

**Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants:
Theory and Experimental Evidence from India***

Nikhar Gaikwad
nikhar.gaikwad@columbia.edu
Assistant Professor
Columbia University
Department of Political Science
420 W 118 St, Mail Code 3320
New York, NY 10027

Gareth Nellis
gnellis@ucsd.edu
Assistant Professor
University of California, San Diego
Department of Political Science
Social Sciences Building 301
9500 Gilman Drive, Mail Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093

*We are grateful to the Institute of Social and Economic Research and Policy at Columbia University and the University of California, San Diego for funding; to Morsel PLC for fieldwork; and to Basti Suraksha Manch for their assistance with the intervention. For comments and advice, our thanks to Claire Adida, Allison Carnegie, Jasper Cooper, Thad Dunning, Susan Hyde, Kimuli Kasara, John Marshal, Carlo Prato, Kenneth Scheve, Michael Weaver, and workshop participants at Columbia University, the University of California, San Diego, the University of Rochester, and the 2019 Conference on South Asia at Madison, Wisconsin. For outstanding research assistance, we are indebted to Heba Abbas, Thomas Brailey, Aura Gonzalez, Karminder Malhotra, Bidisha Mandal, Rochan Mathur, Amritanshu Patnaik, Seungyu Sin, Nitin Teotia, and Shane Xuan.

Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants: Theory and Experimental Evidence from India

Abstract: Migrants are politically marginalized in cities of the developing world, participating in destination-area elections less than long-term residents. We theorize three reasons for this shortfall: migrant's socio-economic links to origin regions; bureaucratic obstacles to enrollment that disproportionately burden newcomers; and nativist ostracism by politicians. We randomized a door-to-door drive to facilitate voter registration among internal migrants to two Indian cities. Ties to origin regions do not predict willingness to become registered locally. Meanwhile, assistance navigating the electoral bureaucracy increased migrant registration rates by 24 percentage points and substantially boosted next-election turnout. An additional treatment arm informed politicians about the drive in a subset of localities; rather than ignoring new migrant voters, elites amplified campaign efforts in response. We conclude that onerous registration requirements impede the political incorporation and thus the wellbeing of migrant communities in fast-urbanizing settings. The findings also matter for assimilating naturalized yet politically excluded cross-border immigrants.

Word Count: 11,783

Countries witnessing rapid economic development frequently struggle to assimilate new migrants into cities (Post 2018; Thachil Forthcoming). As the population of Britain's towns doubled in size during the industrial revolution, Friedrich Engels (1845: 115, viii) described a burgeoning urban proletariat "cast out and ignored by the class in power" and living in a "state of dilapidation, discomfort, and misery." During the Great Migration in the United States, African Americans escaping Jim Crow laws met with "unwritten, mercurial, [and] opaque" resentment in northern cities; they were pushed to the margins, leading Martin Luther King Jr. to lament that "Chicago has not turned out to be the New Jerusalem" (Wilkerson 2010: 386).

Internal migrants, who number one seventh of the world's population, face similar challenges across much of today's Global South (Bell and Charles-Edwards 2013). Political exclusion is commonplace (Bhavnani and Lacina 2018; Singer and Quek 2017). Evidence suggests that those who shift from the countryside to cities participate in destination-area politics at lower rates than long-term city residents. This shortfall matters normatively, cutting against democracy's promise of equal representation. It is also of practical consequence, as social groups failing to exercise suffrage experience state neglect (Fujiwara 2015; Bussell 2019).

What accounts for migrants' under-representation in urban politics? We theorize three mechanisms by which mobility induces political marginalization. The first centers on migrants' enduring economic and social ties to their origin regions. Migrants who maintain close links to "home" may be unwilling to refocus their activity on cities, opting to remain detached from political life there. Second, bureaucratic obstacles associated with city-based participation—above all, the hassle costs of updating voter registration and navigating electoral bureaucracies—militate against urban engagement. Whereas governments normally assume

responsibility for initiating the registration process in advanced industrialized states, we find that sixteen of the twenty most populous low- and middle-income democracies place the onus on *citizens* to initiate enrollment.¹ Last, ostracism by long-term city residents and their elite representatives could impede migrant incorporation (Dancygier 2010). “Sons of the soil” parties that vilify newcomers have sprung up in Mumbai, Karachi, and Cape Town in recent decades (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015; Weiner 1978). It stands to reason that migrants meeting with broad-based indifference or hostility will foresee few benefits to sinking their energies on politics in host communities.

We study the role played by these factors in undermining migrants’ *political incorporation*, conceptualized to comprise both citizen-side political engagement and elites’ readiness to include citizens in urban political machines. To do so, we fielded a large randomized controlled trial in India, a leading case for evaluating the political under-representation of internal migrants. We evaluate a door-to-door campaign to facilitate voter registration among migrants to two cities: Delhi, the national capital, and Lucknow, which is the capital of India’s largest state and is emblematic of a class of mid-tier cities increasingly attractive to jobseekers (Thachil 2017). Partnering with a non-governmental organization (NGO) in advance of the 2019 national parliamentary elections, we recruited 2,306 migrants who lacked local voter registration documents. Half of those who expressed an interest in registering to vote in the city were then

¹ Voter-initiated registration is used in India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, South Africa, Myanmar, Kenya, Colombia, Iraq, Malaysia, Ghana, Nepal, Burkina Faso, and Madagascar. Governments initiate registration in Indonesia, Argentina, Peru, and Sri Lanka. Detailed information is given in Appendix A.

offered intensive assistance in applying for a voter identification card that enabled them to cast a ballot locally in the upcoming polls. In addition, we built a cluster-level experiment on top of the individual-level design. Its purpose was to inform politicians in a randomly chosen subset of neighborhoods that the registration drive had taken place, and thus to test whether attaining registered status paved the way to migrants' full-fledged political incorporation. Surveys were administered at baseline and two months after the elections.

Previewing the results, there is little to suggest that migrants' ongoing links to their former places of residence prevent them from incorporating politically into cities. Asked whether they *wished* to register locally, 98 percent of eligible respondents replied "yes," indicating that voluntary disengagement is rare in our sample. This is striking since interviewed migrants reported significant social and economic ties to their prior hometowns. By contrast, there is clear evidence that bureaucratic obstacles to registering to vote hinder migrants' electoral participation. Alleviating these constraints—by providing at-home assistance in completing and submitting complex voter registration documents—increased migrant registration rates by 24 percentage points and next-election turnout by 20 percentage points. It also shifted downstream outcomes, raising political interest and perceptions of local political accountability. We do not see effects on perceptions of political efficacy and political trust, suggesting that deeper beliefs about the capabilities of the local state remained unchanged.

Does elite non-responsiveness further undermine migrants' local political incorporation? The eagerness of migrants to accept registration assistance suggests that anticipation of ostracism is not a major determinant of exclusion on the demand side. Yet, we go further to assess experimentally whether the *basis* for such perceptions exists. If city politicians are constrained

by the nativist preferences of urban electorates, then learning about the mass registration of migrant voters locally should fail to influence their campaign strategies. Against this prediction, we find that electioneering increased in the vicinity of polling stations listed in our communications to candidates. As migrants found a place on local electoral rolls and politicians learned about it, political candidates began soliciting migrant support.

Overall, we conclude that stringent registration requirements—rather than “opting out” or fears of ostracism by local political machines—drive the political incorporation gap between migrants and long-term residents in the fast-growing cities we study.

Our study breaks new ground. First, recent studies suggest that registration drives are effective tools for spurring enrollment among unregistered citizens (e.g. Nickerson 2015; Harris and van der Windt Forthcoming). Yet to date there has been negligible theoretical or empirical work on the roadblocks to political access and participation encountered by migrants in the Global South. Second, going beyond prior studies, we assess in additional tests whether political incorporation can engender social and economic assimilation. Supporting this conjecture, our results reveal that treated migrants were more likely to consider the city their “home,” to harbor norms of inter-ethnic tolerance, and to be willing to make tax contributions to city-based public goods. Third, we advance understanding of the sources of urban deprivation (Auerbach 2019). Our novel cluster-level experiment demonstrates that enlarging migrant vote blocs can galvanize politician responsiveness, potentially leading to welfare gains in “patronage democracies,” where urban politicians serve as critical intermediaries channeling material benefits from states to citizens (Chauchard 2018). Last, we note the persistent voting gap between naturalized cross-border immigrants and native-born citizens (Alizade et al Forthcoming). Thus, naturalized

immigrant groups may benefit from interventions like the one evaluated here (Braconnier et al 2017; Pons and Liegey 2019; Mosley and Singer 2015).

The Migrant-Native Participation Gap Worldwide

We begin by documenting a divergence in the political participation rates of migrants and natives worldwide. Naturalized cross-border immigrants are less likely to vote than native-born citizens. In the OECD, turnout rates averaged 80 percent for native-born citizens compared to 74 percent for foreign-born naturalized citizens between 2008 and 2016 (OECD 2019: 128). An analogous 10 to 12 percentage point disparity existed in the United States throughout the 2000s (Wang 2013). We analyzed data from the 2014 World Values Survey, which covered 50 countries, and found that 82 percent of native-born citizens report that they “always voted” or “usually voted,” compared to 71 percent of foreign-born citizens (see Appendix B).

Systematic data is less readily available for internal migrants. Yet evidence points to an equivalent deficit. Residential mobility in Costa Rica “disrupts” voting and is associated with an 8 to 10 percentage point reduction in turnout propensity (Alfaro-Redondo 2016: 73). Focusing on Turkish municipalities, Akarca and Tansel (2015) estimate a negative province-level relationship between in-migration and electoral participation: a one percentage point increase in a province’s share of incoming migrants corresponds to a 0.07 point decline in turnout. Gay (2012) shows for the United States that utilization of a randomly assigned housing-relocation voucher reduced the probability of voting in national elections by 7 percentage points. Based on qualitative and case study materials, scholars have substantiated internal migrants’ relative political disengagement in

Nigeria (Akinyemi et al 2005), Malaysia (Sadiq 2009), Ukraine (National Democratic Institute 2019), and Myanmar (Callahan and Oo 2019).

India, with 1.4 billion citizens and 900 million eligible voters, exemplifies this phenomenon, as multiple sources attest. Subnational states with more migrants evince lower voter turnout.² Survey data from five states suggest that between 60 and 83 percent of domestic migrants failed to cast a ballot in at least one national, state, or local election after moving (Tata Institute of Social Sciences 2015). Representative surveys collected after the 2014 national election revealed turnout to be 69 percent in rural constituencies, 63 percent in smaller cities and towns, and 57 percent in large metropolitan areas (Kumar and Banerjee 2017: 83). Two micro-level studies from Delhi identify low turnout among urban-based migrants as a prime contributor to the rural-urban turnout divide. In 2014, only 65 percent of recent migrants to Delhi possessed a voter ID card allowing them to vote in city elections, while the overall average for Delhi residents was 85 percent (Kumar and Banerjee 2017).³ Thachil (2017) finds in a sample of

² Data from the Election Commission of India indicate that “a 10 percent increase in migrants in a state is associated with a reduction in voter turnout by 0.4 percentage points” (Tata Institute of Social Sciences 2015: 30).

³ These results corroborate findings from India’s largest city, Mumbai. In a 2018 survey of 6,884 slum dwellers in Mumbai, 61 percent of respondents who were born out-of-state reported having a local voter ID card, while the corresponding figure for in-state respondents was 71 percent (Gaikwad et al 2020).

Delhi construction workers that only one in five migrants had ever voted in the city's elections.⁴ The de facto disenfranchisement of internal migrants has been dubbed a "serious infirmity in the electoral process of the world's largest democracy."⁵

Theorizing the Migrant-Native Participation Gap

Given extensive evidence that mobility is associated with suppressed political participation at the individual level, what mechanisms underlie this relationship? Standard models posit an individual-level calculus of participation: citizens engage politically when the expected benefits of doing so exceed the expected costs (Downs 1957). Benefits are typically seen to encompass the utility derived from performing a civic duty, and the utility of having a preferred candidate prevail over the most likely alternative, discounted by the probability that the marginal vote cast will tip the outcome of the race. Costs entail both the direct and opportunity costs of participating: for instance, time spent waiting in line at the polling station as well as any foregone wages.

This decision-theoretic paradigm is illuminating. Yet it overlooks several cost/benefit considerations that *uniquely* fall on those who move. These, we propose, shape the space and

⁴ Furthermore, elite survey data demonstrate that municipal councilors in India's 28 largest cities perceive that migrants are less likely to be registered to vote than long-term city residents (Gaikwad and Nellis Forthcoming). When asked whether they believed that a hypothetical long-term city resident would be registered to vote in the city, 97 percent of councilors answered "yes;" only 51 percent answered "yes" when asked about a recent migrant to the city.

⁵ "The Migrants Indian Democracy Forgot." February 7, 2019. *The Diplomat*.

motivation for migrants to invest in destination-area politics. We now parse these factors in depth, drawing out testable hypotheses.

Voluntary Detachment

Migrants may voluntarily decline to engage in destination-region politics because they see greater advantages to remaining politically involved in their home regions. Unlike native-born residents, migrants possess a choice about where to assert their political participation: they can do so either in their region of origin—their default option—or in the place they settle. Thus, one potential engagement repertoire for migrants entails delinking their place of residence (the city) from their place of political participation (the village).

A delinked engagement strategy holds out several attractions for migrants. First, social and emotional attachments weigh against withdrawing from politics in origin areas. Political interest develops during the early, formative years of individuals' lives, and it does so in a specific locale (Holbein and Hillygus 2020). Social image concerns increase political participation via both negative and positive channels (Gerber et al 2008). It follows that migrants will be less apt to engage politically in places where they are less socially embedded.

Migrants commonly experience social isolation in host cities. Among rural-to-urban migrants in China, for example, “non-kin social ties between migrants and local urban residents are limited [and] non-residents still make the majority of migrant networks” (Yue et al 2013:

1720).⁶ Abiding social relationships may thus serve to prolong origin-area political participation, even after migrants move away.

Second, economic motivations could dissuade migrants from shifting the locus of their political activism. Rationally, migrants with significant material assets (e.g. property) in their former homes will seek to maintain a political voice there post-migration—to ward off expropriation and other economic threats. Intangible assets, above all patron-client relations, provoke similar calculations. Problems of commitment and defection bedevil clientelism. Clientelistic contracts involve high start-up costs, as brokers rely on social networks and repeated interactions to screen for trustworthy, “reciprocal” clients (Finan and Schechter 2012). Giving up these mutually profitable relationships is suboptimal for origin-area politicians, who may try to perpetuate them, for example by bussing migrant workers back to villages at election time.⁷

Summing up, there are compelling reasons for migrants to wish to anchor their political participation in origin regions, rather than to transfer it to the city. Importantly, states generally place few limits on participating “at a distance,” making such behavior possible.

