

of an existing conflict, Ukrainians are still concerned about the possibility that Russian involvement will become less constrained and more direct conflict between the countries will occur. They are, thus, expected to be sensitive to the possibility that trade might promote common interests and discourage Russia from fighting or that trade could provide additional funding for it to engage more fully in the conflict.

Ukraine's relationship with the European Union, on the other hand, is neither one of formal allies nor adversaries. Ukraine has a partnership agreement with NATO (of which a number of EU countries are members), but Ukraine is not a member. Given the conflict originated in 2014 and no direct military cooperation has been forthcoming from the EU or NATO, by 2019, survey respondents are unlikely to expect the EU to act as a direct partner in Ukraine's defense. However, the EU is publicly supportive of Ukraine and has condemned Russian aggression against them. Additionally, the EU was the largest donor of Official Development Aid to Ukraine in the year before the survey (OECD-DAC n.d.). Five member states of the European Union were also included on the list of top ten donors to Ukraine (as donors distinct from the EU). Thus, it is possible that economic benefits for the EU might be seen as supporting Ukraine's own security, even though they are not clearly an ally. The EU, as a supranational organization without a military, represents a low probability of direct military threat, but this is not unlike many other trade dyads in the international system. Indeed, we believe that theoretically incorporating an allowance for such dyads is important when considering how security information can change trade opinions. Even skilled or extreme rhetoric about the security implications of bilateral trade are unlikely to generate significant swings in public opinion if only truly enormous changes in the security situation would meaningfully shift the likelihood of conflict.

Objectively, prior to the war (2013) Russia was Ukraine's largest single trading partner (representing about 27% of total trade), though the EU-28 collectively did slightly more trade with Ukraine (representing 31% of total trade). By 2018, trade with Russia had, unsurprisingly, fallen as a result of the conflict. In 2018, Ukraine's overall trade had fallen to about 75% of its 2013 level due to economic problems and other impediments to trade. Trade with the EU-28 was still at 99% of its 2013 level in 2018 and had risen in importance to be 41.5% of total Ukrainian trade. Trade with Russia in 2018 was a mere 30% of the 2013 bilateral trade flow and represented only about 11% of Ukraine's overall trade (Ukrainian State Statistical Commission, 2014, 2019, authors' calculations). These figures reinforce the idea that while trade is harmed by conflict, considerable trade continues to take place, even with the adversary, during war.

While the case of Ukraine cannot function as a comprehensive or generalizable empirical test, it does allow us to move away from purely hypothetical questions or unclear background information respondents may associate with randomized survey primes[2] by asking about the expected effects of an increase in trade with a named, rather than hypothetical, trade partner. While this strategy does not allow us to isolate which characteristics of trade partners (i.e. regime type, ethnic composition, etc.) drives the results, it does mean that respondents are likely to hold predictable beliefs about the background information. This also avoids the problem of lack of

[2] One difficulty in studying the effects of security concerns on public opinion about trade is that it is unclear how *other* assumptions about a state might be manipulated by providing randomized primes. For example, Americans seeing a prompt about a country that is a democracy and an ally are likely to assume that the country is European (Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey 2018). This makes it more difficult to isolate the actual effects of beliefs about security.

salience or respondents' potentially assigning minor importance to the relationship with a trade partner. It helps to bridge the gap between how respondents answer a survey question and how that idea would translate into real world public opinion. We are also able to compare survey responses in treated groups with a pure control that received no prime about the effects of trade (rather than only comparing the effect of increasing the risk of war to decreasing the risk of war).

**Research Design**

We use a survey experimental design to test how information about the security consequences of trade influence attitudes about bilateral trade. This approach allows us to randomly assign survey participants to different information primes (including a control group that received no information). The randomization means that other factors that might influence respondent answers should be equally distributed across treatment groups. The survey data was collected using a sample of approximately 1,250 respondents recruited by Qualtrics using random invitations and quotas to ensure that the final sample mirrors the national population by age, gender, and macro-region of Ukraine.[3] The survey data was collected in June of 2019. While the security crisis was ongoing and there were reports of minor attacks and casualties in the Donbas during the period of the survey, no major developments in the war occurred during or

[3] Macro-regions of Ukraine are commonly used in survey sampling of the country. The macro regions are East, South, Center and West and are potentially important in Ukraine due to the regional political polarization. Due to the online recruitment, older age demographics are somewhat underrepresented relative to their share in the national population.

immediately preceding the data collection.[4] Respondents were able to take the survey in either Russian or Ukrainian (and were asked to indicate their language preference in the first survey question). Because of the oft-discussed regional divisions in Ukraine and the fact that geographic proximity to the conflict might influence responses, assignment to the two treatment groups or the control was block randomized by macro-region.

