Bureaucratic Constraints on Embedded Liberalism: Evidence from the Trade Adjustment Assistance[*]

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Abstract

Scholars have long claimed that international integration can be sustained by providing sufficient government compensation to workers adversely affected by it. We argue that the success of this social contract—known as *Embedded Liberalism*—also depends on the bureaucracies responsible for delivering the compensation. Bureaucratic delays in delivering compensation can undermine citizens' confidence in the government's ability to protect them from the adverse consequences of international trade, leading to diminished support for redistribution and internationalism. We test our theory on the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in the United States. By leveraging the quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions to individual bureaucrats, we estimate the effect of bureaucrat-driven delays in processing petitions on the attitudes of over 200,000 voters from 2006 to 2016. Empirical results support our theory and additionally indicate that labor unions play a crucial role in informing voters about TAA bureaucratic delays. We discuss how bureaucratic hurdles in redistributive programs may significantly contribute to the backlash against globalization.

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Introduction

What sustains international integration? Scholars have long argued that the government providing economic compensation to workers adversely affected by trade—a social contract referred to as *Embedded Liberalism*—is of utmost importance for this end (Ruggie 1982; Ritchie and You 2021; Rickard 2015, 2023). The compensation not only assuages the grievances of laid-off workers directly affected but also reassures other workers who can potentially be negatively impacted by international economic competition. This welfare provision has become especially relevant in recent years as increased import competition has been tied to higher support for economic nationalism, increased support for the far-right, and electorally-motivated legislators opposing trade liberalization.[1] In this regard, existing studies have focused on how the provision of redistributive benefits to the losers of trade liberalization affects public attitudes (Margalit 2011; Ritchie and You 2021; Kim and Gulotty 2024), emphasizing the importance of promoting workers' participation in redistributive programs designed to benefit those laid off due to trade (Kim and Pelc 2021a, 2021b; Kim 2024).

Herein we underline an important limitation to Embedded Liberalism that the existing literature has not fully considered: bureaucratic implementation of redistributive programs. Specifically, delivering redistributive benefits could be delayed due to bureaucrats who administer redistributive programs on behalf of the government. Such bureaucratic delays are prevalent in many government programs and can severely threaten the economic security of workers laid-off due to trade. For example, workers in the United States who are laid off due to trade can submit their petitions to the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program. However, processing time by TAA bureaucrats can often takes more than several months despite the statutory limit of 40 days; in 2009, for example, it took an average of 153 days for officers of the TAA program to process petitions

[1] See, inter alia, Margalit 2011; Feigenbaum and Hall 2015; Weymouth, Jensen, and Quinn 2017; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Walter 2021; Baccini and Weymouth 2022; Colantone, Ottaviano, and Stanig 2022.

due to the lack of staff and adequate control steps for processing petitions (Gao 2012). These delays are significant, as losing one month of labor income can cause many households to fall into destitution.[2]

We argue that such problems in bureaucratic implementation could be an impediment to international integration. Bureauratic delays in delivering compensation can erode citizens' confidence in the government's ability to protect them from the adverse consequences of international trade, reducing their support for international integration. Moreover, as workers lose faith in the functioning of redistributive government programs, they are also less likely to support redistribution through taxation.

We present a theory that explains how citizens update their policy preferences based on the information they receive about bureaucratic performance. First, our theory rests on citizens attributing responsibility to the government for bureaucratic performance and, as a result, questioning the government's capability to uphold what it promised to give. While the government cannot fully control individual career-bureaucrats, rational voters understand that bureaucratic outcomes are a product of joint inputs by the government and bureaucrats. Based on observed outcomes and their inference on the input by these two actors, voters would update their beliefs about the government's capacity or willingness to uphold its commitment (e.g., Slough 2024).

Second, we highlight the role of organized interests in transmitting the information about the bureaucratic performance in redistributive programs to citizens. Existing studies argue that citizens judge the impact of local trade shocks based on their direct observation of their surrounding environment such as layoffs (Bisbee 2024), from local news media (Jonston, Feldman, and Knight 1986; Mansfield and Mutz 2009), or from cues by political elites (Guisinger 2017). In contrast, bureaucratic performance that affects local residents is difficult to observe directly and less likely to be salient in the

[2]See these reports, for example: https://prosperitynow.org/sites/default/files/resources/2019_Scorecard_Key_Findings.pdf, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/banking/living-paycheck-to-paycheck-statistics-2024/ and https://content.schwab.com/web/retail/public/about-schwab/Charles-Schwab-2019-Modern-Wealth-Survey-findings-0519-9JBP.pdf

news media (e.g., Epp and Jennings 2020). We argue that organized interests representing (potential) beneficiaries of government redistributive programs can play a key role in providing their members with information on bureaucratic performance. In the context of trade policies, local labor unions have served as one of key organized interests (Sun 2012; Alquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014; Kim and Margalit 2017). Thus, we claim that union members would be better informed than non-union members about how residents in their localities have been affected by the bureaucratic implementation of redistributive programs.[3]

To test our theory, we examine the TAA program in the United States—a national government program that assists workers laid off due to international trade competition.[4] To qualify for TAA benefits, workers laid-off due to trade must submit petitions to the TAA agency; subsequently these petitions are centrally collected and then quasi-randomly assigned to individual rank-and-file officers who determine the eligibility of petitions (Hyman 2018), as in "examiner designs" (e.g., Kling 2006; Doyle Jr 2008).

This quasi-random assignment of petitions allows us to develop an original measure of TAA investigators' intrinsic traits regarding the petition processing time, independent of their positions within the agency, the quality of petitions, experience, as well as local sociodemographic, economic, and political characteristics of the locations where petitions are submitted. We aggregate these investigator traits at a congressional district-year level to capture citizens' quasi-random exposure to bureaucrat-driven TAA delays in their districts, *conditional on* petitions being submitted in their districts in a given year.

Using the quasi-random variation of the exposure to local TAA bureaucratic delays and survey data on more than 200,000 respondents from 2006 to 2016, we estimate the

[3]While other interest groups may also play a role in this regard, investigating this is outside the scope of our paper.

[4]Due to the termination provision under Section 285(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, as of July 1, 2022, the the Department of Labor of the US didn't issue any determinations and accepted any new petitions or requests for reconsideration for any workers who were certified and separated from their job after June 30, 2022. However, the TAA was reauthorized to do so in 2024. Our period of analysis ends in 2016, before these events.

effect of these bureaucratic delays on citizens' attitudes. First, we find that in congressional districts where TAA petitions are assigned to investigators with propensities to delay petition decisions, labor union members are more likely to express lower support for redistribution and international integration. However, these effects are not observed among non-union members. The effects of TAA delays on union members is robust to accounting for individuals' education, employment and other observable characteristics associated with self-selection into unions, lending support to our argument.

To further evaluate the role of labor unions as information distributors, we collect data on collective bargaining notices to measure labor-union-strength at the congressional district level. Consistent with our argument, we find that the effects of TAA bureaucratic delays are stronger in congressional districts where local labor unions are stronger. Moreover, we find that TAA bureaucratic delays lead union members to disapprove the performance of the incumbent president who is in charge of running the federal government, indicating rational blame attribution by voters. Lastly, we find evidence that these delays can affect citizens' propensity to vote for politicians advocating for economic nationalism; we find that TAA bureaucratic delays modestly increased the presidential vote share for Trump in 2016.

This paper offers several contributions to the existing literature. First, this paper is the first to document how bureaucratic delays in disbursing redistributive benefits can erode support for international integration. While the existing literature suggests that the recent populist backlash against globalization may be due to the insufficient amount of compensation provided to losers of free trade (Rodrik 2018; Milner and Solstad 2021), our findings suggest that the slow bureaucratic delivery of compensation can also contribute to the backlash against globalization. This is especially relevant inasmuch as far-right parties advocate for economic nationalism and attempt to dismantle the welfare state and bureaucracies (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2019; Mansfield, Milner, and Rudra 2021; Walter 2021; Colantone, Ottaviano, and Stanig 2022; Bauer 2023; Bellodi,

Morelli, and Vannoni 2024).[5] Signs of malfunctioning redistributive programs could be used by these groups to mobilize political support against international integration.

We also build on recent literature demonstrating the importance of unions in trade liberalization policies (Alquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014; Kim and Margalit 2017; Becher and Stegmuller 2023; Balcazar 2023). Our findings suggest that unions are an interest group that provides information to workers, shaping their preferences and behavior. Thus, despite some concerns on the recent declining strength of labor unions, our paper shows that labor unions still serve as a pivotal organized interest.

Lastly, our findings have important policy implications beyond the United States given that many other countries—such as South Korea, European Union member states, Japan, among other—have government programs assisting workers laid off due to trade, and many more have general government programs that offer economic assistance to the unemployed. To sustain trade liberalization, policymakers must not only focus on expanding the benefits provided by redistributive programs to those affected but they must also improve the selection and monitoring of bureaucrats who implement these government programs. This calls for a deeper understanding of problems of adverse selection, moral hazard and other bureaucratic constraints between bureaucrats and their political principals in redistributive government programs.

