Trade as a Potent Threat A Firm-Centered Approach to Economic Statecraft

Jihye "Jacqueline" Park

University of Rochester

IPES 2023

Recap

Theory & Hypotheses

•00

Data 000000 Analyses (Pt I)

Recap

Analyses (Pt II)

Theory & Hypotheses

► Firms drive US economic statecraft

- firms want free trade (Arkolakis et al., 2019; Baccini et al., 2018) & protection of IP rights (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; Helpman et al., 2004; Osgood et al., 2017)
- US trade deficit, The Trade Act of 1974, the National Trade Estimate report, and firms

► Emerging economies susceptible to 301 actions

- lack of resources to retaliate (Carter and Stone, 2015; Davis, 2023; Dreher and Sturm, 2012)
- trade dependence on the United States (Sell, 2003)

► Ideological appeasement

- ► UNGA voting as a proxy for ideology (Voeten, 2021)
- voting compliance related to US aid disbursements (Carter and Stone, 2015); IMF lending (Stone, 2008; 2011); World Bank loans (Dreher and Sturm, 2012); exclusive club membership, e.g., OECD, EU (Davis, 2023)

Theory & Hypotheses

► Firms drive US economic statecraft

- firms want free trade (Arkolakis et al., 2019; Baccini et al., 2018) & protection of IP rights (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; Helpman et al., 2004; Osgood et al., 2017)
- ▶ US trade deficit, The Trade Act of 1974, the National Trade Estimate report, and firms

► Emerging economies susceptible to 301 actions

- ► lack of resources to retaliate (Carter and Stone, 2015; Davis, 2023; Dreher and Sturm, 2012)
- trade dependence on the United States (Sell, 2003)

► Ideological appeasement

- ► UNGA voting as a proxy for ideology (Voeten, 2021)
- voting compliance related to US aid disbursements (Carter and Stone, 2015); IMF lending (Stone, 2008; 2011); World Bank loans (Dreher and Sturm, 2012); exclusive club membership, e.g., OECD, EU (Davis, 2023)

► Firms drive US economic statecraft

- firms want free trade (Arkolakis et al., 2019; Baccini et al., 2018) & protection of IP rights (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2002; Helpman et al., 2004; Osgood et al., 2017)
- ▶ US trade deficit, The Trade Act of 1974, the National Trade Estimate report, and firms

► Emerging economies susceptible to 301 actions

- lack of resources to retaliate (Carter and Stone, 2015; Davis, 2023; Dreher and Sturm, 2012)
- trade dependence on the United States (Sell, 2003)

► Ideological appeasement

- ▶ UNGA voting as a proxy for ideology (Voeten, 2021)
- voting compliance related to US aid disbursements (Carter and Stone, 2015); IMF lending (Stone, 2008; 2011); World Bank loans (Dreher and Sturm, 2012); exclusive club membership, e.g., OECD, EU (Davis, 2023)

Hypotheses

Theory & Hypotheses

00

- 1. Firm lobbying \longrightarrow negative NTE
- 2. Negative NTE \longrightarrow trade sanctions, esp. for emerging economies
- Targeted states converge on the US ideal point in UNGA voting space.

Data

Analyses (Pt I)

Analyses (Pt II)

Recap 00

Theory & Hypotheses

Data •00000

Recap

The National Trade Estimate reports

Years 2004 - 2022; 60-80 countries per year; country-year observations

Sneak Peek at the NTE

Theory & Hypotheses

NOTICE THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO

PERSON WALK SAMESSA





Recap

► "Wordfish" by Slapin and Proksch (2008)

- "Wordfish" by Slapin and Proksch (2008)
- ▶ US criticism of trade barriers in each country; θ

NTE Position Estimates

- "Wordfish" by Slapin and Proksch (2008)
- \triangleright US criticism of trade barriers in each country; θ
- Functional form:

$$y_{ijt} \sim Poisson(\lambda_{ijt})$$


 $\lambda_{ijt} = exp(\alpha_{it} + \psi_j + \beta_j * \theta_{it})$


NTE Position Estimates

- "Wordfish" by Slapin and Proksch (2008)
- ▶ US criticism of trade barriers in each country; θ
- Functional form:

$$y_{ijt} \sim Poisson(\lambda_{ijt})$$


 $\lambda_{ijt} = exp(\alpha_{it} + \psi_j + \beta_j * \theta_{it})$





Theory & Hypotheses

Persistence of NTE Position Estimates





Theory & Hypotheses


Analyses (Pt II)

Recap

US Firm Grievances and Trade Consequences










Analyses (Pt II)

Investment Cuts in Countries of Concerns



Vulnerability to Special 301





Analyses (Pt II)

Theory & Hypotheses

Data 000000

Analyses (Pt I)

Analyses (Pt II) ●○○

Analyses (Pt II)

Recap

Appeasing Move Towards the United States


	(1)	(2)	(3)
Theta $(\theta, lagged)$	-0.095**	-0.072^{+}	-0.033
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.033)
OECD		0.014	-0.021
		(0.066)	(0.062)
Priority Watch		0.011	0.038
		(0.050)	(0.045)
$OECD \times Theta$		0.008	
		(0.057)	
Priority Watch \times Theta			-0.130***
			(0.030)
N	1,033	969	969
Country FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	✓
Year FE	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{UNGA}}$ voting distance is the DV, control variables omitted

Recap

 $^{^{+}}$ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appeasing Move Towards the United States



Analyses (Pt II)

Recap

▶ Firms raise concerns \longrightarrow negative NTE \longrightarrow 301 targeting \longrightarrow ideological appeasement

- ▶ Firms raise concerns \longrightarrow negative NTE \longrightarrow 301 targeting \longrightarrow ideological appeasement
- ▶ NTE text as data, first attempt in the literature

- ▶ Firms raise concerns \longrightarrow negative NTE \longrightarrow 301 targeting \longrightarrow ideological appeasement
- ▶ NTE text as data, first attempt in the literature
- more micro-level explanation about economic statecraft

Analyses (Pt II)

Thank you!

Questions or comments are welcome:)

Feel free to reach me out: jihye.park@rochester.edu

You can also find me at https://jihyepark.me