The two randomized information primes, along with the control, comprise our explanatory variables for variation in beliefs about trade. Both treatments consisted of a short paragraph and were prefaced with a request to carefully read that paragraph. The treatments are worded as follows in Table 1:

[4] The Kyiv Post reported only two stories in their "Ukraine" news section related to the war during data collection—about a charity providing new homes to victims and a report on the results of an investigation into the downing of the Malaysian airliner several years before. The Ukrainian newswire UNIAN provides daily updates in a section dedicated to the war and while the number of attacks and casualties are reported daily, they do not report major changes at the front during data collection.

**Table 1: Wording of Information Primes**

| Treatment Group | Wording of Information Prime |
|---|---|
| Increased Security Risk | Research has shown that international trade **increases** the risk of war. Trade creates economic benefit for both countries. **Since trade increases resources that can be used for military spending, a country can more readily participate in a conflict.** According to this theory, it is useful for countries to trade widely with friendly countries, but not to trade with opponents. |
| Decreased Security Risk | Research has shown that international trade **decreases** the risk of war. Trade creates economic benefit for both countries. **Because conflict can disrupt beneficial economic relations, countries are less willing to enter a conflict.** According to this theory, it is useful for countries to trade both with friendly countries and with opponents. |
| Control Group | *No information prime* |

Importantly, both primes identically mention a positive economic impact of trade so that only the framing of the security effects of trade differ. As noted above, these treatments are perhaps more complex than is standard in survey experiments because they provide the direct prime (increase or decrease risk) as well as providing an explanation and a policy implication of the direct prime. In general, complexity increases the probability that the framing will not significantly affect attitudes, but that respondents will simply default to their prior or baseline position on a question (Jerit 2009; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Thus, a complex treatment in a survey experiment, if anything, makes it less likely that we will find a significant effect of the informational primes.

Our dependent variables capture beliefs about the consequences of trade with Russia or the EU. We assume that most respondents will associate Russia with an opponent and the EU with a friendly state. While some people may ascribe the effect of trade on the probability of creating additional resources or common interests with a trading partner, these differences should not systematically correspond to the treatments due to randomization. Unlike many other survey questions about trade (i.e., favoring limits on imports or support for trade agreements), which do

not permit us to parse out how various considerations might influence overall policy preference, we ask respondents about their perceptions of the consequences of trade with each trading partner (Russia and the EU) on 1) the political situation in Ukraine; 2) the national economic situation; and 3) their personal financial situation. The outcome variables were presented as follows:

*How much do you agree with the following statements? Increasing the amount of international trade between* ***the Russian economy*** *and the Ukrainian economy will* [bold in the original]:

- *improve the political situation Ukraine*
- *improve the financial situation of your family*
- *improve the economic situation of Ukraine as a whole.*

An identically worded question substituting the economy of the European Union (EU) in place of the Russian economy was asked immediately following this question. Responses were recorded on a 10-point scale from "Completely Disagree" to "Completely Agree." Only the end points of the scale carried descriptive labels. Intermediate values were simply numbered.

We hypothesized that the security primes should most directly affect the question about the political situation in Ukraine because the war in the Donbas is the most salient political issue in Ukraine. According to a 2019 poll, nearly 74% of Ukrainians listed ceasefire in the Donbas as among the highest priority policy decisions for the government (and an additional 13% listed regaining Crimea, which is also a security issue that Ukraine faces in conflict with Russia). The next most popular answer was increasing people's living standards, which garnered just over 51%. No other policy issue was mentioned by a majority of respondents (Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2019). Since the political situation was asked for as a separate category from economic circumstances, it is highly likely that respondents were considering

Ukraine's security issues in response to this question. Additionally, the question itself primes respondents to think about the security situation as an important part of the political situation due to its mention of Russia. The priming effect of mentioning Russia affects both treatments groups and the control uniformly, so it should not influence any differences in the dependent variable across experimental conditions. Despite the question priming the existence of the conflict, the control group remains unprimed with respect to the effects of trade on the risk of conflict. Furthermore, it is unclear why the information primes about the effect of trade on the risk of war would impact other political issues facing Ukraine (i.e. corruption or healthcare), so that if some respondents interpreted this question as asking about something other than the political issues other than national security that Ukraine is facing, it would simply weaken the results of the experimental treatments.