Theory

Embedded liberalism emerged in the second half of the twentieth century as a principle to support international integration by enhancing the provision of redistributive benefits through the existence of a welfare state (Ruggie 1982). Accordingly, workers that are negatively affected by international economic competition will oppose trade liberaliza-

[5] In the United States, former president Trump has recently attempted to spread misinformation based on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) response to Hurricane Helene (Fowler 2024). In Europe, the former British prime minister Liz Truss claimed that "power that used to be in the hands of politicians has been moved to quangos and bureaucrats and lawyers so what you find is a democratically elected government actually unable to enact policies" (Smith 2024).

tion unless they expect to be, or are, compensated in proportion to their economic loss. A less appreciated aspect of this social contract is whether these welfare provisions can reach their recipients in an efficient and timely manner. In modern administrative states, the delivery of welfare typically involves setting up a government program and delegating the task of delivery to bureaucrats. However, this delegation can create hurdles for receiving benefits promptly, threatening the economic security of workers laid off due to trade.[6]

Bureaucratic hurdles in government programs could arise due to the lack of resources given to bureaucracies, which yields low capacity of government programs. However, even when the government provides sufficient resources to run government programs, bureaucratic hurdles can still exist due to government-principals lacking full control over individual bureaucratic agents—a standard principal-agent problem. The principal-agent model implies that bureaucratic hurdles in delivering benefits occur due to individual career bureaucrats lacking skills, shirking, or because their outcomes reflect idiosyncratic preferences in regards to their tasks.[7]

The central theoretical claim that we advance is that the system of Embedded Liberalism generates additional information on whether bureaucrats promptly deliver welfare benefits to recipients. Consequently, citizens receiving this information update their beliefs about the capacity of the government to adequately compensate them for their losses incurred by international trade.

An essential premise of our theory is that when citizens observe bureaucratic hurdles in redistributive government programs such as delays and other related outcomes, they blame the government for the outcomes and question it's willingness and ability

[6] Anecdotes on these bureaucratic hurdles abound, ranging from food stamp, unemployment benefits, and other. As a scholarly examination, Autor et al. (2017) find that longer processing times has a long-term negative impact on the employment and earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) applicants for multiple years following application.

[7] These idiosyncratic preferences can reflect, but are not limited to, their political ideology, skill, rent-seeking incentives, strength of other-regarding preferences, among others (Besley 2006). To see the most recent literature review on this topic, see Pepinsky, H. Pierskalla, and Sacks (2017).

to provide material compensation to those requesting it. This voter-inference problem has been discussed extensively in the blame attribution literature. While some studies suggest that politicians can successfully shift blame to bureaucrats by delegating tasks to them (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1982, 1989; Arnold 1990; Schoenbrod 1990), more recent literature indicates that voters would hold politicians accountable for bureaucratic outcomes under certain conditions (Fox and Jordan 2011; Almendares 2012; Foarta 2023; Slough 2024): While voters cannot perfectly distinguish the share of inputs by politicians and bureaucrats, they are aware that bureaucratic outcomes could be affected by the capacity of politicians to monitor and discipline bureaucrats. Thus, it might be rational for voters to attribute some blame to politicians when they observe bureaucratic outcomes adversely affecting them.[8]

The second premise of our theory is that for citizens to update their beliefs on international integration based on how the bureaucracy performs, citizens must obtain such information. This raises the question of how citizens become aware of bureaucrats' performance. Generally, a substantial number of citizens do not directly observe bureaucratic hurdles in government programs unless they directly apply to them. Thus, direct observations—which are commonly studied informational mechanisms for mass layoffs in local areas (Bisbee 2024)—might not be the primary means by which citizens acquire such information. Furthermore, while local news media can give cues to voters (Jonston, Feldman, and Knight 1986; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Guisinger 2017), it is questionable whether they would pay more attention to bureaucratic hurdles in government programs that other more salient issues.[9] Thus, We argue that organized interests representing the

[8]Other related studies have discussed how citizens could infer the government's capacity or intention based on events that are fully out of government control (Ashworth, Mesquita, and Friedenberg 2018; Balcazar and Kennard 2024). According to these studies, even if bureaucratic hurdles occur solely due to bureaucrats' actions that are fully out of politicians' control, if the government cannot address bureaucratic hurdles that citizens experience ex-post, it is also rational for citizens to question the feasibility of redistributive schemes that the government promises.

[9]Using the database from the Global Database of Events, Language and Tone (GDELT) from 2009 to 2023, available at https://www.gdeltproject.org, we find that the major TV stations—MSNBC, Fox News, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera America—devoted 250 times more coverage to the topic of lay-offs than to the TAA program.

interests of beneficiaries of government programs, such as labor unions, are crucial for the dissemination of information on bureaucratic hurdles to citizens. This argument is in line with the existing scholarship that treats organized interests as a "fire-alarm" mechanism (e.g., McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Hall and Miler 2008).

In the context of international integration, labor unions have been a key interest group providing the information related to trade policies and welfare policies to their members, substantively shaping their policy preferences and levels of political activism (Alquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014; Kim and Margalit 2017). Notably, Kim and Margalit (2017) finds that the sudden U-turn in the United Auto Workers stance toward a trade liberalization agreement with Korea had a significant impact on their union members' attitudes on the issue. Therefore, we expect that when local residents experience bureaucratic hurdles in redistribute government programs, local labor unions, whose members are potential beneficiaries of the programs, are more likely to inform their members about the incident. Therefore, labor union members would become more skeptical towards the government's ability to protect them from negative consequences of trade liberalization than non-union members.

Given the declining number of labor union members in recent decades, some might question whether bureaucratic implementation on redistributive programs could serve as a substantial constraint on Embedded Liberalism.[10] However, such perspective does not consider the role of labor unions as powerful organizations that influence government policy, in addition to their role as information distributor both within and beyond the union: Historically and also contemporaneously, local labor unions have been strong organized interests that influence local policy outcomes in favor of less well-off constituents (Becher, Stegmueller, and Kppner 2018; Becher and Stegmueller 2021). For example, labor unions formed a coalition to block trade liberalization agreements and

[10] According to the PEW Research Center, the share of U.S. workers who belong to labor unions has dropped to 10% in 2023 from 20.1% in 1983. See, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/03/12/majorities-of-adults-see-decline-of-union-membership-as-bad-for-the-us-and-working-people/.

have often succeeded in achieving their goals, as demonstrated by the failure of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2015 (DePillis 2015).

We argue that the information on bureaucratic hurdles is crucial for citizens to update their beliefs regarding the government's ability to uphold the system of Embedded Liberalism. However, some workers might be less receptive to new information if they already have strong prior beliefs against redistribution, or strongly support economic nationalism at the baseline. Since these factors would attenuate the overall effect of bureaucratic delays conditional on union status, if our estimates are statistically significant, this evidence would lend support to our informational rationale.

Which Policy Preferences Get Activated?

As we claim above, bureaucratic hurdles associated with the provision of redistributive benefits cause citizens to lose their faith in principles underpinning Embedded Liberalism and, thus, trade liberalization. At its most basic level, opposing trade liberalization implies opposing the free movements of goods and services, and supporting trade barriers and other similar protectionist barriers. At a broader level, individuals' attitudes on trade liberalization are intricately tied to their perspectives on international integration and community (Erskine 2002; Held 2003; Van Den Anker 2010; Gaikwad, Hanson, and Tóth 2024).

International integration encompasses the promotion of universal moral standards, establishing global political structures, and/or developing a platform for mutual cultural expression and tolerance promoting cooperation. Therefore, individuals from varying locations enter relationships of mutual respect despite their differing religious or political beliefs, both domestically and across borders. This implies that citizens from a more globally-integrated country should have more acceptance of otherness and tolerance for different "out-groups," promoting a single moral realm in which each person is equally worthy of respect and consideration through both local and international institutions.

In liberal societies individuals should perceive themselves to be incidentally being members of the political system they belong to and embrace international integration. In contrast, individuals in nativist and isolationist societies oppose this. Such close ties between trade liberalization and international integration, broadly conceived, have been observed in nationalist movements—such as far-right parties—which exhibit popular ideas opposing trade liberalization and seeking to unravel international integration and cooperation. Indeed, scholars have documented that increasing import competition has coincided with increased support for far-right parties across the developed world, as well as lower support international organizations and trade agreements (Walter 2021; Colantone, Ottaviano, and Stanig 2022).

In addition to activating individuals' attitudes on international integration, bureaucratic hurdles on implementing Embedded Liberalism can also reduce individuals' support for redistribution. This is inevitable, as when bureuaucratic hurdles in government redistributive programs unfold, citizens would lose faith in the capacity of the government to adequately redistribute. Moreover, if fiscal resources are seen as a scarce resource, then citizens' support for redistribution should decrease in response to poorly functioning compensation schemes, as they expect a lower marginal benefit from redistributive policies.[11] Therefore, we conjecture that as a result of higher bureaucratic hurdles in redistributive programs, workers will: i) prefer weaker redistributive schemes, ii) display stronger nativist preferences, and iii) oppose internationalism.

Case Study: The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)

To test our theory, we focus on the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in the United States. Proposed by President Kennedy in 1962, the TAA provides benefits to workers who are laid off due to trade. To receive benefits provided by the program, a group of workers must submit a petition to the Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance

[11] This is a standard precept in the study of redistribution (Persson and Tabellini 2002).