⁶ This is true of cross-border immigrants too. Because “migrants cluster in ethnic communities” and have “limited contact with the host society,” their “connection to the political life in their host country is at best limited” (Careja and Emmenegger 2012: 880), whereas their attachment to country of origin politics remains strong (Alarian and Goodman 2017: 140).

⁷ “MP Polls: Migration of Voters Big Worry for Parties in Bundelkhand Region.” November 24, 2018. *Economic Times*.

Bureaucratic Hassle Costs

A second class of explanations for migrants' political under-representation emphasizes the high administrative barriers migrants face in registering to vote in destination cities. Registration serves as a gateway to both electoral and non-electoral forms of participation. Randomized trials of voter registration campaigns in France, Kenya, and the United States demonstrate that enrollment is sensitive to convenience costs for the average citizen (Nickerson 2015; Braconnier et al 2017; Harris and van der Windt Forthcoming). Our own survey of registration rules worldwide reveals registration to be a cumbersome process for citizens in most large developing democracies (see Appendix A).

These costs are likely to be de facto higher for internal migrants than for long-term city residents. Migrants' disadvantage stems from four sources. First, newcomers lack familiarity with local government procedures, rules, and regulations. The everyday knowledge required to navigate local bureaucracies (e.g. knowing the location of the nearest ward office) is likely to be second nature to long-term city residents but opaque to outsiders. Second, in multilingual contexts, migrants from poor, peripheral regions often speak a different language from those living in urban centers. Laitin and Ramachandran (2016) find that having a mother tongue remotely related to the locally indigenous one impairs health because it makes relevant health information harder to understand. By the same token, migrants speaking a non-local language are handicapped in their bid to register to vote (Gupta 2012). Third, registrants must provide supporting documents along with their application. Here, too, migrants lag—particularly those living in informal settlements without title deeds or formal utilities. Finally, in many contexts, migrants are shouldered with a “double registration burden.” That is, they are required to

deregister to vote in their prior place of residence before reregistering in their destination city. Locals do not have to jump through this additional hoop.

These observations combine to suggest that migrants are levied with a registration surcharge. If true, lowering registration costs should boost migrant enrollment rates and help close the migrant/local participation gap.

Political Ostracism

A final perspective attributes migrants' political exclusion to ostracism and nativist backlash by urban elites. Across domains, long-term residents foresee that the arrival of newcomers will heighten labor market competition (Scheve and Slaughter 2001), strain public services (Hanson et al 2007), and "dilute" the ethno-cultural fabric of urban society (Gaikwad and Nellis 2017). The upshot is that locals, along with their political representatives, are prone to exhibit anti-migrant bias. Bias can manifest as passive indifference: migrant entry is permitted but nothing more is done to smooth migrants' integration or to deliver them services to which they are entitled. It can also materialize as active antagonism—for instance, through the passage of voter suppression measures or violent collective action (Bhavnani and Lacina 2015).⁸

Migrants may disengage politically in these environments. Those who expect to be left sidelined have little to gain from taking part in city politics in the first place. Migrants fearful of

⁸ A historical example of migrant-targeted voter suppression is provided by the French Second Republic, which in May 1850 instituted a local residency requirement that disenfranchised city-based workers from the countryside and "drove republican politics underground" (Berenson 2014: 169).

police harassment, additional taxes, and pogroms may prefer to live in the “shadow of the state,” illegible to its agents (Jha et al 2007; Scott 2009). Ethnographic accounts affirm the reality of these concerns. For example, Jones (2020: 93) writes of seasonal migrants in Guariba, Brazil:

[Their] status as outsiders places seasonal migrant workers in a position where they feel they do not belong and are not entitled to make demands ... civic ostracism places them on the margins of local politics ... they have internalized the exclusion that they experience at the hands of permanent residents in Guariba, as they demonstrate behavior that suggests that their focus is intently on working, saving money, and returning to the northeast, where they are comfortable.

How general these experiences are, and their ultimate impact on political incorporation, remains to be established.

A second, subtler logic emphasizes how politicians’ uncertain beliefs about migrants’ preferences can produce an exclusionary equilibrium. In places where nativist sentiment is muted, it may seem intuitive that parties and candidates would take it upon themselves to help migrants register and participate. Yet because migrants are often “unknown quantities” in local politicians’ eyes—that is, politicians are uncertain whether and in which direction migrants from disparate climes would vote if given the chance—and because the costs of shepherding migrants through the registration process are high, running migrant-focused registration drives is a risky enterprise for competitive elites. As such, the conditions needed for parties to rationally offer migrants registration assistance may seldom appear in practice.

Conceptualizing Political Incorporation

Before proceeding, we clarify what is meant by migrant political incorporation. Our conceptualization involves both *demand*- and *supply*-side inputs. The demand side emphasizes citizen-based political engagement, which has five parts. The first is turning out to vote in

destination-region elections, widely considered to be the fundamental democratic act. Why citizens fail to vote in locations where they ordinarily reside is a central puzzle we aim to elucidate. Second, healthy democracy requires an engaged and informed electorate (Dunning et al 2019). Thus, we look at migrants' attention to politics at the local and national levels. Third, we assess perceptions of political accountability. This follows Adsera et al (2003), who posit that enfranchised individuals should view political elites as more subject to citizen political control and, consequently, as disincentivized to engage in corruption or mismanagement. Fourth, we consider migrants' sense of political efficacy: the notion that "people like me" have influence over the government (Hainmueller et al 2015). Fifth, we quantify trust in formal political institutions, echoing findings in political psychology that inclusion in decision-making processes enhances their legitimacy (Levi and Stoker 2000).⁹

Citizen action alone, however, is insufficient to bring about full political incorporation: for that, political elites must reciprocate by responding to migrant concerns. We therefore consider the nature and extent of campaign activity in migrant-dominated enclaves surrounding elections, on the supposition that if elites do not seek out the support of enfranchised migrants at this pivotal juncture—the moment when politicians confront the strongest incentives to do so—then any other forms of responsiveness to migrants are unlikely to materialize.

⁹ To be sure, incorporation is a multi-faceted concept. In the results section, we further examine political incorporation's relationship to social integration: the comfort that migrants feel in their host cities, their ethnic preferences, and their willingness to pay taxes there.

Migration and Voting in India

We now describe a study setting—India—conducive to a rigorous test of our theoretical claims. There are an estimated 325 million internal migrants in India, comprising 29 percent of the country’s population (Government of India 2010). At 33 percent, India’s current level of urbanization is low by international standards. However, the country’s urban population is projected to grow twofold by 2040, and the preponderance of all new jobs generated over the next 20 years will be city-based (Sankhe et al 2010).

India’s rural-to-urban migrants constitute a disadvantaged population category. A United Nations report notes that “a holistic approach is yet to be put in place that can address the challenges associated with internal migration in India” (UNESCO 2012: 2). New migrants encounter discrimination in accessing government services (Gaikwad and Nellis Forthcoming). Migrant slums lack basic facilities, and anti-migrant political violence is extensive (Auerbach 2019; Bhavnani and Lacina 2015). Migrants evince poor public health outcomes compared to natives (Nitika et al 2014). Demands for “locals only” employment quotas and discriminatory language stipulations have been prevalent (Weiner 1978). In 2019, the state of Andhra Pradesh reserved 75 percent of private industrial jobs for locals.¹⁰ A 2016 survey in 19 major states showed 63 percent of younger respondents agreeing that “priority should be given to people from your state over people from any other state” in the allocation of jobs.¹¹

¹⁰ “Andhra Pradesh First State to Reserve 75% Private Jobs for Locals.” July 23, 2019. *Times of India*.

¹¹ “What Drives Demand for Local Job Quotas?” July 19, 2019. *Hindustan Times: LiveMint*.

To enhance generalizability, our study covers two sites. Delhi is home to 19 million residents and is India's national capital city. It absorbs more migrants than any other metropolitan area. Like other megacities, its urban landscape is dotted with *jhuggi jhopri* ("slum hut") dwellings, constructed from plastic, corrugated iron, and wood. Estimates suggest that 40 percent of Delhi's population comprises migrants from other Indian states.¹² Lucknow, meanwhile, has 2.8 million residents. It is the capital of Uttar Pradesh, India's largest state. Most migrants to Lucknow are attracted by higher wages and originate from economically backward districts of the state (Bose and Rai 2014: 53-55). The Government of India classifies Delhi as a "Tier I" city and Lucknow as a "Tier II" city.

Voter Registration Process

India operates a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. Simple plurality rules are used to elect 543 members of India's lower house of parliament (MPs) to single-member districts. Each citizen in our sample is further represented by an elected Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA, a state-level position), as well as an elected municipal corporator.¹³ Incumbents are not term-limited.

¹² "Delhi Has Highest Share of Inter-State Migrants." July 28, 2019. *Hindustan Times*. About two thirds of migrants come from the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand—so-called *purvanchali* migrants.

¹³ Elections for these offices were not held concurrently with the national elections in the two study cities.

Our investigation was timed to coincide with the 2019 Indian national elections. All Indian citizens aged 18 or over are entitled to vote. Citizens are required to initiate the registration process, which can be done online or on paper. The process has four components:

- *Form-filling.* Registrants must complete the “Application for Inclusion of Name in Electoral Roll” (Form 6, reproduced in Appendix C). A migrant coming from a constituency where she was previously registered to vote must additionally complete and submit a form annulling her entry on the voter roll there (Form 7), and submit the official deletion slip. If she was not previously registered elsewhere, she must sign a form (Form 5.7) stating as much.
- *Documentation.* Citizens must provide proof of local residence (for example, a locally addressed electric/gas bill, ration card, driving license, or bank passbook), two passport size photographs, and proof of age (a 10th grade passing certificate, birth certificate, or Unique ID/Aadhar card). If the applicant is a tenant, her landlord must sign an affidavit confirming current occupancy.
- *Submission.* Applications are submitted to the registration office of the Assembly Constituency in which the citizen resides. Alternatively, applicants can hand over the documents to a Booth Level Officer (BLO) during “summary revisions:” brief voter registration drives conducted annually by local election offices.
- *Verification.* Local BLOs process the forms. If they are found to be in order, a BLO will then pay an in-person visit to the applicant’s given address to verify that the submitted photograph matches the applicant. A voter identification card is mailed by post to the applicant following approval, and their name is entered on the local voter roll. Applicants

are not informed in cases of rejections. Rejections occur either when documents are judged incomplete or improperly filled, or when the applicant is not found during the BLO's visit.¹⁴

Barriers to Registration

Inertia, corruption, and classism mar India's voter registration system. Peisakhin (2012) found the median processing time for new voter registrations to be 150 days for middle-class Delhi residents and 331 days for the city's slum residents. Payment of an INR 1,000 (USD 13) bribe cut those averages in half. To maximize rents, "officials at election registration offices did almost everything in their power to indirectly encourage applicants ... to turn to middlemen for assistance" (Peisakhin 2012: 139). Non-bribe payers were additionally harassed, being asked to supply documents not required by law.

Our own qualitative interviews back these claims, while also highlighting the peculiar problems migrants face in registering to vote. BLOs betrayed animus toward migrants in interviews, referring to them as "troublemakers." According to one officer:

Petty crimes in the area have shot up since the recent influx of migrants. They use voter IDs to get loans and then abscond. I would perform numerous background checks on a prospective tenant who is a migrant since all his ID proofs will carry my address, and it is me who stands to get bogged down by all the police paperwork in the event of an untoward incident. At the voter office, we are advised to exercise caution in our dealings with migrants.¹⁵

¹⁴ The BLO must make three attempts to locate the applicant at their place of residence.

¹⁵ Interview: BLO, Karol Bagh Assembly Constituency, Delhi, August 22, 2019.

Ahuja and Chhibber (2012) contend that the poor in India vote at high rates because they see it as their civic right. But local elites were skeptical about migrants' motives for registering. "It wouldn't be a stretch to say that in the case of migrants, the primary motive for obtaining voter IDs is not the right to vote itself;" rather, they care only about the "potential benefits," including a "claim to a government plot" if the slum is demolished, as well as "healthcare and education benefits."¹⁶ *Pradhans* (local community leaders) flagged landlords' apprehensions about migrants' obtaining local voter ID cards:

There is a scheme for allotment of municipal corporation plots to slum dwellers ... The bone of contention is a clause which stipulates that competing claims on a plot [e.g. by a tenant with a local voter ID card, attesting to their residency on that plot] will result in its blockage ... Landlords frequently refuse to sign the mandatory undertaking required by a tenant while filling registration *Form 6*. Further, landlords have, in the past, dragged the election office to court for registering migrants without their approval. Subsequently, BLOs have been as wary as the landlords themselves in dealing with tenants in *bastis* [slum colonies].¹⁷

Migrants harshly criticized the local election management system. "The voter office is jolted out of its inactivity only days before the elections. I suspect *bastis* are not even a priority for them. This year BLOs arrived at Ambedkar Camp ... clueless and ill-prepared."¹⁸ According to another: "A few years ago, I had approached the Election Officer at the Dwarka voter registration office only to be told that the concerned BLO had resigned, and there was nobody

¹⁶ Interview: BLO, New Delhi Assembly Constituency, Delhi, August 13, 2019.

¹⁷ Interview: *Pradhan*, Punjabi Bagh, Delhi, September 7, 2019.

¹⁸ Interview: Resident, Karol Bagh, Delhi, September 12, 2019.

assigned to our *basti* at the moment.”¹⁹ These accounts testify to the difficulties migrants encounter in registering to vote in destination cities.

Parties have a patchy record of assisting migrants to register to vote in Delhi and Lucknow. Indian electoral law requires that registration applications be filed before candidate nominations are declared. Yet India’s weakly institutionalized parties have been likened to “pop up restaurants” that emerge in campaign seasons only to shutter between elections (Auerbach et al 2020). Thus, registration assistance must be given in periods when parties are generally poorly staffed. More than that, knowing whether and in which way migrants will vote is challenging in a context such as India, where voters and candidates routinely switch parties. These reasons help explain, therefore, Indian migrants’ relatively low rates of registration under the status quo.

Research Design

We implemented a large, multi-level field experiment to shed light on the reasons why migrants fail to incorporate politically into destination cities, and the degree to which such disengagement is remediable. This section details the empirical strategy.