**Results**

Due to the randomized nature of the survey treatments and evidence of covariate balance across treatments (balance tests are shown in the Appendix, Table A3), we present results as a simple difference of means across treatment groups. As the survey experiment includes three groups and outcomes are measured with a 10-point agreement scale, we used OLS regression to analyze differences between the control group and the increased risk and decreased risk treatment groups. Each treatment group contains approximately 420 respondents. Figure 2 shows the means and 95% confidence errors across the decrease security risk, increase security risk, and control groups for the three dependent variables measuring beliefs about the political, personal economic, and national economic effects of an increase in trade with Russia.

**Figure 2: Comparisons of Means in Beliefs about Effects of Increased Trade with Russia (with 95% confidence intervals)**




As Figure 2 shows, respondents are, on average in the control, most optimistic about the effect that increasing trade with Russia will have on the national economy, followed by the political outcome, and then personal economic outcomes. Figure 2 depicts the differences in means between the control group and each of the treatment groups in the expected direction. Relative to the control, the decreased risk prime makes respondents more optimistic about the effects of trade across all three dependent variables. Conversely, the increased risk prime lowers agreement that increasing trade with Russia will improve all three outcomes. For the question about the effect of trade on Ukraine's political situation, both treatment groups significantly differ ($p<.05$) from the control. For the question about the national economy, both treatment groups weakly differ ($p<.10$) than the control in the expected directions. For the question about the effect of trade with Russia on the respondents' personal economic situation, the decreased

risk treatment significantly differs from the control ($p<.05$), but the increased risk treatment, while negative, does not significantly differ from the control. This may be because of some Ukrainians' personal economic situation are more insulated from the war than others (given the wars geographic concentration in just two of Ukraine's 25 provinces).[5] Given the high level of salience of the conflict and accompanying economic problems that exists within Ukraine as well as the complexity of the framing information, it is notable that brief information primes are able to exert an effect since, even in the control group, respondents have a great deal of knowledge about the situation. However, the control group is unlikely to have strong or systematic beliefs about how trade will affect the security situation.

[5] These numbers do not include the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia. Ukraine (and many Ukrainians) vehemently dispute this classification, viewing that territory as "temporarily occupied," but it is not currently the site of military activity of any kind.

**Figure 3: Comparisons of Means in Beliefs about Effects of Increased Trade with EU (with 95% confidence intervals)**




In contrast, for beliefs about the effects of EU trade, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no meaningful difference between each treatment group compared to the control group for the EU outcomes. Figure 3 compares the mean response across treatment groups for the EU outcomes and indicates substantively small and statistically insignificant framing effects. Not surprisingly, optimism about the effects of trade (the mean values across groups) are a notably higher for trade with the EU than for trade with Russia, echoing findings from earlier studies that trade with adversaries is less popular than trade with other states. Table 2 displays the linear regression output from the Ukrainian survey data for both trading partners (Russia and EU), for the political, national economic, and personal financial outcomes.

The lack of framing effects for beliefs about any of the consequences of trade with the EU indicates an asymmetry in the effects of security consequences on beliefs about trade based on the extent of the security threat, consistent with H3. We anticipated no significant treatment

effects on outcomes with countries that represented only a remote possibility of conflict though it was unclear whether opinions would move in the same directions as beliefs about trade with Russia, or whether both primes might make trade with the EU more attractive. In our analysis of EU outcomes, we see the increased risk prime and the decreased risk prime move respondents in opposite directions, relative to the control, though not meaningfully. Despite the fact that the EU represents a substantial source of aid for Ukraine, Ukrainians did not see trade that increases military resources as positive for increasing trade with the EU, either economically or politically. Since conflict with the EU is viewed as sufficiently improbable, the security effects of trade do not meaningfully change Ukrainians' assessments of trade with the EU for either treatment.

This differs somewhat from Carnegie and Gaikwad's (2019) findings. As in this study, they find that a prime about trade increasing military resources does not significantly affect support for a trade agreement with an ally, but only with an adversary. However, among American respondents, they find that "when informed that trade will help ensure peace, respondents upgrade their evaluation of the free trade agreements for both adversaries and allies" (19). We posit that we find an asymmetrical effect for both the increase and the decrease risk primes because in our experiment people have concrete examples in mind, allowing them to account for the (non-)salience of the threat. In a hypothetical situation, naming a state as ally or adversary and invoking military size or risk of war in a vignette that gives very few facts about the state is likely to predispose respondents to think of the security issues as salient in that bilateral relationship. According to our theory, ascribing salience to the security issues increases the significance of the security prime.