(OTAA)—a federal agency under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Employment and Training Administration (ETA).

According to the DOL website, the OTAA consists of one administrator and 20-30 investigators who are career bureaucrats. Each petition is assigned to an investigator who is responsible for determining whether the petition meets the TAA eligibility criteria. Furthermore, correspondence with TAA officials reveals that "TAA cases are assigned [to investigators] primarily based on investigator caseload, as well as previous experience with a company or industry. Staff leave or other scheduling issues can be a factor as well" (Hyman 2018). Each investigator is responsible for approving or denying petitions assigned to them. To do so, they collect all necessary information by contacting petitioners, unions, customers of the workers' firm, etc. They also follow detailed guidelines and steps mandated by the DOL.[12]

This demonstrates that investigators bear the burden of providing evidence for (or against) workers' eligibility for the program. Workers and companies only need to provide their names, addresses, and phone numbers on their petition forms.[13] These petition forms could be obtained online, or from the DOL, local State Employment Security Agency and any agency designated by the governor to provide reemployment services under the TAA program. Moreover, any group of at least three workers—in addition to unions or authorized state agency representatives—is eligible to submit petitions, which reduces the burden on laid-off workers.

The efficient functioning of the OTAA is essential to assist workers in need. Nonetheless, TAA investigators in charge are often overdue in providing determinations on petitions, with the processing time easily exceeding the statutory limit of 40 days, to even a year or more. Figure 1 shows the distribution of TAA petition processing time and the number of TAA petitions that were investigated in a given year. The figure suggests that

[12]See, https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2020/06/trade-adjustment-assistance-petitions-what-businesses-need-to-know-cv19-lf.

[13]See the form provided by the State of California, for example: https://edd.ca.gov/siteassets/files/pdf_pub_ctr/de8309.pdf.

TAA processing time frequently gets delayed more than 40 days. Moreover, the number of TAA petitions and TAA petition processing time appear to be weakly correlated, suggesting that delays in processing times are not driven by the sheer number of TAA petitions submitted to the agency.

Figure 1: TAA Processing Time (Left Axis, Lines) and the Number of TAA Petitions (Right Axis, Bar Plots), 1975-2019



Source: The TAA petition data obtained from the Department of Labor website.

These delays are, to some extent, attributable to administrative procedures that make petition processing depend heavily on individual investigators. The TAA procedure mandates that investigators, not petitioners, collect all the necessary information relevant to the qualification of petitions. Consequently, even small delays in collecting information from third parties could result in unexpectedly long waiting times for petition determination. Moreover, given the large number of petitions submitted every year, TAA bureaucrats are responsible for investigating multiple petitions simultaneously, which contributes to petition backlogs. As one labor union leader mentioned, "I don't want to say that people aren't trying, [...] but ... I think they're overwhelmed" (Sun

2012).

Both government agencies and legislators have attempted to shorten the processing time of TAA petitions. DOL employees constantly strive to process petitions within the statutory limit. On its website, the DOL lists calculations of the average waiting times by states. In 2003, under the Bush administration, when the agency succeeded in reducing the processing time for TAA petitions, legislators praised the achievement: "the Department of Labor has reduced its average petition processing time from 107 days in 2002 to 38 days in 2003 ... it is evident that the funds available under TAA are beginning to be administered more effectively." (Grassley 2004). Despite these efforts, it is virtually impossible for politicians to fully control the TAA's processing time.

Bureaucratic delays in determining TAA petitions impose additional economic burdens on losers from trade liberalization. Since unemployment benefits are available beginning 60 days after the petition is submitted, many officials and staff have raised the concern that "the delay in petition approvals ... will mean that some workers will run out of Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRA) benefits before they finish the training" (Wandner 2013).[14] Therefore, TAA delays might leave many workers dissatisfied, generating additional negative perceptions on trade-liberalization.

In this context, local labor unions have played a crucial role in maintaining the TAA program and assisting their members in obtaining benefits. First, labor unions have pressured politicians and federal government officials to improve the implementation of the TAA. For instance, in response to increased import competition in 2007, the AFL-CIO—the biggest union federation in the United States—stated that "America's workers deserve a well-funded, intelligently designed and competently administered dislocated worker adjustment assistance program."[15] Moreover, local labor unions help their members in obtaining TAA benefits, who might not have otherwise received them.[16] For ex-

[14] After the TAA reform act in 2009, TRA benefits are tied to the date of petition approval.

[15] See https://aflcio.org/about/leadership/statements/trade-and-manufacturing-real-change-needed

[16] See the effort by local chapters of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) to assist T-Mobile USA workers in 2012, https://cwa-union.org/news/entry/cwa_gains_taa_benefits_for_workers_laid_o

ample, among 56,777 TAA petitions investigated from 1991 to 2019, about 12% of them were directly submitted by local chapters of labor unions on behalf of laid-off workers.

Give this context, we test two main empirical hypotheses for our theoretical claims. First, conditional on TAA petitions being submitted in local areas, bureaucratic delays in processing these TAA petitions reduce local residents' support for international integration and redistribution. Second, the negative impact of local TAA petition delays is expected to be more pronounced for labor union members residing in the affected local areas.

Data

TAA Bureaucrats' Propensities to Delay Petition Decisions

Our empirical focus is on delays stemming from the idiosyncratic traits of individual bureaucrats assigned to determine the eligibility of TAA petitions. However, the processing time of each petition does not adequately capture delays induced by bureaucrats, as petition-processing delays can be influenced by various political and socioeconomic characteristics of the areas from where petitions are submitted. These factors could also be associated with the policy preferences of local residents, potentially yielding biased estimates of the effect of local TAA bureaucratic delays on outcomes.

To measure TAA investigators' idiosyncratic traits concerning the petition processing time, we obtained data on TAA petitions from the website of the Department of Labor (DOL). This data covers all petitions submitted since 1975 and has detailed information on the principal investigator that was assigned to the petition, the geolocation and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of the factory that submitted the petition, the estimated number of workers included in the petition, and the decision (approval or denial). It also includes the date on which investigators start working on petitions ("institution date") and the date on which the initial decision was made by the agency

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("determination date"). For our estimation, we restrict our attention to 56,777 petitions with the institution date between 1991 to 2016, before COVID-19 occurred.

Table A2 shows that during the period 1991-2016, TAA investigators during each Congress session were responsible for about 137 petitions coming from 26 states and 15 two-digit SIC industries on average. Hence, the assignment of petitions to TAA investigators is not driven by their specific linkage with states or industries.

To estimate investigators' idiosyncratic traits, we estimate the following linear regression model using the petition data:

$$ProcessingTime_{pbtis} = \alpha_b + \delta_t + \tau_i + \phi_s + X_{pbtis} + \epsilon_{pbtis} \quad (1)$$

where p denotes the petition, b the TAA investigator, t the year, i the SIC two-digit industry, s the state. $ProcessingTime_{pbtis}$ is the day difference between the petition's institution date and initial determination date.[17] α_b represents TAA investigator fixed effects, which capture the bureaucrats' propensity to delay petition processing. X_{pbtid} includes the characteristics of the TAA investigator in charge of the petition, the House representative where the petition is submitted,[18] whether the petition has been submitted from swing states or core states of the president, and various pre-treatment sociodemographic and economic characteristics at the congressional district level. δ_t, τ_i and ϕ_s are year, industry and state fixed effects respectively; ϵ_{pbtic} is an idiosyncratic error term.[19] Table A2 provides the description of variables included in the regression model; Table A3 shows the results of the regression model.[20]

[17] From 1991 to 2016, only four percent of petitions have been re-investigated and revised.

[18] Because the petition data does not provide the congressional district information of the petition, we match congressional districts corresponding to TAA petitions based on their zipcode information. Appendix B describes our matching procedure.

[19] Using congressional fixed effects is unjustified since congressional districts go through redistrict every ten year and, thus, we cannot treat congressional districts before and after the redistricting as necessarily being the same.

[20] We additionally made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and DOL to obtain information about investigators' education, pay grade and salary. However, both agencies responded that they do not retain those records.

For the investigator fixed effects to reflect bureaucrats' idiosyncratic traits, the TAA petition assignment should be quasi-random, otherwise the fixed effect estimates might also be correlated with other petition-level characteristics. While the interview with TAA officials by Hyman (2018) lends support to this assumption, we additionally check whether the assignment is quasi-random from the petition data. We show in A1 that although the sociodemographics and political characteristics of districts and petitions are correlated with the processing time of TAA petitions, however including or excluding these variables from the regression model does not change the estimates of α_b. We additionally show in Figures A2 and A3 that including additional congressional district characteristics or legislators' direct contact to the DOL regarding specific TAA petitions do not affect our estimates.[21]

This suggests that while local factors affect petition processing times, they does not affect the estimation of TAA investigator fixed effects due to investigators being quasi-randomly assigned to multiple petitions. Thus, with our procedure, we obtain the estimates of TAA investigator fixed effects for 192 investigators who worked in the TAA program from 1991-2019.

Figure 2(a) shows the distribution of these estimates, which indicates that while most investigators cluster toward the middle of the distribution, there is substantial variation in investigators' traits concerning the petition processing time. One standard deviation of the estimated fixed effects is about 120 days, meaning that if a TAA petition is assigned to an investigator at the 75th percentile of the distribution, it would take 120 more days to process the petition compared to it being assigned to an investigator at the 25th percentile.