Sampling, Recruitment, and Baseline

Sampling and the administration of the baseline survey proceeded in four stages.

1. *Site selection.* We first generated a list of 100 migrant-dominated settlements, which is to our knowledge the most comprehensive list of such settlements for Delhi and Lucknow. To make this initial frame of potential sites, we relied on census data, schedules of

¹⁹ Interview: *Pradhan*, Sagarpur, Delhi, September 22, 2019.

informal settlements produced by city governments, and information gleaned from respondents at migrant-dominated labor *chawks* (markets). Scoping teams of 30 researchers assessed the suitability of potential sites over a period of nine months.²⁰ During visits to settlements, they surveyed residents regarding the possession of local voter ID cards. The study includes those settlements where informants reported the greatest numbers of unregistered internal migrants residing.

2. *Individual-level screening.* Within selected neighborhoods, enumerators employed interval sampling to choose potential households to interview. Informed consent was requested from the adult household respondent with the next upcoming birthday. Subjects stating that they were neither born in the city nor had a voter ID card enabling them to vote there were deemed eligible.
3. *Short baseline on omnibus sample.* Eligible subjects were asked about basic demographics, their past voting behavior, as well as the extent of their social, economic, and political connections to their home villages or towns. At the conclusion of this module, we asked whether they wished to obtain a local voter ID card. The survey ended if a respondent replied “no.”
4. *Long baseline on experimental sample.* Respondents replying “yes” entered the experimental sample. We posed a larger set of demographic and attitudinal questions to this group. These subjects were then randomized into different treatment conditions.

²⁰ We included seven graduate students from local universities in this effort, as part of their research training for their masters degrees.

Treatment 1: Individual-Level Registration Drive (Migrant-Targeted)

Our primary intervention (“T1”) operated at the level of individual migrants. Simple randomization was used to assign individuals who completed the long baseline survey to T1 with 50 percent probability. Remaining subjects were assigned to a pure control condition.

The intervention was an intensive door-to-door facilitation campaign to help migrants obtain a local voter identification card (see Appendix C for further details). This card would enable them to participate in the forthcoming national elections in the city where they were living (either Delhi or Lucknow). To begin, a worker trained by our NGO partner visited migrants at their place of residence and presented their credentials. The worker described the benefits of holding a local voter ID card, the process for getting one, and the type of assistance the worker could provide. The worker asked whether the migrant had the necessary supporting documents to hand. If they did, the migrant was asked to gather those documents in time for a future visit, and a time was set. Migrants who lacked these documents were instructed on how to get them.

At the follow-up visit, the worker helped the migrant to complete the required forms online using an internet-enabled computer tablet. At the end of the meeting, workers ensured that the form, along with uploaded photographs of the required documents, were submitted to the local registration office. The worker then tracked the progress of the applications. Where problems arose—often, for example, BLOs were unable to track down the applicant at their listed residence—the worker intervened to try to fix the issue.

Treatment 2: Cluster-Level Information Dissemination Campaign (Politician-Targeted)

Our second treatment arm—henceforth, “T2”—operated at a cluster level. Using GIS software and publicly available information on the locations of polling stations in Delhi and Lucknow, we identified the 87 polling stations in closest proximity to our geo-located sample of experimental subjects. Each subject was tagged to the nearest one of these polling stations. We then divided the 87 polling stations into four blocks, defined by city and whether the number of experimental subjects assigned to that polling station was above or below the city’s median average. Last, we randomly assigned equal numbers of polling stations within each randomization block to either the T2 intervention or to the T2 control condition. Randomization to T2 was thus fully independent of the T1 trial.

Between two and four weeks before election day—during India’s month-long campaign season and following parties’ selection of candidates—we sent individually tailored letters, WhatsApp messages, and emails to four types of local politicians tied to each polling booth: the incumbent MP; officially declared MP candidates; incumbent MLAs; and incumbent municipal corporators. Politicians’ contact details were gleaned from public databases. The messages were written in both English and Hindi. They informed the politicians that a voter registration drive had been recently carried out among migrant communities in their area (see Appendix D for examples of the communications). Specifically, communications listed the names of polling stations that had been put in the T2 treatment, and that fell within the boundaries of the addressee’s constituency. They also included a map visualizing the location of those polling booths. The purpose of the treatment was to disseminate information about the registration drives

that had taken place, and thus to update politicians' beliefs about the average registration of migrants in those localities.

Outcomes

Outcomes were measured in an endline survey conducted approximately two months after the elections were held.²¹ The study timeline is shown in Appendix E, and the survey question wordings are given in Appendix F. Several outcomes are indices; methods used to create the indices are described in Appendix H.

Analysis

For estimations involving T1, we run pre-registered ordinary least squares regressions of the following form:

$$\text{(Equation 1) } Y_i = a + b \cdot T1_i + \mathbf{X}'_i \lambda + u_i$$

where, i indexes subjects, Y is the dependent variable of interest, $T1$ is a dummy taking 1 if the subject was assigned to the registration facilitation campaign and 0 if assigned to control, and \mathbf{X} is a vector of baseline covariates, included to improve statistical precision. All specifications control for gender, age, religion, caste, education, income, married status, length of residence in

²¹ Outcomes are self-reported. Note, however, that intervention and survey workers belonged to independent teams, and that the specific intent of the project—to gauge the intervention's effects on political incorporation—was not disclosed to subjects.

the city, and homeownership status.²² Where available, we also included pre-treatment measures of outcomes. T1 analyses employ Huber-White robust standard errors.

For the T2 analysis, we employ weighted least squares regression:

$$\text{(Equation 2) } Y_{ij} = a + b \cdot T2_{ij} + \mathbf{X}'_i \lambda + \delta^s + u_{ij}$$

Here, Y is the outcome of interest, $T2$ is a binary indicator taking 1 if individual i in cluster j was assigned to the T2 treatment and 0 if assigned to T2 control, and \mathbf{X} is a vector of controls—the same set used for the T1 estimation. δ^s are block fixed effects. We use cluster-robust standard errors, clustering at the polling booth level, which is the unit of randomization.²³ We re-weight individuals such that each cluster contributes equally to the estimation.

The intent-to-treat (ITT) effect is the quantity of interest across all experimental analyses. We pre-registered the study on the Evidence in Governance and Politics online registry.²⁴

Ethics

Our experimental design was informed by ethical best practices (Humphreys 2015). First, we selected a sample size that was no larger than necessary to detect meaningfully sized treatment effects. Second, our non-partisan intervention partner had already conducted extensive voter registration drives among urban migrants. As academic partners, we saw our role as helping the

²² The income covariate was winsorized to address significant outliers (see Appendix I).

²³ The T2 estimation sample is somewhat smaller than that for T1 because we lacked geo-coordinates for a small number of individuals, precluding their assignment to polling stations.

²⁴ Two deviations from the pre-analysis plan are described in Appendix G.

NGO elicit the efficacy of its activities. Third, we sought the permission of the Election Commission of India as well as community leaders in each slum colony prior to beginning work there.²⁵ Fourth, control group migrants remained free to submit applications for voter ID cards at any time. The study design was approved by the Institutional Review Boards of [University Name Redacted] and [University Name Redacted].

Internal validity

We check for internal validity in two ways. First, to verify our randomization procedures, we perform balance tests, separately regressing the T1 and T2 treatment indicators on pre-treatment covariates and lagged dependent variables used in the respective T1 and T2 analyses (see Appendix J.1). Omnibus tests of joint orthogonality fail to reject the null hypotheses for all covariates ($P[>F]=0.304$ for the T1 test and $P[>F]=0.406$ for the T2 test).

Second, migrants are by definition a mobile population group, generating the potential for attrition. Anticipating this, we collected extensive contact details for all experimental subjects at baseline to help ensure successful follow up. Ultimately, we were able to reinterview 91 percent of baseline subjects at endline. Reassuringly, we find no evidence of differential attrition rates by treatment condition (see Appendix J.2).

²⁵ The Election Commission has itself promoted migrant voter registration in their place of ordinary residence (Tata Institute of Social Sciences 2015).

Results: Political Incorporation

We first characterize the sample. Subjects' average age was 29; 54 percent were female, and 65 percent had attended primary school. 77 percent of respondents had relocated to the city from villages, 8 percent from towns, and the remainder from other small or large cities.²⁶ We asked the profession of the main working member of each interviewed household. Most household heads were said to be engaged in unskilled/semi-skilled (33 percent) or skilled (22 percent) production, followed by minor commerce (16 percent). Subjects had spent 11 of the past 12 months residing in host cities, on average.²⁷

Voluntary Detachment

Recall, our first set of hypotheses zeroed in on enduring socio-economic ties to home regions as an explanation for political disengagement. Baseline data, plotted in Figure 1, underscore the prima facie plausibility of these claims. Subjects retained strong linkages to their hometowns. Socially, a large majority (72 percent) weakly or strongly agreed that they felt “more at home” in their previous place of residence. This was true even though 74 percent of migrants lived more than 100kms away from their home district, and 35 percent lived more than 500kms away, making regular visits impractical. A significant minority had material stakes in origin areas: 28 percent personally owned land or property and 47 percent reported benefiting from government schemes there.

[FIGURE 1]

²⁶ For concision, we hereafter refer to all types of origin areas as “villages.”

²⁷ See Appendix K for summary statistics.

Under the theory of voluntaristic detachment, such socio-economic bonds to “home” should predict ongoing political participation there. To investigate this, we regress indicators for (a) whether the migrant possessed a village-based voter ID card, and (b) whether they had previously left the city to go home to vote in the village, on the socio-economic characteristics just described as well as one extra migrant attribute. The results are displayed in Table 1. Greater subjective attachment to origin regions, current receipt of government schemes, and owning village property all emerge as robust, positive correlates of village-based political engagement post-migration. Longer-term residence in the city and greater geographic distance to home are negatively associated with those outcomes.

[TABLE 1]

On first inspection, the patterns highlighted in Table 1 suggest that persistent socio-economic attachments to home may induce migrants to hold onto village-based engagement, as theories of social-group pressure, economic policy interests, and clientelism imply. However, further leveraging our research design, we find no evidence that such factors are sufficiently potent—in and of themselves—to reduce migrants’ willingness to integrate politically into the city. At the end of the short baseline survey, we asked eligible migrants whether they were interested in taking steps to register to vote locally. Of the 2,350 subjects who initially entered our sample, an overwhelming majority—98 percent—replied “yes.” In other words, notwithstanding their material and social connections to villages, almost all favored concentrating their political activities in destination areas.

While perhaps surprising in light of Figure 1, migrants’ desire to integrate politically sits with their positive estimations of their economic situation in the city. A majority—65 percent of

respondents—rated their current employment opportunities as “good” or “very good,” something that only 25 percent said of their opportunities in the village at the time they left. Only three percent stated that their incomes had gotten worse since migrating, whereas the rest claimed their incomes had stayed the same (26 percent) or gotten better (71 percent). Consistently, 96 percent of subjects expressed an intent to reside in their destination cities permanently. At the same time, many subjects reported a low sense of political efficacy. We asked to what extent they agreed that “people like me don’t have any influence on the government in [Delhi/Lucknow].” 47 percent agreed and only 34 percent strongly disagreed. It appears, then, that city-based political incorporation is seen as desirable—if not essential—by a population that has come to be economically and residentially ingrained in the city, even as they continue to maintain links elsewhere.

Bureaucratic Hassle Costs

Demand-side explanations are inadequate to account for the low rates of voting and political participation among internal migrants in India’s cities. We thus turn to our second candidate explanation for migrant exclusion—onerous voter registration procedures—which we test using our T1 experimental manipulation.

Table 2 presents the key T1 experimental results for our primary political outcomes. Column 1 shows that the intervention had a sizable first-stage impact. Note, only migrants lacking locally valid voter ID cards at baseline were eligible to participate in the study. By endline, 16.1 percent of control group subjects had gone on to obtain a local voter registration document. According to our main specification (Table 2, column 1), providing simple assistance

with this procedure boosted registration rates by 23.6 percentage points, over and above the control group mean. This equates to a 147 percent proportional increase. The estimated effect is substantively large and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), supplying strong evidence that the real or perceived costs of local voter registration prevent large swathes of India’s migrants from appearing on city voter rolls. Providing simple at-home assistance can go a long way toward remedying migrants’ deficient representation in urban electorates.

[TABLE 2]

The right hand columns of Table 2 quantify effects for turnout: whether subjects voted locally in India’s 2019 national election, and their assessments of how likely they were to vote in future subnational elections. Assignment to the registration campaign increased the probability of turning out to vote by 20.3 percentage points ($p < 0.001$), totaling a 114 percent increase relative to the control group average (Table 2, column 2).²⁸ The intervention also caused subjects to state that they would be more likely to vote in the city’s next state election—although it is noteworthy that most control group subjects were optimistic too in this regard (Table 2, column 3).

We next examine how the treatment shaped subjects’ political consciousness. To begin, we combine two measures of political interest—one capturing attention to city politics and the other to national politics—to generate a Z-score index. The results for the overall “Interest”

²⁸ We note that the proportion of control group subjects who reported having voted in the city (17.8 percent) slightly exceeds the proportion who said they were registered to vote locally (16.1 percent). A reason for this may be that individuals who voted in a village in the vicinity of the city interpreted this as city-based voting; supporting this claim, the median distance to home district for these aberrant cases is 42 percent of that for all other cases.

outcome are shown in Table 3, column 1. Assignment to the intervention caused a 0.091 standard deviation increase in political interest ($p=0.010$). Our survey asked respondents the extent to which they agreed that politicians are accountable to citizens. The control group average for this ordinal variable suggests that most citizens “somewhat agree” that politicians are accountable (Table 3, column 2). We find that assignment to treatment raised perceptions of accountability by 3.9 percentage points ($p=0.003$). Possessing the documentation needed to vote thus enhanced citizens’ beliefs that good types of politicians can be rewarded at the ballot box and bad types punished.

[TABLE 3]

By contrast, we do not observe any increase in citizens’ sense of political efficacy (Table 3, column 3) or of political trust, measured as an index that combines trust in national, state, and municipal governments as well as political parties (Table 3, column 4). It may be that these null estimated effects reflect the reality that, while voting raises awareness that politicians are vulnerable to being ousted (accountability), it does not change certain fundamentals: that an individual citizen has limited sway over the government of a vast polity (efficacy), and that core democratic institutions will not immediately be transformed by an additional migrant registering to vote (trust).