**Table 2. OLS Output, Treatment Groups Compared to Control**

| | *Dependent variable: Increasing Trade with [Country] will Improve the [Situation] in Ukraine* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia - Political | Russia - Personal Economic | Russia - National Economic | EU - Political | EU - Personal Economic | EU - National Economic |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Decrease Risk | 0.468** | 0.523** | 0.406* | 0.163 | 0.080 | 0.198 |
| | (0.227) | (0.220) | (0.229) | (0.190) | (0.209) | (0.185) |
| Increase Risk | −0.449** | −0.258 | −0.390* | −0.115 | −0.065 | −0.122 |
| | (0.228) | (0.221) | (0.230) | (0.191) | (0.210) | (0.186) |
| Constant | 4.262*** | 3.811*** | 4.637*** | 7.198*** | 6.252*** | 7.332*** |
| | (0.161) | (0.156) | (0.162) | (0.135) | (0.148) | (0.131) |
| Observations | 1,250 | 1,247 | 1,246 | 1,250 | 1,248 | 1,248 |
| $R^2$ | 0.013 | 0.010 | 0.010 | 0.002 | 0.0004 | 0.002 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.008 | 0.0001 | −0.001 | 0.001 |
| Residual Std. Error | 3.293 (df = 1247) | 3.187 (df = 1244) | 3.316 (df = 1243) | 2.757 (df = 1247) | 3.031 (df = 1245) | 2.682 (df = 1245) |
| F Statistic | 8.060*** (df = 2; 1247) | 6.476*** (df = 2; 1244) | 5.961*** (df = 2; 1243) | 1.064 (df = 2; 1247) | 0.237 (df = 2; 1245) | 1.506 (df = 2; 1245) |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2 corresponds to Figures 2 and 3 above, depicting the treatment effects when compared to the control group. These results are from an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis, in which we analyze all participants who were randomized in the study according to the treatment groups to which they were originally assigned, regardless of whether an attention check indicated that they understood or remembered the treatment. As pre-registered, we also calculate the average-treatment-effect among the treated (ATT), limiting the sample to the subset which answered an attention check question in the survey. This ATT analysis is presented in the appendix (Table A1).

If we compare the two treatment groups in our study to each other (as in Carnegie and Gaikwad 2019) rather than to the control, the increased risk treatment group reports more pessimistic views of trade than the decreased risk treatment group at a significance level of $p<.01$ for all three assessments of the effects of trade with Russia. However, the framing effects are insignificant at a conventional significance levels across indicators for beliefs about trade with the EU. These results are displayed in Table 3. This comparison indicates that if competing frames are used to discuss the impact of trade and security, it can increase polarization of attitudes about trade.

**Table 3. Effects of Trade with Russia or EU on Political and Economic Outcomes, Comparing Increased Risk Treatment to Decreased Risk Treatment**

| | *Dependent variable: Political and Economic Consequences of Trade with Russia* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Russia - Political | Russia - Personal Econ | Russia - National Econ | EU - Political | EU - Personal Econ | National Econ - EU |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Increase Risk | −0.918*** | −0.781*** | −0.796*** | −0.278 | −0.145 | −0.320* |
| | (0.229) | (0.223) | (0.230) | (0.192) | (0.211) | (0.187) |
| Constant | 4.730*** | 4.335*** | 5.043*** | 7.360*** | 6.333*** | 7.530*** |
| | (0.161) | (0.157) | (0.162) | (0.135) | (0.148) | (0.132) |
| Observations | 830 | 828 | 827 | 830 | 828 | 829 |
| $R^2$ | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.018 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.001 | −0.001 | 0.002 |
| Residual Std. Error | 3.304 (df = 828) | 3.203 (df = 826) | 3.305 (df = 825) | 2.761 (df = 828) | 3.036 (df = 826) | 2.695 (df = 827) |
| F Statistic | 16.005*** (df = 1; 828) | 12.314*** (df = 1; 826) | 11.993*** (df = 1; 825) | 2.098 (df = 1; 828) | 0.471 (df = 1; 826) | 2.922* (df = 1; 827) |
| *Note:* | | | | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

Table A2 in the appendix displays the corresponding results from a simple Welch two-sample t-test, confirming the significant difference in average treatment effect between those given the Increase Risk information prime and those primed with the Decrease Risk.