Our theory is agnostic regarding the potential sources behind the observed variation—

[21]The reason why we don't include these variables in the main regression model is that the relevant datasets cover only a limited time period. The American Community Survey (ACS) that provides data on congressional district demographics is only available after 2005, and the data on legislators' contact to the DOL regarding TAA petitions is provided only for 2005-2012 Ritchie and You (2019). While we made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the DOL to get the contact data for the rest of the period, the DOL replied that the data is not available due to the termination of the record-retention period.

such as moral hazard or adverse selection, or other factors. For our theory to hold, citizens simply need to dislike bureaucratic delays in delivering redistributive benefits because they generate a negative impact on beneficiaries' welfare, regardless of the underlying motivation for the delays. We nonetheless examine whether TAA investigator fixed effect estimates predict petitions being revised later on, but we find they do not (Table A4).

For our main analyses, we aggregate our investigator fixed-effect estimates at the congressional district×year level. Having congressional districts as the geographical unit of analysis is warranted for our empirical tests insofar as local labor unions actively organize their activities at the congressional district level (e.g., Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018; Becher and Stegmuller 2023). In contrast, the county or zipcode area is too small of a geographical unit: we could easily expect spillovers to neighboring zipcodes or counties that fall within their jurisdiction, violating the stable unit treatment value assumption in our analyses.

To aggregate the measure, first we identify petitions that were investigated in each congressional district in a given year, and the TAA investigator fixed-effect estimate that corresponds to each of these petitions. Then, we calculate the average of investigator fixed-effect estimates weighted by the estimated number of workers in each petition.

Figure 2(b) shows the distribution of this measure for the year 2013. In that year, 370 congressional districts had TAA petition investigated and thus have a measure of TAA bureaucratic delays. The figure shows substantial variation in TAA bureaucratic delays across districts, due to the quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions. Notably, districts with TAA bureaucratic delays above the 75th percentile of the distribution are evenly distributed across 47 states.

Figure 2: Distribution of Estimated TAA Investigator Fixed Effects

(a) Individual Investigator Level (N=192)



(b) Congressional District×Year Level, Year 2013 (N=370)



Notes: Congressional districts colored as white do not have petitions investigated in the year 2013 and, thus, TAA bureaucratic delays cannot be measured.

Dependent Variables: Individuals' Attitudes

To measure individuals' attitudes, we use the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) surveys (https://cces.gov.harvard.edu) from 2006 to 2016. The CCES is a

national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov involving more than 50,000 respondents each year. The advantages of using the CCES surveys is that it includes common questionnaires that allows us to track individuals' attitudes over a long time span and that it also provides detailed information on individuals' characteristics, such as union membership and education, that we can use for analysis.

Among the common questionnaires that the CCES uses, we focus on the list of questionnaires related to individuals' support for redistribution and involvement in international affairs. We present the list in Appendix C. We construct indices of individuals' attitudes on these three policies by estimating the first component after Principal Component Analysis.[22] In addition to the indices on redistribution and international involvement, we create an index of individuals' attitudes on domestic rights. We expect that individuals' attitudes on domestic rights such as abortion, gay marriage, or affirmative action concern individuals' perceptions on in-groups and out-groups within their nation and, therefore, are less likely to be activated by TAA delay shocks that can generate conflicting perceptions on their nation (in-group) and foreign countries (out-group).

One limitation of the CCES surveys is that they don't have questions on individuals' preference on trade policies.[23] On the other hand, the CCES has the information on congressional districts that allows us to match each respondent with our congressional district-level measure on TAA bureaucratic delays.

[22] Before Principal Component Analyses, we residualize all of the survey responses based on individuals' age, education, race, gender, and zipcode and month fixed effects. These covariates and fixed effects do not affect the residualized variance in our congressional district$\times$year-level measure on TAA bureaucratic delays, nor the residualized covariance between our outcomes and the treatment, as per the Frisch-Vaugh-Lovell theorem. They enable more precise estimate of the effects of TAA bureaucratic delays, following standard clustered standard error formulas.

[23] While the General Social Survey (GSS) provides trade-related questionnaires, the geocoded data from the GGS is only available for a tenured faculty member. Moreover, the GGS does not provide the information on congressional districts where respondents reside. We are currently exploring the American National Election Study (ANES) as an additional data source.

Empirical Strategy

Using individual survey respondent-level data, our regression model specification is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ictl} =& \beta_1 Delays_{ct-1} + \beta_2 Delays_{ct-1} \times UnionMember_i \\ &+ \beta_3 UnionMember_i + \alpha_l + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ictl} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where i denotes survey respondent, c congressional district, t year, and l House representative. Y_{ict} is the list of dependent variables that capture survey respondents' attitudes; $Delays_{ct-1}$ is one-year lagged measure on the congressional district×year-level TAA bureaucratic delays; $UnionMember_i$ is one if the respondent is or was a member of any labor unions, zero otherwise.[24] $UnionMember_i$ is our moderator.[25] We standardize both our independent and dependent variables to better interpret our results and compare the effect size across dependent variables with different scales. Our standard errors are clustered at the level of the House representative.

We do not include any congressional district×year-level covariates, such as demographics and socioeconomic conditions, because doing so does not change our estimates. As we discussed and showed in Figure A2 and A3, these congressional district-level sociodemographics and other characteristics do not affect the estimates of TAA investigator fixed effects.

Our identification strategy rests on the quasi-random assignment of TAA petitions. β_1 denotes a one-year lagged effect of TAA bureaucratic delays for non-union members conditional on petition being submitted, and $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ denotes a one-year lagged effect on union members.[26] For our theoretical claims to hold, both β_2 and $\beta_1 + \beta_2$ should be

[24] Given that there are very few individuals who were previously union members, coding them as 0 does not change the results.

[25] We find that $Delays_{ct-1}$ does not affect $UnionMember_i$ hence union status is unlikely to be post-treatment.

[26] The CCES annual surveys typically take place on the November of each year. Almost all petitions that are submitted in the previous year have their decisions made before the CCES survey date.

negative.

We are agnostic about the direction of β_1. This is because, while our theory emphasized the role of organized interests in distributing information on bureaucratic performance, we cannot empirically track survey respondents' affiliations with all organized interests relevant to trade policy issues. On the one hand, β_1 can be closer to zero if local-labor-unions is the sole mechanism through which the information on TAA bureaucratic delays might reach citizens. On the other hand, the presence of other interest groups (e.g., trade associations) that amplify or counter labor unions' information transmission might lead β_1 to be either more negative or positive, respectively.

One limitation of our model specification is that we cannot construct our binary indicator of union membership based on whether the respondent is specifically a member of manufacturing or commercial service unions, which are most relevant within the context herein. While the CCES provides the information about respondents' industry affiliation, they are available only for the years 2006, 2007, 2011-2014, and 2016. If we account for this measurement error, our estimates would be a lower bound of the true effect of TAA bureaucratic delays on labor union members' attitudes because we're pooling union members with high treatment uptake (receiving the information about TAA bureaucratic delays) with those with low or no treatment uptake.

Results

Delays Erode Support for Redistribution and Internationalism

Table 1 shows that TAA bureaucratic delays have a significant impact on union members' support for redistribution and involvement in international affairs. Substantively, a one-standard deviation increase in TAA bureaucratic delays — or about seventy days— reduces labor union members' support for redistribution by one percentage point, and reduces union members' support for international integration by 3.5 percentage points. Given that the absolute magnitude of standardized regression coefficients ranges from 0

to 1, the effect size is modestly small. However, our estimates are likely a lower bound of the true effect on labor union members because we might be including member of unions less relevant to trade policies; including members who may not be strongly affected by our treatment can bias our estimates toward zero due to lower treatment uptake. Despite this, we still observe effects consistent with our theoretical expectations.

Furthermore, note that seventy days might not be a substantial delay: one standard of the distribution of petition-level bureaucratic delays from 2006 to 2016 is approximately 130 days. For long 130-day delays, support for redistribution can fall by almost $1.16 \times 130/70 = 2.1$ percentage points, and support for internationalism by $3.5 \times 130/70 = 6.5$ percentage points.

Across all specifications, TAA bureaucratic delays do not significantly affect non-union members' attitudes. Further, consistent with our expectations, column (3) shows that TAA bureaucratic delays have little effect on individuals' support on domestic right issues. We report in Tables E1, E2, and E3 similar effects for the components of the index.

In Appendix D, we find that our results would be robust to the presence of unobservable confounders as strong as our control variables—including sociodemographics, political and economic characteristics—via sensitivity analysis, and that our results are not driven by any given congressional district.

We additionally test whether the effects of TAA bureaucratic delays are moderated by whether petitions are approved or denied. To do so, we split petitions into those that are approved and denied, and calculate the congressional district$\times$year-level measure of TAA bureaucratic delays separately for each group of petitions. We then run the same regression models with the same set of outcome variables. Table 2 shows that citizens are likely to react to delays in delivering redistributive benefits even though these benefits eventually reach laid-off workers in their localities.