Table 4 considers two outcomes not included in our pre-analysis plan, yet that bear on citizens’ political engagement beyond elections. Column 1 shows the registration campaign somewhat increased the number of urban politicians subjects report having contacted within the past three months (0.039 additional contacts, $p=0.069$). Non-electoral participation, too, responded to the treatment, with the count of reported activities increasing by 0.043 ($p=0.048$;

column 2). Both behavioral changes are impressive given the comparatively short timespan of the project. They resonate with a growing body of literature stressing the significance of claims-making in developing country contexts: the need for active citizens to make requests of the state if their welfare needs are to be met (Bussell 2019). The small absolute magnitudes of the effects are in line with the low control group means. The majority of respondents had neither contacted any city official nor engaged in any non-electoral political activity over the past three months, highlighting the depths of this group's marginalization.

[TABLE 4]

We have thus far presented the main effects of our T1 experimental intervention. An important question is whether the campaign worked symmetrically across different classes of migrants, or whether it impacted migrant subgroups differentially. We test five moderators, all but one of which focus on salient dimensions of social and economic marginalization in the Indian setting:

- *Muslims*, who comprise 14 percent of the country's population and 23 percent of our study sample, have historically been targets of discrimination and violence (Nellis et al 2016).
- *Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs)* are on the lowest rungs (and indeed lie formally outside) India's rigid caste hierarchy. Social bias against these groups is widespread. Combined, SCs and STs make up 38 percent of the sample, surpassing their share of the national population (25 percent).²⁹

²⁹ The overrepresentation of Muslims, SCs, and STs in our sample accords with work suggesting that migrant laborers are more likely to belong to religious minorities and lower castes—largely

- While India enshrines the right to *primary education* in its laws and constitution, in practice many citizens fail to receive even basic schooling. 35 percent of respondents in our sample had not attended primary school.
- We partition subjects at the sample median of *monthly household income*. At INR 10,000 (USD 131), the median-average is low, highlighting the poverty of many urban migrants.
- Last, we look for differential effects by whether or not the respondent is a *long-term migrant*; that is, whether their number of years in the city exceeds the sample-median value.

Table 5 displays our two sets of pre-registered tests of heterogeneity for the two primary political outcomes: receipt of a local voter ID card, and city-based voting in the 2019 election. The interaction coefficients are interpretable as the differences in T1's effect across the groups defined by each dichotomous moderator. The estimates in column 1 paint a consistent picture. In terms of first-stage effects, the intervention proved more impactful for relatively *advantaged* migrant subpopulations. Setting migrants' other background characteristics at their base levels, we find that the impact of the intervention was 8.3 percentage points larger for those with primary education (SE=0.041). The gulf in treatment efficacy is wider still for Muslims and SCs/STs. The estimated impact of the intervention was 11.4 percentage point lower for Muslim migrants than for non-Muslims (SE=0.048). Likewise, the effect of T1 on SCs/STs is 11.3 percentage points lower than it was for non-SCs/STs (SE=0.042). That said, the heterogeneous

because marginalized ethnic groups face systematic barriers to obtaining jobs in home markets (Gaikwad et al 2020).

effects for turnout in column 2 are substantially more muted, and only statistically significant for the SC/ST moderator.

[TABLE 5]

A fuller explanation for the variability in treatment effects on registration awaits future research. Yet our qualitative interviews with local brokers and community representatives in several sampled slum colonies indicates that the actions of local electoral gatekeepers may form part of the story.³⁰ A common refrain heard was that minorities, when made to establish their credentials, were held to a double standard:

Muslim migrants from West Bengal must constantly deal with persecution owing to the authorities' suspicion of them being Bangladeshi. This may have been aggravated due to the government's NRC [National Register of Citizens] policy.³¹

A second interviewee stressed that “[t]here is wide variation in documentation requirements for forward castes vis-à-vis minorities [Muslims and SCs/STs]. In case of the former, verbal confirmation often suffices, while the latter are subjected to onerous formalities.”³² The extra burden placed on minorities may be a product of individual-level discrimination by officials, or

³⁰ Some respondents alleged widespread voter suppression, e.g., “[e]xclusion of names from lists just days prior to the election is pretty much the norm. People from my neighborhood, which is majority Muslim, have seen their names disappear this time even though they had voted in the last state election and the 2014 Lok Sabha election. Initially I thought this was limited to Muslim localities, but turns out the story is very similar in Valmiki [SC] neighbourhoods too.” Interview: *Community volunteer*, East Seemapuri, Delhi, November 20, 2019.

³¹ Interview: *Community organizer*, Okhla, Delhi, November 17, 2019.

³² Interview: *Dalit Leader and Party Worker*, West Patel Nagar, Delhi, November 12, 2019.

may represent more systemic discrimination. As one respondent commented, “BLOs and AEROs [Assistant Electoral Registration Officers] are very risk averse professionally. They are doubly apprehensive and place more stringent documentation requirements on Muslim migrants relative to other demographics, fearing reprimand from senior officials.”³³

Ostracism by Political Elites

We have shown that subsidizing the costs of voter registration fosters migrants’ engagement in urban politics. Thus, there is considerable evidence that bureaucratic hurdles forestall migrant registration. We now adjudicate our final theoretical explanation for migrants’ political exclusion: ostracizing behavior on the part of political elites. Put simply, if elected elites on the “supply side” of politics resist or ignore even registered migrants, then migrants might reasonably find it unprofitable to situate their political affiliations in cities in the first place—or will see little reason to go on dropping time and effort into city-based participation going forward.

To assess whether such exclusionary behavior by politicians occurs, we exploit our T2 clustered experimental design, examining five endline variables that measure exposure to the 2019 Lok Sabha campaign, as well as the Z-score index that combines them. The raw responses indicate the campaign was quite hard-fought. 79 percent of subjects either strongly or somewhat agreed that politicians and party workers had campaigned hard to win the votes in the respondent’s neighborhood; 41 percent said that at least one incumbent politician or MP candidate had visited their basti; and two percent reported having been offered a gift.

³³ Interview: *Community Volunteer*, East Seemapuri, Delhi, November 20, 2019.

Did informing local politicians about the rollout of a migrant-focused voter registration drive in the vicinity of a polling booth cause them to direct additional campaign resources there, or were such new voters disregarded? The evidence in Table 6 argues strongly for the first possibility. Looking at the pre-registered analysis on the campaign exposure index (column 1), we see that respondents living near polling booths assigned to the T2 information dissemination condition report campaign exposure 0.10 standard deviations higher than subjects close to polling booths that came under the control condition ($p=0.042$). Columns 2-6 break down the results for each component measure. This exercise reveals that the positive impact on the overall index comes primarily from the increase in perceived campaign intensity (column 6) and, secondarily, from a rise in the number of gifts offered to treated migrants (column 4). This second result is telling. It suggests that the campaigning windfall felt by subjects was “pro-migrant” and not due to politicians ramping up nativist rhetoric in areas with a burgeoning migrant electorate.

[TABLE 6]

The fact that urban politicians modify their campaign strategy in response to information about migrant-focused voter enrollments is encouraging, pointing to a state of the world in which migrants register to vote and politicians incorporate them more fully into the mainstream political life of the city. It further indicates that nativism and neglect by urban politicians is unlikely to be a principal explanation for migrants’ low registration rates in city elections.

We earlier described the reasons why parties may be hesitant to involve themselves in the business of registering migrants to vote: the unit costs are high, and migrants’ propensity to vote, as well as their ultimate vote choice, are clouded with uncertainty. The analysis in Table 6

clarifies that once the costs of migrant registration have been borne by other actors, office-seeking politicians and party machines treat migrant voters conventionally: plying them with selective benefits and currying their support.

Results: Socio-Economic Integration

The paper’s central objective has been to theorize and test the determinants of migrants’ political exclusion. Yet a large case-study literature calls attention to the social and economic dislocation that city newcomers endure, and their struggles in adjusting to unfamiliar urban environments (e.g. Jones 2020). This raises the natural question as to whether the acquisition of urban “citizenship,” via voter registration and the political incorporation it stimulates, alters the broader outlooks and behaviors of internal migrants.

Our pre-analysis plan set forth three final hypotheses concerning the downstream socio-economic impacts of voter registration. Returning to our T1 design, we first study whether political incorporation promotes social assimilation. Specifically, using a two-component Z-index, we evaluate whether treated individuals begin to regard their new cities as “home,” and go on to develop interpersonal connections with long-term city residents (Just and Anderson 2012; Hainmueller et al 2017).³⁴ In Table 7, column 1, subjects assigned to T1 prove significantly more likely to report feeling socially integrated in the city (0.059 standard deviations, $p=0.023$).

[TABLE 7]

³⁴ For definitions of all indexes and variables used in this section, see Appendix F and H.

Second, we examine whether political incorporation increases inter-ethnic tolerance—as might occur if migrants come to feel more politically secure, and become exposed to a larger cross-section of social groups via political action (Thachil 2017). In Table 7, column 2, we find that assignment to treatment substantially boosted norms of inter-ethnic tolerance. Subjects were more likely to express openness to allow members of their family to marry someone from a different religion, and to allow their children to play with children belonging to a different faith. The treatment effect on the Z-score index is qualitatively large (0.077 standard deviations) and highly significant ($p=0.004$).

Last, we assess whether registration engenders willingness to pay more taxes to fund city-based public goods. Fiscal contract theories posit that states sell services to citizens, and that tax morale rises as citizens have more say over how public money is spent (Luttmer and Singhal 2014). We do see evidence of migrants consenting to make bigger monetary contributions toward public goods in their current cities of residence, and away from those in their villages (Table 7, column 3). The effect magnitude, at 0.019 standard deviations ($p=0.076$), is slight. Nevertheless, it indicates that voter registration may motivate movers to invest more heavily in local public goods. Taken together, these findings suggest that political incorporation catalyzes socio-economic integration, with positive implications for underfunded states and divided societies.

Conclusion

We offer new theory and evidence to explain the drivers of migrants' low rates of political incorporation into destination regions. A large, multi-site experiment in India identifies

bureaucratic hassle costs, rather than migrants' voluntary abstention from urban politics or nativist political ostracism, as the salient constraint. Subsidizing these costs, by providing at-home assistance in registering to vote, substantially increases political incorporation: raising registration rates, turnout, political interest, and perceptions of political accountability. Moreover, elites react to news of the local enfranchisement of migrants by boosting pro-migrant electioneering.

The experimental evidence we marshal comes from two major cities that are jointly home to 22 million people (roughly the population of Scandinavia). The substantive findings, along with the theoretical framework that motivates them, have broad scope for generalizability. For example, a report by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Mooney and Jarrah 2004: 7) notes that internally displaced persons “face obstacles in exercising their right to vote, sharply reducing their influence over the many political, economic and social decisions affecting their lives.” To be sure, the dominant factor explaining political exclusion—whether voluntary detachment, bureaucratic impediments, or nativist resistance—may vary contextually. Still, onerous voter-initiated registration systems, which our study pinpoints, are the rule rather than the exception in the world's largest low- and middle-income democracies. This suggests that the mechanisms we decode likely operate elsewhere.

Policywise, the findings are relevant for election management bodies in states witnessing explosive urban growth. Rejecting proxy voting for internal migrants as logistically unfeasible, a recent review by the Election Commission of India recommended instead that migrants

re-register in their new locations, employing the existing voter-initiated procedure.³⁵ As we document, this overlooks the multiplex and unusual challenges that migrants confront in navigating such systems. Building capacity to streamline and perhaps automate registration should be a priority for the future.

There are also lessons for migrant advocacy groups. Investing in voter registration drives is worthwhile in territories where citizens are mobile. Our results sound a note of caution, however. The registration facilitation outreach, while effective overall, had a more positive impact among migrants belonging to advantaged ethnic, religious, and educational subgroups. These lopsided benefits highlight a tradeoff. Easing registration requirements can lift the share of migrants in urban electorates, but worsens representativeness along other axes of social identification. It will be important to engineer interventions that avoid producing such political inequalities.

Two uncertainties remain, setting the path for future research. First, the finding that urban politicians are attentive to migrants upon learning that they are registered is encouraging. But we cannot rule out the possibility that growth in the share of migrant voters will—over time and in sufficient quantities—invite pushback from natives (Dancygier 2010). There may be a tipping point at which parochialist political movements sprout up in reaction. Further theory building, combined with empirical studies crafted to evaluate longer-term political and welfare impacts, are justified.

³⁵ S. Irudaya Rajan and Prashant Singh, “The Disenfranchised Migrants.” August 30, 2019. *The Hindu*.

Second, the effects on social integration, and what causes them, merit further investigation. We show that migrants offered registration help were more likely to consider the city to be their “home;” they forged more social ties with locals; they were more likely to endorse norms of inter-ethnic tolerance; and they were also somewhat more willing to pay for city-based public goods. These findings dovetail with recent research documenting the consequences of citizenship acquisition for international immigrants (Hainmueller et al 2017). That socio-economic integration may emerge hand-in-hand with political incorporation opens up a wide spectrum of promising research questions.

We end by underlining how the paper’s findings matter not only for within-country migrants. Low registration rates also characterize immigrant-background communities (Alizade et al Forthcoming). Bass and Casper (2001: 105) write of “naturalization and registration” as “the first two barriers to voting” for foreign-born citizens in the United States, for example. Interventions like the ones evaluated here may thus aid political incorporation among naturalized immigrant groups and incentivize parties and politicians to bring immigrant communities in their electoral coalitions. Thereby, political exclusion may be overcome.