**Robustness checks**

Given the random assignment of our treatment design, controlling for covariates is not strictly necessary. Statistical analyses in the appendix confirm that the treatment groups are balanced in terms of education level, city size, age, income, macro-region, survey language, and gender (balance plots included in Appendix A, Section (IV), Figures A2 – A3). However, while covariate adjustment is not necessary because of the randomization of treatments, it can improve precision of estimates and can be desirable because the selected controls may be powerful predictors of the outcome variable (Gerber and Green 2012). For example, in the Ukrainian context, Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians may have quite different views on trade with Russia and the EU than do Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Accordingly, we additionally examine the effects of each treatment (relative to the control group) while controlling for the respondents' gender,

age, education level, language, region, city size. All covariates included in Figure 4 are asked prior to the treatment, removing the possibility of inadvertent bias from conditioning on post-treatment variables influenced by the information treatment primes (Montgomery et al. 2018). Gender, age, and education level have been found in numerous studies to influence both security attitudes and attitudes towards trade. As mentioned above, language is likely to influence foreign policy preferences across issue areas. The language variable simply indicates the language the respondent selected when asked in which language they would prefer to take the survey. This should capture which language the respondent is more comfortable speaking, while avoiding the complicated sociology of language that exists in Ukraine and the politicization of language that has been exacerbated by the conflict. 48.5% of respondents chose Ukrainian, and 51.5% of respondents chose to take the survey in Russian. It is equal to one for those who chose Russian. It is expected to be increase the baseline level of optimism about trade with Russia and decrease the baseline level of optimism for trade with the EU.

Regional dummies correlate with proximity to the conflict and the relative importance of trade with the EU and Russia in the local economy both before and during the conflict, so may have different baseline beliefs about trade. The omitted region is the Central region, which includes the capital city, Kyiv). City size demarcates those living in larger, urban settings from those in small cities (population less then 50,000) and rural areas as economic considerations may vary according to size of the local economy.

**Figure 4: Coefficient Plot, with Pre-treatment Covariates**




Figure 4 (and corresponding Table A4 in the appendix) display the results of these analyses.[6] These analyses confirm the findings reported above with respect to the framing effects of the security primes. The inclusion of controls strengthens the results somewhat. With controls, both the increased and decreased risk treatments differ significantly from the control ($p<.05$) for the questions about the effects of trade with Russia on the national economy and the political situation. For one's personal economic situation, it is still the case that only the decreased risk treatment differs significantly from the control. The increased risk treatment does not change beliefs about the effects of trade on the respondents' personal economic situation. Additionally,

[6] In addition, Figure A4 in the appendix and Table A5 in the appendix display the results of this OLS analysis controlling for the personal proximity variable, as outlined in our preregistered design. In addition, Figure A6 in the appendix calculates the interaction effects between Treatment X Personal Proximity.

language and region significantly influence the baseline beliefs about the effects of trade with Russia. As expected, Russian speakers have significantly higher assessments of the effects of trade with Russia (and lower assessments of the effects of trade with the EU) across dependent variables. Those in Eastern Ukraine also are more positive about the effects of trade with Russia, while those in Western Ukraine have lower assessments than those in the central region (but do not significantly different from the central region in their baseline assessment of EU trade). This indicates that effects of regional variables are inconsistent with the idea that proximity to the conflict alone makes people more averse to trade with Russia, but are consistent with the strength of economic relations between that region and Russia.

These analyses provide support for our hypotheses that informational primes about the security implications of trade actually do alter assessments of trade (in both directions). However, this appears to only affect attitudes towards trade with trading partners posing high security risks. Even beneficial security effects of trade do not significantly change attitudes about trade with friendly trading partners.[7]

[7] We conducted some additional analyses to ensure the robustness of these results. Models that cluster the standard errors by province (since each province's economy has a differing level of trade dependence on Russia and a different exposure to risk from the war) confirm the results. Of course, because treatments are randomized at the individual level, this was not necessary (Abadie et al. 2017). Running a variance inflation factor (VIF) by calculating the quotient of the variance in a model with multiple terms by the variance of a model with one term alone, we found GVIF values consistently below 2, quantifying low severity of (if any) multicollinearity in our OLS

In addition, unlike the tradeoff frequently posited between economic and security effects of trade, we find that citizen beliefs about both the economic and political effects of trade move in the same direction when primed to think about the security effects of trade in a highly insecure environment such as Ukraine. We do not want to over-emphasize the importance of this finding, as it is possible that survey respondents may have insufficiently distinguished between the questions while taking the online survey. However, we do find that over 40% of respondents gave different answers across the three questions about the effects trade with Russia. Additionally, at least some respondents gave widely divergent answers for the anticipated effects of trade on the economic and political situation (awarding one a strongly agree and another a strongly disagree).