Table 1: Effect of TAA Bureaucratic Delays on Individuals' Attitudes

	Dependent Variables:		
	Redistribution	***Internationalism***	***Domestic Rights***
	(1)	(2)	(3)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays	-0.0001	0.0092*	-0.0014
	(0.0042)	(0.0049)	(0.0041)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays x Union Member	-0.0115**	-0.0442***	0.0034
	(0.0056)	(0.0069)	(0.0059)
Linear Combination of Coefficients:			
Effect for union members	-0.0116**	-0.0350***	0.0019
	(0.0053)	(0.0068)	(0.0061)
Observations	206836	264142	234106
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R2	0.0207	0.0024	0.0283

Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Table 2: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Petition Approval

	Dependent Variables:					
	Redistribution		***Internationalism***		***Domestic Rights***	
	Approved	Denied	Approved	Denied	Approved	Denied
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bureaucratic Delays	0.0027	-0.0040	0.0109**	0.0122**	0.0019	-0.0055
	(0.0044)	(0.0056)	(0.0049)	(0.0062)	(0.0041)	(0.0051)
Bureaucratic Delays x Union Member	-0.0106*	-0.0131*	-0.0446***	-0.0343***	0.0038	-0.0044
	(0.0060)	(0.0077)	(0.0068)	(0.0082)	(0.0057)	(0.0072)
Linear Combination of Coefficients:						
Effect for union members	-0.0078	-0.0172**	-0.0337***	-0.0222***	0.0057	-0.0099
	(0.0057)	(0.0075)	(0.0066)	(0.0083)	(0.0055)	(0.0078)
Observations	196105	114314	250102	145444	224091	129727
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R2	0.0201	0.0249	0.0244	0.0024	0.0284	0.0279

Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Heterogenous Effects of Delays

While we find heterogeneous effects by union membership, this heterogeneity could be driven by individuals characteristics associated with their selection into union membership, such as education, employment status and race. To check whether this is the case, we estimate triple interaction models by adding these three variables into the regression model (2), respectively. Figures E1, E2 and E3 show the result of these triple interaction models. The results show that even after taking account of individuals' employment status, education levels and race, we observe stronger negative effects of TAA bureaucratic delays on labor union members' support for both redistribution and international involvement.

We also check whether having a union member in the household also moderates the impact of TAA bureaucratic delays. We do so by including a binary indicator, in a triple-interaction-effect setting, for whether survey respondents have family members in their households who were or are labor union members. Figure E4 shows that having a union member in the household could also affect individuals' attitudes on redistribution and international involvement, independent of whether respondents themselves are union members or not.

Our theory hinges on the capacity of organized interests to disseminate information on bureaucratic performance. In the context of the TAA, stronger local unions would be more capable of distributing information on TAA bureaucratic delays, amplifying their effect on individuals' attitudes. To examine heterogeneity by labor union strength, we use the data on collective bargaining mediation provided by the U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service from fiscal years 2005 to 2016.[27] We assume that the frequency of these notices occurs proxies for the strength of labor unions, as stronger labor unions

[27]Collective bargaining agreements empower labor union members by setting up working salaries, working conditions, benefits, and other aspects of workers' compensation and rights for workers. Employers and labor unions are required by law to collectively bargain a contract before it terminates. If the parties involved do not reach an agreement, unions and employers most notify the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) about the dispute.

are more likely to have higher bargaining capacity.

Using the data on collective bargaining mediation, we construct congressional district ×year-level measure of local labor union strength. We explain our variable construction procedure in Appendix G. We validate our measure by comparing it with the establishment of statewide right-to-work laws, and the number of union members and union concentration at the congressional district×year level measures compiled by Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner (2018) for years 2005-2012. The results are reported in Table G1. We observe lower values for this measure in right-to-work states, as expected; our measure is also positively correlated with the number of labor union members and negatively correlated with union concentration.[28] Moreover, CCES respondents are more likely to be union members where our measure is higher.

We run triple interaction models by adding a categorical variable that represents four quartiles of our labor union strength measure to the regression model (2).[29] Figure 3 shows the results of the triple interaction models. Figure 3(a) suggest that in congressional districts where local labor union strength is high, we observe a larger negative effect of TAA bureaucratic delays on labor union members' support on redistribution. In Figure 3(b) we observe similar effects for union members' support for international involvement, although the difference in the effects across districts with varying degrees of labor union strength is small.

In Appendix I, we show that a measure on local import competition has similar moderating effects; however, heterogeneous effects by local labor union strength are robust to controlling for this measure. All in all, the results suggest that the effect of TAA bureaucratic delays on individuals' attitudes would be more pronounced in congressional districts with stronger labor unions.

[28] Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner (2018) argue that lower union concentration leads to the weaker influence of labor unions on legislators' policy choices.

[29] We create quartiles based on the distribution of labor union strength measure in each year. Triple interaction with categorical variable allows us to estimate the effect of TAA delays for each given categorical value without imposing linear effects on the related joint hypotheses given values of the moderator.

Figure 3: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Local Labor Union Strength

(a) Redistribution Index



(b) Internationalism Index



(c) Domestic Rights Index



Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Delays Activate Blame Attribution and Protectionist Backlash

Our theory suggests that, as bureaucratic delays cause citizens to lose faith in the government's capacity to protect them from negative impacts of international integration, these delays are likely to make citizens disapprove of the incumbent politician in charge of running the redistributive government programs. Since the TAA is a federal govern-

ment program, we expect the effects to be particularly stronger for the president who is in charge of managing federal government employees. Voters' approval ratings for senators and House representatives could also be affected by TAA bureaucratic delays that occur in their districts, since they often contact the DOL concerning TAA petitions (Ritchie and You 2019). In contrast, we expect rational and well-informed voters to not attribute responsibility to state-level politicians for TAA bureaucratic delays.

To measure individuals' disapproval ratings of incumbent politicians, we use survey questions in the CCES data that measures the extent to which individuals disapprove the incumbent president, senators, the House representative, and their governor.[30] We then use these disapproval measures as outcome variables. Table 3 shows the results.

The results indicate that TAA bureaucratic delays indeed increase labor union members' disapproval ratings of the president. While the results also indicate that non-union and union members respond differently to TAA delays regarding senators, the effect on union members' disapproval is not statistically significant.

Overall, these results suggest that labor union members who receive information on TAA bureaucratic delays attribute blame to the incumbent politician who is in charge of running the federal government. Hence, we find evidence for rational blame attribution in the context herein.

Another relevant question to our theory is whether TAA bureaucratic delays lead voters to support politicians who advocate for protectionist trade policies. In the United States, Trump notably brought an economic-nationalist agenda to the forefront of his 2016 campaign rhetoric. Following the approach of Ritchie and You (2021), we examine in Appendix H whether TAA bureaucratic delays at the county level led to a higher vote share for then-presidential-candidate Donald Trump. We use the data on county-level presidential vote return because most boundary changes for counties across decades are minor relative to congressional districts. Table H1 shows that a one within-unit

[30]The information about the questionnaires and responses is available in Appendix F1.

Table 3: TAA Bureaucratic Delays and Disapproval of Incumbent Politicians

	Dependent Variables: Disapproval Rating			
	the President	Senators	House representative	the Governor
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays	-0.0136*	-0.0032	0.0022	-0.0043
	(0.0074)	(0.0042)	(0.0049)	(0.0073)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays x Union Member	0.0547***	0.0098**	0.0054	-0.0023
	(0.0063)	(0.0044)	(0.0053)	(0.0055)
Linear Combination of Coefficients:				
Effect for union members	0.0411***	0.0066	0.0076	-0.0066
	(0.0084)	(0.0051)	(0.0059)	(0.0084)
Observations	302990	250552	249279	284802
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R2	0.0306	0.0395	0.0276	0.0512

Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

standard deviation increase in TAA bureaucratic delays at the county level (about thirty days) led to about a 0.4 percentage point increase in the Republican vote share in the 2016 presidential election. The results indicate that TAA bureaucratic delays could lead voters to choose politicians who advocate for anti-globalization policies.

Discussion

We propose an informational theory explaining how bureaucratic delays in redistributive programs can undermine international integration. In the context of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in the United States, we observe that delays in processing TAA petitions negatively affect a broad range of individuals' attitudes toward redistribution and support for international involvement. Furthermore, we focus on labor unions as key distributors of information about these delays, finding that union

members—who are more likely to be informed about delays—are the primary drivers of our results.

Our findings speak to the ongoing debate on the impact of labor union memberships on shaping members' beliefs and attitudes. For instance, although recent evidence casts doubt on unions' role in shaping their members political preferences (e.g., Yan 2024), our findings align with another recent stream of scholarship showing that belonging to a union leads to a gradual process of shaping its the attitudes and behavior of some of its members (e.g., Hadziabdic and Baccaro 2020; Frymer and Grumbach 2021; Hertel-Fernandez 2024). Specifically, we demonstrate that self-selection into unions by more informed or politically oriented individuals is unlikely to account for our results. Thus, our results echo calls for further analysis on the role of self-selection into unions and the effects of unionization on sociopolitical outcomes (Kaplan and Naidu 2024).