References

- Adsera, A., Boix, C., and Payne, M. 2003. "Are You Being Served? Political Accountability and Quality of Government." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 19(2): 445-490.
- Ahuja, A., and Chhibber, P. 2012. "Why the Poor Vote in India: 'If I Don't Vote, I am Dead to the State.'" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 47(4): 389-410.
- Akarca, A., and Tansel, A. 2015. "Impact of Internal Migration on Political Participation in Turkey." *IZA Journal of Migration* 4(1): 1.
- Akinyemi, A., Olaopa, O., and Oloruntimehi, O. 2005. "Migration Dynamics and Changing Rural-Urban Linkages in Nigeria." Mimeo: Obafemi Awolowo University. go.aws/3dgwoZ8.
- Alarian, H., and Goodman, S. 2017. "Dual Citizenship Allowance and Migration Flow: An Origin Story." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(1): 133-167.
- Alfaro-Redondo, R. 2016. "Divided We Vote: Turnout Decline in Established Democracies: Evidence from Costa Rica." PhD Dissertation: Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.
- Alizade, J., Dancygier, R., and Dittmann, R. Forthcoming. "The Local Politics of Citizenship and Politician Responsiveness to Immigrants." *Journal of Politics*.
- Auerbach, A. 2019. *Demanding Development: The Politics of Public Goods Provision in India's Urban Slums*. Cambridge University Press.
- Auerbach, A., Bussell, J., Chauchard, S., Jensenius, F., Schneider, M., Sircar, N., Suryanarayan, P., Thachil, T., Vaishnav, M., Verma, R., and Ziegfeld, A. 2020. "Rethinking India and the Study of Electoral Politics in the Developing World." Mimeo: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. bit.ly/2xZqVad.
- Bass, L., and Casper, L. 2001. "Impacting the Political Landscape: Who Registers and Votes among Naturalized Americans." *Political Behavior* 23(2): 103-30.
- Bell, M., and Charles-Edwards, E. 2013. "Cross-national Comparisons of Internal Migration: An Update of Global Patterns and Trends." United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: Technical Paper No. 2013/1. bit.ly/3fnE51O.
- Berenson, E., 2014. *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1830-1852*. Princeton University Press.
- Bhavnani, R., and Lacina, B. 2015. "The Effects of Rainfall-Induced Migration on Sons of the Soil Violence in India." *World Politics* 67(4): 760-94.

Bhavnani, R., and Lacina, B. 2018. *Nativism and Economic Integration Across the Developing World: Collision and Accommodation*. Cambridge University Press.

Bose, P., and Rai, R. 2014. "Job Search and Labour Market Conditions of Migrants at the Destination: The Case of Lucknow." *Urban India* 34(1): 47-67.

Bussell, J. 2019. *Clients and Constituents: Political Responsiveness in Patronage Democracies*. Oxford University Press.

Braconnier, C., Dormagen, J. and Pons, V. 2017. "Voter Registration Costs and Disenfranchisement: Experimental Evidence from France." *American Political Science Review* 111(3): 584-604.

Callahan, M., and Oo, M. 2019. "Myanmar's 2020 Elections and Conflict Dynamics." *United States Institute of Peace*. bit.ly/2Z11zUI.

Careja, R., and Emmenegger, P. 2012. "Making Democratic Citizens: The Effects of Migration Experience on Political Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(7): 875-902.

Chauchard, S. 2018. "Electoral handouts in Mumbai Elections: The Cost of Political Competition." *Asian Survey* 58(2): 341-64.

Dancygier, R. 2010. *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Downs, A. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper-Collins.

Dunning, T., Grossman, G., Humphreys, M., Hyde, S., McIntosh, C., and Nellis, G., eds. 2019. *Information, Accountability, and Cumulative Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I*. Cambridge University Press.

Engels, F. 1845. *The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844*. Cosimo Classics.

Finan, F., and Schechter, L. 2012. "Vote-Buying and Reciprocity." *Econometrica* 80(2): 863-81.

Fujiwara, T. 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica* 83(2): 423-64.

Gaikwad, N., Hanson, K., and Toth, A. 2020. "Do International Employment Opportunities Impact Individuals' Political Preferences and Behavior?" Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting. <https://bit.ly/3fMgo3i>.

Gaikwad, N., and Nellis, G. 2017. "The Majority-Minority Divide in Attitudes Toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(2): 456-72.

- Gaikwad, N., and Nellis, G. Forthcoming. "Do Politicians Discriminate Against Internal Migrants? Evidence from Nationwide Field Experiments in India." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Gaikwad, N., Nellis, G., and Thomas, A. 2020. "The Politics of Public Service Formalization: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Urban India." Mimeo: Columbia University.
- Gay, C. 2012. "Moving to Opportunity: The Political Effects of a Housing Mobility Experiment." *Urban Affairs Review* 48(2): 147-79.
- Gerber, A., Green, D., and Larimer, C. 2008. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 102(1): 33-48.
- Government of India. 2010. "Migration in India: 2007–2008." National Sample Survey Organization Report No. 533. bit.ly/3btvUH.
- Gupta, A. 2012. *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India*. Duke University Press.
- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D. and Pietrantuono, G. 2015. "Naturalization Fosters the Long-Term Political Integration of Immigrants." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 112(41): 12651-56.
- Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., and Pietrantuono, G. 2017. "Catalyst or Crown: Does Naturalization Promote the Long-Term Social Integration of Immigrants?" *American Political Science Review* 111(2): 256-76.
- Hanson, G., Scheve, K., and Slaughter, M. 2007. "Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies." *Economics and Politics* 19(1): 1-33.
- Harris, J., and van der Windt, P. Forthcoming. "Equalizing Access to Improve Voter Registration: Experimental Evidence from Kenya." *Journal of Politics*.
- Holbein, J., and Hillygus, D. 2020. *Making Young Voters: Converting Civic Attitudes Into Civic Action*. Cambridge University Press.
- Humphreys, M. 2015. "Reflections on the Ethics of Social Experimentation." *Journal of Globalization and Development* 6(1): 87-112.
- Jha, S., Rao, V. and Woolcock, M. 2007. "Governance in the Gullies: Democratic Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi's Slums." *World Development* 35(2): 230-46.
- Jones, T. 2020. *Sugarcane Labor Migration in Brazil*. Springer.

- Just, A., and Anderson, C. 2012. "Immigrants, Citizenship and Political Action in Europe." *British Journal of Political Science* 42(3): 481-509.
- Kumar, S., and Banerjee, S. 2017. "Low Levels of Electoral Participation in Metropolitan Cities." *Economic and Political Weekly* 52(45): 82-6.
- Laitin, D., and Ramachandran, R. 2016. "Language Policy and Human Development." *American Political Science Review* 110(3): 457-80.
- Levi, M., and Stoker, L. 2000. "Political Trust and Trustworthiness." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3(1): 475-507.
- Luttmer, E., and Singhal, M. 2014. "Tax Morale." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28(4): 149-68.
- Mooney, E., and Jarrah, B. 2004. "The Voting Rights of Internally Displaced Persons: The OSCE Region." Mimeo: Brookings Institution-Johns Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal Displacement. brook.gs/3cuw8FT.
- Mosley, L., and Singer, D. 2015. "Migration, Labor, and the International Political Economy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 283-301.
- National Democratic Institute. 2019. "Statement of the NDI Election Observation Mission to Ukraine's April 21, 2019 Second Round Presidential Election." bit.ly/2WVgPzt.
- Nellis, G., Weaver, M., and Rosenzweig, S. 2016. "Do Parties Matter for Ethnic Violence? Evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11(3): 249-77.
- Nickerson, D. 2015. "Do Voter Registration Drives Increase Participation? For Whom and When?" *Journal of Politics* 77(1): 88-101.
- Nitika, A., Nongkynrih, B., and Gupta, S. 2014. "Migrants to Urban India: Need for Public Health Action." *Indian Journal of Community Medicine* 39: 73-5.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2019. "Society at a Glance 2019: OECD Social Indicators." OECD Publishing. bit.ly/3bgNipr.
- Peisakhin, L., 2012. "Transparency and Corruption: Evidence from India." *Journal of Law and Economics* 55(1): 129-49.
- Pons, V., and Liegey, G. 2019. "Increasing the Electoral Participation of Immigrants: Experimental Evidence from France." *Economic Journal* 129(617): 481-508.

- Post, A. 2018. "Cities and Politics in the Developing World. *Annual Review of Political Science* 21: 115-33.
- Sadiq, K., 2009. "When Being 'Native' Is Not Enough: Citizens as Foreigners in Malaysia." *Asian Perspective* 33(1): 5-32.
- Sankhe, S., Vittal, I., Dobbs, R., Mohan, A., Gulati, A., Ablett, J., Gupta, S., Kim, A., Paul, S., Sanghvi, A., and Sethy, G. 2010. *India's Urban Awakening: Building Inclusive Cities, Sustaining Economic Growth*. McKinsey Global Institute. mck.co/3fKGhAv.
- Scheve, K., and Slaughter, M. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133-45.
- Scott, J. 2009. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press.
- Singer, D., and Quek, K. 2017. "Attitudes Toward Internal and Foreign Migration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in China." Mimeo: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Tata Institute of Social Sciences. 2015. "Inclusive Elections in India: A Study on Domestic Migration and Issues in Electoral Participation." Technical Report. bit.ly/3by9Ulq.
- Thachil, T. 2017. "Do Rural Migrants Divide Ethnically in the City? Ethnographic and Experimental Evidence From India" *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4): 908-26.
- Thachil, T. Forthcoming. "Does Police Repression Spur Everyday Cooperation? Evidence from Urban India." *Journal of Politics*.
- UNESCO. 2012. "National Workshop on Internal Migration and Human Development in India." Technical Paper. bit.ly/2KkV4U7.
- Wang, T. 2013. "Expanding Citizenship: Immigrants and the Vote," *Democracy* 28.
- Weiner, M. 1978. *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India*. Princeton University Press.
- Wilkerson, I. 2010. *The Warmth of Other Suns: The Epic Story of America's Great Migration*. Random House.
- Yue, Z., Li, S., Jin, X., and Feldman, M. 2013. "The Role of Social Networks in the Integration of Chinese Rural-Urban Migrants: A Migrant-Resident Tie Perspective." *Urban Studies* 50(9): 1704-23.




Figure 1: Baseline descriptive statistics of migrants' attachments to their former places of residence.

Table 1: [Exploratory] Baseline correlates of migrants' continued political participation in their former place of residence ("village"), estimated using OLS regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has Village Voter ID (1)	Returned to Vote in Village (2)
More at home in village (0-1)	0.158*** (0.025)	0.088*** (0.020)
Still receives village schemes (0/1)	0.108*** (0.019)	0.101*** (0.017)
Owens village property (0/1)	0.072*** (0.022)	0.039** (0.020)
Length of residence in city (years)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Straight-line distance to home district (kms)	-0.0001** (0.00003)	-0.0001*** (0.00002)
Constant	0.177*** (0.027)	0.146*** (0.022)
DV values	{0,1}	{0,1}
Observations	2,306	2,306
Adjusted R ²	0.056	0.047

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: [Pre-registered] T1 experimental results for primary political outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Has City-Based Voter ID (1)	Voted in City in 2019 (2)	Likelihood of Voting in City in Future (3)
T1 treatment	0.236 (0.019)	0.203 (0.019)	0.031 (0.009)
p-value (upper)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Control mean	0.161	0.178	0.856
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.084	0.065	0.011
DV values	{0, 1}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

Table 3: [Pre-registered] T1 experimental results for additional political outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Political Interest Index (1)	Politician Accountability Perceptions (2)	Sense of Political Efficacy (3)	Political Trust Index (4)
T1 treatment	0.091 (0.039)	0.039 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.027 (0.028)
p-value (upper)	0.010	0.003	0.745	0.170
Control mean	0.000	0.697	0.450	0.000
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.027	0.006	0.003	0.019
DV values	$[-1.44, 1.56]$	$\{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1\}$	$\{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1\}$	$[-1.62, 1.17]$

Table 4: [Exploratory] T1 experimental results for contacting and non-electoral participation. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Contacting City Officials Index (1)	Non-Electoral Participation Index (2)
T1 treatment	0.039 (0.026)	0.043 (0.026)
p-value (upper)	0.069	0.048
Control mean	0.286	0.277
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.028	0.031
DV values	$\{0, \dots, 6\}$	$\{0, \dots, 5\}$

Table 5: [Pre-registered] Estimates of heterogeneous effects of T1 treatment. Models do not include additional covariates. All independent variables are dichotomous. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Has City-Based Voter ID	Voted in City in 2019
	(1)	(2)
T1 x Primary education	0.083** (0.041)	0.057 (0.042)
T1 x Muslim	-0.114** (0.048)	-0.018 (0.049)
T1 x SC/ST	-0.113*** (0.042)	-0.081* (0.042)
T1 x High income	0.028 (0.038)	0.041 (0.038)
T1 x Long-term migrant	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.038)
T1	0.248*** (0.049)	0.183*** (0.049)
Primary education	-0.058** (0.025)	-0.059** (0.026)
Muslim	0.001 (0.029)	0.004 (0.030)
SC/ST	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.008 (0.026)
High income	0.038* (0.022)	0.009 (0.023)
Long-term migrant	0.065*** (0.023)	0.052** (0.024)
Constant	0.149*** (0.028)	0.188*** (0.029)
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R ²	0.087	0.059

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: [Index outcome pre-registered; index component analyses exploratory] T2 experimental results for exposure to campaigning during the 2019 elections. Weighted least squares estimates of intent to treat effects. Clusters weighted equally. Models include block fixed effects and covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Index Components					
	Campaigning Exposure Index (1)	Basti Visits by Politicians (2)	Home Visit by Politician or Party Worker (3)	Number of Gifts (4)	Migrant-Focused Campaigning (5)	Perceived Campaign Intensity (6)
T2 treatment	0.100 (0.057)	0.066 (0.078)	0.036 (0.038)	0.017 (0.012)	0.014 (0.047)	0.073 (0.031)
p-value (upper)	0.042	0.203	0.174	0.073	0.384	0.010
Control mean	-0.059	0.559	0.550	0.013	0.425	0.676
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,931
No. of Clusters	87	87	87	87	87	87
Adjusted R^2	0.055	0.070	0.047	0.019	0.008	0.021
DV values	$[-0.97, 3.73]$	$\{0, \dots, 4\}$	$\{0, 1\}$	$\{0, 1, 2\}$	$\{0, 1\}$	$\{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1\}$

Table 7: [Pre-registered] T1 experimental results for socio-economic outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Social Integration Index (1)	Ethnic Tolerance Index (2)	City-Based Tax Index (3)
T1 treatment	0.059 (0.029)	0.077 (0.029)	0.019 (0.013)
p-value (upper)	0.023	0.004	0.076
Control mean	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.024	0.029	0.004
DV values	[-3.25, 1.40]	[-2.35, 1.07]	[-2.02, 2.09]

**Overcoming the Political Exclusion of Migrants:
Theory and Experimental Evidence from India**

ONLINE APPENDIX

Table of Contents

A	Voter registration procedures worldwide	3
B	Voter turnout rates by naturalized immigrants versus natives globally	9
C	T1 further information	10
C.1	Official forms	10
C.2	Pictures from the field	12
D	T2 further information	15
E	Study timeline	18
F	Survey instruments	19
G	Deviations from pre-analysis plan	24
H	Indexing	25
I	Outliers in income covariate	26
J	Internal validity	27
J.1	Balance	27
J.2	Attrition	29
K	Summary statistics	30
L	Main results without covariates	32

A Voter registration procedures worldwide

Table A1: Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies. We class countries as democratic if their Polity IV score was 6 or greater in 2018. Per the World Bank, low- and middle-income countries are those whose GDP per capita was less than USD 12,375 in 2018. Population and income data are from the World Bank. Information on registration procedures were gathered from official government sources and country experts.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
India	1,352,617,328	2,016	9	Voter-initiated. Citizen must register by submitting Form 6 to local election office and receive at-home verification visit. ID is dispatched to home address by post.	De-registering required. Migrant must submit Form 7 (deletion) at voter office in constituency of origin, and produce deletion slip at destination constituency prior to re-registering.
Indonesia	267,663,435	3,894	9	State-initiated. Citizens with electronic ID cards (e-KTP, which records their address) are automatically registered to vote and placed on the “temporary” voting roll. Individuals without an e-KTP can register online or in person at their designated voter office.	No formal requirements for de-registration.
Pakistan	212,215,030	1,473	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must register by filling Form 21, and presenting their National ID Card as proof of residence and identity.	Need to de-register from electoral rolls at constituency of origin before re-registering at destination constituency.

