

When Trade Hits Home: Family Exposure and Gendered Political Cleavages

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IPES 2025

Globalization and Welfare Attitudes

- Responses to globalization: open borders vs. welfare compensation

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- IPE models focus on individual characteristics:

factors, industries, firms, occupations, firms, race, gender, etc.

(Rogowski 1987; Scheve & Slaughter 2001; Owen and Johnston 2017; Kim 2017, Lee & Liou 2022, Fordham & Kleinberg 2012; Brutger & Guisinger 2022; Betz et al 2022; Bisbee & Rosendorff 2025)

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- However, CP focus on family ties *between* individuals

(Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Häusermann et al. 2016, Ahlquist et al 2017; Walter, 2010)

Research Question

*How do trade shocks diffuse through **families** to shape preferences for globalization barriers and welfare compensation?*

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Preview answer:

(Ricardo-Viner model)

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
Preview answer:

(Ricardo-Viner model) $\times$ (family production model)


→ **Gendered globalization and welfare attitudes**

Theory


Industry (Ricardo-Viner) Model




Families and Economic Risk-Sharing (becker 1965)



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“Becker Convergence” —assumes complete risk sharing



Adding Gendered Family Structures

Within families: risk & responsibilities NOT shared equally by gender

Pew 2023 Data:

(1) women spend 3 more hours per day on housework & caregiving.

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Adding Gendered Family Structures

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
Pew 2023 Data:

- (1) women spend 3 more hours per day on housework & caregiving.
- (2) women = primary or sole breadwinner in 16% of families;

⇨ in average family:

- men *more* exposed to labor market policies
- women *more* exposed to welfare benefits (childcare, medicare, ect.)

Partial/Gendered Risk Sharing




Empirical Analysis

Data

- **Survey data:** US General Social Survey (1996-2004) descriptive stats
- **DVs:**
 - Support for **border restrictions**
to (i) imports and (ii) immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006)
 - Support for **social welfare programs**
{childcare, healthcare, education, social security, addiction programs} (Pierce & Schott 2020)

Id. Strategy: Δ industry trade exposure across kin members

research design



Exogenous shock in 1994 (source: Flaherty 2023):


- Zapatista rebellion/assassinations → Peso Crisis (supercharges net imports).

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \text{Mexico Shock}_{it}^{\text{own}} + \beta_2 \Delta \text{Mexico Shock}_{it}^{\text{kin}} + \mathbf{X}_{it} \boldsymbol{\delta} + \tau_t + \rho_r + \epsilon_{it}$$


$$\Delta \text{Mexico Shock}_{it} = \frac{\Delta(M - X)_{umit}}{L_{it-1}}$$

- **kin** = average exposure of: (1) partner, (2) father, (3) mother
- **Controls (X)**: College, Party ID, Female, White, Age, Married


Result I: Kin Exposure $\rightarrow$ border protections & welfare




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


Result II: Kin Exposure → Gender bias R + Kin




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- Causal identification tests:
 - ✓ no pre-shock trends pre-trend tests
 - ✓ placebo outcomes: space exploration, defense, foreign aid placebo

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 - ✓ placebo outcomes: space exploration, defense, foreign aid placebo
- Affects behavior[✓]: voting
 - ★ ↑ male populist voting
 - ★ ↓ female turnout

Review

- **Question:** IPE focuses on individuals, what about families?

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- **Main Findings:**

Family exposure →

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- broadens demands to welfare (esp. females)

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- **Main Findings:**

Family exposure →

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- broadens demands to welfare (esp. females)

- **Contributions:**

↪ beyond individuals

↪ helps explain male populist backlash e.g. Clark et al. 2022; Jardina 2019

Appendix

Descriptive Statistics [DV, Treatments](#) [industry exposure](#)

Tables [protectionism](#) [welfare preferences](#) [vote choices](#) [vote turnout](#) [placebo outcomes](#)

Additional Results [results II: R + Kin](#) [voting](#) Robustness Check [placebo plot](#) [risk-sharing](#)
[falsification tests](#) [robustness tests](#)

Descriptive Statistics: DV, Treatments I

Appendix

	n	mean	sd	min	max
<u>Treatment</u>					
Kin Exposure	66966	0.00	0.01	-0.19	0.10
Respondent Exposure	67622	0.00	0.02	-0.28	0.12
Spouse Exposure	67923	0.00	0.01	-0.28	0.12
Father Exposure	67232	0.00	0.02	-0.28	0.12
Mother Exposure	68350	0.00	0.01	-0.28	0.12
<u>Globalization DVs</u>					
Trade Barriers	3828	3.63	1.04	1.00	5.00
Immigration Barriers	2715	3.74	1.03	1.00	5.00
<u>Welfare DVs</u>					
Social Security	48182	2.52	0.61	1.00	3.00
Childcare	26821	2.51	0.63	1.00	3.00
Healthcare	37629	2.60	0.61	1.00	3.00
Education	37859	2.58	0.62	1.00	3.00
Addiction Program	36916	2.54	0.65	1.00	3.00
Unemployment Benefits	5875	3.15	0.93	1.00	5.00