Although our paper examines bureaucratic delays that occur in the TAA program in the United States, the scope of our theory is broad enough to apply to other redistributive programs and consider other interest groups besides unions. For instance, scholars have documented that other transfer programs, such as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), implicitly provide insurance to U.S. workers who are against international trade shocks (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013). Similarly, other countries have comparable redistributive programs that are worth analyzing. It is also relevant to examine how other groups—such as far-right parties and politicians—use the information on bureaucratic performance to mobilize their political supporters and further undermine these programs. While these endeavors are outside of the scope of our paper, we believe this research agenda deserves further exploration given the central role that redistribution plays in sustaining international integration.

Lastly, we acknowledge that other types of bureaucratic hurdles, such as red tape, corruption and poor targeting, among other, could exist besides delays. While all these bureaucratic constraints deserve further investigation within the context of compensat-

ing the losers of free trade, our focus on bureaucratic delays represents a first step forward in this regard.

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Online Supplementary Appendix

Table of Contents

A Estimation of TAA Bureaucrats' Propensity

Table A1: The List of Covariates

No	Variable	Mean (SD)	Description
TAA Investigator Chracteristics:			
1	Investigator Load	29.47 (22.62)	The number of other petitions that the investigator is investigating at a time when the investigator being an investigation on the petition
2	Accumulated Years	6.21 (6.62)	The accumulated number of years that the investigator worked in the OTAA
3	Tenured	0.58 (0.49)	1 if the investigator has worked in the OTAA for more than three years; 0 otherwise
House Representative Chracteristics:			
4	African American	0.05 (0.22)	1 if the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted is African American; 0 otherwise
5	Latino	0.04 (0.20)	1 if the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted is Latino; 0 otherwise
6	Power	0.25 (0.43)	1 if the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted is a member of the committee on Appropriations, Rules, or Ways and Means; 0 otherwise
7	DW-Nominate	0.05 (0.41)	1st dimension DW-Nominate score of the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted
8	Democratic Party	0.48 (0.50)	1 if the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted is in the Democratic Party; 0 otherwise
9	Seniority	5.58 (4.25)	Seniority of the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted

10	Freshman	0.15 (0.36)	1 if he House representative of the district where the petition is submitted is freshman; 0 otherwise
11	Majority Party	0.55 (0.49)	1 if the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted is in the majority power; 0 otherwise
12	Committe Chair	0.05 (0.21)	1 if the House representative of the district where the petition is submitted is the committee chair; 0 otherwise
Petition Chracteristics:			
13	Submitted by Workers	0.35 (0.47)	1 if the petition is submitted by workers; 0 if the petition has been submitted by state agencies, companies or labor unions
14	Submitted by Unions	0.12 (0.32)	1 if the petition is submitted by labor unions; 0 otherwise
15	China Mentioned	0.05 (0.22)	1 if the petition is related to China; 0 otherwise
16	Petition Denied	0.27 (0.44)	1 if the petition is denied; 0 otherwise
17	Estimated Number of Workers	88.14 (222.71)	The estimated number of workers in the petition
State-Level Presidential Support:			
18	Swing State	0.50 (0.49)	1 if the state had the vote share for the incumbent president's party has averaged between 0.45 and 0.55 in the previous three presidential elections; 0 otherwise (Kriner and Reeves 2015)
19	Core State	0.24 (0.24)	1 if the state had the vote share for the incumbent president's party has averaged over 0.55 in the previous three presidential elections; 0 otherwise (Kriner and Reeves 2015)

Table A2: Petition Assignment to TAA Bureaucrats, 1991-2019

	Mean (25th Perc., 75th Perc.)	SD	Min	Max	N
Number of States	25.9 (13, 38)	14.6	1	49	411
Number of Industries	15.2 (1, 26)	12.6	1	39	411
Number of Petitions	136.9 (22, 237.5)	128.7	1	856	411

Note: The unit of observation is TAA investigator×Congress session. Industries are categorized based on two-digit SIC code.

Figure A1: Estimated TAA Investigator Propensity With and Without Petition and House Representative Characteristics



Notes: x-axis denotes estimated TAA investigator propensities including all covariates, and y-axis denotes the estimates excluding variables on petition and House representative characteristics. The adjusted R-squared for the correlation between the two estimates is 0.99.

Figure A2: Estimated TAA Investigator Propensity With and Without Congressional District Demographics



Notes: x-axis denotes estimated TAA investigator propensities including all covariates from 2005-2016, and y-axis denotes the estimates excluding congressional district$\times$year log-transformed variables on total population, White population, Black population, Hispanic population, Asian population, the number of people unemployed, employed in manufacturing, construction, services, wholesale, and retail, the number of total households, households with social security income, supplemental security income, public assistance income, and the level of household median income, using the petition data from 2005-2016. The adjusted R-squared for the correlation between the two estimates is 0.99.

Table A3: Determinants of Delays in Investigating TAA Petitions, 1991-2019

	Dependent Variable: TAA Petition Processing Time	
TAA Investigator Chracteristics:		
Investigator Load	8.19	(20.2)***
Accumulated Years	−11.40	(4.61)**
Tenured	−0.72	(3.24)
House Representative Chracteristics:		
African American	2.96	(1.56)*
Latino	−0.57	(2.04)
Power	0.22	(0.67)
DW-Nominate	−4.22	(2.71)
Democratic Party	−2.88	(1.82)
Seniority	0.11	(0.10)
Freshman	0.50	(1.12)
Majority Party	−1.07	(0.91)
Committee Chair	−0.12	(1.91)
Petition Chracteristics:		
Submitted by Workers	4.36	(1.24)***
Submitted by Unions	6.67	(1.74)***
China Mentioned	−10.04	(1.92)***
Petition Denied	24.17	(3.67)***
Estimated Number of Workers	2.57	(0.33)***
State-Level Presidential Support:		
Swing State	-0.18	(0.97)
Core State	0.27	(1.32)
N	53,467	
Fixed Effects	Y	
Adjusted R^2	0.35	
Mean Outcome	68.6	

Notes: Standard errors clustered by TAA investigator and are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The results suggest that delays are more likely if TAA investigators are in charge of too many petitions in a given time, but less likely as TAA investigators accumulate work experience over time. Second, petition-level characteristics strongly predict TAA petition delays. Specifically, delays are more likely if petitions are of lower quality measured by whether they are submitted by workers but not by companies or unions (Ritchie and You 2019). Moreover, delays are more likely if petitions or have a higher number of workers claiming to be eligible for petitions. On the other hand, delays are not affected by variables related to House representatives and presidential support of where the petition was submitted. It is possible that tenured bureaucrats can respond differently to political influence (Kim 2024). However, we find that interaction terms between TAA investigator's tenure and political variables are not significantly associated with TAA petition delays.

Figure A3: Estimated TAA Investigator Propensity With and Without Legislators' Direct Contact to the DOL Concerning Specific TAA petitions



Notes: x-axis denotes estimated TAA investigator propensities including all covariates from 2005-2012, and y-axis denotes the estimates excluding the variable on the number of legislators' contact to the DOL regarding specific TAA petitions, using the petition data from 2005-2012. The adjusted R-squared for the correlation between the two estimates is 0.99.

Table A4: Effect of TAA Investigator Fixed-Effect Estimates on Petition Revision, 1991-2019

	Dependent Variable: TAA Petition Revision
Investigator Fixed-Effect Estimates	0.0000
	(0.0000)
N	53,481
Fixed Effects	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.03
Mean Outcome	0.04

Notes: Standard errors clustered by TAA investigator and are in parantheses. Year, congressional districts, and SIC two-digit industry fixed effects are included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

B Assigning Congressional Districts to Petitions

We use the zipcode-congressional district crosswalk datasets provided by the Missouri Census Data Center (MCDC) (https://mcdc.missouri.edu/geography/ZIP-resources.html). Table B1 shows how petitions that are investigated during each congress session (year) are matched with the corresponding congressional district. For 56,277 petitions that were investigated from 1991 to 2019, 7,714 petitions had congressional districts unmatched either due to missing zipcode or changes in the zipcode that were not captured by the MCDC data. For these unmatched petitions, we alternatively used their city information and used MCDC's city-congressional district crosswalk files. As a result, only 2,804 petitions had congressional district information unmatched.