Table A1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Brazil	209,469,333	8,921	8	Voter-initiated and compulsory. Citizens must register at the local voter office. Eligible voters who do not register by 19 years of age, or newly naturalized persons who do not register within a year of acquiring citizenship, face a penalty of 3.51 reals (payable at time of voter registration), unless the person was away from their voting district on election day and justifies his/her absence to electoral justice. Registrants receive a bar-coded elector's card (título eleitoral) proving their registration within at least 15 days of the request. There are other non-pecuniary penalties for unregistered citizens like ineligibility for passports, public sector jobs, loans from public sector banks. Process is biometric.	No requirement to de-register from electoral rolls at place of origin. Need to re-register when moving between states as well as municipalities.
Nigeria	195,874,740	2,028	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must report to the local election office to register for a biometric Permanent Voter Card (PVC) during the Continuous Voter Registration period. ID is then distributed by the election office.	No need to de-register. The PVC is biometric. Citizen must write to the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) through the Electoral Officer of the current constituency at least 60 days prior to elections. If the REC is satisfied that applicant currently resides in the area, they will approve the application and direct that the applicant's details be transferred to the new location. The transfer is recorded on the centralized computer system and the applicant receives their new voter card.

Table A1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Mexico	126,190,788	9,698	8	Voter-initiated. Individuals must register in person at their local election office. Applicants provide a signature, fingerprint, and photograph to obtain a “Voter’s Mexican Credential.” Photo voting cards are delivered to citizens 20 days after application submissions, or can be collected from the voter office personally. They must be renewed every 10 years.	No requirement to de-register. Re-register at destination constituency by surrendering the previous voter ID.
Philippines	106,651,922	3,103	8	Voter-initiated. The applicant personally appears before the Election Officer (EO), states his/her name and exact address. After establishing the identity of the applicant, the EO verifies the name of the applicant from the Local Voter’s Registration Database or in the Printed Lists of Voters.	No need to de-register. At the destination constituency, EO will issue migrant an application to re-register, upon approval of which, EO in constituency of origin is instructed to delete name from its electoral rolls.
South Africa	57,779,622	6,374	9	Voter-initiated. Registrants must present either a South African bar-coded ID book or a valid Temporary Identity Certificate in order to register at the local voter office/polling station. No voter registration card is issued; rather, the document provided for registration is marked and becomes proof of registration.	No requirement to de-register. Re-registration in new constituency needed to update status.

Table A1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Myanmar	53,708,395	1,326	8	Voter-initiated. Citizen must report to the voter office in designated constituency. Applicants primarily identify themselves with a National Identification Card, but the guidelines are not strict and other forms of identification may apply.	Voter must inform election authorities before moving to new constituency.
Kenya	51,393,010	1,711	9	Voter-initiated. Eligible voters must present themselves to the registration officer with their original identification documents at the designated registration center and complete the registration form (Form A). Registered voters are issued a registration acknowledgement slip bearing the voter's details. The National ID card is the only document required to prove identity.	Citizens must transfer their registration (linked to their National ID card) when moving between constituencies.
Colombia	49,648,685	6,651	7	Voter-initiated. To register, eligible voters must present their national identity card and have their fingerprints taken by the National Civil Registry. The process is often described as registering the ID card with the Electoral Registrar.	De-registering at constituency of origin is not required, only need to re-register at destination constituency.
Argentina	44,494,502	11,653	9	State-initiated. All Argentine citizens with an ID book over the age of 18 are automatically enrolled in the electoral register, known as the Padrón Electoral; therefore, they do not need to initiate registration. A complex fee scheme applies for new cards, renewals, and data verifications/updates.	No need to de-register, updating address on the national ID card leads to automatic re-registration in destination constituency.

Table A1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Iraq	38,433,600	5,878	6	Voter-initiated. Citizen must produce relevant documents and register for a voter ID at the voter office. Process is biometric.	Special polling booths are set up in destination constituency for Internally Displaced Persons who are not biometrically registered.
Peru	31,989,256	6,947	9	State-initiated. Voter registration list is based on the civil registry. All citizens registered in the civil registry are automatically included in the voter registry once they turn 18. The National Registry of Identification and Civil Status is responsible for updating the registry. Registration is free of charge.	No need to de-register, updating address on the national ID card leads to automatic re-registration in destination constituency.
Malaysia	31,528,585	11,239	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must fill a form at the designated local voter office and present MyKad (national ID card) to register as a voter. The officer fills out the registration form on behalf of applicant, and the citizen must verify the data.	The Electoral Center (EC) accepts applications from registered voters who apply to register their new home addresses to determine their new Voting Center. No requirement to de-register.
Ghana	29,767,108	2,202	8	Voter-initiated. Citizens must register in the divisional register of the electoral area in which they ordinarily reside. Successful registrants are issued a biometric voter card at the time of registration.	Citizen must notify the Electoral Commission in case of constituency changes. The transfer is then recorded on the central computer system. No need to de-register before re-registering.
Nepal	28,087,871	1,026	7	Voter-initiated. Citizen must report to the local voter office with their citizenship certificate to get registered as a voter. The process is biometric.	No need to de-register before re-registering at destination constituency as system is biometric.
Madagascar	26,262,368	461	6	Voter-initiated. Citizen must present their national ID card at the local voter office to register as a voter.	No information available.

Table A1: (*continued*) Description of voter registration rules in the 20 most populous low- and middle-income democracies.

Country	Population (2018)	GDP per capita (USD, 2018)	Polity Score (2018)	Voter registration procedure	Post-migration procedure
Sri Lanka	21,670,000	4,102	6	State-initiated, but not compulsory. Registration of electors and revision of electoral registers are done annually on June 1. Enumerator appointed by the Registering Officer of the district provides the Registration form (BC form) to the chief occupant of each house. The filled registration form (BC form) is collected by the enumerator. Registration of a voter is valid for one year only.	Since lists are revised annually, there is no requirement to de-register.
Burkina Faso	19,751,535	731	6	Voter-initiated. Registrants must present a passport, national ID card, or military card. Successful registrants are issued a voter registration card. Process is biometric.	No information available.

B Voter turnout rates by naturalized immigrants versus natives globally

Table A2: Average voter turnout rates by natives versus naturalized immigrants, according to the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2010-14). Turnout percentages are calculated using data from all countries where responses to two questions were gathered: “Respondent immigrant?” (1 = yes; 0 = no), and “Vote in elections?” (1 = always/usually; 0 otherwise). Included countries are: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Belarus, Chile, Taiwan, Colombia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Haiti, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Jordan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Egypt, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

Native turnout percent	Naturalized immigrant turnout percent
81.82	71.1


C T1 further information

C.1 Official forms

ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA FORM-6		Acknowledgement No. _____ (To be filled by office)
(See Rules 13(1) and 26(2) of Representation of the People Act, 1950)		
Application for Inclusion of Name in Electoral Roll for First time Voter OR on Shifting from One Constituency to Another Constituency.		
To: The Electoral Registration Officer, _____ Assembly / Parliamentary Constituency		SPACE FOR PASTING ONE RECENT PASSPORT SIZE PHOTOGRAPH (3.5 CM X 3.5 CM) SHOWING FRONTAL VIEW OF FULL FACE WITHIN THIS BOX
I request that my name be included in the electoral roll for the above Constituency. (Tick appropriate box) As a first time voter <input type="checkbox"/> or due to shifting from another constituency <input type="checkbox"/>		
Particulars in support of my claim for inclusion in the electoral roll are given below:-		
Mandatory Particulars		
(a) Name		
(b) Surname (if any)		
(c) Name and surname of Relative of Applicant (see item (d))		
(d) Type of Relation	Father <input type="checkbox"/> Mother <input type="checkbox"/> Husband <input type="checkbox"/> Wife <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>	
(e) Age (as on 1 st January of current calendar year.....)	Years <input type="text"/>	Months <input type="text"/>
(f) Date of Birth (in DD/MM/YYYY format)(if known)	<input type="text"/>	
(g) Gender of Applicant (tick appropriate box)	Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female <input type="checkbox"/> Third Gender <input type="checkbox"/>	
(h) Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident	House No. <input type="text"/>	
Street/Area/Locality		
Town/Village		
Post Office	Pin Code <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
District	State/UT	
(i) Permanent address of applicant	House No. <input type="text"/>	
Street/Area/Locality		
Town/Village		
Post Office	Pin Code <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
District	State/UT	
(j) EPIC No. (if issued)		
Optional Particulars		
(k) Disability (if any) (tick appropriate box)	Visual impairment <input type="checkbox"/> Speech & hearing disability <input type="checkbox"/> Locomotor disability <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>	
(l) Email id (optional)		
(m) Mobile No. (optional)	<input type="text"/>	
DECLARATION: I hereby declare that to the best of knowledge and belief - (i) I am a citizen of India and place of my birth is Village/Town..... District..... State..... (ii) I am ordinarily resident at the address given at (h) above since (date, month, year). (iii) I have not applied for the inclusion of my name in the electoral roll for any other constituency. (iv) My name has not already been included in the electoral roll for this or any other assembly/ parliamentary constituency OR *My name may have been included in the electoral roll for Constituency in State in which I was ordinarily resident earlier at the address mentioned below and if so, I request that the same may be deleted from that electoral roll. * strike off the option not appropriate		

Address of earlier place of ordinary residence (if applying due to shifting from another constituency)		
House No.	Street/Area/Locality	
Town/Village		
Post Office	Pin Code <input type="text"/>	
District	State/UT	
I am aware that making a statement or declaration which is false and which I know or believe to be false or do not believe to be true, is punishable under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950).		
Place.....	Signature of Applicant.....	
Date.....		
Remarks of Field Level Verifying Officer:		
Details of action taken (To be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency)		
The application of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumari for inclusion of name in the electoral roll in Form 6 has been accepted/ rejected. Detailed reasons for acceptance [under or in pursuance of rule 18/20/26(4)] or rejection [under or in pursuance of rule 17/20/26(4)] are given below:		
Place:		
Date:	Signature of ERO	Seal of the ERO
Intimation of decision taken (to be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency and to be posted to the applicant on the address as given by the applicant)		
The application in Form 6 of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari.....		
Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident	House No.	Postage Stamp to be affixed by the Electoral Registration Authority at the time of dispatch
Street/Area/Locality		
Town/Village		
Post Office	Pin Code <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
District	State/UT	
Has been (a) accepted and the name of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari.....		
Has been registered at Serial No..... in Part No..... of AC No.....		
(b) rejected for the reason.....		
Date:	Electoral Registration Officer	
Address.....		
Acknowledgement/Receipt		
Acknowledgement Number	Date.....	
Received the application in form 6 of Shri / Smt. / Ms.		
[Applicant can refer the Acknowledgement No. to check the status of application].		
Name/Signature of ERO/AERO/BLO		

Figure A1: Election Commission of India, Form 6.

 ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA FORM-7 <small>(See Rules 13(2) and 26 of Registration of Electors Rule-1960)</small>		Acknowledgement No. _____ <small>(To be filled by office)</small>
Application for Objecting Inclusion of Name of Other Person / Seeking Deletion of Own Name/Seeking Deletion of Any Other Person's Name in Electoral Roll due to Death/Shifting.		
To, The Electoral Registration Officer, _____ Assembly / Parliamentary Constituency		
I hereby object to the proposed inclusion of the name of the under mentioned person in the electoral roll <input type="checkbox"/>		
I hereby request that entry relating to name of the person mentioned below is required to be deleted <input type="checkbox"/>		
I request that the entry relating to myself is to be deleted from Electoral Roll <input type="checkbox"/>		
Particulars in support of my objection/deletion are given below:-		
Particulars of the applicant		
(a) Name		
(b) Surname(if any)		
(c) Part No. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(d) Serial No. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
(e) EPIC No. (If issued)		
Details of person inclusion of whose name is objected to/whose entry is to be deleted:		
(a) Name		
(b) Surname(if any)		
(c) Part No. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	(d) Serial No. <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
(e) EPIC No. (If issued)		
(f) Reason(s) for objection/deletion:		
Declaration I hereby declare that the facts and particulars mentioned above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief, I am aware that making a statement or declaration which is false and which I know or believe to be false or do not believe to be true, is punishable under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950).		
Place.....		
Date.....	Signature of Applicant.....	

Remarks of Field Level Verifying Officer:	
Details of action taken <small>(To be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency)</small>	
The application of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumariobjecting to inclusion/ seeking deletion of name of Shri / Shrimati/ Kumari in the electoral roll in Form 7 has been accepted/rejected.	
Detailed reasons for acceptance [under or in pursuance of rule 18/20/26(4)] or rejection [under or in pursuance of rule 17/20/26(4)] are given below:	
Place: _____	
Date: _____	Signature of ERO _____ Seal of the ERO _____
Intimation of decision taken (to be filled by Electoral Registration Officer of the constituency and to be posted to the applicant on the address available in the record)	
The application in Form 7 of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari.....	
Current address where applicant is ordinarily resident _____ House No. _____	
Street/Area/Locality _____	<small>Postage Stamp to be affixed by the Electoral Registration Authority at the time of dispatch</small>
Town/Village _____	
Post Office _____	Pin Code <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
District _____	State/UT _____
Has been (a) accepted and the name of Shri/Shrimati/Kumari.....has been deleted from..... Part No..... of AC No.....	
(b) rejected for the reason.....	
Date: _____	Electoral Registration Officer Address.....
Acknowledgement/Receipt	
Acknowledgement Number _____	Date _____
Received the application in form 7 of Shri / Smt. / Ms. _____ [Applicant can refer the Acknowledgement No. to check the status of application].	
Name/Signature of ERO/AERO/BLO _____	

Figure A2: Election Commission of India, Form 7.

