Staying or Leaving? How Businesses Take Action Towards Economic Sanctions and Evidence from the Ukrainian War

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October 2023

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- Around half of Western firms are still maintaining their business there
- Heineken (fully withdrawn) and PepsiCo (business-as-usual).

Research question: following economic sanctions, under which circumstances are firms more likely to withdraw from the target state?

Theory: Under economic sanctions, firms which are more economically vulnerable under geopolitical risks will be less likely to exit.

- Economic footprint in the target market.
- Extractive sectors.

• Geopolitical risks: "threats or escalation of adverse events linked with wars, terrorism, and other state or political actor tensions influencing the peaceful trajectory of international relations" (Caldara & lacoviello, 2022)

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- Two primary economic factors determining economic vulnerability of firms: their input and strategic environment.

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- Ex ante: Firms whose inputs are sensitive to geopolitical risks by nature
- *Ex post*: Firms with higher probability of being "retaliated" by both sides

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 - Market valuation

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 - Highly politicized \rightarrow volatile input price
 - Highly regulated and restrictive to foreign firms

- Data: consult from a variety of data sources
 - CELI: a list of companies withdrawing and staying in Russia after sanctions, collected by the team from Yale School of Management (Sonnenfeld & Yale Research Team, 2022).
 - Orbis: information of private firms around the world
 - UNCTAD International Investment Agreements: information of BITs.
 - fDi Market: history of operation

- Dependent variable: *Withdraw*, 1 if a firm withdraws, 0 otherwise (coded from the original categorical variable)
- Independent variable:
 - Extractive: 1 if a firm is extractive, 0 otherwise
 - Russian Subsidiaries: Number of subsidiaries in Russia


- Control variables:
 - In_employees: Natural log of the number of employees
 - US_allies_subsidiaries: Number of subsidiaries in the US and allies
 - In_market_cap: Natural log of market capitalization
 - year_in_Russia: Number of year in Russia
 - ▶ US Allies: 1 if the firm's original country is the US or its allies; 0 otherwise

Research Design

- Empirical Model
 - Full matching
 - Multiple Imputation
 - Logistic model with country clustered standard errors
 - Industry fixed effects for H1


Robustness Check

- Entropy matching (Hainmueller, 2012)
- Control for the origins' bilateral investment treaty with Russia
- Ordered-logistic model with original coding scheme.
- ▶ Replacing US_allies with US_firm, and re-run the baseline model.



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


	Dependent variable: Withdrawal	
	(1)	(2)
Russia_subsidiaries	-0.100*** (0.015)	
extractive		-0.809*** (0.190)
Constant	-0.049 (0.505)	-0.767* (0.395)
Observations Industry FEs	1301 Yes	1301 No

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the sectoral and matching subclasses levels.

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Marginal Effects of Russia Subsidiaries on Withdraw

Predicted Probability of Withdrawal

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Contributions

- Business operation and political risks (Abdelal, 2015; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Bussy & Zheng, 2023; Caldara & Iacoviello, 2022; Haendel, 2019; Hassan et al., 2019; Horst, 1972; N. Jensen, 2008; Kobrin, 1979, 1980; Wellhausen, 2019)
- Contribution: Delves into how economic vulnerability shapes firms' reactions to economic sanctions
- Political economy of international security (Blanchard et al., 1999; Kirshner, 1998; Mastanduno, 1999; Narizny, 2007; Patomaki, 2007)
- Contribution: Sheds light on the behavior of multinational firms

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- Using more comprehensive datasets on foreign firms in Russia to increase the sample size.
- Adding variables on types of sanctions and specific products are under US and EU sanction regimes.
- Getting the information of fully withdrawn firms on their timing, i.e the difference in the time they fully withdraw and utilize this variation to conduct other empirical tests.

Robustness Tests

	-	Depender	t variable:	
	Withdraw			
	Entropy	Entropy	BIT	BIT
Russia_Subsidiaries	-0.103^{***}		-0.079***	
	(0.015)		(0.016)	
extractive		-0.912***		-0.892***
		(0.186)		(0.198)
US_allies	0.065	-0.039	0.664***	0.772***
	(0.127)	(0.117)	(0.170)	(0.163)
In_employee	0.010	0.009	-0.005	-0.015
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.035)
US_allies_Subsidiaries	0.001***	0.0004***	0.001***	0.0003***
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
In_market_cap	0.022	0.009	0.057	0.026
	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.039)
year_in_Russia	0.066***	0.073***	0.056***	0.060***
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
BIT			-0.986***	-1.233***
			(0.177)	(0.168)
Constant	0.047	-0.887**	0.219	-0.227
	(0.536)	(0.400)	(0.513)	(0.410)
Observations	1301	1301	1301	1301
Industry FEs	Yes	No	Yes	No

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Robustness Tests

	Dependent variable: Grade	
	(1)	(2)
Russia_Subsidiaries	-0.065**** (0.011)	
extractive		-0.499*** (0.167)
US_allies	-0.024 (0.109)	-0.119 (0.103)
In_employee	0.019	-0.003
in 2 in proyee	(0.030)	(0.030)
US_allies_Subsidiaries	0.0004*** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
ln_market_cap	0.068**	0.044
	(0.034) 0.051***	(0.033) 0.055***
year_in_Russia	(0.011)	(0.010)
Digging In Buying Time	-1.623*** (0.331)	-0.495 (0.346)
Buying Time Scaling Back	-0.957***	0.135
	(0.332)	(0.346)
Scaling Back Suspension	-0.373 (0.334)	0.677* (0.346)
Suspension Withdrawal	1.253*** (0.339)	2.204*** (0.350)
	(0.339)	(0.330)
Observations Industry FEs	1301 Yes	1301 No
Note:		0.05; ***p<0.01

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Robustness Tests

	Depende	nt variable:		
	Wit	Withdraw		
	(1)	(2)		
Russia_Subsidiaries	-0.095*** (0.015)			
extractive		-0.876***		
		(0.177)		
US_firm	0.361**	0.693***		
	(0.162)	(0.144)		
In_employee	-0.011	-0.016		
	(0.036)	(0.034)		
US_allies_Subsidiaries	0.001***	0.0003**		
	(0.0002)	(0.0001)		
In_market_cap	0.031	0.001		
	(0.042)	(0.038)		
year_in_Russia	0.068***	0.085***		
	(0.013)	(0.012)		
Constant	-0.077	-0.978**		
	(0.518)	(0.385)		
Observations	1301	1301		
Industry FEs	Yes	No		

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Thank you for listening!

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