Table B1: CMDC Congressional District Crosswalk Data for Congress Session (Year)

Congression Session (Year)	MCDC Data
102nd (1991-1992)	Zipcode (City) 1990 - 102nd Session
103rd (1993-1994), 104th (1995-1996), 105th (1997-1998), 106th (1999-2000), 107th (2001-2002)	Zipcode (City) 1990 - 103rd Session
108th (2003-2004)	Zipcode (City) 2000 - 108th Session
109th (2005-2006)	Zipcode (City) 2000 - 109th Session
110th (2007-2008), 111th (2009-2010), 112th (2011-2012)	Zipcode (City) 2018 - 111th Session
113th (2013-2014)	Zipcode 2018 (City) - 113th Session
114th (2015-2016)	Zipcode (City) 2018 - 114th Session
115th (2017-2018)	Zipcode (City) 2018 - 115th Session
115th (2019-2030)	Zipcode (City) 2018 - 116th Session

C CCES Survey Questionnaires

Table C1: CCES Survey Questionnaires

Description	Question	Options	Value
Redistribution Index			
1. Preference for raising taxes over spending cuts	If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it would have to raise taxes on income or sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending?	All from tax increases All from spending cuts	0 100
2. Preferences for incomes taxes over sales tax	If the state had to raise taxes, which taxes should it increase? Suppose that your state government has to raise some combination of sales taxes and individual income taxes in the coming year. What share of the tax increase should come from increased income taxes and what share from increased sales taxes?	All from sales taxes All from income taxes	0 100
Security Index			
1. Military use for allies	For each of the following reasons, would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops? Please check all that apply: To protect American allies under attack by foreign nations	No Yes	0 1

2. Military use for democracy	For each of the following reasons, would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops? Please check all that apply: To assist the spread of democracy	No Yes	0 1
3. Military use for international laws	For each of the following reasons, would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops? Please check all that apply: To help the United Nations uphold international law	No Yes	0 1
4. Military use to destroy terrorists	For each of the following reasons, would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops? Please check all that apply: To destroy a terrorist camp	No Yes	0 1
5. Military use against genocide	For each of the following reasons, would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops? Please check all that apply: To intervene in a region where there is genocide or a civil war	No Yes	0 1
6. Military use to secure the supply of oil	For each of the following reasons, would you approve of the use of U.S. military troops? Please check all that apply: To ensure the supply of oil	No Yes	0 1

Domestic Rights Index			
1. Support for abortion	(2006, 2007) There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view on this issue?	By law, abortion should never be permitted	0
		The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger	0
		The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established	0
		By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice	1
	(2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view on this issue?	By law, abortion should never be permitted	0
		The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger	0
		The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established	0
		By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice	1

	(2014, 2015, 2016) Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals?: Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice	Oppose/(2014) Against Support/(2014) For	0 1
2. Support for affirmative action	Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities [2008: and to women] in employment and college admissions in order to correct for discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action?	Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support	0 0 1 1
	(2006, 2007) Some people think that if a company has a history of discriminating against blacks when making hiring decisions, then they should be required to have an affirmative action program that gives blacks preference in hiring. What do you think? Should companies that have discriminated against blacks have to have an affirmative action program?	(7) Strongly oppose (6) (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) Strongly support	0 0 0 1 1 1 1
	(2015) Affirmative action programs give preference to specific types of people in employment and college admissions. Do you	Oppose Support	0 1

	support or oppose affirmative action for the following groups or reasons?: For Blacks and Hispanics		
3. Support for gay marriage	Do you support a Constitutional Amendment banning gay marriage?	No Yes	0 1
	(2006, 2007) President Bush recently spoke out in favor of a Constitutional Amendment defining marriage as strictly between a man and a woman. Do you support or oppose a Constitutional amendment banning gay marriage?	Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support	0 0 1 1
Individuals' Characteristics			
Union members	Do you or have you ever belonged to a labor union?	Never have belonged to a labor union Past member Current member (2006: please specify which union):	0 1 1
Union household	Does anyone in your household belong to a labor union?	Never have belonged to a labor union Past member Current member (2006: please specify which union):	0 1 1
	(2008) Are you or a member of your household members of a union?	I am not a union member and no one in my household is a union member I am not a union member but someone else in my household is	0 1

		I am a union member and no one else in my household is in a union	1
		I am a union member and someone else in my household is too	1
Race	What racial or ethnic group best describes you?	White	1
		Black	2
		Hispanic	3
		Asian	4
		Other	5
Education	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	Did not graduate from high school	0
		High school graduate	1
		Some college, but no degree (yet)	1
		2-year college degree	2
		4-year college degree	2
		Post-graduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)	3
Birth year	In what year were you born?		
Employment status	Which of the following best describes your current employment status?	Unemployed	0
		Temporarily laid off	0
		Working part time now	1
		Working full time now	1
		Retired	2
		Permanently disabled	2
		Taking care of home or family	2
		Student	2
	(2006) What is your current employment status?	Unemployed	0
		Temporarily laid off	0

		Working part time now	1
		Working full time now	1
		Retired	2
		Permanently disabled	2
		Taking care of home or family	2
		Student	2
Ideology	Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?	Very liberal	1
		Liberal	2
		Moderate	3
		Conservative	4
		Very conservative	5
	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?	Democrat	1
		Republican	2
		Independent	3
		Other (Specify) [Open]	3
Political interest	Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...?	Hardly at all	0
		Only now and then	0
		Some of the time	0
		Most of the time	1
	(2006, 2007, 2008) How interested are you in politics and current affairs?	Not sure	0
		Not much interested	0
		Somewhat interested	0
		Very much interested	1
Disapproval Ratings			
1. President	Do you approve of the way each is doing their job...:President	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2

		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4
	(2006, 2007) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2
		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4
2. Senate	Do you approve of the way each is doing their job...:Senate	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2
		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4
	(2006, 2007) Do you approve or disapprove of the way [Senator] is handling [his/her] job as U.S. Senator for [State]?	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2
		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4
3. House Representative	Do you approve of the way each is doing their job...:House Representative	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2
		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4
	(2006, 2007) Do you approve or disapprove of the way [Representative] handles [his/her] job as a member of Congress?	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2
		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4
4. Governor	Do you approve of the way each is doing their job...:The Governor of State	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2
		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4
	(2006, 2007) Do you approve or disapprove of the way [Governor] is handling [his/her] job as Governor of [State]?	Strongly approve	1
		Somewhat approve	2
		Somewhat disapprove	3
		Strongly disapprove	4

D Robustness

Three relevant concerns may arise from our empirical design: i) The presence of heterogeneous effects that could bias the results, ii) The possibility that any group of observations is driving the results, and iii) That results are robust to different weighting schemes addressing heterogeneous treatment uptake (*in progress*). I explore these potential issues next:

Sensitivity to unobserved confounding. We check the sensitivity of the estimated results with respect to deviations from the conditional exogeneity assumption; i.e., if there are unobserved variables that affect assignment into treatment and the outcome variable simultaneously that estimated coefficients may not be robust to. We explicitly relax the exogeneity assumption by allowing for a limited amount of correlation between treatment and unobserved components of the outcomes (Imbens 2003). We find that an unobservable confounder that could potentially overturn my main results needs to exhibit a higher partial R^2 vis-á-vis the confounders we already included (Figure AD1), which is unlikely to exist since it would need to have a much stronger effect than import competition— the confounder with the highest partial R^2.

Parameter stability to observations. To further corroborate that our results are driven by few outliers, I carry out a robustness tests wherein I drop on congressional district at a time with replacement (*á la* Jackknife). I find that my treatment indicator is quite stable and statistically significant for each permutation (Figure AD2).

Figure D1: Sensitivity analysis to unobserved confounding

(a) Redistribution index



(b) Internationalism Index



(c) Rights index



Note: 95% confidence intervals, clustered at state level and controlling for family-wise error, in the shaded area.

Figure D2: Parameter stability to excluding one district with replacement

(a) Redistribution index



(b) Internationalism Index



(c) Rights index



Note: 95% confidence intervals, clustered at state level and controlling for family-wise error, in the shaded area.

E Additional Analyses

Table E1: Effect of TAA Bureaucratic Delays on Individuals' Attitudes (Redistribution Index)

	Dependent Variables: Opinions	
	Tax v. cuts	*Inc. v. sales tax*
	(1)	(2)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays	-0.0001	-0.0000
	(0.0009)	(0.0010)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays x union member	-0.0018	-0.0015
	(0.0012)	(0.0014)
Effect for union members	-0.0019	-0.0015
	(0.0013)	(0.0013)
Observations	238021	216225
Demographic controls	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Adjusted R2	0.0213	0.0415

Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Table E2: Effect of TAA Bureaucratic Delays on Individuals' Attitudes (Internationalism Index)

	Dependent Variables: Opinions					
	Protect allies	*Intervene terrorism*	*Spread democracy*	*Uphold int. law*	*Intervene genocide*	*Intervene oil*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays	0.0031**	0.0013	0.0009	0.0019	0.0001	0.0019
	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0014)	(0.0017)	(0.0018)	(0.0014)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays x union member	-0.0119***	-0.0085***	-0.0037**	-0.0102***	-0.0071***	-0.0045**
	(0.0019)	(0.0021)	(0.0018)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0020)
Effect for union members	-0.0088***	-0.0072***	-0.0028	-0.0083***	-0.0070***	-0.0026
	(0.0019)	(0.0020)	(0.0017)	(0.0025)	(0.0023)	(0.0019)
Observations	264141	264141	264141	264141	264141	264141
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R2	0.0033	0.0025	0.0045	0.0040	0.0032	0.0046

Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Table E3: Effect of TAA Bureaucratic Delays on Individuals' Attitudes (Domestic Rights Index)

	Dependent Variables: Opinions		
	Abortion	*Affirmative Action*	*Gay Marriage*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays	0.0005	0.0007	-0.0016
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0030)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays x union member	-0.0023	0.0006	0.0013
	(0.0022)	(0.0024)	(0.0025)
Effect for union members	-0.0018	0.0014	-0.0003
	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0034)
Observations	306126	261355	285173
Demographic controls	Y	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R2	0.0327	0.0089	0.0047

Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Figure E1: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Employment Status



Note: 95% confidence intervals, clustered at the House representative level. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Figure E2: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Education

(a) Redistribution Index



(b) Internationalism Index



(c) Domestic Rights Index



Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Figure E3: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Race

(a) Redistribution Index



(b) Internationalism Index



(c) Domestic Rights Index



Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Figure E4: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Union Household



Note: 95% confidence intervals, clustered at the House representative level.