C.2 Pictures from the field



Figure A3: Photographs of field workers assisting T1-assigned migrants in gathering documents and filling in the forms needed to register to vote locally.



Figure A4: Pictures of the local election offices where applications to register to vote are evaluated and processed.



Figure A5: Successful applicants hold up their newly minted voter ID cards, enabling them to vote locally.

D T2 further information

Address: [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED],

Our NGO, [REDACTED], along with [REDACTED], has been working hard over the past year to help migrants in parts of your constituency to become politically empowered. In particular, in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections, we have been running a voter registration drive in the city, helping thousands of migrants from other parts of India to register to vote here for the first time. This will allow them to participate fully in the upcoming elections in this city. Below we show a list and a map of the polling booth areas where we've been working to help migrants register. We're sending this letter to all candidates standing in the forthcoming election in this constituency, as well as to sitting MPs, MLAs, and municipal corporators in this area. We hope these newly empowered migrant citizens will exercise their democratic right to vote here. We wanted to let you know that these citizens are now registered to vote in your constituency! Warm regards, [REDACTED]

हमारा एन जी ओ, [REDACTED] पिछले एक साल से कड़ी मेहनत कर रहा है ताकि आपके निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में भारत के विभिन्न स्थानों/ प्रदेशों से आये हुए व्यक्तियों को राजनीतिक रूप से सशक्त बनने में मदद मिल सके। विशेष रूप से, लोकसभा चुनावों में, हम शहर में मतदाता पंजीकरण अभियान चला रहे हैं, जिससे भारत के अन्य हिस्सों से आये हुए हजारों व्यक्तियों को पहली बार यहां मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकरण करने में मदद मिली है। यह उन्हें इस शहर में आगामी चुनावों में पूरी तरह से भाग लेने की अनुमति देगा। नीचे हम एक सूची और मतदान केंद्र के क्षेत्रों का एक नक्शा दिखाते हैं जहाँ हम ऐसे व्यक्तियों को पंजीकरण करवाने में सहायता प्रदान कर रहे हैं। हम इस निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में आगामी चुनाव में खड़े होने वाले सभी उम्मीदवारों, साथ ही साथ इस क्षेत्र में बैठे सांसदों, विधायकों और नगर निगम के पार्षदों को यह पत्र भेज रहे हैं। हम आपको सूचित करना चाहते हैं कि ये नागरिक अब आपके निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकृत हैं एवं हमें पूर्ण विश्वास है कि ये नागरिक मतदान के अपने लोकतांत्रिक अधिकार का प्रयोग करेंगे। [REDACTED]

Polling booth names (English):

- [REDACTED]

Polling booth names (Hindi):

- [REDACTED]

Figure A6: Example of typed letter mailed to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted and the referenced map is omitted.



██████████@gmail.com>

Wed, May 1, 2019 at 6:48 AM

To: ██████████

Dear ██████████,

Our NGO, ██████████, has been working hard over the past year to help migrants in parts of your constituency to become politically empowered. In particular, in the run up to the Lok Sabha elections, we have been running a voter registration drive in the city, helping thousands of migrants from other parts of India to register to vote here for the first time. This will allow them to participate fully in the upcoming elections in this city. Below we show a list and a map of the polling booth areas where we've been working to help migrants register. We're sending this message to all candidates standing in the forthcoming election in this constituency, as well as to sitting MPs, MLAs, and municipal corporators in this area. We hope these newly empowered migrant citizens will exercise their democratic right to vote here. We wanted to let you know that these citizens are now registered to vote in your constituency!

Warm regards, ██████████

हमारा एन जी ओ, ██████████, पिछले एक साल से कड़ी मेहनत कर रहा है ताकि आपके निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में भारत के विभिन्न स्थानों/ प्रदेशों से आये हुए व्यक्तियों को राजनीतिक रूप से सशक्त बनने में मदद मिल सके। विशेष रूप से, लोकसभा चुनावों में, हम शहर में मतदाता पंजीकरण अभियान चला रहे हैं, जिससे भारत के अन्य हिस्सों से आये हुए हजारों व्यक्तियों को पहली बार यहां मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकरण करने में मदद मिली है। यह उन्हें इस शहर में आगामी चुनावों में पूरी तरह से भाग लेने की अनुमति देगा। नीचे हम एक सूची और मतदान केंद्र के क्षेत्रों का एक नक्शा दिखाते हैं जहाँ हम ऐसे व्यक्तियों को पंजीकरण करवाने में सहायता प्रदान कर रहे हैं। हम इस निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में आगामी चुनाव में खड़े होने वाले सभी उम्मीदवारों, साथ ही साथ इस क्षेत्र में बैठे सांसदों, विधायकों और नगर निगम के पार्षदों को यह पत्र भेज रहे हैं। हम आपको सुचित करना चाहते हैं कि ये नागरिक अब आपके निर्वाचन क्षेत्र में मतदान करने के लिए पंजीकृत हैं एवं हमें पूर्ण विश्वास है कि ये नागरिक मतदान के अपने लोकतांत्रिक अधिकार का प्रयोग करेंगे। ██████████

Polling booth names (English):

- ██████████
- ██████████
- ██████████
- ██████████

Polling booth names (Hindi):

- ██████████
- ██████████
- ██████████

Figure A7: Example of email sent to local politicians in the lead up to the 2019 elections in T2 treated clusters. For confidentiality, identifying content is redacted and the referenced map is omitted.

E Study timeline




Figure A9: Study phasing. Red and green bars show the timing of the surveys. Blue bars show the timing of final voter registration application decisions, as reported in online administrative data.

F Survey instruments

Table A3: Variable definitions.

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Baseline survey		
Female	What is your gender?	1. Female / 2. Male / 3. Other
Age	What is your age?	18 - 99
Muslim	What is your religion?	1. Hindu / 2. Muslim / 3. Sikh / 4. Christian / 5. Jain / 6. Buddhist / 7. Parsi / 8. No religion / 9. Other
SC/ST	What is your caste group?	1. SC / 2. ST / 3. OBC / 4. Forward caste / 5. Other-specify
Primary education	What is the highest level of education you have attained?	1. No formal education (cannot read and write) / 2. No formal education (can read and write) / 3. Primary school / 4. Secondary school / 5. Senior secondary school / 6. Graduate / 7. Postgraduate
Income (INR 000s)	What is your total monthly household income in Rupees?	0 - 1,000,000
Married	Are you currently married?	1. Yes / 2. No
Length of residence	When did you move to Delhi to live or work?	1920 - 2018
Owns home	Do you own or rent your home?	1. Rent / 2. Own / 3. Other-specify
Politically active in village	Have you gone back to vote in an election in your home village or town since moving to Delhi?	1. Yes / 2. No
Pivotality in village	How important do you think your vote was in affecting the final result of that election?	1. Very important / 2. Somewhat important / 3. Somewhat unimportant / 4. Very unimportant / 5. I didn't vote
Pivotality in city	Suppose a similar type of election were to be held in Delhi, and you were to vote in it. How important do you think your vote would be in affecting the final result of such an election in Delhi?	1. Very important / 2. Somewhat important / 3. Somewhat unimportant / 4. Very unimportant
More at home in village	To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "I feel more at home in my previous place of residence than I do in Delhi."	1. Very much agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Very much disagree
Family in city	Which of the following family members stay with you here in Delhi?	1. No family members / 2. Spouse / 3. Children / 4. Parents / 5. Gradparents / 6. Other extended family
Number of calls to prior residence	Over the past week, approximately how many phone calls did you make to friends or relatives back in your previous place of residence?	0 - 99
Election gifts in prior residence	Leading up to the last election in which you voted in your previous place of residence, which of the following items did politicians offer you to encourage you to vote for them?	1. A gift of money / 2. A gift of clothing / 3. A gift of alcohol / 4. Free travel / 5. A gift of a different kind-specify / 6. Nothing was offered

Table A3: Variable definitions. (*continued*)

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Election gifts in city	Suppose a similar type of election were to be held in Delhi. Based on your knowledge and experience in the city so far, which of the following items do you think Delhi politicians would offer you to encourage you to vote for them?	1. A gift of money / 2. A gift of clothing / 3. A gift of alcohol / 4. Free travel / 5. A gift of a different kind-specify / 6. Nothing was offered
Receives schemes in prior residence	Do you or your immediate family continue to benefit from government schemes in your previous place of residence-for example, PDS, MGNREGA, or cash transfer schemes?	1. Yes / 2. No
Owns property in prior residence	Do you or your spouse personally own land or property in your previous place of residence?	1. Yes / 2. No
Wants city voter ID card	Do you wish to apply for a Delhi voter ID card that will allow you to vote in national, state, and local elections in Delhi?	1. Yes / 2. No
Has voter ID for prior residence	Do you currently have a voter ID card allowing you to vote in your previous place of residence (outside Delhi)?	1. Yes / 2. No
How likely to vote	If an election for the Delhi municipal corporation were going to be held tomorrow, and you were registered to vote here, how likely do you think it is that you would vote?	1. Very likely / 2. Somewhat likely / 3. Somewhat unlikely / 4. Very unlikely
Political interest	In general, how interested are you in politics?	1. Very interested / 2. Somewhat interested / 3. Not very interested
Political efficacy	To what extent do you agree with the following statement? "People like me don't have any influence on the government in Delhi"	1. Strongly agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Strongly disagree
Trust in national government	How much trust do you have in the national government?	1. No trust at all / 2. Not much trust / 3. Some trust / 4. A great deal of trust
Trust in state government	How much trust do you have in the Delhi state government?	1. No trust at all / 2. Not much trust / 3. Some trust / 4. A great deal of trust
Trust in municipal corporation	How much trust do you have in the Delhi municipal corporation?	1. No trust at all / 2. Not much trust / 3. Some trust / 4. A great deal of trust
Shared meal with ethnic out-group	Over the past six months, how many times have you shared a meal with someone from another jati or religion?	1. Very regularly / 2. Somewhat regularly / 3. A few times / 4. Not at all
Satisfaction with government services	How satisfied are you with the quality of government services-for example, roads, water, and street lamps-in the place where you are living?	1. Very satisfied / 2. Somewhat satisfied / 3. Somewhat dissatisfied / 4. Very dissatisfied
Received schemes in city	Do you or your family receive any of the following benefits in Delhi?	1. PDS / 2. Midday meals
Politician visits to basti	Which of the following politicians, if any, have visited your basti here in Delhi in the past year?	1. Municipal corporator / 2. MLA / 3. MP

Table A3: Variable definitions. (*continued*)

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Last vote in prior residence	Think about your previous place of residence. What best describes the most recent election in which you yourself voted there?	1. I voted in a village as part of a Lok Sabha election / 2. I voted in a village as part of a state assembly election / 3. I voted in a village as part of a gram panchayat election / 4. I voted in a town or city as part of a Lok Sabha election / 5. I voted in a town or city as part of a state assembly election / 6. I voted in a town or city as part of a municipal corporation election / 7. Other-please specify 8. I have not voted previously
Officeholders contacted	Which of the following Delhi officeholders have you contacted at some point over the past year?	1. Delhi corporation official / 2. Delhi municipal corporator / 3. Local MLA / 4. Local MP / 5. Party worker inside your basti / 6. Party worker outside your basti / 7. Housing society/vikas samiti official in your basti / 8. Ward samiti representative in your basti / 9. Dalal/broker/middleman / 10. Other community worker in your basti
Endline survey		
Has voter ID for city	Do you currently have a voter ID card that allows you to vote in [Delhi/Lucknow] elections?	1. Yes / 2. No
Voted in city in 2019	Did you vote in [Delhi/Lucknow] during the Lok Sabha elections held in May of this year?	1. Yes / 2. No
How likely to vote in city	How likely is it that you will vote in the next state elections held in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. Very likely / 2. Somewhat likely / 3. Somewhat unlikely / 4. Very unlikely
Attention to city politics	How much attention do you pay to news about politics in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. A lot of attention / 2. Some attention / 3. No attention at all
Attention to national/state politics	How much attention do you pay to news about national and state politics?	1. A lot of attention / 2. Some attention / 3. No attention at all
Political accountability	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "Elected politicians are accountable to the citizens of this city."	1. Very much agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Very much disagree
Political efficacy	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "People like me don't have any influence on the government."	1. Strongly agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Strongly disagree
Trust in national government	How much trust do you have in the national government?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all

Table A3: Variable definitions. (*continued*)

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Trust in state government	How much trust do you have in the [Delhi/Lucknow] state government?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all
Trust in municipal corporation	How much trust do you have in the municipal corporation of [Delhi/Lucknow]?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all
Trust in political parties	How much trust do you have in political parties?	1. A great deal of trust / 2. Some trust / 3. Not very much trust / 4. No trust at all
Considers city home	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "I consider [Delhi/Lucknow] to be my home."	1. Very much agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Very much disagree
Friends with locals	Think about your close friends in [Delhi/Lucknow]: people you see socially at least once a week. How many of these close friends were born in [Delhi/Lucknow]?	0 - 20
Inter-ethnic marriage attitude	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "I would be happy for a member of my family to marry someone of a different religion."	1. Very much agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Very much disagree
Inter-ethnic play attitude	Most people in this city are either Hindus or Muslims. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "I would be comfortable with my child playing with a child of the other main religion."	1. Strongly agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Neither agree nor disagree / 4. Somewhat disagree / 5. Strongly disagree
Willingness to pay city taxes	Suppose the government wants to spend money to improve schools and health centers close to your basti in [Delhi/Lucknow], and that it needs to collect taxes from households like yours to make these improvements. What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year to help fund these improvements?	1. Rs. 0 / 2. Rs. 10 / 3. Rs. 50 / 4. Rs. 100 / 5. Rs. 500 / 6. Rs. 1000 / 7. More than Rs. 1000
Willingness to pay prior residence taxes	Suppose the government wants to spend money to improve schools and health centers in your native village or town (outside of [Delhi/Lucknow]), and that it needs to collect taxes from households like yours to make these improvements. What is the maximum amount you would be willing to pay per year to help fund these improvements?	1. Rs. 0 / 2. Rs. 10 / 3. Rs. 50 / 4. Rs. 100 / 5. Rs. 500 / 6. Rs. 1000 / 7. More than Rs. 1000
Campaign: basti visits	Which of the following politicians, if any, have visited this basti in the last three months, including during the Lok Sabha election campaign?	1. Sitting municipal corporator / 2. Sitting MLA / 3. Sitting MP / 4. MP candidate
Campaign: home visit	During the recent Lok Sabha campaign in [Delhi/Lucknow], did a politician or political party worker come to your door to ask for your vote?	1. Yes / 2. No
Campaign: gifts	During the recent Lok Sabha campaign in [Delhi/Lucknow], did a politician or political party worker offer you any of the following items? If so, which items?	1. A gift of money / 2. A gift of clothing / 3. A gift of alcohol / 4. Another kind of gift / 5. Free travel / 6. No, nothing was offered

