

Green Industrial Policy and the Geopolitics of Investment in Critical Minerals and Batteries

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China has a Stranglehold on the Global EV Battery Supply Chain

China's grip on battery supply chain is expected to last through the decade

Share of supply chain (%)

China North America Rest of the world

2023

Cathode



Anode



Electrolyte



Separator



Cell



2030

Cathode



Anode



Electrolyte



Separator



Cell



Source: BloombergNEF

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China has a Stranglehold on the Global EV Battery Supply Chain

Beijing also dominates vast swaths of the critical minerals supply chain

Share of supply chain (%)

China US Chile Australia DRC Indonesia Russia South Africa
Rest of the world

Mining

Copper



Lithium



Cobalt



Graphite



Rare earths



Refining

Copper



Lithium



Cobalt



Graphite



Rare earths



Source: Lazard calculations based on USGS 2022-2023 data, S&P Global Commodity Insights, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, Rystad Energy, and other industry estimates

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Problem: *How can the U.S. incentivize extraction, processing, and production in specific countries outside of its borders?*

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- ▶ **Credibility challenge:** making foreign financial incentives robust to political change.
- ▶ **Distributional challenge:** which countries do and do not qualify for incentives?

The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act

New Clean Vehicle Credit (7500 \$)

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- ▶ Annually rising % of battery manufacturing and assembly in North America (from 50% to 100 % in 2029)

IRA Raised Geopolitical Tensions, Including among U.S. Allies




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
Data

- ▶ 1459 Greenfield FDI project announcements from fDi Markets
- ▶ 1439 "Placebo" projects on non-battery electronic components
- ▶ 736 Cross-border M&A projects from LSEG


Capital Investment in Battery Supply Chain and Critical Minerals 2016-2024, 6-month periods.



New FDI Projects in Battery Supply Chain and Critical Minerals 2016-2024, 6-month periods.



M&A Agreements in Battery Supply Chain and Critical Minerals 2016-2024, 6-month periods.



Note: Counts of M&A activity in automotive batteries, lithium, cobalt, graphite, manganese, and nickel. Data from LSEG. Entries are based on 6-month periods

Effect of FTAs after IRA (Poisson Regressions)

Dependent Variables: Model:	Capital Investment (1)	(2)	Nr of FDI Projects (3)	(4)	M&A Activity (5)	(6)
<i>Variables</i>						
FTA _x IRA	1.263*** (0.3361)	1.148*** (0.3392)	0.4606** (0.2332)	0.4428** (0.2192)	0.5299** (0.2421)	0.4620* (0.2490)
UN Idealpoint		0.7584 (0.8067)		0.3393 (0.3807)		0.3404 (0.5306)
FDI (% of GDP)		0.0089*** (0.0023)		0.0030** (0.0013)		0.0029 (0.0060)
Trade (% of GDP)		0.0089 (0.0143)		0.0124 (0.0087)		-0.0111 (0.0138)
GDP Growth		-0.0817** (0.0389)		0.0122 (0.0205)		0.0162 (0.0298)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>						
Country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Semester	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>						
Observations	1,564	1,488	1,564	1,488	1,060	1,042
Squared Correlation	0.45971	0.49909	0.62165	0.63861	0.93221	0.92960
Pseudo R ²	0.67068	0.67596	0.47542	0.47329	0.68459	0.68668
BIC	540,058.8	521,073.2	3,329.5	3,269.6	1,871.0	1,873.7

- ▶ No evidence of clear pre-trend but effect wanes in second half of 2024
- ▶ Effect applies when control group is non-FTA military allies
- ▶ Effect entirely driven by increases in non-Chinese investments
- ▶ No evidence that Chinese investment has declined in response to IRA

Conclusions

- ▶ The IRA did affect the location of FDI in critical minerals and battery supply chain
- ▶ Affected de jure beneficiaries of IRA (FTA countries) rather than all allies
- ▶ Effect disappeared as doubts over credibility of IRA mounted
- ▶ IRA had no effect on location of Chinese investments