Descriptive Statistics: DV, Treatments II

Appendix


	n	mean	sd	min	max
<u>Placebo DVs</u>					
Defense	36931	1.93	0.75	1.00	3.00
Foreign Aid	36851	1.38	0.61	1.00	3.00
Space Exploration	36381	1.70	0.70	1.00	3.00
Race Inequality	35496	2.18	0.73	1.00	3.00
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Female	68338	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00
College	68185	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
White	68358	0.80	0.40	0.00	1.00
Party ID (Dem to Rep)	67916	2.68	1.97	0.00	6.00
Age	67922	46.25	17.57	18.00	89.00
Married	68316	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00

Respondent, spouse, mother, and father industry exposure Appendix

	R's Exposure	Spouse's Exposure	Father's Exposure	Mother's Exposure
Respondent's Exposure	1.000			
Spouse's Exposure	0.160	1.000		
Father's Exposure	0.077	0.029	1.000	
Mother's Exposure	0.028	0.011	0.064	1.000


Correlations between Respondents' and Kin Exposure to Mexico shock.

Source: GSS 1996 wave. N=2903.




Placebo Outcomes

Appendix




Pre-trend Tests: Globalization Barriers

Appendix




Pre-trend Tests: Welfare

Appendix




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


Electoral Consequences—male backlashes and no left-voting



Electoral Consequences—suppressed female turnout

Appendix



Result I (attitudes): Open Borders (trade, immigration)

Appendix

	Trade Barriers	Immigration Barriers
Mexico Shock (Kin Ave)	0.029** (0.014)	0.059** (0.029)
Mexico Shock (Respondent)	0.050** (0.022)	−0.003 (0.042)
Female	0.107*** (0.037)	0.015 (0.062)
College	−0.461*** (0.044)	−0.370*** (0.073)
White	0.024 (0.049)	0.213** (0.090)
Party ID (Dem. to Rep.)	−0.016* (0.009)	0.039** (0.016)
Age	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.002)
Married	0.088** (0.036)	0.005 (0.064)
Region FE	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	
Observations	3,790	1,299

Vote choice Robustness Appendix

	Perot 1996			Democrats 2000		
	Full Samples	Female	Male	Full Samples	Female	Male
Mexico Shock (Kin Ave)	0.009** (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	0.013 (0.008)	0.002 (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)	−0.001 (0.007)
Mexico Shock (Respondent)	0.011** (0.006)	0.006 (0.009)	0.014* (0.007)	−0.001 (0.006)	−0.006 (0.010)	0.002 (0.007)
Female	−0.012 (0.010)			0.008 (0.011)		
College	−0.051*** (0.011)	−0.046*** (0.015)	−0.054*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.011)	0.069*** (0.016)	0.042*** (0.016)
White	0.119*** (0.010)	0.110*** (0.014)	0.129*** (0.017)	−0.119*** (0.016)	−0.120*** (0.022)	−0.118*** (0.024)
Party ID (Dem. to Rep.)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	−0.162*** (0.002)	−0.159*** (0.003)	−0.164*** (0.003)
Age	−0.002*** (0.0003)	−0.002*** (0.0004)	−0.002*** (0.0005)	0.00003 (0.0003)	−0.0001 (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.0005)
Married	−0.017 (0.010)	−0.013 (0.014)	−0.023 (0.017)	−0.031*** (0.011)	−0.032** (0.015)	−0.032* (0.017)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	4,982	2,824	2,158	5,019	2,852	2,167

Turnout robustness

Appendix

	Perot 1996			Democrats 2000		
	Full Samples	Female	Male	Full Samples	Female	Male
Mexico Shock (Kin Ave)	−0.007 (0.006)	−0.013* (0.007)	0.005 (0.009)	−0.006 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.007)	−0.009 (0.007)
Mexico Shock (Respondent)	−0.023*** (0.006)	−0.032*** (0.010)	−0.016** (0.007)	−0.009 (0.006)	−0.025** (0.011)	−0.003 (0.007)
Female	0.009 (0.012)			0.040*** (0.012)		
College	0.220*** (0.012)	0.209*** (0.017)	0.226*** (0.018)	0.214*** (0.012)	0.207*** (0.016)	0.218*** (0.018)
White	0.039** (0.017)	0.027 (0.022)	0.055** (0.027)	0.031* (0.017)	0.024 (0.023)	0.040 (0.026)
Party ID (Dem. to Rep.)	0.001 (0.003)	−0.008** (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Age	0.007*** (0.0003)	0.007*** (0.0005)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.0004)	0.008*** (0.0005)	0.008*** (0.001)
Married	0.073*** (0.012)	0.055*** (0.016)	0.092*** (0.019)	0.101*** (0.012)	0.098*** (0.016)	0.109*** (0.019)
Region FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	7,469	4,201	3,268	7,659	4,258	3,401

Risk-sharing Mechanism

Appendix