Table A3: Variable definitions. (*continued*)

Survey / variable name	Question text	Response options
Campaign: pro-migrant	During the recent Lok Sabha campaign, did any politician or political party try to specifically win the votes of recent migrants to this neighborhood?	1. Yes / 2. No
Campaign: intensity	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "During the recent Lok Sabha campaign, politicians and political party workers campaigned hard to win the votes of people in this particular basti."	1. Strongly agree / 2. Somewhat agree / 3. Somewhat disagree / 4. Strongly disagree
Contacting officials	Which of the following officeholders, if any, have you yourself contacted in the past three months?	1. [Delhi/Lucknow] corporation official / 2. Municipal corporator / 3. Local MLA / 4. Local MP / 5. Political party worker inside your basti / 6. Party worker outside your basti / 7. Housing society/vikas samiti official in your basti / 8. Ward samiti representative in your basti / 9. Dalal/broker/middleman / 10. Other community worker in your basti
Non-electoral participation	Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. Please tell me which of these, if any, you have personally done during the past three months.	1. Attended a community meeting / 2. Joined or participated in the meetings of a civic association, such as a club, union, or NGO / 3. Gone to a meeting of a political party / 4. Gone to a political rally / 5. Given money to a political party or to a political cause / 6. Handed out leaflets or done door to door campaigning on behalf of a cause or a political party / 7. Voted in an internal political party election

G Deviations from pre-analysis plan

The study pre-analysis plan (PAP) was filed at the Evidence in Governance and Politics registry before the researchers accessed the endline data and prior to any data analysis being conducted. An anonymized version of the PAP can be made available to reviewers on request. There were two deviations from the pre-registered plan. First, the lagged dependent variable, `b_tax_expenditure`, was planned as a Z-score index of two variables, `b_satisfied_gov_services` and `b_received_benefits_city`. Due to an implementation error, the variable `b_received_benefits_city` was not correctly gathered at baseline. Thus, `b_satisfied_gov_services` (the one available component of the planned index) is used in place of the planned lagged dependent variable. Second, the observational data analyses described on pp. 6–7 of the PAP were not implemented as there was insufficient variation in the outcome variable of interest (whether eligible subjects wished to acquire a city-based voter ID card) to make these tests feasible. This substantive finding is highlighted in the paper. All remaining pre-registered experimental and heterogeneous treatment effect analyses are presented in this paper and are implemented in exact conformity with the PAP.

H Indexing

Table A4: Index construction. Z-score indexes are constructed by coding component variables such that higher values are more beneficial. Component variables are then centered and standardized using the control group mean. The final index is then the average of the standardized components.

Variable type	Indexed variable label	Component variable labels	Method of indexing
Outcome	Political interest	Interest in politics at the city level (ordinal); Interest in politics at the national level (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	Political trust	Trust in national government (ordinal); Trust in state government (ordinal); Trust in municipal corporation (ordinal); Trust in parties (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	Contacting city officials	Contacting officials (categorical)	Sum
Outcome	Non-electoral participation	Non-electoral participation (categorical)	Sum
Outcome	Social integration	Considers city home (ordinal); Friends with locals (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	Inter-ethnic tolerance	Inter-ethnic marriage attitude (ordinal); Inter-ethnic play attitude (ordinal)	Z-score index
Outcome	City-based tax	Willingness to pay city taxes (ordinal); Willingness to pay prior residence taxes (ordinal). Note, we reverse code the second measure, such that a rise on the aggregated score indicates willingness to simultaneously spend more in destination areas and less in prior places of residence.	Z-score index
Outcome	Campaign exposure	Basti visits by politicians (integer); Home visit by politician or party worker (integer); Number of gifts (integer); Migrant-focused campaigning (binary); Perceived campaign intensity (ordinal)	Z-score index
Lagged DV	Political trust	Trust in national government (ordinal); Trust in state government (ordinal); Trust in municipal corporation (ordinal)	Z-score index
Lagged DV	Politician visits	Politician visits to basti, by municipal corporator, MLA, and MP	Sum
Lagged DV	Social integration	More at home in village (ordinal); Number of calls to prior residence (ordinal)	Z-score index

I Outliers in income covariate

When cleaning the data we observed several extreme outliers in the `income` covariate. We suspect these outliers result from data entry errors. To minimize the influence of these extreme values, we winsorize the variable, setting all values above the value of the 99th percentile to the value of the 99th percentile itself. The transformed variable is used in all statistical analyses.




Figure A10: Box plots show the distribution of the raw income covariate before and after winsorizing.

J Internal validity

J.1 Balance

Table A5: T1 balance test for subjects included in T1 analyses. OLS regression. All covariates are measured at baseline. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	T1 treatment indicator
Female	0.014 (0.025)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)
Muslim	0.015 (0.028)
SC/ST	0.003 (0.025)
Primary education	-0.007 (0.026)
Income (INR 000s)	0.001 (0.002)
Married	-0.035 (0.029)
Length of residence in city	0.002* (0.001)
Owns home in city	0.057** (0.025)
Hadn't voted previously	0.045 (0.041)
How likely to vote in city if registered	0.006 (0.061)
Political interest	-0.038 (0.041)
Sense of political efficacy	-0.029 (0.031)
Political trust index	0.002 (0.015)
Social integration index	-0.043* (0.025)
Shared meal with non-coethnic	-0.013 (0.034)
Has village voter ID	0.019 (0.038)
Returned to vote in village	0.040 (0.042)
More at home in village	0.081 (0.052)
Straight-line distance to home district	0.00003 (0.00004)
Still receives village schemes	-0.004 (0.024)
Owns village property	0.0003 (0.026)
Pr(>F) of H0: joint orthogonality	0.304
Observations	2,120
Adjusted R ²	0.001

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A6: T2 balance test for subjects included in T2 analyses. Weighted least squares regression. Clusters weighted equally. All covariates are measured at baseline. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	T2 treatment indicator
Politician visits	−0.008 (0.035)
Female	0.018 (0.039)
Age	0.001 (0.002)
Muslim	0.121 (0.078)
SC/ST	0.003 (0.056)
Primary education	0.001 (0.042)
Income (INR 000s)	0.011** (0.004)
Married	0.007 (0.049)
Length of residence in city	0.002 (0.002)
Owens home in city	0.004 (0.058)
Pr(>F) of H0: joint orthogonality	0.406
No. of clusters	87
Observations	1,969
Adjusted R ²	0.017
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

J.2 Attrition

J.2.1 Attrition rates by treatment condition

Table A7: Comparison of attrition rates across T1 treatment arms using OLS regression. The analysis includes all subjects randomized to T1 treatment or control. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Attrition indicator
Assigned to T1 treatment	-0.007 (0.011)
Observations	2,306
Adjusted R ²	-0.0003
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A8: Comparison of attrition rates across T2 treatment arms using weighted least squares regression. Clusters are weighted equally. Models include block fixed effects. The analysis includes all subjects randomized to T2 treatment or control. (Note that this number is smaller than that for the T1 attrition analysis as baseline geo-coordinates were unavailable for some subjects; hence they were not assigned to clusters or randomized.) Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Attrition indicator
Assigned to T2 treatment	-0.021 (0.021)
No. of clusters	87
Observations	2,131
Adjusted R ²	0.003
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

K Summary statistics

Table A9: Summary statistics for analyses involving T1 dataset. “(E)” variables were measured at endline and “(B)” variables were measured at baseline.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
(E) Has city-based voter ID	2,120	0.281	0.450	0	1
(E) Voted in city in 2019	2,120	0.281	0.449	0	1
(E) Likelihood of voting in city in future	2,120	0.872	0.197	0	1
(E) Political interest index	2,120	0.045	0.909	-1.442	1.559
(E) Politician accountability perceptions	2,120	0.715	0.336	0	1
(E) Sense of political efficacy	2,120	0.446	0.409	0	1
(E) Political trust index	2,120	0.009	0.652	-1.616	1.170
(E) Contacting city officials index	2,120	0.303	0.610	0	6
(E) Non-electoral participation index	2,120	0.295	0.598	0	5
(E) Social integration index	2,120	0.033	0.686	-3.250	1.396
(E) Ethnic tolerance index	2,120	0.043	0.686	-2.347	1.069
(E) City-based tax index	2,120	0.010	0.301	-2.020	2.086
(B) T1 treatment	2,306	0.493	0.500	0	1
(B) Female	2,306	0.540	0.498	0	1
(B) Age	2,306	28.795	10.063	18	88
(B) Muslim	2,306	0.235	0.424	0	1
(B) SC/ST	2,306	0.379	0.485	0	1
(B) Primary education	2,306	0.650	0.477	0	1
(B) Income (INRs)	2,306	10.252	4.663	1	30
(B) Married	2,306	0.684	0.465	0	1
(B) Length of residence in city	2,306	16.472	9.894	0	78
(B) Owns home in city	2,306	0.672	0.470	0	1
(B) Hadn't voted previously	2,306	0.747	0.435	0	1
(B) How likely to vote in city if registered	2,306	0.920	0.186	0	1
(B) Political interest	2,306	0.265	0.299	0	1
(B) Sense of political efficacy	2,306	0.570	0.367	0	1
(B) Political trust index	2,306	0.001	0.751	-1.703	1.409
(B) Social integration index	2,306	-0.023	0.723	-1.334	2.535
(B) Shared meal with non-coethnic	2,306	0.386	0.344	0	1
(B) Has village voter ID	2,306	0.268	0.443	0	1
(B) Returned to vote in village	2,306	0.174	0.379	0	1
(B) More at home in village	2,306	0.615	0.346	0	1
(B) Straight-line distance to home district	2,306	384.075	328.329	2.386	1,761.926
(B) Still receives village schemes	2,306	0.468	0.499	0	1
(B) Owns village property	2,306	0.276	0.447	0	1

Table A10: Summary statistics for analyses involving T2 dataset. “(E)” variables were measured at endline and “(B)” variables were measured at baseline.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
(E) Campaign exposure index	1,969	0.005	0.580	-0.962	3.731
(E) Basti visits by politicians	1,969	0.586	0.871	0	4
(E) Home visit by politician or party worker	1,969	0.591	0.492	0	1
(E) Number of gifts	1,969	0.020	0.146	0	2
(E) Migrant-focused campaigning	1,969	0.447	0.497	0	1
(E) Perceived campaign intensity	1,931	0.718	0.359	0	1
(B) T2 treatment	1,969	0.530	0.499	0	1
(B) Politician visits	1,969	0.608	0.823	0	3
(B) Female	1,969	0.537	0.499	0	1
(B) Age	1,969	28.617	10.075	18	88
(B) Muslim	1,969	0.241	0.428	0	1
(B) SC/ST	1,969	0.369	0.483	0	1
(B) Primary education	1,969	0.667	0.471	0	1
(B) Income (INRs)	1,969	10.220	4.632	1	30
(B) Married	1,969	0.671	0.470	0	1
(B) Length of residence in city	1,969	17.038	10.036	0	78
(B) Owns home in city	1,969	0.693	0.461	0	1

L Main results without covariates

Table A11: T1 experimental results for primary political outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models do not include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Has City-Based Voter ID (1)	Voted in City in 2019 (2)	Likelihood of Voting in City in Future (3)
T1 treatment	0.243 (0.019)	0.208 (0.019)	0.033 (0.009)
p-value (upper)	0.000	0.000	0.000
Control mean	0.161	0.178	0.856
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.073	0.053	0.007
DV values	{0, 1}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

Table A12: T1 experimental results for additional political outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models do not include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Political Interest Index (1)	Politician Accountability Perceptions (2)	Sense of Political Efficacy (3)	Political Trust Index (4)
T1 treatment	0.091 (0.039)	0.037 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.018)	0.018 (0.028)
p-value (upper)	0.011	0.006	0.660	0.263
Control mean	0.000	0.697	0.450	0.000
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.000
DV values	$[-1.44, 1.56]$	$\{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1\}$	$\{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1\}$	$[-1.62, 1.17]$

Table A13: T1 experimental results for contacting and non-electoral participation. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models do not include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Contacting City Officials Index (1)	Non-Electoral Participation Index (2)
T1 treatment	0.035 (0.027)	0.037 (0.026)
p-value (upper)	0.094	0.079
Control mean	0.286	0.277
Observations	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.000	0.000
DV values	$\{0, \dots, 6\}$	$\{0, \dots, 5\}$

Table A14: T2 experimental results for exposure to campaigning during the 2019 elections. Weighted least squares estimates of intent to treat effects. Clusters weighted equally. Models do not include covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Index Components					
	Campaigning Exposure Index (1)	Basti Visits by Politicians (2)	Home Visit by Politician or Party Worker (3)	Number of Gifts (4)	Migrant-Focused Campaigning (5)	Perceived Campaign Intensity (6)
T2 treatment	0.099 (0.059)	0.055 (0.080)	0.039 (0.039)	0.020 (0.014)	0.006 (0.046)	0.073 (0.032)
p-value (upper)	0.049	0.249	0.160	0.078	0.445	0.012
Control mean	-0.059	0.559	0.550	0.013	0.425	0.676
Observations	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,969	1,931
No. of Clusters	87	87	87	87	87	87
Adjusted R^2	0.043	0.049	0.033	0.012	0.004	0.012
DV values	[-0.97, 3.73]	{0, ..., 4}	{0, 1}	{0, 1, 2}	{0, 1}	{0, 0.33, 0.67, 1}

Table A15: T1 experimental results for socio-economic outcomes. OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Models do not include covariates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

	Social Integration Index (1)	Ethnic Tolerance Index (2)	City-Based Tax Index (3)
T1 treatment	0.067 (0.030)	0.087 (0.030)	0.020 (0.013)
p-value (upper)	0.012	0.002	0.061
Control mean	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	2,120	2,120	2,120
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.004	0.001
DV values	[-3.25, 1.40]	[-2.35, 1.07]	[-2.02, 2.09]