As an additional robustness check, given the significance of ethnolinguistic identity in shaping Ukrainian public opinion and politics, we analyzed our results based on subgroups according to respondents' preferred survey language.[8] Since the analyses in Figure 4 show that preferred language significantly impacts beliefs about the effects of trade with Russia and the EU, we find it relevant to consider whether the effects of the treatments might also differ according to ethnolinguistic identity. The difference in means across treatment groups along with 95% confidence intervals are shown in Figure 5. The Russian-speaking subgroup is shown in the upper panels of Figure 5, while the effects of the treatments for Ukrainian speakers are shown in the lower panels.

analyses (Appendix, Table A6). As a Breusch-Pagan test revealed some heteroskedasticity in the data, we also show results using robust standard errors (see Appendix A, Table A9).

[8] This subgroup analysis is consistent with our pre-registered intentions for analyzing the data.

**Figure 5. Means Comparisons for Trade with Russia, by ethnolinguistic subgroup:**




Figure 5 demonstrates that effects of the information primes are larger (and indeed are only significant) for the Ukrainian-speaking subgroup. Specifically, for Ukrainian speakers only, the decreased security risk prime improves assessments of the effects of trade with Russia across all three dependent variables. However, the increased risk treatment does not significantly worsen beliefs about the economic results of more trade with Russia, though it does weakly ($p<.10$) worsen beliefs about the political effects of trade with Russia. For the Russian-speaking subgroup, the differences between the increased risk and decreased risk treatment groups remain significant (albeit weakly so for the question about the national economic effects), but the

treatments do not differ significantly from the control.[9] We speculate that this is the result of greater variance in attitudes in the Russian-speaking subgroup, particularly in the control group. This does not appear to be due to Russian speakers being concentrated in the eastern part of Ukraine (i.e. closer to the conflict). While respondents in the Eastern region have a significantly more positive view of the effects of trade with Russia across dependent variables than those in central Ukraine (and those in the West significantly more negative), the effects of the primes do not differ significantly across region (see Table A11 in the Appendix).

Analyzing our results based on ethnolinguistic subgroups for the EU outcomes reveals no significant differences between treatment groups within either the Ukrainian- or Russian-speaking subgroups. Figure 6 below compares the mean responses for political, personal economic, and national economic consequences of trade with the EU within ethnolinguistic subgroups.

[9] However, the effects of the treatments do not significantly differ across language groups. See Table A10 in the Appendix for models that interact the treatments with respondent language.

**Figure 6. Means Comparisons for Trade with EU, by ethnolinguistic subgroup:**




Consistent with our main survey experiment findings, there is no significant treatment effect for EU outcomes. This suggests that information frames have little effect in altering public opinion toward trade with a non-salient threat, both overall in Ukraine as well as within Russian-speaking or Ukrainian-speaking subgroups.

## Conclusion

This study contributes to our understanding of how elites may be able to lead, rather than follow, public opinion on foreign policy by examining framing effects about the consequences of trade on security risks. It also contributes to a nascent literature on how the security consequences of trade affect public opinion on trade. Security consequences of trade should be

thought of as including not only whether the trading partner is friend or foe, but also understanding how trade might alter the nature of the threat. Indeed, this latter concern is the security rhetoric that most frequently emerges in political narratives about trade. Rarely do elites seek to reframe a state that is popularly seen as a foe to be less threatening. Rather, if they wish to advocate for expanding economic relations with adversary, they argue that trade reduces the risk of conflict or improves the geopolitical position of the home state against a foe.

Alternatively, those wishing to curtail economically profitable trade relations do so by linking trade to increased threats to national security. The Trump administration in the United States, for example, "view[s] another country's trade practices as dangerous to the United States as its military abilities" (Swanson and Mozer 2019), which has been used to justify use of national security measures to block imports with China. While this national security justification might be dismissed by those skeptical of the administration's motives, this framing appears to have been effective with some portions of the public. Support for the tariffs and the Trump administration remained high even among sectors and regions (i.e. agriculture and the Midwest) that were economically harmed by the policy. Consistent with our third hypothesis, this may be due to different baseline beliefs within the American public about how threatening China actually is. However, also consistent with these findings about how the salience of security threats mediates the effect of invoking security concerns, similar national security rhetoric against imports from the EU or Japan have been less successful in mobilizing public opinion.