F Summary Statistics

Table F1: Summary Statistics

	Average	Sd.	Min	Max	N
A. TAA Petition Data					
Congressional District×Year-Level Variables					
TAA Bureaucratic Delays	-0.03	0.95	-2.18	3.66	312996
TAA Bureaucratic Delays (approved)	-0.03	0.96	-2.14	3.59	296248
TAA Bureaucratic Delays (denied)	-0.04	0.95	-2.15	3.40	172461
Estimated workers	478.01	739.38	1	8982	312996
Proportion of Petition Denial	0.21	0.27	0.00	1.00	312996
B. Cooperative congressional election study					
Outcome Variables					
Index of redistribution	0.00	1.13	-3.45	4.24	247600
Index of security	0.00	1.41	-3.62	4.31	317359
Index of rights	0.00	1.07	-3.47	3.37	275623
Opinion on tax v. cuts	0.00	0.24	-0.64	0.86	283782
Opinion on income tax v. sale tax	0.00	0.26	-0.61	0.77	257973
Opinion on abortion	0.00	0.46	-0.93	1.02	369245
Opinion on affirmative act	0.00	0.42	-1.17	0.99	308375
Opinion on gay marriage	0.00	0.49	-0.90	0.82	343904
Opinion on miltary use for allies	0.00	0.43	-1.02	0.63	317359
Opinion on miltary use for democracy	0.00	0.38	-0.53	0.97	317359
Opinion on miltary use for international law	0.00	0.48	-0.87	0.92	317359
Opinion on miltary use against terrorists	0.00	0.45	-1.00	0.79	317359
Opinion on miltary use against genocide	0.00	0.48	-0.73	1.04	317359
Opinion on miltary use for oil	0.00	0.40	-0.51	1.03	317359
Disapproval Rating for the President	0.00	1.15	-2.67	2.74	363571

Disapproval Rating for Senators	0.00	0.87	-1.93	1.91	297186
Disapproval Rating for the House representative	0.00	1.01	-1.65	1.96	296326
Disapproval Rating for the Governor	0.00	1.06	-2.36	1.72	340692
Respondent Characteristics					
Union membership	*0.28*	*0.45*	*0*	*1*	*373237*
Age	*49.92*	*16.15*	*18*	*109*	*374545*
Level of education	*2.53*	*0.74*	*1*	*4*	*374478*
Marital status	*0.61*	*0.49*	*0*	*1*	*373032*
Gender of respondent	*0.47*	*0.50*	*0*	*1*	*374545*
Unemployed	0.07	0.26	0	1	374319
Interest in news	*0.57*	*0.50*	*0*	*1*	*354191*
Political ideology	*3.13*	*1.09*	*1*	*5*	*373205*
Union membership in household	*0.24*	*0.43*	*0*	*1*	*370860*

C. American community survey

Congressional District×Year-Level Variables					
Median income	51186.58	15948.52	13514	120089	373649
Total population	717338.13	68247.88	392934	1061221	373649
Total households	268568.97	28854.00	126039	414804	373649
White population	543500.31	127224.30	77790	918701	373649
Asian population	32145.04	40070.45	1109	402466	373649
Black population	84432.29	95464.95	846	489500	373649
Unemployment rate	27230.18	13046.32	0	74197	373649
Manufacturing employment	35539.93	15839.88	6680	104990	373268
Retail employment	38873.78	6167.45	15719	63439	373268
Services employment	16201.78	3009.84	7325	33937	373268
Wholesale employment	9618.88	3000.67	2983	23944	373268
Construction employment	22144.89	6509.03	5009	66511	373268
Public transfers to households	6900.78	3305.67	1230	34290	373649
Social transfers to households	77883.93	19668.07	27009	182970	373649
Social security transfers to households	12335.66	5142.94	2319	44477	373649

D. Labor Union Strength					
Labor union strength congressional district (continuous CBA)	21.03	32.48	0.00	406.00	374545
Labor union strength congressional district (quartile CBA)	2.47	1.13	1.00	4.00	374545
Statewide Right-to-work law enacted	0.42	0.49	0	1	374545
Union Members in Congressional District (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018)	29142.52	67215.25	5.00	927551.00	294908
Union Concentration of Congressional District (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018)	0.58	0.20	0.14	1.00	294908

G Labor Union Strength Measure

First, for each congressional district in a given year t, we track the total number of collective bargaining mediation reported within that congressional district from fiscal years $t-3$ to $t-1$ by labor unions in manufacturing, construction, support services and waste management, personal services and private organizations, and whole trade industries. We exclude collective bargaining mediation reported by industry sectors such as governments, professional, education services, arts, entertainment and recreation, mining and oil, utilities, transportation and warehousing, retail trade, accommodation and food services, finance and insurance, real estate and rental/leasing, scientific and tech services, and information. Then, we calculate the average annual number of collective bargaining mediation reported during these fiscal years in that district.

To show that this continuous measure adequately captures labor union strength in congressional districts, we examine the correlation of our measure with the establishment of statewide right-to-work laws, congressional district×year-level measures on the number of union members and union concentration compiled by (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018) for years 2005-2012, and a CCES respondent being a union member. Results are reported in Table G1.

Table G1: Correlations Between Congressional District-Level Union Strength Measure and Other Union-Related Variables, 2006-2016

	Dependent Variable:			
	Statewide Right-to-Work Laws	log(The Number of Union Members+1)	Union Concentration	Being a Union Member
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
log(Strong Labor Unions+1)	-0.14***	0.52***	-0.016***	0.006***
	(0.02)	(3967.68)	(0.006)	(0.001)
N	4,874	3,346	3,346	373,237
State Fixed Effects	N	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Adjusted R^2	0.18	0.51	0.31	0.03
Mean Outcome	0.40	9.663	0.56	0.28

Notes: The unit of analysis is congressional districts×year for columns (1), (2), (3) and CCES survey respondent for column (2). Standard errors are clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

H County-Level Analyses on TAA Bureaucratic Delays

We collect data on the presidential vote share for the 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections at the county level. We estimate the following regression model:

$$RepVoteShare_{it} = \beta_1 Delays_{it} + X_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

where i denotes county, and t denotes the presidential election year. We include county and year fixed effects. $Delays_{it}$ represents TAA bureaucratic delays, calculated as the average bureaucrat fixed effect estimates of petitions investigated from year $t-7$ to year t and submited in county i, weighted by the number of workers affected by TAA petitions. X_{it} includes the total number of workers affected by these petitions and the denial rate of the petitions. $RepVoteShare_{it}$ is the county-level vote share for the Republican presidential candidate in a given election. To examine how TAA bureaucratic delays affected the vote share for Trump in 2016, we run our regression model on two separate samples—comparing the 2008 and 2016 elections, and the 2012 and 2016 elections, respectively. We present the results in Table H1.

Table H1: County-Level TAA Bureaucratic Delays and Support for Trump in 2016

	Dependent Variable: Republican Party Vote Share			
	Sample: 2008, 2016 General Elections		Sample: 2012, 2016 General Elections	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TAA Bureaucratic Delays	0.0045**	0.0042**	0.0037*	0.0042**
	(0.0019)	(0.0019)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)
Petition Denial Rate		0.0039***		0.0053***
		(0.0015)		(0.0021)
log(Estimated Workers+1)		-0.0041***		-0.0081***
		(0.0012)		(0.0021)
Mean Outcome	0.5424	0.5424	0.5550	0.5550
Adjusted R^2	0.9070	0.9083	0.9331	0.9350
Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	3164	3164	3375	3375

Notes: Standard errors clustered by county. TAA bureaucratic delays and petition denial rate are standardized for each sample. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and county fixed effects.

I Accounting for Local Import Competition

It is well known that import competition, especially from China, has been an important driver of unemployment in the United States. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that places with high import competition are places where bureaucratic delays regarding the provision of TAA benefits are long, as well as places where workers are more likely to display grievances toward international integration. However, our analysis regarding our estimates of bureaucrat idiosyncrasies in Appendix A shows that this is not a concern.

The problem is that if places with high import competition are also places where unionization is high, then the former is a competing mechanism to the latter. To address this concern we use the standard shift-share measure of the *China Shock* by David Autor and co-authors – which we aggregate to the congressional district level using spatial correspondences – as a moderator, in a similar way as we did with our measure of union strength.

Although we observe in Figure I1 that the effect is visible for union members exposed to high levels of import competition, the correlation between this measure and our measure of union strength is -0.2. We re-run our analysis controlling for import competition as a competing mechanism, and we find that our results are robust: Figure I2 shows that even after accounting for import competition we still observe an effect on preferences for redistribtuion and international intervention where unions are stronger.

Figure I1: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Level of Import Competition

(a) Redistribution Index



(b) Internationalism Index



(c) Domestic Rights Index



Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.

Figure I2: Heterogeneous Effects of TAA Bureaucratic Delays by Local Labor Union Strength (controlling for import competition as competing mechanism)

(a) Redistribution Index



(b) Internationalism Index



(c) Domestic Rights Index



Notes: Standard errors clustered by House representative. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Regressions include year and House representative fixed effects.