By examining the framing effects of security implications of trade on public opinion about trade with either friend or foe, this study extends the few previous studies on this topic by considering beliefs about the economic and political effects of trade separately and by doing so in a context where security issues are highly salient. It examines a context outside of the United

States, where both trade dependence on a few trade partners and security risks are higher. By testing our theory on the case of Ukraine, we provide additional insight into the effects of informational primes, such as those that are used in political debates about trading with the enemy, in the context of an actual ongoing conflict.

We find that when asking about "trading with the enemy," optimism about trade increases if trade is believed to decrease security risks. However, pessimism about trade with the enemy can also be increased if people are primed to believe that trade will exacerbate risk. However, the informational primes have different effects on attitudes toward trade depending on the salience of security risks posed by the trade partner. The primes significantly move beliefs about the consequences and importance of trade with Russia, whereas the treatments have no significant effect on beliefs about trade with the EU. This suggests that framing effects from the information security implications of trade will only change attitudes towards trade if security concerns about the trading partner are evident to the public.

These findings have important implications for scholars and policy-makers alike interested in understanding how to frame the benefits – or costs – of trade with economic partners posing high security risks. This study indicates that politicians have significant policy leeway in how they engage economically with adversaries. While public opinion is frequently assumed to be a constraint on such policies, this study shows that deploying rhetoric that casts trade as exacerbating or mitigating the security risks that arise from trading with the enemy can sway public opinion.

## References


Abadie, Alberto, Susan Athey, Guido W. Imbens, and Jeffrey Wooldridge. 2017. "When Should You Adjust Standard Errors for Clustering?" NBER Working Paper 24003.

Bailey, Michael A. 2003. "The Politics of the Difficult: Congress, Public Opinion, and Early Cold War Aid and Trade Policies." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 2: 147-77.

Barbieri, Katherine, and Jack S. Levy. 1999. "Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade." *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 4: 463-79.

Bearce, David H. 2003."Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace." *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 3: 347-70.

Bennet, Stephan Earl. 2003. "Is the Public's Ignorance of Politics Trivial." *Critical Review* 15, no. 3-4: 307-37.

Carnegie, Allison and Gaikwad, Nikhar. 2019."Public Opinion on Geopolitics and Trade: Theory and Evidence." Unpublished manuscript, last modified August 15, 2019. PDF. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2909761

Carpini, Michael X. Delli, and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven; London: Yale University Press.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2018. "Economic Security as National Security: A Discussion with Dr. Peter Navarro." November 13, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-security-national-security-discussion-dr-peter-navarro

Chen, Frederick, John Pevehouse, and Ryan Powers. 2017. "Folk Theories of Trade: Geopolitics, Sociotropic Concerns, and Consumer Safety." Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Political Economy Society, Austin, November 17, 2017. https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/sites/default/files/paper-uploads/2017-11-15-19_03_55-ryan.m.powers@gmail.com.pdf

Dafoe, Allan, Baobao Zhang, and Devin Caughey. 2018. "Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments." *Political Analysis* 26, no. 4: 399-416.

Davis, Christina L. 2008. "Linkage Diplomacy: Economic and Security Bargaining in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-23." *International Security* 33, no. 3): 143-79.

DiGiuseppe, Matthew and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2019. "Economics Security and Individual Level Preferences for Trade Agreements." *International Interactions* 45, no. 2: 289-315.

Flores-Macías, Gustavo A., and Sarah E. Kreps. 2013. "The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade: China's Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992–2006." *The*

*Journal of Politics* 75, no. 2: 357-71.

Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. 2001. "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict." *International Organization* 55, no. 2: 391-438.

Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2012. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

Giltner, Philip. 1997. "Trade in 'Phoney' Wartime: The Danish-German 'Maltese' Agreement of 9 October 1939." *The International History Review* 19(2): 333-336.

Gowa, Joanne. 1995. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gowa, Joanne, and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade." *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2: 408-20.

Grinberg, Mariya. 2019. "Planning for the Short Haul: Explaining Wartime Trade between Enemies." PhD diss., University of Chicago.

Herrmann, Richard K., Philip E. Tetlock, and Matthew N. Diascro. 2001. "How Americans Think about Trade: Reconciling Conflicts among Money, Power, and Principles." *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 2: 191-218.

Hiscox, Michael J. 2006. "Through a Glass and Darkly: Attitudes toward International Trade and the Curious Effects of Issue Framing." *International Organization* 60(3): 755-780.

Holsti, Ole R. 2007. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.

Hudson Institute. "Vice President Mike Pence's Remarks on the Administration's Policy Towards China October 4 Event." Filmed October 4, 2018 at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC. Website. https://www.hudson.org/events/1610-vice-president-mike-pence-s-remarks-on-the-administration-s-policy-towards-china102018

Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. 2019. "Public Opinion: November 2019." Accessed May 12, 2020. https://dif.org.ua/en/article/public-opinion-november-2019

Jerit, Jennifer. 2009. "How Predictive Appeals Affect Policy Opinions." *American Journal of Political Science* 53: 411-426.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company

Kinder, Donald R. and David O. Sears. 1985. "Public Opinion and Political Action." In

*Handbook of Social Psychology*, edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, 659-741. New York: Random House, 3rd ed..

Levy, Jack S., and Katherine Barbieri. 2004."Trading with the Enemy During Wartime." *Security Studies* 13, no. 3: 1-47.

Liberman, Peter. 1996. "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains." *International Security* 21, no. 1: 147-75.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2000. "Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict." *International Organization* 54, no. 4: 775-808.

Morrow, James D. 1997. "When Do "Relative Gains" Impede Trade?" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (1997): 12-37.

Naoi, Megumi and Ikuo Kume. 2015. "Workers or Consumers? A Survey Experiment on the Duality of Citizens' Interests in the Politics of Trade." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(10): 1293-1317.

Naoi, Megui and Shujiro Urata. 2013. "Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: The Case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement." *Asian Economic Policy Review* 8(2): 326-349.

OECD-DAC. nd. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-glance.htm.

Oneal, John R., and Bruce M. Russett. 1997. "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985." *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 2: 267-93.

Oneal, John R., Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce Russett. 1996. "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85." *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 1: 11-28.

O'Rourke, Kevin and Richard Sinnott. 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence." *Brookings Trade Forum*: 157-206.

Polachek, Solomon William. 1980. "Conflict and Trade." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 1: 55-78.

Rho, Sungmin and Michael Tomz. 2017. "Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?" *International Organization* 71 Supplement 2017: S85-S108.

Sattler, Thomas, and Tanya Schweinberger. "Trade as a Foreign Policy Issue: A Bilateral Micro Perspective." Unpublished manuscript, last modified October 22, 2019. PDF. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3468070

Skonieczny, Amy. 2018. "Trading with the Enemy: Narrative, Identity and US Trade Politics." *Review of International Political Economy* 25, no. 4: 441-62.

Sniderman, Paul M., & Theriault, Sean M. 2004. "The Structure of Political Argument and The logic Of Issue Framing." In W. E. Saris & P. M. Sniderman (Eds.) *Studies in public opinion* (pp. 133–165). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Spilker, Gabriele, Thomas Bernauer, and Víctor Umaña. 2016. "Selecting Partner Countries for Preferential Trade Agreements: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 4: 706–18.

Swanson, Ana, and Paul Mozur. 2019. "Trump Mixes Economic and National Security, Plunging the U.S. into Multiple Fights." *New York Times*, June 8, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/business/trump-economy-national-security.html

Ukrainian State Statistical Commission. n.d. "Geographic Structure of International Trade in Goods in 2018." [Географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі товарами у 2018 році] Accessed May 10, 2020. https://ukrstat.org/uk/operativ/operativ2018/zd/ztt/ztt_u/ztt1218_u.htm.

Ukrainian State Statistical Commission. n.d. "Geographic Structure of International Trade in Goods in 2013." [Географічна структура зовнішньої торгівлі товарами за 2013 рік] Accessed May 10, 2020. https://ukrstat.org/uk/operativ/operativ2013/zd/ztt/ztt_u/ztt1213_u.html

Walter, Stefanie. 2010. "Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2): 403-426.

White House. "Remarks by President Trump on the Administration's National Security Strategy." Given December 18, 2017 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C. Website. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-administrations-national-security-strategy/

Zeng, Ka, and Xiaojun Li. " Geopolitics, Nationalism, and Foreign Direct Investment: Perceptions of the China Threat and American Public Attitudes toward Chinese FDI." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 12, no. 4 (2019): 495–518. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poz016